U. S. Policy Towards Israel: The Special Relationship CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA History Author Major Cozy E. Bailey, USMC EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: U.S. POLICY TOWARDS ISRAEL: THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP THESIS: U.S. policy towards Israel has been contradictory, unfulfilling and defined and driven by special interest groups. ISSUE: The U.S. has strong ties with Israel. Until very recently the U.S. -Israeli relationship was not bound in formal treaties or documents but has remained strong and durable nonetheless. The ties that bind these two countries are varied: cultural, military, economic, political, and ideological. Strongest among these are the political and military ties. The political ties are influenced and kept strong by a very active Jewish lobby. This lobby is so strong that Israel has weathered many storms of controversy and continues to thrive with U.S. support and monetary aid. The military ties are influenced by Israel's success on the battlefield using American supplied weapons. This paper examines the bonds between Israel and the U.S. focusing on political and military ties. It also takes a look at the future of the "special relationship" between the two countries and discusses changing determinants of that relationship. U.S. POLICY TOWARDS ISRAEL: THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP OUTLINE THESIS STATEMENT. U.S. policy towards Israel has been contradictory, unfullfilling, and driven and defined by special interest groups. I. Beginnings of U.S.-Israeli Ties A. Formation of Israel B. Early U.S. interest in the Middle East II. U.S. Israeli Policy Formulation A. U.S. Middle East Policy defined B. The Soviet Factor C. Special Interest Group Role III. Israeli Policy Contradictions A. USS Liberty Incident B. War with Lebanon C. Arms Control Violations IV. Military Value A. Intelligence B. Battlefield Experience C. Military Performance V. Conclusions A. Special Relationship B. Future Considerations U.S. POLICY TOWARDS ISRAEL: THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP Since the creation of the Jewish state on May 14, 1948, the United States and Israel have maintained very strong ties. Israel owes it very existence in large part to the efforts of the United States. Traditionally, Israel has been looked upon as a solid friend and ally in a very tumultuous region of the world. A tremendous amount of aid, especially military and economic, has been given to the country. American support for Israel has been accepted as the "right thing to do." Most alliances formed by the United States tend to be because the potential ally in some way can assist in the protection or attainment of U.S. vital interests. Israel holds no such strategic value. It has no raw materials required by the United States, it doesn't occupy strategic land, and it certainly doesn't exert political influence over its neighbors. Why then does the United States maintain a de facto alliance with Israel? The United States had a history of isolationism much longer than its history of support for Israel. How does a country which practically had to be forced into World War II suddenly become so committed to the survival of a tiny nation half a world away? Why is so much military and economic aid provided to a nation which holds such little strategic value to United States vital interests? An examination of the origins of U.S. -Israeli relations must be made to begin to answer these questions. The United States has had interests in the Middle East dating back to the 1920's. The interest then, as now, was oil. Private companies realized the potential of Middle East oil reserves and began exploration and exploitation. The primary interest the U.S. government had was to protect the investments of its citizens. During World War II the interest shifted to one of a national nature because of the increased need for oil supplies for the U.S. war effort. Still, at this time, the United States was not interested in forming and supporting a Jewish homeland. Maintaining friendly relations with the oil producing countries was of paramount importance. The United Kingdom had been active in the internal politics of the Middle East for quite some time and Arab-Jewish problems were considered British problems. With increased persecution of Jews in Europe led by Nazi Germany, world wide clamor by Jews for a separate homeland began to increase in volume. In the United States alone, four agencies; the American Jewish Conference, the Jewish Agency for Palestine, the American Emergency Committee for Zionists Affairs, and the American Palestine Committee, were formed for the sole purpose of forming a Jewish state in Palestine. (2:24) These agencies began to exert tremendous pressure on the U.S. government to support a Jewish homeland in the Middle East. Finally, the United States gave de facto recognition to the State of Israel and thus began a history of U.S. support to Israel sponsored by special interest groups. Over time, the United States has developed a traditional or classic list of interests in the Middle East. They are: - Avoiding confrontation with the