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The Nigerian Civil War: Causes, Strategies, And Lessons Learnt

The Nigerian Civil War: Causes, Strategies, And Lessons Learnt


CSC 1992

























1. List of Maps.


2. Outline.


3. Introduction.


4. Executive Summary.


5. Background History of Nigeria.


6. History of the Nigerian Army before 1966.


7. The War - Planning Strategies.


8. The Clash of Arms.


9. Lessons Learnt.


10. Conclusion.


11. Bibliography.





1. Map 1 : The four Regions of Nigeria.


2. Map 2 : The twelve states of Nigeria.


3. Map 3 : The liberation of the Mid - Western state.


4. Map 4 : The front line in mid - 1969.


5. Map 5 : The final offensive.








The Nigerian Civil War was fought to reintegrate and reunify


the country. This paper will focus on the causes of the war, strategies


employed by the belligerents in the conflict, and the lessons learnt.


I. Background History of Nigeria


II. History of the Nigerian Army before 1966


III. The War - Planning Strategies


IV. The Clash of Arms


V. Lessons Learnt


VI. Conclusion




The Federation of Nigeria, as it is known today, has never really


been one homogeneous country, for it's widely differing peoples and


tribes. This obvious fact notwithstanding, the former colonial master


decided to keep the country one in order to effectively control her


vital resources for their economic interests. Thus, for administrative


convenience the Northern and Southern Nigeria were amalgamated in 1914.


Thereafter the only thing this people had in common was the name of


their country since each side had different administrative set - up.


This alone was an insufficient basis for true unity. Under normal


circumstances the amagalmation ought to have brought the various peoples


together and provided a firm basis for the arduous task of establishing


closer cultural, social, religious, and linguistic ties vital for true


unity among the people. There was division, hatred, unhealthy rivalry,


and pronounced disparity in development.


The growth of nationalism in the society and the subsequent


emergence of political parties were based on ethnic/tribal rather than


national interests, and therefore had no unifying effect on the peoples


against the colonial master. Rather, it was the people themselves who


were the victims of the political struggles which were supposed to be


aimed at removing foreign domination. At independence Nigeria became a


Federation and remained one country. Soon afterwards the battle to


consolidate the legacy of political and military dominance of a section


of Nigeria over the rest of the Federation began with increased


intensity. It is this struggle that eventually degenerated into coup,


counter coup and a bloody civil war.






The Nigerian Civil War broke out on 6 July 1967. The war was the


culmination of an uneasy peace and stability that had plagued the Nation


from independence in 1960. This situation had its genesis in the


geography, history, culture and demography of Nigeria.


The immediate cause of the civil war itself may be identified as


the coup and the counter coup of 1966 which altered the political


equation and destroyed the fragile trust existing among the major ethnic


groups. As a means of holding the country together in the last result,


the country was divided into twelve states from the original four


regions in May 1967. The former Eastern Region under Lt. Col. Ojukwu saw


the act of the creation of states by decree "without consultation" as


the last straw, and declared the Region an independent state of


"Biafra". The Federal Government in Lagos saw this as an act of


secession and illegal. Several meetings were held to resolve the issue


peacefully without success. To avoid disintegration of the country, the


central government was left with only one choice of bringing back the


Region to the main fold by force.


The Federal side expected a quick victory while the Biafrans saw


the war as that of survival and were ready to fight to the last man.


By August 1967, the war had been extended to the Mid - Western Region by


the Biafrans with the aim to relief pressure on the northern front and


to threaten the Federal Capital, Lagos. Both sides employed Political,


Diplomatic, Psychological and Military strategies to prosecute the war.


By the end of April 1969, after almost two years of bloody and


destructive war, the envisioned quick victory had eluded the Federal


side, the rebel enclave had been drastically reduced in size but the


Biafrans were still holding on. More peace conferences were held but


none achieved a cease - fire and an end to the war. The Federals


embarked on a strategic envelopment of the remaining Biafran enclave. By


the Christmas of 1969, it was obvious that the end of the civil war was




The self - acclaimed Head of State of Biafra, Lt. Col. Ojukwu,


realizing the hopelessness of the situation fled the enclave with his


immediate family members on the 10th of January 1970. The Commander of


the Biafran Army who took over the administration of the remaining


enclave surrendered to the Federal Government on 14th January 1970


bringing an end to the war, secessionist attempt and bloodshed.


Several lessons were learnt from the war and these have helped in


the unification, political, military and economical progress of the






The Nigerian civil war, popularly known all over the world as the


"Biafran War" was fought from 2 July 1967 to 15 January 1970. The war


was between the then Eastern Region of Nigeria and the rest of the


country. The Eastern Region declared itself an independent state which


was regarded as an act of secession by the Federal Military Government


of Nigeria. The war was fought to reunify the country. In order to


understand what led to the civil war, it is necessary to give a brief


background history of Nigeria.





The land mass known today as Nigeria existed as a number of


independent and sometimes hostile national states with linguistic and


cultural differences until 1900. The Governor General of Nigeria between


1920 - 31 , Sir Hugh Clifford, described Nigeria as "a collection of


independent Native States, separated from one another by great


distances, by differences of history and traditions and by ethnological,


racial, tribal, political, social and religious barriers." (Nigeria


Council Debate. Lagos, 1920). The building of Nigeria as a multi -


national state began in 1900 with the creation of Northern and Southern


Protectorates along with the colony of Lagos by the British government.


Further effort at unification and integration was made in May 1906 when


the colony of Lagos and the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, which had


existed separately, were amalgamated to become the Colony and


Protectorate of Southern Nigeria.


Even then the Northern and the Southern Administration were


separate and distinct. Both were independent of one another and each was


directly responsible to the Colonial Office. The first momentous act of


the British in the political evolution of Nigeria as a modern state was


the amalgamation of the administration of the two sections of Nigeria on


1 January 1914 by Lord Lugard. For ease of governing and in the economic


interest of the British, indirect rule and separate development policy


were maintained in the two sections of the country, with the amalgamated


administration based in Lagos. This, in effect produced two Nigerias, each


with different social, political, economic, and cultural backgrounds and


development within the country.


