"MLRS": A Rocket System For The Marine Corps
AUTHOR Major C. W. Morris, USMC
CSC 1989
SUBJECT AREA - Aviation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: "MLRS": A ROCKET SYSTEM FOR THE MARINE CORPS
I. Purpose: To establish the need for a Marine Corps
General Support Rocket System as well as a concept for
employment of the system after it is acquired.
II. Problem: Although the use of rocket launchers is not
new to the Marine Corps, at present there is no general
support rocket system in its inventory. Due to artillery
force reductiona1 the age of the present general support tube
systems, and the dynamics of the modern battlefield, the
MAGTF commanders are going to require surface-to-surface fire
support which will not be available without the acquisition
of a replacement general support weapon system.
III. Data: The Army presently possesses a Multiple Launch
Rocket System (MLRS) which has proven very versatile and both
operationally and strategically mobile. The massing and
shock firepower capabilities of this system are very
beneficial to the maneuver commander when considering that
most enemy forces the Marine Corps could face will be
equipped with rocket launchers and mechanized or armored
forces spread over great distances. The maneuver commander
requires a system to take advantage of new target acquisition
capabilities, to expand his area of influence, and to provide
counterfire and interdiction of enemy second echelon forces.
The Marine Corps MAGTF Master Plan establishes the
requirement for a general support weapon system with a range
of 40 kilometers. The currently fielded MLRS presently
approaches that range, and, with the advent of new
experimental munitions, will more than double it, thereby
allowing the maneuver commander to expand his area of
influence without total reliance on valuable air assets. The
MLRS provides the support required to prosecute Maneuver
Warfare.
IV. Conclusions: The Army MLRS is an "off-the-shelf,"
expeditionary system which meets the needs and requirements
of the Marine Corps extremely well. While there are some
significant disadvantages, not the least of which is cost,
there are many advantages which provide the maneuver
commander a strategically mobile system with more combat
power over a greater range than he has heretofore known. It
is a weapon ideally suited to expanding th. MAGTF commander's
area of influence and destroying enemy cohesion by applying
firepower at the proper place and time.
V. Recommendations: While the Marine Corps is presently
considering acquisition of the MLRS, the decision must be
finalized and the system purchased to replace the aging
203-mm howitzer on a one-for-one basis. The advantages of
the system and overall increase in firepower will far
outweigh the initial procurement cost.
"MLRS": A ROCKET SYSTEM FOR THE MARINE CORPS
OUTLINE
THESIS: Attention must be focused on both the acquisition
and employment of an optimum number of rocket launchers to
adequately support the Marine Corps and its concept of
deployment as a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) and
employment as a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF).
I. Introduction
II. A brief history of rocket employment
A. Early development and use of rocket systems
B. Modern development and use of rocket systems
through WW II and Korea
III. Army and Marine interest in rocket systems
A. Army and Marine developmental testing
B. Army acquisition of the MLRS
IV. Army employment of the MLRS
A. System characteristics
B. Concept of employment
V. Marine requirement for the MLRS
A. Reductions in general support tube artillery
B. Initiative for replacement general support
system
1. Disadvantages of the MLRS
2. Advantages of the MLRS
VI. Marine employment of the MLRS
A. Integration of MLRS with the Maneuver Warfare
Concept
B. Proposed organization and concept of employment
VII. Summary
"MLRS": A ROCKET SYSTEM FOR THE MARINE CORPS
As early as 1814, Sir William Congreve had written of
the theory of rocket system employment. In his writings he
discussed the facility of firing a great number of rounds
as quickly as possible, thereby advocating the capability of
massing fires and the benefits that accrue to a rocket
system (2:1 and 2). He stressed two characteristics: the
simplicity of a launcher and, primarily, its capacity to
mass fires on a large target instantaneously, thus affecting
total surprise on the enemy. In the 198O's his theories on
the tactical employment of rocket launchers are still
valid. While the use of rockets as early as 1232 A.D. by
the Chinese has been documented (4:10 and 11), the
employment of rockets for surprise, psychological, and shock
effects has been debated continually since that time. Over
the centuries the employment of rockets as a weapon system
has been refined until, looking at modern day examples, we
begin to see extremely effective systems utilized by many
nations of the world. Most effective, both in capabilities
and numbers, have been the Warsaw Pact systems. There are
other examples, including the West German Light Artillery
Rocket System (LARS) and the US Army Multiple Launch Rocket
System (MLRS); but it is the Soviets who have used these
systems continually and effectively for the greatest period
of time.