Soviet Union - Preventing the establishment of Soviet regional hegemony - Continuing access to oil at reasonable prices for the U.S., Western Europe, and Japan. - The survival of Israel - Preventing polarization of regional powers along ideological lines - Establishing a stable and durable peace in the region (3:6) Although it is generally agreed that the above list encompasses the spectrum of U.S. interests in the Middle East, there has been little consensus on priority. Further, debate has raged in Congress and the executive branch as to which of the interests can be termed vital. Every discussion or debate concerning continued support to Israel is couched in classic diplomatic terminology referring to subjects such as regional, economic, and political stability. However, unique to Israel, political leaders speak of moral obligations and shared values in defense of sustaining or increasing aid. In a 1970 report to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Henry Jackson stated that "this country and Israel are bound together by shared values, cultural affinities, and a common ethical and religious heritage. The senator further stated that Israel is a stable and egalitarian democracy; ...... qualities that inspire the respect of many Americans. Israel is the first line of Western defense against Soviet expansionism." (6:8) American concern for Soviet domination of the Middle East is consistent with concerns for Soviet domination in every region of the world. Likewise, desires for regional peace and stability go hand in hand with the need to protect a source of raw materials, in this case oil, for the United States and its military and economic allies. The Arab-Israeli conflict is the principal basis for Soviet influence in the Middle East. Continued steadfast U.S. support for Israel only serves to enhance the atmosphere for Soviet influence. Yet, the United States continues to implement policy decisions; strong support for Israel, seemingly at odds with the accomplishment of traditional national goals and objectives. The only interest or goal from the list that is out of place is the "survival of Israel", based upon the special relationship between the two countries rather than a pragmatic approach to foreign relations. This special relationship is not easily explained in terms of tangible linkages. There are several aspects of the relationship that must be understood. Among these aspects, probably the single most significant is the U.S. domestic political factor. The connection to Israel is particularly strong in domestic politics due to the high level of political activism characteristic of the American Jewish Community; the same force that helped convince the U.S. government to support establishment of Israel. Obviously the thrust of these organizations has changed to sustainment of Israel, but the power and influence have only increased. Organizations that influence United States policy in favor of Israel have organized themselves under the umbrella of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC).(5:236) According to Rowland Evans and Robert Novak of The Washington Post, AIPAC's efforts are covertly directed from Israel.(5:236) AIPAC and affiliated organizations were extremely successful during the decade of the 70's and on into the early 1980's. According to the May 1983 issue of the National Journal, the major pro-Israel political action committee, NATPAC, contributed $542,500 to the 1982 congressional elections. Moreover, according to the Federal Election Committee, during the same congressional campaign, the combined contributions of Jewish organized PAC's was more than $1.67 million. (8:94) The PAC's used this money intelligently. The funds supported friendly incumbents and helped defeat unfriendly ones. By way of comparison, donations made by the Jewish PAC's was matched only by contributions the United Auto Workers and the American Medical Association. (8:96) The American Jewish community has power and knows how to use it. Its power is not so much in numbers as it is in political awareness and expertise, and money. The power wielded is all the more awesome considering that American Jewry comprises only 3% of the population of the United States. The power projection is intensified by the various Jewish organizations; unwavering, universal support for the existence and security of a sovereign Israel. In this country, the best way to exert political and policy making influence is to have a friend in Congress. The American Jewish community knows how to get a friend. The American Jewish community knows how to get a friend but does Israel know how to keep a friend? Two occurrences in the past 25 years tend to indicate that it doesn't; the attack on the USS Liberty in 1967 and the invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Both of these incidents depict an upside down relationship between the United States and Israel. A total rehash of the sinking of the USS Liberty is not necessary to understand the important aspects of the incident. In summary, the Liberty was a SIGINT platform working for the National Security Agency. It kept the country abreast of developments in the 1967 war. When Israel decided that the ship might have been gathering information undesirable to Israeli policies, the ship was sunk. (5:252) The Israelis offered official apologies stating that the sinking of the ship was an accident. Evidence shows that the vaunted Israeli intelligence community should definitely have known that the Liberty was a U.S. naval vessel.