Expansion Of American Persian Gulf Policy By Three Presidents AUTHOR Major Randy B. Bell, USMC CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA History EXECUTIVE SUMMARY EXPANSION OF AMERICAN PERSIAN GULF POLICY BY THREE PRESIDENTS The United States concerns over the security and military defense of the Persian Gulf have steadily intensified during the last four decades. Our interests in the Persian Gulf have been very simple: first, to ensure access by the industrialized world to the region's vast resources and second, to deny Soviet political and military control over those resources. The significance of the region has tended to increase as a result of growing Western dependence on Persian Gulf and Middle East oil and the need to assure the continued access to the region's vast resources. Under the presidential administrations of Nixon, Carter, and Reagan, the United States went from a role of supporting the British to a a major player in power responsibility in the Persian Gulf. The actions of these three presidents were in response to internal and external threats to the economic, political, and strategic interests of the United States in the Persian Gulf. President Nixon developed the initial U. S. Persian Gulf policy to fill the void in Western participation by establishing Iran and Saudi Arabia, the "twin pillars", as U. S. surrogates for the region. President Carter took a more aggressive approach to safeguard U. S. interests by designating the Persian Gulf as a "vital interest" to the United States and threatened to repel any attempts by outside powers to gain control of the Gulf in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. President Reagan affirmed the Carter administration and, though he saw the Soviets as the most significant threat to the region, he was concerned about internal Gulf instability serving Soviet objectives in the region. The Iran-Iraq war, along with the "arms for hostages" sales to Iran presented the greatest challenges to U. S. policy during the Reagan administration. The need to end the war, with its resultant attacks on shipping in the Gulf and the need to regain U. S. credibility with Gulf friendly states resulted in over 30 U. S. Navy ships in the Gulf and the U. S. leading peace efforts in the United Nations. America's interests in the Persian Gulf will continue to grow. President Bush and future presidents will have to deal with regional instability in the Gulf that may arise from territorial dispute, religious differences, ethnic dissensions, and ideological contests that threaten the U. S. and its allies' interests. These potential conflicts situations raise significant risks for future U. S. policy in the Gulf. Expansion of American Persian Gulf Policy by Three Presidents Outline Thesis Statement: American policy in the Persian Gulf has been progressively expanded by three presidential administrations -- Nixon, Carter, and Reagan -- culminating in the United States reflagging over 30 combat and support ships in the Gulf to escort the reflagged tankers. I. The Nixon Years A. British Withdrawal From the Persian Gulf B. Concern Over Regional Balance of Power C. The "Twin Pillar" Policy D. Effects of the Arab-Israeli War on U. S. Policy E. The Fall of the Shah of Iran II. The Carter Years A. The Iranian Revolution B. The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan C. The Carter Doctrine D. Rapid Joint Deployment Task Force (RDJTF) E. Outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War III. The Reagan Years A. Reaffirming the Carter Doctrine B. "Strategic Consensus" C. Commitment to RDJTF D. Intensification of the Iran-Iraq War E. The "Tanker War" and threats to U. S. Interests F. Decision to Reflag the Kuwaiti Tankers Expansion of American Persian Gulf Policy by Three Presidents The United States concerns over the security and military defense of the Persian Gulf have steadily intensified during the last four decades. The interests of the United States in the Persian Gulf region have been very simple and consistent: first, to ensure access by the industrialized world to the vast resources of the region; and second, to prevent the Soviet Union from acquiring political and military control over those resources. The significance of the region has tended to increase as a result of growing United States and Western dependence on Persian Gulf and Middle East oil and the need to assure continued access to the region's vast resources. (22:1) Preserving the stability and independence of the gulf states and containing the threat of Islamic fundamentalism are other interests that have been expressed by American leaders from time to time. But those are derivative concerns growing out of specific circumstances and are implicit in the two grand themes of oil and Soviet containment that have been the constants of expanding U. S. policy. While American military and security interests in the Persian gulf area orignated during World War II, it was not until around 1971 that the U. S. became increasingly and directly concerned with the defense of the region and Western interests there. (1:1) Prior to 1971, the responsibility for the region's security fell to the British, with the United States maintaining a supportive role. (6:21) However on 18 January 1968, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced to the House of Commons that the British had decided to withdraw their forces from the Persian Gulf by the end of 1971. That