Understanding Revolutionary Warfare AUTHOR Major Dennis I. Merritt, USMC CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Foreign Policy EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: UNDERSTANDING REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE THESIS: A major trend in warfare during the 20th Century has been a shift from conventional warfare with its large, heavily equipped armies to guerrilla operations in support of revolutionary warfare. U.S. policy makers and military leaders have been slow to recognize and understand that significant trend. The Vietnam War pointed out the tragic consequences of not knowing our enemy. Revolutionary warfare has been a powerful force in the world during the past fifty years, and all indications are it will continue to shape the future. Therefore, it is essential for civilian and military leaders to have some knowledge of revolutionary warfare theory, strategy, tactics, and causation. DISCUSSION: The historical origins of revolutionary warfare go back centuries. However, the theory and practice of revolutionary war-fare is really a 20th Century development. Marx and Engles provided some early strategic guidance (mobilize the masses) while Lenin and Trotsky worked out many of the tactical considerations (only negotiate to gain time; a strong organization is a must). The most influential revolutionary, nevertheless, was Mao Tse-tung who espoused the importance of protracted struggle, strength of will, and political considerations over military action. In other words, revolutionary warfare is much more than just guerrilla warfare. Revolutionary warfare has a political goal or objective and seeks to completely overthrow the social, political, and economic order. Guerrilla warfare is but one tool used by revolutionaries to gain their objectives. Therefore, defeating a revolutionary war movement requires a broader approach than just the military option. CONCLUSION: Despite much progress made in the last decade toward understanding unconventional warfare, there are still too many civilian and military leaders who do not know the true nature or meaning of revolutionary warfare. As a nation, we must do better. Another Vietnam would be more than tragic, it would be criminal. UNDERSTANDING REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE OUTLINE THESIS STATEMENT. A major trend in warfare during the 20th Century has been a shift from conventional warfare with its large, heavily equipped armies to guerrilla operations in support of revolutionary warfare. U.S. policy makers and military leaders have been slow to recognize and understand that significant trend. The Vietnam Revolutionary warfare has been a powerful force in the world during the past fifty years, and all indications are it will continue to shape the future. Therefore, it is essential for civilian and military leaders to have some knowledge of revolutionary warfare theory, strategy, tactics, and causation. I. Introduction A. Changing nature of warfare 1. Compounds task of knowing enemy 2. Conventional to unconventional warfare B. World War II catalyst for change 1. Nuclear weapons 2. Collapse of colonial system 3. Communist ideology 4. Revolutionary warfare theory a. Strategy--Marx and Engles b. Tactics-- Lenin and Trotsky c. Application of theory--Mao II. Revolutionary warfare A. Complex, confusing 1. Terminology 2. Emotional issue 3. Importance of doctrine, strategy, tactics 4. Military theorist focus on Europe (conventional) B. What is revolutionary warfare, what is it not 1. Not guerrilla warfare 2. Diverse--no two alike III. Historical examples A. Sun Tzu B. Zealots C. American and French Revolutions D. Why examples not true revolutionary warfare IV. Guerrilla/revolutionary warfare difference A. Spanish example B. Importance of political objective C. Guerilla warfare tool of revolutionary warfare V. Tactical application of theory A. Use of elements of power B. Use of violence C. Legitimacy of government a target C. Vulnerable societies VI. U.S. policy options A. Understand risks B. Support allied/friendly governments C. Support democratic revolutionary movements VII. Importance of understanding problem, taking action UNDERSTANDING REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE Know yourself and know your enemy. Virtually every military organization in existence today knows the importance of mastering those too principles. They are basic truths that if ignored will certainly lead to defeat. They are also more easily talked about than practiced. The ever changing nature of warfare only compounds the difficult task of truly knowing yourself, much less the enemy. As Clausewitz writes in On War and Mao quotes in his Guerrilla Warfare: "Wars in every period have independent forms and independent conditions, and, therefore, every period must have its independent theory of war."1 Take, for example, the major changes in warfare that have taken place just since the end of World War II. It is evident that warfare has shifted away from conventional wars fought by large heavily equipped armies to unconventional wars commonly referred to as guerrilla wars. "Indeed, virtually every year since World War II has seen at least one revolutionary conflict underway in the third world."2 In fact, a complete listing of these wars would probably fill several pages. Some of the more widely known are: Malaya, Kenya, the Congo, Algeria, Cuba and Vietnam. Despite the evidence, some might deny that the nature of warfare has fundamentally changed. After all, they would argue, if there is a real war (read: NATO vs Warsaw Pact), conventional warfare would once again dominate. Those people