The Air Land Battle - The Right Doctrine For The Next War? AUTHOR Major Thomas J. Gill, USAF CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Air Land Battle The Right Doctrine for the Next War? THESIS: The Air Land Battle Doctrine of the U.S. Army, endorsed by the U.S. Air Force, is well designed and can be adapted to all levels of conflict in the operational continuum. The current threat to the doctrine is not from those critics who view it as too narrow in scope, but rather, from instablity in the defense budget. The Air Land Battle Doctrine must be tailored to fit the capabilities of the force which will fight using it. ISSUE: Since the advent of aerial warfare, planners from each of the two services have worked together to design the warfighting formula with which the the Army and the Air Force will fight. This cooperative effort has evolved to the point that doctrinal designers from each service work side by side daily to insure that the meshing of the two forces will be done to the best advantage of each. The current doctrine, the Air Land Battle, has guided joint operations since its publication in 1982, in the Army Field Manual 100-5. Critics of the doctrine have questioned its focus on the central European theater, as well as the ability of the Air Force to support the concept in the vital areas of intra-theater airlift and deep reconnaissance. In spite of these criticisms, the doctrine has stood up well in the face of the threat it was designed for, and even shown itself to be capable of responsiveness to low intensity conflict in the recent Operation Just Cause. The real threat to the doctrine is not the criticisms from within the Department of Defense, but rather from the downsizing of our defense capabilities due to Congressional and Executive branch budget reductions. It is these pressures that will make the Air Land Battle plan an obsolete one if the forces necessary to see deep, strike deep, and fight the close battle are not made available to the warfighters. The process is well underway, and mission area capabilities are disappearing rapidly in some areas most critical to the successful application of the doctrine. CONCLUSION: As the budgetary reduction process seems to be on an irreversible course for the present, we must make an honest appraisal of our capabilities to fight with the forces we will have available. If we determine that we cannot fight according to the plan with what we have been given, we must either take the action necessary to restore those capabilities lost, or change the plan to reflect reality. The most dangerous course would be to cling to what we believe to be the best plan if we know full well that we will be unable to deliver. THE AIR LAND BATTLE THE RIGHT DOCTRINE FOR THE NEXT WAR? The warfighting formula for the U.S. Army and Air Force team is set down in the Army's official doctrinal manual, Field Manual(FM)100-5. While not official USAF doctrine, there is agreement between the respective service chiefs that, when called jointly to arms, these forces will operate in the manner described by that manual. Critics of this doctrine have described it as too narrow in scope, designed exclusively for high intensity conflict(HIC) in the European theater. Others have questioned the capabilities of the Air Force to support the deep battle, particularly in the intelligence and intra-theater airlift capabilities. Whatever its shortcomings, this doctrine has provided a foundation for a defensive posture which has played its role in the deterrence of war between the world's two mightiest nations for the past ten years. These ten years have seen the military strengths of the potential adversaries reach unprecedented heights. With the likelihood of European war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. on the wane, we have a chance to reflect upon this doctrine and examine whether or not it is the plan we feel is best suited to take us into the next decade and beyond. This opportunity is not being missed, as the doctrinal engineers of both services are currently examining the present plans and charting the future of joint operations by the Army/Air Force team. This paper will examine these efforts and determine if the doctrine can provide the optimum capability against the most likely threat scenario in the context of what will surely be lean years for the defense budget in our nation. A review of the hisory of the Air Land Battle Doctrine would be useful at this point. While it took its name from the 1982 edition of FM 100-5, cooperative efforts between the services greatly pre-date that publication. The earliest use of the airplane in support of ground forces occurred in Europe during the first World War. These efforts were primitive, with the role of aircraft restricted initially to reconnaissance. It filled the void created when Europe's vast maze of trenches denied horse-borne cavalry the mobility needed to see the battlefield. An offshoot of reconnaissance, artillery ranging, led to the advent of the counter-air mission. It did not take long for the troops in the trenches to connect the appearance