The U.S. Army: America's Strategic Land Force For The 1990s And Beyond AUTHOR Major Harold A. Graziano, USA CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Intelligence EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: THE U.S. ARMY: AMERICA'S STRATEGIC LAND FORCE FOR THE 1990s AND BEYOND THESIS: While ongoing events in the world will require changes in the United States' military structure, the U.S. Army with its highly trained mixture of light, heavy, and special operating forces is well poised to continue as America's strategic land force in the 1990s and beyond. ISSUE: Today, United States national security is a unique crossroad. Although our interests and basic strategy are not likely to change, we face decisions which will seriously affect our security posture. In support of America's national interests, the U.S. Army enters a new decade examining the qualities it has and must develop for the uncertain future. It is important to understand the Army's strategic mandate, the resources it has to meet its requirements, and the challenges it faces in the 1990s and beyond. In conducting an objective view of the Army's strategic responsibilities, it is important to consider, the origins of the Army's strategic roles, the doctrine which guides the strategic land force, major force decisions, and the training and employment readiness of the U.S. Army. Finally it is critical that these ingredients be looked at in relation to the future. To be sure, many aspects of the threat are changing. How the Army handles this change will be as important as the "change' that provoked it. CONCLUSION: The world is becoming more complex. The world is not necessarily a safer place to live in. What ever the future holds, the United States Army is tasked to build, maintain, and support a force to protect America's interests under any circumstances. The ability of the Army to fight and win the wars of our Nation is key to the survival of our democracy. As in the past, the Army with its unique mix of highly trained heavy, light, and special forces, will provide America with its strategic land force for the 1990s and beyond. THE U.S. ARMY: AMERICA'S STRATEGIC LAND FORCE FOR THE 1990'S AND BEYOND. OUTLINE Thesis Statement. While ongoing events in the world will require changes in the United States' military structure, the U.S. Army with its highly trained mixture of light, heavy, and special operating forces is well poised to continue as America's strategic land force in the 1990s and beyond. I. THE ORIGINS OF THE ARMY'S STRATEGIC ROLES. A. PERCEIVED THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY B. U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS C. U.S. NATIONAL STRATEGY D. THE WORLD POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT. II. DOCTRINE: GUIDING THE STRATEGIC LAND FORCE. A. AIR LAND BATTLE DOCTRINE B. JOINT NATURE OF WARFARE C. OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR III. ORGANIZING AND EQUIPPING THE STRATEGIC LAND FORCE: FORCE DESIGN AND MAJOR FORCE DECISIONS. A. HEAVY DIVISIONS B. LIGHT DIVISIONS C. SPECIAL OPERATING FORCES D. EQUIPPING THE ARMY IV. PREPARING THE STRATEGIC LAND FORCE: TRAINING, READINESS, AND EMPLOYMENT. A. TRAINING: THE ARMY'S FIRST PRIORITY B. INDIVIDUAL/UNIT TRAINING V. THE STRATEGIC LAND FORCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE. A. FUTURE THREAT B. THREAT DEFICIT C. THE WORLD WE LIVE IN D. FORCE DESIGN TABLE OF CONTENTS Page FORWARD 1 INTRODUCTION 3 THE ORIGINS OF THE ARMY'S STRATEGIC ROLES 5 DOCTRINCE: GUIDING THE STRATEGIC LAND FORCE 15 ORGANIZING AND EQUIPPING THE STRATEGIC LAND FORCE: 21 FORCE DESIGN AND MAJOR FORCE DECISIONS PREPARING THE STRATEGIC LAND FOARCE: TRAINING, 25 ` READING, AND EMPLOYMENT THE STRATEGIC LAND FORCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR 29 ` THE FUTURE BIBLIOGRAPHY 37 THE UNITED STATES ARMY: AMERICA'S STRATEGIC LAND FORCE FOR THE 1990s AND BEYOND FORWARD I selected "The U.S. Army: America's Strategic Land Force For The 1990s And Beyond" as a research topic with some trepidation. First, I did not want my effort construed to be a part of the "mindless debate" concerning the "roles and missions" of the different military services. To that end I have attempted to be objective and avoid comparisons with my sister services. Secondly, I was concerned that the importance of the topic compared to my limited knowledge would not allow for adequate treatment of the subject. The reader will make that judgement. Finally, being a guest at the U.S.M.C. Command and Staff College, I did not want this effort viewed as an "official" Army communication on the subject. I must stress that although I do not profess to have any original "vision" for my Army, the thoughts in this paper are my own, and have not been approved by any Army official. Where appropriate however, I have given credit for thoughts, ideas, and concepts to responsible individuals. So it is with these thoughts and my limitations that I submit this paper. INTRODUCTION Today, the world is changing faster than anyone could have ever imagined. United States national interests are being reviewed and redefined. In support of America's national interests, the U.S. Army enters a new decade examining and underscoring the qualities it has and must develop to prepare for the uncertain future. This is a good time to look at where the Army is today, and where it is going in the future. It is equally important to understand the Army's strategic mandate, the resources the Army has to meet its requirements, and the challenges it faces in the 1990s and beyond. While ongoing events in the world will require changes in the United