Due to the fact that Soviet arms sales have proliferated
to a great degree since World War II, the probability of
meeting the armed forces of a country equipped with rocket
systems, whether in low, medium, or high intensity conflict,
is very great. Does the Marine Corps require a rocket
system to provide a massing and counterfire capability to
meet such a threat? The answer is, unequivocally. "Yes!"
In fact, a number of proposals for the acquisition and
employment of such a system have been made over the years.
However, these proposals have received little attention
until recently. The most recent Program Objecotive
Memorandum (POM) has budgeted for the acquisition of three
U. S. Army multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) in Fiscal
Year (FY) 93 and an additional five in FY 94 (8:13).
Questions of adequacy of numbers were not addressed by this
proposed acquisition. Unfortunately, this decision was
based upon a cross section of several proposed employment
concepts with no firm Required Operational Capabilities
(ROC) being approved to date. One draft ROC proposes a
General Support Rocket System (GSRS) battalion of eighteen
launchers (15:2). While other proposals have surfaced, to
include anywhere from four to eighteen launchers per Marine
division, the POM proposed acquisition will not provide for
adequate numbers of launchers. Therefore, attention must be
focused on both the acquisition and employment of an optimum
number of rocket launchers to adeauately support the Marine
Corps and its conceit of deployment as a Marine
Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) and employment as a Marine
Expeditionary Force (MEF).
At this point, a brief history of the development and
use of rocket launchers may be beneficial in this study. As
it was mentioned previously, the earliest use of rocket
launchers was documented in 1232 A.D. by the Chinese. Since
that time many refinements in the systems employed by all
users have evolved. The greatest benefits derived from the
use of early rocket systems were the instantaneous mass
destruction capabilities, as well as the psychological
surprise and shock effects. Many of the early systems were
not accurate or stable and resulted in more danger to the
users than the enemy recipients (4:9 through 24). Rockets
were used throughout Europe in the 19th century and in the
Civil War of the United States. As the 19th century ended
and the 20th began, interest in rockets waned until the
1920's and 1930's, when developmental periods were begun by
Germany and Russia (4:28 and 29).
The first significant rocket use in modern times was
undertaken by Germany in World War II. Russia followed
closely with its own development and use of rockets. The
German system had a range of 7850 meters and the Russian
model, BM-13, had a range of 8500 meters (4:42). The
Russians continued development following World War II,
culminating in the BM-21 and BM-27 which are well known
today. The BM-21 is a 122-mm system with a range of 20
kilometers and the BM-27 is a 240-mm system with a range of
40 kilometers.
Early U.S. Army systems developed prior to and during
World War II included the 2.36 and 3.5-inch anti-tank
rockets, as well as the 4.5-inch surface-to-surface rockets.
The 4.5-inch system was developed in several configurations,
all of which were used extensively by both the Army and the
Marine Corps. Maximum achievable range of the 4.5-inch
launchers was 5250 yards. Marine utilization was an
off-shoot of Navy use in support of amphibious assaults.
Interest in these systems was reflected by numerous written
articles following World War II, and their use continued on
through the Korean Conflict where rocket batteries were
depended upon heavily and used with great effectiveness.
Interestingly enough, these launchers were used in
conjunction with helicopter transport providing tactical
mobility and resupply to the rocket units, which documents
the first use of helicopter movement of supporting arms to a
forward position of employment.
