Command And Control: As It Applies To Maneuver Warfare AUTHOR Major Thomas M. Kinnear, USMC CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA C4 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: COMMAND AND CONTROL: AS IT APPLIES TO MANEUVER WARFARE THESIS: Commanders in the Marine Corps must have a clear understanding of command and control as it applies to Maneuver Warfare to be efficient and effective in combat. ISSUES: The Marine Corps has adopted a new doctrine to conduct warfare. Unlike the attrition style of warfare used by the U.S. military over the past century, the Corps cannot accept nor the American public tolerate, the high cost in men and material associated with attrition warfare. "Maneuver Warfare" is the current philosophy described in the Fleet Marine Force Manual 1 entitled "Warfighting." The publication describes, in great detail, the doctrine of maneuver warfare. It provides commanders with the necessary insight to conduct warfare in other terms than attrition. However, it leaves a tremendous void on the subject of command and control. The heart of maneuver warfare is based on a clear understanding of command and control as a philosophy and as a system. This paper discusses the differences between command and control as a system, based on high technology, equipment and facilities and command and control as a philosophy, based on leadership , commander's intent and mission type orders. CONCLUSION: Commander's must change their previous concepts of what command and control is and is not, if they are to be successful in applying the principles of maneuver warfare. They must understand the limitations of the command and control system and be capable of exploiting the strengths of the command and control philosophy. COMMAND AND CONTROL: AS IT APPLIES TO MANEUVER WARFARE OUTLINE I. Command and Control A. Defining Command and Control. B. Command and Control system components 1. Organization 2. Equipment II. Dimensions of War A. Fog B. Friction C. Fluidity D. Fleeting Opportunities E. Attrition vs Maneuver Warfare III. Command and Control System A. Technology and Equipment B. Explicit Communication C. Centralized Control D. Enemy Capabilities IV. Command and Control Philosophy A. Based on Leadership B. Implicit Communication C. Decentralized Control D. Commander's Intent E. Mission Type Orders V. Summary COMMAND AND CONTROL: AS IT APPLIES TO MANEUVER WARFARE The basic concept of command and control is a relatively new term in the Marine Corps. The Joint Chiefs of Staff define command and control as "the facilities, equipment, communications, procedures and personnel essential to a commander for planning, directing and controlling operations of assigned forces to accomplish assigned missions."1 The Marine Corps, over the past few years, has changed its philosophy on the nature of warfighting. "Maneuver Warfare" is the doctrine which directs how the the Marine Corps will conduct combat operations now and into the 21st. century. It is important to examine what war is to understand how maneuver warfare applies to command and control. War is generally characterized by the application of military power in a hostile and violent clash of wills in order to impose our will on our enemy. The ultimate objective of war, through the application of military power, is the physical destruction of an individuals ability to resist the will of the force applying power.2 Typically, all wars which use military power end with the cessation of 1 Armed Forces Staff College, Pub.1, The Joint Officer's Guide, (Norfolk, Va. 1988), p.309. 2 USMC, Warfighting, FMFM 1, (Headquarters USMC, Washington, D.C. 1989),p.3. hostilities. Victory comes to the individual who was able to impose his will over his opponent. War has many dimensions; to be successful in war, the leaders of marines must attempt to understand the characteristics of war and learn to operate within the environment which makes up the battlefield. Friction, as described by Carl von Clausewitz, "is the force that makes the apparently easy so difficult."3 As it applies to war, friction is the force that prevents the imposition of our will on the enemy. War is manifested in uncertainty (the fog of war), fluidity and fleeting opportunities. Friction in combat can derive from poor leadership or overly restrictive control measures placed on individuals and units. There are endless sources of friction for every action attempted in battle; no matter how simple the task or goal, there will be a certain amount of friction which will inhibit a military operation.4 The key to being successful in battle is the ability to fight effectively within the medium of friction and to adapt to constantly changing situations. There are primarily two styles of warfare, attrition and maneuver. Attrition is based on firepower, while maneuver is based on movement.5 The Marine Corps, with its fully integrated air ground team, is able to capitalize on the best of both styles of 3 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans, and ed. M. Howard and P. Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984) p. 119. 