MV-22 Osprey: The Best Solution To The Marine Corps Medium Lift Requirement AUTHOR Major Lenn M. Lanahan, USMC CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: MV-22 OSPREY: THE BEST SOLUTION TO THE MARINE CORPS MEDIUM LIFT REQUIREMENT THESIS: With the CH-46 approaching its twenty-sixth year of service life, a long term replacement, such as the MV-22 Osprey, must be acquired to fill the Marine Corps medium lift requirement well into the twenty-first century. ISSUE: The Marine Corps is facing an extreme challenge in overcoming short falls that exist in its tonnage lift capabilities and medium lift assault requirement. The MV-22 Osprey is the least expensive, most significant and best technologically developed aircraft to meet these needs. Tilt-rotor development began in 1951 when the U.S. Army contracted with Bell Helicopters to build the XV-3. Bell Helicopters produced the XV-15 in the 1970's and proved beyond a doubt the importance of the tilt-rotor. In 1978, the Marine Corps set the criteria for an aircraft to satisfy its medium lift requirements. The Joint Service Advance Vertical Lift Aircraft (JVX) was approved and met the specified criteria. Bell Helicopters and Boeing Vertol teamed together to produce this aircraft, the MV-22 Osprey. Looking only at dollar amounts and not considering the MV-22's tremendous flexibility, Secretary of Defense Cheney cancelled the Osprey program. This action angered many Congressmen who have formed a bipartisan coalition to revive the program. CONCLUSION: The United States is in position to be the first to effectively use the tilt-rotor technology both commercially and militarily. The MV-22 Osprey is the best all around solution to the Marine Corps medium lift requirement. MV-22 OSPREY: THE BEST SOLUTION TO THE MARINE CORPS MEDIUM LIFT REQUIREMENT OUTLINE THESIS STATEMENT. With the CH-46 approaching its twenty-sixth year of service life, a long term replacement, such as the MV-22 Osprey, must be acquired to fill the Marine Corps medium lift requirement well into the twenty-first century. I. History of the tilt-rotor A. Early development B. The promise of the XV-15 C. The reality of the MV-22 II. Capabilities of MV-22 A. Flight characteristics B. Self-deployable benefits III. Alternatives to the MV-22 Osprey program IV. Current status of the MV-22 Program A. Department of Defense position B. Congressional support V. Possible future for the MV-22 program MV-22 OSPREY: THE BEST SOLUTION TO THE MARINE CORPS MEDIUM LIFT REQUIREMENT As the 1990's begin, the Marine Corps is facing an extreme challenge in overcoming short falls that exist in its tonnage lift capability and medium lift assault support requirements. With the CH-46 approaching its twenty-sixth year of service life, a long term replacement, such as the MV-22 Osprey, must be acquired to fill the Marine Corps medium lift requirement well into the twenty-first century. The MV-22 Osprey is the product of over thirty years of technological development and is described as the single most significant development in aviation since the jet engine. (15:54) In 1951, the U.S. Army contracted Bell Helicopters to design a convertiplane which was later designated the XV-3. Tilt-rotor technology has progressed greatly since XV-3's first flight in 1958. As a relatively small aircraft with a length of 30 feet and a wing span of 54 feet, the XV-3 had a cruise airspeed of 175 mph. While the XV-3 was a convertiplane, it could autorotate like a helicopter in the event of engine failure. (9:229) The XV-3 became the foundation of tilt-rotor technololy over the next seven years of testing during which it made more than 110 conversions. During the 1960's, both Bell Helicopters and Boeing Vertol continued conducting independent research into convertiplane technology; however, without governmental support neither company's research was overly successful. Each company continued to develop its own approach to the convertiplane. Boeing Vertol concentrated on tilt-wing design while Bell Helicopter continued developing the tilt-rotor design. In the early 1970's, the Army, Navy, and National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA) entered into a contract with Bell Helicopter to produce two tilt-rotor aircraft to be designated the XV-15. These prototypes, which first flew in April 1977, were to become the test beds upon which tilt-rotor technology would be proven. After more than 600 flight test hours and some 1800 conversion operations, the XV-15 proved beyond a doubt that tilt-rotor technology and advancing aerospace construction technology would make the MV-22 viable.(10:12) The Marine Corps began in 1978 to delineate criteria for the HXM, the designation for replacement aircraft, which would satisfy the Marines medium lift requirements through the early part of the twenty-first century. Initially, the HXM would have to meet five criteria. The first criteria was that the aircraft would have to possess a dash airspeed of 300 knots. Next, the aircraft must have fuel endurance of at least three hours. The HXM must be designed to have a deck spotting factor comparable to a CH-46. It must be able to survive 12.7mm to the fuselage and 23mm high explosive incendiary to the drive system. Finally, HXM's flight performance had to be able to take-off vertically with a payload of 8190 pounds at sea level on a 90F day and hover out of ground effect with a payload of 5520 pounds at 3000 feet MSL on a 91.5F day.