C-17, Candidate For The Budget Axe? CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Aviation Author: Major Kenneth K. Alexander, USAF DISCLAIMER The views and opinions expressed in this document represent the personal views of the author only, and should not in any way be constrned to reflect any endorsement or confirmation by the Department of Defense (DoD), The Department of the Air Force, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, or any other agency of the United States Government. This document is the property of the United States Government and is not to be distributed outside official agencies of the United States Government without permission of the Commandant, Marine Command and Staff College, Quantico, Virginia 22134. Clearance for public release under the provisions of AFR 190-17 has IIQI been obtained. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: C-17, CANDIDATE FOR THE BUDGET AXE? THESIS: The C-17 has a valid requirement for both the current and foreseeable future world situations. Alternatives are not viable from cost or capability standpoints. The program must be financially supported relative to development and production progress as assessed by the defense acquisition management system. ISSUE: Political adversaries of the military and the C-17 program are positioning themselves for a battle in Congress over budget funding. There is a lack of comprehension of the validated requirement by members of Congress. The program is at risk of experiencing an extensive slow down or possibly even being halted if all testing is not completed on schedule and with outstanding results. The axe wielders anxious to find a lamb to sacrifice in order to spare their pet programs and demonstrate an attempt to balance to budget will not tolerate failure. Yet, failure in testing is what leads to corrective actions to improve the system. CONCLUSION: This report identifies the C-17's validated requirement, it's capabilities and military necessity. It recommends the program be allowed to pursue a natural course of maturation with a "hands off" policy in Congress. This recommendation is deemed valid since an adequate acquisition management system exists to measure performance, and control cost/schedule accordingly. C-17, CANDIDATE FOR THE BUDGET AXE? OUTLINE THESIS STATEMENT. The C-17 has a valid requirement for both the current and potential future world situations. Alternatives are not viable from cost or capability standpoints. The program must be financially supported relative to development and production progress as assessed by the defense acquisition management system. I. C-17 Program Overview A. Early development B. Cancellation of the AMST C. Initiation of the C-X program D. Complications along the way E. Progress to date and future milestones II. Requirements Overview A. Mission requirements B. Operational need C. Where the C-17 fits in the tactical and strategic airlift structure D. Current operational deficiencies E. Airlift verses sealift F. Unique Capabilities III. Proposed Employment Concepts A. Army B. Marine Corps IV. Political Impacts A. CFE and possible future reductions around the globe B. Has the requirement changed? C. The battle between the Air Forces "big four"-B-2, C-17, ATF,and ATA? V. Alternatives to full acquisition and potential effects A. Cancellation B. Delay C. Stretch out D. Program restructure for a m1x of C-17's and other aircraft VI. The best course of action A. Defined B. Influencing factors C-17, CANDIDATE FOR THE BUDGET AXE? The administration's January submission of a $295.1 billion defense spending plan is under heavy attack. Charging the budget is based on old strategies and outdated assumptions in a fast changing world, Sam Nunn, Democrat--Georgia, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) and Les Aspin, Democrat--Wisconsin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) supported by other members of Congress and their constituents are questioning the relevancy of the 1991 defense budget.1 The 1991 defense budget is only part of the overall issue of the size and rate of defense reductions that can be made in response to the changing world situation over the next five to ten years. These decisions must be made with consideration to more than just changing world politics, Soviet/East Block military posture, and the United States' budget deficit. Proper consideration must be given to the military's accomplishment of its basic defense missions, support of our global interests and commitments, and potential impacts on the defense industrial base and the national economy. Also, caution must be taken to not make reductions which undermine either conventional or strategic arms control negotiations with the Soviets. Efforts to modernize the United States (U S) military under the Reagan Administration resulted in the initiation or renewal of numerous major acquisition programs. Congress is looking at targeting of these new systems as well as military personnel reductions to achieve its budget cuts. Anti-military activists are attempting to capitalize on the changing and "perceived reduction" of the Soviet 