The Situation In The Norwegian Sea Today AUTHOR Major Odd F. Tangen, Norwegian Army CSC 1989 SUBJECT AREA - General EXECUTIVE SUMMARY THE SITUATION IN THE NORWEGIAN SEA TODAY The Soviet Union has during the last thirty to forty years transformed the Kola peninsula into a base for a formidable fleet: The Northern Fleet. As a result, Norway has the world's most complex and concentrated navel base and a sophisticated blue water navy located within fifty miles of her border. However, for this fleet to reach the Atlantic Ocean it must transit the Norwegian Sea and the GIUK gap. This fact has influenced the situation in the Norwegian Sea. The number of ships in the Northern Fleet has not increased significantly over the years, but this fleet has received most of the new naval ships being built in the Soviet Union. The SSBN/SSB's, operating from the Kola peninsula and acting as a part of the Northern Fleet, have changed its character. The development of submarines and intercontinental ballistic missiles made it possible for most of the Soviet SSBN/SSB's to operate in the Barents and Polar seas. As a result, this made the Norwegian Sea and the GIUK gap less and less important for the Soviet submarines. Yet, for the Soviet Union's Northern Fleet, the Norwegian Sea retains its importance for both offensive and defensive reasons. NATO's and Norway's reinforcements and supplys must transit the North Atlantic from the USA to Europe. The ability to be reinforced or supplied will be decisive in any conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The relative naval power in the North Atlantic which would enable NATO to perform this mission will to quite some degree depend on the situation in the Norwegian Sea. In the Norwegian Sea two opposite and irreconcilable strategic needs meet; both NATO and the Warsaw Pact wish to control this area in a war situation. The Soviet Union, through her last maritime exercises, has both demonstrated increased confidence in her own capacity, and shown interest in controlling a larger part of the Norwegian Sea. NATO has, on the other hand, exercised different reinforcements plans to deny the Soviets control of this area: Air and ground forces are moved to the northern flank, Iceland's defences are strengthened, and naval forces are deployed to the Norwegian Sea. This shows NATO's understanding of the importance of this area. In spite the fact that the Soviet SSBN/SSB fleet has started to operate further north and no longer needs to transit or operate from the Norwegian Sea, the Norwegian Sea still retains strategic importantance, probably even more so now then some years ago. For NATO control of the Atlantic is dependent upon the Norwegian Sea. Although a major conflict probably will not be won in the Norwegian Sea, it almost cetainly can be easily lost there. THE SITUATION IN THE NORWEGIAN SEA TODAY OUTLINE How important is the Norwegian Sea today, as seen from both the east and the west, and has it changed over the last years? If it did change, why and in what direction did it change? I. Introduction II. USSR forces on the Kola Peninsula A. The Northern Fleet 1. Development of ships and submarines 2. Change of operation areas 3. Tasks for the Northern Fleet 4. Operational advantageous for the SSBN father north 5. New exercise pattern for the Northern Fleet B. Air assets on the Kola Peninsula C. Army units in the Leningrad Military District III. Allied forces in and around the Norwegian Sea today and planned reinforcements in crises and war A. Iceland 1. Political Icelandic decisions 2. Forces on Iceland today 3. Military tasks for the forces on Iceland B. Norway 1. The Collocated Operating Base agreement 2. The Rapid Reinforcement Plan 3. The Norwegian defence and security policy C. Greenland D. Svalbard E Jan Mayen F. Supervisions and listening devices G. Allied naval forces in the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea 1. NATO's Standing Force Atlantic 2. The Striking Fleet Atlantic and the maritime Contingency Force Atlantic IV. US and NATO maritime strategy V. Conclusions A. Importance of the Norwegian Sea seen from the East B. Importance of the same area seen from the West THE SITUATION IN THE NORWEGIAN SEA TODAY The Norwegian Sea has during the last thirty to forty years become more important. As the only avenue for the Soviet's Northern Fleet to the Atlantic Ocean, Norway's strategical position has been given greater emphasis from western and eastern international defence policies. When NATO was established in 1949, Norway and the NATO's northern flank received very little interest. Today, NATO recognizes the strategic importance of this area and the significance its location will have on any future conflict between the Warsaw Pact countries and NATO. Both blocs attach great strategic importance to this. My questions are, how important is the Norwegian Sea today, as seen from both the east and the west, and has its importance changed over the last years? If it did change, why and in what direction did it change? The Soviet Union has during the last three to four decades transformed the Kola Peninsula into a base for a formidable