States' military structure, the U.S. Army with its highly trained mixture of light, heavy, and special operating forces is well poised to continue as America's strategic land force in the 1990s and beyond. In conducting an objective view of the Army's strategic responsibilities, it is important to consider, the origins of the Army's strategic roles, the doctrine which guides the strategic land force, major force decisions, and the training and employment readiness of the U.S. Army. Finally, it is critical that these ingredients be looked at in relation to the future. THE ORIGINS OF THE ARMY'S STRATEGIC ROLES "My vision is an Army that is trained and ready, today and tomorrow, to carry out its roles as a strategic force anywhere in the world, anytime." (26:60) CARL E. VUONO GENERAL, USA CHIEF OF STAFF Today, United States national security is at a unique crossroad. Although our interests and basic strategy are not likely to change, we face decisions which will seriously affect our security posture. (12:1) Our American military experience provides valuable lessons in dealing with the present and preparing for the future. The armed conflicts of the Twentieth Century have bolstered the need for combat ready ground forces. In support of national security, the United States Army has distinctive strategic roles. The specific size, composition, location, and strategic roles of the United States Army are heavily influenced by elements external to the Army. The origins of the Army's strategic roles include: the perceived threat to national security, United States national interests, national strategy, and the world political and social economic environment. A discussion of the origins of the Army's strategic roles must be reviewed within the context of the perceived threats to the United States. As a strategic force, the U.S. Army must prepare to meet many different threats across the entire spectrum of conflict. Despite drastic reforms in the Soviet Union, that country remains the principal threat to our national security. The Soviet Union is the only military power capable of destroying the U.S. Additionally, developing military capabilities of traditional Third World countries have resulted in a changing threat environment for the U.S. Army. The Soviet Union has begun broad reform initiatives. The imperative of economic revitalization is driving the Soviet's program of restructuring ("perestroika"). The Soviet military leadership apparently recognizes that it will need to accept lower levels of defense spending in favor of other sectors of the economy in order to achieve the military posture of "reasonable sufficiency." (13:1) Clearly, the USSR seeks a reduced threat perception in the West. The former American ideas of the "evil empire" and direct conflict of wills between our countries seem to be waning. For the United States this remains a two-edged sword. While the reduced tensions are welcomed by the U.S., the Soviets understand that it is perception of the threat which will dictate the extent of resources the United States and other Western countries invest in defense spending. It is also this perception that will define the national will to utilize the armed forces. A military force in a democracy without the will of its citizenry to apply force, is a hollow proposition. It is this perception that will be a key ingredient in shaping the strategic roles of the Army and its sister services. In spite of actual and announced reform initiatives, the Soviet Union remains a strong land force adversary. Even if the recently announced unilateral reductions are implemented by the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact will continue to hold a very significant advantage over NATO in vital ground force systems. Reform in the Soviet Union is a very tenuous endeavor which will continue to influence the Army's strategic roles. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney said it best: "While we certainly can point to benign intentions on the part of the stated posture of Gorbachev, my problem is that I have to deal with the capabilities that the Soviet Union still possesses. (24:2) Likewise, the Army's strategic roles must address the capabilities the Soviet Union presently possesses. The possibilities for conflict in the Third World seem to be increasing. The Middle East is perhaps the region most likely to experience conflict. It is in this part of the world that low-intensity conflict (LIC) is most likely to happen and put at risk American interests. As U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5 puts it, "Army actions in LIC must be fully coordinated with national strategy and fused at the operational level into a coherent effort." (22:4) Potential enemies will be able to field larger ground forces than we will be able to deploy quickly. The trend toward this type of conflict is a formidable challenge to the Army's strategic roles. Finally, the perceived threat from illegal drugs must be addressed. As reported by retired Admiral Crowe: "We are confronted with the illicit trafficking and production of narcotics in Latin America, posing a threat not only to the sovereignty, integrity and stability of governments to our south, but also to the social fabric of the United States itself." (24:16) During his 5 September 1989 speech to the Nation outlining his new anti-drug strategy, President Bush said: "Our message to the drug cartels is this: the rules have changed. We will help any government that wants our help. When requested, we will for the first time make available the appropriate resources of America's armed forces." (27:1) This aspect of the threat will