4 Warfighting, p.6. 5 Ibid. p.27. warfare. Attrition warfare requires the capability of massing fire power, and incorporates the systematic destruction of enemy targets. Maneuver warfare, on the other hand, is the ability to move forces with speed and surprise to exploit enemy vulnerabilities. It is important to understand that depending on the tactical situation, a commander will capitalize on the value of massing fire power and the systematic destruction of enemy targets, without paying the high price in men and material that is normally associated with attrition warfare. There in lies the difference, exploit the benefit without the cost. The essence of maneuver warfare is based on speed of execution (relative to the enemy's ability to react), the concentration of combat power (fires), surprise, boldness, and exploiting enemy vulnerabilities. The objective is to shatter the enemy's cohesion and provide him with a deteriorating situation which he cannot cope with.6 It is prudent that the Marine Corps adopt the doctrine of maneuver warfare. As Sir Winston Churchill so aptly put it: Battles are won by slaughter and maneuver. The greater the general, the more he contributes in maneuver, the less he demands in slaughter.7 Command and control as it applies to maneuver warfare provides a unique dichotomy in terms. There is the Command and 6 Ibid. p.59. 7 Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1923), vol.II, p.5. Control system and the Command and Control philosophy, both of which are essential to maneuver warfare. At the first glimpse, one would seem to be the antithesis of the other. The system and philosophy are made up of separate and distinct characteristics which compliment the extraordinary organization of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). The command and control system is fundamental to the Corps; it is the glue that binds together the air ground team. It was developed for the coordination of supporting arms and aviation assets. The system to be effective requires state of the art technology, explicit communication, and centralized control of personnel and equipment. Conversely, the command and control philosophy is constitutive to maneuver warfare which requires leadership, implicit communication and decentralized control of personnel. Both the system and philosophy are necessary; they both help to reduce the fog of war and gain certainty during battles for the commander. The purpose of the command and control system is to coordinate the efforts of the MAGTF to produce the desired "synergistic" effect on the battlefield. The heart of the systems is primarily made up of communications equipment and facilities. As mentioned previously, the system requires explicit communications and centralized control for the coordination of the various supporting arms. In the Marine Corps, the organization and equipment to effectively orchestrate the command and control system over the past decade has continued to improve and develop tremendous capabilities. The equipment which the Marine Corps has acquired for its command and control system has, quite literally, kept pace with the space age technology.8 Because of the vast improvement in the system, the battlefield characteristics of fog and friction have been reduced. The MAGTF commander now has a decided advantage over a third world foe who lacks the sophistication, or the means to thwart the use of the Marine Corps command and control system. Fluidity on the battlefield is the rapidity in which the situation changes; it leads to fleeting opportunities. These two characteristics of friction, are now minimized and capitalized on respectively in the Corps. Commanders are capable of directing devastating fires rapidly and accurately on enemy positions, because of the advance concepts and characteristics in the command and control system. The commander who is in the best position to take advantage of the situations, the one who shapes and develops the battlefield, will ultimately be the victor. The command and control system has evolved and is compatible with the needs of MAGTF commanders as they apply the concepts of maneuver warfare. The system helps to eliminate uncertainty during the fog of war. The system which uses state of the art communications equipment is both flexible and survivable under most conditions. Today's command and control system facilitates freedom of action, making it responsive to the 8 Col. L.G. Norwork, U.S. Army, "Synchronizing Deep Attack Support: The Corps Troops Operations Cell", Military Review, (July, 1988), p.23. commander's will.9 Every commander has what Von Crevald would describe as "the futile quest." Commanders seeking to apply the doctrine of maneuver warfare probe for certainty. However, they need not be preoccupied with their search. The improved capabilities of the command and control system decrease the uncertainty and move the commander to a more certain position in the execution of his decisions. He is able to coordinate the proper combination of supporting arms and aviation assets to execute the