Developing A Continuous Operations Capability AUTHOR Major Joseph J. McMenamin, USMC CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Strategic Issues EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: DEVELOPING A CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS CAPABILITY I. Thesis: Developing a continuous operations capability is vital to sustaining the performance of Marine forces because it will slow down or negate the degrading effects of continuous operations, preserve the fighting capabilities of Marine units, and reduce the potential for battle fatigue (BF) casualties among Marines and leaders. II. Background: Threat doctrine calls for conducting warfare day and night in any weather by maintaining a highly maneuverable and dynamic offensive. Frontlines will be fluid and electronic warfare will add to the confusion and stress of the battlefield. Although this scenario applies to the Warsaw Pact, the Marine Corps, by its expeditionary nature, could find itself committed to operations against nations trained and equipped by the Soviets or their client states. III. Data: Continuous operations will require Marines to fight at a high pace for extended periods. Additionally, the lethality of the battlefield has increased greatly since World War II. The recent experiences of the Israeli Defense Force indicate that at least one psychiatric casualty will occur for every four battle casualties during the first 30 days of combat. Marines that do not become battle casualties will find their performance degraded by lack of sleep, physical fatigue, disrupted wake/sleep cycles, and stress. Those unable to cope with the cumulative effects of stress will become battle fatigue casualties. High risk operations such as amphibious assaults and heliborne assaults, missions that Marines traditionally train for, will produce higher rates of battle fatigue. IV. Conclusions: Continuous operations will adversely effect the fighting performance of Marines and their leaders. Efforts to counter the degrading effects of continuous operations must be planned for and executed in training. Strong, effective leaders must be identified, trained, and prepared for continuous combat operations. Recognizing and coping with stress is crucial to conserving the fighting capabilities of Marines and leaders in this type of combat. V. Recommendations: Rigorous, stressful training, including skills to cope with stress, is a key factor in developing a continuous operations capability. Leaders must ensure that training is tough and demanding. Leaders must establish standards and through their behavior set the example for the Marines they lead. A continuous operations capability should not only be a goal for all units but a mission essential task necessary to ensure success on the battlefield. DEVELOPING A CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS CAPABILITY OUTLINE Thesis Statement. Developing a continuous operations capability is vital to sustaining the performance of Marine forces because it will slow down or negate the degrading effects of continuous operations, preserve the fighting capabilities of Marine units, and reduce the potential for battle fatigue (BF) casualties among Marines and leaders. I. Introduction A. Predictions of BF casualties B. Definitions 1. Continuous operations 2. Sustained operations C. Effects of continuous operations 1. Battle fatigue 2. High risk operations 3. Combat tasks II. Leadership A. Measures taken before combat 1. Unit cohesiveness 2. Communications 3. Responsibility for training B. Identifying leaders 1. Requirements for strong leaders 2. Psychological maturity 3. Task maturity C. Committed to combat 1. Understanding the effects of continuous operations 2. Communication 3. Preventing BF casualties III. Training A. Core of success B. Training under rigorous and stressful conditions 1. Insights 2. By-products 3. Impact of long duration training 4. Incremental approach C. Preventing BF casualties 1. Training under all conditions 2. Critical combat tasks 3. Physical fitness IV. Stress A. Recognizing stress 1. Stress in others 2. Stress in ourselves B. Coping with stress 1. Coping as a combat skill 2. Stress reduction techniques 3. Stress inoculation C. Sleep loss 1. Effects of sleep loss 2. Sleep plans 3. Requirements for duty versus sleep V. Conclusion A. Training as you expect to fight 1. Hard skills B. Leadership, training, and coping 1. Key sources of strength 2. Commitment C. Success on the battlefield 1. Blending the tangibles and intangibles DEVELOPING A CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS CAPABILITY The firing increased as the helicopters approached for the extraction. Green tracers streaked overhead and mortars burst in the treetops. The operation had only taken 12 hours, yet the movement to the staging area and the transit to the objective had left little time for sleep in the past three days. What was supposed to be an easy operation had taken a turn for the worse with resistance encountered most of the day. The platoon commander supervised the loading of the helicopters and made one last check of the of the area. Boarding the helicopter as it started to lift off, the lieutenant yelled at the Marine in front of him for help. The Marine sat unmoving, eyes wide and vacant. Although not visibly wounded, this Marine had become a casualty. This Marine was a battle fatigue (BF) casualty. He eventually returned to full duty with counselling and remained with his platoon. However, in future conflicts not all Marines will be this lucky. U.S. Army experiences in previous conflicts and Israeli Defense Force experiences in 1973 and 1982 predict that in a high intensity conflict with conventional weapons at least one BF casualty will occur for every four battle casualties