of an airplane overhead with the devastating artillery barrage which would soon follow.1 The early counter-air efforts against these aerial observers were frustrating, characterized by incidents of propellors being sheared off by one's machine gun, or worse, by bullets ricocheting off the newly metal-clad propellor back into one's cockpit. However primitive, all of those uses of the airplane represented the first efforts at cooperation between the ground and air arms of our military. The increased lethality and sophistication of new weapons platforms led to the need for a much greater synchronization of airpower into the scheme of manuever during the second World War. The early phases of that war, particularly on the part of the Allies, were characterized by a piece-meal application of air assets by tactical commanders, and poor integration of air into the operational level intent. An example of this would be the disasterous battle for the Kasserine Pass during the North African campaign of late 1942. When it became apparent that the German focus of effort was against his U.S. Army II Corps, Maj Gen Fredendall requested air support from adjacent, but idle, corps commanders. No command authority existed which could divert those sorties necessary to avoid a resounding German victory.2 Those bordering commanders had nothing to gain from offering their subordinate supporting arms to Fredendall's aid, and held them in reserve. Partially as a result of this, and other similar occurrences, an agreement was reached at the Casablanca Conference held in January, 1943. This agreement raised the status of the air arm to that of the ground forces, and established a command structure which would allow for the integrated use of air power to support the campaign plan at the operational level. This new relationship paved the way for Eisenhower's use of the Eighth Air Force heavy bomber assets against the German transportation network through France prior to Operation Overlord. Following the breakout, Patton's pursuit of the Germans across France in concert with the Nineteenth Tactical Air Force further demonstrated the value of close air support.3 Innovations such as ground based fighter pilots equipped with VHF radios on the lead tanks of attack formations, able to direct the overhead action, helped insure the success of that operation.4 The Air Force became a separate service in 1947, and the Key West agreement of the following year began the task of specifying overall roles and missions. The Air Force was assigned the strategic air mission, defense of the U.S. against air attack, and air and logistic support of ground units.5 1949 saw further discussions and refinement of the respective roles by the service secretaries, Bradley and Vandenburg. Army fixed and rotary wing aircraft were limited by weight, and these aircraft were provided to expedite and improve ground combat procedures in forward areas, specifically tasked to provide fire adjustment, route reconnaisance and courier duties.6 Having been tasked to support the Army, the Air Force found itself in the early fifties going in exactly the opposite direction. The monopoly on atomic weapons enjoyed by this nation led to the pre-eminence of the Strategic Air Command at the expense of tactical aviation. A generation of aircraft not well suited to the close air support role flew that mission during the Korean war and the Vietnam conflict. The lack of a mad threat to our air superiority in both of those wars allowed tactical success in spite of the hardware.7 One lesson learned from the Vietnam war was that the Army and Air Force team would need more doctrinal and training commonality to avoid repeat of the errors made in the area of synchronization. The Air Land Battle Doctrine, as defined by the Army Training and Doctrine Command(TRADOC), is the vehicle through which this commonality is assured. It been continually endorsed by the Air Force Tactical Air Command(TAC) since its list publication in 1982, and the support has been more than verbal. Since 1975, both services have combined their doctrinal design teams at TAC and TRADOC to insure that the interests and capabilities of the respective forces are represented. The prime mover in this effort is the Air Land Forces Application Agency(ALFA) at Langley AFB, Virginia. In addition there are several other Army/Air Force teams working together daily to enhance joint compatibility and capability. These include the Air Ground Operations School(AGOS) at Hurlburt Field, Florida, the Directorate of Air Land Forces Agency(DALFA) in Europe, the Airlift Concepts and Requirements Agency(ACRA) at Scott AFB, Illinois, and the Center for Low Intensity Conflict, also at Langley.8 This present doctrine, most recently laid down in the 1986 edition of FM 100-5, is based upon the need to defeat a series of Soviet echelons flowing across a linear battlefield. The design intent is fora numerically inferior force to be able to use its superior battlefield vision (see deep) to direct a massive interdiction effort against the following echelons (strike deep). These strikes would complement