Marine Maneuver Warfare And The Omnibus Agreement AUTHOR Major Frederick J. Klauser, USMC CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Foreign Policy EXECUTIVE SUMMARY MARINE MANEUVER WARFARE AND THE OMNIBUS AGREEMENT The Marine Corps has adopted maneuver warfare as its doctrinal method of warfighting. However, the role of the ACE in Marine maneuver warfare is not certain. While specific roles for Marine aviation continue to be hotly debated, the MAGTF commander must be prepared to conduct maneuver warfare on a moments notice. One of the MAGTF commander's constraints in joint operations is the policy contained in the Omnibus Agreement of 1986. What effect does the agreement have on the MAGTF commander's ability to to employ his entire MAGTF in maneuver warfare, and can the ACE be effectively employed as a maneuver element under the agreement? Marine commanders must demoralize the enemy and make his fighting force ineffective. One of his primary tools is combined arms, and one of the most effective and important combined arms weapons is the ACE. Therefore, retaining the ACE should be a key priority for the MAGTF commander. This may be difficult because the Omnibus Agreement allows the Joint Force Commander (JFC) to control the ACE if he deems necessary. Since World War II, MAGTF commanders have historically been unsuccessful at maintaining MAGTF integrity when the JFC has chosen to centralize control of aviation. Additionally, differences in Marine and Air Force doctrine have complicated the MAGTF integrity issue. Even though Joint doctrine acknowledges Marine doctrine, the MAGTF commander must educate and convince the JFC that MAGTF integrity is in the JFC's best interest. In order to do this, the MAGTF commander must have a thorough knowledge of ACE capabilities and employment. To attain knowledge of the ACE, Marine officers must take the initiative to self-educate themselves. Additionally, the Marine Corps must provide its officers with the educational vehicles, through resident and nonresident programs, to arrive at an adequate level of knowledge. The MAGTF commander can fully employ his MAGTF and ACE in maneuver warfare if he has the knowledge and ability to influence the JFC. If he does not, Marine history will repeat itself. MARINE MANEUVER WARFARE AND THE OMNIBUS AGREEMENT OUTLINE Thesis Statement. If the MAGTF commander is expected to employ the ACE in maneuver warfare during joint operations, then he must have a thorough knowledge of Marine aviation capabilities and employment. I. Marine Maneuver Warfare Doctrine. A. Need to destroy enemy moral/physical cohesion. B. Destroy cohesion with several tools, including combined arms. C. ACE is an essential part of combined arms concept. II. Omnibus Agreement of 1986. A. Major points of the agreement. B. Intent of the agreement. C. Reality of agreement terms. III. History of Joint Operations. A. World War II. B. Korea. C. Vietnam. D. Lessons learned. IV. Aviation Doctrine Differences. A. Marine doctrine. B. Air Force doctrine. C. Consequences for MAGTF commanders. V. Marine Corps Efforts. A. Future doctrinal guidance. B. MAGTF commander's responsibilities. C. Success limiting factors. VI. Future Requirements for MAGTF Integrity. A. Marine officer self-study. B. Revision of Marine education programs. C. Immediate action. MARINE MANEUVER WARFARE AND THE OMNIBUS AGREEMENT In recent years, maneuver warfare has been the subject of great discussion, debate, and speculation within the Marine Corps. The increased destructiveness and accuracy of modern weapons have raised the cost of attrition warfare to unacceptable levels; the United States can no longer afford the cost in lives, equipment, and national wealth of waging wars of attrition. As a result, maneuver warfare has become the focus of Marine Corps doctrinal thinking. Officially, the Marine Corps declared its intent to employ maneuver warfare doctrinally in Warfighting, FMFM 1. Yet, questions concerning maneuver warfare remain. In particular, the employment of the Aviation Combat Element (ACE) of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) in maneuver warfare continues to be hotly debated. Controversy concerning the ACE in maneuver warfare is widespread. Some authors, such as William S. Lind and MGEN Dailey, have addressed tactics and individual weapons systems, while others have studied operational employment and doctrinal control. (2,12,20) The object of this paper is to address the ACE in maneuver warfare in context with the Omnibus Agreement of 1986. This document's agreement or lack of agreement with Marine Corps Doctrine is not an issue. Whether Marines like it or not, the Omnibus Agreement makes too much sense, from a "joint" perspective, to be changed or cancelled. There are other important issues, however. First, what effect does the Omnibus Agreement have on the MAGTF commander's ability to employ his entire MAGTF in maneuver