during the initial stages of war. If it is necessary to fight in a nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) environment, predictions of BF casualties to battle casualties range from 1-to-3 to 1-to-2 for a 30-day period. (3:28) Confusion, stress, and the lethality of the modern battlefield will all place heavy demands on the human endurance of today's Marine. The courage, perseverance, and ability or desire of Marines to make decisions, perform combat duties, and execute the skills needed to survive will be tested by the high tempo of operations. FM 22-9, Soldier Performance in Continuous Operations, states that combat operations in future wars will be both continuous and sustained. Continuous meaning that technology will allow effective movement at night and during periods of reduced visibility. Operations can now continue around the clock with high levels of intensity without let-up. The historical reasons for halting or slowing operations have been overcome by technology. Sustained operations will find the same Marines and units engaged in continuous operations with little opportunity for relief. (15:1-2) One of the effects of continuous operations is the presence of BF casualties. BF manifests itself in many ways depending on the amount of time an individual is in combat. The initial cases of BF will most likely be seen in the first 30 days. These cases are highlighted by tremors, shaking, hallucinations, uncontrollable crying, and possibly hysterical blindness. As combat becomes prolonged, the dramatic cases of the early days will become rare but there will be an increase in what is known as the "Old Sergeants Syndrome." Lieutenant Colonel B. H. Chermol, USA, in his article Psychiatric Casualties in Combat describes this symptom of BF as characterized by apathy, lack of concern about one's survival or equipment, dependence on others, vomiting, diarrhea, depression, and social withdrawal. (3:29) High-risk operations such as amphibious assaults, heliborne assaults, or combat in a built-up area where the Marine has little control over his own destiny will produce high rates of BF during or immediately after the operation. Certain occupational fields (MOS's) have a historically higher incident rate of BF. Armored units in World War II experienced the highest rate of BF. (3:27) The noise, confinement, and feeling of isolation within the vehicle: increased stress by degrading the ability to cope with the loss of sleep. (4:38) Death by incineration was a daily possibility and infantry units attached to tank units had the highest rate of any group. Armored units were often assigned high risk missions and required to maintain a higher tempo of operations contributing to fatigue and stress. Continuous combat will cause the fighting performance of Marines and units to degrade even if they do not become BF casualties. The adverse conditions of combat and causes of BF such as physical fatigue and sleep loss respect neither rank nor role. Commanders and staffs that operate continuously without rest are more likely to become degraded than the Marines in their charge. Combat tasks that become severely degraded after 120 mission hours are command, control and communications, repositioning of forces, controlling direct and indirect fires, and the processing of information. Problem solving, thinking, and decision making are activities that suffer the most. (15:1-11) How can we reduce the potential for BF casualties among our Marines and leaders? Can we negate or slow down the degrading effects of continuous operations? What does it take to develop a continuous operations capability? Most experts state that the three main factors in reducing BF and the degrading effects of continuous operations are leadership, training, and developing skills to cope with stress. These three elements cannot be looked at in isolation but must be viewed together as they establish a means to reduce or prevent the debilitating effects of combat. Leadership plays many key roles in preparing Marines for continuous operations and reducing the potential for BF casualties. Leaders need to realize that success in continuous operations is achieved by measures taken before Marines are committed to combat. Leaders must plan for unit cohesion by minimizing turbulence among small units and teams. Unit cohesiveness builds teamwork and a strong sense of responsibility among members of the team. This "esprit de corps" and unit cohesiveness are strong sources of strength for individuals facing the rigors of combat. Leaders should communicate with their men during their training and development. They must get to know their Marines and what they are capable of accomplishing under all conditions. Not all Marines have the same potential. Leaders must use this training time to identify and pair individuals within teams and small units together forming a "buddy system." These individuals eat, sleep, and go on liberty together. When combat comes, they are capable of checking each other for stress and other signs of BF. The Marine Corps fire team is a good example of an institutionalized "buddy system." Leaders are also responsible for ensuring training is physically and mentally tough, realistic, and stressful. High standards are established and training is developed to meet these standards. Tests are conducted to evaluate the performance to Marines and units ensuring competence in all tasks. Leader training is equally as important. Training in the hard skills of war - patrolling/tactics, weapons, and maintenance - is a must for leaders. (5:B-11) These hard skills will prepare leaders to be effective in combat which should reflect in a reduced number of casualties. Continuous operations will require strong leaders who exhibit self-confidence, make sound judgements, and