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Air Interdiction--Focus For The Future
AUTHOR Major John A. Snider, USAF
CSC 1990
SUBJECT AREA Aviation
-TEXT-
                EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
            TITLE: AIR INTERDICTION--
               FOCUS FOR THE FUTURE
I.  Purpose:  To investigate planned USAF equipment and
doctrinal/procedural enhancements needed to meet future air
interdiction requirements
II.  Thesis:   Air interdiction has a long history of
effectiveness from the Second World War to the present
day.  To maintain and enhance that effectiveness in the
face of increasingly mobile and lethal ground forces
protected by increasingly sophisticated and effective air
defense systems, the USAF and her sister-Service air
components must improve both interdiction related systems
and the procedures used in their employment.
III. Discussion:  Interdiction campaigns from World War II,
Korea, and Viet Nam shared certain characteristics.  They
required air superiority as a prerequisite.  They were
almost totally daytime operations that allowed the enemy
some level of movement at night.  Finally, they
concentrated on transportation systems and infrastructure
more than on enemy force, and they were most successful
when coordinated with the action of the ground forces.
Future air interdiction efforts should build on these
lessons and attempt to eliminate the shortfalls they show.
    Systems to improve interdiction capability are being
developed and procured  in support of the U.S. Air-Land
Battle (ALB) Doctrine accepted in 1982 and in the Follow-On
Forces Attack (FOFA) Concept endorsed by NATO in 1984.
These systems consist of three types; reconnaissance,
surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA); Command,
Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I); and attack
systems.  These improvements will go a long way the
historic shortfalls in interdiction capability but new
procedures will be required to fully exploit those
capabilities.
    A new doctrinal framework for interdiction is required
in concert with the focus of ALB doctrine.  Procedural
changes built around mission-type interdiction orders will
best support this doctrinal framework.
IV.  Conclusion:  USAF is well on its way to improved
interdiction capability with the planned hardware
enhancements but needs to pursue the recommended doctrinal
and procedural changes to fully exploit those capabilities.
        AIR INTERDICTION--FOCUS FOR THE FUTURE
                       OUTLINE
  Thesis Statement.  Focused equipment improvements are
adding quantum capabilities to the Army/Air Force team's
ability to interdict enemy forces long before they can be
brought into battle but complementing procedural and
doctrinal changes are required to fully exploit these new
capabilities.
I.    History of Air Interdiction
         A.   WW II
         B.   Korea
         C.   Vietnam - Rolling Thunder & Linebacker
II.   Interdicion System Improvements
         A.   Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target
              Acquisition (RSTA) Systems
         B.   C3I Systems
         C.   Attack Weapons Systems
III.  Improvements - Doctrine and Procedures
         A.   New Framework for Interdiction Missions
         B.   Mission Orders
        AIR INTERDICTION--FOCUS FOR THE FUTURE
    Throughout history military geniuses have recognized
the decisive advantages gained by interposing themselves
between their enemy and his supplies or reinforcements.
Fredrick the Great won by cutting off his enemies from
their capital.1  Time and time again, Napoleon would
position himself to defeat one enemy completely before
another could intervene.2  The modern military tool to
isolate an enemy on the battlefield would be an
unbelievable fancy to these military giants but the
principles necessary for its employment are the same as
those Fredrick and Napoleon used so successfully.
    On the modern battlefield, airpower with its inherent
range, flexibility, and firepower provides the commander
with a powerful means of isolating and defeating an enemy.
Current doctrine recognizes the importance of this
"interdiction" mission and the U.S. Air Force lists it as
one of only three tactical missions for airpower, the
others being Counter-Air and Close-Air Support.  Air
interdiction consists of:
         air operations conducted to destroy, neutralize,
         or delay the enemy's military potential before it
         can be brought to bear effectively against
         friendly forces, at such distance from friendly
forces that detailed integration of each air
         mission with fire and movement of friendly forces
         is not required. (DOD Dictionary of Military
         Terms)
    Air interdiction has a long history of effectiveness
from the Second World War to the present day.  To maintain
and enhance that effectiveness in the face of increasingly
mobile and lethal ground forces, protected by increasingly
sophisticated and effective air defense systems, the USAF
and her sister-Service air components must improve both
interdiction related systems and the procedures used in
their employment.
