"MLRS": A Rocket System For The Marine Corps AUTHOR Major C. W. Morris, USMC CSC 1989 SUBJECT AREA - Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: "MLRS": A ROCKET SYSTEM FOR THE MARINE CORPS I. Purpose: To establish the need for a Marine Corps General Support Rocket System as well as a concept for employment of the system after it is acquired. II. Problem: Although the use of rocket launchers is not new to the Marine Corps, at present there is no general support rocket system in its inventory. Due to artillery force reductiona1 the age of the present general support tube systems, and the dynamics of the modern battlefield, the MAGTF commanders are going to require surface-to-surface fire support which will not be available without the acquisition of a replacement general support weapon system. III. Data: The Army presently possesses a Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) which has proven very versatile and both operationally and strategically mobile. The massing and shock firepower capabilities of this system are very beneficial to the maneuver commander when considering that most enemy forces the Marine Corps could face will be equipped with rocket launchers and mechanized or armored forces spread over great distances. The maneuver commander requires a system to take advantage of new target acquisition capabilities, to expand his area of influence, and to provide counterfire and interdiction of enemy second echelon forces. The Marine Corps MAGTF Master Plan establishes the requirement for a general support weapon system with a range of 40 kilometers. The currently fielded MLRS presently approaches that range, and, with the advent of new experimental munitions, will more than double it, thereby allowing the maneuver commander to expand his area of influence without total reliance on valuable air assets. The MLRS provides the support required to prosecute Maneuver Warfare. IV. Conclusions: The Army MLRS is an "off-the-shelf," expeditionary system which meets the needs and requirements of the Marine Corps extremely well. While there are some significant disadvantages, not the least of which is cost, there are many advantages which provide the maneuver commander a strategically mobile system with more combat power over a greater range than he has heretofore known. It is a weapon ideally suited to expanding th. MAGTF commander's area of influence and destroying enemy cohesion by applying firepower at the proper place and time. V. Recommendations: While the Marine Corps is presently considering acquisition of the MLRS, the decision must be finalized and the system purchased to replace the aging 203-mm howitzer on a one-for-one basis. The advantages of the system and overall increase in firepower will far outweigh the initial procurement cost. "MLRS": A ROCKET SYSTEM FOR THE MARINE CORPS OUTLINE THESIS: Attention must be focused on both the acquisition and employment of an optimum number of rocket launchers to adequately support the Marine Corps and its concept of deployment as a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) and employment as a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). I. Introduction II. A brief history of rocket employment A. Early development and use of rocket systems B. Modern development and use of rocket systems through WW II and Korea III. Army and Marine interest in rocket systems A. Army and Marine developmental testing B. Army acquisition of the MLRS IV. Army employment of the MLRS A. System characteristics B. Concept of employment V. Marine requirement for the MLRS A. Reductions in general support tube artillery B. Initiative for replacement general support system 1. Disadvantages of the MLRS 2. Advantages of the MLRS VI. Marine employment of the MLRS A. Integration of MLRS with the Maneuver Warfare Concept B. Proposed organization and concept of employment VII. Summary "MLRS": A ROCKET SYSTEM FOR THE MARINE CORPS As early as 1814, Sir William Congreve had written of the theory of rocket system employment. In his writings he discussed the facility of firing a great number of rounds as quickly as possible, thereby advocating the capability of massing fires and the benefits that accrue to a rocket system (2:1 and 2). He stressed two characteristics: the simplicity of a launcher and, primarily, its capacity to mass fires on a large target instantaneously, thus affecting total surprise on the enemy. In the 198O's his theories on the tactical employment of rocket launchers are still valid. While the use of rockets as early as 1232 A.D. by the Chinese has been documented (4:10 and 11), the employment of rockets for surprise, psychological, and shock effects has been debated continually since that time. Over the centuries