U.S. Policy In Central America: Time For Decisive Action
AUTHOR Major J. M. Hughes, USMC
CSC 1989
SUBJECT AREA - Foreign Policy
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
U.S. POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA:
TIME FOR DECISIVE ACTION
I. Purpose: To show that the Marxist government of
Nicaragua has had ample opportunities to implement measures
to return to democracy.
II. Problem: Central American countries are vital to
America's national defense; yet our national strategy lacks
a feasible plan for protecting democracy and its future in
Central America.
III. Data: The importance of Central America and the
adjoining Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea is of extreme
importance to the United States, let alone the Western
Hemisphere. Nicaragua itself has strategic importance by
possessing at least one port on each coast capable of
handling merchant, cargo, tanker, and/or roll-on, roll-off
vessels. By becoming the only Central American nation with
a military designed for offensive purposes, Nicaragua
threatens its democratic neighbors and democracy itself in
Central America. Since taking power 10 years ago, the
Marxist Sandinistas have made public statements promising to
return to democracy but have yet to begin to take the first
steps toward that goal. Massive amounts of aid from the
Soviet Union and other Communist/anti-American governments
has allowed Nicaragua to become a potent and visible threat
to the region. Despite Nicaragua's broken promises and the
infusion of military equipment and weapons well beyond their
defensive needs, the U.S. has still to annunciate a firm
policy towards the Sandinistas.
IV. Conclusions: The United States must take immediate and
decisive steps to thwart the growing threat in Marxist
Nicaragua. We must support the cause of freedom and
democracy in Nicaragua and Central America-- for freedom once
lost, is rarely regained.
V. Recommendation: None.
U.S. POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA: TIME FOR DECISIVE ACTION
OUTLINE
THESIS STATEMENT: Central American countries are vital to
America's national defense; yet our national strategy lacks
a feasible plan for protecting democracy and its future in
Central America.
I. Importance of Central America, Gulf of Mexico,
Caribbean Sea
A. Principal route to Europe for NATO reinforcement
of U.S. troops, supplies
B. Half of U.S. imports/exports transported through
Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea
C. 2 out of 3 ships transiting Panama Canal carry
goods to or from U.S.
D. More than half of imported petroleum required by
U.S. passes through Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea
E. Nicaragua has two strategic ports; one on each
coast
II. Communist/anti-U.S. governments aid Nicaragua
A. Provide millions of dollars in military aid,
equipment
B. Also send advisors
III. Why should U.S. be concerned with Nicaragua?
A. Marxist government antithesis to democratic
Central American governments
B. Massive military buildup far beyond its defensive
needs
C. Sandinistas encouraging assassination/terrorism in
other countries
IV. Benefits of Marxist Sandinista government
A. Inflation soaring-past 30,000 percent
B. Currency was 11 to one dollar, now at 4.2 million
to one dollar
C. Harassment of citizens because of Christian faith
D. Intimidation
V. U.S. provided economic aid when Sandinistas came to
power in 1979
A. Supported efforts to replace Somoza
B. Provided $25 million in emergency food and medical
aid
C. Offered assistance relevant to development of
democratic institutions
D. Supported Nicaragua's request for loans from
international institutions
VI. Sandinistas have had opportunity to make democratic
reforms
A. Organization of American States promise
B. 1984 "Arias Plan"
C. 1988 Esquipulas II accords
VII. Freedom fighters looked towards U.S. as ally
A. U.S. has dismal record of supporting third
country allies
B. Cuba, Iran, Vietnam, People's Republic of China
VIII. Questions remain
A. Will Bush administration show political courage?
l. Humanitarian aid
2. Military aid
B. Will Congress support bill for humanitarian
and/or military aid?
C. Will U.S. support freedom in Central America?
l. History will judge
2. Freedom once lost is rarely regained
U.S. POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA: TIME FOR DECISIVE ACTION
Since President Bush's inauguration on January 2, 1989,
he has had to deal with many crisis on the national and
international fronts. But there is one crisis which
forebodes long-term trouble, needs immediate attention, and
decisive action: Nicaragua. Central American countries are
vital to America's national defense; yet our national
strategy lacks a feasible plan for protecting democracy and
its future in Central America.