  History of Air Interdiction
    Air interdiction served as a powerful tool in all
theaters of the Second World War.  Chronologically, the
first major success of interdiction was achieved without
flying a single sortie.
    In 1940 after the startlingly effective success of his
armor/air-team led Blitzkrieg, Hitler contemplated an
invasion of England to subdue the last of his Western
foes.  His invasion fleet was poised in the Channel ports
but before he could launch them he had to suppress the
Royal Air Force's ability to interdict them as they
crossed.  His attempt led to the legendary Battle of
Britain in which the RAF prevailed and whose continued
existence made the cross-channel invasion impossible.3
    A year later the British used interdiction of supplies
decisively in the North African campaign.  Rommel was on
the Egyptian border, prepared for a final offensive.  The
British intensified their sea and air interdiction campaign
from Malta and in November succeeded in destroying 77% of
the supplies sent to the Africa Corps.  By December Rommel
was down to 40 tanks, his ammunition stocks were at a
critical level and the Italians could not get anything to
him.  He had no choice but to withdraw from Egypt and
Tobruk.  Only the suppression of Malta with massive air
attacks freed Rommel to resume his offensive the following
year.4
    Air interdiction continued to play a critical role in
the European Theater throughout the war.  Operation
Strangle, the interdiction campaign in Italy, made
breaching of the Gustav line possible by first reducing the
Germans resupply from 88,000 tons per day to only 4,000.
The impact on vehicles and roads was just as important:
         What made an enormous difference, however was the
    German inability to move reserves to the front or to
    move forces laterally across it.  The interdiction
    campaign had taken such a toll of trucks and trains,
    and had done so much damage to bridges, railroads, and
    roads, that the Germans were dependent on foot power
    and animal transport to move anywhere.5
    Interdiction played a similarly crucial role in the
preparations for the Normandy invasion.  The concentrated
effort by Allied air to isolate the beach defenders from
reinforcements was an unqualified success.  Von Rundstedt,
overall commander of German forces opposing the Normandy
landing summed it up best:
         It was all a question of air force, air force, and
    again air force.  The main difficulties that arose at
    the time of the invasion were the systematic
    preparations by your air force: the smashing of the
    main lines of communications,....We had prepared for
    various eventualities ... that all came to nothing or
    was rendered impossible by the destruction of railway
    communications,....  The second thing was the attack on
    the roads...so that it was impossible to move anyone at
    all by day....  That also meant that bringing up of the
    armoroured divisions was also out of the question,
    quite impossible.  Those were the main things that
    caused the general collapse.6
    In the Pacific, MacArthur's entire island hopping
campaign was predicated at the operational level on
interdiction to isolate enemy strong points that could then
be reduced at will or simply bypassed.  At the strategic
level, the Southwest Pacific Campaign was aimed at cutting
the supply lines to the Japanese home islands to strangle
the war industries.  Airpower and the submarine force made
interdiction successful at both levels.
    In Korea interdiction again played a part in both
offensive and defensive operations although with more mixed
results than seen in World War II.  In both the defense of
the Pusan perimeter and the retreat from the Yalu, reducing
the southern flow flow of Communist forces and supplies
allowed the ground force the time to regroup for a cohesive
defense.  Yet there were problems:
         There is little doubt that in the first months of
    the war, thousands of the interdiction missions flown
    by the Air Force were valueless because of inadequate
    targeting.  "The Air Force bombed and bombed the main
    routes...but achieved very little because they didn't
    understand Chinese techniques.  The Communists simply
    weren't on the main routes."7
    In the longer run, interdiction did have a major
impact.  The Chinese were never manpower limited.  Because
of the interdiction campaign they were totally denied
movement in the daytime and were severely restricted at
night because of the damage done to the North Korean
transportation system.  Consequently the size of China's
forces in Korea was restricted by the number of men for
whom supplies could be brought south from the Yalu.8
    In Viet Nam the story of interdiction is even more
confused and controversial.  According to Secretary of
Defense Robert McNamara in Congressional Testimony, the
Rolling Thunder campaign from 1965 to 1968 had three
objectives; reducing infiltration to the south, showing the
North Vietnamese that continued aggression would be costly,
and bolstering the morale of the South Vietnamese.
