Developing A Continuous Operations Capability
AUTHOR Major Joseph J. McMenamin, USMC
CSC 1990
SUBJECT AREA Strategic Issues
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: DEVELOPING A CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS CAPABILITY
I. Thesis: Developing a continuous operations capability is
vital to sustaining the performance of Marine forces because
it will slow down or negate the degrading effects of
continuous operations, preserve the fighting capabilities of
Marine units, and reduce the potential for battle fatigue
(BF) casualties among Marines and leaders.
II. Background: Threat doctrine calls for conducting warfare
day and night in any weather by maintaining a highly
maneuverable and dynamic offensive. Frontlines will be fluid
and electronic warfare will add to the confusion and stress
of the battlefield. Although this scenario applies to the
Warsaw Pact, the Marine Corps, by its expeditionary nature,
could find itself committed to operations against nations
trained and equipped by the Soviets or their client states.
III. Data: Continuous operations will require Marines to
fight at a high pace for extended periods. Additionally, the
lethality of the battlefield has increased greatly since
World War II. The recent experiences of the Israeli Defense
Force indicate that at least one psychiatric casualty will
occur for every four battle casualties during the first 30
days of combat. Marines that do not become battle casualties
will find their performance degraded by lack of sleep,
physical fatigue, disrupted wake/sleep cycles, and stress.
Those unable to cope with the cumulative effects of stress
will become battle fatigue casualties. High risk operations
such as amphibious assaults and heliborne assaults, missions
that Marines traditionally train for, will produce higher
rates of battle fatigue.
IV. Conclusions: Continuous operations will adversely effect
the fighting performance of Marines and their leaders.
Efforts to counter the degrading effects of continuous
operations must be planned for and executed in training.
Strong, effective leaders must be identified, trained, and
prepared for continuous combat operations. Recognizing
and coping with stress is crucial to conserving the fighting
capabilities of Marines and leaders in this type of combat.
V. Recommendations: Rigorous, stressful training, including
skills to cope with stress, is a key factor in developing a
continuous operations capability. Leaders must ensure that
training is tough and demanding. Leaders must establish
standards and through their behavior set the example for the
Marines they lead. A continuous operations capability should
not only be a goal for all units but a mission essential task
necessary to ensure success on the battlefield.
DEVELOPING A CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS CAPABILITY
OUTLINE
Thesis Statement. Developing a continuous operations
capability is vital to sustaining the performance of Marine
forces because it will slow down or negate the degrading
effects of continuous operations, preserve the fighting
capabilities of Marine units, and reduce the potential for
battle fatigue (BF) casualties among Marines and leaders.
I. Introduction
A. Predictions of BF casualties
B. Definitions
1. Continuous operations
2. Sustained operations
C. Effects of continuous operations
1. Battle fatigue
2. High risk operations
3. Combat tasks
II. Leadership
A. Measures taken before combat
1. Unit cohesiveness
2. Communications
3. Responsibility for training
B. Identifying leaders
1. Requirements for strong leaders
2. Psychological maturity
3. Task maturity
C. Committed to combat
1. Understanding the effects of continuous
operations
2. Communication
3. Preventing BF casualties
III. Training
A. Core of success
B. Training under rigorous and stressful conditions
1. Insights
2. By-products
3. Impact of long duration training
4. Incremental approach
C. Preventing BF casualties
1. Training under all conditions
2. Critical combat tasks
3. Physical fitness
IV. Stress
A. Recognizing stress
1. Stress in others
2. Stress in ourselves
B. Coping with stress
1. Coping as a combat skill
2. Stress reduction techniques
3. Stress inoculation
C. Sleep loss
1. Effects of sleep loss
2. Sleep plans
3. Requirements for duty versus sleep
V. Conclusion
A. Training as you expect to fight
1. Hard skills
B. Leadership, training, and coping
1. Key sources of strength
2. Commitment
C. Success on the battlefield
1. Blending the tangibles and intangibles
DEVELOPING A CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS CAPABILITY
The firing increased as the helicopters approached
for the extraction. Green tracers streaked overhead
and mortars burst in the treetops. The operation
had only taken 12 hours, yet the movement to the
staging area and the transit to the objective had
left little time for sleep in the past three days.