fleet: The Northern Fleet. The Kola Peninsula contains the only harbors in the western part of this country which provides unrestricted and ice free access to the Atlantic Ocean. As a result, Norway has the world's most complex and concentrated naval base located within fifty miles of its border. Such a development has to have consequences for the sea and land areas adjacent to this peninsula. The Northern Fleet, dominated by submarines, consist of 1 38 SSBN/SSB's 36 SSGN/SSG's 90 SSN/SS's 73 Larger surface vessels 111 Smaller surface vessels 15 Landing craft Although the fleet has not grown in size over the last six to seven years, it did receive the majority of all newly built ships, especially submarines. The most importent class of submarines are those which carry intercontinental missiles. Today, the Soviet Union has four Typhoon and thirty-nine Delta I-IV submarines operational. Of these, all the Typhoon-class and twenty-three of the Delta I-IV's belong to the Northern Fleet.2 This means 63% of all newly built strategic submarines, all equipped with missiles with range of 7800 kilometers or more, reside in the Nothern Fleet. Recently, the Soviet Union launched another Typhoon and Delta IV and have two to three more of both types on order. Where these new submarines will be stationed remains unknown. To protect these strategic assets, the Soviet Union developed several new types of attack submarines.3 In this category one version carries cruise missiles (SSGN/SSG). The Soviet Union developed small cruise missiles that can be fired through standard torpedo tubes on these new submarines. Two cruise missile types under development, the SS-NX-21 and SS-NX-24, are reported to be on sea trials. These missiles will probably have a range up to 3000 kilometer and can be used against sea as well as land targets.4 Submarines capable of employing these missiles already belong to the Northern Fleet. The surface vessels in the Northern Fleet are today larger and more technical sophisticated then before. These ships have a variety of weapon systems, greater range, and they can perform a greater number of operations then their predecessors. This creates flexibility in their tactical use and their versatile design makes them capable to operate all over the world. The Soviet Union has one Kiev class carrier also assigned to the Northern Fleet and another which may be added in the near future. This fleet exerts the greatest amount of Soviet influence over the Norwegian Sea, but other military elements project their potential over this area too. There are two infantry divisions on the Kola peninsula, and another nine in the Leningrad Military District. Additionally, there exists one airborne division and naval infantry units in this district. Recently, the naval infantry unit at Kola has been increased to a brigade sized unit, consisting of 5 battalions or 3000 men. The Kola Peninsula has sixteen military airfields; most of them are not used daily but all can rapidly be made operational.5 The Northern Fleet's airforce, which consist of approximately 450 planes and helicopters, can for that reason be rapidly reinforced. Consequently, as the number of aircraft can be rapidly reinforced, the current number of aircraft stationed there becomes irrelevant. In wartime their numbers could be increased substantially. What are the Northern Fleet's tasks? In peacetime the Northern Fleet like all the other Soviet fleets marks Soviet global interest. The Soviet leaders probably learned during the Cuban crisis in 1962 how important it is to be able to put "weight" behind their political decisions. In war their most likely tasks will be 6 - to maintain the capability to launch a nuclear attack on the USA or to counter strike a USA nuclear attack. (The SSBN's are actually not a part of the Nothern Fleet. They belong to the Strategic Nuclear Forces but are located with the Northern Fleet.) - to protect the SSBN fleet. - to defend the homeland through control of the Norwegian Sea. - to cut the sea-lanes of communication (SLOC) between North America and Europe. - to attack and destroy NATO's navy forces. The priority of these tasks can be discussed, but most maritime analysts can agree that all are valid. The ranges of the submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) were, in the 1960's and the first part of the 1970's, relatively short. For that reason the strategic submarines of the Northern Fleet had to pass through the Norwegian Sea and the GIUK-gap to reach launching positions in the western part of the Atlantic to strike the continental United States. Today, 76% of the Northern Fleet's SSBN/SSB can reach any target in the USA, Western Europe, Japan, and China from launching positions in arctic waters. According to the SALT II agreement, neither of the two superpowers can have more then sixty-two modern strategic submarines.7 As a result, for each new Delta or Typhoon class submarine built, one Yankee I equipped with the SS-N-6 Serb (range 2400 kilometer) retires. Therefore, the percentage of Soviet strategic submarines that can reach their targets from the Barents and Polar seas has