No further constitutional development took place until 1922. The


1922 constitution made provision, for the first time, for elected members


to sit on a Nigerian legislative council, but did not empower them to


make laws for the North. Nigeria was divided into four administrative


units in 1940; the colony of Lagos, the Northern, Eastern and Western


provinces. This administrative divisions, with increased power for the


colony and the provinces, was not only maintained but separateness was


also strengthened and deepened by Sir Arthur Richardson's constitution


of 1946 which inaugurated Nigeria's regionalism. It however achieved a


half - hearted political breakthrough by integrating the North with the


South at the legislative level for the first time.


The post second World War political awareness and upsurge of


nationalism in Africa brought about the Richardson's constitution of


1950. Political parties were formed on regional and ethnic basis.



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The outcome of this was obvious: full scale regionalism. With the


Macpherson's constitution of 1951, a greater measure of autonomy was


granted the regions with stronger regional legislatures. With only


residual power left to the central government, Nigeria politically took


a turn for the worse, and there was a possibility of three countries


emerging out of Nigeria.


In 1953, the central cabinet was split over the acceptance of a


target date for securing self - government with the end result of the


Kano riot. The gap between the regions widened. For the first time the


North talked openly of the possibility of secession rather than endure


what they saw as humiliation and ill - treatment. The West also threatened


to secede over the non - inclusion of Lagos in the West in the new


constitution. The 1954 constitution confirmed and formalized the wishes


of Nigerian leaders to move and remain as far apart as they possibly


could. The choice between Unitary and Federal options in the form of


government had been irrevocably made. The leaders settled for Federal


option. Thereafter things happened fast in the political arena. There


were constitutional conferences in 1957, 1958, 1959 and in 1960


culminating in the granting of independence to Nigeria on October


1, 1960.


It should be noted that from 1954 onwards, the political direction


was constantly away from a strong center towards a formidable, almost


insulation of the regional base of each major political party. The


failure of the Willink commission to recommend the creation of more


states in 1958 for the Nigerian type of federalism planted the most


potent seed of instability into the evolution of Nigeria as a nation in


the 1950s. All the political leaders who had strong and firm political


bases in the regions fought hard for maximum powers for the regions


which weakened the center. At the same time, the ugly embers of


tribalism and sectionalism had been fanned into a deadly flame by all


the political leaders. These leaders rode on the crest of this cancerous


tribalism and ignorance of the people to power, at the expense of


national unity and the nation.


Instead of regionalism ensuring and preserving national unity, it


became its bane. There were diffusion instead of fusion of the three


units. According to Gen. Obasanjo: "The only point on which Nigerian


political leaders spoke with one voice was the granting by the British


of political independence - and even then they did not agree on the


timing." (5:3) With granting of independence in 1960, all the dirt,


swept under the carpet, surfaced. Nigeria was now beset by strings of


political problems which stemmed from the lop-sided nature of the


political divisions of the country and the type of the existing federal


constitution, and the spirit in which it operated.


The first post independence disturbance was over the defense


agreement between Great Britain and Nigeria, which was seen as "an


attempt (by Britain) to swindle Nigeria out of her sovereignty", by


contracting with Nigeria to afford each other such assistance as may be


necessary for mutual defense and to consult together on measures to be


taken jointly or separately to ensure the fullest cooperation between


them for this purpose. It was viewed an unequal treaty. Through student


demonstrations and vehement opposition by the general public and members


of the Federal House of Representatives, the agreement was abrogated in


December 1962.


This episode was nothing compared with later developments in the


country's turbulent political history. The general census conducted in


1962 was alleged to be riddled with malpractices and inflation of


figures of such astronomical proportions that the Eastern Region refused


to accept the result. A second census was carried out in 1963, and even


then the figures were accepted with some reservations. Meanwhile the


people of the Middle Belt area of the North had grown increasingly


intolerant of the NPC rule of the North. The Tiv, one of the major


tribes in the Middle Belt, openly rioted for almost three years


(1962 - 1965). Then came the biggest crisis of them all - the general


election of 1964. The election was alleged to be neither free nor fair.


All devices imaginable were said to have been used by the ruling parties


in the regions to eliminate opponents.


The Chairman of the Electoral Commission himself admitted there


were proven irregularities. The President, Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe refused to


appoint a Prime Minister in the light of these allegations. The


President and the incumbent Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa,


were each seeking the support of the Armed Forces. This marked the first


involvement of the Armed Forces in partisan politics. For four anxious


days, the nation waited until the President announced that he had


appointed the incumbent Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, to


form a broad based government. The same could not be said of the Western


Region election of 1965. The rigging and irregularities in the election


were alleged to be more brazen and more shameful. Law and order broke


down completely leading to an almost complete state of anarchy. Arson


and indiscriminate killings were committed by a private army of thugs of


political parties. Law abiding citizens lived in constant fear of their


lives and properties.


This was the state of affairs when the coup of 15 January 1966 took


place. "As an immediate cause, it might be claimed that the explosion of


that day could be traced back along the powder trail to the fuse lit at


the time of the Western Region election of October 1965." (5:6) The


aim of the coup was to establish a strong, unified and prosperous


nation, free from corruption and internal strife. The outcome of the


half-hearted and ill-fated coup was a change of political balance in the


country. Major Nzeogwu's (the leader of the coup) aims for the coup was


not borne out of its method, style and results. All the politicians and


senior military officers killed were from the North and Western Region


except a political leader and a senior Army officer from the Mid - West


and the East respectively.


The coup hastened the collapse of Nigeria. "The Federation was sick


at birth and by January 1966, the sick, bedridden babe


collapsed." (1:210) From independence to January 1966, the country had


been in a serious turmoil; but the coup put her in an even greater


situation. Most of the coup planners were of Eastern origin, thus the


Northerners in particular saw it as a deliberate plan to eliminate the


political heavy weights in the North in order to pave way for the


Easterners to take over the leadership role from them. The sky high


praises of the coup and apparent relief given by it in the south came to


a sudden end when the succeeding Military Government of


Maj Gen. J.T.U. Aguiyi Ironsi, an Easterner, unfolded its plans. If


Ironsi had displayed a greater sensitivity to the thinking of the


Northerners, he could have capitalized on the relief that immediately


followed the coup.


But in addition to his failure to take advantage of the


initial favorable reaction to the coup, he did not know what to do


with the ring leaders who had been arrested. He did not know whether to


treat them as heroes of the revolution or send them before a court


martial as mutineers and murderers. Military Governors were appointed to


oversee the administration of the regions. In the North the numbed


favorable reaction in certain quarters turned to studied silence and a


"wait and see" attitude. This gradually changed to resentment,


culminating in the May 1966 riots throughout the North during which most


Easterners residing in the North were attacked and killed.