action set the stage for America's future involvement in the Persian Gulf. American policy in the Persian Gulf has been progressively expanded by three presidential administrations - Nixon, Carter, and Reagan - culminating with the United States reflagging Kuwaiti tankers and having over 30 combat and support ships in the Gulf to escort the reflagged tankers. THE NIXON DOCTRINE Early U. S. policy was predicated upon the Nixon Doctrine, which specified "that the United States would furnish military and economic assistance to nations whose freedom was threatened, but would look to these nations to assume primary responsibility for their own defense." (10:22) However, the Nixon Doctrine did not rule out possible U. S. intervention. It added that the U. S. would provide naval and air support if the local countries could not protect themselves against external threat, and, as a last resort, American ground forces would be committed to guarantee preservation of regional stability. (7:13) The U. S. feared that unless actions were taken before the British withdrawal, a dangerous vacuum would be created in the Gulf. It was argued that the Soviet Union could move to fill this vacuum and therefore jeopardize Western access to the region's oil resources. Though the Nixon administration was worried about the Gulf's security, it recognized the the U. S. was overextended militarily in Vietnam and that the American public, already divided in American participation in Vietnam, would not support active U. S. involvement in the Gulf. Accordingly, under the guidelines of the Nixon Doctrine, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Joseph Sisco, stated before Congress in August 1972 that U. S. interests and policies toward the region were the following: (1) Support orderly political development and regional cooperation to assure the tranquility and process of the area; (2) Support local governments in maintaining their independence and ensuring peace, progress, and regional cooperation without our interfering in the domestic affairs of the friendly countries; (3) Encourage Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the smaller states to cooperate wholeheartedly with one another to assure that the region remains secure; (4) Assist in the modernization of the armed forces of Iran and Saudi Arabia to enable them to provide effectively for their own security and to foster the security of the region as a whole; (5) Extend Washington's diplomatic presence in the area; (6) Continue to maintain a small naval contingent at Bahrain which has for a quarter of a century carried out the mission of visiting friendly ports in the region to symbolize American interests. (15:100) The fourth principle became the key point to U. S. policy, which came to be known as the "twin pillar" policy. Iran and Saudi Arabia were designated U. S. surrogates for security of the region and American national interests there. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran shared American anxieties regarding future Soviet expansion in the region. The Nixon administration recognized that Iran's growing military power combined with Saudi Arabia's financial assets, enhanced by rising oil prices, would constitute a formidable, if indirect, instrument of American policy in the Gulf. Although the U. S. policy was known as the "twin pillar", Saudi Arabia was clearly the less dominant partner. Saudi Arabia's importance was due to its possession of the world's largest oil fields and its emerging influence in pan-Arab politics and councils. Iran was by far the more significant partner due to its much larger population, relatively more developed economy, and more powerful armed forces. (19:146) Additionally, the Shah of Iran did not want non-region states to fill the power vacuum in the Gulf and his dream to make Iran the paramount power in the area coincided with the objectives of the United States. (1:33) In Nixon's Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's view, it was imperative that the regional balance of power be maintained. Since Iran was willing to fill the vacuum left by the British and was willing to pay for the necessary military equipment out of its own revenues, the U.S. was willing to grant the Shah a virtual carte blanche in arms purchases, except nuclear weapons. Iran received an unprecedented magnitude and high technological level of the weapons which the U. S. supplied to Iran. From the U. S. perspective, the "twin pillar" policy was working fine in the Gulf. In Nixon's fourth report to Congress on 3 May 1973, the President praised the Gulf states for their efforts in assuming responsibility for their security, particularly Iran and Saudi Arabia to enhance the area's stability. Nixon also stated that as the United States and other industrialized nation's energy demands increased, the need for Persian Gulf oil would also increase. Further, Nixon said "assurance of the continued flow of Middle East energy resources is increasingly important to the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. "(15:99) This marks one of the earliest statements by a President over the importance of the oil resources in the Persian Gulf. The Arab oil embargo, levied as a result of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, caused a major readjustment of U. S. policy priorities in the Gulf. (11:85) U. S. and Western Europe economic vulnerability to the oil embargo underscored the strategic importance of