warfare? Second, can the ACE be effectively employed as a maneuver element under the provisions of the Omnibus Agreement? Before these questions can be properly addressed, several areas must be reviewed in order to provide some logical bases for the answers. The Marine Corps' doctrinal concept of maneuver warfare provides the primary focus for the employment of all Marine forces, including the ACE. According to doctrine: The aim of maneuver warfare is to render the enemy incapable of resisting by shattering his moral and physical cohesion--his ability to fight as an effective, coordinated whole--rather than to destroy him physically through incremental attrition. . . (italics mine). (27:59) The Marine Commander shatters the enemy's moral and physical cohesion through selective application of firepower, operational tempo, concentration of strength against critical vulnerabilities, and surprise. (27:60-6l) When the enemy is surprised, his vulnerabilities are exploited, fires are massed upon him, and he cannot keep operational pace, he will become demoralized and ineffective as a fighting force. (27:60) In order to effect the demoralization and ineffectiveness of the enemy by these means, the Marine commander is expected to utilize a number of tools. Some of these tools are the assignment of missions to subordinate commanders, the specification of the commander's intent, the identification of the focus of effort, the exploitation of enemy weaknesses, and the utilization of combined arms. (27:70-75) In regard to combined arms, FMFM 1 states: Combined arms is the full integration of arms in such a way that in order to counteract one, the enemy must make himself more vulnerable to another. We pose the enemy with not just a problem, but a dilemma--a no win situation. (27:75) This statement implies that the MAGTF commander must use all of the assets at his disposal to create a situation which will render the enemy ineffective. Therefore, the ACE, as one of the MAGTF commander's combat elements, should be fully utilized in schemes of maneuver to achieve desired combined arms effects. (24:18) Although it may be hard to visualize how to use the ACE as a maneuver element, it should not be hard to grasp the idea of the MAGTF commander waging more efficient maneuver warfare with an integrated ACE. Unfortunately, the MAGTF commander has more to contend with than just realizing the importance of his ACE in maneuver warfare. He must also deal with the constraints of the "1986 Omnibus Agreement for Command and Control of Marine TACAIR in Sustained Operations Ashore." The primary purpose of the Omnibus Agreement was to formally confirm the relationship between the MAGTF commander and the Joint Force Commander (JFC) for command and control of Marine Tactical Aviation assets during joint military operations. The relationship outlined in the Omnibus Agreement was not a new concept. Marine doctrinal publications such as FMFM 0-1 and FMFM 5-1 described the same relationship when they were published in 1979. However, the Omnibus Agreement announced the acceptance of the relationship by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on behalf of their respective Services. Briefly, the major points of the Omnibus Agreement are: 1) The MAGTF commander will retain operational control of his organic air assets. 2) During joint operations, the MAGTF air assets will normally be in support of the MAGTF mission. 3) The MAGTF commander will make sorties available to the JFC, through his Air Component Commander, for air defense, long-range interdiction, and long-range reconnaissance. 4) Sorties in excess of MAGTF direct support requirements will be provided to the JFC for tasking. 5) The Theater JFC has the authority to exercise operational control, assign missions, redirect efforts (E. G., reapportion and/or reallocate MAGTF sorties when it has been determined by the JFC that they are required for higher priority missions), and direct coordination among his subordinate commanders. . . .(5:2-4) The intent of the agreement was to maintain the integrity of the MAGTF and to employ it as a whole unit while supporting the JFC in his mission. However, the agreement also sought to ensure that the JFC's authority would not be restricted during the conduct of his mission. Therein lies the rub. Most people are willing to admit that endeavors do not always turn out as planned. Depending on their level of pessimism, some may contend that few undertakings ever turn out as planned. Consequently, some Marines are concerned about the JFC's authority to reapportion sorties or, worse yet, reassign operational control of the ACE. GEN P. X. Kelly explained it best when he wrote, "The bottom line is that the Joint Force commander is in charge." (5:1) Although the Omnibus Agreement's implied intent is to maintain the integrity of the MAGTF, the reality of the matter is that the JFC has the authority to do whatever he deems