A counter coup was staged by the Northern military officers on 29


July 1966 with two aims: revenge on the East, and a break up of the


country. But the wise counsel of dedicated Nigerians, interested and


well-disposed foreigners prevailed. The Head of State, Maj. Gen Aguiyi


Ironsi and many other senior officers of Eastern origin were killed.


After three anxious days of fear, doubts and non-government,


Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon, at the time the most senior officer of Northern


origin and then the Chief of Staff, Nigerian Army, emerged as the new


Nigerian political leader. The lack of planning and the revengeful


intentions of the second coup manifested itself in the chaos, confusion


and the scale of unnecessary killings of the Easterners throughout the


country. Even the authors of the coup could not stem the general


lawlessness and disorder, the senseless looting and killing which spread


through the North like wild fire on 29 September 1966.


Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon, the then Head of State, in a broadcast to


the people of the North in September said; "I receive complaints daily


that up till now Easterners living in the North are being killed and


molested and their property looted. It appears that it is going beyond


reason and is now at a point of recklessness and


irresponsibility." (3:9) Before then, in an effort to stop the killings


and to preserve the nation in one form or the other, an ad hoc conference


of the representatives of the regions was called on 9 August 1966 in


Lagos. The meeting made the following recommendations:



1. Immediate steps should be taken to post military

personnel to barracks within their respective regions of origin.


2. A meeting of this committee or an enlarged body should

take place to recommend in a broad outline the form of political

association which the country should adopt in the future


3. Immediate steps should be taken to nullify or modify any

provisions of any decree which assumes extreme centralization.


4. The Supreme Commander should make conditions suitable for

a meeting of the Supreme Military Council urgently as a further means of

lowering tension.



The first recommendation was implemented on 13 August 1966. Troops


of Eastern Nigeria origin serving elsewhere in the country were


officially and formally released and posted to Enugu, the capital of


Eastern Region, while troops of non-Eastern origin in Enugu moved to


Kaduna and Lagos. This marked the beginning of division and disunity


within the rank and file of the Nigerian Armed Forces. "This simple and


seemingly innocuous action broke the last thread and split the last


institution symbolizing Nigeria's nationhood and cohesion which had been


regularly tampered with by the politicians since 1962. The rift between


the Eastern Region and the rest of the country was total." (5:8) Most of


the civilian of Eastern Region origin who had never lived in the East


and would have continued to live elsewhere in the country lost


confidence and moved to the East. Some of them when they arrived at


their destination became refugees in their own country


None of the other recommendations was fully implemented except


nullification of the unification decree. The implementation of the


recommendation with regards to the posting of troops to barracks within


their region of origin was relentlessly pursued by the political leaders


of Western Region after the exercise had been completed in the Eastern


Region. They were afraid of the so - alled Northern troops domination


and probably of the safety of the troops of Western Region origin.


With the troops of Eastern Region back in Enugu and the non-Eastern


troops withdrawn from there, with Nigerians of non-Eastern origin driven


out of the East in their own interest, and with Easterners at home and


abroad returning home with news of Nigerian's brutality against them,


and with the oil flowing in the Eastern Region, the way was now open for


the implementation of the secession. The East and the North began a


virulent of words through their radios and newspapers. Early in 1967, a


peace negotiating meeting of the Supreme Military Council of the Federal


Republic of Nigeria and the Eastern Region Military Governor,


Lt. Col. Ojukwu was called under the auspices of Gen. Ankrah of Ghana in


Aburi, Ghana. As it turned out, all the other members of the council


except Ojukwu were either too thrusting, too naive or too ill - prepared


for the meeting. Therefore Ojukwu scored a vital goal in his ambition.


Walter Schwarz remarked : "Ojukwu got his way with little effort,


by being the cleverest. He was the only one who understood the issue.


Step by step the others came to acquiesce in the logic of Ojukwu's basic


thesis - that to stay together at all, the regions had first to draw


apart. Only Ojukwu understood that this meant, in effect, a sovereign


Biafra (Eastern Region) and the end of the Federation." (6:18)


Different versions of what happened in Aburi were released by


Ojukwu in the East and by the Federal Military Government in Lagos.


Ojukwu accused the Federal Government of bad faith and going back on


promises. The Federal Government accused Ojukwu of distortion and half


truths. After several meetings amongst the Federal and Regional


officials, what amounted to the demise of the Federation was promulgated


in decree No. 8 of 17 March 1967 in a desperate effort to implement the


Aburi decisions and to avoid further stalemate and possible civil war.


Not surprisingly, Ojukwu completely rejected Decree No. 8 as falling


short of full implementation of Aburi decisions. The die was cast. All


efforts to intervene by eminent Nigerians and well - wishers to Nigeria


like Gen. Ankrah, late Emperor Hallie Selassie of Ethiopia and the late


Dr Martin Luther King proved abortive.


The flurry of conciliatory meetings achieved nothing. Gen. Obasanjo


remarked: "Ojukwu was adamant, obstinate and obdurate. He refused to


attend the Supreme Military Government meeting called in March in Benin


city, Nigeria to discuss outstanding issues and deliberate on the budget


for the coming fiscal year. If he could not achieve his long cherished


ambition of ruling an independent Nigeria, he could break it up and rule


an independent and sovereign "Biafra." Nothing could stop him." (5:10)


As early as 7 June 1966, after the May incident in the North, Ojukwu was


quoted as saying: We are finished with the Federation. It is all a


question of time." (5:11)


Ojukwu seized the Federal Government property and funds in the


East. He planned the hijacking of a National commercial aircraft Fokker


27 on a schedule flight from Benin to Lagos. All these and other signs


and reports convinced the Federal Military Government of Ojukwu's


intention to secede. Lt Col. Yakubu Gowon, the Head of Federal


Government, imposed a total blockade of the East. It was realized that


more stringent action had to be taken to weaken support for Ojukwu and


to forestall his secession bid. Short of military action at that time,


creation of States by decree was the only weapon ready to hand. The


initial plan was to create States in the Eastern Region only. Such


action was considered impolitic and fraught with danger. Eventually


12 States were created throughout the country on 27 May 1967.


The Eastern Region was divided into three states. The reaction from


Enugu was sharp and quick: the declaration of Eastern Nigeria as the


independent sovereign state of "Biafra" on 30 May 1967. The month of


June was used by both sides to prepare for war. Each side increased its


military arsenal and moved troops to the border watching and waiting


until the crack of the first bullet at the dawn of 6 July 1967 from the


Federal side. The war had started and the dawn of a new history of



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What is known today as the Nigerian Army was, before 1966, a part of


the British West African Army called the Royal West Africa Frontier


Force ( RWAFF ). This force included the armies of Gold Coast (Ghana)


Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Gambia. At this time, there were eight


indigenous Nigerian officers in the entire force, the rest being British


officers. The role of an army in a developing country was not fully


realized by the nationalist leaders struggling for independence, hence,


there was no effective pressure on the British Government to train


Nigerian officers in preparation for independence. Even at this stage,


it was clear that the future stability of a nation such as Nigeria


depended to a large scale on the existence of a reliable army. One


result of this short - sightedness was that the first Nigerian to


command the Nigerian Army - Maj Gen. J.T.U. Aguiyi Ironsi, was not


appointed until 1965, nearly five years after independence.


At independence, it was also obvious that only the group that


controlled the Army could aspire to run a stable Nigerian government.


Either by coincidence or by design, almost all the military


installations were concentrated in one area of the country - The North.


To illustrate this fact, below is a list of major military installations


in Nigeria and their locations before the January 1966 coup:


Northern Nigeria:


1. 3rd Bn Kaduna


2. 5th Bn Kano


3. 1 Field Battery (Arty) Kaduna


4. 1 Field Squadron (Engrs) Kaduna


5. 88 Transport Regt Kaduna


6. Nigerian Defense Academy "


7. Ordinance Depot "


8. 44 Military Hospital "


9. Nigeria Military Training College "


10. Recon Squadron & Regt "


11. Nigerian Air Force "


12. Ammunition Factory "


13. Recruit Training Depot Zaria


14. Nigerian Military School "



Western Nigeria:


1. 4th Bn Ibadan


2. 2 Field Battery (Arty) Abeokuta


3. 2 Recon Squaron "




Eastern Nigeria


1st Bn Enugu




There were no military units in the Mid - Western Nigeria and those


in Lagos were either administrative or ceremonial. Recruitment of


soldiers into the Nigerian Army was based on ethnic quota system. Under


this system Northern Nigeria provided 60%, Eastern and Western Nigeria


15% each and Mid - Western Nigeria 10%. This was done to encourage the


Northerners who had not been interested in joining the Army initially.


The standard of entry into the Army was as well lowered to favor the


Northerners. As a result the North in 1966 had the absolute majority


within the rank and file of the Army. The standards fell within the Army


and the soldiers became more politically conscious. Madiebo pointed out


"In order to ensure the loyalty of the military thus established, the


criterion for promotion and advancement was based more on political


considerations than efficiency or competence. (2:10)


The involvement of the Military in politics took a turn for the


worse during the Western Nigerian elections in October 1965. The


politicians openly courted the friendship of top military officers. Due


to the chaos that characterized the general election of 1964 and the


Western Region election of 1965, it had become clear that Nigeria was


overdue for a change. By October 1965, rumors of an impending coup were


already circulating in the country. It was therefore not much of a


surprise when the coup was finally staged.






The declaration of secession made war not inevitable but imminent.


At the dawn of 6 July 1967, the first bullet was fired signalling the


beginning of the gruesome 30 month civil war and carnage, brothers


killing brothers. Preparations for war had already been set in motion


on the Nigerian side by May 1967. All the soldiers of Northern,


Western, and Mid - Western origin had been withdrawn from the East and


redeployed. Four of the regular infantry battalions of the Army were


placed under the command of 1 Brigade and redesignated 1 Area Command.


Mobilization of ex - service men was ordered by the Commander - in -


Chief. Out of those called up, about seven thousand in number, four


other battalions were formed. Increased recruitment from the personnel


of the Nigerian Police Force was embarked upon.


The civilians were trained in civil defense duties. In mobilizing


the people of Nigeria, the Federal Government had to make the war look a


just cause to stop the disintegration of the country and in doing this a


slogan was invented "To keep Nigeria one is a task that must be done."


Even the letters of the Head of the Federal Government, GOWON was coined


to read "Go On With One Nigeria" and became a very strong propaganda.





Delivery of arms and equipment for the Nigerian Army were hastened.


Nigerian Army Headquarters (NAHQ) Operations plan envisaged a war that


will be waged in four phases and that will be over within a month with


the capture of Enugu, the capital and nerve center of Eastern Region.


The four phases were (1) Capture of Nsukka, (2) Capture of Ogoja, (3)


Capture of Abakaliki, (4) Capture of Enugu. 1 Area Command was to be


the fighting force, 2 Area Command in Ibadan, Western Region, was


earmarked for the defense of Mid - West and border protection while the


Lagos Garrison Organization was earmarked for the defense of Lagos, the


Federal capital.


The NAHQ assessment of the rebels in terms of men under arms and


equipment did not give the NAHQ much concern. The total mobilization


and the will of the people of the Eastern Nigeria to fight against


severe odds was under estimated. Nigeria knew that the survival of


Biafra depended on importation of material from abroad to sustain her


war efforts and the only route was through the Atlantic Ocean. As part


of strategic planning, the Nigerian Navy (NN) was to blockade the region


from the sea thereby preventing shipment of arms, equipment, food and


other war materiel and services into the East. At the same time all


flights to the region were cancelled and the international community were


informed that no flight to the region would be accepted without


clearance from Lagos. The NAHQ did not pay any particular attention to


strategic intelligence of the Eastern Region. In planning and concept


the war was intended to be fought by the troops located in the North and


to be supplied mainly from Kaduna.


Immediately secession was declared, Nigeria sent her war ships to


blockade and secure all sea routes into the region. The Nigerian Air


Force was tasked to ensure the control of the air space over the entire


country. The offensive was to be a two prong attack, a combined arms


mechanized infantry divisional attack from the north and an amphibious


operation by another division from the south with the aim of crushing


the Biafran army in between. The offence was to be supported by the Air


Force and the Navy. A third and fourth fronts were introduced later in


the war.



At the Diplomatic level, the Federal Government mounted a serious

campaign to dissuade other countries, particularly the super powers, the


USA, USSR, and the United Kingdom from recognizing the secessionist.