Several articles in the Marini Corps Gazette in 1952
and 1953 extolled the virtues of the employment of rocket
systems. Some of the advantages enumerated included
reinforcing the fires of direct support artillery as well as
the ability to surprise the enemy with massed fires. One of
the biggest disadvantages noted was the signature of the
rocket launchers when firing. This appears to be a major
disadvantage of systems in use today. As a result, special
sets of tactics and techniques were developed, which are
still in use. Following Korea, interest in rockets in the
Marine Corps began to decline, primarily due to the
increased weight required to extend the range (4:50 through
74). The only other modern experience of note for the
Marine Corps was to be found on the receiving end of rockets
during Vietnam, where the Viet Cong's use of Soviet rockets,
while not highly effective in producing damage, did have
some effect on morale (4:74 through 76).
Following the Korean Conflict, while assessing the high
intensity need for a tactical nuclear system with extended
range for use in the European theatre, the Army began
development which eventually lead to the Lance and Pershing
missile systems. However, Army interest in rockets did not
totally abate, and, eventually, a conventional, general
support artillery rocket system was seen as a requirement in
the early "70"s. Due to the increased Warsaw Pact threat
facing the Army in Europe, a need was forseen to be able to
attack critical, time-sensitive targets. In the early-to-
late `70's, the Army became interested in the Slammer, a
series of 2.75 inch aerial rocket pods mounted on a
trailer. Due to questionable lethality and range, interest
in this system disappeared.
Following developmental testing, the Army acquired the
MLRS in 1981 (10:1). Around the same time period Marine
interest was centered upon the Field Artillery Rocket System
(FARS), 5-inch Zuni rocket pods mounted on a trailer (5:59),
and the Hydra, a system incorporating pods of 2.75-inch
rockets (21:1 and 2). Although accused by individuals as
"misguided interest" (5:59), a real need for a mass
destruction weapon system was perceived in the Marine
Corps. Unfortunately, short range and lethality raised
questions that resulted in the Marines' decision to drop the
FARS and Hydra (21:1 and 2). In the mean time, the Army
culminated its efforts in the early `80's by awarding a
contract and acquiring the MLRS. The need for a rocket
system of this type was recognized by the Marine Corps at
this time, but remained unfulfilled (6:10 through 12).
Before continuing, a description of the system the Army
acquired is in order. The MLRS is a tracked,
self-propelled, all-weather, rocket system capable of
launching twelve 227 millimeter rockets in a single ripple
of approximately 60 seconds, or engaging targets
individually with a single rocket. The armored
Self-Propelled Loader-Launcher (SPLL) is operated by a crew
of three men and provides an automated positioning and
firing capability. Its on-board communications system and
fire-direction computer are digital, and provide a burst
transmission link to higher and adjacent headquarters. It
is produced by the LTV Corporation and is presently able to
deliver 644 (M77) anti-material/anti-personnel grenades
(Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions) per rocket.
It is air transportable by both the C-141 and C-5A
aircraft. It is highly mobile and is designed to augment
cannon artillery in its suppression, counterfire and
interdiction roles. It may be used in the general support
(GS), general support-reinforcing (GSR), or reinforcing (R)
role as an indirect fire area artillery weapon system. The
inherent responsibilities of each of these missions are
similar to those for tube artillery (11:1-12). It will
provide additional firepower while freeing tube artillery
units for the direct support (DS) role (3:2-4 through
2-14). Its present range is 30+ kilometers (unclassified),
but with the advent of munitions currently undergoing
development, its range will increase to 100+ kilometers.
While this presents a brief summary of some of the system
characteristics, more will be presented as the paper
progresses and the system is discussed.
The Army is presently organized utilizing the MLRS
battalion (3 batteries of 9 launchers each) as a corps
asset, either independently deployed or attached to a field
artillery brigade within the corps. The battalion is
organized to provide rocket fires in support of the corps,
as well as to reinforce other corps artillery units. In
addition, an MLRS battery (9 launchers) is organic to the
divisional artillery (DIVARTY) of the Army's heavy divisions
(mechanized and armored). This provides general support
fires for the division. The batteries which are organic to
the DIVARTY are virtually identical to those within a Corps
MLRS battalion (13:2-1 through 2-5).