the main battle area commander's intent of using his more concentrated and synchronized firepower at the critical place and time against the enemy by limiting the quantitative advantage that enemy would enjoy. The decisive defeat of the enemy takes place in the main battle area while the contribution of forces in the deep battle is measured by their influence upon the close battle. The four tenets of the doctrine which help acheive that success are initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization.9 Initiative is required to establish a favorable tempo for us on the battlefield, impede our opponents temporal progress, and force him to do battle on our terms. Depth should not be considered as only a two or even three dimensional concept, but rather an expansion of the enemy's problems in resources, time and space. To properly use depth we must attack the enemy using our entire arsenal of weapons. These would include air operations, maneuver, deep fires, electronic warfare, deception and special operations forces, all aimed at vulnerabilities which allow us to set the terms of the battle. Like depth, agility cannot be viewed in just the physical sense. Mental agility is required to attack the mind of the enemy as well as to be able to fully comprehend and implement our own commanders intent. Physical agility requires that we move quickly, strike hard, and be able to smoothly transition to the next phase or operation. The glue that binds these three previous tenets together is synchronization, probably the most elusive of the qualities we seek on the battlefield. As with the other tenets of the doctrine, synchronization is achieved on the battlefield only after it is designed into the system by the planners and practiced by the operators during exercises. It is in this planning phase that the two services are pushing hardest to make the doctrine responsive throughout the entire operational continuum. In August 1989, the TAC and TRADOC commanders, General Russ and General Foss, issued a white paper entitled Air Attack on the Modern Battlefield. Their work reaffirmed "basic concepts regarding attack air employment, suggested some evolutionary changes to the command and control interfaces and reemphasized the importance of proper training."10 On the surface nothing too radical there, but a good look at some of the "evolutionary changes to command and control" reveals that some significant changes are proposed which may not make the system more responsive at the low end of the spectrum of conflict. The current planning processes within each service are well designed and well practiced. On the USAF side of the equation an air tasking order(ATO) is a clear and directive document which drives the system to produce sorties over the target on time. It is the Army problem to insure that requests for battlefield air interdiction(BAI) or close air support(CAS) sorties from ground maneuver units flow upward to the Air Support Operations Center(ASOC) in minimum time. One of the goals of the changes proposed in the white paper is the meshing of the two processes at a level lower than the ASOC, to allow earlier concurrence in the process and a more rapid response to that ground commander. Two methods are being looked at to shorten the planning cycle and increase this synchronization. The first is to elevate the level of command at which the air battle is directed. As indicated in the white paper; . . . .the Army and Air Force planning and execution interfaces at higher tactical levels require strengthening. Top down tactical planning requires focusing attention at the Army and Air Force planning interfaces at the corps and division. It is at these levels that detailed synchronization of attack air may have its highest payoff. Increasing Air Force planning responsibilities at these levels and commensurate increases in manning for sustained around-the-clock operations require examination.11 The price paid for elevating the echelon of command for the air battle is that iniative is taken from the regimental commanders. As we enter an era in which it is even more likely that our conflicts will be below the level of major theater conventional warfare, we must guard against building a process which is actually geared towards a higher level on that operational continuum. For the maneuver unit commander (the regimental or battalion commander) to have the freedom of action to put together a good combined arms plan, the direction of the air war from the corps level may be counterproductive. The second initiative discussed in the white paper involved the battlefield disposition of the air liaison officers(ALOs), the direct point of contact between airmen and ground forces. The proposal is to place these officers in helicopters in order to provide increased mobility, enhanced target acquisition, and better communications. It further allows massing of control assets at the point of execution and provides better command and control in situations where fixed and rotary-wing attack air are employed together.12 This should be a positive development if implemented, assuming