(5:252) Even if the assertion that the attack on the Liberty is wrong, subsequent U.S. actions towards Israel are no less than remarkable. First, as previously stated, following the 1967 war, the United States became the principal supplier of arms to Israel. This became in fact a repudiation of America's concept of an arms balance in the Middle East. Worse, it was exactly counter to America's policy that aggressors should not be allowed to keep the lands they conquer by force or impose conditions on the restoration of those lands. (5:260) The attack on the USS Liberty was designed to hide the fact that Israel was the aggressor in the 1967 war. The military aspect of U.S. support to Israel is also important. By 1967, the United States was the only major source of arms to which Israel could turn. In becoming the major supplier of arms to Israel, the Unites States risked confrontation with the Soviet Union twice; in 1967 and again in 1973. In 1973, the Israeli requirements were so great that in order to meet them, the Unites States drew equipment from military stocks in Europe and from reserve units; risking degradation of its own readiness posture. These demonstrations of U.S. support for Israel created conflict with the European Allies and an increased U.S. isolation in the United Nations. In Lebanon, the United States followed Israel down a path that may yet prove to be disastrous. America has no interests in Lebanon other than Israeli interests. By taking sides with Israel, America has diminished its ability to act as a mediator between Arab nations and Israel. Also, the United States' reputation as a champion of human rights was hurt due to its failure to keep its promise to protect Palestinians left behind when the PLO leadership left. Of course, American involvement in Lebanon with no clear purpose resulted in the deaths of over 240 Marines and sailors at Beirut Airport. When Israel decided to invade Lebanon, it was a clear violation of the Arms Export Control Act, yet no punitive action was taken. This act requires that a country receiving military aid from the United States must use weapons only for defensive purposes. When Turkey violated a similar commitment by using American supplied military equipment to invade Cyprus in 1974, the U.S. strictly enforced the law. This was done even thought Turkey was a member of NATO and Cyprus provided provocation for the invasion. (1:34) Obviously, Israel received preferential treatment. Not since President Eisenhower did in 1956 has the American government subjected Israel to sanctions for violations of agreements. On the contrary, just as in the aftermath of the `67 war, Israel seems to gain from her actions. For example, the first session of the 101st Congress which ended in December of 1989 voted more aid to Israel than ever before. According to AIPAC, Congress approved a record $666.1 million in special economic and military aid above and beyond the $3 billion originally appropriated. (10) Thus far, discussion has centered on the fact that Israel receives special treatment from the United States yet doesn't have any direct strategic value. Israel does however have some indirect value to the United States. Israel provides some positive gains for United States interests when seen in the global military context. Israel can be viewed in the global military context from several perspectives: its intelligence techniques, the implications of its battlefield experiences, and the impact of its military performance on the reputation of U.S. arms. American intelligence services have cooperated with their Israeli counterparts for more than three decades. Shared information has enabled the United States to save on training by deploying fewer intelligence operatives and utilizing fewer facilities. On many occasions over the past 25 years Israel has provided information regarding planned terrorist activities. Israel has become not only a provider of information, but also an important developer of instruments designed for collection of intelligence data. The Israelis have helped to devise intelligence systems with several U.S. corporations which saves dollars for the U.S. government. The Israelis assume the development costs and the United States either adopts the already refined product or benefits from the information acquired. The Israelis cannot contribute to such areas as strategic weapons system or aircraft carrier technology, but Israel is the only nation recently to fight repeatedly on the front line against authentic electronics, aircraft, and artillery of the Soviet Union. (11) The lessons learned cannot be purchased, developed, or simulated. The advantage Israel offers is not only data but experience, technique, and tactics that cannot be gained anywhere else. In the 1982 Lebanon War, the Israelis were able to inspect electronic equipment