The concept for employment of the MLRS is GS and GSR at
the DIVARTY level while the battalion can be used in a R,
GSR, or GS role at the Corps level. It can be used not only
for the attack of deep, high payoff targets, but also to
augment tube artillery suppression of enemy air defense,
counterfire, and interdiction (13:4-0 through 4-1). Its
value in augmenting tube artillery by providing additional
firepower is made evident when considering that one rocket
with 644 submunitions equals 7.3 rounds of 155-mm (88
submunitions per round) or 3.5 rounds of 203-mm (182
submunitions per round) (3:13-5). This equates to a single
launcher with 12 rockets equalling or exceeding the massed
firepower (one round per tube) of 11 batteries of 155-mm
howitzers or 7 batteries of 203-mm howitzers. While the
overall concept is to augment the fires of tube artillery,
it must be noted here that the 203-mm howitzer is reaching
the end of its service life. It is the intent of the Army
to eventually replace all 203-mm howitzers with MLRS (10:1)
Having noted the Army's success with MLRS, and the
Marine Corps' interest (or lack thereof) in rocket systems
following Korea, one might ask, "Why should the Marine Corps
be interested in such a system?" This is a very valid
question. There are several drawbacks, including cost and
logistics: still the system does offer some significant
advantages when considered in light of the Marine Corps
concept of deploying as a MEB and employing as a MEF, and
when considering the system's potential employment in
conjunction with "Maneuver Warfare". Due to the fact that
many Warsaw-Pact satellite and third world nations are now
equipped with Soviet mechanized, armored, and rocket units;
thought must be focused on these types of forces and what
the Marine Corps will need to face them in future
conflicts. The intensity and complexity of warfare has
increased due to extended engagement distances, very mobile
armored forces, and shorter duration of engagements due to
those highly mobile forces being placed in armored
formations. In such an environment, the commander of a
Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is going to need more
firepower than three or four battalions of artillery can
provide him. He will have to mass his fires repeatedly and
with great intensity if he is going to succeed in his
mission. It is under these circumstances that a rocket
launcher becomes a very useful weapon system. Its major
characteristics of heightened volume of fire, shock, and
surprise effect fulfill a definite requirement for the
massing of fires on high priority targets.
Another point to consider is the current age of Marine
Corps general support weapons systems. While the 155-mm
self-propelled howitzer will probably remain in both the
Army and Marine Corps inventories for some years to come,
since it is the mainstay of artillery support for Army heavy
divisions and provides needed self-propelled support for the
Marine Corps, the same cannot be said for the 203-mm. The
Army has opted not to extend the service life of that system
and in the very near future the Marine Corps will find the
logistics base for it ceasing to exist. The logistics base
for the 155-mm will remain open through the Army, but the
Marine Corps cannot afford to develop its own logistics base
for the 203-mm by becoming the primary inventory control
agency for it. This indicates that the Marine Corps may run
into the same problem now faced with the 105-mm howitzer;
that is, trying to maintain it as a logistically supportable
weapon system. In light of the disappearance of one GS
battalion per regiment, as well as current tube artillery
reductions in the remaining GS battalions, the Marine Corps
cannot afford further reductions due to aging weapons
systems. A replacement must be considered now for the
203-mm howitzer. A bold and aggressive use of the artillery
available by means of flexible command and control and
organizations for combat will temporarily diminish the
problem, but long-term considerations for additional fire
support must be addressed. A possible solution to these
problems is the acquisition of the Army MLRS as a
replacement GS system. There are disadvantages and
advantages to this proposal which will be discussed in the
following paragraphs.
While an exhaustive list of the system's disadvantages
is not necessary for the purposes of this paper, a few of
the major problems associated with the Marine Corps'
purchase of the MLRS require discussion. The first of these
problems is the cost. Currently, the cost of one MLRS
launcher is approximately 2.3 million dollars (8:14). Based
upon the number of launchers acquired, this can become an
expensive proposition. However, the increase in combat
power available to a MAGTF commander must be weighed, as
must be done for every acquisition, against the cost; and it
appears, to this untrained observer, to be well worth it. A
second drawback is logistic support. The rockets are large
and cumbersome; but, as was pointed out in previous
comparisons (10:5), while 30 days of ammunition for the MLRS
is slightly heavier, its cube is smaller than the 203-mm
howitzer. Tied to this, however, is the acquisition of
support vehicles to transport this load. A ripple of 12
rockets fired in less than one minute can expend a great
deal of ammunition, so indiscriminate use of the MLRS
against all targets cannot be contemplated. Current 5-ton
trucks (M900 series) would not be able to provide the
necessary ammunition resupply support. Acquisition of the
MK 48 Logistic Vehicle System (LVS), which the Marine Corps
is currently fielding in the Force Service Support Group and
considering for logistic support to DS artillery units,
would relieve this problem to a certain degree. Still, the
additional costs of this logistics system must be
considered. Prioritization of the overall targeting effort
to consider high value targets for engagement by MLRS would
aid in the justification for accepting these additional
problems.