continue to shape the Army's strategic roles. In summary, the threat to the United States is is changing. It is more complex, and perhaps less overt. Threat capabilities however, are growing, as are the sources of the threat. Success in battle against these threats may not automatically assure the achievement of national goals, but defeat will guarantee failure. The United States Army is challenged to develop and train a land force capable of meeting these threats and fulfilling its strategic roles. We cannot discuss the Army's strategic roles without considering the greater goals and interests of the United States. The Army's strategic roles must serve our national interests. Included in our national interests is our survival as a free nation with our values intact; a stable and secure world free of major threats to our interests and those of our allies, healthy and vigorous alliance relationships, and finally, the growth of human freedom and free market economies throughout the world. (16:3) These national interests naturally translate into national strategy. National strategy has two parts: national security objectives, and national military strategy. It is at this level that the Army's strategic roles begin to be focused. The first national security objective involves the safeguarding of the U.S. and allies through deterrence. If deterrence fails the Army must be prepared to terminate the resultant conflict successfully. Additionally, the Army must be prepared to help ensure U.S. access to critical resources. This may lend itself to conflicts in the traditional Third World countries. The last national security objective which has a direct relationship to the Army's strategic roles is the reduced reliance on nuclear weapons by strengthening conventional forces. As the land component of the United States' conventional forces, the Army is tasked to maintain a trained and ready force. The second part of national strategy which influences the Army's strategic roles is the national military strategy of the U.S. This includes: deterrence through strength, including forward deployed forces and alliance strategy. Should deterrence fail, national military strategy calls for coalition warfare. Coalition warfare demands that we conduct a forward defense. Army FM 100-5 addresses this: "The nature of modern battle and the broad geographical range of U.S. interests make it imperative that Army units fight as part of a joint team with units of the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Marine Corps, and representatives of appropriate civilian agencies. It is also critical that commanders prepare themselves to fight in coalition warfare alongside the forces of our nations's allies." (22:2) The Army must be poised to contribute to the military strategy of the U.S. through well developed strategic roles. These roles must include forward deployed ground forces prepared to conduct coalition warfare. In peacetime, the Army is the front line of strategic deterrence. There can be no stronger symbol of our Nation's commitment than forward deployed American soldiers supported by trained and ready contingency units in the U.S. Finally, the world political and social economic environment shapes the Army's strategic roles. The world political and social economic environment is changing rapidly. Many countries are evolving into global and/or regional economic superpowers. Japan is already superior to the Soviet Union in economic output. Some predict that China will also surpass the Soviet Union early in the 21st century. India continues to be the predominant force in South Asia, while in South America, Brazil is working to become the most powerful country. The conditions in the Third World will continue to shape the Army' strategic roles. Despite some growth, the Third World continues to trail economically and politically. The increased foreign debt of traditional Third World countries suggest that many of these states could actually fall farther behind the industrial West. To make matters worse, social tensions which are often caused by economic conditions, may combine with territorial disputes and fuel continued instability among the Third World countries. While some of the Third World instability will not have serious implications for United States interests, others will. These conditions will continue to shape the Army's strategic roles. Any discussion of the world's political and social economic environmental impact on the Army' strategic roles would not be complete without a review of the Middle East. The Middle East may continue to be the most unstable region of the world. Many of the problems in this part of the world are deep-rooted with no apparent solutions predicted. Iran's continuing state sponsored terrorism will continue to affect United States interest. Likewise, the Israeli- Palistinian problem in the occupied territories will continue to add to instability in the region and affect the Army's strategic roles. The Middle East generally suffers from weak and eroding economies. Many states have invested disproportionate shares of their economies into military arsenals. Many of these countries with economic problems are experiencing social upheaval. Coupled with ethnic and religious discord, this region will continue to influence the Army's strategic roles. As a result of the perceived threats to national security, U.S. national interests, national strategy, and the world political and social economic environment, the following five strategic roles of the United States Army have been formulated: (26:1) -- Provide forward deployed ground forces (heavy, light and special operations) for