Deception: An Integral Part Of Warfare AUTHOR Major Jack L. Hughes, USMC CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Foreign Policy EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: DECEPTION: AN INTEGRAL PART OF WARFARE Thesis: The MAGTF commander must actively pursue deception operations, not only as a force multiplier but also as an integral part of warfare. Issue: Deception as a principle of war has been around since before the time of Sun Tzu. As a means of surprise, deception has not held the U.S. military spotlight, partly because a successful deception may never be revealed. Extensive study and analysis of the 1973 Yon Kipper war resulted in a major restructuring of the U.S Army toward the Air Land Battle concept. Such an in-depth study failed to heed the lesson of deception as a "force multiplier". The Egyptians planned and executed a strategic deception on a scale not seen since World War II, yet its contribution to their initial success has been largely ignored. Conclusions: Deception should be viewed as the perfect "force multiplier". It can easily be tailored for the operation, from one to several hundred men, depending on the situation. The payoffs for surprise are almost always high, it multiplies the chances for quick and decisive military success. If the deception is ignored, at least the enemy has spent his time evaluating the deception, and not planning his course of action. Recommendation: The decision to deceive rests with the MAGTF Commander and he must employ deception as an integral part of warfare. DECEPTION: AN INTEGRAL PART OF WARFARE Thesis: The MAGTF commander must actively pursue deception operations, not only as a force multiplier but also as an integral part of warfare. I. History of Deception in Warfare A. Gideon and the Midianites B. Siege of Troy II. Military Policies of Deception A. Russia B. U.S. III. Elements of Deception A. Categories of Deception B. Principles of Deception C. Means of Deception D. Parts of Deception IV. Planning the Deception A. U.S. Army Deception Maximums B. Ten Step Process DECEPTION: AN INTEGRAL PART OF WARFARE Though fraud in other activities be detestable, in the management of war it is laudable and glorious, and he who overcomes an enemy by fraud is as much to be praised as he who does so by force. (7:XL) Machiavelli The use of deception and surprise is as old as warfare itself. Concealment and camouflage are the primary methods used to achieve surprise. Deception, as a means of surprise, has not held the limelight of U.S. military study. Often a successful deception is never revealed and as such is never studied. It also may be that it is so infrequently or intermittently practiced that it has never gained a firm foot hold on formal doctrine. (22:3) In his exhaustive study of deception in warfare, Stratagem, Barton Whaley could only find seven exceptions to his generalization that deception had become a mere staff function in the 20th Century. (22:7) The MAGTF commander must actively pursue deception operations, not only as a "force multiplier" but as an integral part of warfare. Deception appears to be one of those techniques of war, like psychological warfare, that seems fated to cycles of loss and resurgence despite the fact that they have been around since the birth of time. Sun Tzu writes "All warfare is based on deception!"(12:66) Writing around 500 B.C., Sun Tzu was one of the first to envision it as a "principle of war" but he was not the first to employ it. (12:11) Legends, such as stories of Gideon and the Midianites, and the Trojan Horse, lay testament to practice of deception since man began waging war. (10:viii) In 1300 B.C., Gideon, the wise Judge of the Israelites, is credited with a classic coup in the annals of military deception when he outwitted and defeated Israel's ancient foe, the Midianites. According to the Old Testament Book of Judges, Gideon ordered a small band of soldiers to raise such a clatter, by clanging pitchers and sounding trumpets, that the enemy fled in alarm. The illusion of a large attacking army had been created. In 1200 B.C., the Greeks had besieged the city of Troy for ten years, attempting to batter down their defenses. A Greek warrior named Epeus finally hit upon the scheme of concealing many soldiers inside a huge horse of wood, positioning it outside the gates of Troy as a monument to Athena, and departing by sea. They even warned the Trojans not to take it inside their city lest a disaster befall them. The horse was taken inside the city, the Greek soldiers emerged, opened the gates for their comrades who had returned from over the horizon, and Troy fell. Doctrine is the bridge between practice and theory. (22:24) It might be useful to examine the differences in military doctrine on deception between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to see how two countries came away from the same war, WW II, with different philosophies. The U.S. definition of "deception" is: Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests.(14:105) The U.S.S.R. defines "deception" as the actual means for achieving surprise. The doctrine of "maskirovka" supports surprise by secretly: ...securing military operations and the routine activity of troops, and (by) confusing the enemy with regard to the presence and position of the forces, military complexes, their position, level of preparation and activity, as well as the plans of the command structure. (9:25) The U.S. entered WW II with only limited experience in deception and was content with allowing the British to plan and execute the allied deception plans. (22:52) By 1943, Admiral Halsey and General MacArthur had re-instituted deception in the Southwest Pacific Campaign. After the successful Bodyguard and Fortitude plans to mask the Normandy landing (Operation Overlord), JCS became interested and planned the diversionary actions by Admiral Nimitz in the Central Pacific theater and Lord Mountbatten in China-Burma theater to play down MacArthur's invasion of the Philippines. (22:53) The U.S. technique of deception emerging from WW II was to set up one force that could strike in one of several places to force the enemy to either split his forces or choose to ignore one of the possible targets. (3:271) Tactical deception was one of camouflage and concealment, with concentrated efforts on dummy equipment. The Russians had deception as a part of their doctrine well before WW II, but were caught completely off guard by the German Invasion in 1941, Operation Barbarossa. (3:217) The Russians viewed this as a failure on the part of their commanders to carry out Soviet regulations. After renewed emphasis on the regulations, subsequent innovative implementation of "maskirovka" in WW II proved the Soviets had mastered the art. (3:244) The Russian equivalent of "Overlord" was Bagration," an successful deception operation aimed at massing four field armies and a tank army, the largest groupment of forces in the history of the Patriotic war, to recover Byelorussia in the summer of 1944. (3:259) The Soviet technique is to deploy two or more forces, and then make the main strike with only one. (3:271) Tactical deception is stressed heavily as a commander's responsibility and relies on dummy equipment, camouflage, and periods of reduced visibility for implementation. (9:33) Both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. have doctrines of continuous efforts at tactical deception and camouflage, but curiously enough, both largely confine their efforts in peacetime to measures that can readily be applied to the training at hand. (9:34 & 6) The Soviets have engaged in systematic strategic deception since 1955, initially to hide their weaknesses and subsequently to mask their capabilities. (4:90) The latest resurgence of deception as a viable part of the U.S. Army Air Land Battle doctrine appeared around 1985 during Gen. Otis' command of USAREUR. (6) Oddly enough, most of the U.S. Marine Corps publications containing references to deception were being rewritten during that period. (15- 16,l8-21) The result was the classification of deception as a "force multiplier" to offset Soviet advantages in military capabilities. (11:57) A second, and perhaps more useful, result is that all the publications agree on terminology and content. Strategic deception is military deception supporting our national objectives. It is most often exercised at the Unified Command or higher level. Operational deception is the integration of two or more tactical deceptions to achieve a common goal. This level would be exercised at the Joint Task Force level. Tactical deception is the physical, technical, and administrative actions to mislead the enemy and induce him to act counter to his best interest. This is deception at the MEF or ATF levels and below. This is the aspect with which we should be most familiar. It must be understood from the very start at whom the deception plan is aimed. The enemy commander is the deception target and the objective is the result desired from the deception effort. Initially the deception target is the enemy's intelligence organization. (3:8) The intelligence analysts are the ones seeking and actively collecting information to discern probable intentions or at least capabilities. The secondary target is the enemy commander's staff, since they are the ones screening information and advising the commander. Total deception is a lofty goal; it is necessary only to fool some of the staff to adversely influence the enemy commander. Deception is often treated as an isolated event or as a precursor to the main battle. (22:3) For example, in JCS Pub 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, it discusses deception in the chapter titled "Preassault Operations". (15:15-3) The decision to employ deception as a "force multiplier" is