the region. Oil and economic matters were placed on an equal footing with strategic interests. (11:85) Continued access to the region's oil supplies at reasonable prices and in sufficient quantities to meet our needs and those of our allies, and employment by oil exporters of their rapidly growing income in constructive ways to foster sound economic development and support of the international system were added to "twin pillar" policy by President Nixon. Also as a result of the Arab-Israeli war, the U. S. reevaluated its strategy in the Indian Ocean and concluded that it could not place heavy emphasis on allied support. Without reliable allied support for its actions in the region, along with heightened suspicions of a growing Soviet military presence in the region, the U. S. began periodic naval deployments in the Indian Ocean and expanded Diego Gracia into a naval station capable of supporting major air and naval deployments. (10:25) A series of events in the region beginning in 1979 started the end of the Nixon Doctrine and started a more aggressive U. S. policy towards the Gulf. These events included: (1) The downfall of the Shah's regime in Iran and the revolution that followed; (2) The short border war between the Yemens; (3) The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; (4) The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war. (19:146) The fall of the Shah in early 1979 likely had the greatest effect in forcing a policy change, for without the Shah, there could be no surrogate policy in the region. The sudden and total collapse of the Shah's regime effectively demolished a decade of U. S. strategy in the Persian Gulf region. (25:50) Without the Shah, the Nixon Doctrine was invalidated as Saudi Arabia was not able to take that role. Additionally, the incoming Carter administration saw the Iranian revolution, itself, as being a threat to Gulf security. (19:146) THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION AND THE CARTER DOCTRINE With the Shah gone, Iran's new regime, under Ayatollah Khomeini, started antagonizing Arab countries, mostly Iraq, and calling for Shi'ite minorities in the Gulf to revolt. The U. S. approach was one of caution since the U.S. had a "burdensome past to live down after being totally identified with the Shah for over two decades." (4:13) The Carter administration wanted to prevent a communist take over in Iran which would further unsettle the Gulf region. More importantly, the U. S. was concerned about the continuation of the export of oil to the western world. Therefore, Carter administration officials attempted to "normalized" relations and to avoid offending the new regime or giving the impression that the U. S. was intent on containing or isolating the new regime. However, in late 1979 after the Khomeini regime condoned the seizure of 52 U. S. diplomatic personnel, relations with Teheran were ended. (17:115) The sudden war between South Yemen and North Yemen in March 1979 provided the Carter administration with the opportunity to demonstrate a possible new role in the Gulf region. The U. S. responded to the Yemen crisis with a series of measures intended to assure American friends in the region and to demonstrate U. S. resolve. This action was basically in support of Saudi Arabia, who perceived South Yemen's attack on North Yemen as a calculated communist probe to overthrow the relatively conservative government of North Yemen and to test Saudi and Western reactions. The Carter administration responded by dispatching a carrier task force to the Arabian Sea, establishing a new baseline of constant U.S. military presence. Also, an emergency military aid package was rushed to North Yemen, and AWACS early warning aircraft were deployed to Saudi Arabia for joint training and to bolster Saudi air defense. (25:51) The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late December 1979 made a new policy inevitable. The image of a Soviet drive to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean dominated analysis by the Carter administration. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was widely perceived as an initial step to more lucrative targets at a time when U. S. power and influence were severely impaired by loss of U.S. influence in the region by the downfall of the Shah and the Iranian revolution. The new policy was articulated by President Carter in his 1980 State of the Union Address and became known as the Carter Doctrine. In a definitive statement of U. S. policy to meet the threat posed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Carter stated: Let our position be absolutely clear: any attempt by outside force to gain control of Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault; on vital interests of the United States of American, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary including military force. "(1:95) Carter was the first President to state that the Persian Gulf was a "vital interest" to the United States. The Carter Doctrine clearly established the United States as the protector of the power of the region and effectively gave the United States policy responsibility in the Persian Gulf. When President Carter made his statement, it reflected U.S. intentions rather than capabilities. The United States was poorly equipped militarily to respond to a major Soviet challenge in the Persian Gulf region. Steps were taken to increase military power in the region to make America's