Obviously only the first of these is truly a military
objective; the others are psychological and belong more in
the political realm.9
    In spite of severe bombing restrictions, a series of
bombing halts, bad weather, and an elusive enemy, Rolling
Thunder did have an impact. As President Johnson said
during a 1968 visit to Viet Nam:
         Through the use of air power, a mere handful of
    you men --as military forces are really reckoned--are
    pinning down several hundred thousand--more than half a
    million--North Vietnamese. You are increasing the cost
    of infiltration.  You are imposing a very high rate of
    attrition when the enemy is engaged, and you are giving
    him no rest when he withdraws.10
    The President's words not withstanding, Rolling Thunder
did not preclude the continuation of the insurgency in the
south or a sufficient buildup of supplies for launching the
Tet offensive of 1968.
    In 1972, interdiction played a more forceful role as
American ground forces were being drawn down.  The
Linebacker operation put U.S. air power as the primary
block in front of the North Vietnamese Easter Offensive.
    Linebacker, together with the mining [of Haiphong],
    tactical air support in the South, and stiffening
    Southern resistance, wrecked Hanoi's capacity to
    conduct offensive warfare.  Moreover the bombing and
    mining restricted all Northern imports, and the
    Politburo found its populace in danger of starving.11
The result was an end to the offensive and a move to the
negotiating table.
    All these interdiction campaigns shared certain
characteristics.  They required air superiority as a
prerequisite.  They were almost totally daytime operations
that allowed the enemy some level of movement at night.
Finally, they concentrated on transportation systems and
infrastructure more than on enemy force, and they were most
successful when coordinated with the action of the ground
forces.  Future air interdiction efforts should build on
these lessons and attempt to eliminate the shortfalls they
show.
  Interdiction Systems Improvements
    Systems to improve interdiction capability are being
developed and procured  in support of the U.S. Air-Land
Battle (ALB) Doctrine accepted in 1982 and in the Follow-On
Forces Attack (FOFA) Concept endorsed by NATO in 1984.
These systems consist of three types; reconnaissance,
surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA); Command,
Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I); and attack
systems.12
    The centerpiece of RSTA systems for improved
interdiction is the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack
Radar System (Joint STARS).  Joint STARS, now in full-scale
development by the Air Force and Army, consists of a
multi-mode airborne radar on a modified Boeing 707 airframe
(E-8) with operator stations on the aircraft and in mobile
Ground Station Modules (GSMs).  The radar is capable of
locating and tracking vehicles continuously across a wide
(Corps-size) frontage more than 100km behind the FLOT.13
High speed processors and data links enable both onboard
operators and GSM users  a near instantaneous picture of
movement throughout the coverage area.  Mass digital
recording and playback of successive radar sweeps builds a
moving picture of traffic patterns.  Coupled with its high
accuracy, this picture allows the operator not only to
analyze where units are currently but to predict their
future position on the battlefield.
    The implications for interdiction are obvious.  With
Joint STARS' picture of movement, the commander can better
see where the enemy's forces are concentrating and thus
identify those critical units which should be the priority
interdiction targets.
    Just as importantly, by tracking these targets over
time, even if they stop, Joint STARS can provide attacking
aircrews with updated target position or updated expected
time-of-arrival in a pre-planned target-area-of-interest
(TAI).
    Another new RSTA system important to the improvement of
interdiction is the Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV).  Equipped
with TV or FLIR sensors and characterized by fairly long
endurance, UAVs can provide real-time surveillance along
likely approach corridors and over suspected assembly
areas.  With Joint STARS' "Big Picture" UAVs could be used
to fill in any blanks caused by radar masking and to
provide more detailed imagery of suspected high priority
targets.
    The final set of RSTA systems that will assist in the
interdiction campaign is contained in the Advanced Tactical
Air Reconnaissance System (ATARS).  ATARS brings the
advantages of digital sensor technology to the tactical
reconnaissance units of the USAF, USN, and USMC.  It
provides a digital tape-based reconnaissance suite to
replace the film-based systems currently in use. The
difference in timeliness is analogous to the difference
between using a 35mm camera versus a camcorder at home.
One must be processed; the other is ready immediately.  By
providing that instant picture, ATARS will make the manned
and unmanned systems of the three services more timely and
consequently more useful for the interdiction mission.