mission in the most effective and efficient manner. The centralized control and execution of his supporting arms, makes war a science, battles deterministic and the results more certain. However, as wonderful as this sounds, it must be kept in the proper perspective; there is a down side. As the Corps' technology has improved, so have the enemy's systems which are capable of detecting and destroying the Marines' command and control system. Electromagnetic signatures of links and nodes emits unique electromagnetic characteristics that distinguish elements of the MAGTF.10 High, very high and ultra high frequency emissions from a single site are indicators of tactical air and fire support coordination and control systems. Certain radar frequencies and parameters identify specific weapon systems by providing the 9 Ibid. p.25. 10 Maj. T.L. McMahon, U.S. Army, "The Key to Success: Developing a Command and Control System", Military Review, (Nov. 1988), p.31. signature of their emitters. The key to protecting our command and control system is an in-depth understanding of the threat. The Marine Corps must realize that military operations today cannot be conducted without a massive effort to deny enemy sensors the physical and electronic signature needed to identify critical elements of the MAGTF's command and control structure. There are both passive and active counter measures which can be employed. Passive counter measures are achieved by: communicating only when required and using burst transmissions, use nonelectronic means when possible, focus on the commander's critical elements of information and keep reports to an absolute minimum. Active counter measures employ: tactical military deception techniques, such as, electronic simulators, multiple emitter sites, decoys and dummy command post.11 If these measures are incorporated by the MAGTF, they would significantly aid in the survivability of the command and control system. Still and all, the Marine Corps has only precious few communications assets. The corps at the division and wing level will be hard pressed to maintain a sufficient command and control system to adequately sustain operations, if they experience minimal combat damage. It is unrealistic to expect an elaborate active counter measure system made up of decoy transmitters and dummy 11 Ibid. p.33. command posts, given the fiscal limitations in which the Corps must operate. These must be discounted as serious consideration for the protection of our command and control assets. Passive counter measures provide the Marines with the most practical means of protection. The ability of the Marine Corps to coordinate its supporting arms and aviation assets is one of its greater strengths. The Corps needs to develop a system which is able to operate in an austere fiscal and sophisticated combat environment without the use of telecommunications and emitters. Granted, there is no easy answer and this will be a particularly hard task for the Marine Corps to accomplish. However, this problem could be significantly reduce if all the major subordinate elements of the MAGTF have a complete understanding of the commander's intent. Before the Marine Corps adopted the doctrine of maneuver warfare, the primary function of the command and control system was to coordinate and provide the commander with a means to relay his decisions vertically through the chain of command. It allowed the commander to translate decisions into orders, and communicate those orders to subordinate commanders for execution. Control was the centralized means to gain certainty over the battlefield through direct intervention with instructions to subordinates. For example, during the Vietnam war, it was considered "state of the art" command and control for a battalion commander, with the aid of a VHF radio, to direct the actions of his infantry companies in combat from the vantage point offered by a Huey helicopter. This allowed the battalion commander to give explicit instructions and maintain centralized control of his units. The basic premise of maneuver warfare is based on leadership; it requires implicit communications and decentralized control. It relies on a clear understanding of the commander's intent and the use mission type orders.12 The term command and control is redundant when applied to maneuver warfare. It indicated an inability to think of command in other than its control aspects. Prior to the doctrine of maneuver warfare, command and control was based on some antiquated idea that command equated simply to authority and control. Now, however, command and control is the philosophy which directs maneuver warfare. Control can be thought of as a tool on a straight line. At one end of the line you have complete control which is characterized by the terms regimentation, regulations and norms. Subordinates are not allowed to exercise initiative under this state of control. At the other end of the line, the state of control is complete discipline. This end of the line is characterized by self control and obedience based on understanding of the commander's intent, with subordinates exercising complete initiative.13 For maneuver warfare to be effective, it is vital that the command and control philosophy exploit the characteristics of self control and incorporate commander's intent with mission type orders. 