have the ability to cope with battle stress. Developing leaders and potential leaders must not just focus on tactics, physical fitness, and the proper application of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). The fluid, autonomous nature of today's battlefield requires the development of leaders who exhibit psychological and task maturity. This is especially true at the small-unit level because these leaders are essential to independent operations characteristic of mission orders and maneuver warfare. An individual who demonstrates psychological maturity is able to work with minimal guidance, is a self-starter, and is able to keep success and failure in the proper perspective. Inner-directed, he does not need constant task or relationship behavior to stay motivated. Some of the indicators of psychological maturity are: -accepts responsibility for his actions -self-confidence -ability and willingness to do job/accept change -risk-taking behavior (moderate risks preferred over easy/hard) -ability to accept constructive criticism (18:1) Task maturity develops in individuals not only the ability to know how to accomplish a task, but its relative importance to other tasks. The impact of the task and its logical extension is well understood ensuring that "spin-off" responsibilities associated with the task are completed allowing for continual successful performance. Task maturity is indicated by: -does more than expected -anticipates what needs to be done and does it -helps others without being asked to do so -well-planned, knows where to go and why -takes action -always seeking new ideas/better techniques (19:1) Developing psychological and task maturity comes from challenging Marines and leaders to think and exercise initiative. This maturity must come from an environment that encourages independence, rewards aggressiveness and creativity, and realizes that mistakes are not setbacks but opportunities to be exploited. Continuous operations will present many demands on leaders at all levels. Those that possess psychological and task maturity along with flexibility and imagination will enhance the performance of small-units and improve the performance of higher level units as well. (16:7) Committed to combat, leaders must know and understand the effects of continuous operations on their men. Leaders should not add to the already stressful situation. Maintaining units in a higher than needed alert status and unnecessary movement should be avoided when possible. A sleep plan must be established with the same attention to detail as a feeding plan, ammunition resupply, and preventative maintenance. Communication continues to be important. Great care must be taken to avoid ambiguity and to provide information in a clear, precise, and direct manner. Frequent contact with leaders will serve to reassure Marines that they can cope, that they can keep going, and they can do what is asked of them. The leader should set the example and exhibit self- control. Coping with stress, overcoming fear, and doing what is necessary though unpleasant are means used by the leader to set the example and provide a role model from which Marines can pattern their behavior. In combat, strong leadership plays an integral part in reducing or preventing BF casualties. Studies comparing combat units in World War II demonstrated the significance of effective leadership in reducing BF. Lieutenant Colonel B. H. Chermol, USA, in his article Psychiatric Casualties in Combat stated that " the essential qualities of leadership noted in World War II are still valid today: competence, candidness, commitment, courage, and caring." (3:30) Proper training is critical to developing a continuous operation capability. S. L. A. Marshall in Men Against Fire stated: During training, the soldier, and certainly the officer, can be given enough knowledge about human nature under the stresses of the battlefield that when it comes his time to go forward, he can make tactical use of what he knows in the same way that he applies what he has learned about his equipment. (10:41) Training should provide the core for success in combat. Effective training conditions the body and the mind and stretches the endurance of Marines and equipment. Training provides a highly resistant base against the adverse impacts of continuous operations. A by-product of demanding training are the intangibles of teamwork, esprit, courage, and confidence. Strong bonds are built based on hardships endured and the pride of completing difficult training evolutions. A study conducted for the Army in 1985 on training under rigorous and stressful field conditions looked at five wars (World War II, Korea, Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli Wars, and the Falklands War) and training conducted at the National Training Center (NTC) and offered some valuable insights. Training should be between 15 and 30 days duration with units and individuals working 18 hours a day throughout the exercise. Training exercises should incorporate all normal supporting elements (organic and attached) and these units should operate in the field with the units they support. Changing plans at unexpected times adds additional stress and forces leaders to think and react appropriately. Units must operate against a realistic enemy who is trying to win. Some of the by-products of this type of training were more proficient units, more effective leaders, more rapid adaptation to combat, reduced adverse reactions in or after combat, and greater confidence, determination, and aggressiveness in combat. All of these elements help reduce BF. (5:B-12) However, this long duration training takes training areas, resources, and the supporting units that have everyday daily requirements such as medical, supply, and