What was supposed to be an easy operation had taken a
turn for the worse with resistance encountered most of
the day. The platoon commander supervised the loading
of the helicopters and made one last check of the
of the area. Boarding the helicopter as it started to
lift off, the lieutenant yelled at the Marine in front
of him for help. The Marine sat unmoving, eyes wide
and vacant. Although not visibly wounded, this Marine
had become a casualty.
This Marine was a battle fatigue (BF) casualty. He
eventually returned to full duty with counselling and
remained with his platoon. However, in future conflicts not
all Marines will be this lucky. U.S. Army experiences in
previous conflicts and Israeli Defense Force experiences in
1973 and 1982 predict that in a high intensity conflict with
conventional weapons at least one BF casualty will occur for
every four battle casualties during the initial stages of
war. If it is necessary to fight in a nuclear, biological,
and chemical (NBC) environment, predictions of BF casualties
to battle casualties range from 1-to-3 to 1-to-2 for a 30-day
period. (3:28)
Confusion, stress, and the lethality of the modern
battlefield will all place heavy demands on the human
endurance of today's Marine. The courage, perseverance,
and ability or desire of Marines to make decisions, perform
combat duties, and execute the skills needed to survive will
be tested by the high tempo of operations. FM 22-9, Soldier
Performance in Continuous Operations, states that combat
operations in future wars will be both continuous and
sustained. Continuous meaning that technology will allow
effective movement at night and during periods of reduced
visibility. Operations can now continue around the clock
with high levels of intensity without let-up. The historical
reasons for halting or slowing operations have been overcome
by technology. Sustained operations will find the same
Marines and units engaged in continuous operations with
little opportunity for relief. (15:1-2)
One of the effects of continuous operations is the
presence of BF casualties. BF manifests itself in many ways
depending on the amount of time an individual is in combat.
The initial cases of BF will most likely be seen in the first
30 days. These cases are highlighted by tremors, shaking,
hallucinations, uncontrollable crying, and possibly
hysterical blindness. As combat becomes prolonged, the
dramatic cases of the early days will become rare but there
will be an increase in what is known as the "Old Sergeants
Syndrome." Lieutenant Colonel B. H. Chermol, USA, in his
article Psychiatric Casualties in Combat describes this
symptom of BF as characterized by apathy, lack of concern
about one's survival or equipment, dependence on others,
vomiting, diarrhea, depression, and social withdrawal. (3:29)
High-risk operations such as amphibious assaults,
heliborne assaults, or combat in a built-up area where the
Marine has little control over his own destiny will produce
high rates of BF during or immediately after the operation.
Certain occupational fields (MOS's) have a historically
higher incident rate of BF. Armored units in World War II
experienced the highest rate of BF. (3:27) The noise,
confinement, and feeling of isolation within the vehicle:
increased stress by degrading the ability to cope with the
loss of sleep. (4:38) Death by incineration was a daily
possibility and infantry units attached to tank units had the
highest rate of any group. Armored units were often assigned
high risk missions and required to maintain a higher tempo of
operations contributing to fatigue and stress.
Continuous combat will cause the fighting performance of
Marines and units to degrade even if they do not become BF
casualties. The adverse conditions of combat and causes of
BF such as physical fatigue and sleep loss respect neither
rank nor role. Commanders and staffs that operate
continuously without rest are more likely to become degraded
than the Marines in their charge. Combat tasks that
become severely degraded after 120 mission hours are command,
control and communications, repositioning of forces,
controlling direct and indirect fires, and the processing of
information. Problem solving, thinking, and decision making
are activities that suffer the most. (15:1-11)
How can we reduce the potential for BF casualties among
our Marines and leaders? Can we negate or slow down the
degrading effects of continuous operations? What does it
take to develop a continuous operations capability? Most
experts state that the three main factors in reducing BF and
the degrading effects of continuous operations are
leadership, training, and developing skills to cope with
stress. These three elements cannot be looked at in
isolation but must be viewed together as they establish a
means to reduce or prevent the debilitating effects of
combat.