since two last years increased from 60 to 76% and will within a few years reach 100%. The Barents and Polar seas combined are approximately ten million square kilometers; large areas of these seas are covered with ice at least part of the year. However, the central part of the Polar Sea is not always encased with a continuous unbroken sheet of ice. According to calculations done by the US Navy, 5 to 8 % will be open water or thin ice (less then 2 feet thick) in wintertime and as much as 15 % open water in summertime.8 The newest strategic submarines (Typhoons and Delta IV's at least) are believed capable of surfacing through ice up to ten feet thick and then launch their missiles. Additionally, exercises and research activities seem to indicate that the strategic submarines will operate close to or under the ice in the Polar Sea. This fleet is less and less dependent of getting out in the Atlantic. No Delta or Typhoon has been seen south of the Norwegian sea after 1975.9 Evidently, the strategic submarines of the Northern Fleet are being moved north. In this regard, the Norwegian sea and the GIUK gap lose their importance as an operation and transit area. Operating under the ice will make the SSBN's less vulnerable to western observations and anti-submarine warfare. The reasons are - natural protection of the ice - impossible to detect submarines through the ice - easy to hide close to or between the icebergs - closer to their home base - an operation area further away from or outside USA and NATO controlled areas In spite of these reasons, attack submarines from the USA and NATO will operate in this area. One of Northern Fleet's primary tasks then will be to protect their SSBN's. A great part of the Soviet attack submarines, surface vessels, and planes will have to be used in an anti-submarine role. Based on the foregoing, the Norwegian Sea is unimportant to the Soviet SSBN's. They will in the future not use this sea. However, in spite of this, from an offensive and defensive perspective, the control of the Norwegian Sea will still remain important to the Soviet Union. Such control indirectly protects the strategic submarine fleet and reduces the possibility for an attack on the Soviet homeland. In addition, it will give the Soviet Navy access to the North Atlantic, and hence, the possibility to fight and defeat the US or other NATO country's navy in this area. The Soviet Navy, in this case the Northern Fleet, might be able to cut sea-lines of communication (SLOC) across the Atlantic. The supply of new surface ships and submarines, with or without cruise missiles, gives the Northern Fleet an increased offensive character. The exercise pattern of the Soviet Navy points in the same direction. Their naval exercises in the middle of the 80's are the most comprehensive seen so far. The purpose of these exercises was probably to test the Soviet defence plans in the initial phase of a conflict with NATO. The exercises can in this connection be seen as a defence of the naval base complex on Kola and the strategic submarine operation area. The Soviet Union will try to achieve this goal by rapidly seeking control of the Norwegian Sea. This will also, at the same time, provide better positions for offensive operations into the north Atlantic. Compared to a few years ago, their naval power extends much further south. This might indicate an increased confidence in their own capacity from the supply of new and more effective vessels and weapon systems.10 This means that NATO must have a strong military defence. NATO's military planning aim is to secure the peace through deterrence.11 An attack on NATO must consume enough resources and generate significant negative consequences, that the results are not in proportion to the effort and the risk taken. The land areas around the Norwegian Sea all belong to NATO countries. (The Svalbard agreement puts the Svalbard Islands in a special position.) Norway and Iceland both play important parts in the surveillance and control of the Norwegian Sea. Iceland has a very important strategic position in the middle between the Norwegian Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. This gives the side that controls or has an alliance with Iceland a strategic advantage. However, it seems the Icelandic people have not really appreciated the significance of their country's central position in the defence of NATO's northern flank and Central-Europe. Occasionally, since the end of the Second World War, Iceland's Lagting (parliament) has been in debate about whether Iceland should become neutral or allow the presence of foreign troops on its territory. Today, the Icelandic people accept that their country lies in the intersection between Eastern and Western interests. It also understands that none of the superpowers can, or will, accept uncertainties or a security policy gap in this area. Iceland can not for that reason become neutral in a crisis or in a war situation. It would have to ally itself with one of the superpowers.12 The Kjeflavik base is today a cornerstone in NATO's defence of the Norwegian Sea. The base's military tasks can be divided in