The Role Of Hornet-D In The Marine Air Ground Task Force Air Combat Element AUTHOR Major Ronald G. Richardella, USMC CSC 1989 SUBJECT AREA - Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: THE ROLE OF HORNET-D IN THE MARINE AIR GROUND TASK FORCE AIR COMBAT ELEMENT I. PURPOSE: To report the results of independent crew-size studies and use them to justify and recommend a tactical aviation force structure which integrates the F/A-18D and its capabilities into the Marine Corps Air Combat Element. II. PROBLEM: As a more effective weapons delivery platform in both the strike and air-to-air arenas, the two-seat F/A-18D should play a major role in Marine aviation in terms of both force composition and mission allocation. Both flight testing and simulation have proven the superior survivability and weapons employment ability of two-seat aircraft. Adoption of the F/A-18D into Marine aviation would enhance warfighting capabilities while reducing the logisti- cal support necessary to support the various aircraft used today to accomplish our tactical missions. Capabilities of the all-Hornet force would eventually exceed present capabilities due to the aircraft's performance character- istics and its ability to integrate emerging technology. III. DATA. The Marine Corps currently has twelve single- seat F/A-18 squadrons responsible for conducting antiair warfare (AAW) and offensive air support (OAS). Its five- squadron all-weather attack force is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain and support. Its photo-reconnaissance squadron uses an aging aircraft in need of replacement. All of its tactical air coordination (airborne)/forward air con- troller (airborne) (TAC(A)/FAC(A)) aircraft are being retired this year. Independent studies present overwhelming evidence that two-seat strike/fighter aircraft are capable of superior performance in the air-to-ground and air-to-air arenas, and are more survivable. The incorporation of Hornet-D as our primary all-weather attack, photo-reconnaissance, and TAC(A)/FAC(A) aircraft would provide a tactically superior, logistically supportable aircraft, fully capable of AAW and OAS, to compliment our current fighter/attack force. IV. CONCLUSIONS. The dual-seat F/A-18D provides the Marine Corps with an economically feasible, tactically superior, logistically supportable option for the future. V. RECOMMENDATIONS. The Marine Corps should replace its A-6 squadrons (all-weather attack), RF-4B squadron (photo- reconnaissance), and OA-4 squadrons (TAC(A)/FAC(A)) with six, twelve-plane F/A-18D squadrons. This transition requires supporting fewer aircraft than at present with a system which is already in place. Most importantly, however, it provides the Marine Corps with vastly superior performance and the ability to exceed current capabilities as the technology is developed and incorporated. TITLE: THE ROLE OF HORNET-D IN THE MARINE AIR GROUND TASK FORCE AIR COMBAT ELEMENT OUTLINE THESIS: As a more effective weapons delivery platform in both the strike and air-to-air arenas, the two-seat F/A-18D should play a major role in Marine aviation in terms of both force composition and mission allocation. I. ISSUE OVERVIEW A. One seat/two seat debate B. Historical perspective C. Timeliness of raising issue D. Methods of addressing issue II. SYNOPSIS OF SOURCE MATERIALS A. Autonetics B. U. S. Navy C. F. ter Braak D. Boeing E. Hughes (1969) F. Hughes (1975) G. CNA III. EVALUATION OF RESULTS A. Study conclusions B. Author's conclusions IV. RECOMMENDATIONS A. Structure B. Mission Allocation C. Deployment D. Employment THE ROLE OF HORNET-D IN THE MARINE AIR GROUND TASK FORCE AIR COMBAT ELEMENT Is there a role for the Hornet-D in Marine Aviation? Indeed, is there a need for a two-seat fighter-attack aircraft in any aviation scenario given the technology available today? Can one man do it all, or have the performance capabilities of modern flying machines exceeded the ability of human pilots to control them as some sources claim?1 In military tactical aviation circles, one could not pick a more controversial or timely topic. Why did such a debate ever begin? Weren't fighters always single-seaters and bombers always crew- manned? Yes, but times have changed. In fact, times changed on May 27, 1958 with the maiden flight of the F-4 Phantom, a two-seater soon to become the nation's front- line fighter, which would stock the inventories of all fighter-equipped U.S. military services, as well as many others around the world. To fully appreciate the present debate over the role of the two-seat Hornet-D in the Marine Corps inventory, it helps to begin by understanding the reasons why the Navy initially approved the two-seat design for the F-4 in 1955. "...No one was entirely certain whether the new intercepter should be a single- or a two- seater (the argument continues with new designs to this day). In a single place version, the pilot workload would be very high, and this factor could possibly restrict further development, given the technology of the period. MAC (McDonnell Aircraft Corporation) therefore produced an alternative two-seat layout, differing from the original proposal. . .Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and Bureau of Aeronautics (BuAer) were offered the choice and within 36 hours had settled for the two-seater... Having established the military requirement for the F4H-1 (two-seat) type of fighter, BuAer invited Chance Vought to build a competing air- craft. . .the XF8U-3 Crusader III...a single-place, single engined design... On December 17, (1958) the result (of the "fly-off" competition) was announced; the F4H-1 had been selected as the U.S. Navy's first-line all-weather fighter. The choice of the McDonnell fighter. . .was mainly decided by two factors. The two-man crew was judged to be the more effective for the mission, given the complex nature of the weapons system, and two engines were also considered to be an advantage... although this consideration was reported to be secondary."2 This rationale would seem to support the idea that, in the late 1950's, aircraft capabilities had surpassed a single human's ability to control them. However, in examining tactical aviation developments twenty years hence, it would seem that technology did advance to the point which would allow one man to adequately employ a modern weapons system. This is evidenced by: - the U.S. Air Force switch from the F-4 to both the F-15 and F-16, both single-seaters, which now handle the fighter and attack missions, respectively, previously performed by the Phantom; and - the U.S. Marine Corps switch to the single-seat F/A-18 to handle the dual fighter-attack role of Marine fighter squadrons. Only the U.S. Navy has retained a two-seat fighter, the F-14 Tomcat, because in its view: "The two-seat fighter offers significant advan- tages over single-seat aircraft in both short range air-to-air combat over enemy territory and longer range fleet air superiority encounters. The air- combat advantages accrue primarily because the two-man crew can sight and acquire targets quickly while maintaining six o'clock surveillance and surface-to-air missile (SAM) lookout. Fleet air superiority advantages stem from the ability of the second crew member to concentrate attention on sophisticated multiple target threats and electronic countermeasures (ECM) while the pilot flies the aircraft and maintains the essential visual surveillance."3 In the case of the Marines' switch to the F/A-18, does the inherent technology truly allow one man to maximize the awesome multi-mission integrated capabilities of the aircraft in a given threat scenario? This is the crux of the issue, and opinions vary widely. For the Marine Corps, a relatively small, integrated air-ground team, the answer to this question is absolutely critical. According to one officer, Hornet pilots agree that the man-machine interloop in the F/A-18 is one of the tightest ever designed, and that introduction of a second crew member into the system will interrupt the delicate interface and result in degraded vice enhanced capability.4 This is a subjective opinion, as are the opinions of those Hornet pilots who state that there is no substitute for a "second set of eyeballs" regardless of the aircraft's capabilities and technology. Of importance is that this is not a moot issue for the Marine Corps since, at the writing of this paper, a Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation proposal sits on the Commandant's desk which involves the replacement of all five all-weather attack A-6 squadrons and the photo-reconnaissance RF-4 squadron with six squadrons containing the F/A-18D two- seat aircraft.5 Because both the single- and two-seat models of the F/A-18 will be configured with similar weapons systems and avionics, it is imperative that the Marine Corps understand the strengths of each variant in order to allocate mission priorities to each type of unit in a way which will best support its mission. This research paper, based on a review of several objective, independent crew size studies, will make recommendations relative to the assignment of mission priorities for each community as well as recommendations for peacetime geographical employment which would enhance training in support of the mission of the air combat element of the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF). SYNOPSIS OF SOURCE MATERIALS For an appreciation of the basis upon which these recommendations