deterrence, sustained land combat, and conflict termination in areas of vital interest to the U.S. -- Maintain contingency forces with capabilities for immediate combat worldwide, across the spectrum of conflict. -- Maintain reinforcing forces in CONUS to support forward deployed and contingency forces. -- Provide peacetime support to friends and allies through peacekeeping, security assistance, and Army-to-Army contacts. -- Provide support to U.S. civilian authorities in activities such as interdiction of illicit drug traffic and disaster relief. In conclusion, the strategic roles of the U.S. Army are and will continue to be influenced by elements external to the Army. The Army's strategic missions span the entire operational continuum- from peactime to global war. The Army will contine to refine its strategic roles as the threats to national security, and the world political and social economic environment change. DOCTRINE: GUIDING THE STRATEGIC LAND FORCE "You know you never defeated us on the battlefield," said the American colonel. The North Vietnamese colonel pondered this remark a moment. "That may be so," he replied, "but it is also irrelevant." Conversation in Hanoi, April 1976 (17:1) The United States is a global power with global responsibilities. As America's strategic land force, the Army must be prepared to respond to challenges wherever they occur. In order to guide actions on the battlefield, the Army has developed and maintained dynamic realistic doctrine. The U.S. Army's basic fighting doctrine is called AirLand Battle (ALB). This doctrine describes the Army's approach to combat power at the tactical and operational level of war. The name reflects the nature of modern warfare: all services and combined arms. (23:8) Viewing the battlefield from the operational level of war is not new to American field commanders. GEN. Patton once captured the essence of it by saying, "Hold `em by the nose, and kick `em in the tail." The Army's warfighting doctrine has been continuously evolving. In the late 1970's, the expanding Soviet force modernization threat, combined with potential world-wide rapid response contingencies, personnel ceilings, and fiscal constraints, combined to influence a reevaluation of the Army's fundamental warfighting doctrine. The result of the Army's several year effort was termed "AirLand Battle" in rocognition of the inherently joint nature of modern warfare. (23:8) The Army's warfighting doctrinal evolution is summarized at figure 1. AirLand Battle's major contribution to American military thought are the reintroduction of the "operational art" as the key link between tactics and strategy, and the view of the unity of the battlefield which transcends services, echelons, and national military components. (23:9) The Army's AirLand Battle doctrine utilizes four basic tenets: agility, initiative, depth, and synchronization. These fundamental tenets describe the characteristics of successful operations. They are also the basis for the development of all current U.S. Army doctrine, tactics, and techniques. (22:2) While initiative, agility, depth, and synchronization characterize successful AirLand Battle operations, the Army's doctrine also enlists ten combat imperatives: (22:23) -- Ensure unity of effort. -- Anticipate events on the battlefield. -- Concentrate combat power against enemy vulnerabilities. -- Designate, sustain, and shift the main effort. -- Press the fight. -- Move fast, strike hard, and finish rapidly. -- Use terrain, weather, deception, and OPSEC. -- Conserve strength for decisive action. -- Combine arms and sister services to complement and reinforce. -- Understand the effects of battle on soldiers, units, and leaders. The Army is small compared to the size of its strategic roles and missions. AirLand Battle doctrine recognizes that conflicts will be waged by American armed forces, acting together in Joint Operations. Joint operations however, does not refer to equal amounts of forces from each service. Instead, Joint operations demand that we build "force packages" containing each service's unique capabilities carefully crafted to meet the threat. The recent example of Operation "JUST CAUSE" in Panama is an excellent example of highly successful joint combat operations. Until the first paratrooper landed in Panama, the action was almost entirely an Air Force operation. Then the Army conducted three separate parachute assaults while the Marines seized key points along the approaches to Panama City. There were also several targets for Special Operating Forces, including Navy SEALS. Future conflicts will utilize similar "force packages". Operation "JUST CAUSE" also validated the tenets of AirLand Battle- agility, initiative, depth, and synchronization. What is particularly noteworthy is that Army doctrine was proved in a non-NATO operation. The success in Panama shatters the myth that the Army's AirLand Battle doctrine is applicable only to NATO scenarios. Army doctrine was successful in Panama, we can expect that it will be tested in other parts of the world when we least expect it. The lack of preparation in any area of doctrine defines accepted risk. The Army must be prepared for all types of conflicts- as soon as we are convinced that global war is not possible, it will most certainly occur. Army ALB doctrine guides the strategic land force through all potential scenarios. ALB doctrine balances short term U.S. orientation and long term interests. By its nature ALB doctrine is flexible. It does not deny the tactics of the moment. ALB doctrine accepts unpredictability, but encourages leaders at all levels to be proactive in order to influence