cannot be lightly dismissed. The United States dares not dismiss the threat from the U.S.S.R. and its Warsaw Pact allies. They are, despite their current move toward liberalization and democratization, the only force that can quickly bring about the destruction of the United States. Still others argue that successful revolutions require large conventional forces using conventional tactics to bring a revolutionary conflict to successful fruition. The Peoples Republic of China and North Vietnam certainly used large conventional forces to nail down their revolutions. Those points are well taken; however, the actual theory and practice of warfare in today's world environment does seem to have dramatically changed. What is commonly called guerrilla warfare, but in actuality is revolutionary warfare, has indeed changed warfare and made knowing your enemy even more difficult. There are many reasors for that change, but there are three that seem particularly significant. First, nuclear weapons have made large conventional wars too costly to contemplate. (That does not mean, of course, that we should not be prepared to meet that threat--that would be fool hardy.) Second, World War II set the stage for the collapse of the colonial system. Colonies all over the world, even though militarily weak, demanded independence and were prepared to fight for it. Third, the post World War II popularity of Communist ideology encouraged the poor and disenfranchised in many third world countries to attempt armed insurrection. That does not, despite the fact that current world events have shown Communist ideology to be bankrupt, negate the powerful--but tragic--influence it had on world events. Has revolutionary warfare, propelled by the reasons delineated above, become the dominate form of modern warfare? It seems clear that the answer is yes. Certainly the evidence supports that contention; its difficult to ignore the more than twenty such wars fought in the last fifty years. That is not to suggest, however, that the U.S. completely restructure its forces to fight such wars. The primary threat still remains the U.S.S.R. and its nuclear arsenal. It does suggest, though, that much more needs to be learned about the theory and practice of revolutionary wars and the people associated with it. It is difficult to imagine a more complex, emotionally charged subject than revolutionary warfare. There is disagreement on virtually every aspect of revolutionary warfare to include its definition. For instance, many civilian officials as well as a good number of military people believe revolutionary warfare is just another name for guerrilla warfare, partisan warfare, or terrorism, all of which many people tend to lump under the heading of low-intensity conflict (LIC). Is there a real difference between the types of warfare commonly found at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict or are the arguments just over semantics? Naturally, arguments over semantics should not drive or hinder our efforts to understand important concepts. Nevertheless, it is important to define revolutionary warfare to some degree so that policy makers and concerned citizens have a common base or reference from which to build a useful dialogue that deepens under- standing. In other words, the doctrine, strategy, tactics and psychology of revolutionary warfare have to be understood to effec- tively counter or assist revolutionary warfare movements. (More will be said about the often ignored concept of assisting revolut- ionary movements later in this paper.) Without that understanding of revolutionary warfare "means and ends", the U.S. risks making fundamental mistakes that will frustrate or defeat its future attempts to promote democracy, peace and prosperity in the world community. Just what is revolutionary warfare; and, perhaps just as instructive, what is it not? Finding a simple, straight forward answer to those questions is difficult if not impossible. Even many standard reference books are silent on the matter. JCS Pub.1, for instance, is mute on the subject. Worse yet, there is no definition to be found in the dictionary. What can be found in the dictionary is this entry: "Revolutionary War see American Revolution." As alluded to earlier in this paper, the drought of a formal definition can be traced to the changes in warfare that have evolved since World War II. Military theorists focused on a potential European war and studied the problems of how to fight large conventional forces. They were slow to turn their attention to the small but active wars spreading around the globe. And, when they did refocus on the actual shooting wars, there was a tendency to disregrd other causative factors and concentrate on solving purely military problems--mostly at the tactical level. In his Guerrilla Warfare, Mao quotes Lenin: As regards the form of fighting, it is unconditionaly requisite that history be investigated in order to discover the conditions of environment, the state of economic progress, and the political ideas that obtained, the national characteristics, customs and degree of civilization... it is necessary to be completely unsympathetic to abstract formulas and rules and to study with sympathy the conditions of the actual fighting, for these will change in accordance with the political and economic situations and the realization of the people's aspirations. These progressive changes in conditions create new methods.3 Vietnam is a good example of what happens when that advice is ignored. For the most part, the U.S. military took the view that finding and destroying guerrillas, or relatively small regular forces using guerrilla