The Situation In The Norwegian Sea Today
AUTHOR Major Odd F. Tangen, Norwegian Army
SUBJECT AREA - General
THE SITUATION IN THE NORWEGIAN SEA TODAY
The Soviet Union has during the last thirty to forty years
transformed the Kola peninsula into a base for a formidable
fleet: The Northern Fleet. As a result, Norway has the world's
most complex and concentrated navel base and a sophisticated blue
water navy located within fifty miles of her border. However,
for this fleet to reach the Atlantic Ocean it must transit the
Norwegian Sea and the GIUK gap. This fact has influenced the
situation in the Norwegian Sea.
The number of ships in the Northern Fleet has not increased
significantly over the years, but this fleet has received most of
the new naval ships being built in the Soviet Union. The
SSBN/SSB's, operating from the Kola peninsula and acting as a
part of the Northern Fleet, have changed its character. The
development of submarines and intercontinental ballistic missiles
made it possible for most of the Soviet SSBN/SSB's to operate in
the Barents and Polar seas. As a result, this made the Norwegian
Sea and the GIUK gap less and less important for the Soviet
submarines. Yet, for the Soviet Union's Northern Fleet, the
Norwegian Sea retains its importance for both offensive and
NATO's and Norway's reinforcements and supplys must transit
the North Atlantic from the USA to Europe. The ability to be
reinforced or supplied will be decisive in any conflict between
NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The relative naval power in the North
Atlantic which would enable NATO to perform this mission will to
quite some degree depend on the situation in the Norwegian Sea.
In the Norwegian Sea two opposite and irreconcilable
strategic needs meet; both NATO and the Warsaw Pact wish to
control this area in a war situation. The Soviet Union, through
her last maritime exercises, has both demonstrated increased
confidence in her own capacity, and shown interest in controlling
a larger part of the Norwegian Sea. NATO has, on the other hand,
exercised different reinforcements plans to deny the Soviets
control of this area: Air and ground forces are moved to the
northern flank, Iceland's defences are strengthened, and naval
forces are deployed to the Norwegian Sea. This shows NATO's
understanding of the importance of this area.
In spite the fact that the Soviet SSBN/SSB fleet has started
to operate further north and no longer needs to transit or
operate from the Norwegian Sea, the Norwegian Sea still retains
strategic importantance, probably even more so now then some
years ago. For NATO control of the Atlantic is dependent upon
the Norwegian Sea. Although a major conflict probably will not
be won in the Norwegian Sea, it almost cetainly can be easily
THE SITUATION IN THE NORWEGIAN SEA TODAY
How important is the Norwegian Sea today, as seen from both the
east and the west, and has it changed over the last years? If it
did change, why and in what direction did it change?
II. USSR forces on the Kola Peninsula
A. The Northern Fleet
1. Development of ships and submarines
2. Change of operation areas
3. Tasks for the Northern Fleet
4. Operational advantageous for the SSBN father north
5. New exercise pattern for the Northern Fleet
B. Air assets on the Kola Peninsula
C. Army units in the Leningrad Military District
III. Allied forces in and around the Norwegian Sea today and
planned reinforcements in crises and war
1. Political Icelandic decisions
2. Forces on Iceland today
3. Military tasks for the forces on Iceland
1. The Collocated Operating Base agreement
2. The Rapid Reinforcement Plan
3. The Norwegian defence and security policy
E Jan Mayen
F. Supervisions and listening devices
G. Allied naval forces in the North Atlantic and the
1. NATO's Standing Force Atlantic
2. The Striking Fleet Atlantic and the maritime
Contingency Force Atlantic
IV. US and NATO maritime strategy
A. Importance of the Norwegian Sea seen from the East
B. Importance of the same area seen from the West
THE SITUATION IN THE NORWEGIAN SEA TODAY
The Norwegian Sea has during the last thirty to forty years
become more important. As the only avenue for the Soviet's
Northern Fleet to the Atlantic Ocean, Norway's strategical
position has been given greater emphasis from western and eastern
international defence policies. When NATO was established in
1949, Norway and the NATO's northern flank received very little
interest. Today, NATO recognizes the strategic importance of
this area and the significance its location will have on any
future conflict between the Warsaw Pact countries and NATO. Both
blocs attach great strategic importance to this. My questions
are, how important is the Norwegian Sea today, as seen from both
the east and the west, and has its importance changed over the
last years? If it did change, why and in what direction did it
The Soviet Union has during the last three to four decades
transformed the Kola Peninsula into a base for a formidable
fleet: The Northern Fleet. The Kola Peninsula contains the only
harbors in the western part of this country which provides
unrestricted and ice free access to the Atlantic Ocean. As a
result, Norway has the world's most complex and concentrated
naval base located within fifty miles of its border. Such a
development has to have consequences for the sea and land areas
adjacent to this peninsula.
