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U.S. Policy In Central America: Time For Decisive Action

 

AUTHOR Major J. M. Hughes, USMC

 

CSC 1989

 

SUBJECT AREA - Foreign Policy

 

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

U.S. POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA:

TIME FOR DECISIVE ACTION

 

I. Purpose: To show that the Marxist government of

Nicaragua has had ample opportunities to implement measures

to return to democracy.

 

II. Problem: Central American countries are vital to

America's national defense; yet our national strategy lacks

a feasible plan for protecting democracy and its future in

Central America.

 

III. Data: The importance of Central America and the

adjoining Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea is of extreme

importance to the United States, let alone the Western

Hemisphere. Nicaragua itself has strategic importance by

possessing at least one port on each coast capable of

handling merchant, cargo, tanker, and/or roll-on, roll-off

vessels. By becoming the only Central American nation with

a military designed for offensive purposes, Nicaragua

threatens its democratic neighbors and democracy itself in

Central America. Since taking power 10 years ago, the

Marxist Sandinistas have made public statements promising to

return to democracy but have yet to begin to take the first

steps toward that goal. Massive amounts of aid from the

Soviet Union and other Communist/anti-American governments

has allowed Nicaragua to become a potent and visible threat

to the region. Despite Nicaragua's broken promises and the

infusion of military equipment and weapons well beyond their

defensive needs, the U.S. has still to annunciate a firm

policy towards the Sandinistas.

 

IV. Conclusions: The United States must take immediate and

decisive steps to thwart the growing threat in Marxist

Nicaragua. We must support the cause of freedom and

democracy in Nicaragua and Central America-- for freedom once

lost, is rarely regained.

 

V. Recommendation: None.


 

U.S. POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA: TIME FOR DECISIVE ACTION

 

 

OUTLINE

 

THESIS STATEMENT: Central American countries are vital to

America's national defense; yet our national strategy lacks

a feasible plan for protecting democracy and its future in

Central America.

 

I. Importance of Central America, Gulf of Mexico,

Caribbean Sea

A. Principal route to Europe for NATO reinforcement

of U.S. troops, supplies

B. Half of U.S. imports/exports transported through

Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea

C. 2 out of 3 ships transiting Panama Canal carry

goods to or from U.S.

D. More than half of imported petroleum required by

U.S. passes through Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea

E. Nicaragua has two strategic ports; one on each

coast

 

II. Communist/anti-U.S. governments aid Nicaragua

A. Provide millions of dollars in military aid,

equipment

B. Also send advisors

 

III. Why should U.S. be concerned with Nicaragua?

A. Marxist government antithesis to democratic

Central American governments

B. Massive military buildup far beyond its defensive

needs

C. Sandinistas encouraging assassination/terrorism in

other countries

 

IV. Benefits of Marxist Sandinista government

A. Inflation soaring-past 30,000 percent

B. Currency was 11 to one dollar, now at 4.2 million

to one dollar

C. Harassment of citizens because of Christian faith

D. Intimidation


 

V. U.S. provided economic aid when Sandinistas came to

power in 1979

A. Supported efforts to replace Somoza

B. Provided $25 million in emergency food and medical

aid

C. Offered assistance relevant to development of

democratic institutions

D. Supported Nicaragua's request for loans from

international institutions

 

VI. Sandinistas have had opportunity to make democratic

reforms

A. Organization of American States promise

B. 1984 "Arias Plan"

C. 1988 Esquipulas II accords

 

VII. Freedom fighters looked towards U.S. as ally

A. U.S. has dismal record of supporting third

country allies

B. Cuba, Iran, Vietnam, People's Republic of China

 

VIII. Questions remain

A. Will Bush administration show political courage?

l. Humanitarian aid

2. Military aid

B. Will Congress support bill for humanitarian

and/or military aid?

C. Will U.S. support freedom in Central America?

l. History will judge

2. Freedom once lost is rarely regained


 

U.S. POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA: TIME FOR DECISIVE ACTION

 

Since President Bush's inauguration on January 2, 1989,

 

he has had to deal with many crisis on the national and

 

international fronts. But there is one crisis which

 

forebodes long-term trouble, needs immediate attention, and

 

decisive action: Nicaragua. Central American countries are

 

vital to America's national defense; yet our national

 

strategy lacks a feasible plan for protecting democracy and

 

its future in Central America.

 

The importance of Central America and the adjoining Gulf

 

of Mexico and Caribbean Sea is of extreme importance to the

 

United States, let alone the Western Hemisphere.

 

For example, the narrow straits of Florida, which pass

 

by Cuba and are considered the strategic crossroads of the

 

Western Hemisphere, would be the principal route to Europe

 

of U.S. troop and supply ships carrying 60% of the

 

reinforcements and resupplies to NATO during a European

 

emergency. About half of U.S. imports and exports are

 

transported through these waters, and two out of ever three

 

ships transiting the Panama Canal carry goods to or from the

 

United States. More than half of the imported petroleum

 

required by the United States passes through these waters.1

 


Nicaragua itself has strategic importance by possessing

 

at least one port on each coast capable of handling

 

merchant, cargo, tanker, and/or roll-on, roll-off (RO/RO)

 

vessels. Corinton, located on the Pacific side of

 

Nicaragua, can accommodate conventional merchant/cargo ships

 

and RO/RO vessels. The main pier is 380 meters long and the

 

port can accommodate ships up to 20,000 dead weight tons.