three major parts 13 - Defence of Iceland, included the base area and the seas around the island - Maritime surveillance - Logistic support to navy and airlift operations The main part of the Iceland Defence Force (IDC) is the US Airforce stationed on the island. In 1985-86 twelve out of twenty-four F-4E Phantoms were replaced by eighteen F-15 Eagles, and new hangers were built.14 Iceland has also, in response to the increased threat from the Northern Fleet, accepted a comprehensive program to make SACLANT better able to counter the threat. The program includes modernization of two existing radar stations and the building of another two.15 Additionally, there have been efforts made to increase the survival capability of the base's command element during an attack. Reinforcement plans for Kjeflavik base have been worked out and can be quickly implemented. Normally, one to three E-3A AWACS surveillance aircraft are stationed on Iceland along with a P-3C ORION squadron (approximately 9 planes). The Orions can be used for antisubmarine (A/S) missions and can be equipped with bombs, torpedoes and/or mines. It is also interesting to note that Holland will participate with surveillance missions from Kjeflavik with one P-3C Orion on rotational basis.16 Kjeflavik also acts as an intermediary stop. This is for the transfer of fighter squadrons from the USA and Canada to Europe and, especially, to Norway and Denmark. Control and surveillance of the northern part of the Norwegian Sea, the Barents Sea, and the Polar Sea is coordinated with corresponding activities from Kjeflavik and Scotland. The Norwegian P-3B's at Andoeya and E-3A's at Oerlandet perform these missions.17 Beginning in 1978, a series of agreements involving allied support for reinforcing the defence of northern Norway have been made. Besides extending surveillance and warning activities, an agreement concerning the preparations for air reinforcements to Norway, the Collocated Operating Base (COB) agreement, has been made. As a result, eight Norwegian airfields, four in northern Norway, have or are just now being prepared for allied squadrons. Storage rooms have been built and equipment for actual planes are now being stored. The airfields can on short notice receive allied squadrons.18 Today, up to sixteen allied squadrons are planned as reinforcements to Norway.19 The planes can be stationed in Norway within a few days. This makes for a considerable strengthening of the Norwegian airforce. Preparations for receiving and making effective use of allied reinforcements is also prepared through approval by Allied Command Europe of the so called Rapid Reinforcement Plan in 1982. According to this plan a complete Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) consisting of approximately 40000 men will be sent to Northern Command Europe. One third of this force is earmarked for Norway. This force would marry up with prepositioned equipment already established within Norway.20 Two other allied brigades may appear in Norway depending upon other European requirements. These are the United Kingdom/Netherland's Commando Brigade and Allied Mobile Force, Europe. Until this year a Canadian brigade was planned for Norway. The Canadians have now decided to concentrate their forces in Germany. A replacement has not yet been designated. The Norwegian defence and security policy is built on the assumption of allied support in crises and in war. However, situations may arise where Norwegian forces may need to have the capacity to resist an attack alone. This could be in a conflict arising so fast that allied forces do not have sufficient time to come to Norway's assistance. More likely the conflict could be of such a character that just politically asking for allied assistance would be the same as escalating the conflict. Norway has built her defence on a total defence concept and has for her armed forces a conscript system. Every man being fit has to serve in the forces for twelve to fifteen months and will later have to be in mobilization units for fifteen to twenty years. The Norwegian forces can mobilize from a peace time strength of approximately 40000 men to about 360000 men within seventy two hours. This is 7.7% of the Norwegian population, higher then any other NATO country. Most of the Norwegian population live in the southern part of the country, but Norway has put most of her defence emphasis up north. Norway has for that reason prestocked equipment for several units in the northern part of Norway. These units will be moved north as soon as they are mobilized. At least four Norwegian brigades will be used in the Troms area in addition to allied units coming to northern Norway. Norway keeps a modern force and properly trained mobilization units to maintain its credibility. Greenland has several big airfields, mostly on the southern and western part of the country. These airfields have no Permanent military forces in peacetime, but for operations in the North Atlantic, in the southern part of the Norwegian Sea, or when moving forces to Europe these airfields assume a great importance and will be manned. Svalbard Islands, on