the employment of rockets as a weapon system has been refined until, looking at modern day examples, we begin to see extremely effective systems utilized by many nations of the world. Most effective, both in capabilities and numbers, have been the Warsaw Pact systems. There are other examples, including the West German Light Artillery Rocket System (LARS) and the US Army Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS); but it is the Soviets who have used these systems continually and effectively for the greatest period of time. Due to the fact that Soviet arms sales have proliferated to a great degree since World War II, the probability of meeting the armed forces of a country equipped with rocket systems, whether in low, medium, or high intensity conflict, is very great. Does the Marine Corps require a rocket system to provide a massing and counterfire capability to meet such a threat? The answer is, unequivocally. "Yes!" In fact, a number of proposals for the acquisition and employment of such a system have been made over the years. However, these proposals have received little attention until recently. The most recent Program Objecotive Memorandum (POM) has budgeted for the acquisition of three U. S. Army multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) in Fiscal Year (FY) 93 and an additional five in FY 94 (8:13). Questions of adequacy of numbers were not addressed by this proposed acquisition. Unfortunately, this decision was based upon a cross section of several proposed employment concepts with no firm Required Operational Capabilities (ROC) being approved to date. One draft ROC proposes a General Support Rocket System (GSRS) battalion of eighteen launchers (15:2). While other proposals have surfaced, to include anywhere from four to eighteen launchers per Marine division, the POM proposed acquisition will not provide for adequate numbers of launchers. Therefore, attention must be focused on both the acquisition and employment of an optimum number of rocket launchers to adeauately support the Marine Corps and its conceit of deployment as a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) and employment as a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). At this point, a brief history of the development and use of rocket launchers may be beneficial in this study. As it was mentioned previously, the earliest use of rocket launchers was documented in 1232 A.D. by the Chinese. Since that time many refinements in the systems employed by all users have evolved. The greatest benefits derived from the use of early rocket systems were the instantaneous mass destruction capabilities, as well as the psychological surprise and shock effects. Many of the early systems were not accurate or stable and resulted in more danger to the users than the enemy recipients (4:9 through 24). Rockets were used throughout Europe in the 19th century and in the Civil War of the United States. As the 19th century ended and the 20th began, interest in rockets waned until the 1920's and 1930's, when developmental periods were begun by Germany and Russia (4:28 and 29). The first significant rocket use in modern times was undertaken by Germany in World War II. Russia followed closely with its own development and use of rockets. The German system had a range of 7850 meters and the Russian model, BM-13, had a range of 8500 meters (4:42). The Russians continued development following World War II, culminating in the BM-21 and BM-27 which are well known today. The BM-21 is a 122-mm system with a range of 20 kilometers and the BM-27 is a 240-mm system with a range of 40 kilometers. Early U.S. Army systems developed prior to and during World War II included the 2.36 and 3.5-inch anti-tank rockets, as well as the 4.5-inch surface-to-surface rockets. The 4.5-inch system was developed in several configurations, all of which were used extensively by both the Army and the Marine Corps. Maximum achievable range of the 4.5-inch launchers was 5250 yards. Marine utilization was an off-shoot of Navy use in support of amphibious assaults. Interest in these systems was reflected by numerous written articles following World War II, and their use continued on through the Korean Conflict where rocket batteries were depended upon heavily and used with great effectiveness. Interestingly enough, these launchers were used in conjunction with helicopter transport providing tactical mobility and resupply to the rocket units, which documents the first use of helicopter movement of supporting arms to a forward position of employment. Several articles in the Marini Corps Gazette in 1952 and 1953 extolled the virtues of the employment of rocket systems. Some of the advantages enumerated included reinforcing