tactics, were the keys to winning the war. To highlight that fact, Vietnam was widely labeled and referred to as a "guerrilla war" by civilian and military officials alike. In truth, the enemy conducted a revolutionary war and simply used guerrilla warfare as one of their tools to accomplish their political, social and economic goals. Obviously, as we have just seen, the question of what is revolutionary warfare cannot be satisfactorily answered by simply concentrating on military theory and practice. Rather, a true understanding of revolutionary warfare requires a much more complex approach. That does not mean, however, that the military role in revolutionary warfare is insignificant or should be ignored. But, military action is only one tool or option at the disposal of a revolutionary movement. To gain an appreciation for how, why and when the revolutionary uses the military tool to further his interests, one must understand the ideological and psychological background of the members of a specific revolutionary movement. Finally, the underlying social, political and economic conditions of a country or region that spawned the revolutionary attack on the incumbent system must be thoroughly understood. Although it is imperative to keep in mind that each revolu- tionary movement is influenced by unique conditions and cir- cumstanaces and should be viewed through its own specific set of prisms, we can reasonably assert that theory has played an important role in the development of revolutionary warfare. To do otherwise would require us to ignore the large body of theoretical writing produced by such men as Marx, Lenin, Trotsky, Mao, Che Guevara and many others. Consequently, a brief historical examination of that theory may be profitable to our understanding of revolutioanry warfare. The emergences of revolutionary warfare and its attendant body of theory is a relatively recent historical development"...largely because it is so closely associated with two aspects of modernity- -industrialism and imperialism."4 That is not to say, however, that revolutionary warfare is a totally new concept. Its historical origins go back centuries. Students of Asian cultures have argued that more than two millennia ago Sun Tzu, the Chinese military philosopher, formulated the strategic principles of revolutionary warfare- -attack weakness, avoid strength, be patient.5 In fact, history is awash with examples of rebellions, coup-d- etats, revolts and guerrilla wars. Jews that called themselves Zealots fought for an ideology against the Romans in Judaea during the 1st Century. History tells us they committed suicide at Masada rather than surrender. The Middle Ages saw numerous peasant revolts and noble uprisings. Later, and probably more familiar to many, the American and French Revolutions of the 18th Century helped change the course of history. But were they true "revolutionary" wars that have captured the worlds attention in the 20th Century. For example, some would characterize the American revolution as an essentially conventional war: During the American War of Independence both sides made a serious effort to keep warfare within conventional forms and limits. American provincial leaders had seized power from British officials in most areas even before the outbreak of fighting, so the "revolutionary" nature of warfare was minimized, and only at the very outset, along the frontier zones, and again during the last years in the South, did violence take on the popular, irregular character of revolutionary warfare.6 Coming on the heels of the American Revolution, the French version had a profound impact on western civilization. And, while "polit- ical ideology became linked to revolutionary violence"7 the Revolution was not a revolutionary war in the "modern sense." Mass citizen armies were not used to topple the French government--they were used to defend France against her external enemies. At first glance, it appears the distant past offers up many examples of revolutionary warfare. And, indeed, some elements of revolutionary warfare theory can be traced back to an earlier time and place. For instance, past wars have been fought for ideological reasons, for economic reform and for the purpose of reshaping the social order. Furthermore, guerrilla warfare and popular support are not unique to modern revolutionary warfare. But, to truely understand the essence of revolutionary warfare we must look to the more recent past. Of course violent popular protest and uprisings have dotted European history...but only a century or so ago did the idea of revolutionary warfare, considered as a set of formidable problems with specific strategic solutions, begin to take shape and acquire momentum.8 It was Marx and Engles that provided the early strategic guidance and who..."were among the first to analyze the problem of mobilizing and employing armed force to defeat the police and army of the capitalist and ruling classes."9 Later, Lenin and Trotsky worked out many of the tactics that became successful: never trust the government to act fairly; negotiate to gain time only--con- cessions are never permanent; a strong organization is a must; show no mercy--destroy the government army first, then the state. Finally, the most influential: "However much we may seek it elsewhere, the basic text for ideas about revolutionary war is the writings of Mao Tse-tung."10 Just a few of his contributions to revolutionary theory were: emphasized the political over the military; protracted struggle--time is a weapon that favors the revolutionary; popular support is crucial to success; revolution requires hard work and tough mental