will be made, a synopsis of the findings of all crew size studies used is presented. AUTONETICS The Autonetics Division of the North American Rockwell Corporation did a study in 1967 of one-man crew effectiveness for the F-X (experimental) fighter aircraft. Mission scenarios selected were: - fighter screen; - point intercept; - day interdiction; - all-weather strike. Results and conclusions were as follows: - a one-man system optimized for air-to-air missions will be effective for air-to-ground missions also; - the controls and displays necessary to operate and monitor this system will fit in a one-man cockpit; - the performance of this system shows reduced dependence on crew size/performance; - this system will not cause problems for a one-man crew in non-tactical regimes such as takeoff and landing; and - the system can achieve its capabilities through utility, centralization, integration, and increased automation/advanced technology. In general the study concluded that a one-man crew would not be overloaded. However, the study did not consider degraded mode operation. It was also not apparent that varying threat levels were utilized in judging pilot performance in different mission scenarios. As a component of the same study, Air Force combat flying personnel were interviewed. They agreed that a two-man crew is desirable when: - flying CAP (combat air patrol) missions requiring long range radar detection; - navigating difficult low altitude air-to-ground missions; and - when degraded mode operations cannot be handled by one man.6 U. S. Navy In research conducted by the U.S. Navy and summarized in 1973, the merits of a two-man aircraft in the air-to-air and fleet air superiority roles are discussed as already indicated above. However, it is also added that: ... A two-man crew permits a double check on flight procedures and minimizes diversion of pilot attention from flying the aircraft. Dual seat aircraft consequently enjoy a 2 to 1 safety improvement over single seaters in Navy experience. The high combat kill effectiveness. .. combined with low losses due to accidents and enemy action make the second seat a good investment for Navy aircraft...7 F. ter Braak For the purpose of determining whether or not a second crewmember reduces cockpit workload, F. ter Braak (1974) studied the physical, mental, and psychological factors of crews during strike, attack and reconnaissance missions. It was concluded that workload was not reduced because each crewman performs his tasks under the same conditions as a single pilot crew. In fact, it was also ter Braak's opinion that workload increased due to the need for crew coordination.8 No further details are available, however, which define the parameters of this study. Boeing This study compared one- and two-man crew performance in visually acquiring small ground targets from low altitude (200 feet) at various airspeeds ranging from Mach .4 to 1.2 (approximately 300 mph to 900 mph at sea level). Performance was measured in terms of range at visual acquisition, acquisition errors, and time and distance required to designate the target after visual acquisition. The findings were as follows: - two-man crews acquired targets at significantly greater ranges at lower airspeeds. These distances decreased as airspeed increased; - at Mach 1.2, acquisition probability was poorer and nonacquisitions occurred at about the same rate for either sized crew; - little change in performance was noted in single-man crews as test conditions varied; - both one- and two-man crews acquired targets at significantly greater ranges during a second pass over the test area; and - acquisition distance varied by individual target under all test conditions.9 Generally, the results can be characterized as follows: "... The two-place multi-mission fighter/attack aircraft system appears.. .to provide the best probability of mission success. .. and. . .has advantages if degraded-mode operations are required, and could improve target acquis ition performance under any mission situation.. "10 Major criticisms of this work, however, are "the lack of any out-of-cockpit visual tasks other than the visual target acquisition task and the failure to vary crew workload in a controlled manner over a large range."11 Hughes (1969) A one- versus two-man crew study was done by Hughes Aircraft Company during development of the F-15. The study concluded that two men could better exploit the avionics system than one. However, it was also discovered that the long term cost of adding the automatic features necessary to compensate for a second crewman was not significant when compared to the aircraft performance penalties involved with adding the second seat. Hughes thus finally