U.S. Policy In Central America: Time For Decisive Action
AUTHOR Major J. M. Hughes, USMC
CSC 1989
SUBJECT AREA - Foreign Policy
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
U.S. POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA:
TIME FOR DECISIVE ACTION
I. Purpose: To show that the Marxist government of
Nicaragua has had ample opportunities to implement measures
to return to democracy.
II. Problem: Central American countries are vital to
America's national defense; yet our national strategy lacks
a feasible plan for protecting democracy and its future in
Central America.
III. Data: The importance of Central America and the
adjoining Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea is of extreme
importance to the United States, let alone the Western
Hemisphere. Nicaragua itself has strategic importance by
possessing at least one port on each coast capable of
handling merchant, cargo, tanker, and/or roll-on, roll-off
vessels. By becoming the only Central American nation with
a military designed for offensive purposes, Nicaragua
threatens its democratic neighbors and democracy itself in
Central America. Since taking power 10 years ago, the
Marxist Sandinistas have made public statements promising to
return to democracy but have yet to begin to take the first
steps toward that goal. Massive amounts of aid from the
Soviet Union and other Communist/anti-American governments
has allowed Nicaragua to become a potent and visible threat
to the region. Despite Nicaragua's broken promises and the
infusion of military equipment and weapons well beyond their
defensive needs, the U.S. has still to annunciate a firm
policy towards the Sandinistas.
IV. Conclusions: The United States must take immediate and
decisive steps to thwart the growing threat in Marxist
Nicaragua. We must support the cause of freedom and
democracy in Nicaragua and Central America-- for freedom once
lost, is rarely regained.
V. Recommendation: None.
U.S. POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA: TIME FOR DECISIVE ACTION
OUTLINE
THESIS STATEMENT: Central American countries are vital to
America's national defense; yet our national strategy lacks
a feasible plan for protecting democracy and its future in
Central America.
I. Importance of Central America, Gulf of Mexico,
Caribbean Sea
A. Principal route to Europe for NATO reinforcement
of U.S. troops, supplies
B. Half of U.S. imports/exports transported through
Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea
C. 2 out of 3 ships transiting Panama Canal carry
goods to or from U.S.
D. More than half of imported petroleum required by
U.S. passes through Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea
E. Nicaragua has two strategic ports; one on each
coast
II. Communist/anti-U.S. governments aid Nicaragua
A. Provide millions of dollars in military aid,
equipment
B. Also send advisors
III. Why should U.S. be concerned with Nicaragua?
A. Marxist government antithesis to democratic
Central American governments
B. Massive military buildup far beyond its defensive
needs
C. Sandinistas encouraging assassination/terrorism in
other countries
IV. Benefits of Marxist Sandinista government
A. Inflation soaring-past 30,000 percent
B. Currency was 11 to one dollar, now at 4.2 million
to one dollar
C. Harassment of citizens because of Christian faith
D. Intimidation
V. U.S. provided economic aid when Sandinistas came to
power in 1979
A. Supported efforts to replace Somoza
B. Provided $25 million in emergency food and medical
aid
C. Offered assistance relevant to development of
democratic institutions
D. Supported Nicaragua's request for loans from
international institutions
VI. Sandinistas have had opportunity to make democratic
reforms
A. Organization of American States promise
B. 1984 "Arias Plan"
C. 1988 Esquipulas II accords
VII. Freedom fighters looked towards U.S. as ally
A. U.S. has dismal record of supporting third
country allies
B. Cuba, Iran, Vietnam, People's Republic of China
VIII. Questions remain
A. Will Bush administration show political courage?
l. Humanitarian aid
2. Military aid
B. Will Congress support bill for humanitarian
and/or military aid?
C. Will U.S. support freedom in Central America?
l. History will judge
2. Freedom once lost is rarely regained
U.S. POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA: TIME FOR DECISIVE ACTION
Since President Bush's inauguration on January 2, 1989,
he has had to deal with many crisis on the national and
international fronts. But there is one crisis which
forebodes long-term trouble, needs immediate attention, and
decisive action: Nicaragua. Central American countries are
vital to America's national defense; yet our national
strategy lacks a feasible plan for protecting democracy and
its future in Central America.
