Aircraft Hardening: The Archilles Heel Of The MAGTF AUTHOR Major Arthur L. Deal, USMC CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Aviation AIRCRAFT HARDENING: THE ACHILLES HEEL OF THE MAGTF by Maj. A. Lewis Deal EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: AIRCRAFT HARDENING: THE ACHILLES HEEL OF THE MAGTF THESIS: The Marine Corps in an attempt to solve the problem of rear area security in particular the air base, left out a critical element of the equation--that of hardening aircraft, equipment, and critical installation facilities. BACKGROUND: American forces are and will continue to be involved in Third World conflicts. Third World country insurgents are being trained in numerous communist countries on the correct tactics to counter US forces. Because of this growing threat the Marine Corps is vigorously pursuing the problem of rear area security with special concerns for the expeditionary air base. AIRCRAFT HARDENING: The Marine Corps has neglected the threat posed by surface to surface weapons in its air base defense doctrine. The lessons learned in the Vietnam War are an ideal case study in how to counter this threat. There are a variety of technical/equipment solutions, however, they do not meet the criteria of being expeditionary. RECOMMENDATIONS: By learning from the Vietnam War experience and combining these lessons with existing engineering techniques in a vigorous training program, the problem can be solved. The Marine Corps must realize that there will not be any money available to develop any state of the art expeditious aircraft shelters. There are materials organic to the MAGTF that can be utilized to construct effective shelters. CONCLUSIONS: If the Marine Corps continues to neglect this critical area of vulnerability, in the next conflict our air assets could be seriously threatened by an enemy who recognizes and exploits this weakness. AIRCRAFT HARDENING: THE ACHILLES HEEL OF THE MAGTF OUTLINE THESIS STATEMENT. The Marine Corps in an attempt to solve the problem of rear area security in particular the air base, has left out a critical element of the equation--that of hardening aircraft, equipment, and critical installation facilities. I. REAR AREA SECURITY A. AIR BASES ARE A CRITICAL VULNERABILITY OF THE MAGTF B. THE THREAT OF SURFACE TO SURFACE WEAPONS C. TYPES OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS D. MORTAR/ROCKET BELT E. EFFECTS OF THE WEAPONS II. VIETNAM CASE STUDY A. ATTACKS ON U.S. AIR BASES B. LOSS OF AIRCRAFT C. PERSONNEL ACCOUNTS III. TECHNICAL FIXES A. TYPES OF AIRCRAFT SHELTERS (AIR FORCE) B. TYPES OF AIRCRAFT SHELTERS (MARINE CORPS) IV. CONCLUSIONS EXPLOITING VULNERABILITY AND OPPORTUNITY We obviously stand a better chance of success by concentrating strength against enemy weakness rather than against strength. So we seek to strike the enemy where, when, and how he is most vulnerable... Of all the vulnerabilities we might choose to exploit, some are more critical to the enemy than others. It follows that the most effective way to defeat our enemy is to destroy that which is the most critical to him. We should focus our efforts on the one thing which, if eliminated, will do the most decisive damage to his ability to resist us... Therefore, we should focus our efforts against a critical enemy vulnerability... Reduced to its simplest terms, we should strike our enemy were and when we can hurt him most. (Warfighting FMFM-1) Click here to view image The Attack! The commander nervously looked at his watch for the third time in five minutes. The time was 0315, in fifteen more minutes the 122mm rocket attack would begin on the U.S. Marine helicopter base in the valley below. The American forces had been in El Salvador for nearly six weeks and their constant attacks had taken their toll on the FMLN forces. But know it was his turn to apply his combat power to the enemy. Like most FMLN commanders he had been sent to a guerrilla training camp in Vietnam and now it was time to see if the tactics he had been taught worked. Reconnoitering had shown that the American forces employed an extensive air base defense to include day/night security patrols; armed perimeter defense; limited access points with armed checkpoints and all were in order with existing American air base defense doctrine. But there was one area the American defenders had failed to adequately plan for. All the patrolling in the world could not stop the 122mm rocket attack that was about to start. The rocket attack would utilize surprise and stand-off range afforded by the weapon. But most of all the Americans had neglected to harden the aircraft from such an attack! From five separate launch sites the attack began, each site firing ten rockets. The firing sequence took less then two minutes. The commander watched with joy as the rockets began to impact on the air base. Seconds later he could see the flash of numerous secondary explosions as unprotected helicopters began to explode and burn. The commander had accomplished his mission. . .he had destroyed or damaged the bulk of the American helicopters and he did so without losing a single man! Click here to view image AIRCRAFT HARDENING: THE ACHILLES HEEL OF THE MAGTF The preceding scenario is fictitious; however, certain elements are plausible: 1. American forces are and will continue to be involved in Third World conflicts. 