concluded that the workload would be small enough so that one man could effectively employ the F-15.15 Hughes (1975) Because it was felt that existing information (summarized previously) could not address the question of a single pilot's ability to both control the aircraft and designate radar targets, the U.S. Air Force Avionics Laboratory initiated a study to investigate the crew size requirement for tactical all-weather strike aircraft. This study was conducted by the Display Systems and Human Factors Department of Hughes Aircraft Company in 1975 for specifically determining whether a radar should be used in single-seat aircraft. This study required a crew (one- or two-man) to perform tasks which included: - flight control - air-to-air radar monitoring and target lock-on - radar warning receiver monitoring - countermeasures activation - outside-cockpit threat detection - ground map radar target recognition and designation - communications with airborne command and control center and second crewman. Five threat densities from one to over fourteen threats per minute were used. Performance was measured in terms of flight control (heading, altitude, etc.), threat detection and response, and ground map target acquisition. Results are summarized as follows: - as threat density increased, flight control performance degraded, especially altitude control; this occurred much more rapidly for one-man crews; - there was no appreciable difference for inside cockpit threat detection during the target acquisition phase, except at the highest threat density, where one-man crews were better. This was caused by a crew coordination breakdown in the two-man crews. However, during the penetration phase two-man crews were slightly better; - two man crews were significantly better in outside-cockpit threat detection by a factor of forty to ninety-five percent; - less radar target acquisition time was required by two-man crews except at the highest threat density. The probable reason for this is the ignoring of outside- cockpit threats by one-man crews until the radar acquisition task was completed. Thus, one-man crews sacrificed outside-cockpit threat detection at the highest threat density in order to achieve higher performances. The major advantage of two-place radar air-to-ground aircraft, therefore, is the "improved visual surveillance achieved with two crewman and the resulting increased survivability when over hostile enemy territory."13 Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) By far the most comprehensive, current and relevant work done to examine the benefits and/or penalties of a second crewmember is the CNA study entitled "F/A-18 Single-Seat Versus Dual-Seat Crew Evaluation." This study was the result of Secretary of the Navy approval in 1984 of a program to develop a night, austere all-weather capability for all F/A-18's. The question followed as to whether one pilot was capable of assimilating and effectively using all the information which would now be available in the cockpit. Phase I of this study identified penalties associated with a dual-seat F/A-18 (less fuel, increased aircraft carrier habitability problems and increased costs), but also found that more research would be required to quantify the benefits associated with a second crewmember and the optimum mix of single- and dual-seaters for the Navy, if any were in fact to be recommended.14 This issue was, at the time, already resolved for the Marines, who would include eight dual-seaters and eight single-seaters in each of its twelve fighter/attack squadrons. Missions of the Marine dual-seaters would include reconnaissance, tactical air coordination (airborne), forward air controller (airborne) (FAC(A)/TAC(A)), and air defense near the forward edge of the battle area -- expected to be a "many versus many" air-to-air scenario. 15 For Phase II of this study, which would address the benefits of the dual-seat configuration, five Naval missions were singled out for simulation (listed in order of increasing difficulty): - day strike; - strike escort; - close air support (CAS); - night strike; and - adverse weather. These missions seemed to emphasize the strike aspects of the F/A-18, but each included an air-to-air aspect. The objective of the simulation was a summarization of results and conclusions of one- versus two-seat performance. The primary measures of performance were: - survivability to the ground threat; - ordnance delivery performance; - timeliness at target; - escort effectiveness; and - terrain impacts. Further, kill removal would not be used in order to allow all measures to be treated independently. The flight simulation was conducted at the McDonnell Aircraft Company, in St. Louis, in the Manned Air Combat Simulator. Five missions, each with steadily increasing levels of aircrew workload, were flown by six single- and six dual-seat crews, resulting in 180 sorties.16 The biggest limitation of the flight simulation was the lack of experienced F/A-18 back-seaters, but to some extent this may have been offset by the lack of a wingman for single-seat aircrews, causing them to have to do their own lookout. 