The United States Military Confronts The "New World Order" AUTHOR Major William A. Hingston, USMC CSC 1991 SUBJECT AREA - Foreign Policy EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: THE UNITED STATES MILITARY CONFRONTS THE "NEW WORLD ORDER" The United States military must have a renaissance, realigning its strategic and operational thinking in order to respond effectively as the "New World Order" sweeps the globe. Many foundations of the United States military's formulas for success have been leveled in the recent past. The Berlin wall is down, the Cold War is over and the "911" solution is no longer economically feasible. Unlike the past, where the perceived threat was simply bipolar, there now exists a wide spectrum of geo-political scenarios requiring diverse levels of military readiness. The United States military's effectiveness in meeting these legitimate demands will be determined by its ability to reevaluate its own needs of manpower, technology, and mission. These requirements will in turn be affected by societal parameters and economic necessities. The United States military must, in concert with the elected political leadership, forge a policy and program that keeps the United States in the forefront of the "New World Order". The United States Military "Confronts the New World Order" Outline The United States military must therefore have a renaissance; realigning its Strategic and Operational thinking in order to respond effectively in the "New World Order". I. Historical Implications A. The demise of the Cold War B. Champion of the "underdog" II. Ambiguous Geo-political Framework A. Bipolar world B. Persian Gulf C. Middle East III. Framework of Flexible Response A. Manpower 1. Post World War I and II 2. Cold War 3. Vietnam 4. All Volunteer Force 5. Post Cold War B. Technology 1. Increased abilities 2. Negative influence on defense issues C. Mission 1. Spectrum of possibilities a. Low intensity b. Gulf War impact c. Para-military warfare IV. The Budget as the determinant The United States Military Confronts the "New World Order" Come writers and critics who prophesize with your pens And keep your eyes wide the chance won't come again And don't speak too soon for the wheel's still in spin... And the loser now will be later to win; And the times they are a changin' Come Senators, Congressmen please heed the call Don't stand in the doorway; don't block up the hall For he that gets hurt will be he who has stalled The battle outside raging will soon shake your windows and rattle your walls; For the times they are a changin' Come mothers and fathers throughout the land And don't criticize what you can't understand Your sons and your daughters are beyond your command Your old road is rapidly aging. Please get out of the new one if you can't lend your hand; Oh the times they are a changin' The line it is drawn; the curse it is cast The slow one now will later be fast As the present now will later be past The order is rapidly fading And the first one now will later be last; Oh the times they are a changin'. -- Bob Dylan -- Al though Bob Dylan wrote these words about a world over twenty-five years ago, their relevance is equally profound for the 1990s. Dylan's words focused on social changes in the Western World, concentrating on the United States. Ironically twenty-five years later translating these words into Russian, Chinese, German, or Spanish, instills the same spark of social change in the hearts and minds of emerging peoples. With these changes will come unprecedented political complexities that will impact all facets of the Western World. The relative simplicity of East and West ideologies, which had clearly definable boundaries and allowed for comfortable political fundamentals is now gone. The prophetic concept of the 1960s notion of the world as a "global village" has become a reality in the 1990s. With the loss of the clearly definable boundaries of East and West irretrievably blurred, a relatively simple U.S. military strategy is no longer applicable. The U.S. military must therefore have a renaissance; realigning its strategic and operational thinking in order to respond effectively in "the New World Order". This realignment will be necessarily based on contemporary world history, changing geopolitical scenarios, and United States domestic realities. In an attempt to develop a legitimate and effective U.S. military policy an encapsulated review of current history is needed to define the parameters that will bound the U.S. military. The most dramatic element is the apparent end of the "Cold War". "and the walls come tumbling down" The Cold War was fought on the battlefield of budgets and balance sheets, stockpiles and posturing. It was the ultimate ideological fight between capitalism and communism. This war, championed by both the United States and the Soviet Union, was a conflict based on economic strength and endurance. It was therefore ultimately unwinnable by the Communists because they lacked depth in their industrial base and a superficial research and development program. The last gasps of the war occurred with such unprecedented speed and urgency that the West and the United States was left scrambling for a cohesive strategy to enact. The collapse of the Eastern Bloc was so swift, irreversible, and unexpected, that the United States was overwhelmed and lost its focal point. We were so immersed in the traditional revelry of victory, that the United States now faces a quagmire of unparalleled geopolitical problems. They were simmering below the surface but were never confronted because these issues were suppressed by the two sides of the ideological Cold War. But now that this "war" has ended we find both warriors vanquished, economically depleted, politically exhausted, and economically subjugated by the very nations they sought to protect or entice. The end of the war has stripped away the