(11:50) In December 1981, the Joint Service Advance Vertical Lift Aircraft (JVX) was formally approved, and the JVX became the expected replacement for the Marine Corps medium lift requirement HXM in the 1990's. As early as May 1982, the tilt-rotor concept became the front runner for the JVX as studies were showing that JVX could fill more missions and cover at least three times the ground that a helicopter could cover.(2:42-43). Preliminary design efforts to build the JVX were based on the following Multi Service Mission Requirements: -- Capability to hover out of ground effect at 3000 feet on a 91.5F day with a 8300 pound external load -- Dash speed of 275 knots -- Tactical range of 1400 nautical miles (nm) -- Self-deployable range of 2100nm These mission requirements met or exceeded the Marine Corps criteria for its medium lift requirement.(16:84-85) Bell Helicopters and Boeing Vertol teamed together, and responded with a tilt-rotor concept, designated the MV-22 Osprey, which met all the Multi Service Mission Requirements. The MV-22 was further designed to be compatible with LHA and LHD amphibious shipping which dictated a wing span of 85 feet 10 inches and a length of 60 feet 11 inches for all services. The Department of Defense was programmed for a purchase of 913 MV-22's which involved each of the four services (USMC 552, USN 50, USAF 80, AND USA 231). While the program buy was set, a considerable rise in production was expected as the capability and versatility of this concept were further proven.(1:595) With the benefits of higher speeds, greater range, lower noise levels, and improved maneuverability as proven by XV-15, the JVX/MV-22 program was heralded as a dramatic departure from existing hel i'=opter technology (16:85) As the MV-22 Osprey program began to take shape, the Navy was the first to look at increasing its purchase order. Visualizing an Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) variant MV-22, the MV-22 Osprey was first seen as a supplement to and then as a replacement for the S-3A/B. The idea was that the MV-22 would deploy on the larger carrier decks and use the other air capable ships in the task force to extend its launch cycle times. With the MV-22 Osprey's large cabin volume which could store up to sixty passive sonobouys, the MV-22 Osprey would be able to execute two or three missions per launch cycle. Another strong selling point to the Navy for an ASW variant was the ability to exploit vertical flight capabilities. This could be essential if the Navy was to prosecute Soviet submarines in their favorite hiding places under the Polar Cap. The Navy was strong on the ability to "soft-deploy" and recover expensive sensors in order to take more active measures against the Soviet newer, quieter, and larger missile submarines.(6:30) As part of the fiscal 1987 continuing resolution, the House and Senate approved full funding for two Department of Defense top-priority programs, the LHX and MV-22 Osprey. This resolution fully funded the fixed-price full-scale development cost. (5:80) May 1988 could well be the high water mark for this program. On the positive side, the first full-scale prototype was rolled out at Bell Helicopter's Arlington, Texas plant. However, citing approaching budgetary constraints the Navy abandoned the ASW variant, the Air Force reduced its requirement by twenty-five, and the Army withdrew completely from the program.(14:19) While six MV-22 Osprey prototypes will continue their flight test profile, tbe tilt-rotor design is proving itself capable of meeting or exceeding all the Multi Service Mission Requirements. After making its first flight, on March 19, 1989, which consisted of slow taxis, lift-offs, hover turns, and run-on landings, the test program continued generally on track. During the Fall of 1989, the MV-22's test profiles achieved an equivalent airspeed of 250 knots. (18:26) The tremendous flexibility for tactical employment of force on the modern battlefield promised by the tilt-rotor speed, range, and versatility makes the MV-22 Osprey the aviation cornerstone for over-the-horizon (OTH) amphibious operations. The requirement to be able to execute OTH operations is being dictated by the increases in weapons' accuracy, lethality, and numbers defending even Third World beaches. The precept behind the implementation of OTH is the need to reduce the risk to the Amphibious Task Force (ATF). No longer can it be expected that the ATF will be able to operate within 4000 meters of most beach in the world with impunity. While the OTH concept increases the survivability of the ATF, it is also in keeping with maneuver warfare. By expanding the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA) to allow the ATF more defensive maneuvering space, OTH expands the area with which the defender must be concerned when developing defensive courses of action. This