2. Third World insurgents are being trained in numerous communist countries (e.g. Vietnam, Bulgaria, East Germany, and the Soviet Union).(3:71-78) 3. The U.S. Marine Corps is vigorously pursuing the problem of air base defense (as part of rear area defense). The Marine Corps in an attempt to solve the problem of rear area security in particular the air base, left out a critical element of the equation--that of hardening aircraft, equipment, and critical installation facilities. In understanding the "art of war," we have been taught to look for a "critical enemy vulnerability" and "strike our enemy where and when we can hurt him the most." Have our future enemies found a critical vulnerability in our air base defense doctrine? For example, the U.S. Marine Corps OH 2-6 MAGTF Rear Area Security, addresses in depth the perceived future threat capabilities. They include: terrorism; raids; helicopter operations; sabotage, and unconventional warfare missions. (10) But no where is the threat from surface to surface weapons addressed! An airfield is a center for offensive operations; however, the paradox is it is in itself a static defensive operation. What is most critical to continuing offensive air operations is the preservation of the air assets. There are few potential adversaries that possess the air force striking power to challenge the U.S. for air superiority. They will have to challenge our air forces on the ground. Even then an adversary may find himself "out-gunned" by our combined arms MAGTF. The logical step would be to attack our air assets at our most vulnerable point with the most effective weapon- surface to surface munitions. The proliferation of surface to surface weapons (munitions) in the Third World has been dramatic since the end of the Vietnam War. In fact, the number of countries possessing surface to surface weapons of at least 150-mile range has increased 50 percent since the Vietnam War. (2:61) Two widely distributed Soviet-Warsaw Pact weapon systems that the MAGTF might face are the: 120mm mortar and 122mm rocket. These two weapon systems are found throughout the Third World (most places the U.S. may find its forces deployed to). Both weapon systems are man portable, easy to conceal, and do not need sophisticated fire control direction systems (the NVA used the water tower at Marble Mountain as an "aiming stake" for their 122mm rockets for years. That is why they never destroyed the water tower!) Because of the maximum effective range of these two common weapon systems the rocket/mortar belt around a MAGTF airfield is extensive. Such a large square area is extremely difficult, if not impossible to constantly patrol for and sanitize from these types of surface to surface weapon systems. For example, the maximum effective ranges for the two example weapon systems: 120mm mortar---5700m 122mm rocket---20,000m (1:211,212) This equates to a rocket/mortar belt of potentially: 98sq. km for the 120mm mortar 1256sq. km for the 122mm rocket (see TABLE 1.) For a recent and definitive case study of aircraft hardening in an expeditionary airfield mode, the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War is an excellent source. Early involvement in Vietnam found our air bases subjected to attacks from ground assault forces only. The deployment of U.S. Marine combat units was at first to protect the Da Nang air base complex. (1:20) It was due to the increased perimeter/area defense which caused the NVA to switch their tactics from primarily ground (sapper) attacks to the utilization of surface to surface fires. How effective were these new tactics? During this conflict Click here to view image U.S. forces had to defend 10 key air bases. These bases were subjected to 475 attacks with over 6200 rounds of various surface to surface munitions impacting on the air base proper. These attacks resulted in the loss of over 900 aircraft! (1:204) The loss of aircraft became so critical that in 1968 the highest priority was given to construction of protective cover for tactical aircraft at the various military bases. (11:273) How valid is citing data from a war that took place over 20 years ago? First, it illustrates the vulnerability of unprotected aircraft (such as our expeditionary