Leadership plays many key roles in preparing Marines for
continuous operations and reducing the potential for BF
casualties. Leaders need to realize that success in
continuous operations is achieved by measures taken before
Marines are committed to combat. Leaders must plan for unit
cohesion by minimizing turbulence among small units and
teams. Unit cohesiveness builds teamwork and a strong sense
of responsibility among members of the team. This "esprit de
corps" and unit cohesiveness are strong sources of strength
for individuals facing the rigors of combat.
Leaders should communicate with their men during their
training and development. They must get to know their
Marines and what they are capable of accomplishing under all
conditions. Not all Marines have the same potential.
Leaders must use this training time to identify and pair
individuals within teams and small units together forming a
"buddy system." These individuals eat, sleep, and go on
liberty together. When combat comes, they are capable of
checking each other for stress and other signs of BF. The
Marine Corps fire team is a good example of an
institutionalized "buddy system."
Leaders are also responsible for ensuring training is
physically and mentally tough, realistic, and stressful.
High standards are established and training is developed to
meet these standards. Tests are conducted to evaluate the
performance to Marines and units ensuring competence in all
tasks. Leader training is equally as important. Training in
the hard skills of war - patrolling/tactics, weapons, and
maintenance - is a must for leaders. (5:B-11) These hard
skills will prepare leaders to be effective in combat which
should reflect in a reduced number of casualties.
Continuous operations will require strong leaders who
exhibit self-confidence, make sound judgements, and have the
ability to cope with battle stress. Developing leaders and
potential leaders must not just focus on tactics, physical
fitness, and the proper application of Standard Operating
Procedures (SOPs). The fluid, autonomous nature of today's
battlefield requires the development of leaders who exhibit
psychological and task maturity. This is especially true at
the small-unit level because these leaders are essential to
independent operations characteristic of mission orders and
maneuver warfare.
An individual who demonstrates psychological maturity is
able to work with minimal guidance, is a self-starter, and is
able to keep success and failure in the proper perspective.
Inner-directed, he does not need constant task or
relationship behavior to stay motivated. Some of the
indicators of psychological maturity are:
-accepts responsibility for his actions
-self-confidence
-ability and willingness to do job/accept change
-risk-taking behavior (moderate risks preferred
over easy/hard)
-ability to accept constructive criticism (18:1)
Task maturity develops in individuals not only the
ability to know how to accomplish a task, but its relative
importance to other tasks. The impact of the task and its
logical extension is well understood ensuring that "spin-off"
responsibilities associated with the task are completed
allowing for continual successful performance. Task maturity
is indicated by:
-does more than expected
-anticipates what needs to be done and does it
-helps others without being asked to do so
-well-planned, knows where to go and why
-takes action
-always seeking new ideas/better techniques (19:1)
Developing psychological and task maturity comes from
challenging Marines and leaders to think and exercise
initiative. This maturity must come from an environment that
encourages independence, rewards aggressiveness and
creativity, and realizes that mistakes are not setbacks but
opportunities to be exploited. Continuous operations will
present many demands on leaders at all levels. Those that
possess psychological and task maturity along with
flexibility and imagination will enhance the performance of
small-units and improve the performance of higher level units
as well. (16:7)
Committed to combat, leaders must know and understand
the effects of continuous operations on their men. Leaders
should not add to the already stressful situation.
Maintaining units in a higher than needed alert status and
unnecessary movement should be avoided when possible. A
sleep plan must be established with the same attention to
detail as a feeding plan, ammunition resupply, and
preventative maintenance.