the other hand, are prohibited from having military forces stationed there or to even making preparations to receive military forces. Although Svalbard has a central position in the operation area for the Northern Fleet's SSBN's, it will probably not play any significant role since the Soviet Union is able to control this area from the Kola Peninsula Jan Mayen Island will have an even less significance. This island has just a weather observation post in peace time and no military equipment or personnel. Jan Mayen Island has very bad flying weather conditions, and the island will normally be covered by thick fog 360 days a year. An enemy can easily destroy all the installations on this island. The Norwegian Sea's adjacent land areas also play an important role in NATO's warning systems. Radar stations in Norway, The Foeroyar islands, Iceland, and Greenland oversee continually the whole area. The stations on Greenland, Iceland, and the Foeroyers are either renovated or will be in the near future with a corresponding increase of coverage. All stations are a part of NATO's Distant Early Warning (DEW) or Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS). Located in several places in the Norwegian Sea and the GIUK-gap are permanent listening devices for the purpose of monitoring the movement of the Warsaw Pack submarines. These installations consist of a few to several hundred hydrophones linked either ashore or read directly when overflown by surveillance planes. Analysis of collected information will be used to survey the Soviet submarine operation patterns. From this information, NATO can discern peacetime characteristics and possibly prevent surprise attacks. The importance of these listening assets will probably decrease as we begin to see developments towards satellite surveillance in the future. Patrolling the Norwegian Sea is the responsibility of NATO's Standing Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT). It is a small force of five to eight cruisers or frigates. This flotilla, normally deployed in European or North-Atlantic waters, can be rapidly moved to the Norwegian Sea. This force shows allied unity and presence, but does not by itself contain any threat to the Northern Fleet.21 The main part of the allied navy forces in the Atlantic will be the Striking Fleet Atlantic. Together with a Marine Expeditionary Brigade, this combination constitutes the Maritime Contingency Force Atlantic. This force consist normally of two to four carrier groups and 150 to 360 planes. The Striking Fleet Atlantic can according to contingency plans deploy to the North Atlantic or the Norwegian Sea in approximate ten days, but the size of the force will vary according to the situation in other parts of the world.22 In addition to the Atlantic Fleet the Federal Republic of Germany wishes to increase its participation in the Norwegian Sea. It is possible that Germany will build the submarines for this purpose while Norway constructs the supply bases on Norwegian territory.23 John Lehman in 1981, as the Secretary of the Navy of the United States, became the spokesman advocating for a stronger and larger U. S. Navy and for a new U. S. maritime strategy. This strategy is built on the principals of deterrence, forward defence, and offensive warfare.24 In 1982 NATO adopted its own strategy concerning maritime operations. This concept is based on defending in depth and retaining the initiative. Both strategies are built on offensive and forward defence. NATO's recent naval exercises in the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea in the last part of the 1980's reflects the ideas contained in these strategies. Vice Admiral H. Muskin said as commander for the Strike Fleet after the exercise "OCEAN SAFARI 85", that it was not possible anymore to remain passive in defensive positions and let the Soviet navel forces escape into the North Atlantic. The fighting has to be brought to the enemy and for that reason it was his task to find new tactics and new ways to employ limited navel forces consistent with NATO's maritime strategy. The Norwegian Sea was, according to Admiral Muskin, a important area for this new offensive tactics.25 I started by asking the two following questions. How important is the Norwegian Sea today, seen both from the east and the west, and has the importance changed over the years? If it did change, why and in what direction did it change? It is obvious that the significance of the Norwegian Sea area is still developing and not static. The Northern Fleet has changed its character during the last few years. By renovating the strategic submarine fleet located with the Northern Fleet the Soviet Union enhanced its strategic submarine operational capabilities. Most of this fleet need not operate in the Norwegian Sea today and within a few more years will probably operate in the Barents and the Polar seas only. Thus, for an important part of the fleet operating out from the Kola Peninsula, the Norwegian Sea has lost its important. However, to protect their SSBN/SSB's in wartime will still be a difficult task. If western submarines enter the Barents and Polar