Light Infantry: The Multi - Spectra Force AUTHOR Major Lance D. Jordan, USA CSC 1989 SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: Light Infantry: The Multi-Spectra Force I. Purpose: A review of the roles and missions of light infantry forces in low-, mid-, and high-intensity conflicts through an examination of common characteristics of light infantry forces. II. Problem: Although light infantry forces are often associat- ed with employment in a low-intensity conflict, the light infan- try force has an equally important role in the mid- to high-intensity conflict. III. Data: Light infantry forces have demonstrated a common characteristic: self reliance. These units have displayed excel- lent leadership patterns at the small unit level. Junior leaders are trained to make independent decisions. Historically, light infantry forces have been employed throughout the spectrum of conflict. Commanders must conduct a thorough METT-T analysis to insure that light forces are occupying the correct sector or are assigned missions within their capabilities. IV. Conclusions: U.S. Army Airland Battle Doctrine is consistent with the employment of light forces and a heavy/light force pack- age should be considered when the terrain and weather will justify the decision. V. Recommendations: Light infantry divisions have a role and mission just as mechanized forces; each has their own capabili- ties and limitations. Light infantry forces have the ability to operate in terrain that will not support mechanized operations. Light infantry can and should perform economy of force roles to allow heavy forces to concentrate elsewhere. Light Infantry: The Multi-Spectra Force OUTLINE Thesis: Light infantry forces are often associated with low- intensity conflict, but they have an equally important role in the mid- and high-intensity battlefield as well. I. Historical perspective A. Between the world wars B. Malaya l946-l966 C. China-Burma-India 1944 D. North Africa 1941 II. Characteristics, roles and missions of light infantry A. Self reliance B. Independent action C. Use of weapons III. Airland Battle Doctrine and NATO A. Doctrine and light infantry B. Light infantry in the covering force Light Infantry: The Multi-Spectra Force by Major Lance D. Jordan. USA Modern technology affords today's armies with the means to move, shoot, and communicate more reliably than ever. This en- hanced capability has resulted in an increased cost: heightened destructability. The military and political leadership from 1950 to the present have placed nuclear weapons at tactical, operation- al, and strategic levels. This strategy has been to maintain a credible, cost effective force(e.g. nuclear weapons as a substi- tute for conventional forces). Motivated by political and military reasons, commanders on both sides of the Iron Curtain are reevaluating the use of nucle- ar weapons. The recent signing of the INF treaty between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. has brought about a change in focus from nuclear to conventional forces. From a U.S. perspective, this change in focus has meant the creation of light infantry divi- sions. During REFORGER 1988 a brigade from the 10th Infantry Division (Mountain) was deployed to Europe to augment one of the U.S. Corps and to validate U.S. Army doctrine on the use of a heavy/light force combination. (6) Additionally, there are two other poignant illustrations of this modern phenomenon of military evolution. First, in 1973 well-trained and determined Egyptian soldiers armed with portable Soviet ATGMs defeated Israeli armor formations. (1:188) Second, in 1988 an Afghan rebel armed with the U.S. Stinger mis- sile defeated Soviet attack helicopters. The effectiveness of these light forces demonstrates that there is a role for light infantry on the modern battlefield. Light infantry forces are often associated with low-intensity conflict, but they have an eaually important role in the mid- and high-intensity battlefield as well. This analysis of light infantry will first look at three historical examples of the use of light infantry during and after World War II. Second, a discussion of common characteristics of light infantry units and possible roles and missions will be provided. Third, the requirements for light forces under Airland Battle Doctrine and a possible scenario for light infantry employ- ment in NATO will be addressed. Historical Perspective In the prologue to his book, On Infantry, John A. English writes, ". . . groups of foot soldiers remain to this day among the most powerful and influential forces on the battlefield." (1:ii) Had this point of view been expressed between World Wars I and II, John A. English would not have found many followers. The dawn of the airplane and the tank created much doubt as to the continued utility of foot infantry. During this period between the wars, two strategic thinkers emerged in Western writ- ings, J.F.C. Fuller and Liddell Hart. In the mind of Fuller the mechanization of the battlefield reduced foot infantry to perform- ing unimportant missions. According to Fuller, "Tanks conquer and infantry holds." (1:31) In contrast, Hart's philosophy of the "expanding torrent" was that foot infantry penetrated and held the flanks while mo- bile forces exploited and pursued. The use of light infantry to achieve tactical surprise by attacking at night in reduced visi- bility urged the revival of the