necessary to accomplish his mission. This does not imply that he will arbitrarily take actions to limit the MAGTF commander's capabilities, but it does imply that MAGTF integrity is not guaranteed. From a historical perspective, the concerns cited above are not unfounded. Several precedents reinforce apprehensions that joint commanders will alter command and control relationships for the ACE when they believe it is appropriate. Major M. D. Becker identified most of the pertinent examples in his article published in the Marine Corps Gazette. (2:53-54) For example, during World War II, Marine Corps air assets were primarily under Navy control in the Pacific. (14:379,407) The only significant exceptions to that relationship took place in the Guadalcanal, Bouganville, New Britain, Peleliu, and Okinawa campaigns. On Guadalcanal, BGEN Geiger had complete control of all the aviation assets (Army, Navy, and Marine) which comprised the Cactus Air Force. (13:68) In the Okinawa campaign, Marine assets were under the command and control of the 10th Army Tactical Air Force. Coincidentally, the 10th Army Tactical Air Force was under the command of MGEN Mulcahy, a Marine. (21:325) Despite GEN Vandergrift's and LTGEN Holland Smith's efforts to emphasize the employment of Marine units as integrated forces, Marine air assets were rarely under the Marine Corps' unhindered control. (21:324) The command and control situation during the Korean Conflict was similar to World War II. When the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade arrived to fight in the Pusan Perimeter, Marine aviation assets were dispersed to aircraft carriers and to the 5th Air Force in Japan. (15:Vol I, 89-90) Later, the 1st Marine Air Wing (MAW) commander was assigned as X Corps Tactical Air Commander during the Inchon-Seoul Operation. As the Tactical Air Commander, he maintained command and control of the 1st Marine Air Wing which supported both the 1st Marine Division and the 7th Army Division during the operation: (15:Vol II, 71) After the Inchon-Seoul Operation, however, the 1st MAW was placed under the operational control of the 5th Air Force and remained there until conflict termination in 1953. (14:502) The Vietnam War provided a further example of Marine aviation command and control during joint operations. In 1967, GEN Westmorland, ComUSMACV, believed that it was necessary to consolidate the control of all Tactical Air in South Vietnam in order to provide for the adequate defense of Khe Sanh. Accordingly, he assigned GEN Momyer, the 7th Air Force commander, as ComMACV Deputy for Air. His function was to act as the central coordinator for all TacAir in South Vietnam. (11:274;19:22,85) The MAGTF commander was tasked with providing all Tactical Air sorties which were not in direct support of Khe Sanh's defense to the central controlling authority. Although the MAGTF commander maintained operational control of his aircraft, the Marine Corps' position was that the arrangement violated the integrity of the MAGTF.(11:38) The dispute was later resolved in favor of GEN Westmorland, and the Marine Corps complied with his organization for tactical sortie control until Marine units withdrew from Vietnam in 1971. (11:137;14:27,587) In his study, Major Becker noted that Marine aviation units supported Marine ground units in most of the cases described above. The fact that Marine ground units were given priority for Marine aviation sorties is important because it demonstrates that JFCs have historically attempted to employ Marine aviation as it was intended to be employed. There is another, more important lesson, however. None of the situations which caused the JFCs to change command and control relationships were identical. Although there were many similarities, the circumstances which caused each JFC to make changes were different. The lesson, then, is that the JFC's decisions on how to command and control his subordinate forces are situation dependent. Each JFC will organize his forces in a way that he believes will best accomplish his mission. Unfortunately, the JFC's concept for command and control of Marine aviation assets has historically differed from the Marine commander's concept. In addition to the historical precedents which have been set, the MAGTF commander must also be concerned with the differences in doctrine among the Service components assigned to joint operations. Specifically, the MAGTF commander must be concerned with the differences between Marine Corps and Air Force doctrine. In joint operations, the primary subject of dispute between the Marine Corps and the Air Force is the role of the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC). The JFACC concept was developed and implemented in 1986 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the intent that the JFACC would assure centralized coordination of Tactical Air sorties, thus enhancing the JFC's ability to complete his mission. Marine Corps doctrine recognizes the need for the MAGTF commander to support the JFC and to provide him with excess sorties for the benefit of the Joint Force's overall mission.