The importance of Central America and the adjoining Gulf
of Mexico and Caribbean Sea is of extreme importance to the
United States, let alone the Western Hemisphere.
For example, the narrow straits of Florida, which pass
by Cuba and are considered the strategic crossroads of the
Western Hemisphere, would be the principal route to Europe
of U.S. troop and supply ships carrying 60% of the
reinforcements and resupplies to NATO during a European
emergency. About half of U.S. imports and exports are
transported through these waters, and two out of ever three
ships transiting the Panama Canal carry goods to or from the
United States. More than half of the imported petroleum
required by the United States passes through these waters.1
Nicaragua itself has strategic importance by possessing
at least one port on each coast capable of handling
merchant, cargo, tanker, and/or roll-on, roll-off (RO/RO)
vessels. Corinton, located on the Pacific side of
Nicaragua, can accommodate conventional merchant/cargo ships
and RO/RO vessels. The main pier is 380 meters long and the
port can accommodate ships up to 20,000 dead weight tons.
The port is large enough to allow the largest Soviet surface
combatants (the KIEV-class V/STOL carrier) to dock. Corinto
could also accommodate limited numbers of Soviet missile or
attack submarines, together with submarine support ships.2
El Bluff, located on the Atlantic/Caribbean side of
Nicaragua, can accommodate limited numbers of cargo, tanker
and RO/R0 vessels. The Sandinistas are in the process of
adding two new wharves of 180 and 200 meters in length.
When complete, the port will be able to accommodate vessels
of up to 25,000 dead weight tons. Cargo handling facilities
will include R0/R0 ramps and liquid cargo handling
equipment. The port can now accommodate limited numbers of
Soviet frigates and smaller vessels, including patrol boats
and intelligence collectors, but probably not submarines.3
Rama, located up river from El Bluff, serves as the way
station and distribution point for goods received at El
Bluff destined for the interior of Nicaragua. Rama can
accommodate limited numbers of cargo and R0/R0 vessels and
could accommodate Soviet frigates and smaller vessels, but
not submarines.4
Turning to their airfield capabilities, the
Sandinistas, with Cuban assistance in 1982, began
constructing the Punta Huete airfield. With its 10,000
foot runway, Punta Huete can accommodate any aircraft in
the Soviet inventory. Soviet reconnaissance planes flying
out of Punta Huete would be able to fly missions along the
U.S. Pacific Coast just as they now reconnoiter the U.S.
Atlantic Coast from Cuba.5 (For airfields capable of
supporting military operations by fixed wing aircraft and
helicopters, see Figure 1.)
All Soviet tactical fighter-bombers, intermediate-range
bombers and long-range bombers could use Nicaraguan
airfields, although some aircraft would be restricted to
use of those airfields with runways over 6,500 feet in
length. No aircraft in the current Nicaraguan inventory is
capable of flying combat missions against targets in the
U.S. If introduced into Nicaragua, Soviet tactical
fighter-bombers could attack targets in the Central
American and Caribbean area, including the Panama Canal,
the Gulf of Mexico and south Atlantic sea lanes.6
Soviet intermediate-range or long-range bombers
operating from Nicaragua would threaten the continental
United States, with the combat radius of the TU-95 Bear
covering all of North America. (See Figure 2, "Soviet
Aircraft Characteristics.") The potential for Soviet
military use of Nicaragua complicates U.S. defense
planning. In a crisis situation the United States could be
compelled to divert resources to counter such a
possibility. 7
If any nation has understood the strategic importance of
Central America and its surrounding waters, it has been the
Soviet Union.