airfields offer). Second, the lethality and effectiveness of surface to surface weapons. Third, this is the most likely form (LIC) of war we will encounter in the near future. Have we done anything to make provisions for hardening our expeditionary airfields? Has the lethality and the effectiveness of surface to surface weapons improved from 20 years ago? Has the proliferation of these types of weapons increased in Third World countries? To further illustrate the significants of the Vietnam case study, examine the accompanying photographs and read the following interviews. Click here to view image Col. C.T. Crews, U.S.M.C. HMM-263 1966-1967 CH-34 HMA-169 1970-1971 AH-1 1. FREQUENCY AND TYPE OF ATTACKS "During my first tour we did not come under any type of rocket or mortar attack. Our biggest problem was from sapper attack. We were at Marble Mountain and had no perimeter defense at all. In fact there was no bunkers, aircraft revetments, or any type of overhead protection. Our main concern was from sapper attack. In fact Da Nang was hit, I believe in July, by a large sapper attack. (This attack took place on 1 July, 1965. The sapper force destroyed: 3 C-130s, 3 F-102s, and damaged three more F-102s. In all there was over 15 million dollars worth of damage done with the loss of only one sapper.) (1:51) During my second tour we had solved the sapper problem for the most part, but we now had to face the rocket and mortar attacks. At least once a month we would receive what I would call random H and I fires. They had shifted their tactics." (Exploiting vulnerability and opportunity--FMFM 1) 2. ACCURACY "The mortars were the most accurate of the two. The rockets were fired at a random pattern and often hit buildings and facilities outside of the airfield. I think the NVA gunners suffered from `buckfever', they knew we were looking for them and their haste to fire and get to hell out of there affected their aiming" 3. REVETMENTS "We did not have any type of revetments my first tour. However since they had changed their tactics we had hardened all the aircraft. Most of the revetments at Marble Mountain were very simple. We had taken airfield matting to form walls with sand in the middle. The few concrete revetments we had did have overhead cover but we stored our ammo and other vital supplies in them. The main concern of protecting the parked Cobras, was the fact that they were armed, you didn't want them getting hit and causing alot of secondary explosions and damage. We even had bunkers and sandbagged work and living spaces." 4. COUNTER-TACTICS "We knew what kind of weapons they were using so we drew up rocket/mortar belts around Marble Mountain and Da Nang airfields. They had over the years used the same general areas to launch their attacks. We would patrol (air patrol) every day looking for signs of them preparing a launch site. You could tell by the disturbance of the grass or a muddied rice patty that there had been some kind of activity. You see once a rice patty has been planted the farmers don't walk through them, they use the dikes around the edges. The NVA would walk through them at night but the muddy footprints would stay up to six hours or so. We also had most of the suspected launch sites registered with counter artillery/mortar fire. We also had a Cobra sitting on the hot pad all ready to go. If we thought an attack was coming we would try to disperse our aircraft to other fields. They almost always attacked at night unless it was part of a big overall attack. The best place to be during a rocket attack is in the air!" Click here to view image Lt. Col. P.B. Pratt Jr. VMO-2 1969-1970 OV-10 1. FREQUENCY AND TYPE OF ATTACKS "I would say along the lines of once a month for rockets and less frequency for mortars. I was at Marble Mountain and we had less attacks than Da Nang. Da Nang was a much bigger base and an easier to hit." 2. ACCURACY "The mortars were much more accurate than the rockets. They did walk mortars in one night while I was the duty officer and they hit the troops hootches. They also got the fuel dump with rockets one night. There was an U.S. Army unit, the 80th Support Group, I think, which was camped near our perimeter. They got hit one night by rockets that were meant for us. It wasn't the accuracy of the attacks that was the mainconcern. It was the mental game they played with you. The attacks were more of a terror weapon. The indiscriminate nature of the attacks is what got to you, there was no protection from them. I found the fear of a rocket or mortar attack more of a concern than flying in combat. They did not do the attacks to often so we would get use to them. Plus there was always people rotating in/out so you always had new personnel." 