that a low cost airframe can be devoted to the mission; one that does not detract firepower from the existing attack air force structure. Having looked at some of the organizational changes proposed within the warfighting team, it is appropriate to consider the resources available to that team with which they can prosecute the war. Specifically, we must examine the impact of the shrinking defense budget on the force and determine the extent to which phased out weapons systems will deny us the mix of assets necessary to fight using the Air Land Battle Doctrine. Interdiction is the key function of air in almost all scenarios, whether supporting the close battle in the BAI role or disrupting the flow of follow-on echelons to the battlefield in the deep interdiction role. In order to be successful in this mission, air assets must be able to identify enemy reserve strongpoints for targeting and then suppress the integrated air defenses to allow access to the targets. To accomplish this air will be deployed across the FEBA in large packages with the intent of overwhelming that defensive shield. It is in these two vital mission areas, tactical air reconnaissance and suppression of enemy air defense(SEAD), that the effects of recent budget reductions are being most strongly felt. These two missions have been the province of the venerable F-4 Phantom, now in its thirtieth year of operational employment. The variants used in these roles, the RF-4C and the F-4G Wild Weasel, are both approaching the end of their service lives. In the past three years, three of the six mission ready USAF RF-4 squadrons have been disbanded, with a fourth slated for dissolution in FY91.13 This capability will be degraded for an indefinite period of time while a successor weapon system is developed. The advanced tactical reconnaissance system(ATARS) development is ongoing, but will probably not be operational until FY94 or beyond. Coupled with the loss of our strategic capability, in the form of the recently retired SR-71, we are no longer capable of providing the targeteers with near real-time intelligence data on the enemy disposition. The picture is less grim for the SEAD capability, but a follow-on weapon system has not been identified and we can exect the budgetary pressure to draw down the F-4G community before a replacement can be fielded. Even if we develop an off-the-shelf airframe, such as the Panavia Tornado, it is unlikely that this system can be deployed before the mid to late nineties. The importance of these two missions in support of our interdiction efforts bears further discussion. In order to be successful in the high threat environment, air assets must be massed. This mix of aircraft includes, in addition to the reconnaisance and SEAD jets, the strike aircraft, escort anti-air elements, electronic combat platforms, and refueling aircraft if necessary. Each mission element depends upon the success of the other elements of the package to a greater or lesser degree. Even if the force chooses to be launched without the benefit of acccurate pre-strike reconnaisance, the prospect of massing significant portions of the available tactical airframes without the benefit of SEAD escort is a daunting one. An integrated air defense capability comparable to that presently fielded in eastern Europe would absolutely decimate the attacking package. If that package fails in its mission, the effect on the entire air-land battle is obvious. Should enemy follow-on echelons be able to advance unimpeded to the main battle area, no amount of smart weapons and sophisticated command and control will be able to long withstand the massed attackers. Just as current budgetary pressures are impacting our ability to fight according to the resent doctrine, there will be significant downward pressure on weapons system development for those capabilities needed to fight the Air Land Battle Future. It must be noted that this evolution is still in the early conceptual stages. Little has been published about it, but what is known indicates that the importance of seeing deep and striking deep will not be diminished. The Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar SystemRadar (JSTARS) currentlly in development, will be lynchpin for air command and control. This system, designated the E-8A, will have capabilities which make current C3I systems look like two tin cans and a piece of string, and will transform the control of the ground battle as AWACS has for the air battle. Technologies being designed into the system will enable it to scan deep into enemy areas in search of ground activity. Specifically, "there will be a zoom capability down to the individual road, very small towns, ... individual vehicles, to tell which way they are moving and at what speeds."14 This technology comes at no small cost however. Estimated in June 1989 to cost in the vicinity of $200 milion per aircraft, the program was initially planned for 22 systems. This number has now been revised downward to 15.15 The USAF's newest tactical fighter, the F-15E Strike Eagle, has also been a victim of budgetary reductions. This