National Security Strategy And American Public Opinion AUTHOR Major Larry D. Tarbet, USMC CSC 1989 SUBJECT AREA - National Security EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION Thesis. The United States Government must inform the public of its national security strategy in ways that are clear, and credible, and likely to elicit support. Issue. The makers of national security strategy in the United States are the President, along with his advisors, and the Congress. Since 1947, and the formation of the National Security Council (NSC) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), formulation of this strategy has increasingly become one formulated by committee. The President's cabinet, as well as the NSC and the JCS, are appointees; therefore, they are not elected by the people to their positions. These appointees are immune to any direct electoral sanctions by the American people; consequently, they may not feel the need to inform the public. The Congress has always had the potential to exert substantial control over national security strategy. It derives power through its control of the national purse strings, its legislative capabilities, its authority to declare war and ratify treaties, its capacity to veto Presidential appointees, and its responsibility for overseeing the operations of the Executive branch. Historically, at least three factors have limited the congressional role in national security policy making: (1) most congressmen have traditionally shown a much lower interest in foreign affairs than in domestic policy issues; (2) congressional powers are decentralized among a large number of committees resulting in lack of inter-congressional communication and an inability to reach a consensus on the direction that national security strategy should take; and (3) inadequate staffs have hindered their capacity to keep close tabs on the activities of the executive branch. One of the United States' greatest resources is public support: however, the government has not been doing a very good job of keeping the public informed of its strategy. To understand why this problem exists we must look at three key questions: (1) is the national security strategy presented in a way that the public can understand it, (2) is it supported by both sides of the political process, and (3) will the public support it even if it means going to war. Conclusion. The American Government must get the public to support the national strategy if we are to continue in the world as a super power. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY and AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION Thesis Statement. The United States Government must inform the public of its national security strategy in ways that are clear, credible, and likely to elicit support. I. National Security Strategy A. Definition B. National security objectives C. Resources available to achieve objectives 1 Four elements of national power 2. Instruments used in employing national power D. National Security Strategy of the U.S. FOR 1988 II. Makers of National Security Strategy A. The President 1. National Security Council 2. Joint Chief's of Staff B. The Congress III. Public Opinion A. Definition B. Role of the people 1. Political parties 2. Pressure groups IV. Public not informed of the National Security Strategy A. Ways the government tries to inform the public 1. Presidential speech 2. Congressional record B. Test needed by the government to see if the public is informed. 1. Has it been presented to the public in a clear fashion 2. Is it supported by both sides of the political process 3. Will public support it if it means going to war V. Vietnam's impact on public opinion and national security strategy A. Lack of national strategic objectives B. Loss of public support NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION Strategy as defined by the JCS Pub 1 is "the art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychological, and military forces as necessary during peace and war; to afford the maximum support to policies in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory; and to lessen the chances of defeat".1 This strategy is developed by defining what the national interests are and refining these into broad goals which become our national objective. Once the objectives are developed we must look at what resources are available to achieve these objectives. The United States possesses four elements of national power to achieve its objectives: diplomatic, informational, economic, and military. Falling under these elements are specific instruments that are used in employing them. Ten of the instruments which the United States employs are: moral and political example, military strength, economic vitality, alliance relationships, public diplomacy, security assistance, development assistance, science and technology cooperation, international organizations, and diplomatic mediation. Moral and political example and public diplomacy will be addressed in this paper.2 The NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES, distributed by the White House in January 1988, states that moral and political example is the American spirit and prosperity which represents a critical challenge to the ideology and the practical record of our adversaries. Since the days of our Founding Fathers, this power of example has represented a potent leverage in international relations. But we should not leave its expression to chance. It is in our interest to spread this message in an organized and effective way. Public diplomacy seeks to explain to foreign audiences our policies and actions in ways that are clear, credible, and likely to elicit support for our interest and objectives.3 If one looks closely at these statements it can be seen that they are directed at foreign governments not the people of the United States. Nowhere in the list of ten instruments is there anything dealing with keeping the American people informed or involved in the national strategy. History has shown that nations have come full circle from the age of small states who fought limited wars for limited objectives to an age of larger states with citizen armies waging total war to the present where large states are fighting limited wars for limited objectives. In order for the United States to fight limited wars, the objectives for that war must be sound and in the best interests of the nation as seen by the people. The makers of national security strategy in the United States are the President, along