    These systems all improve the ability of the commander
to "see" the battlefield, day and night.  Their total
effect will provide both the interdiction planner and the
crews flying the missions with a more accurate, complete,
and timely picture of the battlefield.
    As important as these RSTA improvements are, they are
largely useless unless the C3I system can turn their
information into meaningful and timely intelligence and
then execute the commander's decision effectively.  Three
new programs offer help in this respect.
    The Enemy Situation Correlation Element (ENSCE) is the
USAF's portion of the Army's Joint Tactical Fusion Program
(JTFP).  While JTFP may sound nuclear in nature it is not.
The program aims at bringing automation to the correlation
of intelligence from multiple sources.  By moving the
intelligence officer out of grease boards and manual
message assimilation into the world of computer driven and
update threat displays, JTFP will increase  the accuracy,
completeness, and timeliness of the intelligence picture.
    ENSCE's impact on interdiction will be twofold.  First,
by giving the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC)
and his staff a better picture of the battlefield, they can
plan a more effective interdiction campaign.  An added
benefit of the jointness of the program is that with the
Air Force and Army systems feeding each other, both
component commanders will be working against the same
threat picture.  This will undoubtedly make coordination
and joint decision making easier and more effective.
ENSCE's does not only benefit the headquarters staff.
    It also helps the aircrew at the squadron.  ENSCE will
feed Intelligence Workstations at the wing and squadron
level to provide complete and current intelligence in a
readily usable form to crews planning air missions,
particularly interdiction missions.
    Another system that will aid the interdiction campaign
is the Ground Attack Control Capability (GACC) upgrade to
the Modular Control Equipment (MCE) in the Tactical Air
Control Center (TACC) .  MCE is the digital control and
display system that is replacing conventional radar scopes
in the TACC.  GACC is a software enhancement that provides
the TACC's controllers with Joint STARS input and
menu-driven capabilities for rapidly matching targets with
available aircraft and weapons.  The controller can then
pass updated mission, target, and threat information to the
airborne aircrew.
    Passing information to aircrews is the last area of
improvement under the C3I heading.  Updating target
location, target type, time-over-target, and enemy threats
for a pilot flying a high-performance aircraft in a combat
environment has never been easy.  In today's communications
jamming environment it will be doubly hard.  Yet to
effectively capitalize on the increased ability to see deep
that information must get to the crew.  The most used
current procedure is for the pilot to copy the information
with a grease pencil on his canopy, an amazing throwback in
a multi-million dollar, fully computerized combat
aircraft.  Luckily, a better "grease pencil" is at hand.
    The Joint Tactical Information Distribution System
(JTIDS) is a high-rate, time-distributed, digital data link
under development for all Services.  JTIDS was designed and
is being fielded to support the Counter-Air campaign
(Anti-Air Warfare for Naval types).  It allows rapid
passing of data among all users at a rate that approaches
real-time.  Already installed in the TACC, onboard ships,
and on the E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System
(AWACS), JTIDS has recently completed testing on the F-15.
Although too large for many fighters in its current
configuration, JTIDS, or a similar system could be that
final link in the information chain needed to fight a
focused interdiction campaign against moving maneuver
elements.
    All the RSTA and C3I improvements in the world would be
useless without aircraft and weapons suited for the
interdiction mission.  In fact improvements in the planes
and weapons are to some extent ahead of the supporting
improvements already discussed.  In the aircraft category,
the prime improvement is a concerted effort to improve the
night attack capability of tactical fighters.  The weapons
improvements aim at improved lethality against armor and
increased standoff for increased flexibility and
survivability.
    For several years the Tactical Air Forces' priority
development and procurement program has been the Low
Altitude Navigation, Targeting, Infra-Red, Night (LANTIRN)
system.  LANTIRN consisted of two externally mounted pods
that provide Foward Looking Infra-Red (FLIR) and Terrain
Following Radar (TFR) for low-altitude, high-speed
navigation and target acquisition at night below the
weather.  LANTIRN will enable both the multi-role F-16 and
the new dual-role F-15E to provide a quantum improvement in
the USAF's night attack capability.  This capability will
largely eliminate the night sanctuary from interdiction
enemy forces have enjoyed in the past.