importance of light infantry forces. Liddell Hart viewed the light infantry soldier or "light fighter" (7th Infantry slogan) as a stalker, an athlete, and a marksman. (1:34-38) Light infantry is easily distinguished from other infantry. Major Scott McMichael writes that there are two points of view on this issue. First, the traditional U.S. point of view is that light infantry is light in organization and equipment for the purpose of achieving strategic mobility. Second, the European view is that light forces have a philosophy and mindset that make them unique. Their tactics are different and their style appears to be more self reliant than conventional or mechanized infan- try. (8:xi-xii) Three excellent examples of the use of light infantry are found in the British operations in Malaya(1946-1966), the World War II China-Burma-India theater with the Chindits(1944), and the 9th Australian Infantry Division in North Africa(1941). Malaya 1946-66 In the first example-the British, along with the Malayan police and civilian authorities combined their efforts and con- ducted a successful counterinsurgency operation against Chinese communist forces. This case study of Malaya is a shining example of a successful counterguerrilla operation and serves as a good model for the proper employment of light infantry forces in a low-intensity conflict. Active military operations took three forms: combat patrols, area saturation with large units, and jungle bashing. (8:101) The first two methods proved to be unsuccessful methods due to the loss of surprise. The third technique, "jungle bashing." proved to be the most favorable method because small units would secretly infiltrate an area and force the guerrillas to move. The guerrilla's movement would subject them to ambush by govern- ment troops. Two key elements to the British success were small unit leadership and skill among their junior leaders in decision making. (8:101) Commanders were given wide latitude in handling operations within their area of responsibility. Company commanders were allowed to maintain their units in the field for long periods of time, thereby exposing the soldiers to the same conditions experi- enced by the guerrillas. In this type of environment,the British soldier learned discipline, patience, and field craft which led to denial of sanctuary to the enemy in the jungle. (8:106-107) Burma 1944 The second example is equally as significant, but not as well known. The actions of light infantry forces in Burma be- tween March to June 1944 were sometimes referred to as the Chin- dit War. The term Chindit was a reference to a group of British and Indian jungle fighters trained by Major General Orde C. Wingate, the "Lawrence of Burma." Eventually the term "Chindit" was used to refer to all of the units operating in the Japanese rear area. (10:918) These light infantry forces were employed at the operational level of war in a mid-intensity environment. Twenty thousand specially-trained jungle soldiers operated two hundred miles to the rear of the Japanese forward line of troops. The U.S. Army contribution to this campaign was three thousand soldiers under the command of Brigadier Frank D. Merrill. This unit, known as "Merrill's Marauders" was one of many British, Indian, and Chinese units under the command of Lieutenant General Joseph Stillwell. These were not elite soldiers, but ordinary, well-trained light infantry capable of independent action. (8:41) The operations of these units can be characterized as unor- thodox and ambitious. These units would move great distances over unimaginable terrain and attack the enemy where he least expected it. The training of these soldiers emphasized physical endurance, field craft, and mule team procedures. The tactics stressed surprise, envelopment, shock, and disciplined fire. (8:42) The self-sufficiency of the "Chindits" through the use of mule teams and aerial resupply made it possible for the units to operate without fixed lines of communication. The Chindit War illustrates that the high value of individual skills, coupled with special tactics and techniques can have an effect disporpor- tional to the actual numbers of men involved. (8:42) North Africa 1941 The third example, places light infantry in a static defense against armor. In April and May 1941 the German Afrika Korps met defeat when they encountered an outnumbered Australian unit at To- bruk.(9:1) The 9th Australian Division was not operating in a high-intensity battlefield as defined to- day(i .e. ,nuclear/chemical). However, considering the technology available in 1941 and the environment of the battle, it was high-intensity for its era. The 9th Division organized its de- fense as a strongpoint in depth with a mobile reserve. This division was well supported with separate brigades of armor and numerous anti-tank and field artillery battalions. The key to the success of this division was the close cooperation and coordi- nation of inf antry, armor, artillery, and engineers. The 9th Division used the depth of its defense to its advan- tage. It did not have sufficient forces to be strong everywhere along the front, so its commander chose to establish pockets of resistance. Enemy armor units were allowed to penetrate friendly forward units in preplanned areas so that they would be destroyed in designated kill zones within the strongpoint. The light infan- try used aggressive, deep patrolling