In 1984 the United States Ambassador to the United
Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick, wrote, "By 1957 the Soviet
theoretical journals were writing about opportunities for
tying down the United States in the western hemisphere and
rendering us less able to act in such remote places as
Europe and Asia." 8
The Soviets have basically acknowledged the strategic
importance of Nicaragua. Within months of the Sandanista
regime establishing itself, they began receiving military
aid form the Soviet Bloc in the amount of $10 million
dollars. Since then, the Sandinistas have received a total
of 143,800 metric tons of military equipment with an
estimated value of almost $2.7 billion U.S. dollars from
Soviet bloc nations.9
Known Communist and/or anti-U.S. governments which have
provided military and economic assistance to the Sandinistas
include not only the Soviet Union but the following
countries: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, Vietnam, East
Germany, Poland, Romania, Peoples Republic of China, Libya,
PLO, and North Korea.10 Additionally, a spokesman for the
Soviet Foreign Ministry said that Moscow has no plans to
reduce or suspend millions of dollars in military aid to the
Sandinistas. The Soviets also deny any move on their part
to reduce arms shipments form Moscow to Nicaragua.11
Along with money, some of the above listed countries
send advisors to support the Sandinista military
establishment, principally in the fields of combat arms,
intelligence, internal security and
supply/maintenance/logistics functions. The Cuban advisor
effort (about 1,000-1,500) is the largest: the Soviet Union
provides 50-75 advisors with another 200+ coming from the
combined efforts of the East Bloc nations and periodically
from Third World sources such as North Korea. 12
In a report by the U.S. government, as reported by The
Washington Times, 28 February 1989, the latest figures show
that: "The Soviet Union exported about $515 million worth
of military equipment to Nicaragua last year, the second
highest total since the Kremlin began weapons deliveries in
1980 . . . Peak year for Soviet arms shipments was 1986 when
the Sandinistas received $55O million worth of equipment
U.S. officials have estimated Soviet economic aid to
Nicaragua at about $500 million annually." 13
Why should the United States be concerned about a small
country like Nicaragua, with a population of around 2.7
million (about the same as North Carolina)?14
First of all, its Marxist government is the antithesis
to democratic governments and therefore to its democratic
neighbors--like El Salvador, with its democratic future in
serious question. There is no doubt, however, that the
Sandinista regime is Marxist. In a speech delivered in the
Fall of 1983, Humberto Ortega, Sandinistan Defense Minister,
stated that the Sandinista regime was "guided by scientific
doctrine, by Marxism-Lennism . . . "15
Secondly, its massive military buildup is far beyond its
own defensive needs. Col. Lufty Azzad, Director of Honduran
Operations and Training on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said
that the Nicaraguan military might exceeds that country's
needs and that Nicaragua was a communist state intent on
expanding its power through Central America. 16 The
Sandinistas have created the largest armed forces in Central
America only 18 months after coming into power, and more
than a year before the armed democratic resistance became a
significant factor.17 The Sandinistan active duty armed
forces and security forces now number about 75,00O, plus
almost 44,000 in the inactive reserve and unmobilized
militia. 18 Nicaragua's 75,000 active duty
members dwarfs the defenses of the second largest active
duty force in Central America--that of troubled El Salvador
with 49,000 military members.l9
*Major items of military equipment provided to the
Sandinista armed forces by the Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc
countries include:
152 Tanks
237 Other armored vehicles
549 Surface-to-air missile
launchers (reloadable)
772 Air defense guns
370 Anti-tank guns
961 Artillery/mortar/rocket
launchers
62 Helicopters (includes 12 MI-267
HIND D "Flying Tanks")
45 MI-8/17 HIP (combat transports)
18 Fixed wing aircraft
6,000 Trucks
8 Patrol boats
8 Minesweepers
40 Radars
4 Communications intercept
facilities
252,000 Rifles
4,300 Light machine guns
3,850 Grenade launchers
*Source: U.S. Department of Defense publication: Soviet
Bloc Military Equipment Supplies to Nicaragua (July 1979-Oct
1988), pages 1-2
Finally, there is evidence that the Marxist Sandinista
regime is encouraging assassination/terrorism in other
countries--Latin American countries no less.