    The arrival of the F-15E adds a new dimension to the
interdiction campaign.  In terms of numbers, the F-15E will
almost double the aircraft available for deep operation
relieving some of the pressure on the venerable F-lll, for
the past decade USAF's only tactical deep strike aircraft.
Just as importantly, by retaining all the air-to-air
prowess that has made it famous, the F-15E provides an
anti-air capability for deep interdiction missions that has
long been missing.
    Pending weapons improvements will also increase the
capability of the air component to conduct a focused air
interdiction campaign.  The recent fielding of the GATOR
air delivered mine system provided a capability to delay
and disrupt armor on the move. Just as importantly, it can
be used to deny approach corridors an enemy might prefer.
The Sensor Fused Weapon (SFW), now in development,  will
provide a much improved area armor-kill weapon vice the
currently used Mk-20 Rockeye.  Finally the fielding of an
Imaging Infra-Red seeker for the Maverick anti-tank missile
will open the night window for precision armor attack while
also offering improved survivability through limited
standoff.
    Even more survivability gains and flexibility will be
derived from the Modular Standoff Weapon (MSOW) system.  A
cooperative development effort between a number of NATO
nations, MSOW will consist of a family of air-delivered
standoff missiles with varied ranges and payloads.  Two of
the three variants will be applicable to interdiction.
    These improvements in RSTA, C3I, and weapons systems
will go a long way in eliminating the historic shortfalls
in interdiction capabilities.  The movement of the F-15E
into the interdiction mission will assist in providing the
air superiority that interdiction has always required.  The
improvements in RSTA and the incorporation of LANTIRN will
deprive the enemy of the sanctuary of night.  The total
package of RSTA, C3I, and weapons will allow the air
component to focus more directly on the enemy and less on
the infrastructure that supports him.  Yet the equipment by
itself is not enough.  New procedures will be required to
fully exploit these new capabilities.
  Doctrinal and Procedural Changes
    Focusing interdiction on the enemy will require both
doctrinal and procedural changes.  Current Air Force
doctrine as contained in AFM 1-1 defines Air Interdiction
(AI) as missions "to delay, disrupt, and destroy"  enemy
combat potential before it reaches the battlefield.  A
subcategory called Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI)
consists of those AI missions which must be coordinated
with friendly land forces.  While these definitions are
easily grasped they lead to a managerial approach to
interdiction by failing to focus the mission on the enemy.
    The Air-Land Battle Doctrine as reflected in FM 100-5
does a better job by stating what interdiction (deep
operations) is meant to do:
         At both [tactical and operational] levels, the
    principle targets of deep operations are the freedom of
    action of the opposing commander and the coherence and
    tempo of his operations....Because of the scarcity of
    resources with which to perform these activities, deep
    operations must be focused against those enemy
capabilities which most directly threaten the success
    of projected friendly operations.  These must be
    attacked decisively, with enough power to assure the
    desired impact.  That will be the more true when--as
    will frequently be the case--seizure and retention of
    the initiative depend on successful prosecution of deep
    operations.
    From this concept three types of interdiction missions
emerge; (1) those that create an environment in which the
enemy commander has limited freedom of action and is less
capable of generating coherence and tempo; (2) those that
deny specific courses of action and attack his coherence
and tempo; and (3) those that focus on protecting friendly
operations from the enemy's residual capability.
    Using interdiction to create an environment in which
the enemy is at a disadvantage is, in the main, what the
earlier historic examples detailed.  To be effective these
mission must be focused.  Prime commodities such petroleum
products or critical transportation systems or nodes such
as the railway system or ports would appear appropriate.
The mining of Haiphong and the concerted attacks against
POL in Europe in World War II are good examples.  In both
cases this and supporting interdiction missions denied the
enemy commander the freedom to conduct sustained offensive
operations.
    The second type of interdiction focuses on denying
specific courses of action to the enemy and disrupting his
cohesion and tempo at a particular time and place.  This
interdiction would focus on specific routes and chokepoints
to deny them to the enemy.  It could alternatively aim at
particular enemy formations as the FOFA concept suggests.