1 "Hill: Threats changed, Bush budget hasn't," Air Force Times, March 12, 1990, p. 8. threat to force massive cuts upon the military structure and attempt to resolve the national deficit through the savings in those reductions. Delaying decisions can be very costly, but wrong decisions could be both financially and strategically devastating to the world posture of the United States. The C-17 program is one of many programs under attack because of high cost, cost growth, and delays in development. Numerous studies have been released since January which include the C-17 as one of the programs proposed to be either slowed down, reduced in quantity, or halted altogether. C-17 programming decisions must be based on updated and validated military requirements for the weapon system, the capability of the system as designed to fulfill those requirements as assessed through Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) and Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E), and cost verses other alternatives. The C-141B, the workhorse for strategic airlift, can not can outsize equipment that provides our ground forces their most lethal firepower. The average age of a C-141 in 1992 will be 30 years old. The service life of some aircraft has been greatly accelerated by the stress imposed by the low-altitude airdrop mission. A review of a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) has determined it cannot be cost effective and does not address the real need for fleet modernization.2 Some aircraft are already being evaluated for retirement. Other will be extended by transfer to the Air National Guard forces. The C-5 cannot land on a majority of militarily useful airfields. Many that it can land on have taxiways too narrow for the C-5 to maneuver off of the runway. The C-17 can perform both the strategic and theater airlift role, can carry outsized cargo, and is especially designed for maneuvering on small and congested runways and ramps. The C-17 has a valid requirement for both the current and 2 Phillip Finnegan, "General Stresses to Panel Need for C-17, Extra Sealift Capability," Defense News, February 26, 1990, p. 7. foreseeable future world situations. Alternatives are not viable from cost or capability standpoints. The program must be financially supported relative to development and production progress as assessed by the defense acquisition management system. This questioning of the airlifter's requirement and capabilities is not a new issue to the advocates of the C-17. The program has been the subject of numerous programmatic decisions affecting cost, schedule, performance, and maintainability. These changes made through the system acquisition process must be kept in perspective. They were influenced by economic, political, and operational needs at the time, as well as internal and external constraints which affected the C-17's life cycle cost and schedule. To fully understand the reasons behind the changes, an understanding of the program's history is necessary. Only an overview of the highlights relevant to this research paper will be presented. For an in-depth review of the program's history, the reference cited below provides excellent background material.3 The forerunners of the C-17 program were the Advanced Medium Short Take Off (STOL) Transport (AMST) program and the C-X Program. The AMST proved that powered lift (externally blown flaps) was viable-- this was the technology breakthrough the Air Force needed to begin planning for significant operational changes in the airlift force. The most significant change to Air Force projection of strategic and tactical combat forces was the use of a single type airplane to perform the total airlift mission.4 Advocates of the new intratheater aircraft lacked the "political clout" to sustain the program and President Carter's budget for 1979 and out zero-funded the AMST. However, advocates of a new, highly fuel-efficient airlifter optimized for the long- 3 Charles L. Johnson II, Major, USAF, Acquisition of the C-17 Aircraft--An Historical Account, (Air Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL 1986) 4 Johnson, p. 28. range, strategic (intertheater) mission found support in both the White House and Congress. In December 1979, a HQ USAF Program Management Directive (PMD) formally initiated the C-X program as a follow-on to the C-141 and C-5 aircraft. The Concept Exploration and Demonstration and Validation phases (milestones I and II) were skipped based on a SECDEF decision that the Air Force had demonstrated and proven the advanced technology concepts and operationally utility through the AMST program.5 The recent evacuation of over 6000 Americans out of Iran highlighted General Lew Allen's, Air Force Chief of Staff, concerns with respect to ... our responsibility for airlift of troops and equipment in response to worldwide contingencies. Rapid reinforcement is perhaps the critical limiting factor in U S deterrent and warfighting strategy at both the theater and contingency levels. Thus air mobility has become the gage of our national ability for effective military response to a crisis. Initial