An additional disadvantage to be considered is the fact
that MLRS is not helicopter transportable. On balance, this
is not an overly significant weakness when considered with
respect to the fact that the present DS weapon, the M198,
can only be transported by the CH-53E, and the GS
self-propelled weapons are not helicopter transportable at
all. The very fact that the mobility of these proven
systems is constantly sited as a tactical shortcoming forces
consideration of the same shortcoming regarding the MLRS.
One last disadvantage to be addressed is its firing
signature. Once the rocket is launched, the dust and smoke
create a signature that can be easily identified, visually,
and the trajectory of the rocket can be identified
electronically. This vulnerability has been overcome to a
certain degree by the Army, by the employment of
"shoot-and-scoot" tactics; that is, firing followed by
immediate launcher displacement. This requires in-depth
planning of battle zones to allow for the rapid movement of
launchers and uncovering a large number of firing positions
for their sites.
While the disadvantages are significant and must be
considered in light of possible acquisition, there are many
advantages to the current MLRS fielded by the Army.
Foremost among these is mobility. The M270 MLRS is a
tracked vehicle, providing much greater cross-country
mobility, and speed in displacement for survivability than
current towed weapon systems. The M270 is lighter and
smaller than the present 155-mm or 203-mm self-propelled
tube systems (3:3-3), which contributes to its compatibility
with all present landing craft and the LCAC (Landing Craft,
Air Cushion). In addition, it is capable of being airlifted
by both the C-141 and C-5A aircraft, making its strategic
mobility a point of considerable interest. The ammunition
weight and cube are similar to that of the present 203-mm
howitzer (10:5) which keeps it compatible with the present
amphibious lift capability. In addition, the on-board fire
control computer and navigation system allow for individual
launcher employment or the massing of the fires of several
launchers.
The advantage of increased lethality available with the
MLRS has already been mentioned. This increased killing
power is due largely to the numerous and diverse types of
munitions available and under development for the system.
At present, the M77 rocket fired by the MLRS delivers DPICM
to a range of 32 kilometers. The MAGTF Master Plan (19:Sec
7:30) calls for increased capabilities for counterfire and
the development of a GS system with a range of 40
kilometers. The MLRS approaches this now. At present, tube
artillery is capable of ranging 30 kilometers, but maximum
charges fired to achieve this contribute heavily to tube
wear. Developmental warheads for the MLRS include
scatterable mines, terminally guided warheads, seek-and-
destroy armor (SADARM), and chemical munitions. However,
the most significant developmental munition is the Army
Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), which would extend the
range to 100+ kilometers. While only two missiles per
launcher can be employed, literally no launcher modification
is required, and the capability of the system in terms of
depth of attack will be markedly increased.
An advantage for the Marine Corps lies in the fact that
the MLRS has already been fielded by the Army providing a
proven, off-the-shelf system for acquisition. There would
be some research and development costs associated with it,
for instance, hardening of the computerized systems against
salt water associated with amphibious operations; but these
would be minimal. In fact, the Army may be convinced to
participate and gain a product improvement. Overall, there
would be limited developmental costs incurred.
Finally, there would be a significant manpower savings
with the adoption of the MLRS. In these days of tight
budgets and manpower reductions, this could provide some
welcome relief and allow the excess personnel to be assigned
elsewhere. The battery structure proposed by Major Mazzara
(5:58) calls for 5 officers and 71 enlisted (a crew of 3 is
required to operate the launcher). This is similar to the
Army internal launcher organization and is workable from a
Marine Corps standpoint. When compared to the present
203-mm battery of 5 officers and 105 enlisted, a significant
manpower reduction becomes evident. A one-for-one
replacement with the present 203-mm would result in the
significant decrease of 136 personnel in the overall
artillery force structure. Additional support personnel
would not be deemed necessary.