the fires of direct support artillery as well as the ability to surprise the enemy with massed fires. One of the biggest disadvantages noted was the signature of the rocket launchers when firing. This appears to be a major disadvantage of systems in use today. As a result, special sets of tactics and techniques were developed, which are still in use. Following Korea, interest in rockets in the Marine Corps began to decline, primarily due to the increased weight required to extend the range (4:50 through 74). The only other modern experience of note for the Marine Corps was to be found on the receiving end of rockets during Vietnam, where the Viet Cong's use of Soviet rockets, while not highly effective in producing damage, did have some effect on morale (4:74 through 76). Following the Korean Conflict, while assessing the high intensity need for a tactical nuclear system with extended range for use in the European theatre, the Army began development which eventually lead to the Lance and Pershing missile systems. However, Army interest in rockets did not totally abate, and, eventually, a conventional, general support artillery rocket system was seen as a requirement in the early "70"s. Due to the increased Warsaw Pact threat facing the Army in Europe, a need was forseen to be able to attack critical, time-sensitive targets. In the early-to- late `70's, the Army became interested in the Slammer, a series of 2.75 inch aerial rocket pods mounted on a trailer. Due to questionable lethality and range, interest in this system disappeared. Following developmental testing, the Army acquired the MLRS in 1981 (10:1). Around the same time period Marine interest was centered upon the Field Artillery Rocket System (FARS), 5-inch Zuni rocket pods mounted on a trailer (5:59), and the Hydra, a system incorporating pods of 2.75-inch rockets (21:1 and 2). Although accused by individuals as "misguided interest" (5:59), a real need for a mass destruction weapon system was perceived in the Marine Corps. Unfortunately, short range and lethality raised questions that resulted in the Marines' decision to drop the FARS and Hydra (21:1 and 2). In the mean time, the Army culminated its efforts in the early `80's by awarding a contract and acquiring the MLRS. The need for a rocket system of this type was recognized by the Marine Corps at this time, but remained unfulfilled (6:10 through 12). Before continuing, a description of the system the Army acquired is in order. The MLRS is a tracked, self-propelled, all-weather, rocket system capable of launching twelve 227 millimeter rockets in a single ripple of approximately 60 seconds, or engaging targets individually with a single rocket. The armored Self-Propelled Loader-Launcher (SPLL) is operated by a crew of three men and provides an automated positioning and firing capability. Its on-board communications system and fire-direction computer are digital, and provide a burst transmission link to higher and adjacent headquarters. It is produced by the LTV Corporation and is presently able to deliver 644 (M77) anti-material/anti-personnel grenades (Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions) per rocket. It is air transportable by both the C-141 and C-5A aircraft. It is highly mobile and is designed to augment cannon artillery in its suppression, counterfire and interdiction roles. It may be used in the general support (GS), general support-reinforcing (GSR), or reinforcing (R) role as an indirect fire area artillery weapon system. The inherent responsibilities of each of these missions are similar to those for tube artillery (11:1-12). It will provide additional firepower while freeing tube artillery units for the direct support (DS) role (3:2-4 through 2-14). Its present range is 30+ kilometers (unclassified), but with the advent of munitions currently undergoing development, its range will increase to 100+ kilometers. While this presents a brief summary of some of the system characteristics, more will be presented as the paper progresses and the system is discussed. The Army is presently organized utilizing the MLRS battalion (3 batteries of 9 launchers each) as a corps asset, either independently deployed or attached to a field artillery brigade within the corps. The battalion is organized to provide rocket fires in support of the corps, as well as to reinforce other corps artillery units. In addition, an MLRS battery (9 launchers) is organic to the divisional artillery (DIVARTY) of the Army's heavy divisions (mechanized and armored). This provides general support fires for the division. The batteries which are organic to the DIVARTY are virtually identical to those within a Corps MLRS battalion (13:2-1 through 2-5). The concept for employment