Twenty-eight terrorists who attacked an Argentine army
base in January in which all 28 terrorists, Seven soldiers
and one policeman died, had visited Nicaragua over the past
five years. The group, known as the People's Revolutionary
Army is headed by Enrique Haroldo Garriaran Merlo. The
Nicaraguan government said they "did nothing to encourage"
the terrorist attack.22
In published interviews, Mr. Merlo claimed participation
in the assassination of Mr. Somoza, the deposed Nicaraguan
dictator, which took place in Asuncion, Paraguay in 1980. A
former Argentine guerrilla and one of Argentina's most
wanted fugitives, Mr. Merlo also claimed participation in
the 1981 assassination of Maj. Pablo Emilion Salazar, a
Somoza National Guardsman. Maj. Salazar was one of the
first to take up arms against the Sandinistas. A Nicaraguan
resistance spokesman said his group has received information
from Nicaragua that Mr. Merlo had spent considerable time in
Nicaragua under the protection of Tomas Borge, head of the
Sandinista state security. Mr. Merlo has reportedly worked
with the Sandinistas since his exile from Argentina.23
In a separate report, two suspected murders of
Nicaraguan rebel leader Manuel Rugama said they were hired
by the Nicaraguan embassy to carry out the December 7, 1988
killing. Juan Bautista Nunez Amador of Honduras and Luis
Fernando 0rdonez of Nicaragua. said that they were hired by
the chief of security of the Nicaraguan embassy, Jose de
Jesus Pena.24
Since establishing its Marxist government 10 years ago.
the Sandinistas have provided the approximately three
million Nicaraguans with the following: inflation soaring
past 30,000 percent--since 1979, the year of the Sandinistan
revolution, Nicaragua's currency was at 11 to one dollar and
today it's 4.2 million to one dollar; harassment by the
Marxist government of Nicaraguan citizens because of their
Christian faith; Nicaraguans singled out for intimidation
by local Sandinistan defense committees for alleged
counter-revolutionary behavior; forcing Nicaraguans to
flee their own country with estimates of 75,000 to 125,000
settling around Miami, Florida alone; and with the Contra
war in a state of cessation, the Sandinistan army continues
to draft aggressively.25
Furthermore, official figures show that about 71,000
adult Nicaraguans out of a population of 3.7 million left
their country in the last six months of 1988 and didn't
return. Additionally, an independent nation-wide poll
conducted in Nicaragua and released towards the end of
February found that 49 percent of Nicaraguans would leave to
live elsewhere if they could.26
Now that we've covered the dangers Nicaragua imposes to
its Latin American neighbors, democratic governments in the
region, and to its own citizens, let's explore the United
States' role in Nicaragua's transformation from a
dictatorship to a Marxist government.
For half a century, the Somoza family had ruled
Nicaragua as its personal kingdom. 27 During this time, the
Somoza family seized most of the wealth of Nicaragua, to
include land the size of Massachusetts, when 200,000
peasants had no land.28 Just how closely tied was the
Somoza government and the United States?
According to the Department of the Army publication,
Nicaragua: A Country Study:
Feeling betrayed after the victory of the
revolution, Somoza declared that no president
anywhere had supported the policies of the United
States more devoutly than he did. United States
support for the Somozas had been similarly
unqualified until the mid-1970s.29
What is ironic, however, is that the insurgents battling
the American-backed Somoza's formed the Sandinista National
Liberation Front, taking its name from General Augusto Cesar
Sandino, who had rebelled against the United States
Marines' occupation of Nicaragua in the 1920s and 1930s.30
The Reagan administration's opposition to the Marxist
Sandinista government was well known. However, what is
apparently not well know is the initial economic generosity
and overall assistance the U.S. provided to the Sandinistas
when they came to power in 1979.