The importance of Central America and the adjoining Gulf
of Mexico and Caribbean Sea is of extreme importance to the
United States, let alone the Western Hemisphere.
For example, the narrow straits of Florida, which pass
by Cuba and are considered the strategic crossroads of the
Western Hemisphere, would be the principal route to Europe
of U.S. troop and supply ships carrying 60% of the
reinforcements and resupplies to NATO during a European
emergency. About half of U.S. imports and exports are
transported through these waters, and two out of ever three
ships transiting the Panama Canal carry goods to or from the
United States. More than half of the imported petroleum
required by the United States passes through these waters.1
Nicaragua itself has strategic importance by possessing
at least one port on each coast capable of handling
merchant, cargo, tanker, and/or roll-on, roll-off (RO/RO)
vessels. Corinton, located on the Pacific side of
Nicaragua, can accommodate conventional merchant/cargo ships
and RO/RO vessels. The main pier is 380 meters long and the
port can accommodate ships up to 20,000 dead weight tons.
The port is large enough to allow the largest Soviet surface
combatants (the KIEV-class V/STOL carrier) to dock. Corinto
could also accommodate limited numbers of Soviet missile or
attack submarines, together with submarine support ships.2
El Bluff, located on the Atlantic/Caribbean side of
Nicaragua, can accommodate limited numbers of cargo, tanker
and RO/R0 vessels. The Sandinistas are in the process of
adding two new wharves of 180 and 200 meters in length.
When complete, the port will be able to accommodate vessels
of up to 25,000 dead weight tons. Cargo handling facilities
will include R0/R0 ramps and liquid cargo handling
equipment. The port can now accommodate limited numbers of
Soviet frigates and smaller vessels, including patrol boats
and intelligence collectors, but probably not submarines.3
Rama, located up river from El Bluff, serves as the way
station and distribution point for goods received at El
Bluff destined for the interior of Nicaragua. Rama can
accommodate limited numbers of cargo and R0/R0 vessels and
could accommodate Soviet frigates and smaller vessels, but
not submarines.4
Turning to their airfield capabilities, the
Sandinistas, with Cuban assistance in 1982, began
constructing the Punta Huete airfield. With its 10,000
foot runway, Punta Huete can accommodate any aircraft in
the Soviet inventory. Soviet reconnaissance planes flying
out of Punta Huete would be able to fly missions along the
U.S. Pacific Coast just as they now reconnoiter the U.S.
Atlantic Coast from Cuba.5 (For airfields capable of
supporting military operations by fixed wing aircraft and
helicopters, see Figure 1.)
All Soviet tactical fighter-bombers, intermediate-range
bombers and long-range bombers could use Nicaraguan
airfields, although some aircraft would be restricted to
use of those airfields with runways over 6,500 feet in
length. No aircraft in the current Nicaraguan inventory is
capable of flying combat missions against targets in the
U.S. If introduced into Nicaragua, Soviet tactical
fighter-bombers could attack targets in the Central
American and Caribbean area, including the Panama Canal,
the Gulf of Mexico and south Atlantic sea lanes.6
Soviet intermediate-range or long-range bombers
operating from Nicaragua would threaten the continental
United States, with the combat radius of the TU-95 Bear
covering all of North America. (See Figure 2, "Soviet
Aircraft Characteristics.") The potential for Soviet
military use of Nicaragua complicates U.S. defense
planning. In a crisis situation the United States could be
compelled to divert resources to counter such a
possibility. 7
If any nation has understood the strategic importance of
Central America and its surrounding waters, it has been the
Soviet Union.