17 Results of this study were considered in detail for purposes of final recommendations, and will therefore be discussed by sub-category and more extensively than those of previous studies addressed (see enclosure (1) for graphic summary of results). --SURVIVABILITY IN TARGET AREA VERSUS DELIVERY PERFORMANCE. Duals (dual-seaters) were consistently more survivable versus the ground threat, but singles (single-seaters) were more effective when delivering ordnance on designated targets, especially at the highest threat level (of the three used). Based on these findings, did singles tend to trade off survivability for ordnance delivery performance? It was speculated that under high workloads, there was a tendency of singles to disregard other tasks and concentrate on a single task.18 It was possible, due to the no kill removal scenario, to disregard the ground threat, concentrate on delivery accuracy, and score higher in this area as a result with no penalty. This occurrence, also seen in a previous study, tends to invalidate the better delivery performance of singles, especially when it occurred at the highest threat level. --ACQUISITION, TIMELINESS AND DELIVERY PERFORMANCE. Singles acquired the correct target during more sorties than duals (81% to 67%), but the average sensor target acquisition range was longer for duals in eleven of twelve sorties. In seven of ten scenarios duals deviated less from briefed time-on-target than singles. On the average, duals were twenty-seven seconds more precise. Overall delivery performance favored singles. Duals were better at day strike, adverse weather, and low threat CAS, but singles were better in all other scenarios. 19 --ESCORT. The measure of effectiveness for this category was separation from lead aircraft when over the target. Singles were slightly more effective.20 --TERRAIN IMPACTS. Singles consistently flew at lower mean altitudes than duals, but the number of flights during which terrain impact occurred was about the same for both.21 --INTERACTION WITH THE AIR THREAT. The factors by which effectiveness versus the air threat was measured were: - hits per F/A-18 missile launch (AIM-7 {radar guided} or AIM-9 {heat seeking}); - percentage of incoming threat missiles defeated; - number of air-to-air first hits given and taken on each sortie; and - total hits received by each crew. Results based on these evaluators were: - duals had a higher hit ratio for the AIM-7 (hits given to hits taken). The second crewmember increased the effectiveness of AIM-7 employment, possibly by being able to launch the AIM-7 from the rear cockpit; - singles were slightly more effective using the AIM-9, although the sample size was very small and results may be an anomaly; - duals were more effective at defeating incoming short and medium range missiles. Singles were shown to be more effective at defeating medium range missiles in a high threat, but the sample size was very small and this result is also questionable. The success of duals in this area was probably due to the second set of eyes and the additional crew member capable of dispensing flares; - exchange ratios (first hits given to first hits taken) were higher in all cases for duals; - when ranked by fewest hits taken, duals were higher and therefore more survivable to the air threat.22 --OTHER FINDINGS. Duals usually landed with an average of 9% more fuel than singles. This difference in fuel remaining, when compared with the differing fuel capacities of the single- and two-seat aircraft (single-seater having more), did not generally exceed the difference in capacity. It did, however, exceed the difference in capacity in the CAS, night strike, and high threat scenarios. 23 --SUBJECTIVE VIEWPOINTS OF PARTICIPATING AIRCREWS. Despite the results referred to above, a consensus of the participating aircrews expressed the below opinions: - singles were adequate for day strike, escort, and CAS. Night strike was questionable, but adverse weather was definitely a dual mission; - dual performance depends on crew coordination and training; - the lack of a wingman was a major disadvantage for singles; - no agreement existed on the number of duals appropriate for a carrier air wing; - none of the aircrews approved of the idea of singles and duals in the same squadron. 