with his advisors, and the Congress. The President's power resides in his constitutional role as the commander-in-chief and the highest executive of the government. Until the recent past the President has had the responsibility of formulating national security strategy and answered directly to the people for that strategy. Since 1947, and the formation of the National Security Council (NSC) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), formulation of this strategy has increasingly become one formulated by committee. The President's cabinet, as well as the NSC and JCS, are appointees; therefore, they are not elected by the people to their positions. These appointees are immune to any direct electoral sanctions by the American people; consequently, they may not feel the need to inform the public. The NSC and JCS provide the President with the following services and staff work: policy coordination, policy advice, policy planning, and a crisis decision making forum.4 The Congress has always had the potential to exert substantial control over national security strategy. It derives power through its control of the national purse strings, its legislative capabilities, its authority to declare war and ratify treaties, its capacity to veto Presidential appointees, and its responsibility for overseeing the operations of the Executive Branch. Historically, at least three factors have limited the congressional role in national security policymaking: (1) most congressmen have traditionally shown a much lower interest in foreign affairs than in domestic policy issues; (2) congressional powers are decentralized among a large number of committees, each of which jealously guards its piece of national security turf, resulting in a lack of inter-congressional communication and an inability to reach consensus on the directions that national security strategy should take; and (3) inadequate staffs have hindered congressional capacity to keep close tabs on the activities of the executive bureaucracies. However, beginning with the period of the Vietnam War, Congress has demanded a larger role in national security strategy making process primarily through its control over appropriations.5 We must achieve a better working relationship between the Congress and President. Under Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and to a lesser degree Johnson and Nixon, the President was the ultimate maker of national strategy. However, after Watergate and Vietnam the division of this responsibility has become a subject of concern. Congress too frequently responds on the basis of short-term political pressures. By accepting the more permanent significance of foreign policy and looking toward the long term, Congress could become a more effective participant in the initiation and continuity of foreign policy.6 Public opinion is the term most frequently employed for the people as a whole and their political role. Upon until World War I (WWI), foreign policy or national security strategy was the province of the government and not the people. By the end of WWI and its terrible cost of men, the majority of the public wanted a larger voice in national security strategy. This was reinforced by the United States' reluctance to enter World War II (WWII) until we were attacked and forced to declare war.7 There are two ways in which the people can influence national security strategy: either through political parties or pressure groups. The combination of these two helped end the Vietnam War. Elected officials in both parties expressed their disfavor with the war and students and veterans groups forced pressure groups to influence the government. One of the United States' greatest resources is public support; however, the government has not been doing a very good job of keeping the public informed of its strategy. To understand why this problem exists we must look at three key questions: (1) is the national strategy presented in a way that the public can understand it, (2) is it supported by both sides of the political process, and (3) will the public support it even if it means going to war? How the strategy is presented is critical because the public will not support something they do not understand. Strategy is presented to the public through State of the Union messages, televised speeches, or presented to Congress and placed in the congressional record. A large portion of the public will miss the speeches and very few will read the congressional record resulting in an uninformed public on the national security strategy. Consequently, we have a national security strategy that is only known and understood by the Executive Branch and Congress. It may be said that most Americans are not really concerned with the national security strategy unless it involves going to war. This may be true; however, today we are much closer at any given time to a limited war than any time in the past. The American people have always been slow to go to war and had to be provoked. The Vietnam War was a clear example of going to war without a definitive national security strategy with objectives and finding out that the public did not support it. Initially, the Gulf of Tonkin incident gained public support for American intervention. However, continuation of the war without a sound national security strategy resulted in the loss of that support. The government must make every effort to keep the public informed so they will be able to understand and support its strategy. The second question deals with bipartisan cooperation in the Congress. The Executive Branch must find a way to get Congress to understand and support its strategy. It is very difficult in the country to gain the public's support if support in the Legislative Branch cannot be gained. Because of our two party system there will always be some disagreement on national security strategy; therefore, it is imperative that the Executive Branch develop a sound strategy that the majority of the Legislative Branch will support and then relay that support to the public. National strategy must be bipartisan to work and be assured of public support. During the Vietnam War there was a lack of support in the Congress because it became apparent that the Executive Branch did not have a clear set of objectives or the resources to obtain those objectives. This was suggested in a statement by Senator William Fulbright in 1967 that "the U.S. was in danger of losing its perspective on what exactly is in the realm of its power and what is beyond it". Statements