seas, they also benefit from the conditions which protects the Soviet SSBN/SSB's. Stopping the western submarines in the Norwegian Sea will also be a difficult and complicated task. From a eastern perspective the best approach of denying Norwegian, Barents, and Polar seas to the NATO is by blocking or controlling the GIUK gap. This would give the Soviet Navy complete control of the Norwegian Sea and sea areas further north. It will probably also require less assets then any other defence plan when control is established. If this is possible, they would be able to protect their SSBN/SSB fleet, protect their homeland, and, additionally, be able to transit the Norwegian Sea. Another important advantage will be the excellent position the Northern Fleet gains for moving out into the Atlantic. Based on the estimates derived from last years exercises and the Northern Fleet's increased capacity from its new ships, early control of the Norwegian Sea appears to be the most likely objective of the Soviet Union in any conflict with NATO. From a western point of view, control of the Norwegian Sea is more important then any time before. If control is lost in this area, then part of NATO, Norway and Denmark, is lost too. Even more critical to NATO, the loss of the Norwegian Sea provides the Soviets with free access to the Atlantic and, thereby, the possibility to cut NATO's SLOC's. This might split NATO into two parts which would be in Soviets interest. In addition to losing Norway and probably Denmark, losing control in the Norwegian Sea makes it almost impossible to have sufficient surveillance in that area. This would give the Soviet Union several airfields from which they can operate their bombers and fighters. If they also control Iceland, almost any important part of Europe will be within range of their planes. These are the reasons that the alliance has to pay closer attention to NATO's northern flank, and, particularly, the Norwegian Sea. There is no way NATO can accept the lose of this area. The best way to lose the battle in central Europe is to lose control of the Norwegian Sea. The Norwegian Sea has an increased importance for NATO. For both the East and West the Norwegian Sea has a significant importance. More then any time before, two opposing strategic and irreconcilable requirements exist simultaneously over the Norwegian Sea. Although for NATO a future war would probably not be won in this area, it can surely be easily lost there. FOOTNOTES 1) The Military Balance 1987-1988. 2) Ibid. 3) Soviet Military Power, Fourth edition, Washington April 1985, pp 31-31. 4) Saertrykk av Militaerbalansen 1987-1988, pp 4-5. 5) Ibid, p 22. 6) Lt-Gen Tonne Huitfeldt, The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, The Tromso seminar, 4 and 5 December 1985. Nordisk stabilitet: Usikkerhetsfaktorer og aktuelle mottiltak, p 3. 7) Stortingsmelding nr 69 (1976-77), p 209. 8) Arthur E Mollay, The Arctic Ocean and Marine Service in the North Polar region in Oceans, 1969, Vol 1, No 2. 9) Thomas Ries, Northern Waters in Soviet Military Strategy, September 1987, p 4. 10) Spesialnummer av NATO-nytt, December 1985 Sovjetiske marineaktiviteter 1977-1985, pp 26-30. 11) Security in the North. Report from a seminar in Iceland, April 1982, concerning Security and Arms control in the Northern European NATO Region, p 7. 12) Bjoern Bjarnason, Islandsk udenrigs- og sikkerdspolitik, Den Norske Atlanterhavskomite, Oslo 1982, p 14. 13) Anders C Sjaastad og John Kristen Skogan, Plitikk og sikkerhet i Norskehavsomraadet, Dreyer Oslo 1975, p 175. 14) The Military Balance 1985-1986, p 14. 15) Steven Miller with Chine Archer, Western Responses to the USSR in Northern Waters, p 15. 16) Lt-Gen Tonne Hvitfeldt, p 22. 17) Saertrykk fra militaerbalansen, p 23. 18) Maj-Gen Leif Karl Lundesgaard, Sikkerhetsproblemer pa Nord-flanken, Den Norske Atlanterhavskomite, Oslo 1985, p 12. 19) Lt-Gen Tonne Hvitfeldt, p 17B. 20) Ibid., p 17. 21) Air University Review, September/October 1984, p 64. 22) The Military Balance 1984-85, p 111. 23) Nils M Udgaard, Utvidet NATO-rolle for vesttysk marine, Aftenpostens morgenutgave, 6 April 1984, p 8. 24) Maj Hugh K O'Donnell, Northern Flank Maritime Offensive Proceedings, September 1985, p 49. 25) Olav T Storvik, NATO-kontroll i Norskehavet, Aftenpostens morgenutgave, 3 September 1987, p 2. BIBLIOGRAPHY Bach, H C og Taagholt, Jorgen. Gronland og Polaromradet Forsvarskommandoen, Kobenhavn, 1981. Berg, John. Trusselen mot Norge, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 1983. Det sikkerheds- og nedrustningspolitiske utvalg. Nordiske sikkerhetsproblemer, Kobenhavn, 1984. Hoist, Johan Jorgen. Nordomradene - et norsk perspekti, Den Norske Atlanterhavskomite, Oslo, 1979 Sjevetsjenko, Arkadij. Brudd med Moskva, Cappelen, Oslo, 1987. Storen, Harald W. Sovjetunionen, Norden og norsk sikkerhets- politikk, Den Norske Atlanterhavskomite, Oslo, 1986 Wallin, Lars B. The Northern Flank in a Central European War, The Swidish National Defence Research Institute, Stockholm, 1980 Ostreng, Willy. Soviet i nordlige farvan, Gyldedal, Oslo, 1982.
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