the Commander's. It should not be treated separately from the basic scheme of maneuver, or relegated to Appendix 7 to Annex C of the Operations Order. Several principles contribute to deception. First, and perhaps foremost, is security. Secrecy of both the deception plan and the real plan is absolutely essential. General Hans von Greiffenberg, one of the planners for Operation Barba- rossa, wrote: "If the strictest secrecy is not observed, all deception projects are condemned to failure from the very start." (3:16) Deceiving our own troops and subordinate leaders for the sake of security might be necessary and is a normal byproduct of deception. (3:l6) There are two sides to security in a deception plan. One side tries to protect the truth about our intention in an upcoming operation; i.e., the location of our main effort in an offensive assault. The other side tries to protect the existence of the deception effort. Attempting to deny the presence of a deception plan seems futile, but it is one more way to add to the enemy's fog of war. Inadvertent leaks of truthful information are not fatal to the deception effort. Just because a piece of information has been leaked does not guarantee that it will either be detected or believed. In Stratagem, Whaley found that of ten leaks reaching an opponent, where half were true and half were false, all ten were accepted but four out of five genuine leaks were discounted as too blatant to be anything but deliberate leaks. (22:230) This initial acceptance of all ten leaks is probably due to the plausi- bility of the leaked events. Plausibility is the second principle of deception. If the deception you are trying to portray is not probable, then you are wasting an enormous effort. The deception story must fit within our likely courses of action, as predicted by their study of our doctrine and tactics in a given situation. It should be remembered that we are trying to fool him and his intelligence apparatus, not our own apparatus. We routinely exercise against "OPFOR", our own personnel, attempting to simulate what we perceive as his apparatus. Along with plausibility comes the need for credibility of sources used to feed his intelligence apparatus. Analysts routinely rank information according to the reliability of the source. (3:19) The deception becomes more plausible when it has been confirmed by a variety of reliable sources. This should be not construed as a requirement to have all the misinformation absolutely consistent. The deception will be far better if some totally erroneous information is also being fed to their sources. It should be cautioned that information too consistent may alert the enemy that he is being deceived. If the perceived truth seems to emerge from many points, some of which are contradictory, then the enemy is likely to believe he has found the real truth. As Churchill stated, "Truth deserves a bodyguard of lies." (10:132) Along the same line of reasoning, "Deception requires a bodyguard of truth." The third principle of deception is adaptability. No matter how elaborate a deception plan you construct, it must adapt to the changing situation. "As the truth changes, so must the deception if the lie is to remain believable." (4:170) If the deception plan is not adapted to the changing situation, the inconsistencies will reveal the deception. Timely response to these random events make it difficult for the enemy to believe that he is being deceived. Sometimes these events will be small, but once detected they must be acted on. The successful German invasion of Russia in 1941, Operation Barbarossa, was largely due to Hitler not deli- vering an ultimatum of German demands prior to invading. (4:171) The international rumor mill observed Hitler's action prior to his invading Czechoslovakia and Poland and had decided that two times-in-a-row constitute an always. Hitler learned of this conclusion and cleverly adapted his plan to take advantage of it. Although international rumor worked for Hitler, accurate intelligence of what the enemy intends to do and how he is reacting to the deception is paramount. (3:21) It is this intelligence feedback that allows a deception plan to be tailored to the changing situation. The effort may be stopped to protect valuable resources if either the deception isn't working or has been discovered. The requirement for feedback presents the deceiver with the same dilemma as the enemy; is this information reliable? (3:21) Has the enemy discovered my deception and am I now the target of a counter- deception? LtGen Trainor said it quite succinctly, "He who deceives is eager for the success of his deception. . .that makes him vulnerable." (11:60) The fourth principle of deception is integration. The deception effort has to be integrated at all levels and with all means. Integration, of both the deception means and the collection means, is necessary to carry out a