The U.S. supported, through various means, the
establishment of a democratic government in Nicaragua prior
to and immediately after the Sandinistas took power,
according to Ms. Kirkpatrick.31
The U.S. accomplished this, she says, by undertaking the
following:
--supporting efforts to replace Somoza by helping
to negotiate his departure and by supporting the
Organization of American States resolution that called for
his ouster
--by providing $25 million in emergency food and
medical aid in the first week the Sandinistas came to power
and $115 million in
prompt economic aid
--by offering assistance relevant to the
development of democratic institutions, even though the
Sandinista junta gave early signs of claiming a monopoly of
power and imposing censorship
--supported, inside the international fiscal
institutions, such as the Inter-American Development Bank,
Nicaraguan loan applications enabling it to secure from
these institutions more assistance than the Somoza regime
had received from international fiscal institutions in the
previous 20 years.32
Despite the U.S. government initial generosity to the
Sandinistas and offers to help establish a democratic
government, the Sandinistas rejected U.S. peaceful
intentions only to establish the Marxist government they
wanted all along.
The Marxist-Sandinistas have had numerous opportunities
to make the turn towards democracy. Shortly before their
revolutionary triumph, they made a written statement to the
Organization of American States that they would establish
true democracy in Nicaragua "within months." Their second
pledge to democracy was in 1987, under the "Arias Plan,"
when the Sandinistas committed themselves to a series of
major reforms by November 1987, most of which were never
honored. And the third promise for taking steps to
democracy was under the Esquipulas II accords, signed last
March. Here the Sandinistas again promised reforms similar
to those reached earlier, but soon turned against internal
opponents by assaulting a protest march that month and
jailing opposition leaders.33
The latest peace negotiations by the five Central
American president's negotiated a regional peace plan which
will result in the disarming the anti-Sandinista freedom
fighters (Contras) and closing their bases in Honduras. In
return, Nicaragua has promised to hold general elections by
25 February 1990, if not sooner.34
This latest agreement cannot bode well for democracy
when the president of Nicaragua, Mr. Daniel Ortega, is
quoted as saying "What we are doing here is burying the
cadaver of the Contras." He also said the regional peace
agreement was a political victory for his Marxist regime and
the defeat of the U.S. policy of support for the Nicaraguan
resistance (Contras).35 In order to initiate democracy in
Nicaragua, all Mr. Ortega has to do is hold
elections--something he as promised at least three times in
10 years but has yet to carry out.
Why did the democratically elected president of five
Central American countries make what obviously seems to be a
lop sided agreement with Nicaragua? Because a void has been
created from the lack of Central American policy initiatives
by the Bush administration, in particular Secretary of State
James Baker. (The only evidence of any type of policy
towards the Nicaragua/Contra situation is the current $27
million humanitarian aid for the Contras, left over from the
Reagan administration, which runs out at the end of March.
However, the Bush administration says, to date, they will
not let humanitarian aid for the Contras elapse.) The five
Central American president's agreed to Nicaragua's proposal
because they saw the existing vacuum in U.S. policy towards
Nicaragua along with no forthcoming policy.36
Representative Mickey Edwards, ranking Republican on the
Appropriations' Foreign Operations Subcommittee was more
specific as to why the U.S. is not involved in the Central
American peace process: The U.S. has been absent from the
peace process in Central America because of the slow pace of
the Bush administration in appointing personnel to key
foreign policy posts."37
Should the Contras look at recent U.S. history
concerning American government support for a third world
ally, what would they find? They would find a dismal record
of former, fallen allies like Cuba, Iran, Vietnam, People's
Republic of China and last, but certainly not least,
Nicaragua. These countries were once supported by the U.S.
but are now anti-U.S. or communist countries.
The Contras are Nicaraguans too and they seem to have
made the oldest mistake in the freedom fighter's
manual--they trusted American promises . . .38
Winston Churchill II, the grandson of one of Great
Britain's late prime minister's, posed this question for the
United States to ponder.
If you fail in Nicaragua, we must ask, where will
you fail next? If freedom and democracy are not
worth defending in your own hemisphere, where are
they worth defending? The Free World awaits your
answer. Its enemies are waiting, too.