new policy creditable to the Soviets and among its allies. A Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) was established, access agreements were signed with Oman, Kenya, and Somalia, and talks were initiated with Pakistan on countering the Soviet intervention. An Amphibious Ready Group was sent to the Arabian Sea and AWACS aircraft were deployed to Saudi Arabia to enhance air defense in the Gulf after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war. (25:53) U. S. policy during President Carter's last year in office was devoted to getting the hostages out of Iran. Constant negotiations were held for over 400 days between Iran and the U. S., with assistance of other Gulf states to secure the hostages' release. Iran freed the hostages on Carter's last day in office, apparently to embarrass his administration. REAGAN and the PERSIAN GULF The incoming Reagan Administration affirmed the Carter Doctrine and saw the Soviet Union as the most significant threat to the Persian Gulf region. President Reagan's Secretary of State Alexander Haig expressed the administration's view as follows: We confronted a situation where strategic passivity during the Ford administration and excessive piety of the Carter administration's human rights crusade had sapped the will of authoritarian anti-communist governments, eroded confidence of Western allies and encouraged risk taking by the Soviet Union and by Soviet manipulated totalitarian regimes. Since 1975, the bipartisan policy of failure had permitted the Soviet Union to inflict disastrous defeats on the United States at six month intervals... If present treads are not arrested, the convergence of rising international disorder will undo the international codes of conduct that foster the resolution of disputes between nations. (19:422) Accordingly, with the Soviet threat its focus, the Reagan administration at first embraced the idea of "strategic consensus" in which a goal was to persuade the diverse countries of the region "to put aside local parochial security concerns and unite with the U. S. in an alliance type of relationship against the Soviet Union and its clients states." (22:147) However, the idea of "strategic consensus" did not agree with the Gulf states perceptions. Regional and domestic concerns was of far more interest to the Gulf states than external Soviets threats. They had formed the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981 to enhance prospects for security cooperation and to contend with economic and political concerns of the region. Though the GCC states recognized the need for U. S. diplomatic support, and for guarantee of American intervention, they were reluctant to become more overtly aligned with the U. S. than necessary. Despite Reagan administration urgings, the Gulf states remained uninterested in an anti-Soviet regional coalition. Thus, the U. S. moved to a policy that included strengthening its relations with the regional states and improving the RDJTF. Saudi Arabia appeared to be regarded as the primary instrument of U. S. policy in the Gulf as the result of the new policy change. Additional arms sales, including five AWACS aircraft, to the Saudis reflected the change. Saudi policy preferred to keep the U.S. forces "over the horizon" so as not to cause antagonism with other Gulf states and possible disruptions within its own traditional society. (17:117) Joint training and possible stockpiling of U. S. equipment were acceptable, but not basing of the RDJTF. The U. S. remained committed to the RDJTF plan while continuing arms sales to Saudi Arabia. Believing the Soviet Union the greatest threat in the region, the Reagan administration also realized that if the Gulf states could not ensure regional security against the Soviets or Soviet-backed aggressors, then the United States would have to respond directly. (19:439) Secretary of State Casper Weinberger emphasized the buildup of the RDJTF in his budget report to Congress in 1983. He stated two principles for U. S. strategy in the region for the 1980's: ... to improve our mobility forces and preposition adequate equipment and supplies to deploy and support the RDJTF of sufficient size to deter the Soviet aggression; and to provide long-term support and resupply to sustain these forces. (15:112) The Reagan administration succeeded in putting military power and organization behind its words. In 1983, the RDJTF was redesignated the U. S. Central Command, the sixth unified command with a theatre of operations to include the Persian Gulf region. Its basic mission reflected the two themes that had been U. S. Persian Gulf policy from the beginning: to ensure continued access to the region's oil and to prevent the Soviets from getting political-military control, directly or indirectly by its allies. The Carter Doctrine was expanded to state the U. S. would "deal with any kind of threat to the Saudi regime and would keep open the Strait of Hormuz if the Iranians should try to stop shipping through the waterway." As the Iran-Iraq war continued, U. S. policy makers were more occupied with events occurring in other areas of the Middle East involving Israel and Lebanon. However, as Iran won a series of victories in its war with Iraq, American concern shifted back to the Persian Gulf. The Reagan administration's policy towards the war was clearly stated to support our strategic, economic, and political interests: (1) strict neutrality, including refusal to sell