The Northern Fleet, dominated by submarines, consist of 1
73 Larger surface vessels
111 Smaller surface vessels
15 Landing craft
Although the fleet has not grown in size over the last six to
seven years, it did receive the majority of all newly built
ships, especially submarines.
The most importent class of submarines are those which carry
intercontinental missiles. Today, the Soviet Union has four
Typhoon and thirty-nine Delta I-IV submarines operational. Of
these, all the Typhoon-class and twenty-three of the Delta I-IV's
belong to the Northern Fleet.2 This means 63% of all newly
built strategic submarines, all equipped with missiles with range
of 7800 kilometers or more, reside in the Nothern Fleet.
Recently, the Soviet Union launched another Typhoon and Delta IV
and have two to three more of both types on order. Where these
new submarines will be stationed remains unknown.
To protect these strategic assets, the Soviet Union
developed several new types of attack submarines.3 In this
category one version carries cruise missiles (SSGN/SSG). The
Soviet Union developed small cruise missiles that can be fired
through standard torpedo tubes on these new submarines. Two
cruise missile types under development, the SS-NX-21 and
SS-NX-24, are reported to be on sea trials. These missiles will
probably have a range up to 3000 kilometer and can be used
against sea as well as land targets.4 Submarines capable of
employing these missiles already belong to the Northern Fleet.
The surface vessels in the Northern Fleet are today larger
and more technical sophisticated then before. These ships have a
variety of weapon systems, greater range, and they can perform a
greater number of operations then their predecessors. This
creates flexibility in their tactical use and their versatile
design makes them capable to operate all over the world. The
Soviet Union has one Kiev class carrier also assigned to the
Northern Fleet and another which may be added in the near future.
This fleet exerts the greatest amount of Soviet influence
over the Norwegian Sea, but other military elements project their
potential over this area too. There are two infantry divisions
on the Kola peninsula, and another nine in the Leningrad Military
District. Additionally, there exists one airborne division and
naval infantry units in this district. Recently, the naval
infantry unit at Kola has been increased to a brigade sized unit,
consisting of 5 battalions or 3000 men.
The Kola Peninsula has sixteen military airfields; most of
them are not used daily but all can rapidly be made
operational.5 The Northern Fleet's airforce, which consist of
approximately 450 planes and helicopters, can for that reason be
rapidly reinforced. Consequently, as the number of aircraft can
be rapidly reinforced, the current number of aircraft stationed
there becomes irrelevant. In wartime their numbers could be
What are the Northern Fleet's tasks? In peacetime the
Northern Fleet like all the other Soviet fleets marks Soviet
global interest. The Soviet leaders probably learned during the
Cuban crisis in 1962 how important it is to be able to put
"weight" behind their political decisions. In war their most
likely tasks will be 6
- to maintain the capability to launch a nuclear
attack on the USA or to counter strike a USA nuclear
attack. (The SSBN's are actually not a part of the
Nothern Fleet. They belong to the Strategic Nuclear
Forces but are located with the Northern Fleet.)
- to protect the SSBN fleet.
- to defend the homeland through control of the
- to cut the sea-lanes of communication (SLOC) between
North America and Europe.
- to attack and destroy NATO's navy forces.
The priority of these tasks can be discussed, but most maritime
analysts can agree that all are valid.
The ranges of the submarine launched ballistic missiles
(SLBM) were, in the 1960's and the first part of the 1970's,
relatively short. For that reason the strategic submarines of
the Northern Fleet had to pass through the Norwegian Sea and the
GIUK-gap to reach launching positions in the western part of the
Atlantic to strike the continental United States. Today, 76% of
the Northern Fleet's SSBN/SSB can reach any target in the USA,
Western Europe, Japan, and China from launching positions in
arctic waters. According to the SALT II agreement, neither of
the two superpowers can have more then sixty-two modern strategic
submarines.7 As a result, for each new Delta or Typhoon class
submarine built, one Yankee I equipped with the SS-N-6 Serb
(range 2400 kilometer) retires. Therefore, the percentage of
Soviet strategic submarines that can reach their targets from the
Barents and Polar seas has since two last years increased from 60
to 76% and will within a few years reach 100%.
