The United States Military Confronts The "New World Order"
AUTHOR Major William A. Hingston, USMC
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - Foreign Policy
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: THE UNITED STATES MILITARY CONFRONTS THE "NEW WORLD
ORDER"
The United States military must have a renaissance,
realigning its strategic and operational thinking in order to
respond effectively as the "New World Order" sweeps the globe.
Many foundations of the United States military's formulas
for success have been leveled in the recent past. The Berlin
wall is down, the Cold War is over and the "911" solution is
no longer economically feasible.
Unlike the past, where the perceived threat was simply
bipolar, there now exists a wide spectrum of geo-political
scenarios requiring diverse levels of military readiness. The
United States military's effectiveness in meeting these
legitimate demands will be determined by its ability to
reevaluate its own needs of manpower, technology, and mission.
These requirements will in turn be affected by societal
parameters and economic necessities.
The United States military must, in concert with the
elected political leadership, forge a policy and program that
keeps the United States in the forefront of the "New World
Order".
The United States Military "Confronts the New World Order"
Outline
The United States military must therefore have a
renaissance; realigning its Strategic and Operational thinking
in order to respond effectively in the "New World Order".
I. Historical Implications
A. The demise of the Cold War
B. Champion of the "underdog"
II. Ambiguous Geo-political Framework
A. Bipolar world
B. Persian Gulf
C. Middle East
III. Framework of Flexible Response
A. Manpower
1. Post World War I and II
2. Cold War
3. Vietnam
4. All Volunteer Force
5. Post Cold War
B. Technology
1. Increased abilities
2. Negative influence on defense issues
C. Mission
1. Spectrum of possibilities
a. Low intensity
b. Gulf War impact
c. Para-military warfare
IV. The Budget as the determinant
The United States Military Confronts the "New World Order"
Come writers and critics who prophesize with your pens
And keep your eyes wide the chance won't come again
And don't speak too soon for the wheel's still in spin...
And the loser now will be later to win;
And the times they are a changin'
Come Senators, Congressmen please heed the call
Don't stand in the doorway; don't block up the hall
For he that gets hurt will be he who has stalled
The battle outside raging will soon shake your windows
and rattle your walls;
For the times they are a changin'
Come mothers and fathers throughout the land
And don't criticize what you can't understand
Your sons and your daughters are beyond your command
Your old road is rapidly aging. Please get out of the
new one if you can't lend your hand;
Oh the times they are a changin'
The line it is drawn; the curse it is cast
The slow one now will later be fast
As the present now will later be past The order is
rapidly fading And the first one now will later be last;
Oh the times they are a changin'.
-- Bob Dylan --
Al though Bob Dylan wrote these words about a world over
twenty-five years ago, their relevance is equally profound for
the 1990s. Dylan's words focused on social changes in the
Western World, concentrating on the United States. Ironically
twenty-five years later translating these words into Russian,
Chinese, German, or Spanish, instills the same spark of social
change in the hearts and minds of emerging peoples. With
these changes will come unprecedented political complexities
that will impact all facets of the Western World. The
relative simplicity of East and West ideologies, which had
clearly definable boundaries and allowed for comfortable
political fundamentals is now gone. The prophetic concept of
the 1960s notion of the world as a "global village" has become
a reality in the 1990s.
With the loss of the clearly definable boundaries of East
and West irretrievably blurred, a relatively simple U.S.
military strategy is no longer applicable. The U.S. military
must therefore have a renaissance; realigning its strategic
and operational thinking in order to respond effectively in
"the New World Order". This realignment will be necessarily
based on contemporary world history, changing geopolitical
scenarios, and United States domestic realities.
In an attempt to develop a legitimate and effective U.S.
military policy an encapsulated review of current history is
needed to define the parameters that will bound the U.S.
military. The most dramatic element is the apparent end of
the "Cold War".
"and the walls come tumbling down"
The Cold War was fought on the battlefield of budgets and
balance sheets, stockpiles and posturing. It was the ultimate
ideological fight between capitalism and communism. This war,
championed by both the United States and the Soviet Union, was
a conflict based on economic strength and endurance. It was
therefore ultimately unwinnable by the Communists because they
lacked depth in their industrial base and a superficial
research and development program.
The last gasps of the war occurred with such
unprecedented speed and urgency that the West and the United
States was left scrambling for a cohesive strategy to enact.
The collapse of the Eastern Bloc was so swift, irreversible,
and unexpected, that the United States was overwhelmed and
lost its focal point. We were so immersed in the traditional
revelry of victory, that the United States now faces a
quagmire of unparalleled geopolitical problems. They were
simmering below the surface but were never confronted because
these issues were suppressed by the two sides of the
ideological Cold War. But now that this "war" has ended we
find both warriors vanquished, economically depleted,
politically exhausted, and economically subjugated by the very
nations they sought to protect or entice. The end of the war
has stripped away the facade of military strength. Now we find
that "economics has moved to the fore in the power balance,
relegating to a lesser status politics [ideology) and military
power [wars) that dominated the 20th century"1. The demise
of the Cold War was economic and its apparent end rested not
in how many warheads could be tossed but in which economy
could survive the mushrooming cost of the technology which
sustained the war of words.