maintenance. Training under conditions comparable to continuous operations will not be possible on a day-to-day basis. Time will have to be used economically to provide efficient and beneficial training. In most cases, training will have to be conducted in blocks of time ranging from 24 to 120 mission hours. Training in continuous operations should start with exercises of 24-48 hours under realistic conditions. The effects of continuous operations can be simulated so that Marines can learn to cope with fatigue and stress. The following techniques from FM 22-9, Soldier Performance in Continuous Operations, can be used in conjunction with field training exercises (FTX) and other combat exercises: -demanding physical activity before starting FTX -no sleep up to 48 hours before FTX -around-the-clock FTXs -confusion and communication difficulties -logistic problems -simulated equipment malfunctions. (15:2-7) As Marines learn to operate in adverse conditions and stay effective, the duration of the exercises can be increased to 96-120 mission hours. This approach is recommended rather than the shock approach of a sudden continuous operation. The shock approach will find many Marines unable to handle the extremely adverse effects and may cause them to doubt their capability for continuous operations. By utilizing an incremental approach, Marines and units can progress as their confidence and proficiency grows. Training under demanding conditions helps prevent BF casualties by inoculating Marines to the stress of continuous operations. Training must be tough and conducted under all kinds of conditions. Critical combat tasks must be practiced under all circumstances including an NBC environment. Established standards must be met in daylight and at night, in good and bad weather, and with or without a full complement of men and equipment. Physical fitness must be an ongoing program. Leaders must understand that there is a distinct difference between garrison fitness and field fitness, the latter demanding a hardness that cannot be trained for in garrison - - a mental toughness more than anything else. Training should build confidence and show Marines that they can function and win on the modern battlefield. The recognition of stress and coping with its effects may be the most important skills needed in continuous operations. While stress in not unique to continuous operations, disrupted wake/sleep cycles, sleep loss, and physical fatigue will increase to a point where the Marines' ability to perform becomes severely degraded. Stresses unrelated to combat such as heat, humidity, cold, and noise may be present on the battlefield and these will contribute to the build-up of stress. (14:23) Recognizing the effects of stress in others involves observing for outward physical and behavioral changes. While not all inclusive, the following signs will often be present in Marines suffering from the adverse effects of stress: -excitability/emotional outbursts -impulsive behavior -trembling -difficulty with numbers -decision problems (15:3-6) Leaders are as susceptible to the cumulative effects of stress as the men they lead. The critical skills of leaders - decision making, judgement, and thinking - degrade the most rapidly. Leaders at every level must be constantly aware that they face degradation of their abilities in continuous operations. One of the most difficult tasks of leaders is recognizing in themselves the signs of stress. Leaders must realize that the following signs indicate that they are suffering the effects of stress: -inability to concentrate/forgetfulness -low self-esteem/moodiness -depression/apathy -diarrhea/nausea/excessive urination -guilt/nightmares (15:3-6) However, self-observation is often unreliable and can mask true potential problems. Leaders should require others to observe them and provide objective feedback. This feedback should include incidents and observations that may show signs of stress-related deficiencies. Once the signs of stress have been recognized, it will be necessary to apply various coping skills to deal with the adverse factors inherent in continuous operations. Coping with stress should be viewed as a combat skill. As the length of the operation grows this skill will take on greater significance. Coping is the ability to compensate for the increasing effects of adverse factors such as sleep loss, wake/sleep cycle change, fatigue, and mental stress. Coping with stress means achieving some self-control over the stress process. There are several techniques that must be practiced and developed to counter the effects of stress in continuous operations. Relaxation techniques, self-suggestion, and meditation provide methods for calming the body and the mind. (15:2-9) These methods reduce stress levels by obtaining full relaxation. Doctor Herbert Benson of the Harvard Medical School states that "the idea of these techniques is to relax the fight or flight response - that is, to affect the body's response to stress, thereby decreasing breath ratio, nervous system activity, blood pressure, and body metabolism." (14:14) Another technique in reducing stress is inoculation. Stress inoculation is nothing more than training in the same manner that you expect to fight. Conducting operations over extended periods, letting junior leaders assume positions of higher authority, and making battle causalities a realistic part of training all contribute to stress inoculation. Mental practice in coping can be part of inoculation training by allowing stressful situations to be war-gamed and reviewed prior to when the stress is real. Coping techniques must be mastered and practiced to be effective. The commander and the medical officer must become partners in preparing Marines for combat. Coping techniques are not difficult