and shape the next battlefield. Army doctrine recognizes that wars are not fought only at the tactical level; to defeat our potential enemies we must deal effectively with his operational echelons. (23:11) This defines the operational level of war. It is this operational level that is the vital element of ALB doctrine. It is vital because it links the tactical battles to the strategic objectives. The operational level is required if tactical success is to be relevant. Clearly, ALB doctrine tells us that we must win the close battle at the tactical level when batt1e is joined, but we must do more. Potential enemies know they will need to mass forces in order to win in conventional battle, U.S. forces cannot allow this to occur. ALB doctrine stresses defeating the enemy at the operational level while dominating the tactical battle. Army doctrine demands that commanders at all levels deal simultaneously with the close-in and deep fight. In a sense the commander must see both levels as one fight. Army doctrine stresses fighting as a combined arms team. This combined arms approach to battle requires integration of all weapons-infantry, armor, artillery, and aviation. It requires that in any scenario, when battle begins, the enemy is offered several different ways to die. More importantly, ALB doctrine dictates that we do it all at once. In battle, Army doctrine stresses simultaneous attack by many means- close and deep. Enemy forces which cannot get to the front, are not relevant. This doctrine is not NATO specific, to think so is a monumental mistake. ALB doctrine can be tailored to all potential scenarios. ALB doctrine melds technology, leadership, and soldiers. Together with those of our sister services and allies, the U.S. can carry the day across the entire spectrum of conflict. Future conflicts will not be won by hardware issues alone, the U.S. Army intends to win by combining lethal weapons, leadership, soldiers, and realistic, evolving doctrine. AirLand Battle doctrine continues to guide America's strategic land force. ORGANIZING AND EOUIPPING THE STRATEGIC LAND FORCE: FORCE DESIGN AND MAJOR FORCE DECISIONS "The modernization of heavy forces, creation of light divisions, and increases in the size and effectiveness of special operating forces has balanced the Army for any strategic need." (20:25) Like the Army's strategic roles and doctrine, the Army's force design has evolved through the 1980's. The chronology of major force structure decisions in the 80's demonstrates the changing nature of the threat to national interests (figure 2). The changing force design of the Army is a direct reflection of the emerging threats from terrorism and Low Intensity Conflicts (LIC). (23:12) The force decisions also demonstrate the emphasis on the "Total Army"- the active, reserve, and civilian components of the Army. The Army in the early 1980's was at a unique crossroad- the Mid to High Intensity (MIC/HIC) threat seemed to be growing. Concurrently, the possibility of Low Intensity Conflicts in Central America, and terrorism introduced as an element of national power dictated that the Army take action to design forces capable of meeting all contingencies. The Army required Special Operating Forces (SOF), Rangers, and light deployable conventional forces. The Army was faced with raising these new forces while keeping the active personnel strength constant. The decision was made to share responsibilities to an even greater degree with the Reserve Component. In the early 1980's the Army's 24 divisions- 16 Active, 8 Reserve were essentially "heavy" forces. The Army discovered that the doctrinally required support structure for these forces was unaffordable. Throughout the Army, the number of authorized positions was significantly below their required levels. In the words of former Army Chief of Staff, General Meyer, "The Army was hollow". (23:13) Work began to "fix" the Army. The challenges were formidable, but the results pointed to a more credible deterrent force. Today the Army's heavy divisions are more modern, mobile, and agile. Their organic supporting structure has been streamlined with more support provided by the next level of command- the Corps. The average size of the division has been limited to about 15,000 soldiers. Light contingency divisions including the 6th, 7th, 10th, 25th, and 29th have been introduced or redesigned. Today, these forces combined with the Army's existing 82nd and 101st divisions are prepared to conduct Low Intensity Combat. More likely however, these forces will be portions of "force packages" similar to the one utilized during operation "JUST CAUSE". These "force packages" will be a mixture of heavy, light, and special operating forces. Significant progress has also been made in the area of equipping the strategic land force during the 1980's. The Army has upgraded its tank fleet with the deployment of the M1 Abrams tank. During this same period, the Army has also fielded the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, Apache Attack Helicopter, Multiple-Launch Rocket System, Blackhawk Helicopter, Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Trucks (HEMTTs), and High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles(HMMMVs). The Army has also made great strides in fielding night fighting capable equipment to the force. Today the night belongs to the U.S. Army. The Army has also fielded the new family of Stinger Anti-Aircraft missile systems. Coupled with significant improvements in tactical communications, these modernization efforts point to an Army improved in speed, accuracy, lethality, survivability, flexibility, and maintainability. All