When looking at a numbers comparison only, the
advantages definitely outweigh the disadvantages. However,
if the MLRS were acquired, the Marine Corps must still
determine how it will be employed. Since the considerations
following acquisition are still in their infancy, a possible
method of employment for the Marine Corps requires
development.
Before developing a Marine Corps concept of MLRS
employment, we must first examine how the MLRS would be
employed and integrated into the maneuver warfare concept.
Captain John SCHMITT of the Marine Corps Combat Development
Center's MAGTF Warfighting Center is currently developing a
draft of the new FMFM 1, which will be a keystone manual for
the Marine Corps perspective on warfighting doctrine. In
it, maneuver warfare is dealt with extensively. By its very
nature MLRS would lend itself readily to employment as a GS
weapon system with which the maneuver commander can
influence combat. Maneuver warfare must be thought of in
terms of space and time to gain a positional advantage as
well as generating a faster operational tempo to gain
decisive superiority at the required time and place.
Attempts should be made to shatter the enemy's moral and
physical cohesion through rapid, violent and unexpected
actions. Basically, the aim is to create a situation with
which he cannot cope. Firepower, especially that which will
contribute to the shock and surprise of the enemy force,
will be critical to accomplishing these tasks. The idea is
to shift combat power, defined as the sum of firepower and
maneuver, to decisive points and times in the battle.
Firepower, such as that provided by the MLRS can rapidly
shift combat power without the physical movement of maneuver
units. MLRS, due to tts capacity for mobility, lethality,
surprise, and shock; equating to instant suppression and
destruction of large areas of the battlefield; can provide
that concentration of combat power at decisive places and
times. It is capable of immediate response to a situation
with massive coverage of a particular area of the
battlefield. Any joint munitions effects manual will bear
out the increased effects of a first round, massed
time-on-target (TOT) as opposed to second and succeeding
volleys. The key to the employment of the MLRS is the
selective application of its massive capabilities against
critical enemy vulnerabilities. This would lend itself to
the GS mission where control is centralized and exercised
directly by the maneuver commander through his artillery
headquarters. The attempt is to pose dilemnas to the enemy
so rapidly that the maneuver commander dictates terms of
battle. He actively works to seek out enemy vulnerabilities
and concentrate his combat power against them. Rapid rates
of fire and the capability to mass on one or engage twelve
individual targets from a single launcher provide a
capability heretofore unknown by the maneuver commander.
The munition pattern from a single rocket covers an area on
the ground approximately 200 meters in diameter (3:6-10).
The variety of warheads under development would give the
commander a great deal of flexibility.
The present range capability of the MLRS approaches that
called for in the MAGTF master plan. However, the advent of
the ATACMS would allow the maneuver commander to engage
extremely deep targets with a surface-to-surface fire
support system in any kind of weather and in any type of
terrain. Survivability of Marine air assets, the only
system now capable of deep interdiction, as well as an
overall savings of air sorties available, hang in the
balance. It is interesting to note that the Army organizes
its defensive framework to include an area for deep
operations (14:138). An Army commander has the MLRS. as
well as Joint Air Attack Team (JAAT) operations, at his
disposal to extend his area of influence and pursue deep
operations. While the Marine framework considers three
echelons -- security, MBA, and rear -- and stresses deep
attack (18:8-6 and 8-7), the only fire support asset
available for deep operations is air, weather permitting.
Can the MAGTF commander afford to squander air assets and
sorties -- or worse, let his vital mission requirements go
unfulfilled -- when there is an all-weather system available
which would allow him to provide deep interdiction of enemy
second echelon elements and counterfire? MLRS poses an
exciting alternative to extend the MAGTF commander's area of
influence. Given proper intelligence regarding his area of
interest, and new capabilities for target acquisition (SRI
group), he now has an additional capacity for attacking high
priority targets acquired well beyond the security area.