In 1984 the United States Ambassador to the United
Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick, wrote, "By 1957 the Soviet
theoretical journals were writing about opportunities for
tying down the United States in the western hemisphere and
rendering us less able to act in such remote places as
Europe and Asia." 8
The Soviets have basically acknowledged the strategic
importance of Nicaragua. Within months of the Sandanista
regime establishing itself, they began receiving military
aid form the Soviet Bloc in the amount of $10 million
dollars. Since then, the Sandinistas have received a total
of 143,800 metric tons of military equipment with an
estimated value of almost $2.7 billion U.S. dollars from
Soviet bloc nations.9
Known Communist and/or anti-U.S. governments which have
provided military and economic assistance to the Sandinistas
include not only the Soviet Union but the following
countries: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, Vietnam, East
Germany, Poland, Romania, Peoples Republic of China, Libya,
PLO, and North Korea.10 Additionally, a spokesman for the
Soviet Foreign Ministry said that Moscow has no plans to
reduce or suspend millions of dollars in military aid to the
Sandinistas. The Soviets also deny any move on their part
to reduce arms shipments form Moscow to Nicaragua.11
Along with money, some of the above listed countries
send advisors to support the Sandinista military
establishment, principally in the fields of combat arms,
intelligence, internal security and
supply/maintenance/logistics functions. The Cuban advisor
effort (about 1,000-1,500) is the largest: the Soviet Union
provides 50-75 advisors with another 200+ coming from the
combined efforts of the East Bloc nations and periodically
from Third World sources such as North Korea. 12
In a report by the U.S. government, as reported by The
Washington Times, 28 February 1989, the latest figures show
that: "The Soviet Union exported about $515 million worth
of military equipment to Nicaragua last year, the second
highest total since the Kremlin began weapons deliveries in
1980 . . . Peak year for Soviet arms shipments was 1986 when
the Sandinistas received $55O million worth of equipment
U.S. officials have estimated Soviet economic aid to
Nicaragua at about $500 million annually." 13
Why should the United States be concerned about a small
country like Nicaragua, with a population of around 2.7
million (about the same as North Carolina)?14
First of all, its Marxist government is the antithesis
to democratic governments and therefore to its democratic
neighbors--like El Salvador, with its democratic future in
serious question. There is no doubt, however, that the
Sandinista regime is Marxist. In a speech delivered in the
Fall of 1983, Humberto Ortega, Sandinistan Defense Minister,
stated that the Sandinista regime was "guided by scientific
doctrine, by Marxism-Lennism . . . "15
Secondly, its massive military buildup is far beyond its
own defensive needs. Col. Lufty Azzad, Director of Honduran
Operations and Training on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said
that the Nicaraguan military might exceeds that country's
needs and that Nicaragua was a communist state intent on
expanding its power through Central America. 16 The
Sandinistas have created the largest armed forces in Central
America only 18 months after coming into power, and more
than a year before the armed democratic resistance became a
significant factor.17 The Sandinistan active duty armed
forces and security forces now number about 75,00O, plus
almost 44,000 in the inactive reserve and unmobilized
militia. 18 Nicaragua's 75,000 active duty
members dwarfs the defenses of the second largest active
duty force in Central America--that of troubled El Salvador
with 49,000 military members.l9
*Major items of military equipment provided to the
Sandinista armed forces by the Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc
countries include:
152 Tanks
237 Other armored vehicles
549 Surface-to-air missile
launchers (reloadable)
772 Air defense guns
370 Anti-tank guns
961 Artillery/mortar/rocket
launchers
62 Helicopters (includes 12 MI-267
HIND D “Flying Tanks”)
45 MI-8/17 HIP (combat transports)
18 Fixed wing aircraft
6,000 Trucks
8 Patrol boats
8 Minesweepers
40 Radars
4 Communications intercept
facilities
252,000 Rifles
4,300 Light machine guns
3,850 Grenade launchers
*Source: U.S. Department of Defense publication: Soviet
Bloc Military Equipment Supplies to Nicaragua (July 1979-Oct
1988), pages 1-2
Finally, there is evidence that the Marxist Sandinista
regime is encouraging assassination/terrorism in other
countries--Latin American countries no less.