12 Warfighting, p.63. 13 Maj. T.M. Tanhsley, U.S. Army, "Command and Control: Finding the Middle Ground." Military Review, (Sept. 1988) p.46. Command and control with respect to maneuver warfare is the entire process by which military forces and their organizations operate. When discussing command and control there are some questions one should ask: What will be the future of the Marine Corps? What will be their role? What environment will they operate in? As the Soviet threat in central Europe declines, the Corps mission in NATO maybe substantially reduced. However, low intensity conflict throughout third world regions such as, Central and South America, and the Middle East will most likely be trouble spots in which American interest will be at stake. The cutback in the defense budget will force the Marines to operate with reduced personnel and equipment. This does not necessarily mean that the Corps will become less capable. But it will require that the Marine Corps adopt, in earnest, a command and control philosophy that complements the doctrine of maneuver warfare as described in FMFM 1, Warfighting. The Marines must optimize the effectiveness of its most valued resources, its personnel. The primary means to accomplish this is through a command and control philosophy that provides for a more rapid decision making process, particularly at the Regimental, Battalion and Company levels. A rapid decision making process is developed through training. It eliminates the cumbersome chain of command which delay decisions that are vital to the "on seen commander." The ability to make rapid decisions helps to eliminate fleeting opportunities. This ability is not dependent on state of the art communications systems. The Marine Corps is a complex warfighting organization designed around the MAGTF. The Corps must be the architects of a command and control philosophy that exemplifies the doctrine of maneuver warfare. A philosophy that develops individuals to their utmost potential. To accomplish the mission, Marines must be capable of incorporating the philosophy that produces the leadership potential of each individual in the Corps. The Corps seeks the synergetic effects of its air and ground team. They can capitalize on the skills of Marines who are motivated, loyal and through training display initiative and self discipline to provide the synergism of a cohesive combat unit. The self discipline and dedication of every Marine is achieved through unit cohesiveness and education. This process begins at boot camp, continues into the fleet and throughout a career. Unit cohesiveness is not achieved by wearing the insignia of the Marines. The corps must make an active effort to keep individual members of the team together, if they want to achieve the synergistic effect of a cohesive units. Every member of a unit develops leadership qualities through education. Each person must be allowed to make tactical mistakes and everyone in the unit must be allowed the opportunity to learn from the mistakes of others. During times of peace this is an inexpensive and valuable learning tool. A tool, that the aviation community has exploited for a number of years without destroying the individual professionally. Aviation publication such as, "Approach" and "Flight Fax" base a number of their articles on tactical and other judgemental errors made by flight crews. In any readyroom throughout the fleet you can hear pilots discussing the mistakes of brother pilots from the CO down to the nugget, without malice or recalcitrance. The conversation foster learning by exposing mistakes not hiding them. As long as the team continues to grow and learn it will be capable of completing its assigned task. The ability to communicate intent is the key to the development of a command and control philosophy that is responsive to the Marine Corps doctrine of maneuver warfare. Ideally, every part of the organization should be able to communicate amongst itself. This is particularly true at the Battalion and Squadron level. Commanders and their staff must be able to communicate not only vertically up and down the chain of command, but circularly. The effect of this type of communication provides the commander with an open exchange of ideas. The round table style of communication provides that the information will reach the right individual and decisions can be made quickly. The commander makes his intent clear and ensures that no one unit is over taxed. Once the intent is understood, each person is free to decide on how he will accomplish his mission. For this system to be effective, everyone must understand their role and be capable of providing feedback in a timely manner. The only way this type of command and control can work is through experience, gained through realistic training. The unit that is intimately familiar with each of its