Communication continues to be important. Great care
must be taken to avoid ambiguity and to provide information
in a clear, precise, and direct manner. Frequent contact
with leaders will serve to reassure Marines that they can
cope, that they can keep going, and they can do what is asked
of them. The leader should set the example and exhibit self-
control. Coping with stress, overcoming fear, and doing what
is necessary though unpleasant are means used by the leader
to set the example and provide a role model from which
Marines can pattern their behavior.
In combat, strong leadership plays an integral part in
reducing or preventing BF casualties. Studies comparing
combat units in World War II demonstrated the significance of
effective leadership in reducing BF. Lieutenant Colonel B.
H. Chermol, USA, in his article Psychiatric Casualties in
Combat stated that " the essential qualities of leadership
noted in World War II are still valid today: competence,
candidness, commitment, courage, and caring." (3:30)
Proper training is critical to developing a continuous
operation capability. S. L. A. Marshall in Men Against Fire
stated:
During training, the soldier, and certainly the
officer, can be given enough knowledge about
human nature under the stresses of the battlefield
that when it comes his time to go forward, he
can make tactical use of what he knows in the same
way that he applies what he has learned about his
equipment. (10:41)
Training should provide the core for success in combat.
Effective training conditions the body and the mind and
stretches the endurance of Marines and equipment. Training
provides a highly resistant base against the adverse impacts
of continuous operations. A by-product of demanding training
are the intangibles of teamwork, esprit, courage, and
confidence. Strong bonds are built based on hardships
endured and the pride of completing difficult training
evolutions.
A study conducted for the Army in 1985 on training under
rigorous and stressful field conditions looked at five wars
(World War II, Korea, Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli Wars, and the
Falklands War) and training conducted at the National
Training Center (NTC) and offered some valuable insights.
Training should be between 15 and 30 days duration with units
and individuals working 18 hours a day throughout the
exercise. Training exercises should incorporate all normal
supporting elements (organic and attached) and these units
should operate in the field with the units they support.
Changing plans at unexpected times adds additional stress and
forces leaders to think and react appropriately. Units must
operate against a realistic enemy who is trying to win. Some
of the by-products of this type of training were more
proficient units, more effective leaders, more rapid
adaptation to combat, reduced adverse reactions in or after
combat, and greater confidence, determination, and
aggressiveness in combat. All of these elements help reduce
BF. (5:B-12)
However, this long duration training takes training
areas, resources, and the supporting units that have everyday
daily requirements such as medical, supply, and maintenance.
Training under conditions comparable to continuous operations
will not be possible on a day-to-day basis. Time will have
to be used economically to provide efficient and beneficial
training. In most cases, training will have to be conducted
in blocks of time ranging from 24 to 120 mission hours.
Training in continuous operations should start with
exercises of 24-48 hours under realistic conditions. The
effects of continuous operations can be simulated so that
Marines can learn to cope with fatigue and stress. The
following techniques from FM 22-9, Soldier Performance in
Continuous Operations, can be used in conjunction with field
training exercises (FTX) and other combat exercises:
-demanding physical activity before starting FTX
-no sleep up to 48 hours before FTX
-around-the-clock FTXs
-confusion and communication difficulties
-logistic problems
-simulated equipment malfunctions. (15:2-7)
As Marines learn to operate in adverse conditions and stay
effective, the duration of the exercises can be increased to
96-120 mission hours.
This approach is recommended rather than the shock
approach of a sudden continuous operation. The shock
approach will find many Marines unable to handle the
extremely adverse effects and may cause them to doubt their
capability for continuous operations. By utilizing an
incremental approach, Marines and units can progress as their
confidence and proficiency grows.
Training under demanding conditions helps prevent BF
casualties by inoculating Marines to the stress of continuous
operations. Training must be tough and conducted under all
kinds of conditions. Critical combat tasks must be practiced
under all circumstances including an NBC environment.
Established standards must be met in daylight and at night,
in good and bad weather, and with or without a full
complement of men and equipment. Physical fitness must be an
ongoing program. Leaders must understand that there is a
distinct difference between garrison fitness and field
fitness, the latter demanding a hardness that cannot be
trained for in garrison - - a mental toughness more than
anything else. Training should build confidence and show
Marines that they can function and win on the modern
battlefield.