preparation; practical application of theory is as important as theory. As can be seen from the discussion above, revolutionary theory is not for the light of heart. Whats more, an in-depth study of the subject further reveals a certain diversity. Lenin believed revolution had to begin in urban centers. Mao felt revolution should spring from rural areas and would require a long preparation period. Che also believed revolution should start in the country side but thought military action used in the early stages of a revolution could succeed and thus negate the need for a long preparation period. Carlos Marighella preached early military action within the urban setting. Is it possible, for all its complexity and diversity, to derive a useful definition of revolutionary warfare? The answer is a qualified yes. Most of the people who have written and thought about the subject would probably accept the following definition: Revolutionary warfare is never confined within the bounds of military action. Because its purpose is to destroy an existing society and its institutions and to replace them with a completely new structure, any revolutionary war is a unity of which the constituent parts, in varying importance, are military, political, economic, social, and psychological.11 To clear up any lingering doubts about what revolutionary warfare is and what it is not, it may be useful to point out the difference between guerrilla warfare and revolutionary warfare. They are not one and the same. As an interesting aside, it was during the Wars of the French Revolution that the term "guerrilla" was coined in English. The word comes to us from the Spanish word for "little war." After Napoleon invaded and conquered Spain, many of her people took up arms against the French invaders. The Spanish guerrilla's lacked weapons and numerical strength to fight conventional battles and so developed what we now call hit and run tactics or guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla warfare, as practiced by the Spanish against Napoleon's occupation force, illustrates the difference between guerrilla warfare and revolutionary warfare. The fundamental difference between the two revolves around political motives or the lack there of: Conventional war rarely challenges the political system; even "unconventional" partisan war usually seeks the preservation of that system or restoration of the status quo ante--revolutionary war aims at the liquidation of the existing power structure and at a transformation in the structure of society.12 Protection of home, hearth and life were primary motives along with a desire to restore national sovereignty. The Spanish guerrilla's were not interested in changing the social, political or economic order inside Spain. They lacked a revolutionary objective which gives meaning to a revolutionary war. On the other hand, Mao Tse- tung clearly understood the purpose of guerrilla operations when word within the context of revolutionary was: "Military action is a method used to attain a political goal."12 From the above discussion, it is apparent that there is a substantial difference between guerrilla warfare and revolutionary warfare. Revolutionary warfare defines the "ends" to be achieved in terms of political or social goals. On the other hand, guerril- la warfare is but one of the "means" to achieve the goals or "ends" of revolutionary warfare. Mao, in his Guerrilla Warfare, put it very succinctly: These guerrilla operations must not be con- sidered as an independent form of warfare. They are but one step in the total war, one aspect of the revolutionary struggle... without a political goal, guerrilla warfare must fail...14 The historical example of the Spanish briefly sited above helps to delineate guerrilla warfare while differentiating it from revolutionary warfare. Revolutionary warfare is a much more complex and all encompassing concept. The distinction drawn between guerrilla and revolutionary warfare is not inconsequential. The implications are clear--any country that develops and designs a counter-insurgency strategy based primarily around defeating guerrilla forces completely ignores the true nature and scope of the threat. It is analogous to eating an apple then discarding and ignoring the core. Eating an apple is quick and satisfying to eat, but the core contains seeds that can often produce more apples. Revolutionary warfare has sprung upon the world with a vengeance. Few would doubt that it has played an important role in shaping world events during the 20th Century. Unfortunately for Anerica, most revolutionary wars during the past fifty years were inspired or sponsored by groups, idealogies, and nations hostile to the interests of the United States. Because U.S. government officials, both civilian and military, were slow to recognize revolutionary warfare as a distinct form of warfare with its own attendant theory, the nation was committed to a war in Vietnam it did not understand and thus could not win. We simply did not know our enemy. An understanding of revolutionary warfare theory and strategy certainly helps to reduce that knowledge gap. But equally important, policy makers and military leaders need to understand how that theory is applied to completely close the knowledge gap. An in-depth examination of the tactics and techniques associated with revolutionary warfare is beyond the scope of this paper, but a brief discussion will hopefully give the reader some appreciation of how theory is applied. Revolutionary warfare is an attempt by a group or organization to throw out of power the recognized government and replace it with a government of its own. In so doing, the