The war was painted as an adventure by an individual. The government in


Lagos continued to represent the entire country in the international


organizations where a very strong propaganda was mounted to continue to


portray the war as one to re-unite the country. This made it possible to


win the support of the super powers and to continue to discredit Biafra.


Through this support, Nigeria was able to import more arms and equipment


from all over the world to prosecute the war. In order to show that she


was prepared for a peaceful solution to the conflict, Nigeria continued


to participate in peace talks organized by the international community.





Realizing the importance of the support of the civil populace,


Nigeria embarked on an elaborate psychological warfare. "To keep


Nigeria one is a task that must be done" became a very popular slogan.


Leaflets discrediting the Biafran Head of State, encouraging the


Biafrans to lay down their arms with a promise of non-persecution, were


regularly dropped in the East.




On the Biafran side, preparation for war was put into high gear as


soon as the troops of non - Eastern origin withdrew from Enugu in


August of 1966. Thousands of people poured in for recruitment. Training


was embarked upon both for officers and soldiers who were mainly


lecturers and university students. Before the outbreak of hostility, the


Eastern Region had no sufficient arms since all the soldiers who


returned to the region did so without their arms while the soldiers who


were withdrawn from the East departed with their weapons. What was left


of the Nigerian Army at Enugu barracks amounted to about 240 soldiers,


the majority of them technicians and tradesmen and not all the soldiers


had weapons. However at the outbreak of the war, the Eastern Region had


succeeded in securing arms and ammunition from France, Spain and


Portugal. Madiebo remarked, "When more weapons were received in May


1967, a decision was taken to form two new battalions to be called the


9th and 14th Battalions." (2:100)


Many pilots and technicians formerly of the Nigerian Air Force of


Eastern origin returned to the region to form the Biafran Air Force


(BAF). Two old planes, a B26 and a B25 were acquired with new


helicopters. T he two bombers were fitted with machine guns and locally


made rockets and bombs. The BAF also acquired Minicon aircrafts. A small


Navy was established in Calabar with some patrol boat formerly used by


the Nigerian Navy. More boats were later manufactured locally and these


were armored plated and fitted with light guns and machine guns. A


peoples army called, the Biafra Militia, was formed. Local leaders and


ex - servicemen trained young men and women in the use of whatever


weapon the indivIduals had. These weapons were mainly imported and


locally made short guns. The militia were to provide a ready source of


manpower re-enforcement for the regular army, to assist with military


administration immediately behind the frontline, to garrison all the


areas captured or regained from the enemy, and to help educate the


population on the reason why Biafra was fighting.


An establishment known as the Administration Support was formed.


Before the declaration of hostility, the small Biafran Army was almost


completely administered and maintained by donations from the civil


populace. This establishment was to muster necessary support


particularly logistic requirements for the army and to run the


administration since all the young and able bodied men and women were to


be engaged in the fight. A Food Directorate, responsible for the


purchase and distribution of all food, drink and cigarettes to the


armed forces and the nation was formed. A Transport Directorate with


operational procedure similar to that of the Food Directorate was


established. A Petroleum Management Board was established for


procurement, management and distribution of POL. The board designed and


built a sizeable and efficient fuel refinery which produced petrol,


diesel, and engine oil at considerably fast rate.


Several other directorates such as Clothing, Housing, Propaganda,


Requisition and Supply, and Medical were established. Clothing in


particular was very essential as uniform was unavailable in Biafra. The


textile mills in the Eastern Region were reactivated to produce bails


of uniform for the armed forces and the civilians. A Research and


Production Board was established. This organization researched and


manufactured rockets, mines, tanks, grenades, launchers, bombs, flame


throwers, vaccines, biological and alcoholic beverages and so forth.


Women were not left out in the scheme of things. Women were trained


in intelligence gathering and how to infiltrate into the Nigerian side.


Women Voluntary Service was formed to assist in educating the women of


Biafra on the cause of the crisis, keep women informed of developments,


rehabilitation of war casualties, setting up of nurseries, orphanages,


civil defense corps, and provision of cooks for the troops. An Advisory


Committee was set up to plan and execute the war and to advise the Head


of State on political and military matters.





The Biafrans knew that the odds against them was immense and that


their survival depended on the amount of external support they were able


to muster. The Biafrans, through many of their people abroad, mounted a


very strong campaign and propaganda for the recognition of Biafra by the


international community and for the purchase of arms and equipment. This


powerful propaganda paid off by her recognition by countries like,


Tanzania, Zambia, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Haiti, covert support by France


and double dealing by countries like West Germany, Spain, Portugal,


Switzerland, Sweden, Republic of Dahomey, Sierra Leone and secret


importation of arms and ammunition into the region.





Nigeria's potential in manpower, wealth, natural resources, land


mass, infrastructure, international links and diplomacy could hardly be


surpassed in Africa. Whenever war is declared, people are generally


concerned with the relative strengths of the opposing forces coupled


with their war potential. Armed forces are the towing equipment that


pulls a nation out if she runs aground in her policy. It is madness for


a nation to commit herself more than her armed forces can do. There was


no comparison between the strengths of the opposing forces in the


Nigerian civil war. Nigerian Army (NA) was too formidable for Biafra, a


ratio of 4:1. However each side knew the tactics the other side would


employ since they all belonged to the same Armed Forces before the war.


The Biafran Army, realizing the odds against them decided correctly


to go into defense. Taking the advantage of fighting on their own


ground, they constructed fortified pill boxes on the enemy most likely


avenues of approach, the major highways connecting the Eastern Region


with the rest of the country. The Biafran army had gathered a lot of


information on the disposition of the Nigerian army and made contingency


plans to meet any incursion into their territory. They conducted


training exercise code named "Exercise Checkmate" which was on the line


Biafra Army hoped to fight. This exorcise was so realistic that when the


Nigerian Army started their offensive, they reacted exactly the way


Biafra expected them to.


Biafra deployed her troops as follows:


1. Northern Sector - 51st Brigade made up of three infantry



2.Central Zone and Garrison Command - 11th Infantry Battalion


3.Southern Zone - 52nd Brigade made up of three battalions.



The Biafran Air Force carried out strategic bombings of major towns,


military installations and the Defense Industry. This had a


diverstating effect on civilian population and further helped the


Nigerian propaganda which resulted in making more people to join the NA


to crush the rebellion. The Biafran Navy also carried out some attack on


the Nigerian ships with little effect. Mercenaries were hired to train


the troops and took part in the fighting.