of these features will help the strategic land force fight more effectively. Recognizing the significance of sustained modernization, the Army has developed a series of functional modernization plans. These plans have a long range (30 year) orientation, and will support the continuous development, fielding, and displacement of systems. Currently, the Army has prepared an Aviation, Fire Support, Air Defense Artillery, and Heavy Force Modernization plan. The Light Force Modernization Plan is now being prepared. The organization and equipping of the strategic land force will continue to be a challenging endeavor. The tightly constrained budget process will dictate that all Army programs make a major contribution to mission accomplishment. (15:23) Today however, with the modernization of heavy forces, creation of light divisions and increased capability of special operating forces, the Army is poised for any strategic contingency. PREPARING THE STRATEGIC LAND FORCE: TRAINING, READINESS, AND EMPLOYMENT "The best form of `welfare' for the troops is first class training, for this saves unnecessary casualties." Field Marshall Erwin Rommel Nothing says more about the U.S. States Army than the state of its training. Today, America's strategic land force is better trained than at any other time in modern history. Operations in Panama underscore this point. Consider that over 9,000 Army soldiers were alerted from numerous CONUS installations, and within hours were conducting airborne and ground assaults in a strange land. Leader, soldier, and unit training allowed this to happen. Training is the cornerstone of Army readiness. Army training is focused on wartime missions. It is tough, realistic, and continuous. The Army has emphasized a multi-dimensional approach to training the force- from individual, through unit, to major force training in maneuver exercises. Initial entry training for soldiers is tougher, more challenging than any other time in Army history. Officer's Basic and Advanced courses have been improved. Likewise, NCO Primary Leadership, Basic, and Advanced Courses have been updated and made more demanding. Additionally, the Army has embarked on programs to enhance realistic training. Simulator training devices have been developed and fielded. Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement Systems (MILES) are available for most types of equipment. Unit Conduct of Fire Trainers (UCOFT) are now available to replicate the firing of most weapon systems. Unit training has also drastically improved. In support of unit training, the Army has resourced new training facilities. The Army's Combat Training Centers (CTCs) provide Active and Reserve unit commanders and their soldiers tough, realistic, combined arms and joint service training in accordance with AirLand Battle doctrine and currently approved joint doctrine. (26:20) The Army's CTCs include three instrumented tactical field locations and a wargaming program designed to train participants for combat across the entire spectrum of conflict. The CTCs are the Army's warfighting academies. The National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Erwin, California, is the Army's premier CONUS facility for training armored and mechanized infantry units in mid to high intensity combat operations. The Joint Readiness Training Center, located at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, provides training for nonmechanized battalion task forces in low to mid intensity combat environments. The Combat Maneuver Training Center located in Hohenfels, West Germany, provides NTC-like training for forward deployed battalion task forces. At each of these facilities, the Army utilizes a well trained and equipped opposing force to challenge units and leaders. The Army's unit training aims at developing effectiveness with combined arms in specific mission essential tasks. Unit commanders ensure that standardized procedures and battle drills are used to gain the best possible results. When basic standards have been achieved, commanders attempt to perform the same tasks under more difficult conditions. (22:6) Training support units is also critical. The Army recognizes that unit readiness cannot be achieved without logistical readiness. Support units are trained under rigorous, realistic conditions. (22:7) In order to maximize the potential of its equipment and doctrine, the Army is conducting some of the toughest, most realistic training ever. The Army has continued to increase emphasis on individual training at every level. Leaders at every level are being challenged with training that is directly related to their wartime missions. The complexities of combat make it critical to concentrate on programs which improve the skills of leaders. Those who direct the employment of weapons and units are competent in their use. (22:7) Recently, the Army's training program was been tested in combat. The results underscore the fact that America's strategic land force is well trained and ready to defend our Nation's interests. THE STRATEGIC LAND FORCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE "Only the dead have seen the end of war." PLATO The world is changing faster than anyone could have predicted. Perhaps "change" has become the ultimate element of power. Where does the U.S. military fit into the new world order? Without external threats to our Nation's security, a military seems wasteful. (15:23) Strategic roles, doctrine, force design, and training readiness, are meaningless without an external threat. Americans will not continue to pay for a military that is preparing for wars which will never happen. Will the "threat deficit" continue to erode public opinion against continued military modernization in lieu of correcting social ills? Does the apparent maturation of the Soviet Union mean that concensus and compromise will be the order of the day? Is the world more stable than it was twenty years ago? One thing seems certain, the U.S. military will shrink considerably in the near future. How we handle this change will be as important as the "change" that provoked it. Recent history demonstrates that Americans will support specific uses of military force to combat perceived threats to U.S. interests. While the fundamental U.S. international objectives remain constant, the threats, to those objectives have become more complex, sophisticated, and diverse. At a time when U.S. interests are not changing, it seems the U.S. Army will be getting much smaller. (5:16) In the face of these challenging circumstances however, the strategic imperative for the Army remains unchanged- the Army must be trained and ready, today and tomorrow, to protect the national security of the United States, anytime, anywhere. (25:13) It is unlikely that a significant decrease in the active Army will translate into reduced roles and missions. It is this apparent resource/roles mismatch that will pose the greatest challenge for the Army of the future. To be sure, many aspects of the threat are changing. Americans applaud Soviet President Gorbachev's reform initiatives, especially significant Soviet force reductions in Eastern Europe. These Soviet reductions will allow for asymmetrical U.S. force reductions in Europe through the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty talks. (1:1) While the Soviet Union will cut the size of its armed forces, we can expect that they will continue to modernize their forces. In the long run, the smaller, more sophisticated Soviet army may be more capable. Today, however, not even the Soviets seem to know what Eastern Europe will look like in ten years. One result of President Gorbachev's reforms could be crisis. Americans must accept unpredictability, to do otherwise is dangerous. Change by itself will not bring about security. World history is replete with examples of instability and conflicts when great empires have collapsed. on the political level, we should not rush into unilateral force reductions that could fuel world instability. NATO has kept the peace in Europe longer than any other period in history. (3:1) The U.S. military presence in Europe will decline significantly, how we manage this change is critical. Although the evening news seems to focus on events in Europe, we must look past that continent because America is a global power with global interests. Outside of Europe, the world seems more complex. As demonstrated in the Iran- Iraq War, the "Third World" has large military arsenals of tanks, artillery, ballistic missiles, and chemical weapons. The sophistication of the weapons fielded in the developing world were once reserved only for the "superpowers". (14:56) The political situation in the Third World is explosive. Many of the deep rooted problems do not seem to have apparent solutions. Throughout the developing world, the United States has significant interests. The United States cannot ignore the military power of the Third World. We must maintain a significant capability to defeat mechanized and armor forces. Most of our potential adversaries are land powers with forces available to control assets of vital importance to the United States. The requirements to meet this growing mechanized land threat must be met by the U.S. Army. "Heavy" forces are not enough. The Army must continue to develop and modernize its light and special forces. The Army must be ready to "force package" forces at any time to meet any contingency. The "force package" for Operation "Just Cause" comprised virtually every type of Army unit. This mixture of forces will continue to be paramount in all future conflicts. Together with its sister services, the Army must be able to project its geographic reach throughout the world. Where possible, the Army must retain its forward deployment concept. Combined with contingency forces, forward deployment is key to the Army's deployability. In today's world however, the Army cannot count on being forward deployed in all potential crisis areas. For this reason, America must invest more in strategic sea and airlift capabilities. As good as America's strategic land force is, it cannot perform, if it cannot get to the fight. Strategic lift discussions usually end up being debates on "lightening" up Army forces. We will not solve America's security requirements by building down the Army's combat power. What is reguired, is the building up of America's strategic lift capabilities. The question, "How much military is enough?" is in vogue around our Country today. (5:l6) It seems that the answer may come in the form of another question. Does the United States wish to continue to be a superpower? Clearly, military power is only one aspect of our superpower status, but as other aspects of our power are threatened, the military will be asked to take action. There are many proposals to reduce the United States military forces. One such proposal recommends the U.S. Army be reduced to seven active divisions. (5:19) A seven division Army is not the Army of a superpower; it is the Army of a country in retreat. The Army's long-term budget plan calls for the Army to reduce personnel strength by about 35,000 soldiers per year. The total five year reduction would be approximately 140,000 soldiers by 1995. Budget negotiations now being debated in Congress, could increase