of the MLRS is GS and GSR at the DIVARTY level while the battalion can be used in a R, GSR, or GS role at the Corps level. It can be used not only for the attack of deep, high payoff targets, but also to augment tube artillery suppression of enemy air defense, counterfire, and interdiction (13:4-0 through 4-1). Its value in augmenting tube artillery by providing additional firepower is made evident when considering that one rocket with 644 submunitions equals 7.3 rounds of 155-mm (88 submunitions per round) or 3.5 rounds of 203-mm (182 submunitions per round) (3:13-5). This equates to a single launcher with 12 rockets equalling or exceeding the massed firepower (one round per tube) of 11 batteries of 155-mm howitzers or 7 batteries of 203-mm howitzers. While the overall concept is to augment the fires of tube artillery, it must be noted here that the 203-mm howitzer is reaching the end of its service life. It is the intent of the Army to eventually replace all 203-mm howitzers with MLRS (10:1) Having noted the Army's success with MLRS, and the Marine Corps' interest (or lack thereof) in rocket systems following Korea, one might ask, "Why should the Marine Corps be interested in such a system?" This is a very valid question. There are several drawbacks, including cost and logistics: still the system does offer some significant advantages when considered in light of the Marine Corps concept of deploying as a MEB and employing as a MEF, and when considering the system's potential employment in conjunction with "Maneuver Warfare". Due to the fact that many Warsaw-Pact satellite and third world nations are now equipped with Soviet mechanized, armored, and rocket units; thought must be focused on these types of forces and what the Marine Corps will need to face them in future conflicts. The intensity and complexity of warfare has increased due to extended engagement distances, very mobile armored forces, and shorter duration of engagements due to those highly mobile forces being placed in armored formations. In such an environment, the commander of a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is going to need more firepower than three or four battalions of artillery can provide him. He will have to mass his fires repeatedly and with great intensity if he is going to succeed in his mission. It is under these circumstances that a rocket launcher becomes a very useful weapon system. Its major characteristics of heightened volume of fire, shock, and surprise effect fulfill a definite requirement for the massing of fires on high priority targets. Another point to consider is the current age of Marine Corps general support weapons systems. While the 155-mm self-propelled howitzer will probably remain in both the Army and Marine Corps inventories for some years to come, since it is the mainstay of artillery support for Army heavy divisions and provides needed self-propelled support for the Marine Corps, the same cannot be said for the 203-mm. The Army has opted not to extend the service life of that system and in the very near future the Marine Corps will find the logistics base for it ceasing to exist. The logistics base for the 155-mm will remain open through the Army, but the Marine Corps cannot afford to develop its own logistics base for the 203-mm by becoming the primary inventory control agency for it. This indicates that the Marine Corps may run into the same problem now faced with the 105-mm howitzer; that is, trying to maintain it as a logistically supportable weapon system. In light of the disappearance of one GS battalion per regiment, as well as current tube artillery reductions in the remaining GS battalions, the Marine Corps cannot afford further reductions due to aging weapons systems. A replacement must be considered now for the 203-mm howitzer. A bold and aggressive use of the artillery available by means of flexible command and control and organizations for combat will temporarily diminish the problem, but long-term considerations for additional fire support must be addressed. A possible solution to these problems is the acquisition of the Army MLRS as a replacement GS system. There are disadvantages and advantages to this proposal which will be discussed in the following paragraphs. While an exhaustive list of the system's disadvantages is not necessary for the purposes of this paper, a few of the major problems associated with the Marine Corps' purchase of the MLRS require discussion. The first of these problems is the cost. Currently, the cost of one MLRS launcher is approximately 2.3 million dollars (8:14). Based upon the number of launchers acquired, this can become an expensive proposition. However, the increase in combat power available to a MAGTF commander