Nigeria opened her offensive operations from the northern sector.


1 Area Command NA, supported by an Artillery Brigade, Armored units


equipped with British Scorpion tanks, Saladin armored cars and ferrets,


and Engineer units, issued its operational orders for OPUNICORD, the


code name for the "police" action against the rebels on the 2 July 1967.


The offence was launched on two fronts. The command was divided into two


brigades with three battalions each. 1 Brigade advanced on the axis


Ogugu - Ogunga - Nsukka road while 2nd Brigade advanced on axis Gakem -


Obudu - Ogoja road. The rebels successfully repulsed the attack.


However, with the many friends the command had made since they


concentrated on the border waiting for the order to attack, they began


to recruit guides, informants and with this came the intelligence on


the disposition of the Biafran troops, their strength and plans and a




By the 10th of July 1967, 1st Bde had captured all its first


objectives and if they had had the detail intelligence of the Biafran


army on this day they would have pressed on to take Enugu, the Biafran


capital. H.M. Njoku remarked, "At Ukehe I could not believe my eyes. All


along the way were refugees streaming towards Enugu on Nsukka road. Many


of the retreating troops carried self inflicted wounds. Some senior


offices complained of malaria, headache, and all sorts of ailments. If


the NA knew the situation on the Biafran side on this eventful day and


pressed on they would have taken Enugu the same day without


resistance." (4:128)


By the 12th of July the 2nd Bde had captured Obudu, Gakem, and


Ogoja. A second front, the southern sector was opened on the 26 July,


1967 by a sea landing on Bonny by a division formed from the Lagos


Garrison Organization (LGO). With the support of the Navy, the division


established a beach head and exploited north after a fierce sea and land


battle. On 8th August 1967, Biafra invaded the former Mid - Western


Region with the aim to relieve the pressure on the northern sector and


to threaten Lagos, the Federal Capital. While the LGO was making


preparations for subsequent operations beyond Bonny, the news of the


rebel infiltration into the Mid - West was passed to the commander who


was then instructed to leave a battalion in Bonny, suspend all


operations there and move to Escravos with two battalions with a view to


dislodging the rebels and clearing the riverine area of the Mid - West.


These moves were carried out with the support of the Nigerian Navy and



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the merchant of the National Shipping Line. Another division was


formed to support the LGO in the clearing of the Mid - West of the


rebels. At this point, the formations were redesignated 1 Area Command


became 1 Infantry Division, the newly division was designated 2 Infantry


Division, and the LGO became the 3 Infantry Division. And with this the


"police action" turned into a full scale military operation.


By the end of September 1969, a substantial part of the Mid - West


had been cleared of the rebels. The commander of the 3 Infantry Division


secured permission to change the designation of his formation to 3


Marine Commando because of the peculiarly riverine and creek operations


already carried out by the division. This was the first time something


in the resemblance of a Marine organization was tried in the history of


the Nigerian Army. The division was not trained In amphibious


operations. Infact the troops were made up of the soldiers of the Lagos


Garrison Organization (LGO), the administrative establishment for the


Federal capital. However, with some crash training, the division became


the most feared and successful throughout the war.


Enugu became the bastion of secession and rebellion and the Federal


Government of Nigeria expected that its capture would mean the end of


secession. The advance from Nsukka to Enugu began in earnest on 12


September 1967. The rebels counterattacked and for the first time


launched their "Red Devil" tanks. These were modified pre - second World


War armored personnel carriers made in France. They were dangerous,


slow, blind, cumbersome and not easily maneuverable. T hey were easy prey


to anti - tank recoilless rifles and bold infantry attack. By the 4th


October 1967, Enugu was captured and with this capture 1 Infantry



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Division took time to refit and reorganize. The division had the


erroneous belief that the fall of Enugu would automatically mean the


collapse of the rebellIon. 1 Infantry Division decided to give the


rebels time to give up secession not knowing that the fire of rebellion


was still burning high in the hearts of most Easterners. Ojukwu was


callously fanning the fire and riding high on the emotions of his


apparently wounded and high spirited people who felt slighted and wanted


to revenge for all the events of 1966. It took the division another six


months to resume the offence thereby giving the rebels the necessary


respite to also reorganize and acquire more ammunition, weapons and


equipment to continue the resistance.


The 3 Marine Commando opened another front on the south / south


eastern border. With the support of the Navy, Calabar was captured on


the 13th October 1967. The capture of Calabar, Warri, Escravos and Bonny


established the supremacy of the Federal Government in Nigerian waters


and international waters bordering Nigerian coast. Biafra was sealed off


leaving Portharcourt Airport as the only means of international


communication and transportation with the outside world. It was at this


point that Biafran leadership decided to find alternative routes for


importation of war materiel and medical aids into the enclave. Three


stretches of straight roads were developed into airstrips; Awgu, Uga and


Ulli. On 19th May 1968 Portharcourt was captured. With the capture of


Enugu, Bonny, Calabar and Portharcourt, the outside world was left in no


doubt of the Federal supremacy in the war. The mercenaries fighting for


Biafra started deserting. Biafra started to smuggle abroad photographs


of starving children and to blackmail Nigeria of genocide. This secured


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military, economic and political relief from international organizations


for Biafra and further lengthened the war and the suffering of the


people of Biafra.


By the early 1969, 2nd Infantry Division crossed the Niger River at


Idah, after several unsuccessful attempts to cross the river at Asaba,


advanced through the already liberated areas of Nsukka and Enugu to


capture Onitsha. The division continued its advance towards Owerri. At


the same time 1 Infantry Division advanced on Umuahia. The 3 Marine


Commando was by now advancing on three fronts: Oguta - Owerinta - Ulli


airstrip - Umuahia axis; Portharcourt - Aba - Owerri - Umuahia axis; and


Calabar - Uyo - Umuahia axis. The plan was a link up with 1 Infantry


Division at Umuahia in order to envelop the rebels and either force them


to surrender or to destroy their fighting spirit. his plan, the final


offensive, was successfully implemented. Biafra tried unsuccessfully to


hold the NA onslaught using guerrilla tactics.


On the 10th January 1970, Lt. Col. Ojukwu, the self proclaimed Head


of State of Biafra, on realizing the total chaotic and hopelessness of


the situation, handed over to the Commander Biafran Army Maj. Gen.