the 1991 force cut to 80,000 soldiers. This would be almost three times the Army projection. Such deep cuts would cause significant training and readiness problems. Under staffed units cannot train as Army doctrine requires. (7:15) The Army must maintain an acceptable mix of heavy, light, and special operating forces. In America, however, as costs increase, "will" decreases. Our goals cannot outrun resources. The Army's strategic roles are not about to change. The resultant conflict between resources, will, and perceived threats confronts the Army with serious challenges. The Army faces a challenge of maintaining the modernization of its forces in an increasingly austere budget environment. (6:27) All to often, the budget process has seemed short-sighted. How much future warfighting capability will be sacrificed due to the present budget process? For its part, the Army must expend its resources on materiel and programs which enhance warfighting. The Army must also attempt to retain quality people. Quality soldiers are not a luxury, they are essential. As the Army becomes smaller, the need for quality soldiers will increase. So as the Army juggles its modernization requirements, it must also weigh its "people programs". Army leaders must continue to refine their vision of the future Army. If the Army does not make the necessary force reductions, Congress will most certainly "help". Better that the military leaders make these judgements early, then have Congressional leaders make them in seemingly isolated vacuums. Congress is hunting for a "peace dividend" to off-set social ills. The military has never been a better target. At the same time however, military leaders must stand up and state the unpopular. Heavy forces are required. The military establishment understands and seems to agree with a gradual military force reduction; however, a large standing Army is necessary for a superpower to protect its interests. Nobody else will fight America's wars. America's military leaders must be proactive to the point of educating the American public concerning the consequences of quick, steep, force reductions. To often, military leaders have seemed reluctant to carry their message to the American people. Now is not the time for our military leaders to be timid. The world is becoming more complex. The world is not necessarily a safer place to live in. America and the U.S. Army will continue to face serious challenges. What ever the future holds, the United States Army is tasked to build, maintain, and support a force to protect America's interests under any circumstances. The ability of the Army to fight and win the wars of our Nation is key to the survival of our democracy. As in the past, the Army with its unique mix of highly trained heavy, light, and special forces, will provide America with its strategic land force for the 1990s and beyond. Click here to view image BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Adams, Peter. "U.S. Sets Agenda for CFE II Talks." Defense News, (December 4, 1989), p.1. 2. Baker, Caleb. "Army Aims for Highly Mobile Forces." Army Times, (January 15, 1990), p.25. 3. Baker, Caleb. "Army Plans Tank, Troop Pullout in Germany." Defense News, (December 4, 1989), p.1. 4. Carlucci, Frank. "Annual Report to the Congress." (FY90). 5. Church, George. "How Much is Enough?". Time Magazine, (February 12, 1990), p.16-20. 6. Donnelly, Tom. "The Big Chop: 130,000 from Active Duty." Army Times, (December 11, 1989), p.27. 7. Donnelly, Tom. "How Bad Could Larger Cuts Be?" Army Times, (March 19, 1990), p.15. 8. Donovan, Elizabeth. "Marines Launch Preemptive Strike to Defend Mission." Army Times, (January 15, 1990), p.26. 9. Evans, Roland and Novak, Robert. "No Linkage at Malta." Washington Post, December 4, 1989, Section A, p.19. 10. Guertner, Gary. "Conventional Deterrence After Arms Control." Parameters, (December 1989), p. 67-79. 11. Hitchens, Theresa. "CFE Treaty Could Force Realignment of NATO Members Roles." Defense News, (October 1989), p.74. 12. HQ Department of the Army. "Future of the Force: Considerations and Constraints." Discussion Paper, (April 28, l989). 13. HQ Department of the Army. "The Changing Nature of the Threat in 1989." Memorandum, (February 15, 1989). 14. Markowitz, David. "Strategic Weapons in the Third World." Harvard International Review, (Fall 1989), p.56-59. 15. Middleton, Drew. "Defense Cuts: Past Lessons, Future Tests." Army Times, (December 11, 1989), p.23. 16. Reagan, Ronald. "National Security Strategy." (January 1988), p1. 17. Summers, Harry. "On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War", 1984. 18. Tyler, Patrick. "Bush Alerted in May to Soviet Military Cuts." Washington Post, December 11, 1989, Section A, Page 1. 19. U.S. Army. "Strategic Imperatives." Army Focus, (June 1989), 5-12. 20. U.S. Army. "The Army As a Strategic Force." Soldiers Magazine, (January 1990). 21. U.S. Army. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. Training The Force, FM25-100. 1988. 22. U.S. Army. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. Operations, FM100-5. 1986. 23. U.S. Congress. "Statement of the Army's Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Force Development." 100th Congress, 2d Session, March 29, 1988. 24. U.S. Government. "Defense 89." (July/August 1989). 25. Vuono, Carl E., GEN, USA. "Today's U.S. Army: Trained and Ready In an Era of Change." Army Green Book, (October 1989), p.12-32. 26. Vuono, Carl E., GEN, USA. "Vision For the Army." Army Focus, (June 1989). 27. Washington Post. "President Bush's Address to the Nation." (September 6, 1989), p.1.
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