must be weighed, as must be done for every acquisition, against the cost; and it appears, to this untrained observer, to be well worth it. A second drawback is logistic support. The rockets are large and cumbersome; but, as was pointed out in previous comparisons (10:5), while 30 days of ammunition for the MLRS is slightly heavier, its cube is smaller than the 203-mm howitzer. Tied to this, however, is the acquisition of support vehicles to transport this load. A ripple of 12 rockets fired in less than one minute can expend a great deal of ammunition, so indiscriminate use of the MLRS against all targets cannot be contemplated. Current 5-ton trucks (M900 series) would not be able to provide the necessary ammunition resupply support. Acquisition of the MK 48 Logistic Vehicle System (LVS), which the Marine Corps is currently fielding in the Force Service Support Group and considering for logistic support to DS artillery units, would relieve this problem to a certain degree. Still, the additional costs of this logistics system must be considered. Prioritization of the overall targeting effort to consider high value targets for engagement by MLRS would aid in the justification for accepting these additional problems. An additional disadvantage to be considered is the fact that MLRS is not helicopter transportable. On balance, this is not an overly significant weakness when considered with respect to the fact that the present DS weapon, the M198, can only be transported by the CH-53E, and the GS self-propelled weapons are not helicopter transportable at all. The very fact that the mobility of these proven systems is constantly sited as a tactical shortcoming forces consideration of the same shortcoming regarding the MLRS. One last disadvantage to be addressed is its firing signature. Once the rocket is launched, the dust and smoke create a signature that can be easily identified, visually, and the trajectory of the rocket can be identified electronically. This vulnerability has been overcome to a certain degree by the Army, by the employment of "shoot-and-scoot" tactics; that is, firing followed by immediate launcher displacement. This requires in-depth planning of battle zones to allow for the rapid movement of launchers and uncovering a large number of firing positions for their sites. While the disadvantages are significant and must be considered in light of possible acquisition, there are many advantages to the current MLRS fielded by the Army. Foremost among these is mobility. The M270 MLRS is a tracked vehicle, providing much greater cross-country mobility, and speed in displacement for survivability than current towed weapon systems. The M270 is lighter and smaller than the present 155-mm or 203-mm self-propelled tube systems (3:3-3), which contributes to its compatibility with all present landing craft and the LCAC (Landing Craft, Air Cushion). In addition, it is capable of being airlifted by both the C-141 and C-5A aircraft, making its strategic mobility a point of considerable interest. The ammunition weight and cube are similar to that of the present 203-mm howitzer (10:5) which keeps it compatible with the present amphibious lift capability. In addition, the on-board fire control computer and navigation system allow for individual launcher employment or the massing of the fires of several launchers. The advantage of increased lethality available with the MLRS has already been mentioned. This increased killing power is due largely to the numerous and diverse types of munitions available and under development for the system. At present, the M77 rocket fired by the MLRS delivers DPICM to a range of 32 kilometers. The MAGTF Master Plan (19:Sec 7:30) calls for increased capabilities for counterfire and the development of a GS system with a range of 40 kilometers. The MLRS approaches this now. At present, tube artillery is capable of ranging 30 kilometers, but maximum charges fired to achieve this contribute heavily to tube wear. Developmental warheads for the MLRS include scatterable mines, terminally guided warheads, seek-and- destroy armor (SADARM), and chemical munitions. However, the most significant developmental munition is the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), which would extend the range to 100+ kilometers. While only two missiles per launcher can be employed, literally no launcher modification is required, and the capability of the system in terms of depth of attack will be markedly increased. An advantage for the Marine Corps lies in the fact that the MLRS has already been fielded by the Army providing a proven, off-the-shelf system for acquisition. There would be some research and development costs associated with it, for instance, hardening of the