opposition to the program supported a C-5 derivative aircraft. Secretary of the Air Force Hans Mark solidified the Air Force position on the C-X. ... the C-5s in our inventory are a vital, necessary part of our integrated airlift force; but, additional C-5 aircraft would not reduce the dependency of our airlift forces on major airfields ... the C-5 is not compatible with the small, austere airfield...I know that originally we thought C-5s should be able to do that, but we were wrong.7 The C-X source selection commenced. Congressional concerns on embarking on an new airlift development program after just cancelling the AMST program combined with a shortage of funds for the 5 Department of the Air Force, Program Management Directive For Implementation of the C-X Program, 10 December 1979. 6 "General Allen Backs Development of CX Airlift Plane," Aerospace Daily, 1 November 1979, p. 4. 7 Air Force Secretary Hans Mark's memo to Assistant Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation Mr. Murray, Subject: C-X Analysis, dtd 17 March 1980. improvement of sealift led to the withholding of funds based on the completion of a high-level mobility study. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provided incentive for the continuation of the program as well as acquiring additional near- term capability through enlargement of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) and investigation of the feasibility of acquiring additional off-the-shelf aircraft. The mobility study examined four contingencies--two in Southwest Asia, one in NATO, and one with a precautionary reinforcement in NATO concurrent with a Southwest Asia contingency. It evaluated airlift and sealift systems as well as prepositioning ashore and afloat. The study was limited to non-nuclear warfare. The recommended program prepositioned 130 thousand tons of supplies in Southwest Asia and a third prepositioned, brigade-sized Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). It also established goals for an additional 20 million ton-miles/day of oversize and outsize cargo to the existing total airlift capability assessed at 46 million ton-miles/day and an additional 100 thousand ton (payload) of dedicated Roll-on, Roll-off (RO/RO) shipping. Heavier reliance on sealift was ruled out because it failed to provide the rapid deployment capability necessary to implement the defensive strategies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The tonnage goals proposed were insufficient to satisfy the shortfalls identified, but were merely realistic goals based on financial limitations.8 Concurrent to the C-X Source Selection which was won by the McDonnell Douglas C-17, a Commercial Freighter Aircraft System (CFAS) was proposed and bids accepted for B-747 and DC-10 aircraft. The impact of the expansion of the CRAF was also at issue. Lockheed and Boeing further clouded the issues with an unsolicited proposals for the C-5N and the B-747F respectively. C-17 Full Scale Development was to be delayed. 8 U. S. Department of Defense, Congressionally Mandated Mobility Study, USDR&E 81-0318, 30 April 1981. Secret. Unclassified information only used from this source. 1982 was filled with extensive debates in the DoD and Congress. The C-5N was cheaper to acquire but was significantly higher in life cycle cost. The C-5N also had severe operational limitations. Many of the limited number of runways it can land on do not have taxiways wide enough to permit it to exit the runway. "Needless to say, the wing commanders at Hahn, Bitburg, Zweibrucken, Sembach, etc., would not have much trouble choosing between C-17s and C-5s for the outsize airlifter of the future."9 The B-747F aircraft required prepositioned special offloading equipment and did not accommodate outsize cargo. The dilemma of which systems or mix of systems to acquire required development of a comprehensive airlift acquisition strategy. The resultant strategy was formulated and subsequently enacted by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in April 1982. It shifted the C-17 to a low-level development activity to expand the technology base for a possible C-17 or other advanced airlift aircraft FSD decision in late 1984 or early 1985. To reduce the near-term shortfall Secretary Weinberger directed the procurement of a mix of KC-10 and C- 5B aircraft over the next five years to provide approximately 13 million ton- miles/day of additional outsize and oversize airlift capability by 1989. This strategy preserved the option of producing a follow-on airlifter in the late 1980s to meet the remaining airlift needs.10 The procurement of 50 C-5Bs and 44 KC- 10s was delayed by a protest from Boeing which reopened the entire C-17, C-5B, B-747F debate in Congress. In September 1983, the Airlift Master Plan was approved by the Secretary of the Air Force. It formulated the baseline force structure to attain the financially 9 Maj General Perry M. Smith, HQ USAF Director of Plans letter to Deputy Secretary of Defense, USDR&E, 16 December 1981. 