revolutionary group will invariably try to reorder the political, social, and economic structure of the country. The leadership of the movement will usually be small in number and come from the elite class of educated, politically aware members of society. Mao, Lenin, Trotsky, and Che, just to name a few, were all from the elite classes of their societies. Although the specific strategy and tactics will differ in each case (urban vs rural for instance), the revolutionaries will attempt to use political, economic social, psychological, and military means to destroy the very fabric of society. Most revolutionaries are arrogant--one of their weaknesses--and believe they know whats best for the people. To accomplish their goal of overthrowing the government, the revolutionaries will try to separate the people from the government thereby destroying the legitimacy of the government. The government, on the other hand, will try to keep the loyalty of the people. The people, after all, bestow legitimacy to one side or the other because they pay the taxes, grow the food, support the cause and provide the soldiers each side needs. That means, for all intents and purposes, the people become the battleground. The people, to put it in Clausewitzian terms, are the center of gravity in revolutionary warfare. To subvert the government and intimidate the the people, re- volutionaries will attempt to set up a shadow government at both the national and local level. They will use that organization to try an convince or coerce the people into supporting them. Mean- while, they will undermine the political, social, and economic systems from within and without. They will try to create as much dissent and discontent among the population as they can. They will use violence to terrorize certain segments of the population in order to demonstrate the government is powerless and to reinforce the general feeling of insecurity among the people. The incumbent government, if it is not careful, can overreact trying to get control of the situation. If the government resorts to violence, particularly indiscriminate violence, they will quickly loose the support of the people. The revolutionaries, of course, will try to trick and trap the government into using excessive force because it is to their advantage to see the government discredited. Another tactic the government has to be wary of when faced with a totalitarian revolutionary threat is the cynical use of negotiations and coalition power sharing by the enemy. Seldom, if ever, have revolutionaries entered into negotiations in good faith. Negotiations are a tool used to stall and wait out rough times. "In fact, a country in the midst of revolution that believes totalitarians negotiate in good faith is a country doomed to extinction."15 If the strategy and tactics employed by revolutionaries are to succeed, the society must be vulnerable. There is no mystery to determining what countries are at risk. Such countries are usually poor and have large populations that limit or reduce any economic gains. The modernization process itself often places psychological stress on the population because of cultural and value changes that cause uncertainty and instability. Lack of internal unity in many countries once ruled by colonial powers creates huge cultural problems because borders were drawn without regard for religious, ethnic, language, or geographic reasons. Other countries have small but powerful elites that resist change in order to keep their special status or wealth. Finally, any government that tolerates or abets large scale injustice or corruption is vulnerable to revolution. Given the assumption that U.S. leaders better understand the strategy, tactics, and causes of revolutionary wars than they did before and during the Vietnam War, is it likely or wise for the U.S. to get involved in future such conflicts? The "wise" portion of the question is arguable, but the "likely" half of the question has to be--sooner or later. The U.S. is, after all, a superpower with allies that count on her and national interests that demand attention. Or, as better stated in the National Security Strategy of the United States: "Fortress America" is an obsolete concept. Such a policy would be dangerously misguided and self-defeating. Solidarity with our allies multiplies the strength of all. It permits a sharing of responsibilities and it reminds us that the cause of democracies is, after all, one of our most fundamental goals.16 As just about every thinking person realizes, the nations of the world are too interdependent and the interests of the United States too far reaching for America to hide behind her ocean moats. Not only should the United States not hide, she should not hesitate to assist other nations or peoples who share or wish to share the enduring values we as a nation hold dear--"values such as human dignity, personal freedom, individual rights, the pursuit of happiness, peace and prosperity."17 So, it is not only likely the United States will assist other nations in the future, it is an obligation we as a people should not shirk. The question still remains though, can we assist others wisely. And, perhaps just as important, will the American people support that assistance? The answer to both questions is yes. Certainly the end result of the Grenada operation improved the lot of her people while also serving our national interests. The operation also had the widespread support of the U.S. population. Another operation that had the support of the American people was the 1989 intervention in Panama. The vast majority of the Panamanian people welcomed the U.S. military with open