computerized systems against salt water associated with amphibious operations; but these would be minimal. In fact, the Army may be convinced to participate and gain a product improvement. Overall, there would be limited developmental costs incurred. Finally, there would be a significant manpower savings with the adoption of the MLRS. In these days of tight budgets and manpower reductions, this could provide some welcome relief and allow the excess personnel to be assigned elsewhere. The battery structure proposed by Major Mazzara (5:58) calls for 5 officers and 71 enlisted (a crew of 3 is required to operate the launcher). This is similar to the Army internal launcher organization and is workable from a Marine Corps standpoint. When compared to the present 203-mm battery of 5 officers and 105 enlisted, a significant manpower reduction becomes evident. A one-for-one replacement with the present 203-mm would result in the significant decrease of 136 personnel in the overall artillery force structure. Additional support personnel would not be deemed necessary. When looking at a numbers comparison only, the advantages definitely outweigh the disadvantages. However, if the MLRS were acquired, the Marine Corps must still determine how it will be employed. Since the considerations following acquisition are still in their infancy, a possible method of employment for the Marine Corps requires development. Before developing a Marine Corps concept of MLRS employment, we must first examine how the MLRS would be employed and integrated into the maneuver warfare concept. Captain John SCHMITT of the Marine Corps Combat Development Center's MAGTF Warfighting Center is currently developing a draft of the new FMFM 1, which will be a keystone manual for the Marine Corps perspective on warfighting doctrine. In it, maneuver warfare is dealt with extensively. By its very nature MLRS would lend itself readily to employment as a GS weapon system with which the maneuver commander can influence combat. Maneuver warfare must be thought of in terms of space and time to gain a positional advantage as well as generating a faster operational tempo to gain decisive superiority at the required time and place. Attempts should be made to shatter the enemy's moral and physical cohesion through rapid, violent and unexpected actions. Basically, the aim is to create a situation with which he cannot cope. Firepower, especially that which will contribute to the shock and surprise of the enemy force, will be critical to accomplishing these tasks. The idea is to shift combat power, defined as the sum of firepower and maneuver, to decisive points and times in the battle. Firepower, such as that provided by the MLRS can rapidly shift combat power without the physical movement of maneuver units. MLRS, due to tts capacity for mobility, lethality, surprise, and shock; equating to instant suppression and destruction of large areas of the battlefield; can provide that concentration of combat power at decisive places and times. It is capable of immediate response to a situation with massive coverage of a particular area of the battlefield. Any joint munitions effects manual will bear out the increased effects of a first round, massed time-on-target (TOT) as opposed to second and succeeding volleys. The key to the employment of the MLRS is the selective application of its massive capabilities against critical enemy vulnerabilities. This would lend itself to the GS mission where control is centralized and exercised directly by the maneuver commander through his artillery headquarters. The attempt is to pose dilemnas to the enemy so rapidly that the maneuver commander dictates terms of battle. He actively works to seek out enemy vulnerabilities and concentrate his combat power against them. Rapid rates of fire and the capability to mass on one or engage twelve individual targets from a single launcher provide a capability heretofore unknown by the maneuver commander. The munition pattern from a single rocket covers an area on the ground approximately 200 meters in diameter (3:6-10). The variety of warheads under development would give the commander a great deal of flexibility. The present range capability of the MLRS approaches that called for in the MAGTF master plan. However, the advent of the ATACMS would allow the maneuver commander to engage extremely deep targets with a surface-to-surface fire support system in any kind of weather and in any type of terrain. Survivability of Marine air assets, the only system now capable of deep interdiction, as well as an overall savings of air sorties available, hang in the balance. It is interesting to note that the Army organizes its defensive framework to include an area for deep operations (14:138). An Army commander has the MLRS. as well as Joint Air Attack Team (JAAT) operations, at his disposal to extend his area of influence and pursue deep operations. While the Marine framework considers three echelons -- security, MBA, and rear -- and stresses deep attack (18:8-6 and 8-7), the only fire support asset available for deep operations is air, weather permitting. Can the MAGTF commander afford to squander air assets and sorties -- or worse, let his vital mission requirements go unfulfilled -- when there is an all-weather system available which would allow him to provide deep interdiction of enemy second echelon elements and counterfire? MLRS poses an exciting alternative to extend the MAGTF commander's area of influence. Given proper intelligence regarding his area of interest, and new capabilities for target acquisition (SRI group), he now has an additional capacity for attacking high priority targets acquired well beyond the security area. If, in fact, these points are deemed to have merit and the MLRS is acquired, we must now turn our attention to the numbers of launchers the Marine Corps will require and how they will be employed. It is recommended that the MLRS be procurred to replace the 203-mm howitzer on a one-for-one basis. Based upon the currently proposed artillery force structure, this would require a total buy of 42 launchers (12 each for the Tenth and Eleventh Marines, and 18 for the Fourteenth Marines) for the active and reserve artillery component. This figure accounts neither for a maintenance or operational readiness float, nor launchers for the Maritime Prepositioned Force, all of which may also have to be considered. The fact that we ultimately face the demise of the 203-mm howitzer, in addition to the active regiments facing the loss of one GS battalion and one 155-mm howitzer battery, dictates the acquisition of a replacement system to maintain firepower for the MAGTF. The austere artillery assets that would remain without this acquisition are totally inadequate. The Twelfth Marines would maintain their light structure for GS artillery while the Tenth, Eleventh, and Fourteenth Marines would increase their GS capability with procurement of the MLRS. Furthermore, an overall manpower savings of 136 personnel for active artillery regiments and 102 personnel for the reserve establishment would accrue. The increase in firepower and lethality for the MAGTF commander would be substantial. Twelve launchers (two six-laundher batteries) of MLRS can provide the equivalent first-round firepower of 84 tubes of 203-mm howitzers (14 six-gun batteries) per MEF with comparable embarkation characteristics to presently employed systems (comparison is based upon numbers of submunitions delivered in one volley). An added advantage is the strategic mobility of airlift by C-141 aircraft. One battery (six launchers) of MLRS could be attached to the DS battalion of each MEB to increase the firepower of that organization. Upon compositing to form the MEF, one battery could provide GS fires to the GCE, and the other battery could provide GS fires to the MEF commander to take advantage of the SRI Group acquisition capability and allow him to formulate his own counterfire and interdiction programs. Response to the GCE is critical, but the MEF commander must also have a means of increasing his area of influence and providing surprise, rapid and massively destructive fires upon his own priority targets within that area. MLRS makes this provision by supplying the MAGTF commander an all-weather, expeditionary, surface-to-surface, fire support asset which provides greater survivability for aviation assets; particularly with the advent of ATACMS. Both the GCE and MEF commanders would now have a capability to not only extend their areas of influence, but provide a means of destroying enemy cohesion through selective use of separate counterfire and interdiction programs within these areas. They would have the capacity to mass an element of combat power with a ferocity that has been totally unavailable in the past. By relying upon the present personnel within the artillery regiment (survey, meteorlogical, electronics and track repair) there would be no real requirement for support personnel increases. The GS role for the MEF and GS, GSR role for the GCE would be appropriate with no real changes in the inherent responsibilities delineated in current Marine Corps doctrine (16:5-4). At the MEB level a mission of GS or GSR would be appropriate. A reinforcing (R) mission would not be appropriate due to the need to strike high priority targets with mass destructive fires in accordance with the priorities set by the maneuver commander. In addition, the signature associated with those