3. REVETMENTS "Most of our revetments were from materials we had at hand. We used 55 gallon drums filled with sand, two deep to form some of the revetments. Some were airfield matting panels two feet apart with sand between them. These were much higher than the drums, only the rotors of the helos were exposed and most of the OV-10 was protected. There was some damage to aircraft but mostly to facilities. Da Nang had the concrete revetments which also provided overhead protection. We parked one Cobra or OV-10 per revetment, but other types of helos we put two per revetment. There was no type of revetment or protection at the forward bases, you really were exposed there. Not a good feeling!" 4. COUNTER-TACTICS "The rocket belt was known after years of fighting, it was 3-5km deep. The belt was under constant observation. We had OPS, some of which were towers. Many areas were registered with artillery. We also had night vision devices. These were something new and we were quite amazed by them. There was even a 106 recoiless rifle with a zeon tank light. The 106 gun crew using the night vision devices found Charlie setting up a mortar one night. They shot .50 Cal. and the 106 with the zeon light spotting for them--very effective! There was also high threat periods, like during a VIP visit or a holiday like Tet. We would step up our air patrols. Sometimes 5-2 would hear about units moving in or toward our area and the troops were carrying rocket parts. This tipped us off several times of impending attacks. The bottom line is it kept you on edge, you just didn't know when one would fall on you head!" As the Marine Corps enters into a new decade in a world radically changing, it must continue to adapt it's doctrine to meet new enemy threats. (note: much like the situation the Marine Corps found itself during the 1930's) This means taking a hard and critical look at our warfighting doctrine. The attention to rear area security was born from this concern and subsequent recognition of a "critical vulnerability" in our expeditionary MAGTF doctrine. The Marine Corps has done a superb job in resolving (at least in doctrinal theory) the rear area security problem for the bulk of the MAGTF. There is one major element of security left unresolved----the protection of the MAGTF air assets deployed at an expeditionary air base! Combining the lessons of the past with the realities of today the Marine Corps can begin to fill this glaring hole in our rear area security doctrine. One of the first problems the Marine Corps faces is the uniqueness of our expeditionary air bases. No other service utilizes a purely expeditionary air base concept. The U.S. Navy will maintain its air at sea, the U.S. Air Force operates from fixed bases or semi-permanent forward bases. The U.S. Air Force learned its lessons well in the Vietnam War and now has an extensive aircraft hardening program. The U.S. Air Force is deeply concerned with forward air base/installation defending from attacks and continuing to conduct offensive operations. The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Readiness Support, Tidal W. McCay, gave this problem an "urgent" to "critical" rating.(11:52) The Marine Corps should follow suit. Unfortunately, the U.S. Air Force solutions in aircraft protective structures are not compatible with the expeditionary nature of the MAGTF. For example, one expedient aircraft structure (will withstand mortar/rocket attacks, non-nuclear capable) is composed of 324 steel panels and weighs 31 tons! It takes 100 workers 24 hours a day for 7 days to complete.(12:273-274) This type of "expedient" aircraft structure is unacceptable to the Marine Corps concept of "expeditionary" equipment. (note: Maj. John J Busca,USMC, from the Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory, Port Huenene, Ca., stated in a letter on passive protection for forward based aircraft [dated 7 March,1990]. "The Defense Technical Information Center studies were found to be to costly for the Marine Corps to implement by virtue of the initial purchase price and the cost of shipping the materials to forward areas. The U.S. Air Force also holds all the purse strings for these studies and programs.") So where does the Marine Corps turn to solve the technical problem of aircraft protective structures? The answer lies in studying what Marines did in similar circumstances---the Vietnam War. In the interviews with Col. Crews and Lt. Col. Pratt there was reference to the use of "organic" materials to solve the shortage of aircraft protective structures. They were airfield matting sheets and 55 gallon drums used to construct revetments. The use of steel airfield matting (type M8A1) constructed five feet tall and one foot apart or in an "A" frame shape provided the following shielding: Percent Fragments Stopped at Cited Ranges Weapon 5ft. 10ft. 20ft. 30ft. 120mm mortar 98 98-100 