weapons to either side and appeal to other countries to similarly refrain; (2) determination to maintain freedom of navigation in the Gulf; (3) support for international efforts to mediate the conflict; (4) support for the security of the Gulf nonbelligerent against the spread of hostilities. (27:5) The Iran-Iraq conflict became a war of attrition in which the line of battle moved little more than a few miles from the pre-war border, thus the war settled into a stalemate. It was not well-placed for the U. S. to influence either side -- Iraq was pro-USSR and Iran was anti-U.S. -- and the United States was constrained by American hostages in Iran. Yet, U. S. policy was not dormant. The Reagan Administration publicly recognized the threats that an Iranian victory would pose to its allies and interests in the region. The result was that "...The U. S. posture became one of dramatizing the Iranian threat and positioning itself to contain it. " (14:73) The United States' concern with the war tilting to Iran's favor expanded its own prohibition on arms sales to Iran into an active campaign, known as "Operation Staunch", which discouraged allied arms sales to Iran. The U. S. also began to provide military intelligence to Iraq. (13:21) This "tilt to Iraq" was not inconsistent with stated U. S. objectives. The Reagan Administration perceived that Iraq's collapse would have endangered the U. S. interest the security of the nonbelligerent states in the Gulf. (27:5) Although the U. S. did give Iraq intelligence, it provided no weapons to Iraq and turned down informal requests for arms. (13:21) In addition to "Operation Staunch" and providing Iraq information, the U. S. gave some covert aid to Iraq's Arab allies against an Iranian invasion or possible revolution by radical Islamic forces in the Gulf. (17:439) In November 1986, it was revealed that the United States had been selling arms to Iran. This was in contradiction to the declared policy of cutting arms supply to Iran. Even more, it soon transpired that the United States arms sales were, at least in part, designed to help secure the release of American hostages held in Lebanon. The "arms-for-hostages" is important because of its significance for the Persian Gulf region and U. S. policy making for strategic regions. (8:49) The sale of arms to Iran can be traced to two strategic reasons. One was that Israel, who reportedly first suggested the value of arms to Iran to U. S. government officials, apparently acted on the basis of its long-standing "periphery policy" whereby it has tried to maintain good relations with Iranian governments. Two, there was strategic merit in the U. S. creating an "opening" with Iran. As with his predecessors, President Reagan was concerned with the Soviet Union, in the wake of its invasion of Afghanistan, would turn its sights on Iran and control of the Persian Gulf region. The attempt to adopt a conciliatory posture toward Iran comprised other interests, most of all American standing with Arab states friendly to the United States. There was a profound sense of betrayal coming after other events that call into question the U. S. steadfastness and reliability. U. S. credibility in the Gulf region as well as a sense of betrayal provided a backdrop of what proved to be the major events of 1987 in the Persian Gulf, which also stemmed from the continuing Iran-Iraq war. (24:50) Iraq had been attacking Iranian oil terminals and tanks in order to reduce Iran's ability to finance the war. The U. S. did not protest Iraqi attacks because it was not in the U. S. interest to see Iran win the war. However, Iran started a "tanker war" by retaliating against Iraq and nonbelligerent shipping in the Gulf. Additionally, Iran began escalating the war by threatening GCC states, particularly Kuwait, that supported Iraq economically and politically. The Reagan administration had a delicate choice. If it supported the GCC states, it would antagonize Iran. If it tried to conciliate Iran, then it could not defend the Gulf states. The Gulf states probably of all tankers in the Gulf has been attacked and that 70 percent were attacked by Iraq. Instead the real issues were first, the strategic interest of the United States (and the industrialized West) in an area that hold 50 percent of the world's known petroleum reserves and second, the threat posed by the Iran-Iraq war. The Reagan administration had three motives for reflagging the Kuwaiti tankers: to deny the Soviets any political benefits that could get from reflagging the tankers, to bolster Iraqi morale in the face of the Iranian challenge, and to assure Arab states in the Persian Gulf that the sale of arms to Iran had been an aberration. (8:51) The reflagging was for political, not military, reasons. The U. S. had pursued a policy of containment toward Iran based on the assumption that the defeat of Iraq would have a domino effect throughout the Gulf. (23:255) The Reagan administration believed that reflagging the Kuwaiti tankers would save Iraq from defeat and the other Gulf states from falling, one after another, like dominos.