members, from the commander down to the fire team leader or squadron pilot, will be able to execute the mission based trust and confidence gained through experience. Trust is not granted to members of the unit simply because he bares the units name; it is earned through demonstrated ability to accomplish the mission. Once the commander has made his intent clear, he allows his subordinates the freedom necessary to execute the mission.14 Decision making at the lowest level facilitates speed of execution and insures the commander of certainty on the battlefield. Decision quality is improved because it eliminates the chain of command; responsibility for action is retained with individual who is in the best tactical position; fleeting opportunities are reduced. The unit engaged in combat has been trained to respond to the rapidly changing environment and is capable of functioning effectively. Unlike the Corps experience in Vietnam, decentralized control of units does not create uncertainty at the top levels of command. The ability of units to operate effectively in an uncertain environment, the fog of war, is a factor of leadership, training and unit cohesiveness. The commander gains certainty through trust and confidence. The commander who conceptualizes maneuver warfare and applies the principles of command and control will understand the differences between leadership and coordination, implicit and explicit communication, decentralized and centralized control. Commanders must now seek to communicate their intent in person and orally; he must use key, well understood phrases and use mission 14 Warfighting, p.64. type orders.15 There needs to be standardization throughout the Marine Corps in unit operating procedures and training. Unit cohesion and solidarity is a vital requirement. Subordinates must know their commander well enough to be able to read his thoughts. This is a more effective and faster way to communicate intent. It enhances flexibility, responsiveness and survivability. However, the current Marine Corps personnel policies of transferring personnel from coast to coast every few years does not facilitate unit cohesion. For implicit communication to be effective it requires a long term relationship with commanders and their subordinates. If the Marine Corps is serious about maneuver warfare then it will seek to inseminate these requirements for unit cohesion throughout the Corps, instead of providing lip-service to the principles. This will require some serious soul searching at the top levels of the Corps. The measure of an effective command and control philosophy is realized when a commander's force functions more effectively and expeditiously than the enemy. The commander on the battlefield has gained certainty by providing his subordinates with his intent and a means to coordinate his supporting arms and aviation assets. The use of commanders intent and mission type orders will all but eliminate the need for a vulnerable communication systems involving decentralized control. 15 Ibid., p.71. In summary: The Marine Corps has a command and control system and philosophy. They both apply to maneuver warfare. The system and philosophy are separate and independent. Both are vital to the Corps. The command and control system is based on high technology, facilities and equipment. It is used to coordinate supporting arms and aviation assets of the MAGTF. It requires explicit communications and centralized control of personnel and equipment to be effective. The command and control philosophy is based on leadership. It provides for a rapid decision making process based on the commander's intent and mission type orders. It requires implicit communications and decentralized control of personnel to be effective. Both the system and the philosophy are responsive to the commander and both reduce uncertainty during the fog of war. If the Marine Corps is to be successful in future conflicts, commanders must understand the limitations and strengths of both the command and control system and philosophy. Bibliography Books Churchill, Winston. S. The World Crisis, (New York: Charles Scriber's Sons, 1923). Clausewitz. Carl. von. On War, trans. and ed. M. Howard and P. Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984). Sun Tzu. The Art of War, trans. S.B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982). Government Documents Armed Forces Staff College, Pub. 1, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide. (Norfolk, Va. 1988) U.S. Marine Corps. Warfighting, FMFM 1. (Washington. D.C. 1989) Articles and Periodicals Major D.A. Hahn, USA, Leadership: The Heart of Command and Control. Military Review, November, 1988 Major T.L. McMahon, USA, "The Key to Sucess: Developing Command and Control. Military Review, November. 1988 Col. L.G. Nowok. USA, Synchronizing Deep Attack Support: The Corps Troops Operations Cell." Military Review. July, 1988 Lt. Col. R.L. Schmit, USA, "A Doctrine for Command." Military Review, November, 1985 Major D.M. Tanhsley, USA, "Command and Control: Finding the Middle Ground." Military Review, November, 1989