successful deception. This implies a centralized effort. Review of any of the deception references will either state it outright or conclude it from case studies. (1-22) The reason is twofold. First is the need to commit limited resources to the deception effort. These are usually centrally managed. Second is the need to maintain secrecy of what we are revealing and what we are hiding. The MAGTF Commander is the only one that can make these decisions within the framework of his overall plan. The MAGTF Commander is using deception as a "force multiplier" against his opponent commander. Deception can cause the enemy to make mistakes. Three types of deception are used to mislead or confuse an enemy on two basic questions: What are my intentions and what are my capabilities? One type of deception attempts to misdirect the enemy's attention, causing him to concentrate his forces in the wrong place. In this type, the Commander is trying to get the enemy to violate Clausewitz' principle of "concentration of forces." (4:125) Another type attempts to cause the enemy to waste his limited resources on non-existent targets. This is a violation of Clausewitz' principle of economy of force." (4:125) The third type of deception attempts to surprise the enemy, it is often a combination of the first two types. Its purpose is to create a situation that will later catch the enemy off-guard. This is a result of a varied and continuous effort to create the impression that all is normal. A good example of this is Egypt's deception effort prior to their attack in the Yon Kipper War of 1973. (3:323) Every deception effort is comprised of only two basic parts: hiding the real and revealing the false. (4-183 & 11- 60) Hiding the real is called dissimulation. It is the covert part, that which is concealed from the enemy. Revealing the false is called simulation. It is the overt part, that which is falsely revealed to the enemy as truth. Dissimulation and simulation are always present together in any act of deception. (4:183) The three procedures to hide the real are: masking, repackaging, and dazzling. (4:183) Masking hides the real by shielding it from the enemy's sensors. Operationally, this translates into camouflage, concealing features or matching them to surrounding characteristics. This method is most familiar to the military and is heavily used at the tactical level. Repackaging hides the real by disguising. It is done by adding or subtracting characteristics for transformation to a new object. Changing the numbers on ships is an easy example. Dazzling hides the real by confusing. It is done by partially obscuring an object or event to blur its distinctive pattern. Encrypted radio traffic and military codes are simple forms of dazzling. The three procedures to reveal the false are mimicking, inventing, and decoying. (4:185) Mimicking reveals the false by imitating another real object. Operationally, it is done by copying one or more distinctive characteristics of the object being imitated. Inventing reveals the false by displaying another reality. Unlike mimicking, which imitates a real object, inventing creates something new by displaying one or more characteristics. Decoying is revealing the false by diverting attention. Misleading and distracting the enemy are the objects of the its feints and diversions. It is done by creating an alternate false pattern more acceptable than the real. During the U.S. Army's revitalized efforts for battle- field deception, ten rules of conduct were deduced from game theory, history, and deception writings. (6&13) These ten maxims provide a good basis for planning a deception. The maxims are: 1. Reinforce his beliefs (Magruder's Principle)-It is generally easier to induce a target to maintain an existing belief than to entice him to change his beliefs. 2. Target his mind--There are limitations to human information processing that are deceptively exploitable. 3. Use multiple forms of surprise-- Surprise can be achieved in the following categories: size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment-(SALUTE) intent, and style. 4. Feed all the enemy's sources (Jones' Dilemma)-- Deception becomes more difficult as the number of sources available to confirm the real increases. 5. Create Noise only for a purpose--Too much erroneous information can obscure the deception effort. 6. Use deception selectively--It may be wise to withhold the employment of deception capabilities until the stakes are high. 7. Deception is continuous--Deception activities should be sequenced to portray the deception for as long as possible. 8. Feedback is a must--An intelligence collection scheme should be employed to determined if the deception is being adopted, rejected, or countered. 9. Focus on the enemy's action (The Monkey's Paw)- Deception efforts may produce unwanted actions from the enemy and friendly units. 