Reorganizing The Fleet Marine Force: From Division-Wing Teams To Marine Expeditionary Brigades
CSC 1989
SUBJECT AREA - Manpower
Command and Staff College
Marine Corps Combat Development Center
Quantico, Virginia
Reorganizing the Fleet Marine Force:
From Division-Wing Teams to Marine Expeditionary Brigades
Major Joseph H. Schmid, U. S. Marine Corps
15 May 1989
ABSTRACT
NAME: MAJOR JOSEPH H. SCHMID, USMC
TITLE: REORGANIZING THE FLEET MARINE FORCES:
FROM DIVSION-WING TEAMS TO MARINE EXPEDITIONARY BRIGADES
DATE: 9 JUNE 1989
This paper proposes reorganizing the Fleet Marine Forces
around permanent Marine Expeditionary Brigades. After reviewing
the current organization of the Fleet Marine Forces down to the
battalion and squadron level, a discussion of the problems
arising out of the current organization is offered. The
reorganization plan has two goals--to resolve the problems with
the current organization and to reduce the number of headquarters.
A reduction in the number of headquarters would allow conversion
of the associated manpower structure to that for warfighting
elements. The proposed organization is analyzed from the
perspective of its impact on the the ground combat element, the
air combat element, the combat service support element, the
command element, manpower structure, and on Title 10, United
States Code.
The paper concludes that reorganization to permanent Marine
Expeditionary Brigades is possible without a reduction in mission
capabilities. The conclusion summarizes both the problems
resolved by the proposed plan and those left unresolved.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
List of Figures iii
Preface iv
Chapter
I. Introduction 1
Current Organization of the Fleet Marine Forces 1
Statement of the Problem 7
Statement of the Proposal 15
II. Analysis 21
Impact on Ground Combat Element 21
Impact on Aviation Combat Element 28
Impact on Combat Service Support Element 42
Impact on Command Element 44
Impact on Manpower Structure 47
Impact on Public Law 52
III. Conclusions 56
Figures 58
Anotated Bibliography 78
LIST OF FIGURES
Page
1. Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic 58
2. 2d Marine Division 59
3. 2d Marine Aircraft Wing 60
4. 2d Force Service Support Group 61
5. Fleet Marine Force, Pacific 62
6. I Marine Expeditionary Force 63
7. 1st Marine Division 64
8. 3d Marine Aircraft Wing 65
9. 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade 66
10. III Marine Expeditionary Brigade 67
11. 3d Marine Division 68
12. 1st Marine Aircraft Wing 69
13. I and II Marine Expeditionary Force (proposed) 70
14. III Marine Expeditionary Force (proposed) 71
15. Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Amphibious) 72
(proposed)
16. Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Maritime 73
Prepositioning Force) (proposed)
17. Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Reserve 74
Mobilization) (proposed)
18. Aviation Organization (proposed) 75
19. Brigade Service Support Group (proposed) 76
20. Distribution of Enlisted Marines 77
21. Distribution of Marine Officers 77
PREFACE
This paper proposes reorganizing the Fleet Marine Forces
into Marine Expeditionary Brigades. In analyzing the effect of
this proposal, the focus was on the manpower structure depicted
in Tables of Organization for Fleet Marine Force units. The
analysis of this proposal was admittedly limited in several ways.
First, the Tables of Equipment were not examined; thus, the
effect of this proposal on unit equipment was not addressed.
The political consequences of billet reductions within the Fleet
Marine Forces were also not considered. The effect on manpower
structure by programmed-weapons systems was not included in this
analysis.
Sources for this paper ranged from published articles and
books to official Marine Corps documents, memoranda and personal
letters. Documents and memoranda were obtained from staff
copies. Personal letters from representatives of the Commanders-
in-Chief of the Unified Commands were in response to requests
from the author. Citations for sources are keyed to the
bibliography entry number and source page number. A citation
such as (40-31) refers to entry 40 in the bibliography, page 31.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Current Organization of the Fleet Marine Forces
The organizations of the Fleet Marine Forces vary between
the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. However, there are some
command relationships that are similar to each. Regardless of
the fleet, the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, is a
type commander responsible for the administration and training
of all of his subordinate units. The subordinate units of the
Fleet Marine Forces come under the operational control of the
Commanders- in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic or Pacific Fleets, when
deployed.
Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic is organized as shown in
Figure 1. Reporting directly to the Commanding General, Fleet
Marine Force, Atlantic (FMFLant) are the Commanding General,
II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), and the Commanding
Officers of three Marine Expeditionary Units (22d, 24th, 26th
MEU's). The Commanding General, II MEF, exercises operational
control over the 2d Marine Division, the 2d Marine Aircraft
Wing, the 2d Force Service Support Group, the 4th Marine
Expeditionary Brigade, and the 6th Marine Expeditionary
Brigade (MEB). Each of these commands have standing
headquarters, or "command elements" as they are known in
Marine jargon.