If, in fact, these points are deemed to have merit and
the MLRS is acquired, we must now turn our attention to the
numbers of launchers the Marine Corps will require and how
they will be employed. It is recommended that the MLRS be
procurred to replace the 203-mm howitzer on a one-for-one
basis. Based upon the currently proposed artillery force
structure, this would require a total buy of 42 launchers
(12 each for the Tenth and Eleventh Marines, and 18 for the
Fourteenth Marines) for the active and reserve artillery
component. This figure accounts neither for a maintenance
or operational readiness float, nor launchers for the
Maritime Prepositioned Force, all of which may also have to
be considered. The fact that we ultimately face the demise
of the 203-mm howitzer, in addition to the active regiments
facing the loss of one GS battalion and one 155-mm howitzer
battery, dictates the acquisition of a replacement system
to maintain firepower for the MAGTF. The austere artillery
assets that would remain without this acquisition are
totally inadequate. The Twelfth Marines would maintain
their light structure for GS artillery while the Tenth,
Eleventh, and Fourteenth Marines would increase their GS
capability with procurement of the MLRS. Furthermore, an
overall manpower savings of 136 personnel for active
artillery regiments and 102 personnel for the reserve
establishment would accrue. The increase in firepower and
lethality for the MAGTF commander would be substantial.
Twelve launchers (two six-laundher batteries) of MLRS can
provide the equivalent first-round firepower of 84 tubes of
203-mm howitzers (14 six-gun batteries) per MEF with
comparable embarkation characteristics to presently employed
systems (comparison is based upon numbers of submunitions
delivered in one volley). An added advantage is the
strategic mobility of airlift by C-141 aircraft. One
battery (six launchers) of MLRS could be attached to the DS
battalion of each MEB to increase the firepower of that
organization. Upon compositing to form the MEF, one battery
could provide GS fires to the GCE, and the other battery
could provide GS fires to the MEF commander to take
advantage of the SRI Group acquisition capability and allow
him to formulate his own counterfire and interdiction
programs.
Response to the GCE is critical, but the MEF commander
must also have a means of increasing his area of influence
and providing surprise, rapid and massively destructive
fires upon his own priority targets within that area. MLRS
makes this provision by supplying the MAGTF commander an
all-weather, expeditionary, surface-to-surface, fire support
asset which provides greater survivability for aviation
assets; particularly with the advent of ATACMS. Both the
GCE and MEF commanders would now have a capability to not
only extend their areas of influence, but provide a means of
destroying enemy cohesion through selective use of separate
counterfire and interdiction programs within these areas.
They would have the capacity to mass an element of combat
power with a ferocity that has been totally unavailable in
the past.
By relying upon the present personnel within the
artillery regiment (survey, meteorlogical, electronics and
track repair) there would be no real requirement for support
personnel increases. The GS role for the MEF and GS, GSR
role for the GCE would be appropriate with no real changes
in the inherent responsibilities delineated in current
Marine Corps doctrine (16:5-4). At the MEB level a mission
of GS or GSR would be appropriate.
A reinforcing (R) mission would not be appropriate due
to the need to strike high priority targets with mass
destructive fires in accordance with the priorities set by
the maneuver commander. In addition, the signature
associated with those fires must be compensated for when
planning zones of action. The maneuver commander must not
only be aware of the MLRS mass destructive capabilities, but
the fact that its employment makes it a very lucrative
target.
The Marine Corps has had an interest in rockets either
actively, as demonstrated by their use in World War II and
Korea and developmental testing of various lightweight
systems, or passively, as demonstrated by continuous study
and periodic mention in professional journals. The MLRS is
an off-the-shelf, expeditionary system which can provide the
MAGTF commander the finest benefits of any rocket system,
with an increased capability for counterf ire and
interdiction. He is provided one of the simplest, most
direct means of destroying enemy cohesion, the
quintessential element in the maneuver warfare concept. The
maneuver commander must concentrate on the enemy who, when
considered in relation to a non-linear FEBA, may present
many high payoff targets well beyond the capabilities of
engagement of the present tube artillery systems. MLRS
acquisition and employment would provide increased
lethality, strategic mobility, and an overall enlargement of
the area of influence of the MAGTF commander, allowing the
DS units to concentrate on close support fires for the
individual maneuver units.