force, which will have the greatest degree of interoperability with JSTARS, has seen over 40 percent of the originally planned 392 airframes axed. Doctrinal planners must read the writing on the wall regarding the size and capability of the force they will be asked to plan for, and design the doctrine accordingly. The ability of the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force to operate together has been the determining factor in the successes this country has enjoyed since the advent of the airplane. Neither component can go it alone, and no one with any knowledge of military science would suggest otherwise. In order to accomplish their task, the two services have worked together to an increasing extent since the 1920s, to the point now that the doctrinal designers of each service work side by side to direct the present and chart the future of joint operations. The focal point of this commonality is now, and has been for the past eight years, the army publication FM 100-5. The Air Land Battle Doctrine of FM 100-5 directs the joint forces to accomplish three tasks in order to win on the battlefield. We must see deep in order to develop an accurate picture of the enemy's capability and intent. We must then strike him deep before his sizable follow-on echelons are able to exert influence in the main battle area. Finally, we must use our technological and hopefully intellectual edge to administer the killing blow in the main battle area, combining our arms to defeat the enemy in detail. Just as there is dissention in each service concerning the manner in which that service makes its contribution, there are critics of the joint doctrine. This is to be expected, and is healthy. But the doctrine holds up well in the face of the threat it was designed to defeat, a Soviet multi-echelon force rolling across central Europe. Does the doctrine fare as well in the face of a lower intensity conflict? No, but as a departure point, I submit it will be adaptable to LIC or mid-intensity conflict in another theater through the proper apportionment of air assets in support of the ground unit commander. It is not proper to design a different doctrine for each contingency. As such, a docrine which has to be scaled down to fight LIC is far preferable to a doctrine designed for the lower end of the operational continuum if you need to fight the big one against the Soviets. The real danger facing this concept for Army-Air Force warfighting is the downsizing of the defense forces by capability rather than by size. The loss of critical mission areas, such as strategic and tactical reconnaissance, will greatly diminish our capability to prosecute the war using this formula. As we witness a diminishing of the threat of a third World War, we have a chance to redirect our doctrinal thought. We must use this chance to evolve, not failing to consider the changing threat, but more importantly the tools we will be given with which to fight. We must not design a doctrine based upon capabilities we will no longer be able to afford. REFERENCES 1Colonel Dennis M. Drew, "Fire from the Sky," Air University Press, Maxwell AFB Press, Maxwell AFB AL, 1986, p.24. 2Ladislas Farago, Patton; Ordeal and Triumph (New York:Ivan Obolensky, Inc., 1964), p. 59. 3General Richard Myers, "The Army and Air Force in Air Land Battle," briefing to Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School, 2 March, 1990. 4General Myers. 5William W. Momyer, Airpower in Three Wars (Washington:US Govt Printing Office, 1978), p. 112. 6Momyer, p. 117. 7General Myers 8Major Mark Skattum, interviewed at Langley AFB, VA., by author, 16 March, 1990. 9TRADOC, U.S. Army, Operations, FM 100-5 (Ft Monroe, VA., 1986), p.17. 10General Robert Russ, Air Attack on the Modern Battlefield, Aug, 1989, p.3. 11General Russ, p.4. :12General Russ, p.5. 13John Correll, Readiness is Slipping, Air Force Magazine, Sept, 1989, p.32. 14Robert S. Dudney, The Battle Vision of Joint Stars, Air Force Magazine, June, 1989, p. 44. BIBLIOGRAPHY Correll, John R. "Readiness is Slipping." Air Force Magazine, Vol. 73, No. 3 (Sept 89), 27-36. Dudney, Robert S. "The Battle Vision of Joint Stars." Air Force Magazine, Vol. 72, No. 6 (June 89), 42-47. Drew, Dennis M. "Fire from the Sky." Maxwell AFB:Air University Press, 1986. Farago, Ladislas. Patton: Ordeal and Triumph. New York: Ivan Obolenksy, Inc., 1964. Howard, Michael. "1989: A Farewell to Arms?". International Affairs, Vol 65, No. 3 (Summer 89), 407-413. Momyer, William W. Airpower in Three Wars. Washington: U.S. Govt Printing Office, 1978. Powell, Major Jon. S. "Air Land Battle: The Wrong Doctrine for the Wrong Reason." Air University Review, Vol. 32, No. 3 (May-June 85), 15-21. Russ, General Robert H. "Air Attack on the Modern Battlefield." (White Paper) Langley AFB, VA., August, 1989. Swan, Guy C. "Theater Campaign Planning for NATO's Northern Region." Parameters, Vol. XX, No. 1 (March 1990), 48-63. u.S. Air Force. U.S. Army Forces. Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, May 1989 U.S. Army. Training and Doctrine Command. FM 100-5 Operations. Fort Monroe, VA., 1986.