(24:63) Reagan also apparently believed that Iran by continuing to intimidate and attack shipping in the Gulf would aid the Soviet objectives in the Gulf. The buildup of the U. S. Navy did not directly lead to a major clash with Iran. However, there were a number of military encounters between Iran and the United States. It was not clear that the Reagan administration wanted the U. S. to become engaged in a major conflict with Iran or, if it did, that it would be prepared to preserve to the point of eliminating Khomeini. At the same time, Iran had no real interest in fighting the U. S. As 1987 wore on, it became clear Iran shared two common strategic interests: ensuring the flow of oil would not be halted and, more important, containing the influence of the Soviet Union. Yet, the U. S. and Iran continued to have a conflict over the potential spread of the Iranian revolution. The Reagan administration did not want to deepen the conflict with Iran, but it did not want to give any appearance of being chased out of the Persian Gulf. However, at home there were widespread misgivings in Congress about the reflagging and the naval deployments. There were repeated calls for invoking the War Powers Act, whereby the President reports to Congress when U. S. forces are in a situation of facing imminent hostilities and at the end of sixty days, Congress must either sanction their continued presence or the forces must be withdrawn. Reagan resisted the challenge and did not change his policy. In addition to reflagging the tankers, the Reagan administration proceeded along diplomatic lines to end the hostilities in the Persian Gulf. First, he sought help from West European allies to demonstrate support for U. S. policy on the part of the Western oil-consuming maritime nations. Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy sent ships to the Gulf. The responded to Reagan's request because they wanted some influence on U. S. policy in the Gulf and they did not want to feel they did not respond to a crisis that affected the U. S. but also their interests as well. The Reagan administration took the lead at the United Nations to develop means to end the war. It was critical to Western interests that this dangerous and destabilizing situation be resolved in order to promote long-term stability in the Gulf region. When the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 598 in July 1987, Iraq was quick to accept its call for a cease-fire and withdrawal to international frontiers. Iran refused to accept the resolution, giving Western support to Iraq added impetus. A series of Iraqi military victories in early 1988, combined with serious illness of Khomeini, war weariness among its population, and an internal power struggle, probably played a dominant role in Iran unconditionally accepting UN Resolution 598. The substantial Western military presence in the Persian Gulf, lead by the Reagan administration, was undoubtedly a contributing factor as well. However, President Reagan left office just as President Carter; with a strong Persian Gulf policy for his particular time and circumstance, but with U. S. hostages still held in the Persian Gulf's related area. The three presidential administrations --Nixon, Carter, and Reagan -- progressively expanded U. S. policy in the Persian Gulf as concerns over the security and defense of the region intensified over twenty years. United States interests in the Persian Gulf region have remained very simple: to ensure access to the vast oil resources of the region and to deny Soviet political and military control over the region. These interests were central to the progressive American involvement in the Persian Gulf. The actions of the three presidential administrations were in response to internal and external threats to the political, economic, and strategic interests of the United States in the Persian Gulf. Nixon developed the initial U. S. policy in the Gulf to fill the void in absence of Western participation by establishing Iran and Saudi Arabia -- the "twin pillars" -- as U. S. surrogates for security in the region and American interests there. Carter took a more aggressive approach to safeguard U. S. interests by designating the Persian Gulf as a "vital interest" to the United States and threatened to repel any attempts by outside powers to gain control of the Gulf in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Reagan affirmed the Carter administration and, though he saw the Soviets as the most significant threat, he was concerned about internal Gulf instability serving Soviet objectives in the region. The Iran-Iraq war, along with the "arms-for-hostages" sales to Iran presented the greatest challenge to U. S. policy in the Persian Gulf during the Reagan administration. The need to end the war, along with its related attack on shipping the Gulf and the need to regain U. S. credibility with Gulf states resulted in over 30 U. S. combat and support ships in the Gulf and the U. S. leading peace efforts in the United Nations. America's interests in the Persian Gulf will continue to grow. Though in the near future, it appears Soviet adventurism will be contained by their domestic issues, a growing importantance of Persian Gulf oil will be more significant as the Gulf contains seventy one percent of the world's surplus production capacity. Along with assuring continued access to this resource as Western demands increase, President Bush and future presidents will have to deal with regional instability in the Gulf that may arise from territorial disputes, religious differences, ethnic dissensions and ideological contests that threaten the U. S. and its allies' interests. These potential conflict situations raise significant risks for future U. S. policy in the Gulf. However, U. 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