The Barents and Polar seas combined are approximately ten
million square kilometers; large areas of these seas are covered
with ice at least part of the year. However, the central part of
the Polar Sea is not always encased with a continuous unbroken
sheet of ice. According to calculations done by the US Navy, 5
to 8 % will be open water or thin ice (less then 2 feet thick) in
wintertime and as much as 15 % open water in summertime.8
The newest strategic submarines (Typhoons and Delta IV's at
least) are believed capable of surfacing through ice up to ten
feet thick and then launch their missiles. Additionally,
exercises and research activities seem to indicate that the
strategic submarines will operate close to or under the ice in
the Polar Sea. This fleet is less and less dependent of getting
out in the Atlantic. No Delta or Typhoon has been seen south of
the Norwegian sea after 1975.9 Evidently, the strategic
submarines of the Northern Fleet are being moved north. In this
regard, the Norwegian sea and the GIUK gap lose their importance
as an operation and transit area.
Operating under the ice will make the SSBN's less vulnerable
to western observations and anti-submarine warfare. The reasons
- natural protection of the ice
- impossible to detect submarines through the ice
- easy to hide close to or between the icebergs
- closer to their home base
- an operation area further away from or outside USA and
NATO controlled areas
In spite of these reasons, attack submarines from the USA and
NATO will operate in this area. One of Northern Fleet's primary
tasks then will be to protect their SSBN's. A great part of the
Soviet attack submarines, surface vessels, and planes will have
to be used in an anti-submarine role.
Based on the foregoing, the Norwegian Sea is unimportant to
the Soviet SSBN's. They will in the future not use this sea.
However, in spite of this, from an offensive and defensive
perspective, the control of the Norwegian Sea will still remain
important to the Soviet Union. Such control indirectly protects
the strategic submarine fleet and reduces the possibility for an
attack on the Soviet homeland. In addition, it will give the
Soviet Navy access to the North Atlantic, and hence, the
possibility to fight and defeat the US or other NATO country's
navy in this area. The Soviet Navy, in this case the Northern
Fleet, might be able to cut sea-lines of communication (SLOC)
across the Atlantic.
The supply of new surface ships and submarines, with or
without cruise missiles, gives the Northern Fleet an increased
offensive character. The exercise pattern of the Soviet Navy
points in the same direction. Their naval exercises in the
middle of the 80's are the most comprehensive seen so far. The
purpose of these exercises was probably to test the Soviet
defence plans in the initial phase of a conflict with NATO. The
exercises can in this connection be seen as a defence of the
naval base complex on Kola and the strategic submarine operation
area. The Soviet Union will try to achieve this goal by rapidly
seeking control of the Norwegian Sea. This will also, at the
same time, provide better positions for offensive operations into
the north Atlantic. Compared to a few years ago, their naval
power extends much further south. This might indicate an
increased confidence in their own capacity from the supply of new
and more effective vessels and weapon systems.10
This means that NATO must have a strong military defence.
NATO's military planning aim is to secure the peace through
deterrence.11 An attack on NATO must consume enough resources
and generate significant negative consequences, that the results
are not in proportion to the effort and the risk taken.
The land areas around the Norwegian Sea all belong to NATO
countries. (The Svalbard agreement puts the Svalbard Islands in
a special position.) Norway and Iceland both play important
parts in the surveillance and control of the Norwegian Sea.