98-100 98-100 122mm rocket -- -- 70 78 (4:4-30, 4-40) This simple design could help meet our requirements for realistic construction time, less than 3 hours and a weight of approximately 15,000lbs. (6:28-30) If soil is added between the one foot of separation between the steal matting panels all fragments were defeated (120mm mortar/122mm rocket) at an impact distance of five feet! (5:VI- 2) How readily available are these airfield matting panels? Each expeditionary airfield has 15,000-150,000 matting panels allocated. (8:96) Plus there few areas in the world that will not have a ready supply of soil/sand/dirt for filler. Another simple and expedient design is the use of 55 gallon drums filled with soil and set two deep around the aircraft. The best design is the incorporation of the airfield matting panels with the filled 55 gallon drums in between. All these designs do not require any special tools or external support. They will provide substantial protection from most surface to surface fires. But most of all the materials needed are already available. Click here to view image AIRFIELD IN VIETNAM-NOTE THE USE OF AIRFIELD PANELS IN THE CONSTRUCTED REVEMENTS CONCLUSION The Marine Corps has done an excellent job of defining its role in future conflicts (LIC-MIC-HIC). Part of the new doctrine which has grown from this new mission defining is the concept of rear area security. The doctrine published so far goes a long way to solve the myriad of problems associated with expeditionary MAGTF operations. However, there is a critical element missing in the total equation of protecting the air assets in the forward deployed MAGTF. There has been little if any consideration given in the established doctrine of rear area security to the uniqueness of air field protection from surface to surface weapons. In OH 2-6 MAGTF Rear Area Security, there are 17 threat capabilities listed and not one deals with enemy surface to surface weapons.( A Soviet made SCUD B rocket has the range of 300km.) We have neglected to address this threat. The Marine Corps can correct this missing element by: a. Looking to the lessons learned the hard way in the Vietnam War. There is a wealth of knowledge available in numerous military manuals (FM 5-103 Survivability), military journals (The Military Engineer), books (Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam), and the veterans themselves. b. As we rewrite the present doctrine, we must begin to teach these new changes in our formal schools. It must be incorporated in the curriculums and played as part of the war gaming exercises. c. The Marine Corps must realize that in the world of the shrinking defense dollar there won't be room in the budget to allow new R&D for suitable development of state of the art expeditionary quality aircraft protective sheltersd. d. With the materials already available and with a vigorous training program for Fleet Marine Force units (e.g. Marine Wing Support Squadrons and Groups), all incorporated into training exercises (CAX) the problem can be solved. The solution will take imagination, determination, boldness, a lot of sweat but most of all leadership Marine style! BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Fox, Roger P. Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam. Office of Air Force History, Washington, D.C., 1979 2. Blair, Lt.Col. Carl N. "The Air Threat to the MAGTF in the Third World." Marine Corps Gazette, September 1989 (58-63) 3. Rosello, Maj. Victor M. "Vietnam's Support to El Salvador's FMLN: Successful Tactics in Central America." Military Review, January 1990, (71-78) 4. FM 5-103 Survivability. Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1985 5. Sues, Robert H. "Expedient Hardening Methods for Structures Subjected to the Effects of Non-Nuclear Munitions." Applied Research Associates,Inc., Raleigh, N.C. 1989 6. Passive Protection Concepts for Forward-Based Aircraft. Engineering and Services Laboratory, Air Force Engineering and Services Center, Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, 1980 7. Draft Concept of Employment for Marine Wing Support Squadron. Marine Corps Air Station New River, North Carolina, 1989 8. Final Report on the Operational Concept for the Marine Corps Expeditionary Airfield (AEF) System 1985- 1995. United States Marine Corps, Development and Education Command, Quantico, Virginia 1985 9. MWSG-27 Group Operational Handbook (GOH) on Rear Area Security (RAS). Marine Wing Support Group-27, MCAS Cherry Point, North Carolina 1989 10. OH 2-6 MAGTF Rear Area Security. Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico Virginia 1989 11. Correl, John T., "Fighting Under Attack." Air Force Magazine, October 1989 (50-55) 12. Thomspon, Capt. Paul,USAF; "Aircraft Shelters in Vietnam." Military Engineer, July 1969 (273-274)