to deny the enemy close-in observation and maintained all-around security against surprise attack by enemy armor. The Australians learned two unique lessons from this experi- ence. First, the artillery and the anti-tank guns are the nucle- us of the defense. Second, these forces must be integrated with the infantry units and engineer obstacles. In support, the infan- try must be organized to defend these weapon systems and the sectors of fire for the AT weapons must be established and maxi- mum effective marked on the ground with reference points. However, it should be noted, this process is time consuming and must take into account the preparation time for individual and crew-served weapon fighting positions. (9:46) Characteristics, Roles and Missions Characteristics The three previous examples establish three common character- istics for light infantry forces: a tendency towards self reli- ance, an independence of action, and a unique appreciation of the use of weapons. Moreover, to be effective, light infantry forces cannot depend on fixed lines of communication. The attitude that grows from this concept is self reliance. (8:219-222) Self reli- ance may be defined as the ability to do the impossible when faced with a critical mission and no resources. In turn, this self reliance instills strong interdepence between individuals and units. This interdependence is especially noted at the compa- ny, platoon, and squad level. Light infantry units and their leaders have a unique appreciation and view of terrain not shared by their mechanized brothers.(8:219-222) The simple fact that there is no terrain impassable to foot infantry may foster this difference. When selecting sectors for light infantry units, cover and terrain should be unsuitable for enemy tanks and hinder enemy counteractions. (3:33) The tendency towards self reliance is reinforced by excel- lent leadership at the small unit level. The need for indepen- dent action is paramount to insure the survival of light forces. The leadership in light infantry unlike that of other forces. tends to centralize in the NCO and junior officer. This is de- rived from shared experiences of danger and depravation. For example, patrolling is the common method of combat activity; this places a tremendous leadership burden on the young officer or NCO. The advantage created by superior leadership is no more apparent than in the light infantry force's ability to splinter and still conduct successful missions. Large units such as a battalion will breakdown into smaller units for movement or infil- tration of enemy lines. Latter the units will regroup at a desig- nated time and place for a mission. During REFORGER 1988 a light infantry battalion from the 10th Infantry Division (Mountain) conducted a night attack in the opposing force's rear area. While a night attack is not unusual in training exercises, the technique used by the unit was ambitious. This particular unit infiltrated the opposing force positions by squad, moved on multi- ple routes across unfamiliar terrain for over twenty-five kilome- ters, reassembled, and attacked the opposing force's rear area. Later, the unit exfiltrated by squads to return to friendly lines. (6) Finally, light infantry is unique because of its unique use of weapons. The light infantry soldier must be well trained in the employment and firing of his individual as well as the unit's crew-served weapons. The majority of the time these units will be operating outside the range of friendly artillery and beyond external logistic support for class III and V. The light infantry soldier cannot afford to waste ammunition nor to underes- timate his opponent's weakness. The use of weapons must comple- ment the light infantry soldier's tactics as well as the terrain on which he operates.(4:64) Roles and Missions The light infantry force is offensively oriented, but in a high-paced environment it cannot strike quick enough nor follow-through soon enough for decisiveness.(4:34) This fact was recognized by the 9th Australian Division at Tobruk and justified their use of a mobile reserve consisting of armor and anti-tank weapons. There is still a need for mechanized forces and light forces should not be substituted for heavy forces unless the terrain, weather, and combat situation justify the decision. Offensive actions by light forces in a low-intensity con- flict must be curtailed. The military arm of power is not the centerpiece, but takes a supporting role to the diplomatic, eco- nomic, and psychological instruments of power. The more likely role for light infantry is the training of government or popular forces, defending critical sites or borders. (7:57-58) For exam- ple, the mobile training teams sent to Honduras and El Salvador from SOUTHCOM provide instruction to units in those countries on everything from rifle marksmanship to training management. Other roles and missions which could be assigned during any level of conflict are protecting rear areas and defending built-up areas, but they will not be discussed here. Airland Battle Doctrine and NATO One of the previously stated characteristics of light infan- try is an appreciation for terrain. In order for light infantry to be successful in the mid- to high-intensity environment of NATO, the light force must exploit defensively the protective qualities of less traf ticable, compartmented terrain and yet operate offensively against