advantage can quickly disappear without the technology such as the air cushion, the tilt-rotor, and the advanced assault amphibious vehicle (AAAV). The Navy-Marine Corps team is developing a strong triad to meet the OTH requirement based on the Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC), MV-22 Osprey, and AAAV. The MV-22 is designed to do two cycles from the ATF to a Force Beach Head (FBH> which is 110nm away, to loiter for forty minutes within the FBH during each cycle, and to return to the ATF for refueling with a twenty minutes fuel reserve. The MV-22 is the keystone of the aviation component of the OTH triad since existing or projected helicopters lack either the range, speed, or lift capacity to execute an OTH operation successfully. (4:87-88) In preparation for the FY 90 Department of Defense budget, Secretary of Defense Cheney, in an effort to reduce the defense budget, announced the cancellation of the MV-22 Osprey program. Secretary Cheney primarily based his decision on the projected cost of the MV-22 program which is expected to range from 25-30 billion dollars. While the programmed unit price in 1996 was estimated to be 20 million dollars for a purchase of 900 aircraft, fly away cost when the first prototype was rolled out ranged from 16-34.5 million dollars.(14:20) This cost analysis is based on current purchase numbers and research and development costs. With a figure of 25 million dollars generally being accepted as the unit price, reductions in the numbers of production aircraft increases directly increases the unit cost. This attempt to reduce the defense budget by cancelling the MV-22 Osprey program has necessitated the development of an alternative medium lift capability by the Department of Defense. Department of Defense analysts developed an alternative to the MV-22 Osprey which utilized a combination of CH-53E's and HH-60's helicopters. This alternative was presented in two options that were based on the concept of single sling or dual sling operations to bring the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) equipment ashore. The single sling option calls for the HH-60 to carry troops and the CH-53E to carry a partial load of troops while externally transporting a HMMWV. The 590 HH-60's and 376 CH-53E's, which are required by the single sling option, means that the Department of Defense will have to purchase 364 more helicopters than the 602 MV-22's to accomplish the same lift requirements. The second option to the alternative is the dual sling option which is the same as the single sling option, except that instead of externally lifting a single HMMWV with passengers the CH-53E's would carry two bolted together HMMWV's and a partial load of troops. Dual sling operations would still require 225 CH-53E's and 478 HH-60's or 101 more helicopters than tilt-rotors.(3:4) Any mix of helicopters, which replaces the MV-22 Osprey, will not be inexpensive. This is particularly true if the helicopters are equipped with the modern avionics that are required to achieve the navigation and communications at night in adverse weather capabilities comparable to the MV-22.(3:4) The Marine Corps cost analysis of the MV-22 and the Department of Defense alternatives over a twenty year life cycle shows the MV-22 Osprey to be more cost effective than either option by as much as 1.3-14.1 billion dollars. When the Department of Defense analysts did their origin cost analysis, they failed to include several cost factors of the helicopter options. These analysts only considered the cost of plain vanilla helicopters that did not have a comparable night/all weather capability. They also failed to consider that the larger number of helicopters would require more pilots and maintenance personnel which means higher personnel cost and training cost. Furthermore, they did not recognize that a large helicopter fleet, both in size and number, would entail more military construction funding for parking ramps and hangars.(18:12) Finally, these analysts failed to account for the increased costs of strategic lift since neither of the helicopters are self-deployable unlike the self-deployable MV-22 Osprey. The strategic costs in themselves could be overwhelming as it takes one C-5 for every five HH-60's and another C-5 for every two CH-53E's to be able to deploy these helicopters. The Marine Corps continues to argue against both the single sling and dual sling options. The single sling option is unacceptable because it is more than fifty percent more expensive than the MV-22 Osprey. Marine Corps officials dispute the dual sling option for two reasons. First, this option is also more expensive than the MV-22 without consideration of the overlooked cost. Secondly and most importantly, the dual sling option is not tactically sound. Not only does it increase the logistical and administrative time aboard ship during the pre-assault phase, but it requires a like amount of time in the landing zone during the asault. In testimony before the House Armed Service Committee on February 20,1990, General Gray responded to questioning about the viability of using the dual sling option as follows: I consider this whole dialogue of dual sling option totally ridiculous. It has nothing to do with coming from the sea in a wide variety of scenarios... It has nothing to do with warfighting.