24 --EXPECTATIONS. Prior to beginning the simulation, it was anticipated that with the addition of the second crew- member, the biggest differences in performance would occur in the night strike and adverse weather missions. It was also expected, to a lesser degree, that escort and CAS would be enhanced due to the second set of eyes, and that performance in the higher threat scenarios would favor duals.25 EVALUATION OF RESULTS The following summarizes the results of all studies and encompasses modifications in cases where sufficient evidence existed, in the author's opinion, to either invalidate a finding or render it unlikely on an intuitive basis. - Duals are more survivable versus the ground and air threat, and had consistently higher air-to-air exchange ratios.26 - Singles were more effective in the delivery of ordnance, but duals were more timely. Dual performance, however, may have been hindered by backseaters' lack of experience with the Hornet weapon system as well as the use of cockpits which were not truly decoupled. 27 - Singles were found to provide better escort support,28 but it is concluded that duals could, in reality, support this mission at least as well as singles. This segment of the simulation was judged as the least realistic by participants.29 - It is concluded that singles traded off survivability for ordnance delivery accuracy at higher threat levels, and that duals would be more effective in this scenario. While it is possible that a breakdown of dual crew coordination at the highest threat levels may have contributed somewhat to the singles' better performance,30 evidence from all studies used seems to indicate that, when in a high threat scenario, single crews tended to prioritize all tasks and concentrate on the most important, to the exclusion of other taskings. This technique would probably result in aircraft attrition or mission kill in a kill removal scenario or real life situation. - Duals performed better at day strike, CAS, and night strike. Singles performed slightly better in adverse weather31 although it was a consensus among all participants that this should be a dual mission. With the exception of adverse weather, it is concluded that at lower threat levels, both singles and duals could perform these missions with equal effectiveness. Differences in performance during the simulation were not statistically significant and therefore not convincing. - Overall, duals were found to perform significantly better.32 It is concluded that this is true for medium and high threat scenarios only, assuming properly trained dual crews. With ample time for development of crew coordination and training in the decoupled cockpits of the Hornet D, the second crewmember should provide the attention necessary for increased survivability and mission performance effectiveness at higher threat levels. RECOMMENDATIONS Based on the findings and conclusions presented above, recommendations appropriate for consideration are made in the following four areas relative to all configurations of the Hornet (see enclosure (2) for a graphic depiction of below structure and deployment recommendations): - force structure - mission allocation - deployment - employment --FORCE STRUCTURE. Currently all twelve Marine fighter/attack squadrons (VMFAs) are configured with (or are being conf igured with) the single-seat F/A-18. Because of its adequacy for all missions as addressed above, it is recommended that VMFAs remain as currently configured in terms of equipment (single-seater). Based on the results of crew size studies, and Hornet's ability to accommodate new technology, it is recommended that the Marine Corps replace its A-6 aircraft with the F/A-18D. Although the F/A-18D does not yet possess the true all-weather attack capability of the A-6, it is vastly superior in performance and can be easily modified to add this capability. This transition would also reduce the number of type-model-series (TMS) aircraft currently supported and maintained in our inventory. At a date when an adequate reconnaissance capability exists for the F/A-18, the RF-4B should also be replaced by the F/A-18D. Because the projected F/A-18 reconnaissance pallet will be compatible with all series of the aircraft, the conversion of this sixth squadron to the F/A-18D (there are five A-6 squadrons) will balance the force and further reduce TMS aircraft currently supported. Finally, in terms of numbers of aircraft, the transition of A-6 and RF-4B squadrons should be to twelve-plane F/A-18D squadrons (designated VMFA(AW) to differentiate from single-seat squadrons). This transition, in terms of aggregate numbers, would require support of approximately five fewer airframes, would save substantial flying hour and maintenance dollars, and