Iceland has a very important strategic position in the
middle between the Norwegian Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. This
gives the side that controls or has an alliance with Iceland a
strategic advantage. However, it seems the Icelandic people have
not really appreciated the significance of their country's
central position in the defence of NATO's northern flank and
Central-Europe. Occasionally, since the end of the Second World
War, Iceland's Lagting (parliament) has been in debate about
whether Iceland should become neutral or allow the presence of
foreign troops on its territory. Today, the Icelandic people
accept that their country lies in the intersection between
Eastern and Western interests. It also understands that none of
the superpowers can, or will, accept uncertainties or a security
policy gap in this area. Iceland can not for that reason become
neutral in a crisis or in a war situation. It would have to ally
itself with one of the superpowers.12
The Kjeflavik base is today a cornerstone in NATO's defence
of the Norwegian Sea. The base's military tasks can be divided
in three major parts 13
- Defence of Iceland, included the base area and the seas
around the island
- Maritime surveillance
- Logistic support to navy and airlift operations
The main part of the Iceland Defence Force (IDC) is the US
Airforce stationed on the island. In 1985-86 twelve out of
twenty-four F-4E Phantoms were replaced by eighteen F-15 Eagles,
and new hangers were built.14 Iceland has also, in response to
the increased threat from the Northern Fleet, accepted a
comprehensive program to make SACLANT better able to counter the
threat. The program includes modernization of two existing radar
stations and the building of another two.15 Additionally,
there have been efforts made to increase the survival capability
of the base's command element during an attack. Reinforcement
plans for Kjeflavik base have been worked out and can be quickly
Normally, one to three E-3A AWACS surveillance aircraft are
stationed on Iceland along with a P-3C ORION squadron
(approximately 9 planes). The Orions can be used for
antisubmarine (A/S) missions and can be equipped with bombs,
torpedoes and/or mines. It is also interesting to note that
Holland will participate with surveillance missions from
Kjeflavik with one P-3C Orion on rotational basis.16
Kjeflavik also acts as an intermediary stop. This is for
the transfer of fighter squadrons from the USA and Canada to
Europe and, especially, to Norway and Denmark.
Control and surveillance of the northern part of the
Norwegian Sea, the Barents Sea, and the Polar Sea is coordinated
with corresponding activities from Kjeflavik and Scotland. The
Norwegian P-3B's at Andoeya and E-3A's at Oerlandet perform these
Beginning in 1978, a series of agreements involving allied
support for reinforcing the defence of northern Norway have been
made. Besides extending surveillance and warning activities, an
agreement concerning the preparations for air reinforcements to
Norway, the Collocated Operating Base (COB) agreement, has been
made. As a result, eight Norwegian airfields, four in northern
Norway, have or are just now being prepared for allied
squadrons. Storage rooms have been built and equipment for
actual planes are now being stored. The airfields can on short
notice receive allied squadrons.18 Today, up to sixteen allied
squadrons are planned as reinforcements to Norway.19 The
planes can be stationed in Norway within a few days. This makes
for a considerable strengthening of the Norwegian airforce.
Preparations for receiving and making effective use of
allied reinforcements is also prepared through approval by Allied
Command Europe of the so called Rapid Reinforcement Plan in
1982. According to this plan a complete Marine Expeditionary
Force (MEF) consisting of approximately 40000 men will be sent to
Northern Command Europe. One third of this force is earmarked
for Norway. This force would marry up with prepositioned
equipment already established within Norway.20 Two other
allied brigades may appear in Norway depending upon other
European requirements. These are the United Kingdom/Netherland's
Commando Brigade and Allied Mobile Force, Europe. Until this
year a Canadian brigade was planned for Norway. The Canadians
have now decided to concentrate their forces in Germany. A
replacement has not yet been designated.
The Norwegian defence and security policy is built on the
assumption of allied support in crises and in war. However,
situations may arise where Norwegian forces may need to have the
capacity to resist an attack alone. This could be in a conflict
arising so fast that allied forces do not have sufficient time to
come to Norway's assistance. More likely the conflict could be
of such a character that just politically asking for allied
assistance would be the same as escalating the conflict. Norway
has built her defence on a total defence concept and has for her
armed forces a conscript system. Every man being fit has to
serve in the forces for twelve to fifteen months and will later
have to be in mobilization units for fifteen to twenty years.
The Norwegian forces can mobilize from a peace time strength of
approximately 40000 men to about 360000 men within seventy two
hours. This is 7.7% of the Norwegian population, higher then any
other NATO country. Most of the Norwegian population live in the
southern part of the country, but Norway has put most of her
defence emphasis up north. Norway has for that reason prestocked
equipment for several units in the northern part of Norway.
These units will be moved north as soon as they are mobilized.
At least four Norwegian brigades will be used in the Troms area
in addition to allied units coming to northern Norway. Norway
keeps a modern force and properly trained mobilization units to
maintain its credibility.
Greenland has several big airfields, mostly on the southern
and western part of the country. These airfields have no
Permanent military forces in peacetime, but for operations in the
North Atlantic, in the southern part of the Norwegian Sea, or
when moving forces to Europe these airfields assume a great
importance and will be manned.