to learn but must be practiced until they are automatic. The ability to cope with stress is extremely important in continuous operations. Perhaps the most crucial aspects of stress in continuous operations is the the effect of sleep loss. Sleep loss is the most detrimental factor in continuous operations. The brain needs sleep to continue to function adequately. Major General Newman, USA (Ret), in Sleep and the Soldier stated that "...disturbances is behavior from lack of sleep resemble disorders from certain narcotics, alcohol and oxygen starvation...values slip out of focus." (11:2-37) Sleep loss compounds the stress of combat and an increasing sleep debt leads to subtle but potentially critical performance failures. To overcome the effects of sleep loss, a sleep plan must be developed, implemented, and enforced at all levels. As part of this sleep plan, priorities for sleep must be established. Leaders should have the first priority for sleep since their alertness and judgement is the key to the success of the unit. The next priority for sleep after leaders should be Marines that are needed to evaluate information, perform calculations, and execute critical technical tasks. Marines that perform tasks requiring vigilance should receive a high priority. Sentries, radar operators, and reconnaissance units would fall into this category. All other Marines should be allocated opportunities for sleep as evenly as possibly. (15:3-7) Effectiveness in continuous operations is sustained by the implementation of a unit-specific schedule for work, sleep, and duty. While tactical operations may preclude combat units and certain combat support units from maintaining any type of schedule, combat service support units should try to maintain regular work schedules. Work schedules should be stated in hours such as "4 on - 4 off" or "16 on - 8 off". The "off" time is considered sleep or, at least, an absence of duties. When the tactical situation does not permit combat and combat support units extended sleep (a minimum of 3 hours), catnaps are the best means for holding down the effects of sleep loss. However, stress may prevent Marines from falling asleep quickly. The coping techniques previously discussed must be applied to reduce stress allowing Marines to fall asleep quickly. Marines should waste no time getting asleep and staying asleep. The requirements of duty must be balanced with the need for sleep. The decision to maintain high states of alert, to reposition forces, or to modify positions must be made with the realization that these improvements may increase the sleep loss of the units. Leaders must use sound judgement and evaluate what will contribute the most to the units mission - - work or sleep. The end result of any sleep plan is to minimize the effect of sleep loss. Units can remain effective if members can receive as little as 4 hours of uninterrupted sleep per 24-hour period. After periods of extended sleep loss, it is important that the sleep debt be made up quickly and completely. Recovery guidelines range from 12 hours sleep- rest after 36-48 hours of sleep loss to as much as 5 days' sleep-rest following 96 hours or more of complete sleep loss. (15:3-9) Stress is the normal response to combat. Stress will not prevent a Marine from functioning and accomplishing his duties. It is when stress increases to the point that the Marine becomes ineffective in his duties that he becomes a potential BF casualty. It is at this point that the unit needs to apply "emotional first aid." Emotional first aid includes the three "R's" - - recognition, reassurance, and relaxation. (7:41) The effects of stress can be managed, and by doing so, a continuous operations capability developed. This development cannot take place at the outbreak of hostilities. It has to be planned for from a Marines' initial training and continued throughout his subsequent training. Stress management requires practice until it becomes second nature. Marines should train as they expect to fight. With short-notice contingencies covering the spectrum from non- combatant evacuations to actual combat, Marines will find themselves committed to operations that require them to push past the limits of their endurance. Strong leadership and intense training in the hard skills of tactics, weapons, and maintenance will build confidence and strengthen their ability to succeed in continuous operations. These same qualities provide the framework for recognizing stress and developing the skills necessary to cope with its degrading effects. Effective leadership and rigorous, stressful training also influence the intangibles of unit cohesion, esprit, and morale. These items are often key sources of strength for units in continuous operations. Commitment, a factor that cannot be overlooked, is developed as trust in leadership grows and unit cohesion becomes a reality. Whether this commitment is to the objectives of national policy, personal reasons, or, more likely, to their fellow Marines, this commitment will give Marines that extra push needed to accomplish the mission. By blending the tangibles, the hard skills of training, with the intangibles, unit cohesion, esprit, and morale, we prepare Marines to face the confusion, stress, and tempo of the battlefield. These tangibles and intangibles are the direct result of good leadership and realistic training. Together they will develop a continuous operation capability that will allow Marines to succeed on the modern battlefield. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. AWS Battlefield Studies Program. "Fear and Motivation: An AWS Battle Study." Marine Corps Gazette, 72 (August 1988), 65-72. 2. Cartwright, Ian, R., Colonel, British Army. "Training for War." 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