10 Secrtary of Defense Caspar Weinberger letter to Congress, Subject: Airlift Augmentation Program, 15 April 1982. constrained airlift goal of 66 million ton-miles/day. It accounted for the retirement of 54 C-141s and 180 C-130s in the 1990s and provided for the procurement of 180 C-17s. The C-17 option was selected based on life-cycle cost savings, an additional 7000 ton-miles/day of intratheater capability, and the ability to move cargo, including outsize items, directly into small airfields near its destination.11 A subsequent study of the AHUAS-TARA 83 exercise in Honduras which employed two C-5s, (32) C-141s, and (232) C-130s to deliver the cargo via La Mesa illustrated how (19) C-17s could have accomplished the same mission.12 Master Airlift Plan total C-17 aircraft requirements were defined as follows: 180 aircraft to fulfill the DoD Mobility Study goal of 66 million ton-miles/day plus 30 training aircraft (210 total C-17 aircraft) to be procured through 1998. The FSD cost was programmed at 3.9 billion FY85$. The production cost was budgeted to be 15.6 FY81$ with a resultant unit flyaway cost of 64 mIllion FY81$. The comparable C-5B unit flyaway cost is $112 million and C-5A development cost was 3.4 billion FY81$. In February 1985, the C-17 program was approved to go into Full Scale Development with an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) set for the first quarter of 1992. The C-17 weapon system is currently in Full Scale Development (FSD) with a first flight capability set for June 1991. The program is also in Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) based on a successful, January 1989, Defense Acquisition Review Board (DARB) Milestone IIIA decision. The 1990 defense budget slowed production of the C-17 by reducing FSD funding and cutting the production authorization for the year from six to four aircraft. The action was the result of 11 Johnson, p.323. 12 Ibid, pp. 331-335. budgetary pressures combined with "difficulties in the development of the C-17."13 Difficulties have been in the areas of wing production, the flight control system development, and software development to support the mission system computers. Authorizations have been made for a total of ten production aircraft to date. Long lead funding has now been authorized for sixteen aircraft. Twelve of the initial sixteen production aircraft are to be deployed to Charleston AFB, South Carolina between June 1992 and June 1993 to establish the first operational squadron. An Operational Readiness Evaluation (ORE) to access the Reliability, Maintainability, and Availability (RMA) of this first squadron of aircraft will complete the criteria for a Milestone IIIB full rate DARB production decision. The primary mission of the C-17 is ... the support of and participation in combat operations. Intertheater airlift is the primary means of reinforcing theater forces in the most critical period of a war-- the outbreak of hostilities when force ratios are apt to favor the enemy. Even after sealift becomes effective, intertheater airlift is essential to provide the timely delivery of high-priority items to the engaged forces. The primary tasks of intertheater airlift are deployment, retrograde, resupply, and employment. The inherent flexibility of airlift forces allows them to perform a variety of tasks involving airland of airdrop operations. 14 The operational need is, ... to improve the capability to rapidly deploy US forces to meet national commitments and to protect US interests worldwide. The response time needed to get these forces in place is extremely critical to help offset numerically superior enemy forces and to stabilize incidents at the lowest possible level of intensity. Tactical fighter squadrons are an example of unit whose early introduction into the theater can have a large payoff in force capability; therefore, they have a high priority for early movement. At present, intertheater airlift is the only means of providing reinforcements to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) within the first 20 days after a deployment decision has been made. Sealift is not expected to become fully effective until 30 days after deployment starts. Airlift is even more 13 Lee Ewing, "C-17, B-2 programs would be slowed," Air Force Times, November 13, 1989, p. 76. 14 HQ Military Airlift Command, Statement of Operational Need (SON) for Intertheater Airlift Vehicle, MAC 04-79, 10 Augnst 1979. important in a Persian Gulf or Korean contingency since sealift takes even longer to become effective. The most serious need is to increase intertheater airlift capability to meet the combat needs of US forces throughout the 1990's and to eventually provide a replacement aircraft for the C-141 and C-5. Planned airlift enhancements could help to alleviate the cargo airlift shortfall. Prepositioning of material. . could also help, but it is only useful in certain theaters of operation. 