Svalbard Islands, on the other hand, are prohibited from
having military forces stationed there or to even making
preparations to receive military forces. Although Svalbard has a
central position in the operation area for the Northern Fleet's
SSBN's, it will probably not play any significant role since the
Soviet Union is able to control this area from the Kola Peninsula
Jan Mayen Island will have an even less significance. This
island has just a weather observation post in peace time and no
military equipment or personnel. Jan Mayen Island has very bad
flying weather conditions, and the island will normally be
covered by thick fog 360 days a year. An enemy can easily
destroy all the installations on this island.
The Norwegian Sea's adjacent land areas also play an
important role in NATO's warning systems. Radar stations in
Norway, The Foeroyar islands, Iceland, and Greenland oversee
continually the whole area. The stations on Greenland, Iceland,
and the Foeroyers are either renovated or will be in the near
future with a corresponding increase of coverage. All stations
are a part of NATO's Distant Early Warning (DEW) or Ballistic
Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS).
Located in several places in the Norwegian Sea and the
GIUK-gap are permanent listening devices for the purpose of
monitoring the movement of the Warsaw Pack submarines. These
installations consist of a few to several hundred hydrophones
linked either ashore or read directly when overflown by
surveillance planes. Analysis of collected information will be
used to survey the Soviet submarine operation patterns. From this
information, NATO can discern peacetime characteristics and
possibly prevent surprise attacks. The importance of these
listening assets will probably decrease as we begin to see
developments towards satellite surveillance in the future.
Patrolling the Norwegian Sea is the responsibility of NATO's
Standing Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT). It is a small force of
five to eight cruisers or frigates. This flotilla, normally
deployed in European or North-Atlantic waters, can be rapidly
moved to the Norwegian Sea. This force shows allied unity and
presence, but does not by itself contain any threat to the
Northern Fleet.21 The main part of the allied navy forces in
the Atlantic will be the Striking Fleet Atlantic. Together with
a Marine Expeditionary Brigade, this combination constitutes the
Maritime Contingency Force Atlantic. This force consist normally
of two to four carrier groups and 150 to 360 planes. The
Striking Fleet Atlantic can according to contingency plans deploy
to the North Atlantic or the Norwegian Sea in approximate ten
days, but the size of the force will vary according to the
situation in other parts of the world.22 In addition to the
Atlantic Fleet the Federal Republic of Germany wishes to increase
its participation in the Norwegian Sea. It is possible that
Germany will build the submarines for this purpose while Norway
constructs the supply bases on Norwegian territory.23
John Lehman in 1981, as the Secretary of the Navy of the
United States, became the spokesman advocating for a stronger and
larger U. S. Navy and for a new U. S. maritime strategy. This
strategy is built on the principals of deterrence, forward
defence, and offensive warfare.24 In 1982 NATO adopted its own
strategy concerning maritime operations. This concept is based
on defending in depth and retaining the initiative. Both
strategies are built on offensive and forward defence. NATO's
recent naval exercises in the North Atlantic and the Norwegian
Sea in the last part of the 1980's reflects the ideas contained
in these strategies. Vice Admiral H. Muskin said as commander
for the Strike Fleet after the exercise "OCEAN SAFARI 85", that
it was not possible anymore to remain passive in defensive
positions and let the Soviet navel forces escape into the North
Atlantic. The fighting has to be brought to the enemy and for
that reason it was his task to find new tactics and new ways to
employ limited navel forces consistent with NATO's maritime
strategy. The Norwegian Sea was, according to Admiral Muskin, a
important area for this new offensive tactics.25
I started by asking the two following questions. How
important is the Norwegian Sea today, seen both from the east and
the west, and has the importance changed over the years? If it
did change, why and in what direction did it change? It is
obvious that the significance of the Norwegian Sea area is still
developing and not static. The Northern Fleet has changed its
character during the last few years. By renovating the strategic
submarine fleet located with the Northern Fleet the Soviet Union
enhanced its strategic submarine operational capabilities. Most
of this fleet need not operate in the Norwegian Sea today and
within a few more years will probably operate in the Barents and
the Polar seas only. Thus, for an important part of the fleet
operating out from the Kola Peninsula, the Norwegian Sea has lost
its important. However, to protect their SSBN/SSB's in wartime
will still be a difficult task. If western submarines enter the
Barents and Polar seas, they also benefit from the conditions
which protects the Soviet SSBN/SSB's. Stopping the western
submarines in the Norwegian Sea will also be a difficult and
complicated task. From a eastern perspective the best approach
of denying Norwegian, Barents, and Polar seas to the NATO is by
blocking or controlling the GIUK gap. This would give the Soviet
Navy complete control of the Norwegian Sea and sea areas further
north. It will probably also require less assets then any other
defence plan when control is established. If this is possible,
they would be able to protect their SSBN/SSB fleet, protect their
homeland, and, additionally, be able to transit the Norwegian
Sea. Another important advantage will be the excellent position
the Northern Fleet gains for moving out into the Atlantic. Based
on the estimates derived from last years exercises and the
Northern Fleet's increased capacity from its new ships, early
control of the Norwegian Sea appears to be the most likely
objective of the Soviet Union in any conflict with NATO.