would cost nothing in terms of ultimate capability. --MISSION ALLOCATION. Marine F-4s have traditionally performed the missions of AAW (antiair warfare), OAS (offensive air support), and aerial reconnaissance. The F/A-18 has assumed the AAW and OAS missions in VMFAs, and it has been recommended for replacement of the A-6 and RF-4 and the assumption of their missions. With the phase out of the OA-4, the TAC(A)/FAC(A) mission will also have to be reassigned. Missions considered for allocation to the various VMFAs and proposed VMFA(AW)s are therefore as follows: - AAW (including escort) - OAS, including -- CAS -- DAS (deep air support) - TAC(A)/FAC(A) - considered separately from OAS due to uniqueness and additional training required. NOTE: It is understood that any mission, depending upon the tactical situation, will be performed across the spectrum of threat scenarios, weather, and at night using either aircraft configuration. Superior performance by a dual-seat crew during simulation of a high threat, night or adverse weather scenario will not be used as grounds to recommend that single-seat crews be precluded from flying these missions. These crews are trained and fully capable of mission performance under most less-than-optimum conditions. Study results will be used, however, as a basis for recommendations made concerning allocation of missions, in priority order, to either community. The recommended allocation of missions to each community, in priority order, is as follows: - to VMFAs 1. AAW 2. OAS 3. Aerial reconnaissance - to VMFA(AW)s 1. OAS - with emphasis on night, all-weather attack, and any special weapons missions adopted by the Marine Corps 2. AAW 3. TAC(A)/FAC(A) Rationale for the assignment of AAW and OAS to VMFAs is historical and does not need justification. However, because at least one Marine Corps aerial reconnaissance expert maintains that it should be treated as a dual-seat attack mission,33 the recommendation to place aerial reconnaissance in VMFAs may generate some controversy, but is made for several reasons: the single-seater will be just as capable as the dual-seater of performing the mission;34 the dispersal of the mission among twelve squadrons will translate to a broader capability; the F/A-18D will, should it be necessary, still be capable of accepting the standard reconnaissance pallet now planned for the Hornet; and this will relieve the F/A-18D community from the additional training burden of preparing for this mission. The training requirements necessary to fulfill the missions recommended for the F/A-18D community, especially with OAS and the addition of TAC(A)/FAC(A), will be challenging indeed. The training requirements for AAW alone are formidable, especially with AAW placed second among VMFA(AW) priorities. The high priority placed on AAW for VMFA(AW) squadrons was made because of the undeniably outstanding performance qualities of the aircraft, which make it impossible to deemphasize in its fighter role. OAS, with emphasis on night, all-weather attack and special weapons should be the highest priority of VMFA(AW) squadrons. The current A-6 community encompasses these priorities and the transition would be natural. This also takes advantage of the strongpoints of the F/A-18D and dual-seat crews in general as discussed in previous sections. AAW must be a high priority due not only to the performance characteristics of the Hornet, but to also capitalize upon its effectiveness as displayed in the air-to-air arena during the CNA simulation. The TAC(A)/FAC(A) mission is one which must be organic to each Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW). This mission provides a basis for close air support and lies at the very heart of the MAGTF concept. The performance of this mission will be discussed under Employment/Deployment. --DEPLOYMENT/EMPLOYMENT. The F/A-18D should be organic to each wing (its presence in 1st MAW would be satisfied through the unit deployment program) as depicted graphically at enclosure (2). The notable facet of this recommendation is that VMFAs and VMFA(AW)s are collocated at MCASs Beaufort, Cherry Point, El Toro, and Kaneohe Bay. There is a two-to-one ratio of single-seat F/A-18s to F/A-18Ds at each location. The main reason for this is to ensure tactical interoperability. (Commonality will allow logistical support at all sites without imposing a burden.) In addition to AAW and OAS, each air station/MAW will have aerial reconnaissance and TAC(A)/FAC(A) organic to its mission assets. This provides much more balanced support to each Marine Expeditionary Force. What is seen as truly critical to this reorganization is the integration and assimilation of F/A-18D equipped VMFA(AW)s into the present "VMFA