The recognition of stress and coping with its effects
may be the most important skills needed in continuous
operations. While stress in not unique to continuous
operations, disrupted wake/sleep cycles, sleep loss, and
physical fatigue will increase to a point where the Marines'
ability to perform becomes severely degraded. Stresses
unrelated to combat such as heat, humidity, cold, and noise
may be present on the battlefield and these will contribute
to the build-up of stress. (14:23) Recognizing the effects
of stress in others involves observing for outward physical
and behavioral changes. While not all inclusive, the
following signs will often be present in Marines suffering
from the adverse effects of stress:
-excitability/emotional outbursts
-impulsive behavior
-trembling
-difficulty with numbers
-decision problems (15:3-6)
Leaders are as susceptible to the cumulative effects of
stress as the men they lead. The critical skills of leaders
- decision making, judgement, and thinking - degrade the most
rapidly. Leaders at every level must be constantly aware
that they face degradation of their abilities in continuous
operations. One of the most difficult tasks of leaders is
recognizing in themselves the signs of stress. Leaders must
realize that the following signs indicate that they are
suffering the effects of stress:
-inability to concentrate/forgetfulness
-low self-esteem/moodiness
-depression/apathy
-diarrhea/nausea/excessive urination
-guilt/nightmares (15:3-6)
However, self-observation is often unreliable and can mask
true potential problems. Leaders should require others to
observe them and provide objective feedback. This feedback
should include incidents and observations that may show signs
of stress-related deficiencies.
Once the signs of stress have been recognized, it will
be necessary to apply various coping skills to deal with the
adverse factors inherent in continuous operations. Coping
with stress should be viewed as a combat skill. As the
length of the operation grows this skill will take on greater
significance. Coping is the ability to compensate for the
increasing effects of adverse factors such as sleep loss,
wake/sleep cycle change, fatigue, and mental stress. Coping
with stress means achieving some self-control over the stress
process.
There are several techniques that must be practiced and
developed to counter the effects of stress in continuous
operations. Relaxation techniques, self-suggestion, and
meditation provide methods for calming the body and the
mind. (15:2-9) These methods reduce stress levels by
obtaining full relaxation. Doctor Herbert Benson of the
Harvard Medical School states that "the idea of these
techniques is to relax the fight or flight response - that
is, to affect the body's response to stress, thereby
decreasing breath ratio, nervous system activity, blood
pressure, and body metabolism." (14:14)
Another technique in reducing stress is inoculation.
Stress inoculation is nothing more than training in the same
manner that you expect to fight. Conducting operations over
extended periods, letting junior leaders assume positions of
higher authority, and making battle causalities a realistic
part of training all contribute to stress inoculation.
Mental practice in coping can be part of inoculation training
by allowing stressful situations to be war-gamed and reviewed
prior to when the stress is real.
Coping techniques must be mastered and practiced to be
effective. The commander and the medical officer must become
partners in preparing Marines for combat. Coping techniques
are not difficult to learn but must be practiced until they
are automatic. The ability to cope with stress is extremely
important in continuous operations.
Perhaps the most crucial aspects of stress in continuous
operations is the the effect of sleep loss. Sleep loss is
the most detrimental factor in continuous operations. The
brain needs sleep to continue to function adequately. Major
General Newman, USA (Ret), in Sleep and the Soldier stated
that "...disturbances is behavior from lack of sleep resemble
disorders from certain narcotics, alcohol and oxygen
starvation...values slip out of focus." (11:2-37) Sleep loss
compounds the stress of combat and an increasing sleep debt
leads to subtle but potentially critical performance
failures.