In order to effectively address the role of the United
States military in the New World Order we must determine what
the geopolitical responsibilities will be in the post-cold war
world. In this assessment various scenarios should be
examined, since a true national policy has yet to be
established.
"911 to the world"
Since World War II the United States has championed the
causes of many nations in the perceived role of the protector
of the free world and the defender of the underdog. This has
translated into the "911 syndrome" identified by many as
United States foreign policy. This policeman to the world
effort debatedly proved successful throughout the Cold War
period because of the relative simplicity of the East vs. West
idealogies. The us vs them policy found the United States
entering alliances with many nations. These alliances were
1Berens, Robert J., "The Changing Face of World Power". National
Guard Journal, January 1990.
dominated by the United States (both financially and
militarily) with "the rationale for undertaking such expensive
and risky obligations throughout the Cold War to prevent
Soviet global domination"2. The damage in perpetuating this
"911" syndrome in the post-cold war world is that if the
United States insists on policing the planet as the self-
appointed guardian of the status quo it may require an even
larger and more expensive military establishment than it
maintained throughout the Cold War, with a corresponding
higher potential for loss of life.
Another scenario that United States strategists must
consider is the multipolar world, which is the logical
successor of the bipolar Cold War where both participants are
incapable of maintaining a unipolar environment. Charles
Krauthammer in his editorial, "the Unipolar Movement"
(Washington Post, July 20, 1990), maintains that "the bipolar
world in which the real power emanated only from Moscow and
Washington is dead". Krauthammer continues that "the
multipolar world to which we are headed, in which power will
emanate from Berlin and Tokyo, Beijing and Brussels, as well
as Washington and Moscow, is struggling to be born". The
feasibility of this scenario is clearly well within the realm
of possibility and even probability. Hobart Rowen supports
2Carpenter, Ted Galen, "America Can't Police the Planet". The Washington
Post, 30 August 1990.
this assertion by declaring the United States, Japan, and
Germany as the only three world economic superpowers that
really count"3. Krauthammer refers to this as "regional
superpowers
A wildcard scenario in the geopolitical arena that could
clearly impact United States military thinking in the future
is the continued quagmire of the Middle East and Persian Gulf
regions. The interesting twist to this play is that in the
Persian Gulf, a militarily minor, religiously focused culture,
can yield such incredible economic clout because of their
ability to control a majority of a finite global source of
energy -- oil. Conventional military wisdom -- in spite of
the Iraqi war in the gulf region -- really has little impact
in controlling the power base of the region -- petrodollars.
Might does not make right and military and political alliances
in this region are as shifting as the sand with little or no
moral depth to these agreements. Alliances are simply
vehicles to insure the economic prosperity of the region and
little concern is given to the long term requirements of their
military benefactor -- the United States. The situation
almost cries out as a mercenary relationship -- a gun for
hire.
3Rowen, Hobart, "Japan and Germany Must Take Bigger Military, Policy-Making
Roles in World Affairs". The Washington Post, March 3,1991.
The Middle East region however lacks the economic
influence that the Pacific rim, Persian Gulf, or European
areas enjoy. Nevertheless it falls into the classic Cold War
strategy of the enemy of my enemy is my friend. The end of
the Cold war now allows the United States to establish a more
even-handed, statesman-like policy in this region as the
perceived Soviet involvement in the region is no longer (if it
ever was) legitimate. The Middle East is probably the last
region in the world where the United States can act as a
genuine superpower and unilaterally construct a New World
Order through economic and political pressure.
military response
Within such an ambiguous geopolitical framework the
United States military is now being required to revisit the
old strategy of cold war deterrence and look instead to a new
flexible framework that honors the fiscal responsibility
mandated by Congress.
In establishing this new framework of response, three key
areas have been identified for discussion: manpower,
technology, and mission. The interface of these areas and
their reciprocal impacts are apparent; however I will address
each individually and draw conclusions accordingly.
manpower
The United States chronically suffers from selective
memory - - choosing to remember events and things that are
pleasant. The military in 20th Century American History has
fallen victim to this disease twice: post World Wars I&II. In
each case the war was won, the "boys" came home, and it was
time to put the guns away -- back in the closet. Ironically
after each war another crisis arose that required United
States military involvement and in each case, initially, we
were relatively unprepared to execute the prerogative of the
National Command Authority. This resulted in an initial
ineffective response and an unfortunate waste of human life.