facade of military strength. Now we find that "economics has moved to the fore in the power balance, relegating to a lesser status politics [ideology) and military power [wars) that dominated the 20th century"1. The demise of the Cold War was economic and its apparent end rested not in how many warheads could be tossed but in which economy could survive the mushrooming cost of the technology which sustained the war of words. In order to effectively address the role of the United States military in the New World Order we must determine what the geopolitical responsibilities will be in the post-cold war world. In this assessment various scenarios should be examined, since a true national policy has yet to be established. "911 to the world" Since World War II the United States has championed the causes of many nations in the perceived role of the protector of the free world and the defender of the underdog. This has translated into the "911 syndrome" identified by many as United States foreign policy. This policeman to the world effort debatedly proved successful throughout the Cold War period because of the relative simplicity of the East vs. West idealogies. The us vs them policy found the United States entering alliances with many nations. These alliances were 1Berens, Robert J., "The Changing Face of World Power". National Guard Journal, January 1990. dominated by the United States (both financially and militarily) with "the rationale for undertaking such expensive and risky obligations throughout the Cold War to prevent Soviet global domination"2. The damage in perpetuating this "911" syndrome in the post-cold war world is that if the United States insists on policing the planet as the self- appointed guardian of the status quo it may require an even larger and more expensive military establishment than it maintained throughout the Cold War, with a corresponding higher potential for loss of life. Another scenario that United States strategists must consider is the multipolar world, which is the logical successor of the bipolar Cold War where both participants are incapable of maintaining a unipolar environment. Charles Krauthammer in his editorial, "the Unipolar Movement" (Washington Post, July 20, 1990), maintains that "the bipolar world in which the real power emanated only from Moscow and Washington is dead". Krauthammer continues that "the multipolar world to which we are headed, in which power will emanate from Berlin and Tokyo, Beijing and Brussels, as well as Washington and Moscow, is struggling to be born". The feasibility of this scenario is clearly well within the realm of possibility and even probability. Hobart Rowen supports 2Carpenter, Ted Galen, "America Can't Police the Planet". The Washington Post, 30 August 1990. this assertion by declaring the United States, Japan, and Germany as the only three world economic superpowers that really count"3. Krauthammer refers to this as "regional superpowers A wildcard scenario in the geopolitical arena that could clearly impact United States military thinking in the future is the continued quagmire of the Middle East and Persian Gulf regions. The interesting twist to this play is that in the Persian Gulf, a militarily minor, religiously focused culture, can yield such incredible economic clout because of their ability to control a majority of a finite global source of energy -- oil. Conventional military wisdom -- in spite of the Iraqi war in the gulf region -- really has little impact in controlling the power base of the region -- petrodollars. Might does not make right and military and political alliances in this region are as shifting as the sand with little or no moral depth to these agreements. Alliances are simply vehicles to insure the economic prosperity of the region and little concern is given to the long term requirements of their military benefactor -- the United States. The situation almost cries out as a mercenary relationship -- a gun for hire. 3Rowen, Hobart, "Japan and Germany Must Take Bigger Military, Policy-Making Roles in World Affairs". The Washington Post, March 3,1991. The Middle East region however lacks the economic influence that the Pacific rim, Persian Gulf, or European areas enjoy. Nevertheless it falls into the classic Cold War strategy of the enemy of my enemy is my friend. The end of the Cold war now allows the United States to establish a more even-handed, statesman-like policy in this region as the perceived Soviet involvement in the region is no longer (if it ever was) legitimate. The Middle East is probably the last region in the world where the United States can act as a genuine superpower and unilaterally construct a New World Order through economic and political pressure. military response Within such an ambiguous geopolitical framework the United States military is now being required to revisit the old strategy of cold war deterrence and look instead to a new flexible framework that honors the fiscal responsibility mandated by Congress. In establishing this new framework of response, three key areas have been identified for discussion: manpower, technology, and mission. The interface of these areas and their reciprocal impacts are apparent; however I will address each individually and draw conclusions accordingly. manpower The United States chronically suffers from selective memory - - choosing to remember events and things that are pleasant. The military in 20th Century American History has fallen victim to this disease twice: post World Wars I&II. In each case the war was won, the "boys" came home, and it was time to put the guns away -- back in the closet. Ironically after each war another crisis arose that required United States military involvement and in each case, initially, we were relatively unprepared to execute the prerogative of the National Command Authority. This resulted in an initial ineffective response and an