Mission orders for this type of interdiction might read:
    Conduct attacks along the Blue River to deny the enemy
    the ability to attack in sector within the next 36
    hours
or
    Conduct attacks, if required, to ensure the 3rd MRD
    arrives at the FLOT at least 12 hours after the 1st TD
    in order to shatter the planned cohesion of the enemy's
    attack
    The first type of general interdiction would be a
mission assigned to the Joint Air Component Commander
(JFACC) by a CINC or Joint Task Force Commander without
particular concern with the current ground situation.  In
the second type of AI, the CINC would ensure that the
missions assigned to his air and land (or naval) commanders
were complementary and formed a unified plan of action.  In
the final type of interdiction, the air mission is
dependent on and must be closely coordinated with the other
components.
    In protecting friendly courses of action, the JFACC
focuses on supporting friendly operations and assures the
enemy cannot interfere with planned operations.  Typical
missions might include:
    Deny resupply of POL and ammunition to the forces
    facing 3rd Marines in order to facilitate continued
    attack at H-hour
or
    Guard the right flank of Third Army in order to
    maintain security of its supply lines as it advances
    The second example is exactly what happened in 1944
when XIX TAC protected Patton's southern flank as he drove
across France.  Air was so successful in its mission that
the commander of the 20,000 German troop south of the Loire
asked that XIX TAC's commander be present for the Germans'
surrender on 7 September 1944.14
    The advantage of mission oriented interdiction is that
it allows the CINC and the JFACC to focus interdiction much
more sharply that does the current procedure of
apportionment and allocation.  Under the current system the
JFACC recommends, and the CINC approves, the division of
air effort, on a percentage basis, among the different
types of air missions (AI, CAS, Counter-Air, etc.).  While
the mission areas are prioritized, the current Air Tasking
Order and the resultant Fragmentary Order simply do not
provide adequate definition of the object of the
apportioned missions nor do they provide for prioritization
within mission areas.  Furthermore, since they dictate
tasks to be accomplished (sorties flown, specific targets
struck) instead of the mission to be accomplished, they
deny the executing subordinate the flexibility to respond
intelligently to the rapidly changing battlefield.  The
current system provides for a very managerially efficient
allocation of sorties but fails to provide the intent and
focus that is required for an effective interdiction
campaign.  Mission oriented interdiction tasking provides
the required direction and the flexibility.
    The combination of mission oriented interdiction
tasking and the interdiction improvements now underway
promises to keep interdiction a powerful tool for the
military commander.  The increased ability to see deep in
all weather during the day and night provided by Joint
STARS and the other RSTA improvements will provide a basis
for planning and executing a concerted and timely
interdiction campaign aimed at the enemy's forces.  The C3I
improvements will provide the link between the improved
picture of the deep battle and the crews who fly the
missions.  The weapons improvements will enhance their
effectiveness against enemy maneuver units and deny the
enemy his historic night sanctuary.  Finally, mission
oriented tasking will enable the commander to effectively
employ the interdiction weapon to shape the battlefield and
isolate the foe.
                        Footnotes
1  T. R. Phillips, Roots of Strategy, (Stackpole Books,
         Harrisburg, PA, 1985), p. 318-322.
2  IBID., p 405.
3  Richard Hough, The Battle of Britain, (W. W. Norton &
         Co., New York, 1989), p. 103
4  John A. Warden, The Air Campaign, (National Defense
         University Press, Washington, DC, 1988), p. 87
5  IBID, p.90
6  William W. Momyer, Air Power in Three Wars, (Government
         Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1978), p. 166
7  Max Hastings, The Korean War, (Simon & Schuster, New
         York, NY, 1987), p. 255
8  IBID., p. 277
9  Momyer, p. 173
10  IBID., p. 192
11  Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power, (The Free
         Press, New York, NY, 1989), p. 173
12  Unless otherwise noted material in this section comes
    from a briefing given by the author and LTC Mark Kogel,
    USA, to the Department of Defense FOFA Working Group in
    June 1988.  The briefing was subsequently given to the
    NATO Conference of National Armament Directors by flag
    officers from the U.S. Army and Air Force in September
    1988.
13  U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, New
           Technology for NATO: Improving Follow-On Forces
           Attack,  (U.S. Government Printing Office,
         Washington, DC,  1987),  p. 41
14  United States Air Force, Office of Air Force History,
           Condensed Analysis of the Ninth Air Force in the
           European Theater of Operations, (U.S. Government
         Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1987),  p. 29
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