From a western point of view, control of the Norwegian Sea
is more important then any time before. If control is lost in
this area, then part of NATO, Norway and Denmark, is lost too.
Even more critical to NATO, the loss of the Norwegian Sea
provides the Soviets with free access to the Atlantic and,
thereby, the possibility to cut NATO's SLOC's. This might split
NATO into two parts which would be in Soviets interest. In
addition to losing Norway and probably Denmark, losing control in
the Norwegian Sea makes it almost impossible to have sufficient
surveillance in that area. This would give the Soviet Union
several airfields from which they can operate their bombers and
fighters. If they also control Iceland, almost any important
part of Europe will be within range of their planes. These are
the reasons that the alliance has to pay closer attention to
NATO's northern flank, and, particularly, the Norwegian Sea.
There is no way NATO can accept the lose of this area. The best
way to lose the battle in central Europe is to lose control of
the Norwegian Sea. The Norwegian Sea has an increased importance
For both the East and West the Norwegian Sea has a
significant importance. More then any time before, two opposing
strategic and irreconcilable requirements exist simultaneously
over the Norwegian Sea. Although for NATO a future war would
probably not be won in this area, it can surely be easily lost
1) The Military Balance 1987-1988.
3) Soviet Military Power, Fourth edition, Washington April
1985, pp 31-31.
4) Saertrykk av Militaerbalansen 1987-1988, pp 4-5.
5) Ibid, p 22.
6) Lt-Gen Tonne Huitfeldt, The Norwegian Atlantic Committee,
The Tromso seminar, 4 and 5 December 1985. Nordisk stabilitet:
Usikkerhetsfaktorer og aktuelle mottiltak, p 3.
7) Stortingsmelding nr 69 (1976-77), p 209.
8) Arthur E Mollay, The Arctic Ocean and Marine Service in
the North Polar region in Oceans, 1969, Vol 1, No 2.
9) Thomas Ries, Northern Waters in Soviet Military Strategy,
September 1987, p 4.
10) Spesialnummer av NATO-nytt, December 1985 Sovjetiske
marineaktiviteter 1977-1985, pp 26-30.
11) Security in the North. Report from a seminar in Iceland,
April 1982, concerning Security and Arms control in the Northern
European NATO Region, p 7.
12) Bjoern Bjarnason, Islandsk udenrigs- og sikkerdspolitik,
Den Norske Atlanterhavskomite, Oslo 1982, p 14.
13) Anders C Sjaastad og John Kristen Skogan, Plitikk og
sikkerhet i Norskehavsomraadet, Dreyer Oslo 1975, p 175.
14) The Military Balance 1985-1986, p 14.
15) Steven Miller with Chine Archer, Western Responses to the
USSR in Northern Waters, p 15.
16) Lt-Gen Tonne Hvitfeldt, p 22.
17) Saertrykk fra militaerbalansen, p 23.
18) Maj-Gen Leif Karl Lundesgaard, Sikkerhetsproblemer pa
Nord-flanken, Den Norske Atlanterhavskomite, Oslo 1985, p 12.
19) Lt-Gen Tonne Hvitfeldt, p 17B.
20) Ibid., p 17.
21) Air University Review, September/October 1984, p 64.
22) The Military Balance 1984-85, p 111.
23) Nils M Udgaard, Utvidet NATO-rolle for vesttysk marine,
Aftenpostens morgenutgave, 6 April 1984, p 8.
24) Maj Hugh K O'Donnell, Northern Flank Maritime Offensive
Proceedings, September 1985, p 49.
25) Olav T Storvik, NATO-kontroll i Norskehavet, Aftenpostens
morgenutgave, 3 September 1987, p 2.
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