unfortunate waste of human life. Fortunately, after the Korean War the Eastern Bloc represented such a perceived threat that the United States had no alternative but to maintain at least the appearance of a strong military posture. The Cold War had begun. This was manifested in the "Triad" policy of nuclear deterrence. This strategy worked in the world of superpower brinkmanship but was ineffective in the conventional arena. This was made painfully clear with the Vietnam conflict. The professional United States military during the post- Korea/pre-Vietnam era was a relatively small, highly trained force whose only flaw was that it was fused to a strategic nuclear policy focused on a Soviet/United States engagement. It did not have the indigenous manpower assets to respond to any medium or large scale conventional involvement. When the Vietnam conflict enlarged into a protracted conventional war of attrition, the United States military turned to the draft to increase its force structure rather than activate reserve units or national guard assets. This tactical error, not repeated during the recent Iraqi conflict, exacerbated an already politically volatile issue and helped fuel the growing socio-political unrest concerning the merit of the United States involvement in Vietnam. Upon the termination of the Vietnam conflict the United States military turned to the "all volunteer force" concept. This program, in concert with a more realistic postwar scaledown, enabled the United States to maintain a legitimate standing force. This force, after the initial growing pains of the late 1970s, has matured into a internationally respected and emulated cadre of dedicated professionals. Well trained and rearmed in the 1980s, it was a very powerful bargaining chip in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and Conventional Forces Elimination (CFE) negotiations with the Soviets. Unfortunately as the wall came tumbling down in Berlin and the Soviet empire crumbled, the cry immediately arose for a reduction in force strength of the United States military, commiserate with the perceived diminished threat. Since such an effort would save money at a time when the U.S. economy was stalling, many on Capital Hill were quick to embrace the reduction in force concept - once again selectively ignoring history. Current plans call for a twenty-five percent reduction of the active force by the end of 1995. Paradoxically the initial stages of this force reduction policy were occurring in the midst of the largest land battle fought since the Second World War. As we went to war in South West Asia, plans were placed in motion to eliminate from the active forces roughly the equivalent amount of personnel involved in the South West Asia campaign - roughly 525,000 individuals. The irony of this action will not be lost on the quality young staff non-commissioned officers and officers who see their prospects of a noble and legitimate military career becoming less likely and appealing. Many of these young professionals may opt instead for the civilian sector, where the skills paid for and acquired during military service can frequently be put to use for higher pay with fewer personal and family sacrifices required. The manpower situation is extremely volatile and without careful thorough planning, the urgent rush to save money now may in the long run exact a cost that is measured in mediocrity. "space -- the final frontier" Today's military is on the threshold of mind-boggling technology. The recent Iraqi conflict validates the advent of this new age of technology. Even the most inventive minds of the 1950s and 1960s dared not dream what are now the technical realities of the 1980s and early 1990s. What is truly overwhelming is that which is current is fleeting as each new day hastens the obsolescence of the previous day's discoveries. Technology has provided the modern military with the ability to perform its mission with mortal intensity and accuracy that is measured by failure rates of less than ten percent. Its efficiency and accuracy produce an aura of infallibility and invulnerability that is as dangerous as the weapons themselves. Perhaps the most ominous reality of the technological revolution is the astronomical cost of the weapons systems it produces. The unit cost reflects the research and development outlays that are required to design, engineer, and test the technology. The Fiscal Year 1992 (FY1992) defense budget authority calls for a Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RTD&E) authority of 39.9 billion dollars with another 63.4 billion dollars in procurement costs4. This 4Cheney, Dick, Annual Report to the President and the Congress. Washington,DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1991. equate to roughly 37% of the entire defense budget authority. Military personnel and operations and maintenance costs make up the remainder of the authority. It is readily apparent that the cost of modern armament will weigh heavily on defense decision makers. This will ultimately impact the United States military and their ability to perform in the New World Order. "mission impossible- As was addressed earlier, the military faces a broad spectrum of conflict as the United States honors its geopolitical global responsibilities and leadership role in the new world order. The spectrum ranges from the very probable -- low intensity activities in the Third World -- possible mid intensity conflict in the Middle East/Persian Gulf -- to the improbable (at this time) of a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union. Prior to the Gulf intervention the "Conventional Wisdom" was pointing to United States military involvement in the Contingency Action/Limited Objected Warfare arena -- coined CALOW by the Pentagon bureaucrats. Had it not been for the Gulf, it is very likely that the United States military would have been extensively