Twenty-eight terrorists who attacked an Argentine army
base in January in which all 28 terrorists, Seven soldiers
and one policeman died, had visited Nicaragua over the past
five years. The group, known as the People's Revolutionary
Army is headed by Enrique Haroldo Garriaran Merlo. The
Nicaraguan government said they "did nothing to encourage"
the terrorist attack.22
In published interviews, Mr. Merlo claimed participation
in the assassination of Mr. Somoza, the deposed Nicaraguan
dictator, which took place in Asuncion, Paraguay in 1980. A
former Argentine guerrilla and one of Argentina's most
wanted fugitives, Mr. Merlo also claimed participation in
the 1981 assassination of Maj. Pablo Emilion Salazar, a
Somoza National Guardsman. Maj. Salazar was one of the
first to take up arms against the Sandinistas. A Nicaraguan
resistance spokesman said his group has received information
from Nicaragua that Mr. Merlo had spent considerable time in
Nicaragua under the protection of Tomas Borge, head of the
Sandinista state security. Mr. Merlo has reportedly worked
with the Sandinistas since his exile from Argentina.23
In a separate report, two suspected murders of
Nicaraguan rebel leader Manuel Rugama said they were hired
by the Nicaraguan embassy to carry out the December 7, 1988
killing. Juan Bautista Nunez Amador of Honduras and Luis
Fernando 0rdonez of Nicaragua. said that they were hired by
the chief of security of the Nicaraguan embassy, Jose de
Jesus Pena.24
Since establishing its Marxist government 10 years ago.
the Sandinistas have provided the approximately three
million Nicaraguans with the following: inflation soaring
past 30,000 percent--since 1979, the year of the Sandinistan
revolution, Nicaragua's currency was at 11 to one dollar and
today it's 4.2 million to one dollar; harassment by the
Marxist government of Nicaraguan citizens because of their
Christian faith; Nicaraguans singled out for intimidation
by local Sandinistan defense committees for alleged
counter-revolutionary behavior; forcing Nicaraguans to
flee their own country with estimates of 75,000 to 125,000
settling around Miami, Florida alone; and with the Contra
war in a state of cessation, the Sandinistan army continues
to draft aggressively.25
Furthermore, official figures show that about 71,000
adult Nicaraguans out of a population of 3.7 million left
their country in the last six months of 1988 and didn't
return. Additionally, an independent nation-wide poll
conducted in Nicaragua and released towards the end of
February found that 49 percent of Nicaraguans would leave to
live elsewhere if they could.26
Now that we've covered the dangers Nicaragua imposes to
its Latin American neighbors, democratic governments in the
region, and to its own citizens, let's explore the United
States' role in Nicaragua's transformation from a
dictatorship to a Marxist government.
For half a century, the Somoza family had ruled
Nicaragua as its personal kingdom. 27 During this time, the
Somoza family seized most of the wealth of Nicaragua, to
include land the size of Massachusetts, when 200,000
peasants had no land.28 Just how closely tied was the
Somoza government and the United States?
According to the Department of the Army publication,
Nicaragua: A Country Study:
Feeling betrayed after the victory of the
revolution, Somoza declared that no president
anywhere had supported the policies of the United
States more devoutly than he did. United States
support for the Somozas had been similarly
unqualified until the mid-1970s.29
What is ironic, however, is that the insurgents battling
the American-backed Somoza's formed the Sandinista National
Liberation Front, taking its name from General Augusto Cesar
Sandino, who had rebelled against the United States
Marines' occupation of Nicaragua in the 1920s and 1930s.30
The Reagan administration's opposition to the Marxist
Sandinista government was well known. However, what is
apparently not well know is the initial economic generosity
and overall assistance the U.S. provided to the Sandinistas
when they came to power in 1979.
The U.S. supported, through various means, the
establishment of a democratic government in Nicaragua prior
to and immediately after the Sandinistas took power,
according to Ms. Kirkpatrick.31
The U.S. accomplished this, she says, by undertaking the
following:
--supporting efforts to replace Somoza by helping
to negotiate his departure and by supporting the
Organization of American States resolution that called for
his ouster
--by providing $25 million in emergency food and
medical aid in the first week the Sandinistas came to power
and $115 million in