(23:4-54) It also agrees with the concept of the JFACC as the JFC's agent for coordination and planning. The significance of this relationship is that the MAGTF commander supports the JFC while maintaining operational control of Marine aviation assets. By maintaining this arrangement, the MAGTF commander still has the ability to employ the ACE as part of his combined arms team. He has the option of employing the ACE in support of the Ground Combat Element (GCE) or as a separate maneuver element in his maneuver warfare scheme. Air Force doctrine, in contrast to Joint doctrine, associates the JFACC with the Air Force Air Component Commander (ACC) . From the Air Force's point of view, joint forces should be organized by function, with all Theater aviation assets under the operational control of the ACC. (6:4) While this arrangement is legal and makes perfect sense to a single function organization such as the Air Force, it is unacceptable to the Marine Corps because it takes operational control of the ACE away from the MAGTF commander. The obvious consequences of this relationship are that the MAGTF commander must ask for his air support, and his ability to employ combined arms or use the ACE in maneuver is severely curtailed. What do these historical relationships and doctrinal differences signal to the MAGTF commander? They signal that the MAGTF commander will always be confronted with the possible breakup of his MAGTF whenever he is involved in joint operations. The MAGTF commander must realize that the JFC may not fully realize the benefit of maintaining MAGTF integrity. He should also realize that commanders from other Service components may seek to convince the JFC that "functional" task organizations are preferable to separate combined arms forces. The Marine Corps is not blind to the MAGTF commander's potential plight in this area. Presently, the subject is being addressed in several doctrinal publications under development. (22;24) The draft document for FMFM 2 identifies the ACE's importance in maneuver warfare and states: The failure to employ a Service or type of unit wisely can lose the war. For the MAGTF commander, the ACE has the potential to be his most effective means of influencing a developing situation because of the mobility and firepower inherent in the ACE and the ability of the ACE to perform combat functions. (24:5-15) It also identifies the focus of responsibility for maintaining the integrity of the MAGTF: If the commander under whom the MAGTF commander has been placed believes the accomplishment of his mission is best served by breaking up the MAGTF, the MAGTF will be broken up. The responsibility for convincing Joint and Combined Force Commanders to keep the MAGTF intact rests primarily with the MAGTF commander. If the MAGTF commander can (1) educate the Joint Force Commander on the benefits to that commander of keeping the MAGTF intact, on the strengths and weaknesses of a MAGTF, and on the circumstances in which the MAGTF can be most effectively used and (2) then accomplish the missions assigned to the MAGTF commander, the MAGTF will be left whole. If the MAGTF commander cannot accomplish its assigned mission, the Joint force Commander will be tempted to break up the MAGTF. (24:4-6) The MAGTF commander, then, bears the burden of educating his JFC concerning MAGTF employment. His best opportunity to accomplish this is during the planning stages of a joint operation. (24:2-7) When educating the JFC, there are two major areas of concern with respect to the ACE. First, the MAGTF commander must convince the JFC that the ACE should remain part of the MAGTF combined arms team, and that a functional task organization which breaks up the MAGTF will significantly reduce the MAGTF's combat power. Second, he must also convince the JFC that excessive apportionment of ACE sorties to achieve Joint Force missions will also substantially degrade MAGTF capabilities, even when the MAGTF commander retains operational control of the ACE. (22:6-5) If he can do these things and then follow through with mission accomplishment, he will probably maintain MAGTF integrity. Considering the MAGTF commander's potential situation, educating and convincing the JFC may not be easy tasks. He may be the junior ranking Service component commander involved in the joint operation. He will surely have to convince the JFC that he can better control his ACE than an Air Force officer who deals exclusively with aviation on a full time basis. The MAGTF commander, if he wishes to be successful, must tackle these tasks with credibility and confidence. This is not only in the MAGTF commander's best interest, but in the Marine Corps' best interest as well. Clearly, the Marine Corps must take