like these affect public opinion, and it was only a few months later that a survey showed 46% of the public regarded the commitment to Vietnam as a mistake.8 The most important question concerns public support of the strategy even if it means going to war. In a democratic country where the people elect the governing officials, a president may be brought down without public support. The people must believe in the cause and that there is a bonafide reason for it before allowing their sons to be sent to war, which may be more difficult in this age of limited wars fought for limited objectives. The American people are not easily provoked and usually fight for punitive reasons. The government must be able to convince the public that going to war is in the country's best interests. This may be difficult since Vietnam not only divided the country but caused distrust between the public and the government. There are two reasons today that a war like Vietnam could not be sustained by the government: (1) the country has an all voluntary force and no draft, which restricts manpower for the armed forces and (2) with the total force concept the reserves and national guard would have to be called up. This is one of the things President Johnson would not do during Vietnam because of the public opinion. He was quoted as saying "the weakest chink in our armor is American public opinion. Our people won't firm in the face of heavy losses, and they can bring down the government."9 During this timeframe John McNaughton put it best with the statement "a feeling is widely and strongly held that the establishment is out of its mind ... that we are trying to impose some U.S. image on distant peoples we cannot understand, and that we are carrying the thing to absurd lengths". Related to this feeling is the increased polarization that is taking place in the United States, with seeds of the worst split in our people in more than a century."10 Compared to WWII,the enemy engaged in the Vietnam conflict were less "evil"; consequently, it was far more difficult to find convincing ideological or humanitarian reasons to justify the war to the public. It was a "dirty little war" in a far away place. Because of its limited, far away nature, it was more difficult to view the war as necessary from the standpoint of American security, although the idea of "stopping the Communists" was related to this concern. In addition, the war was never formally declared.11 The war became important in domestic partisan politics. It was begun under a Democratic President who decided not to seek reelection at a time when the unpopular war was continuing. In the election, the Democratic party was removed from the White House by the vote of the American people. They chose to elect a Republican candidate who promised new, specific initiatives to bring the war to a speedy end.12 The American people must support the national strategy in order for it to succeed. The American public has always considered their country a winner and Vietnam has shaken that belief. Henry Kissinger has stated, "Vietnam is still with us. It has created doubts about American judgement, about American credibility, about American power--not only at home, but throughout the world."13 Postwar polls show that Americans blame their political leaders for denying victory to the U.S. forces in Vietnam.14 General Fred Weyand, the last American commander in Vietnam, has said: The American Army is really a people's army in the sense that it belongs to the American people, who take a jealous and proprietary interest in its involvement. When the Army is committed the American people are committed; when the American people lose their commitment it is futile to try to keep the Army committed. The U.S. may have won some tactical victories in the war but suffered a strategic failure.15 The American government must get the public to support the national strategy if we are to continue in the world as a super power. The people will not soon forget the government's past transgressions of the Vietnam War and will judge all future policies and strategies by that war. Therefore, along with moral and political example, military strength, economic vitality, alliance relationships, public diplomacy, security assistance, development assistance, science and technology cooperation, international organizations and diplomatic mediation, there should be an eleventh element added that involves informing the public of our national security policies and strategies in ways that are clear, credible, and likely to elicit support. FOOTNOTES 1JCS Pub 1, Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. (Washington D.C., 1987),p. 45. 2The White House National Security Strategy of the United States January 1988.p.7. 3National Security Strategy of the United States,p.7. 4Robert H. Trice,"Principles and Issues,"in American Defense Policy,eds.John F. Reichart and Steven R. Sturm (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1982),p.505. 5Trice,p.506. 6James R. Schlesinger,"U.S. National-Security Challenges for the 1980s,"in The Future of Conflict in the 1980s,eds. William J. Taylor, Jr. and Steven A. Maaranen (Lexington: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath & Company, 1981),p.17. 7Joseph Frankel, The Making of Foreign Policy, (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1963),p.70. 8Stanley Karnow, Vietnam A History, (New York: Penquin Books,1984),p.488. 9Karnow,p.481. 10Karnow,p.479. 11John E. Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion, (New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1973),p.34. 12Mueller,p.34. 13Karnow,p.9. 14Karnow,p.15. 15Karnow,p.16. BIBLIOGRAPHY Frankel, Joseph. The Making of Foreign Policy. London: Oxford University Press, 1963. JCS PUB 1, Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Washington D.C., 1987. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam A History. New York: Penquin Books, 1984. Mueller, John E.. War, Presidents And Public Opinion. New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1973. Schlesinger, James R.." National-Security Challenges For The 1980s," in The Future of Conflict in The 1980s. Ed. William J. Taylor, Jr. and Steven A. Maaranen. Lexington: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath & Company, 1981. The White House. National Security of The United States, January 1988. Trice, Robert H.."Principles and Issues," in American Defense Policy. Ed. John F. Reichart and Steven R. Sturm. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982.