So we await the answer. Will the Bush administration
show political courage and provide humanitarian aid to the
Contras? More importantly, will congress support a bill for
military aid to the Contras? Will Congress see the dangers
in allowing a Marxist government to continue to threaten
democracy in Central America? Where will the United States
draw the line to stop Marxist governments, if not in Central
America? These questions will only be answered as the Bush
administration hammers out its foreign policy.
However, the most important question to ask ourselves as
benefactors of ever 200 years of democracy is will we
support freedom in Central America? That is the question
for which we will be judged by history, for freedom once
lost is rarely regained.
RUNWAY
LENGTH
AIRFIELD (METERS) REMARKS
Punta Huete 3,000+ runway completed;
support facilities
incomplete; currently
used operationally
Sandino 3.000+ civilian/military
International use
Bluefields 2,000-3,000
Montelimar 2,000-3,000
Puerto Cabezas 2,000-3,000
La Rosita 1,000-2,000
Esteli 1,000-2,000
*Source: U.S. Department of Defense publication: Soviet
Bloc Military Equipment Supplied to Nicaragua (July 1979-Oct
1988), page 4
FIGURE 1
*SOVIET AIRCRAFT CHARACTERISTICS
COMBAT MAX NUCLEAR
AIRCRAFT RADIUS (MI) PAYLOAD CAPABLE
MIG-21 FISHBED 465 1,000 KG bombs Y
MIG-23 FLOGGER 750 3,000 KG bombs Y
MIG-27 FLOGGER 375 3,000 KG bombs Y
MIG-31 FOXHOUND 1,30 8 X air-to-air N
missiles
SU-17 FITTER 340 3,000 KG bombs Y
SU-124 FENCER 800 3,000 KG bombs Y
SU-25 FROGFOOT 186 2,000 KG bombs N
TU-16 Badger 1,925 9,000 KG bombs Y
air-to-surface
missiles
TU-22 BACKFIRE 2,500 12,000 KG bombs, ASM Y
TU-95 BEAR 5,150 12,000 KG bombs, ASM Y
TU-95 BEAR H 5,150 Cruise missiles Y
*Source: U.S. Department of Defense publication "Soviet
Bloc Military Equipment Supplies to Nicaragua (July 1979-Oct
1988), page 5
Figure 2
ENDNOTES
1. The Challenge of Democracy in Central America
(Washington D.C. :Department of State and Department of
Defense, October 1986), pp. 3-4.
2. Soviet Bloc Militaryv Equipment Supplied to Nicaragua
(July 1979-October 1988) (Washington D.C. :Department of
Defense, 1988), p. 3.
3. Ibid., pp. 3-4.
4. Ibid., p. 4.
5. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
7. Ibid., pp. 4-5.
8. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, "The Superpowers: Is There a
Moral Difference?", The World Today, May 1984, p. 183.
9. Soviet Bloc Military Equipment Supplied to Nicaragua
(July 1979-October 1988) (Washington D.C. :Department of
Defense, 1988), p. 1.
10. Ibid., p. 2.
11. "Bush Links Soviet Aid to Nicaragua Posture," The
Washington Times, 08 March 1989. p. A3.
12. Soviet Bloc Military Equipment Supplied to Nicaragua
(July 1979-October 1988) (Washington D.C. :Department of
Defense, 1988), p. 2.
13. "Soviet Arms Shipments to Nicaragua Increased Last
Year," The Washington Times, 28 February 1989, p. A10.
14. Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United
States in Central America (New York and London:W.W. Norton
and Co., 1983), p. 11.
15. Jeane K. Kirkpatrick, "Democratic Elections and
Democratic Government," World Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 2
(Fall) (1984), p. 58.
16. "Honduras Shows Copter of Nicaraguan Defector," The
Washington Times, 08 February 1989, p. A2.
17. The Challenge of Democracy in Central America
(Washington D.C. :Department of State and Department of
Defense, October 1986,), p. 19.