15 Identified operational deficiencies are the shortfall of airlift capability and the increased firepower and size of U S equipment has placed even greater demands for movement of outsize cargo. Additionally, the C-141B, and C-5A aircraft will approach the end of their predicted service life by the year 2000. The C-141 came into the inventory in the. it will need to be replaced starting in 1998. The C-5 after completion of a wing modification... will have to start being replaced in 2012. However, technical obsolescence, brought on by the need to take advantage of cost savings or improvements in operational capability.. could create the need to replace these aircraft sooner then expected. 16 By air or sea and what mix is there to be is the real question being debated within the Department of Defense. The need for the C-17 airlifter and additional sea1ift remains pressing despite improved relations with the Soviets. According to the commander in chief of the US Transportation Command, General Hansford Johnson, As the Cold War draws to a close, the world is moving toward a potentially less stable geopolitical environment. Emerging threats will likely be smaller in scope than those represented by the Soviet Union, but will pose tremendous challenges to our ability to respond. .. the growth and modernization of this fleet (the Ready Reserve Force) was jeopardized when Congress cut 63 percent from the 1990 budget request.17 The administration has proposed to transfer $592 million in fast sealift funding for 1990 to other accounts while a sealift strategy that could be used for military as 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Phillip Finnegan, Defense News, February 26, 1990. well as commercial purposes is examined.18 Airlift continues to be in the lead. In the 1973 Arab-Israeli War the Air Force delivered TOW missiles, Mavericks, spares, and artillery munitions when Israel needed them--immediately. However, the five- day war was over before the first ship arrived.19 The accelerated pace of Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) talks and reduced defense spending are driving a dramatic change in the Army' global mission. Both the Army and Marines are focusing on a larger role in contingency missions. The uncertain nature of Third World conflict requires that both the Army and the Marine Corps have fast response forces. Their capabilities are complementary and provide flexibility to meet any contingency. But, the HASC is trying to decide if the two services have duplicative forces. Chief of Staff of the Army, General Carl E. Vuono stated in written testimony, "the Army can airdrop a multi-brigade task force in 30 hours anywhere in the world."20 Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Al Gray contends strategists must be careful about using paratroopers for forcible entry. "When you talk about coming in the airborne mode ... this suggests at last a certain amount of benign environment. There are times when this capability can be used very successfully. There are other times when it would be better to do it another way."21 Marine Brig. General Sheehan was quoted by Rep. Les Aspin as saying, "The Army contingency corps is light enough to get there but just light enough to get 18 Ibid., p. 7. 19 Donald B. Rice, "AF's future strategy:'Punch hard and terminate quickly'," Air Force Times, March 26, 1990, p. 23. 20 Ibid., p.25. 21 Ibid., p.25. itself into trouble."22 General Al Gray further stated that Just Cause was a one- time scenario with low odds of a similar opportunity presenting itself again. Yet, the success of the Panama operation can not be disputed. In Operation Just Cause, within 48 hours after the execute order was issued more than 14,000 troops were flown and delivered up to 3,000 miles. The Army has emerged as a staunch supporter of the C-17 for strategic and tactical airlift. Secretary of the Air Force Rice has defended the C-17 program by stating, the US invasion of Panama required 25 percent of the Air Forces total transport aircraft, even though about half of the one and one-third divisions of troops and equipment had been prepositioned. Without prepositioning, the operation would have required three-fourths of the nations transports to fly to Panama twice in a 30-hour period. Were short on... airlift. Unique capabilities of the C-17 will provide the capability to transport heavy, outsize military equipment to a vast majority of small austere airfields. It takes advantage of proven technology from many commercial aircraft. Acceleration, deceleration, climb, and descent rates of the C-17 increase its survivability. The contract includes a unique warranty with specific reliability, maintainability, and availability parameters. The C-17 also provides the inherent capability to perform both the inter and intratheater missions and provides a significantly reduced life- cycle cost based on reduced fuel and maintenance manpower requirements.23 The program includes: Integrated Logistics Support (ILS), Integrated Contractor Support (ICS), nuclear and chemical survivability and protection, a Reliability, Maintainability, and Availability (RMA) program, a contracted aircrew training program, standard cargo container capability, standard avionics and support equipment, defensive systems, military construction, advanced flight deck 22 Ibid., p.26 23 U. S. Department of Defense, Validation of the Requirements, Concepts, and Design of the C-17 Airlift