Fortunately, after the Korean War the Eastern Bloc
represented such a perceived threat that the United States had
no alternative but to maintain at least the appearance of a
strong military posture. The Cold War had begun. This was
manifested in the "Triad" policy of nuclear deterrence. This
strategy worked in the world of superpower brinkmanship but
was ineffective in the conventional arena. This was made
painfully clear with the Vietnam conflict.
The professional United States military during the post-
Korea/pre-Vietnam era was a relatively small, highly trained
force whose only flaw was that it was fused to a strategic
nuclear policy focused on a Soviet/United States engagement.
It did not have the indigenous manpower assets to respond to
any medium or large scale conventional involvement. When the
Vietnam conflict enlarged into a protracted conventional war
of attrition, the United States military turned to the draft
to increase its force structure rather than activate reserve
units or national guard assets. This tactical error, not
repeated during the recent Iraqi conflict, exacerbated an
already politically volatile issue and helped fuel the growing
socio-political unrest concerning the merit of the United
States involvement in Vietnam.
Upon the termination of the Vietnam conflict the United
States military turned to the "all volunteer force" concept.
This program, in concert with a more realistic postwar
scaledown, enabled the United States to maintain a legitimate
standing force. This force, after the initial growing pains of
the late 1970s, has matured into a internationally respected
and emulated cadre of dedicated professionals. Well trained
and rearmed in the 1980s, it was a very powerful bargaining
chip in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and
Conventional Forces Elimination (CFE) negotiations with the
Soviets.
Unfortunately as the wall came tumbling down in Berlin
and the Soviet empire crumbled, the cry immediately arose for
a reduction in force strength of the United States military,
commiserate with the perceived diminished threat. Since such
an effort would save money at a time when the U.S. economy was
stalling, many on Capital Hill were quick to embrace the
reduction in force concept - once again selectively ignoring
history.
Current plans call for a twenty-five percent reduction of
the active force by the end of 1995. Paradoxically the
initial stages of this force reduction policy were occurring
in the midst of the largest land battle fought since the
Second World War. As we went to war in South West Asia, plans
were placed in motion to eliminate from the active forces
roughly the equivalent amount of personnel involved in the
South West Asia campaign - roughly 525,000 individuals. The
irony of this action will not be lost on the quality young
staff non-commissioned officers and officers who see their
prospects of a noble and legitimate military career becoming
less likely and appealing. Many of these young professionals
may opt instead for the civilian sector, where the skills paid
for and acquired during military service can frequently be put
to use for higher pay with fewer personal and family
sacrifices required.
The manpower situation is extremely volatile and without
careful thorough planning, the urgent rush to save money now
may in the long run exact a cost that is measured in
mediocrity.
"space -- the final frontier"
Today's military is on the threshold of mind-boggling
technology. The recent Iraqi conflict validates the advent of
this new age of technology. Even the most inventive minds of
the 1950s and 1960s dared not dream what are now the technical
realities of the 1980s and early 1990s. What is truly
overwhelming is that which is current is fleeting as each new
day hastens the obsolescence of the previous day's
discoveries.
Technology has provided the modern military with the
ability to perform its mission with mortal intensity and
accuracy that is measured by failure rates of less than ten
percent. Its efficiency and accuracy produce an aura of
infallibility and invulnerability that is as dangerous as the
weapons themselves.
Perhaps the most ominous reality of the technological
revolution is the astronomical cost of the weapons systems it
produces. The unit cost reflects the research and development
outlays that are required to design, engineer, and test the
technology. The Fiscal Year 1992 (FY1992) defense budget
authority calls for a Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation (RTD&E) authority of 39.9 billion dollars with
another 63.4 billion dollars in procurement costs4. This
4Cheney, Dick, Annual Report to the President and the Congress.
Washington,DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1991.
equate to roughly 37% of the entire defense budget authority.
Military personnel and operations and maintenance costs make
up the remainder of the authority. It is readily apparent
that the cost of modern armament will weigh heavily on defense
decision makers. This will ultimately impact the United
States military and their ability to perform in the New World
Order.
"mission impossible-
As was addressed earlier, the military faces a broad
spectrum of conflict as the United States honors its
geopolitical global responsibilities and leadership role in
the new world order. The spectrum ranges from the very
probable -- low intensity activities in the Third World --
possible mid intensity conflict in the Middle East/Persian
Gulf -- to the improbable (at this time) of a nuclear exchange
with the Soviet Union.
Prior to the Gulf intervention the "Conventional Wisdom"
was pointing to United States military involvement in the
Contingency Action/Limited Objected Warfare arena -- coined
CALOW by the Pentagon bureaucrats. Had it not been for the
Gulf, it is very likely that the United States military would
have been extensively focused to CALOW and would have suffered
greatly in the event of any mid-to-high intensity encounter.