18. Ibid., p. 22.
19. Ibid., p. 23.
20. Soviet Bloc Military Equipment Supplied to Nicaragua
(July 1979-October 1988) (Washington D.C. :Department of
Defense, 1988), pp. 5-6.
21. Ibid., p. 6
22. "Nicaraguan Link Cited in Argentine Base Attack," The
Washington Times, 15 February 1989, p. A7.,
23. Ibid.
24. "Murder Suspects Blame Nicaraguans," The Washington
Times, 07 February 1989, p. A2.
25. "Refugees Trade Certain Poverty for Uncertain Asylum in
U.S.,"The Washington Times, 13 February 1989, p. A1 and
"Nicaraguans Flee North Despite U.S. Crackdown," The
Washington Post, 12 March 1989, p. A3O.
26. "Nicaraguans Flee North Despite U.S. Crackdown," The
Washington Post, 12 March 1989, p. A30.
27. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Nicaragua: A
Country Study (Area Handbook Series) (Washington D.C.,
second edition, 1982), p. 145.
28. Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United
States in Central America (New York and London) :W.W. Norton
and Co., 1983), p. 176.
29. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Nicaragua: A
Country Study (Area Handbook Series) (Washington D.C.,
second edition, 1982), p. 176.
3O. Ibid., p. 145, 146-147.
31. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, "The Superpowers: Is There a
Moral Difference?", The World Today, Mary 1984, p. 183.
32. Ibid.
33. "Quayle Leery of Promises of Elections in Nicaragua,"
The Washington Times, 16 February 1989, p. A5
34. Title Unknown, The Washington Times, 17 February 1989,
p. A1.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. "Don't Abandon Contras, House GOP Urges Bush," The
Washington Times, 22 February 1989, p. A4.
38. Paul Greenberg, "Listening to Familiar Echoes of
Gullibility," The Washington Times, date unknown, p. F1.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. "Bush Links Soviet Aid to Nicaragua Posture." The
Washington Times, 28 February 1989. p. A1O.
2. "Don't Abandon Contras, House GOP Urges Bush." The
Washington Times, 22 February 1989, p. A4.
3. Greenberg, Paul. "Listening to Familiar Echoes of
Gullibility." The Washington Times, date unknown,
p. Fl.
4. Headquarters, Department of the Army. "Nicaragua: A
Country Study (Area Handbook Series). Washington
D.C. :second edition, IQ82.
5. "Honduras Shows Copter of Nicaraguan Defector." The
Washington Times, 08 February 1989, p. A2.
6. Kirkpatrick, Jeane J. "Democratic Elections and
Democratic Government." World Affairs, Vol. 47, No.
2 (Fall) (1984). p. 68.
7. Kirkpatrick, Jeane J. "The Superpowers: Is There a
Moral Difference?" The World Today, May 1984, p.
183.
8. LaFeber, Walter. Inevitable Revolutions: The United
States in Central America. New York and
London:W.W. Norton and Co., 1983.
9. "Murder Suspects Blame Nicaraguans." The Washington
Times, 07 February 1989, p. A2.
10. "Nicaraguans Flee North Despite U.S. Crackdown." The
Washington Post, 12 March 1989, p. A30.
11. "Nicaraguan Link Cited in Argentine Base Attack." The
Washington Times, 15 February 1989, p. A7.
12. "Quayle Leery of Promises of Elections in Nicaragua."
The Washington Times, 16 February 1989, p. A5.
13. "Refugees Trade Certain Poverty for Uncertain Asylum in
U.S." The Washington Times, 13 February 1989, p.
A1.
14. "Soviet Arms Shipments to Nicaragua Increased Last
Year." The Washington Times, 28 February 1989, p.
A1O.
15. Soviet Bloc Military Equipment Supplied to Nicaragua
(July 1979-October 1988). Department of Defense,
Washington D.C., 1988.
16. The Challenge of Democracy in Central America.
Department of State and Department of Defense,
Washington D.C. October 1986.
17. Unknown Title. The Washington Times, 17 February 1989,
p. A1.
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