steps to ensure the MAGTF commander's increased opportunity for success in such endeavors. Not only must the MAGTF commander strive to attain a thorough knowledge of ACE employment, but the Marine Corps must provide its MAGTF commanders with the educational tools to gain that knowledge. Major John Saxman, an Air Force officer, made some acute observations concerning the Marine Corps' training of its future MAGTF commanders: If the curriculum at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College is representative of the amount of aviation related instruction given at Marine schools, then the problem is not the aviator's lack of knowledge of ground operations but rather the ground officer's lack of exposure to aviation. During the 1988-89 school year, the Command and Staff College had only one, three-day exercise that emphasized the employment of airpower. (20:62) Major Saxman's comments continue to apply for the 1989-90 academic year. Although aviation considerations are included in most phases of instruction, the instructional emphasis is on ground maneuver. Rarely, if ever, are students forced to deal with the issues of command and control of assets or apportionment of sorties. During wargame exercises, student MAGTF commanders retained complete control of all aviation assets and sorties. Except for advising the Command and Staff student of the potential problems associated with the ACE in joint operations, the curriculum does little to ensure that each officer has a firm grasp on effective ACE employment when he graduates. When one considers the fact that the Command and Staff College is the Marine Corps' highest level school, it is surprising that more emphasis is not placed on an area which has historically been a problem in joint operations. Major Saxman also postulated that the majority of MAGTF commanders are ground officers and that a number of them have little concept of what aviation can do for them or how it can be best employed. (20:62) Based on my own personal observation of students in planning exercises and wargames during academic year 1989-90, I agree with Major Saxman's statements. However, I contend that the lack of knowledge is not limited to ground officers. If Command and Staff students are representative of FMF officers and if the assessments presented above are correct, then there are some commanders who are going to have a tough time trying to educate a JFC on a subject they do not fully understand themselves. The Marine Corps can do very little for officers already in command. Hopefully, all MAGTF commanders will be able to maintain the integrity of their combined arms teams through self-education and lucid articulation. However, the Marine Corps can, and must, affect the MAGTF commanders of the future by incorporating more comprehensive instruction on aviation employment into its resident and nonresident education programs. Only in this way can the Marine Corps increase the likelihood of employing the ACE according to Marine doctrine. In conclusion, the questions posed at the beginning of this paper should be answered. What effect does the Omnibus Agreement have on the MAGTF commander's ability to employ his entire MAGTF in maneuver warfare? The answer is very little, if he can educate and convince the JFC of the benefits of proper MAGTF employment. In order to do that, the MAGTF commander must have a thorough knowledge of his MAGTF's capabilities, especially the ACE. The Marine Corps must provide its officers with the educational means to attain this requisite knowledge. Can the ACE be effectively employed as a maneuver element under the provisions of the Omnibus Agreement? Yes, under the same conditions as listed above. The key to success in maintaining MAGTF integrity and employing the ACE in maneuver warfare is the education of Marine officers. Without a thorough knowledge of aviation capabilities and employment, MAGTF commanders will find it difficult to do either. The Marine Corps should take action now to ensure the future success of its MAGTF commanders. Of course, there is an alternative to taking action. The Marine Corps can allow history to repeat itself. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Beadling, J. H. "Thoughts on the Implementation of Maneuver Warfare Doctrine and Its Implications for Marine Corps Aviation." Undated Draft. 2. Becker, Micheal D. "Command and Control of Marine TacAir in Joint Land Operations." Marine Corps Gazette, 72 (October 1988), 50-55. 3. Bingham, Price T. "Ground Maneuver and Air Interdiction in the Operational Art.", Parameters, 19 (March 1989), 16-30. 4. Britt, Jason, Major, Aviation Doctrine Department, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Warfighting Center. Personal interview about Marine Aviation employment. Quantico, Virginia, February 20, 1990. 5. Commandant of the Marine Corps. White Letter No. 4-86. 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