To overcome the effects of sleep loss, a sleep plan must
be developed, implemented, and enforced at all levels. As
part of this sleep plan, priorities for sleep must be
established. Leaders should have the first priority for
sleep since their alertness and judgement is the key to the
success of the unit. The next priority for sleep after
leaders should be Marines that are needed to evaluate
information, perform calculations, and execute critical
technical tasks. Marines that perform tasks requiring
vigilance should receive a high priority. Sentries, radar
operators, and reconnaissance units would fall into this
category. All other Marines should be allocated
opportunities for sleep as evenly as possibly. (15:3-7)
Effectiveness in continuous operations is sustained by
the implementation of a unit-specific schedule for work,
sleep, and duty. While tactical operations may preclude
combat units and certain combat support units from
maintaining any type of schedule, combat service support
units should try to maintain regular work schedules. Work
schedules should be stated in hours such as "4 on - 4 off"
or "16 on - 8 off". The "off" time is considered sleep or,
at least, an absence of duties. When the tactical situation
does not permit combat and combat support units extended
sleep (a minimum of 3 hours), catnaps are the best means for
holding down the effects of sleep loss. However, stress may
prevent Marines from falling asleep quickly. The coping
techniques previously discussed must be applied to reduce
stress allowing Marines to fall asleep quickly. Marines
should waste no time getting asleep and staying asleep.
The requirements of duty must be balanced with the need
for sleep. The decision to maintain high states of alert, to
reposition forces, or to modify positions must be made with
the realization that these improvements may increase the
sleep loss of the units. Leaders must use sound judgement
and evaluate what will contribute the most to the units
mission - - work or sleep.
The end result of any sleep plan is to minimize the
effect of sleep loss. Units can remain effective if members
can receive as little as 4 hours of uninterrupted sleep per
24-hour period. After periods of extended sleep loss, it is
important that the sleep debt be made up quickly and
completely. Recovery guidelines range from 12 hours sleep-
rest after 36-48 hours of sleep loss to as much as 5 days'
sleep-rest following 96 hours or more of complete sleep
loss. (15:3-9)
Stress is the normal response to combat. Stress will
not prevent a Marine from functioning and accomplishing his
duties. It is when stress increases to the point that the
Marine becomes ineffective in his duties that he becomes a
potential BF casualty. It is at this point that the unit
needs to apply "emotional first aid." Emotional first aid
includes the three "R's" - - recognition, reassurance, and
relaxation. (7:41)
The effects of stress can be managed, and by doing so, a
continuous operations capability developed. This development
cannot take place at the outbreak of hostilities. It has to
be planned for from a Marines' initial training and continued
throughout his subsequent training. Stress management
requires practice until it becomes second nature.
Marines should train as they expect to fight. With
short-notice contingencies covering the spectrum from non-
combatant evacuations to actual combat, Marines will find
themselves committed to operations that require them to push
past the limits of their endurance. Strong leadership and
intense training in the hard skills of tactics, weapons, and
maintenance will build confidence and strengthen their
ability to succeed in continuous operations. These same
qualities provide the framework for recognizing stress and
developing the skills necessary to cope with its degrading
effects.
Effective leadership and rigorous, stressful training
also influence the intangibles of unit cohesion, esprit, and
morale. These items are often key sources of strength for
units in continuous operations. Commitment, a factor that
cannot be overlooked, is developed as trust in leadership
grows and unit cohesion becomes a reality. Whether this
commitment is to the objectives of national policy, personal
reasons, or, more likely, to their fellow Marines, this
commitment will give Marines that extra push needed to
accomplish the mission.
By blending the tangibles, the hard skills of training,
with the intangibles, unit cohesion, esprit, and morale, we
prepare Marines to face the confusion, stress, and tempo of
the battlefield. These tangibles and intangibles are the
direct result of good leadership and realistic training.
Together they will develop a continuous operation capability
that will allow Marines to succeed on the modern battlefield.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. AWS Battlefield Studies Program. "Fear and Motivation:
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1988), 65-72.
2. Cartwright, Ian, R., Colonel, British Army. "Training for
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3. Chermol, Brian, H., Lieutenant Colonel, US Army.
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