Probably the most interesting mission facing the United
States military is the possibility of fighting para-military
actions supporting its counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism
missions. Although global in scope, they have had a profound
domestic impact therefore gaining significant political
attention. This would be urban and jungle guerrilla warfare
fought by a military currently geared to fight high-speed,
high-tech conventional (and worst case nuclear) warfare.
Current training and equipment in the inventory cannot
adequately address the requirements of this type of warfare
and will clearly impact the direction and role of the United
States military in the next decade and on into the 21st
Century.
"give peace a chance"
The issues that have the most dramatic impact on the
United States military role in the New World Order are
domestic. And although there are any number of tributary
issues that can impact the military, they all seem to converge
around the budget. As addressed earlier there is nothing that
so profoundly affects/effects the United States military as
the budget. Money talks in the USA and with peace at hand
(i.e., no real Soviet threat) some Congressmen are demanding
that the so-called "peace dividend " surface in the budget.
The "peace dividend" is assumed to be the financial saving
that will/can be incurred by a reduction in defense
expenditures due to the lessening of tensions among the
superpowers. Put simply, with no real enemy why have a large
expensive military establishment?
Click here to view image
Already, in spite of the Iraqi war, the Percent Real
Growth of the defense budget is decreasing as evidenced in
Figure 1. This reduction is being "paid" for with a 25%
reduction of active duty manpower and the cancellation and/or
reduction in the purchase of major programs. Naval aviation,
for example, has lost the A-12 stealth attack bomber, F-14D
remanuf acture, and the P-7A anti-submarine patrol plane5. The
United States Marine Corps, in desperate need of a replacement
5Holzer, Roger,"Navy Struggles to Find Funding for Ailing Aviation". Defense
News March 25, 1991.
for the CH-46 medium lift airframe, has lost the V-22/Osprey
which was designed to perform that critical mission.
Currently the United States military is enjoying a
resurgence of popularity and prestige, based primarily on a
lopsided victory over a third rate military force in the South
West Asia conflict. This euphoria and its corresponding
support will not survive the realities of today's news as the
fiscal catastrophes of the 1980s and an "economy under siege"
surface in the headlines again. The people will turn to
reducing the defense budget as their salvation; the vehicle to
diminish expenditures and salvage domestic and social
programs. That is the reality of American politics and
contemporary American society.
"it's a new dawn"
In conclusion the New World Order is a defining moment in
history. The potential and the possible pitfalls are great.
As Alice M. Rivlin states that there are four potential
dangers to the future of America: (1) the diffusion of
sophisticated weapons, (2) the possibility of irreversible
damage to the environment, (3) the growing desperation of the
worlds poor and, (4) the weakness of the U.S. economy6. These
issues will clearly impact the role of America in the new
world and by extension the United States military's place in
6Rivlin, Alice M., "New World, New Dangers". The Washington Post April 10, 1990.
American foreign policy. The arguments have begun; on Capital
Hill, in the nation's think tanks, and over coffee in Iowa.
There will be many voices many opinions.
The challenge can be met by a clear defined foreign
policy that honors the heritage and beliefs of the American
people in concert with a sound military and strong electd
leadership to guide the ship of state and its supporting arms
into the uncertainty of the 21st century. The United States
military's task is to ensure that voices like those of Ted
Carpenter are refuted, disputed, and laid to rest. Carpenter
writes: "to be considered a threat to a vital interest, a
development should have a direct, immediate and substantial
connection with Americas philosophical survival, its political
independence, or the preservation of its domestic freedoms
Such isolationism has been tried before and failed -- it must
not become the foreign policy of the United States. Nor
should we continue to the act as the "911" of the world -
economically and socially burdening our country. The
challenge is great: we use our leadership wisely in creating
a "World Order" of peace and stability. This challenge can and
must be met.
7Carpenter.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Berens, Robert J. "The Changing Face of World Power". National
Guard Journal, January 1990.
2. Carpenter, Ted Galen. "America Can't Police the Planet".
The Washington Post, August 30, 1990.
3. Cheney, Dick. Annual Report to the President and the Congress.
Washington, DC., January 1991.
4. Crockett, Norman L. The Power Elite in America. Lexington:
D.C. Heath and Co. ,1970.
5. Fletcher, Joseph. Situation Ethics. Philadelphia: Westminster
Press, 1967.
6. Lipset, Seymour Martin. Political Man. Garden City: Anchor
Books, 1963.
7. Neibuhr, Reinhold. Moral Man and Immoral Society. New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960.
8. Paret, Peter ed. Makers of Modern Strategy. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1986.
9. Rivlin, Alice M. "New World, New Danger". The Washington Post,
April 10, 1990.
10. Rowen, Hobart. "Japan and Germany Must Take Bigger Military,
Policy-Making Roles in World Affairs". The Washington
Post, March 3, 1991.
11. Van Dyke, Vernon. International Politics. Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall, 1972.
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