Aircraft, (Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC) 27 February 1984. instrumentation including a Heads Up Display (HUD), and a manufacturing technology industrial modernization incentive program. The C-17 is designed to be capable of transporting 167,000 lbs of cargo 2,400 nm, unrefueled. The aircraft is capable of airdropping 110,000 lbs either by conventional airdrop or Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System (LAPES). The C-17 can accommodate the Apache and Black Hawk helicopters as well as the M-1 Abrams Tank, and the M-2/3 Bradley fighting vehicle. The aircraft will be able to land with a full cargo load on a 3,000' x 90' runway. This capability opens up 6,400 more airfields to strategic airlift worldwide.24 The navigator and flight engineer are integrated into the aircraft system and avionics. For enhanced navigation capability the aircraft includes Global Positioning System GPS, and four Inertial Reference Units (IRU). Command and Control is enhanced by secure UHF and VHF, and SATCOM capability. The C-17's ability to operate into short airfields and throughput capability allow it to, ... speed the rapid retrograde movement of units being withdrawn from a baffle area or the lateral movement of units needed at another area of the theater. The C-17's wide-body allows the large loads and rapid loading operations that make short lateral moves economical by air and tactically effective. Although the C-17 has been developed to take advantage of its direct delivery capability, its augmentation of the airlift will significantly enhance operational ability and efficiency.25 The C-17 will have special operations capabilities which include very long- range intercontinental employment with low-level Exfiltration/Infiltration capability. C-17 special operations capable aircraft will be able to, ... penetrate hostile, sensitive, or denied airspace at night under blacked-out, adverse weather conditions without detection, either single ship, or formation. ... will possess the capability to detect surface-to- air and air-to-air threats. .. .Defensive systems will enhance survivability in an environment of proliferating portable, shoulder 24 Col.Harry G. Summers Jr., "U. S. should build strong foundation for military strategy," Air Force Times, March 19,1990, p. 25. 25 HQ Military Airlift Command, C-17 Employment Concept of Operations, draft dtd. 15 March 1990. launched, infrared-guided surface-to-air missiles.26 Aircraft survivability is further enhanced by a variety of performance features, redundant, widely separated systems, and defensive systems. For example, an on-board nitrogen production system is used to fill the fuel tanks with inert gas to reduce the potential of a wing fire due to hits by enemy Anti-Aircraft Artillery. The C-17 will be used to deliver payloads as close as possible to their final destinations, consistent with the same risk evaluations made in committing any airlift aircraft to a threat environment. Since all of the services project power, why is the Air Force unique? Because it can deploy quickly; concentrate force with surprise and speed; cover any distance, unconstrained by geography; and provide a wide range lethal or non-lethal actions. Speed, range,lethality, and flexibility are inherent characteristics of the Air Force.27 Both the Army and the Marine Corps now plan to utilize the C-17 to airdrop sizable forces for a specified range of missions, to supply rapid delivery of unexpected, time-sensitive delivery requirements, and for the evacuation of casualties. The Army will utilize the aircraft to supplement delivery of initial sustainment munitions and supplies. The Marine Corps will utilize the aircraft to support the air eschelon movement of equipment and advance personnel in deploying the Maritime Prepositioned Force (MPF). The C-17, it has been challenged, no longer has a valid requirement. Each day, shifts in Eastern Europe, changes in the social dynamics of the Soviet Union, and increases in the relative power of the Pacific Rim and heavily armed third world nations reshape the global political and military environment. 26 Ibid., pp. 6-8. 27 Donald B. Rice, Air Force Times, March 26, 1990, p. 23. How do we begin to restructure our military and implement a new post-Cold War military strategy? First of all, we must assess which factors remain the same and which factors have changed. The cornerstone is that the three basic missions of the military are unchanged: protect the homeland, protect and enhance worldwide US interests, and safeguard internal US security. Strategic mobility requirements may require redefinition in the future, but remain valid. The rapid projection of military power to protect security interests around the globe is a vital component of the US defense strategy. ... Strategic mobility will become even more ..... . in the future, as the US presence abroad is reduced. In the event of a war in Europe the US is committed to augment its forces... To cope with threats in other regions of the world, the United States maintains the capability to deploy about five Army divisions, two Marine Expeditionary