from the remains of several MiG-23s and one MiG- 25, which had been shot down, providing the basis for adjusting operational tactics and improving American weaponry to counter equipment of Soviet design. (11) It is obviously not in the interest of the United States or of Israel for periodic wars in the Middle East to occur. However, once conflicts have been initiated and battles have been fought, there is no reason not to admit the value for the United States in terms of the enhanced credibility of U.S. arms, the lessons learned, and the lost credibility of Soviet weapons. Arms sales represent an ironic example of the effect of Israel's military successes. Since the War of Attrition in 1969-1970, Israel has advertised the proficiency of U.S. weaponry in combat. This process has been expanded considerably as a consequence o the Lebanon War in 1982. Israeli weapons capability makes American arms attractive to Arab nations because the Israelis have succeeded so well with them. Subsequently, the results have been an increase in arms sales to Arab nations which by 1982 accounted for 50 percent of U.S. sales worldwide, compared with 11 percent in 1972. (3) The reputation of Soviet arms has plummeted as a result of the Lebanon War. Both Iraq and Peru questioned the adequacy of their Soviet supplied weapons after the disaster in Lebanon. So Israel simultaneously enhances the reputation of American arms while lowering the status of Soviet weapons. Examining the relationship of the United States and Israel from these three perspectives reveals that the United States has interests in Israeli military performance and capability beyond concern for the Arab-Israeli balance of power. The intelligence gathering capabilities of the Israelis are superior. They improve American arms and advertise their superiority. Their combat experience yields import lessons. Yet, Israel is not just a military laboratory. Its military expertise is a fact of contemporary international politics. Why does the United States give strong support to Israel? As the previous discussion has shown, the United States supports Israel for two basic reasons, political and miliary. The political force exerted is a strong but not pragmatic one. Submission to special interest groups lobbying activities has placed the United States in a big brother role to Israel. Often, Israel plays the part of the spoiled and overindulged younger sibling. Military support is where the United States reaps the greatest dividends. The benefits of the U.S. -Israeli military connection could not have been duplicated by any other country. The U.S. -Israeli connection has been an open ended, informal, and contradictory association which has proven to be increasingly strong and durable for the past forty years. Based upon strong ideological, political, and military linkages, the relationship has created a basic U.S. foreign policy dilemma, reconciling conflicting U.S. national interests in the Middle East. That dilemma has consistently been resolved in favor of preserving the special relationship between the two states; but that relationship should not continue to be the overarching determinant for U.S. national policy in the Middle East. As the speed of world change increases, Americans are likely to once again turn inward. Recent demands for a peace dividend from our national leaders appears to be the first wave of this renewed internal focus. The challenges of domestic problems will very likely dominate political debate over the next few years. If this assertion is true, what of Israel? Should the "outbreak of peace" spread to the Middle East, continued military support to Israel will be in serious jeopardy. All of the many and varied determinants of U.S. policy towards Israel would be drastically changed except for one, the special interest groups that garner support for Israel. The influence of these groups is strong, but not invincible. Future U.S. policy towards Israel will increasingly and finally rest upon the Israel's own behavior and conduct. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Ball, George W., Error and Betrayal in Lebanon. Washington, D.C.: Foundation for Middle East Peace, 1984. 2. Chafets, Ze'ev, Double Vision. New York: William Morrow and Company, 1985. 3. Chambers, Howard L., The US-Israeli Connection. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1976. 4. Dershowitz, Toby, The Reagan Administration and Israel. Washington, D.C.: American Israel Public Affairs Committee, 1987. 5. Green, Stephen, Taking Sides. New York: William Morrow and Company, 1984. 6. Jackson, Henry M., The Middle East and American Security Policy: Report to the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970. 7. Kenen, I.L., Israel's Defense Line. Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1981. 8. Novik, Nimrod, The United States and Israel. Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1986. 9. Safran, Nadav, The United States and Israel. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963. 10. Sieff, Martin, Special Friends. The Washington Times, March 16, 1990. 11. Spiegel, Steven L., U.S. Relations with Israel: The Military Benefits. DISAM Journal, Fall 1987.