family". Collocation at all F/A-18 sites will serve to prioritize training as necessary to support rewritten mission statements, will foster complimentary joint training (e.g. OAS/escort, CAS/FAC(A)), prevent the subordination of lower priority missions (as happens now), discourage elitism, and allow the training methods of each community to have a synergistic effect on training of the entire Hornet community. Joint deployments of some mix of single- and dual-seaters should also be considered as a standard practice, since the complimentary missions of both aircraft, as recommended, would enhance the warfighting potential of the air combat element and therefore support to the MAGTF commander. The F/A-18 has greater capabilities, and potential to absorb new technology, than any aircraft we have yet encountered. It will some day fulfill all of our OAS, AAW and aerial reconnaissance needs to the limit of current technology. With such a wealth of capabilities at hand, it is imperative that we understand the strengths and limitations of each configuration, allocate missions and prioritize training on that basis, posture our forces in a complimentary manner, utilize our potential, and plan now for a future with fewer resources available. This proposal provides a tactically and administratively sound option for consideration. FOOTNOTES 1"Fighter Aircraft," Encyclopaedia Britannica (1985), IV, 771. 2Doug Richardson and Mike Spick, Modern Fighting Aircraft: F-4 Phantom II (New York: Arco Publishing, Inc., 1984), pp. 5-7. 3U.S. Air Force Avionics Laboratory, "Crew Size Evaluation For Tactical All-Weather Strike Aircraft," Defense Technical Information Center, April, 1977, p. 4. 4Walker, R. W., Maj, USMC. "New Roles for the F/A-18. "Marine Corps Gazette (May 1986), 94. 5Stearns, Richard D., LtCol, USMC. Personal Interview (March 24, 1989). 6U.S. Air Force, p. 3. 7U.S. Air Force, p. 4. 8U.S. Air Force, p. 5. 9The Boeing Company, Military Aircraft Product Development, "Low-Altitude, High-Speed, Visual Acquisition of Tactical and Strategic Ground Targets, Part VII," Defense Technical Information Center, May, 1967, pp. v-vi. 10U.S. Air Force, p. 2. 11U.S. Air Force, p. 3. 12U.S. Air Force, p. 4. 13U.S. Air Force, pp. 4-12. 14Center for Naval Analyses. "F/A-18 Single-Seat Versus Dual- Seat Crew Evaluation (U)" July, 1987, pp. 1-2. 15Center for Naval Analyses, p. 5. 16Center for Naval Analyses, pp. 1-4. 17Center for Naval Analyses, p. 16. 18Center for Naval Analyses, p. 55. 19Center for Naval Analyses, p. 42. FOOTNOTES (Cont'd) 20Center for Naval Analyses, p. 51. 21Center for Naval Analyses, p. 54. 22Center for Naval Analyses, p. 34. 23Center for Naval Analyses, p. 61. 24Center for Naval Analyses, p. 63. 25Center for Naval Analyses, pp. 64-65. 26Center for Naval Analyses, pp. 64-65. 27Center for Naval Analyses, pp. 64-65. 28Center for Naval Analyses, pp. 64-65. 29Center for Naval Analyses, pp. 64-65. 30Center for Naval Analyses, pp. 64-65. 31Center for Naval Analyses, pp. 64-65. 32Center for Naval Analyses, pp. 64-65. 33Fagan, M. S., Maj, USMC. Personal Interview (March 24, 1989). 34Krupp, D., LtCol, USMC. Personal Interview (March 24, 1989). BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. The Boeing Company, Military Aircraft Product Develop- ment. Low-Altitude, High-Speed, Visual Acquisition of Tactical and Strategic Ground Targets, Part VII. Cameron Station: Defense Technical Information Center, 1967. 2. Center for Naval Analyses, Naval Warfare Operations Division. F/A-18 Single-Seat Versus Dual-Seat Crew Evaluation (U). Alexandria: Center for Naval Analyses, 1987. 3. Fagan, M. S., Maj, USMC, Administrative Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation, USMC. Personal interview about aerial reconnaissance. Arlington, Virginia, March 24, 1989. 4. "Fighter Aircraft," Encyclopaedia Britannica (1985), IV, 771. 5. Krupp, D., LtCol, USMC, Fighter Program Coordinator, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps. Personal interview about F/A-18 capabilities. Arlington, Virginia, March 24, 1989. 6. Richardson, Doug, and Mike Spick. Modern Fighting Aircraft: F-4 Phantom II. New York: Arco Publishing, Inc., 1984. 7. Stearns, R. W., LtCol, USMC, Section Head, Aviation Plans, Programs, Doctrine, Joint Matters and Budget Branch, Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps. Personal interview about proposed aviation force structure. Arlington, Virginia, March 24, 1989. 8. Walker, R. W., Maj, USMC. "New Roles for the F/A-18." Marine Corps Gazette, (May 1986); 90-95. 9. U. S. Air Force. Air Force Avionics Laboratory. Crew Size Evaluation For Tactical All-Weather Strike Aircraft, Cameron Station: Defense Technical Information Center, 1977. Click here to view image