Forces, associated air and naval forces, and support elements.28 Prompted by the changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, a series of reports advocating substantial reductions in the US military structure have been issued. The first of these studies was one by MIT professor William Kaufman, it suggested a savings of $500 billion and halving the defense budget in ten years could be aftained without undermining the U S global commitments or its posture in arms control reductions. Much of the savings for the first ten years was proposed to be accomplished through weapon system reductions or cancellations. The C-17 was proposed to be cancelled.29 In January, a group of defense experts led by former Assistant Secretary of Defense Larry Korb, similarly called for the 28 Department of Defense, Annual Report to the President and Congress, January 1990, p. 49. 29 Patrick E. Tyler, "Halving Defense Budget in Decade Suggested," Washington Post, 21 November 1989. end or deferment of twelve weapon systems including the C-17.30 The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) joined the bandwagon in February by calling for the cancellation of the B-2, C-17, and National Aerospace Plane (NASP) programs.31 The CBO based its C-17 recommendation on the increased warning time in the event of a Soviet attack on Western Europe from ten to thirty days. However, it acknowledged a requirement to replace a large portion of existing aging aircraft soon and provided no recommendation to fulfill this requirement. Concurrently with the independent studies, Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), Dick Cheney initiated a review of the B-2, C-17, ATF, and ATA aircraft to assess and validate their requirements in light of the changing world situation. In March, immediately prior to release of the SECDEF directed study, three political think tanks: the Heritage Foundation, the Defense Budget Project, and the Committee for National Security recommended major cuts wait one more year until the U S can be sure the changes in the Soviet Union are irreversible. Their recommended program cancellations also included the C-17.32 The DoD review of the four largest aircraft programs, released the end of March, has reaffirmed the need for each aircraft. It concludes all four aircraft can be afforded within the scope of declining budgets by shifting schedules and reducing yearly production quantities. The study recommended further study of production schedules and quantities and an alternative single engine ATF. The B-2 emerged as the weakest of the four 30 Phillip Finnegan, "Citing Changing Threat, Defense Experts Urge to End, Defer 12 Weapon Systems," Defense News, 29 January 1990, p. 40. 31 Phillip Finnegan, "CBO Report: Cancel B-2, C-17, NASP Programs," Defense News, February 26 1990, p. 53. 32 Jim Wolffe, "Liberal and conservative views meld on defense cuts," Navy Times, March 26, 1990, p. 27. programs.33 The C-17 was reported by DoD sources to have emerged as a stronger program as a result of the review, based on Army and Joint CINC's validation of current requirements, and a successful contractor plant review. Despite high expectations, the Major Aircraft Review yielded no conclusive results. The ATF is being evaluated as a reduced capability, single-engine fighter and the ATA has been offered up by Secretary of the Air Force Rice for cancellation in an effort to broaden the conventional arms mission role for the B-2 and protect it from cancellation. The C-17 still faces challenges in the completion of FSD and is in for budgetary fights with Congress; however, the Major Aircraft Review reaffirmed the program's requirement and substantial support for the system within the Departnient of Defense. The following statements were made in testimony to Congress in March: We must have the aircraft and ships to get our forces to the actions. The less our forces are forward deployed, the more efficient and effective the ships and aircraft must be. General Powell, CJCS Of particular importance will be... the rapid acquisition of a transport aircraft with strategic range and undeveloped landing strip capability. General Vuono, CSA We must have the strategic and tactical lift necessary for us to get to the crisis area in a timely manner. Admiral Hardisty, CINCPAC C-17 is strongly supported by the Army and FORSCOM because of its large volume, oversize equipment, long distance, and unimproved field characteristics. General Burba, CINCFOR Meeting our future airlift requirement hinges on timely production of the C-17. General Schwarzkopf, CINCENT C-17 is necessary for reinforcement operations--cutting it would have a grave impact. 