10. Don't make it easy for him--If the target's intelligence collection system has to work for the indicators, the greater the chance he'll believe them. (6 & 13) The actual process in planning the deception is not well understood, nor is it an isolated event. The process of deception can be broken down into ten steps. First, the Commander must define his goals. This may be to achieve a surprise invasion, or simply to insert and retrieve a reconnaissance party from a hostile country with limited casualties. These goals define the limits of the deception. Second, the Commander must decide how he wants the enemy to react. The question is: "What do you want him to do?", and never "What do you want him to think?" Third, only now can the Commander, by himself, decide what he wants the enemy to think about the facts or impending event; exactly what is it you want the enemy to perceive? Fourth, what is to be hidden about the facts or events and what is to be shown in their place. He should remember that hiding and showing take place simultaneously; or else the absence of one reveals the presence of the other. Fifth, the Commander must analyze the pattern of the real thing to identify its distinguishing characteristics. Specifically, which characteristics must be deleted or added to show a different pattern to suitably mask, repackage or dazzle. Sixth, he does the same analysis for the false thing to be shown in place of the real. Seventh, at this point, the Commander has designed a desired effect together with its hidden method. The means to present the effect to the enemy is now explored. This may be limited to assets on hand. This may require a return to step four. Eighth, the planning phase is over and the operational phase begins. The Commander has to turn the plan over to the operational units to "sell" the package. This is not to say that everyone can be told of the deception, just the ones actually conducting the deception. Ninth, the false information has to be delivered to the enemy's sensors. It must reach the sensors the enemy is using; it doesn't do any good to present a false picture to a blind enemy. Tenth, and last, for the deception to succeed, the enemy must "buy" the effect, not perceiving it as an illusion. The deception will fail at this point if the enemy ignores it, detects its method, or misconstrues its intended meaning. Conversely, the enemy will: *take notice, if the effect is designed to attract his attention *find it relevant, if the effect can hold his interests *perceive the false, if the presented patterns match his experience *ignore the real, if the real patterns are hidden from his sensors Effective deception planning must anticipate all four of these contingencies. The wise Commander seeks feedback, monitoring the enemy's responses to assure that these last four contingencies are being met. Deception should be viewed as the perfect "force multiplier". It can easily tailored for the operation, from one man to several hundred depending on the situation. The payoffs for surprise are almost always high, it multiplies the chances for quick and decisive military success. In his study of deception operations, Stratagem, Whaley found a successful deception has at least an 80% chance of yielding surprise. (22:234) Deception can also induce the enemy to divide his assets, thus making him less capable. If the enemy ignores or misinterprets the deception, the MAGTF Commander is no worse off. At the very least, the enemy has spent time evaluating the deception, and not planning his course of action. The military methods of planning deception operations are well documented in various publications. (13-16 & 18-21) The ten steps previously outlined lay out a simple method for the Commander to formulate and execute his deception plan. The decision to deceive always resides with the Commander. The MAGTF Commander must actively pursue deception operations as an integral part of warfare. Warfare today is no different today than in 500 B.C. when Sun Tzu wrote: All warfare is based on deception. Therefore, when capable, feign incapacity; when active, inactivity. When near, make it appear that you are far away; when far away, that you are near. Offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike him. (12:66) BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Boyce, Earl J., Maj, USAF. Cover and Deceptions in World War II-Its Lessons and Doctrine Implications. Defense Technical Information Center, Air Command and Staff College, Report 82-0355. 2. Daly, John H., Maj, USMC. "Tactical Deception Gives an Edge." Marine Corps Gazette, (August 1983),24-26. 3. Daniel, Donald C. and Herbig, Katherine L., eds. Strategic Military Deception. New York: Pergamon Press, 1982 4. Gooch, John and Perlmutter, Amos, eds. Military Deception and Strategic Surprise. Totowa, N.J.: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1982. 5. 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