(3:4) During General Gray's testimony, he asked that the Congress take a new look at the MV-22 Osprey program in light of affordability issues. As early as June 1988, General Gray has been concerned with the lack of enthusiasm for the MV-22 which has been Marine Aviation's highest priority program since May 1985. When Secretary of Defense Cheney canceled the MV-22 program in June 1989, both the Marine Corps and Congress protested this decision. While the Congress failed in the ensuing budgetary battle to support the MV-22 Osprey procurement program, it did reinstate 351 million dollars into the FY 90 budget to fund research and development costs of the MV-22.(8:4) The Congressional FY 90 Defense Appropriation Conference Report directed the Department of Defense to compare the MV-22 Osprey with the helicopter alternative and base any termination decisions on a cost and operation effectiveness analysis (COEA).(12:16) After Congress had specifically directed the Department of Defense to continue funding through FY 90, Deputy Defense Secretary Atwood sent a memo to the Secretary of the Navy which directed Secretary Garrett to terminate all contracts funded under the FY 89 budget for advance procurement of long lead-time items. While Deputy Secretary of Defense Atwood took this action in order to protect the public's fiscal interest by ceasing expenditures on a program which DOD earmarked for cancellation, he undertook this action without first ascertaining what the contractual termination costs would be involved.(7:4) While Deputy Secretary of Defense Atwood's actions have angered many members of the Congress, the Congress will fight in subsequent budget hearings to retain this program on its own merits.(13:26) In order to press for continuing funding of the MV-22 Osprey program, a bipartisan coalition was established. The members of this coalition are Sen. Lloyd BentSen. (D,TX), Sen. Alfonse D'Amato (R,NY), Sen. Phil Gramm (R,TX), Sen. John Heinz (R,PA), Sen. Arlen Specter (R,PA), Rep. Lane Evans (D,IL), Rep. Thomas M. Foglietta (R,PA), Rep. Martin Frost (D,TX), Rep. Pete Geren (D,TX), Rep. George Hochbrueckner (D,NY), Rep. Martin Lancaster (D,NC), and Rep. Curt Weldon (R,PA). Rep. Weldon summarized the Tilt-rotor Technology Coalition's position when he said, "We can't sell the B-2 bomber to TWA, and we can't sell a missile submarine to Carnival Cruise Lines, but the MV-22 can be used as a civil air transport."(3:4) While Congressional backers of the MV-22 Osprey program develop their long term strategy, they have identified 700 million dollars from the FY 91 with which they plan to revive the program. This 700 million dollars consist of the 235 million dollars of unspent long lead procurement which the Department of Defense froze, and 400 million dollars from the purchase of CH-53E's which would be part of the interim alternative to the MV-22. With the wherewithal to keep this program in the FY 91 budget, the Coalition is looking at two complimentary strategies to give the MV-22 long term budgetary life. The first strategy is to lengthen the procurement period by reducing the near term years production. This strategy would make the expenditures for the program more palpable to the Congress as the budgetary line amounts would be in millions of dollars versus billions of dollars. (8:4) To complement this strategy, the Marine Corps, the Department of the Navy, and the production team of Bell Helicopters and Boeing Vertol have to lower the unit price by stimulating Foreign Military Sales and civilian interest. Commercial variants would be essentially the same as the MV-22 except that it would have a pressurized cabin and seating for upwards to fifty-two passengers. These commuter aircraft could operate for metropolitan airports of about four acres in dimension. As an added benefit the two hour tilt-rotor flight from New York to Boston may be as much as half the time it takes today to ground commute from the office to the airport and then from the airport to the office. The Port Authorities of New York and New Jersey have estimated that by the year 2000 there will be 5-8 million passengers a year moving in and out of New York, generating over a billion dollars of new business. Six European companies, Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm, Aerospatiale, Aeritalia, Agusta, CASA, and Westland have banned together to evaluate the tilt-rotor and its applications in Europe. This group envisions the aircraft as a key source of local/regional transportation through the 1990's. With this interest in existence, Bell Helicopters and Boeing Vertol should be able to enter into a joint production agreement with the Europeans to help reduce the unit cost of the MV-22 Osprey.(19:51) The Department of Defense, the Marine Corps, and the Congress agree that the Marine Corps has a serious short fall in its medium lift requirement as it heads into the twenty-first century. 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