Soviet forces. (7:116) This combination of defensive and offensive action is the thrust of the U.S. Army's Airland Battle Doctrine. The defense will provide the force with the opportunity to take offensive action. The decisive battle cannot be won while on the defense; in order to take offensive action, the light infantry force must seize the initiative and exercise it aggressively. The use of surprise is key to the successful execution of Airland Battle Doctrine. (11:14-16) By gaining surprise, light forces can over- come superior enemy forces by creating confusion and disorganiza- tion. Recognizing that heavy forces will dominate in a NATO Cen- tral Front battlefield, the use of light infantry forces in that environment must be examined with that as a foundation. A scenario described by Major James Greer, USA, in a July 1988 article in "Military Review" pointed out four possible missions for light infantry. The number one mission would be to demonstrate U.S. support to NATO by deploying forces to deter Soviet aggression. However, if deterrence fails three employment options would be available for light infantry: 1) To defend forward in the main battle area; 2) To provide rear area security; 3) To assume a covering force role forward of the main battle area. (2:11) The first two roles are easily understood, but the third mission does provide a unique challenge for light forces. Normally covering force operations are carried out by ar- mored cavalry squadrons and regiments. These units are self-contained and organized for operations away from the main body. The problem currently facing these cavalry units is their lack of sufficient dismounted scouts to cover the numerous trails and routes available to an attacking enemy. (2:12-13) Light Infantry can enhance the covering force units by con- ducting reconnaissance patrols, establishing observation posts, and organizing armor killer teams to destroy advance guard vehi- cles.(2:14) The covering force will tight nonlinearly, comple- menting the light infantry's desire to operate in the enemy's rear areas when the light force is bypassed. As in the example of the 9th Australian Division, the light infantry will defend in depth and establish pockets of resistance around their anti-tank weapon systems. A mobile unit of tanks,if attacked, or anti-tank weapons will form the reserve. Two possible methods or techniques would be used to describe this type of operation. One method would be to place the light infantry forward of the armored cavalry regiment. The infantry would be given a mission of reconnaissance of enemy units and disruption of their formations. This technique would be used when the covering force area is deep. (2:14-15) When the covering force area is shallow the side-by-side technique would be used. In both instances a METT-T analysis would determine the best sector to place the light infantry forces. Of the two options, the later would be the most difficult to control.(2:15) Light infantry forces must be as capable as the rest of the U.S. Army. It has to be prepared to face a full range of threats and environments from terrorism to high-intensity conflict. There is no doubt that the newly formed light infantry divisions were structured to take advantage of strategic lift assets in order to gain strategic mobility. (7:1-3) But like their European- counterparts, the U.S. light divisions are recapturing the spirit and philosophy of the light infantry ethic. Tough demanding training is developing those small unit leaders who are capable of taking independent action without reliance on guidance from above. Light infantry forces stress high quality leadership, confidence, and self reliance. The result is a small unit that is decisive and offensively oriented. (8:116) The chaotic environment of the battlefield will find individuals fighting not in mass formations, but in small disjointed groups working independently from one another, but toward a common objective. Groups of fighting men on foot will still reign supreme. (1:204) BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. English, John A. "On Infantry." New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981. 2. Greer, James K.,Major,USA. "A Light/Heavy Covering Force in Europe." Military Review. (July 1988), 10-19. 3. Hart, B.H. Liddell, CPT. "A Science of Infantry Tactics Simplified." 3ed. London: William Clowes and Sons, Ltd., 1926. 4. Hart, B.H. Liddell. "the Future of Infantry." London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1933. 5. Lloyd, E.M.,Col., Royal Engineers. "A Review of the History of Infantry." 2ed. West Port, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1908. 6. Lloyd, Herbert, Col, USA, C/S, 10th Infantry Division. Personal Interview(December 3, 1988). 7. Luttwak, Edward "Strategic Utility of U.S. Light Infantry Divisions, A Systematic Evaluation." USA Training Spt Ctr, Ft. Eustis, Va., August 1985. 8. McMichael, Scott R.,Major,USA. "A Historical Perspective on Light Infantry." Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Ks., September 1987. 9. Miller, Ward A. ,Col,USA. "The 9th Australian Division vs. the Africa Korps:An Infantry Division Against Tanks-Tobruk, Libya, 1941." Combat Studies Inst, Ft. Leavenworth, Ks, August 1986. 10. Montross, Lynn. "War Through the Ages." New York: Harper and Row Pub, 1960. 11. U.S. Army FM 100-5. "Operations." Hq U.S. Army, Washington, D.C. (May 5, 1986).