fires must be compensated for when planning zones of action. The maneuver commander must not only be aware of the MLRS mass destructive capabilities, but the fact that its employment makes it a very lucrative target. The Marine Corps has had an interest in rockets either actively, as demonstrated by their use in World War II and Korea and developmental testing of various lightweight systems, or passively, as demonstrated by continuous study and periodic mention in professional journals. The MLRS is an off-the-shelf, expeditionary system which can provide the MAGTF commander the finest benefits of any rocket system, with an increased capability for counterf ire and interdiction. He is provided one of the simplest, most direct means of destroying enemy cohesion, the quintessential element in the maneuver warfare concept. The maneuver commander must concentrate on the enemy who, when considered in relation to a non-linear FEBA, may present many high payoff targets well beyond the capabilities of engagement of the present tube artillery systems. MLRS acquisition and employment would provide increased lethality, strategic mobility, and an overall enlargement of the area of influence of the MAGTF commander, allowing the DS units to concentrate on close support fires for the individual maneuver units. The possible demise of the 203-mm howitzer, as well as reduction in overall numbers of tubes, demands the examination of a replacement system. The MLRS can exceed the present capabilities with an overall decrease in manpower requirements and a relative status-quo in amphibious or airlift requirements. It is an expensive proposition, to be sure; but one that provides for an overall increase in fire support, as a subset of combat power; allowing our maneuver commanders to destroy enemy cohesion, to save Marine lives and aircraft, and above all, to win! BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Bailey, Edward A., Capt, USMC. "Fire Mission Rockets." Marine Corps Gazette, (Sept 1952), 17-20. 2. Congreve, Sir William. Details of the Rocket System: Showing the Various Applications of this Weapon. London: J. Whiting, Finsbury Place, 1814. 3. LTV Corporation, Missiles and Electronics Group, Missiles Division. MLRS Briefing Manual. Dallas, 27 March, 1987. 4. Mazzara, A. F., Maj, USMC. "Marine Corps Artillery Rockets: Back Through the Future." Command and Staff College, Education Center, MCDEC; Quantico, VA., 6 May, 1987. 5. Mazzara, A. F., Maj, USMC. "The Marine Corps and the MLRS." Marine Corps Gazette, (Sept 1988) , 57-62. 6. McGrath, Jr.,F. J., Lt Col, USMC. "FARS." Marine Corps Gazette, (Dec 1988), 10-12. 7. Moore, F. R., Lt Col, USMC. "Why Not Rocket Artillery?" Marine Corps Gazette, (Dec 1945) , 30-32. 8. Sansone, F., Maj, USMC. Marine Corps Research, Develop- ment, and Acquisition Command, Brief. "Light Weight General Support Rocket Systems", Quantico, undated. 9. Schmitt, J. F., Capt, USMC. Draft FMFM 1, Marine Corps Keystone Manual for the Theory and Nature of War, "Warfighting," Jan 89. 10. Schopfel, W. H., Lt Col, USMC, and Schmalz, E. R., Maj, USMC. Point Paper, "General Support Rocket System." MCCDC, Warfighting Center, 4 Jan, 1989. 11. U. S. Army. HQ, Department of the Army. Fire Support In Combined Arms Overations, FM 6-20. Washington, Dec 1984. 12. U. S. Army. Field Artillery School. Multiple Launch Rocket System 0perations, FC 6-60. Ft Sill, Dec 1986. 13. U. S. Army. HQ, Department of the Army. Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) 0perations, TC 6-60. Washington, Apr 1988. 14. U. S. Army. HQ, Department of the Army. 0perations, FM 100-5. Washington, May 1986. 15. U. S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Center, Warfighting. Draft Required 0perational Capability (R0C) for a General Support Rocket System, Quantico, 1984. 16. U. S. Marine Corps. HQ, U.S. Marine Corps. Field Artillery Support, FMFM 7-4. Washington, Feb 1981. 17. U. S. Marine Corps. HQ, U.S. Marine Corps. Fire Support Coordination, FMFM 7-1. Washington, Apr 1981. 18. U. S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Ground Combat 0perations, OH 6-1. Quantico, Jan 1988. 19. U. S. Marine Corps. HQ, U.S. Marine Corps.MAGTF Master Plan, 1400. Washington, 5 Dec 1988. 20. U. S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Research, Acquisition and Development Command. U.S. Marine Corps Concept of Employment for the General Support Rocket System, Coordinating Draft. Quantico, Oct 1984. 21. U. S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Research, Acquisition and Development Command. USMC Field Artillery Rocket System and HYDRA-70, Information papers. Quantico, undated. 22. Wade, Jr., J. J., Lt Col, USMC. "Ripple and Run." Marine Corps Gazette, (Mar 1953), 32-35.