Phillip Effiong, the administration of Biafra and flew out of the


enclave with his immediate family members in search of peace.


Maj. Gen. Effiong consulted with the Biafra Strategic Committee on the


situation and they decided that enough was enough and that the only


honorable way out was to surrender. In his surrender announcement to the


people of Biafra on Radio Biafra, part of Maj. Gen. Effiong address said:


Fellow Countrymen,


As you know I was asked to be the officer administering the


government of this republIc on the 10th of January, 1970. Since


then I know some of you have been waiting to hear a statement


from me. Throughout history, injured people have had to result


to arms in their self defense where peaceful negotiation have


failed. We are no exception. We took up arms because of the


sense of insecurity generated in our people by the events of


1966. We have fought in defense of that cause. I am now


convinced that a stop must be put to the bloodshed which is


going on as a result of the war. I am also convinced that the


suffering of our people must be brought to an end. Our people


are now disillusioned and those elements of the old regime


who have made negotiations and reconciliation impossible have


voluntarily removed themselves from our midst. I have,


therefore, instructed an orderly disengagement of troops.


I urge on Gen. Gowon, in the name of humanity, to order his


troops to pause while an armistice is negotiated in order to


avoid the mass suffering caused by the movement of population.


We have always believed that our differences with Nigeria


should be settled by peaceful negotiation. A delegation of our


people is therefore ready to meet representatives of Nigerian


Government anywhere to negotiate a peace settlement on the


basis of OAU resolution.


Part of Maj. Gen. Yakubu Gowon, the Head of the Federal


Government's speech to accept formally the declared surrender and the


end of the civil war read:



Citizens of Nigeria,


It is with a heart full of gratitude to God that I announce to


you that today marks the formal end of the civil war. This


afternoon at the Doddan Barracks, Lt. Col. Phillip Effiong,


Lt. Col. David Ogunewe, Lt. Col. Patrick Anwunah,


Lt. Col. Patrick Amadi and commissioner Police, Chief Patrick


Okeke formally proclaimed the end of the attempt at secession


and accepted the authority of the Federal Military Government


of Nigeria. They also formally accepted the present political


and administrative structure of the country. This ends thirty


months of a grim struggle. Thirty months of sacrifice and


national agony.


The world knows how hard we strove to avoid the civil


war. Our objectives in fighting the war to crush Ojukwu's


rebellion were always clear. We desired to preserve the


territorial integrity and unity of Nigeria. For, as one


country, we would be able to maintain lasting peace amongst


our various communities; achieve rapid economic development to


improve the lot of our people; guarantee a dignified future


and respect in the world for our posterity and contribute to


African unity and modernization. On the other hand, the small


successor states in a disintegrated Nigeria would be victims


of perpetual war and misery and neo - colonialism. Our duty


was clear. And we are today, vindicated.


The so - called "Rising Sun of Biafra" is set for ever. It


will be a great disservice for anyone to continue to use the


word "Biafra" to refer to any part of the East Central State


of Nigeria. The tragic chapter of violence is just ended.


We are at the dawn of national reconciliation. Once again we


have the opportunity to build a new nation. On our side, we


fought the war with great caution, not in anger or hatred, but


always in the hope that common sense would prevail. Many times


we sought a negotiated settlement, not out of wickedness, but


in order to minimize the problems of reintegration,


reconciliation and reconstruction. We knew that however the


war ended, in the battlefield or in the conference room, our


brothers fighting under other colors must rejoin us and that


we must together rebuild the nation anew. All Nigerians share


the victory today. The victory for national unity, victory for


hopes of Africans and black people everywhere. We mourn the


dead heroes. We thank God for sparing us to see this glorious


dawn of national reconciliation. We must seek His guidance to


do our duty to contribute our quota to the building of a great


nation, ounded on the concerted efforts of all its people and


on justice and equality. A nation never to return to the


fractious, sterile and selfish debates that led to the tragic


conflict just ending. The Federal Government has mounted a


massive relief operations to alleviate the suffering of


the people in the newly liberated areas. We are mobilizing


adequate resources to provide food, shelter, and medicines for


the affected population. My government has directed that


former civil servants and public corporation officials should


be promptly reinstated as they come out of hiding. Details of


this exercise have been published. Plans for the


rehabilitation of self - employed people will also be


announced promptly. We have overcome a lot over the


past four years. I have therefore every confidence


that ours will become a great nation.


The surrender paper was signed on 14th January 1970 in Lagos and


thus came the end of the civil war and renunciation of secession.





The Nigerian civil war, unlike other wars across international


boundaries, was a war of unification, a war of reintegration. It was


therefore a much more difficult war for the Federal field commanders to


prosecute with the objectives of unification in mind than wars fought


against aggressors on foreign land. The human aspect was paramount. It


was a contradiction and complication not easy to resolve - how to fight


causing only limited destruction, how to inflict wounds and heal at the


same time, how to subdue without fatal and permanent injuries, how to


feed and house civilian population without exposing our troops to danger


and risk of saboteurs and infiltrators, how to achieve surrender without


inflicting permanent or long lasting psychological humiliation.






The Nigerian political tensions, conflicts and confrontations, like


other human interactions, had never conformed with the law of physics


that action and reaction are opposite and equal. Reactions had always


been more intense and graver than action, real or imagined. Those who


are the sowers of wind are usually the reapers of the whirlwind. The


Kano riots of 1953 was a reaction to the humiliation of the Northern


legislators in Lagos most of whom are still alive and politicking while


the rioters are dead, unsung and long forgotten. In the Nigerian


historical context, each political action, tension or conflict had


evoked more violence in reaction and the elites who initiated the action


are normally not the ones who reap the more violent reaction or


destruction. They are masters in the art of survival and they have


always emerged almost unscratched. It is the common man who knows little


or nothing of the on-goings and who certainly gains nothing from the


appointments or the prerequisites of office of these elites that is used


as cannon fodder and expendable material for the attainment and


sustenance of power, wealth and prosperity.


Our leaders aid those of other developing nations must eschew


bitterness and violence, learn that no individual or section has a


monopoly of violence and that one action of violence evokes greater and


more destructive violent reaction, the magnitude which can never be


imagined in advance. In the end the law of retributive justice catches


with the perpetrators of bitterness, violence and destruction. This


difficult lesson must be learnt.