The possible demise of the 203-mm howitzer, as well as
reduction in overall numbers of tubes, demands the
examination of a replacement system. The MLRS can exceed
the present capabilities with an overall decrease in
manpower requirements and a relative status-quo in
amphibious or airlift requirements. It is an expensive
proposition, to be sure; but one that provides for an
overall increase in fire support, as a subset of combat
power; allowing our maneuver commanders to destroy enemy
cohesion, to save Marine lives and aircraft, and above all,
to win!
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Bailey, Edward A., Capt, USMC. "Fire Mission Rockets."
Marine Corps Gazette, (Sept 1952), 17-20.
2. Congreve, Sir William. Details of the Rocket System:
Showing the Various Applications of this Weapon.
London: J. Whiting, Finsbury Place, 1814.
3. LTV Corporation, Missiles and Electronics Group,
Missiles Division. MLRS Briefing Manual. Dallas,
27 March, 1987.
4. Mazzara, A. F., Maj, USMC. "Marine Corps Artillery
Rockets: Back Through the Future." Command and
Staff College, Education Center, MCDEC; Quantico,
VA., 6 May, 1987.
5. Mazzara, A. F., Maj, USMC. "The Marine Corps and the
MLRS." Marine Corps Gazette, (Sept 1988) , 57-62.
6. McGrath, Jr.,F. J., Lt Col, USMC. "FARS." Marine Corps
Gazette, (Dec 1988), 10-12.
7. Moore, F. R., Lt Col, USMC. "Why Not Rocket Artillery?"
Marine Corps Gazette, (Dec 1945) , 30-32.
8. Sansone, F., Maj, USMC. Marine Corps Research, Develop-
ment, and Acquisition Command, Brief. "Light
Weight General Support Rocket Systems", Quantico,
undated.
9. Schmitt, J. F., Capt, USMC. Draft FMFM 1, Marine Corps
Keystone Manual for the Theory and Nature of War,
"Warfighting," Jan 89.
10. Schopfel, W. H., Lt Col, USMC, and Schmalz, E. R., Maj,
USMC. Point Paper, "General Support Rocket
System." MCCDC, Warfighting Center, 4 Jan, 1989.
11. U. S. Army. HQ, Department of the Army. Fire Support
In Combined Arms Overations, FM 6-20. Washington,
Dec 1984.
12. U. S. Army. Field Artillery School. Multiple Launch
Rocket System 0perations, FC 6-60. Ft Sill, Dec
1986.
13. U. S. Army. HQ, Department of the Army. Multiple
Launch Rocket System (MLRS) 0perations, TC 6-60.
Washington, Apr 1988.
14. U. S. Army. HQ, Department of the Army. 0perations,
FM 100-5. Washington, May 1986.
15. U. S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development
Center, Warfighting. Draft Required 0perational
Capability (R0C) for a General Support Rocket
System, Quantico, 1984.
16. U. S. Marine Corps. HQ, U.S. Marine Corps. Field
Artillery Support, FMFM 7-4. Washington, Feb 1981.
17. U. S. Marine Corps. HQ, U.S. Marine Corps. Fire
Support Coordination, FMFM 7-1. Washington, Apr
1981.
18. U. S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development
Command. Ground Combat 0perations, OH 6-1.
Quantico, Jan 1988.
19. U. S. Marine Corps. HQ, U.S. Marine Corps.MAGTF Master
Plan, 1400. Washington, 5 Dec 1988.
20. U. S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Research, Acquisition
and Development Command. U.S. Marine Corps Concept
of Employment for the General Support Rocket
System, Coordinating Draft. Quantico, Oct 1984.
21. U. S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Research, Acquisition
and Development Command. USMC Field Artillery
Rocket System and HYDRA-70, Information papers.
Quantico, undated.
22. Wade, Jr., J. J., Lt Col, USMC. "Ripple and Run."
Marine Corps Gazette, (Mar 1953), 32-35.
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