arms. David Broder wrote in the Washington Post: "Panama represents the best evidence yet that, 15 years after the Vietnam War ended, Americans really have come together in recognition of the circumstances in which military intervention makes sense."18 Here we should exercise some caution and take care not to fall back into the mind set that got us mired down in Vietnam. We should remember the value of humility and refrain from thinking of ourselves as morally, politically or militarily superior to others. Out military and civilian leaders need to educate the public on what the Grenada, Libyan, and Panamanian operations were and what they were not. They might have been LIC operations, but they most certainly were not examples of revolutionary warfare. As discussed earlier in this paper, revolutionary warfare takes years if not decades to defeat. And, as Bernard Fall so adeptly says: I have emphasized that the straight military aspects, or the conventional aspects of insurgency, are not the most important. ...Whether it is the Congo, Viet-Nam or Venezuela, is totally irrelevant. Whether we have the "body count," the "kill count," the "structure count," or the "weapons count"-- these are almost meaningless considerations in an insurgency.19 To win revolutionary wars it will take all the elements of national power--political, social, economic, and military. It will require that the American people, the U.S. Congress, and the news media support the effort. A successful effort will also require the government facing a revolutionary threat to take a good hard look at their internal situation. There is no substitute for a strong, efficient, fair police. Corruption in government has to be held in check. Fighting guerrillas with masses of men and equipment will not work. The government will have to get and keep the trust of their people. Most important of all, a revolutionary war movement cannot be beaten unless the people have some stake and incentive to put forth the necessary sacrifice and effort to defeat the revolutionaries. Know your enemy and know yourself. Simple words that are hard to live by. Nevertheless, making an honest effort at applying those words can pay great dividends in the future for the United States. Remember, revolutionaries make mistakes and fail. Bernard Fall once again: Some of these wars, of course, can be won, as in the Philippines, for example. The war was won there not through military action (there wasn't a single special rifle invented for the Philippines, let alone more sophisticated ordnance) but through and extremely well- conceived Civic Action program and, of course, a good leader--Magsaysay.20 Asked to define or describe revolutionary warfare, the average American citizen would probably give a blank stare. A relatively small percentage might not be able to define revolutionary warfare but would at least attempt to give what they consider an example--probably the American, French or Russian Revolutions. Guerrilla warfare would probably be the favorite answer of most responding, and terrorism would be the likely answer of a few others. In other words, most Americans would be unable to define or describe the most significant military and social trend of the 20th century. That lack of understanding exists despite the tremendous impact revolutionary warfare has had on American society during the last thirty years. One only has to mention Vietnam, Nicaragua, Cuba, and Afghanistan to develop an appreciation for the effect revolutionary warfare has had on the domestic and international relationships of the United States. Obviously, our democratic form of government demands an informed citizenry. Therefore, civilian and military officials as well as concerned citizens must come to grips with revolutionary warfare if we are to make rational, prudent decisions on national security issues. To do less only increases the prospect that we as a nation will fail to understand the forces that shape our world and, eventually, lose control of our own destiny. ENDNOTES 1. Mao Tse-tung, Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare. Translation and Introduction by BGen Samuel B. Griffith, USMC (Ret.), (Frederick A. Praeger, New York, (1962), p. 49. 2. Hans H. Heymann, Jr. and W.W. Whitson, Can and Should the United States Preserve A Military Capability for Revolutionary Conflict?, (Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 1972), p. 5. 3. Mao Tse-tung, p. 49. 4. John Shy and Thomas W. Collier, "Revolutionary War," Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1986) p. 822. 5. Shy and Collier, p. 823. 6. Shy and Collier, p. 823. 7. Douglas M. Craver,"Evolution of Revolutionary Violence," History of Revolutionary Warfare, Vol. I, (United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, 1984) p. 6-4. 8. Shy and Collier, p. 823. 9. Shy and Collier, p. 822. 10. Shy and Collier, p. 838. 11. Mao Tse-tung, p. 7. 12. Heymann and Whitson, p. 54. 13. Mao Tse-tung, p. 89. 14 Mao Tse-tung, p. 41 and 43. 15. William H. Burgess III and Peter F. Bahnsen, "Twelve Rules for Obtaining U.S. Support," Military Review, (Jan 1990) p. 62. 16. National Security Strategy of the United States, The White House, (Jan. 1986) p. 2. 17. National Security Strategy of the United States, The White House, p. 3. 18. David S, Broder, "Panama: An Intervention That Made Sense," The Washington Post, (Jan. 14, 1990) p. B7. 19. Bernard B. Fall, "Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency," History of Revolutionary Warfare Vol. 1, (United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, 1984), p. 9-8 20. Fall, p. 9-9. 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