33 Barbara Amouyal, "DoD's Aircraft Review Affirms Need for Four Major Programs," Defense News, March 26, 1990, p. 1. General Menetrey, COMUSFORCESKOREA The C-17 Aircraft is the best way to ensure the timely arrival of some of our critical equipment and forces in theater. General Galvin, SACEUR We are very interested in seeing the C-17 come into the Air Force inventory... it gives us access to more than we have now. Lt General Sullivan, DCSOPS You get a fleet of (C-17's) and it makes a real difference. The capability is much greater, the tonnage you can move is greater, what will fit is greater. Brig General Bramiett, ADC, 25th ID(light) With a diffusion of threats, interests will shift, but some fundamental US interests will endure. Deterrence of nuclear attack, defense of the United States, stability in the Middle East, and the security of Europe are among many interests with clear although changing commitments. Secretary of the Air Force Donald B. Rice states, "in most likely future scenarios... sharp, short-duration operations where we will punch hard and terminate quickly will characterize our use of power."34 The need for the C-17 is clearly defined. Cancellation of the program would result in a continued shortfall in airlift capability that would quickly widen as our aging airlift fleet approaches retirement. Delays in the program will only result in additional unnecessary cost growth. A Program stretchout, currently perceived to be the most likely event, will also result in additional cost growth, but could possibly be justified if it was implemented by continuing the program at LRIP for an additional year prior to the contractor manning up for full rate. Beyond LRIP, the program must be permitted to be executed within contract guidelines and at the optimum production rate to prevent significant cost growth. Program 34 Donald B. Rice, Air Force Times, March 26, 1990, p. 23. restructure to provide for a mix of C-17s and other aircraft has been examined on numerous other occasions. The variables influencing those previous decisions remain unchanged by today's world situation. A "hands off" policy by Congress would be the wisest possible action in handling the C-17 program in light of the changing world situation and the federal budget deficit. The defense acquisition management system currently in place provides all the safeguards necessary to manage the cost and schedule of the program. The program is essential to the security of the United States and it will be procured. Any attempts to restructure the program that are not directly founded in contractor noncompliance will result in cost growth to the US government and will delay a long needed strategic and tactical capability. Amouyal, Barbara, "DoD's Aircraft Review Affirms Need for Four Major Programs," Defense News, March 26, 1990. p. 1. Department of the Air Force, Air Force Journal of Logistics, AFRP 400-1, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Washington, DC, Fall, 1987. Department of the Air Force, Program Management Directive For Implementation of the C-X Program, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Washington, DC, 10 December 1990. Department of Defense, Annual Report to the President and Congress, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC, January 1990, p. 49. Department of Defense, Validation of the Requirements, Concepts, and Design of the C-17 Airlift Aircraft, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC, 27 February 1984. Ewing, Lee, "C-17, B-2 programs would be slowed," Air Force Times,November 13,1989, p. 76. Finnegan, Phillip, "CBO Report: Cancel B-2, C-17, NASP Programs," Defense News, February 26, 1990, p. 53. Finnegan, Phillip, "Citing Changing Threat, Defense Experts Urge to End, Defer 12 Weapon Systems," Defense News, 29 January 1990, p. 40. Finnegan, Phillip, "General Stresses to Panel Need for C-17, Extra Sealift Capability," Defense News, February 26, 1990, p. 7. "General Allen Backs Development of C-X Airlift Plan," Aerospace Daily, 1 November 1979, p. 4. "Hill: Threats changed, Bush Budget hasn't," Air Force Times, March 12, 1990, p. 8. Headquarters Military Airlift Command, C-17 Employment Concept of Operations, Scott AFB, IL, draft dtd. 15 March 1990. Headquarters Military Airlift Command, Statement of Operational Need (SON) for Intertheater Airlift Vehicle, MAC 04-79, Scott AFB, IL, 10 August 1979. Johnson, Charles L. H, Major, USAF, Acqu8isition of the C-17 Aircraft--An Historical Account, Air Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL, 1986. Mark, Hans, Secretary of the Air Force memo to Assistant Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation Mr. Murray, Subjct: C-X Analysis, dtd 17 March 1980. Rice, Donald B., Secretary of the Air Force, "AF's future Strategy: `Punch hard and terminate quickly'," Air Force Times, March 26, 1990, p. 23. Smith, Perry M., Maj General, HQ USAF Director of Plans letter to Deputy Secretary of Defense, USDR&E, 16 Dcember 1981. Summers, Harry G., Jr., Col., "U. S. should build a strong foundation for military strategy," Air Force Times, March 19, 1990, p. 25. Tyler, Patrick E., "Halving Defense Budget in Decade Suggested," Washington Post, 21 November 1989. U. S. Department of Commerce, Congressionally Mandated Mobility Study, USDR&E 81-0318, 30 April 1981. Secret. Unclassified information only used from this source. Weinbrger, Caspar, Scretary of Defense letter to Congress, Subject: Airlift Augmentation Program, 15 April 1982. Wolffe, Jim, "Liberal and Conservative views meld on defense cuts," Navy Times, March 26, 1990, p. 27.