However, the 2d Marine Division, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing,
and 2d Force Service Support Group are the only major
subordinate commands that have permanently assigned forces.
The Marine Expeditionary Brigades and the Marine Expeditionary
Units have designated forces. Designated forces are
squadrons, battalions, and companies that are earmarked for
deployment with Marine Expeditionary Brigades and Units.
These designated forces remain under the command and control
of their parent command until deployment, at which time
command and control is shifted. This double counting is not
limited to just the operating forces. The Commanding
General, FMFLant, is "double-hatted" as Commanding General,
II MEF. The Commanding General, 2d Marine Division, is also
"double-hatted" as Deputy Commander, II MEF.
The major subordinate commands of II MEF have fairly
traditional organizations. The Second Marine Division is
organized as shown in Figure 2. This is the standard
divisional organization of a headquarters battalion, three
infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, and five
independent battalions - assault amphibian, combat engineer,
light armored infantry, reconnaissance, and tank. Recent
decisions of the Commandant of the Marine Corps have changed
the internal organization of many of the battalions within the
Marine Division in order to enhance the combat readiness of
those units (1). Among these changes were the placing in
cadre the 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, adding scout infantrymen
to and redesignating the Light Armored Vehicle Battalion as
the Light Armored Infantry Battalion, adding a fourth rifle
company to each of the battalions in 8th Marines, and
reassigning the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines from the 3d Marine
Division to the 2d Marine Division.
The Second Marine Aircraft Wing does not have a table of
organization since, by doctrine, it is task organized to
perform the six functions of Marine aviation - assault
support, offensive air support, aerial reconnaissance,
electronic warfare, anti-air warfare, and control of aircraft
and missiles. However, like all Marine Aircraft Wings, it has
a Marine Wing Headquarters Squadron, a Marine Wing Support
Group, a Marine Air Control Group, and aircraft groups
composed of helicopter, attack, and fighter aircraft, as shown
in Figure 3. The Second Force Service Support Group (FSSG) is
organized, as all FSSG's are, into eight battalions, each
fulfilling one of the eight functions of combat service
support. This organization is clearly shown in Figure 4.
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPac), has units spread
across the Pacific Ocean and, thus, does not have as neat
organizational charts as its counterpart in the Atlantic.
Reporting directly to the Commanding General, FMFPac, are the
Commanding Generals, I Marine Expeditionary Force and 1st
Marine Expeditionary Brigade. The Commanding General, III
Marine Expeditionary Force, is forward deployed to Okinawa,
Japan, and is under the operational control of the Commander,
U.S. 7th Fleet, and under the administrative control of the
Commanding General, FMFPac. These command relationships are
shown in Figure 5.
Major subordinate commands of I MEF are the 1st Marine
Division, 1st Force Service Support Group, 3rd Marine Aircraft
Wing, 5th and 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigades, and the 11th,
13th, and 15th Marine Expeditionary Units. The organization
of the 1st Marine Division is shown in Figure 7. The Division
has a structure similar to that of 2d Marine Division. The
notable exception is that 1st Marine Division has four rifle
companies in each infantry battalion. Like the 2d Marine
Division, the 1st Marine Division also had to place an
infantry battalion in cadre to provide the fourth rifle
company to the battalions in the 1st Marine Regiment.
However, the fourth battalion in each regiment was obtained by
permanently reassigning four battalions from the 3d Marine
Division to the 1st Marine Division.
Third Marine Aircraft Wing is task organized as shown in
Figure 8. Performing the same functions as the 2d Marine
Aircraft Wing, the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing also has control,
support and aircraft groups. However, the number of fighter,
attack, and helicopter groups and squadrons differs between
the two wings.
As with II MEF, only the 1st Marine Division, 1st Force
Service Support Group, and the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing have
forces permanently assigned. The Expeditionary Brigades and
Units, similar to those in II MEF, have forces only designated
for their use. As with II MEF, the Commanding Generals are
also "double hatted" in I MEF. The Commanding General, I MEF
is also the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division. The
Commanding General, 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade is the
Assistant Division Commander, 1st Marine Division. The
Commanding General, 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade is
also the base commander at the Marine Corps Air-Ground
Training Center, 29 Palms, California. The Commanding
Officer, 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade is also serves as
Commanding General, Landing Force Training Command,
Pacific.
The First Marine Expeditionary Brigade, located at
Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, is the only expeditionary brigade with
forces permanently assigned. It is composed of a regimental
landing team, a Marine Aircraft Group, and a Brigade Service
Support Group, as shown is Figure 9. The regimental landing
team has three infantry battalions and an artillery battalion.
The Marine Aircraft Group has four medium helicopter
squadrons, one heavy helicopter squadron, one light/attack
helicopter detachment, four fighter squadrons, and a Marine
Air Control Squadron. Although designated as a Marine
Expeditionary Brigade, the 1st MEB, with its assigned forces,
does not have the combat capability of any of the other
expeditionary brigades with their designated forces. The
assigned forces do not reflect the table of organization for
the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade's mission.