The great publicity given to the war by Markpress on behalf of


Biafra, especially the photographs of starving children and ruined or


deserted towns, evoked deep feelings of sympathy all over the Western


world. By and large, these pitiful sights touched the conscience of


those who mounted large scale humanitarian campaigns on behalf of


Biafra. The issues in the war were relegated to the background and the


human and humanitarian aspects came to the fore. Most of them were


genuine in their humanitarian efforts but little did they know that most


of their contributions were used to purchase arms and ammunition which


prolonged the war and thereby increased and heightened the sufferings


of those they were trying to help.


There were involvement of some notable world leaders on supposedly


humanitarian grounds, but they had, as we have seen, ulterior motives


which were mainly to satisfy their political, economic or diplomatic


interests. Some foreign governments covertly encouraged and sustained


rebellion under the guise of humanitarianism by secretly giving weapons


and other war material to Biafra. They seceded in fuelling the war and


prolonged it and consequently prolonging the suffering of the people in


the war affected areas.


The importance of winning the support and mobilizing the civilian


populace became very obvious. Biafra, despite her inferiority in


manpower and war machineries held on for so long because her people


believed in fighting the war which they considered a war of survival. On


the same token, Nigeria won the war primarily because she was able to


win the support of the populace who enlisted in thousands to reunify the







Moral and discipline are two of the most important factors that


greatly contribute to success in war. Obasanjo commented on the effects


of these factors thus, "I observed amongst Nigerian troops during the


war different aspects of human behavior under the stress and strains of


battle, and interaction between ordinary Nigerians, war or no war. What


I found amazing was the length to which soldiers would go when morale


and discipline broke down, in order to avoid going to battle or, so to


speak, facing death. In effect, while running away from death they


inflicted death on themselves as some of them died from their self -


inflicted injuries. But towards the end of the war when everything was


going right - the rebels were on the run, advance was fast and


co-ordinated, moral was high - even our own wounded soldiers did not want


to be evacuated to the rear for treatment and medical attention. Several


times I heard such wounded soldiers saying to me, "Oga, na you and me


go end this war and capture Ojukwu. " (5:169)


Motivation is another very important factor that made troops fight.


The Nigerian soldiers enjoyed rapid promotion and increase in pay


throughout the war. This encouraged them to fight on. It is also


important to allow troops time to worship in their various religious


faith. Chaplains should be provided to pray for the troops whenever time


warrants. War is a situation that requires faith - faith in your


equipment, faith in your comrades and colleagues, faith in God or the


supreme being or whatever one believes in, faith in oneself and in the


cause for which one is fighting. I believe that success in a profession


that embraces the twin problem of human relationships and personal


danger in a degree not to be found in any other profession demands more


than the attributes of man, it requires divine guidance as well. The


care for the wounded and the dead must be taken seriously.


High standard of training can never be over emphasized. Most of


the soldiers recruited during the war did not undergo enough depot


training before being launched into battle. This resulted in many


casualties on both sides. Most of them who survived the war had to be


retrained. Members of the military must recognize that they depend more


on the professional and technical competence and proficiency of their


team members than on the formal authority structure. The maintenance of


the highly sophisticated weapons and equipment procured during the war


became very difficult. Most of them lasted for a few months in combat.


Weapons were imported from all over the world and this led to non -


standardization after the war. Most of them had to be phased out due to


lack of spare parts.


The quality of initiative in the individual must be allowed to


develop. It is the most valued of all leadership qualities and virtues


in the military. In this period of tremedious technological change,


military leaders are confronted with almost perpetual change or crisis


of organization especially in a fairly fluid combat situation. Whatever


may be the technological achievement of our age and it's impact on


military science, improvisation is still the keynote of the individual


fighter and combat group. This aspect of military training must be


emphasized in peacetime. This is particularly important in the


developing nation like ours.


Failures arising from lack of adequate joint training became very


obvious as a result of fratricide that occurred during the war. On many


occasions fire support request made to the Air Force never came, and


when it did come, it was sometimes on own friendly positions. Supply


from the air that became necessary atimes and were tried often fell on


the enemy side.


It is commonly said that an army fights on its stomach. Logistics


won the war for Nigeria. If the Biafrans had half of the resources


Nigeria had, the story might be different. The Biafrans were better


organized and managed the meager resources available to them more


effectively. The Nigerian Army learnt a big lesson from this. The Army


school of Logistics was upgraded and well funded to train and produce


high quality logisticians for the Army after the war.


Communication in the field was a big problem to both sides in the


conflict. Radios were lacking and when they were procured, trained


manpower was not available. The importance of good and reliable


communication and gathering of adequate and up to date intelligence of


the enemy was a big lesson.


The silencing of guns allowed the milk of brotherhood, love,


understanding and sympathy to flow from both the civilians and the


soldiers on the Federal side to their fellow citizens on the rebel side.


As time went by, everybody came to appreciate the futility of the war


which some had regarded as inevitable.




The war had come and gone. The story of the war and what led to it


has been told, is being told and will continue to be told. What seems to


me a human tragedy all through ages is the inability of man to learn a


good lesson from the past so as to avoid the pitfall of those who had


gone before. There is also the innate and unconscious desire of man to


remain oblivious of the lessons of the past. He hopes and believes that


the past can be ignored, that the present is what matters, that no


mistakes of the present can be as serious and grievous as the mistakes


of the past. As a result history tends to repeat itself. However, there


are exceptions of nations and men who had learnt from history to avoid


collective and individual disasters or a repetition of such disasters. I


feel confident that Nigeria must join the group of these happy


exceptions if we are to have political stability, economic progress,


integrated development, social justice, contentment and be the epicenter


of African solidarity. Since the end of the civil war, Nigeria has made


considerable progress in all these areas.





1. Kirk - Green, A.H.M. Crisis and Conflicts in Nigeria 1967 - 70.

Vol. I, January 1966 - July 1967. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971.


2. Madiebo, A. Alexander. The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War.

Fourth Dimensions Publishers, 1980.


3. New Nigerian: Daily Newspaper.


4. Njoku, H.M. A Tragedy Without Heroes: The Nigerian - Biafran War.

Fourth Dimensions Publishers, 1987.


5. Obasanjo, Olusegun General. My Command: An account of the Nigerian

Civil War 1967 - 70. Heinemann Publications, 1980.


6. Schwarz, Walter. Nigeria. London, 1968.

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