focused to CALOW and would have suffered greatly in the event of any mid-to-high intensity encounter. Probably the most interesting mission facing the United States military is the possibility of fighting para-military actions supporting its counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism missions. Although global in scope, they have had a profound domestic impact therefore gaining significant political attention. This would be urban and jungle guerrilla warfare fought by a military currently geared to fight high-speed, high-tech conventional (and worst case nuclear) warfare. Current training and equipment in the inventory cannot adequately address the requirements of this type of warfare and will clearly impact the direction and role of the United States military in the next decade and on into the 21st Century. "give peace a chance" The issues that have the most dramatic impact on the United States military role in the New World Order are domestic. And although there are any number of tributary issues that can impact the military, they all seem to converge around the budget. As addressed earlier there is nothing that so profoundly affects/effects the United States military as the budget. Money talks in the USA and with peace at hand (i.e., no real Soviet threat) some Congressmen are demanding that the so-called "peace dividend " surface in the budget. The "peace dividend" is assumed to be the financial saving that will/can be incurred by a reduction in defense expenditures due to the lessening of tensions among the superpowers. Put simply, with no real enemy why have a large expensive military establishment? Click here to view image Already, in spite of the Iraqi war, the Percent Real Growth of the defense budget is decreasing as evidenced in Figure 1. This reduction is being "paid" for with a 25% reduction of active duty manpower and the cancellation and/or reduction in the purchase of major programs. Naval aviation, for example, has lost the A-12 stealth attack bomber, F-14D remanuf acture, and the P-7A anti-submarine patrol plane5. The United States Marine Corps, in desperate need of a replacement 5Holzer, Roger,"Navy Struggles to Find Funding for Ailing Aviation". Defense News March 25, 1991. for the CH-46 medium lift airframe, has lost the V-22/Osprey which was designed to perform that critical mission. Currently the United States military is enjoying a resurgence of popularity and prestige, based primarily on a lopsided victory over a third rate military force in the South West Asia conflict. This euphoria and its corresponding support will not survive the realities of today's news as the fiscal catastrophes of the 1980s and an "economy under siege" surface in the headlines again. The people will turn to reducing the defense budget as their salvation; the vehicle to diminish expenditures and salvage domestic and social programs. That is the reality of American politics and contemporary American society. "it's a new dawn" In conclusion the New World Order is a defining moment in history. The potential and the possible pitfalls are great. As Alice M. Rivlin states that there are four potential dangers to the future of America: (1) the diffusion of sophisticated weapons, (2) the possibility of irreversible damage to the environment, (3) the growing desperation of the worlds poor and, (4) the weakness of the U.S. economy6. These issues will clearly impact the role of America in the new world and by extension the United States military's place in 6Rivlin, Alice M., "New World, New Dangers". The Washington Post April 10, 1990. American foreign policy. The arguments have begun; on Capital Hill, in the nation's think tanks, and over coffee in Iowa. There will be many voices many opinions. The challenge can be met by a clear defined foreign policy that honors the heritage and beliefs of the American people in concert with a sound military and strong electd leadership to guide the ship of state and its supporting arms into the uncertainty of the 21st century. The United States military's task is to ensure that voices like those of Ted Carpenter are refuted, disputed, and laid to rest. Carpenter writes: "to be considered a threat to a vital interest, a development should have a direct, immediate and substantial connection with Americas philosophical survival, its political independence, or the preservation of its domestic freedoms Such isolationism has been tried before and failed -- it must not become the foreign policy of the United States. Nor should we continue to the act as the "911" of the world - economically and socially burdening our country. The challenge is great: we use our leadership wisely in creating a "World Order" of peace and stability. This challenge can and must be met. 7Carpenter. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Berens, Robert J. "The Changing Face of World Power". National Guard Journal, January 1990. 2. Carpenter, Ted Galen. "America Can't Police the Planet". The Washington Post, August 30, 1990. 3. Cheney, Dick. Annual Report to the President and the Congress. Washington, DC., January 1991. 4. Crockett, Norman L. The Power Elite in America. Lexington: D.C. Heath and Co. ,1970. 5. Fletcher, Joseph. Situation Ethics. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1967. 6. Lipset, Seymour Martin. Political Man. Garden City: Anchor Books, 1963. 7. Neibuhr, Reinhold. Moral Man and Immoral Society. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960. 8. Paret, Peter ed. Makers of Modern Strategy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. 9. Rivlin, Alice M. "New World, New Danger". The Washington Post, April 10, 1990. 10. Rowen, Hobart. "Japan and Germany Must Take Bigger Military, Policy-Making Roles in World Affairs". The Washington Post, March 3, 1991. 11. Van Dyke, Vernon. International Politics. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1972.