III Marine Expeditionary Force, the forward deployed MEF
in the Western Pacific, has the most inferior combat power of
any of the expeditionary forces. As shown in Figure 10, III
MEF is composed of 3d Marine Division, 1st Marine Aircraft
Wing, 3d Force Service Support Group, and 9th Marine
Expeditionary Brigade. III MEF is the only expeditionary
force that does not man forward deployed expeditionary units.
However, the MEU's from I MEF, when forward deployed, come
under the operational control of the Commanding General, III
MEF. Like the expeditionary brigades in the other MEF's, 9th
Marine Expeditionary Brigade is merely a headquarters with
forces designated to it. Of the other major subordinate
commands, only 3d Force Service Support Group is of
comparable size and organization to its companion groups in
the other MEF's.
The organizations of the 3d Marine Division and the 1st
Marine Aircraft Wing are depicted in Figures 11 and 12,
respectively. 3d Marine Division has only two infantry
regiments with two battalions each. Each of these infantry
battalions is permanently assigned to either the 1st or the 2d
Marine Division and is serving with the 3d Marine Division on
a six-month deployment in accordance with the Unit Deployment
Program. The Division's artillery regiment has only two
direct support battalions and has a general support battalion
equipped with towed 155mm howitzers vice a general support
battalion equipped with self-propelled 155mm howitzers and
self-propelled 8-inch guns. Among the independent battalions,
1st Armored Assault Battalion is composed of two tank
companies and two amphibious assault companies. The other
divisions have tank and amphibious assault battalions, each
with four companies.
First Marine Aircraft Wing is similarly understrength
compared to the other aircraft wings. 3d Marine Aircraft Wing
has fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft groups, a support group,
and a control group. However, among these groups the Wing has
only two fighter, one attack, one all-weather attack, one
medium helicopter, one heavy helicopter, and one light/attack
helicopter squadron.
Statement of the Problem
The 1985-1989 Five Year Defense Plan Guidance, in an
effort to ensure a credible amphibious warfare capability,
established a requirement to simultaneously lift the assault
echelons of a MEF and of a MEB (17-i). To lift the assault
echelon of a MEF today would require all of the amphibious
assets in both the Atlantic and the Pacific Fleets. However,
each Fleet does have sufficient assets to lift the assault
echelon of a MEB. Thus, the largest combat force with which
the Marine Corps could conduct a timely amphibious assault in
either the Atlantic or the Pacific Fleet is a Marine
Expeditionary Brigade. As a result of this amphibious lift
constraint, the Marine Corps has debated the dilemma of
deploying as a MEB and employing as a MEF, or as it has been
called, the composite MEF.
Compounding this dilemma are other factors affecting the
way the Marine Corps is organized and trained for combat. One
of the most significant is the anticipated reduction in the
Marine Corps budget for the next several years. Less money
necessitates decreased manpower and decreased training
expenses. At the same time, the theater commanders-in-chief
have levied requirements on the Marine Corps for increased
joint service planning and increased responsiveness to the
call for deployment. Lastly, the Marine Corps has adopted a
new warfighting philosophy to enable it to win outnumbered on
any battlefield in the future.
The current organization of the Fleet Marine Forces is
incompatible with the resolution to these problems. This
leads to four problems:
1. Efficiency in responding to the call of the theater
commanders-in-chief.
2. Synchronization with our view of the foreseeable future
3. Implementation of our maneuver warfare philosophy.
4. Wasteful use of scarce manpower assets.
In order to improve the responsiveness of a MAGTF to the
call of a theater commander-in-chief, the Commandant of the
Marine Corps approved in 1983 the permanent MAGTF headquarters
concept. Two specific concerns that formed the basis for this
were increased emphasis on rapid deployment of MAGTF's and
increased joint service planning commitments requiring
operational data from MAGTF's. This emphasis on rapid
deployment can not be overstated. The theater commanders-in-
chief require a Marine Expeditionary Brigade to be ready for
embarkation within four days of notification and a MEF within
ten days of notification (23,24,25,26). Although the object
of the permanent MAGTF headquarters concept was to eliminate
`ad-hocery' in time of crisis," it does not do so for the
combat elements of the MAGTF. Except for the case of the MEF,
the ground combat element must be task organized by
reinforcing an infantry unit with combat arms units
(artillery, combat engineer, light armored infantry,
reconnaissance, and tank) from the division. The aviation
combat element must be task organized to perform all six
functions of Marine aviation. This will require the task
organization of units from at least six different Groups. The
combat service support element must also task organize units
from eight different battalions. The permanent MAGTF
headquarters concept only eliminates "ad-hocery" within the
MAGTF command element which represents approximately 5% of the
personnel strength of the MAGTF.
This "ad-hocery" not only exists to form the MAGTF, but
also to employ it in combat. Under the composite MAGTF
concept, Marine Corps forces will deploy to a conflict as a
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