 

The port is large enough to allow the largest Soviet surface

 

combatants (the KIEV-class V/STOL carrier) to dock. Corinto

 

could also accommodate limited numbers of Soviet missile or

 

attack submarines, together with submarine support ships.2

 

El Bluff, located on the Atlantic/Caribbean side of

 

Nicaragua, can accommodate limited numbers of cargo, tanker

 

and RO/R0 vessels. The Sandinistas are in the process of

 

adding two new wharves of 180 and 200 meters in length.

 

When complete, the port will be able to accommodate vessels

 

of up to 25,000 dead weight tons. Cargo handling facilities

 

will include R0/R0 ramps and liquid cargo handling

 

equipment. The port can now accommodate limited numbers of

 

Soviet frigates and smaller vessels, including patrol boats

 

and intelligence collectors, but probably not submarines.3

 

Rama, located up river from El Bluff, serves as the way

 

station and distribution point for goods received at El

 


Bluff destined for the interior of Nicaragua. Rama can

 

accommodate limited numbers of cargo and R0/R0 vessels and

 

could accommodate Soviet frigates and smaller vessels, but

 

not submarines.4

 

Turning to their airfield capabilities, the

 

Sandinistas, with Cuban assistance in 1982, began

 

constructing the Punta Huete airfield. With its 10,000

 

foot runway, Punta Huete can accommodate any aircraft in

 

the Soviet inventory. Soviet reconnaissance planes flying

 

out of Punta Huete would be able to fly missions along the

 

U.S. Pacific Coast just as they now reconnoiter the U.S.

 

Atlantic Coast from Cuba.5 (For airfields capable of

 

supporting military operations by fixed wing aircraft and

 

helicopters, see Figure 1.)

 

All Soviet tactical fighter-bombers, intermediate-range

 

bombers and long-range bombers could use Nicaraguan

 

airfields, although some aircraft would be restricted to

 

use of those airfields with runways over 6,500 feet in

 

length. No aircraft in the current Nicaraguan inventory is

 

capable of flying combat missions against targets in the

 

U.S. If introduced into Nicaragua, Soviet tactical

 

fighter-bombers could attack targets in the Central

 

American and Caribbean area, including the Panama Canal,

 


the Gulf of Mexico and south Atlantic sea lanes.6

 

Soviet intermediate-range or long-range bombers

 

operating from Nicaragua would threaten the continental

 

United States, with the combat radius of the TU-95 Bear

 

covering all of North America. (See Figure 2, "Soviet

 

Aircraft Characteristics.") The potential for Soviet

 

military use of Nicaragua complicates U.S. defense

 

planning. In a crisis situation the United States could be

 

compelled to divert resources to counter such a

 

possibility. 7

 

If any nation has understood the strategic importance of

 

Central America and its surrounding waters, it has been the

 

Soviet Union.

 

In 1984 the United States Ambassador to the United

 

Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick, wrote, "By 1957 the Soviet

 

theoretical journals were writing about opportunities for

 

tying down the United States in the western hemisphere and

 

rendering us less able to act in such remote places as

 

Europe and Asia." 8

 

The Soviets have basically acknowledged the strategic

 

importance of Nicaragua. Within months of the Sandanista

 

regime establishing itself, they began receiving military

 

aid form the Soviet Bloc in the amount of $10 million

 


dollars. Since then, the Sandinistas have received a total

 

of 143,800 metric tons of military equipment with an

 

estimated value of almost $2.7 billion U.S. dollars from

 

Soviet bloc nations.9

 

Known Communist and/or anti-U.S. governments which have

 

provided military and economic assistance to the Sandinistas

 

include not only the Soviet Union but the following

 

countries: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, Vietnam, East

 

Germany, Poland, Romania, Peoples Republic of China, Libya,

 

PLO, and North Korea.10 Additionally, a spokesman for the

 

Soviet Foreign Ministry said that Moscow has no plans to

 

reduce or suspend millions of dollars in military aid to the

 

Sandinistas. The Soviets also deny any move on their part

 

to reduce arms shipments form Moscow to Nicaragua.11

 

Along with money, some of the above listed countries

 

send advisors to support the Sandinista military

 

establishment, principally in the fields of combat arms,

 

intelligence, internal security and

 

supply/maintenance/logistics functions. The Cuban advisor

 

effort (about 1,000-1,500) is the largest: the Soviet Union

 

provides 50-75 advisors with another 200+ coming from the

 

combined efforts of the East Bloc nations and periodically

 

from Third World sources such as North Korea. 12

 


In a report by the U.S. government, as reported by The

 

Washington Times, 28 February 1989, the latest figures show

 

that: "The Soviet Union exported about $515 million worth

 

of military equipment to Nicaragua last year, the second

 

highest total since the Kremlin began weapons deliveries in

 

1980 . . . Peak year for Soviet arms shipments was 1986 when

 

the Sandinistas received $55O million worth of equipment

 

U.S. officials have estimated Soviet economic aid to

 

Nicaragua at about $500 million annually." 13

 

Why should the United States be concerned about a small

 

country like Nicaragua, with a population of around 2.7

 

million (about the same as North Carolina)?14

 

First of all, its Marxist government is the antithesis

 

to democratic governments and therefore to its democratic

 

neighbors--like El Salvador, with its democratic future in

 

serious question. There is no doubt, however, that the

 

Sandinista regime is Marxist. In a speech delivered in the

 

Fall of 1983, Humberto Ortega, Sandinistan Defense Minister,

 

stated that the Sandinista regime was "guided by scientific

 

doctrine, by Marxism-Lennism . . . "15

 

Secondly, its massive military buildup is far beyond its

 

own defensive needs. Col. Lufty Azzad, Director of Honduran

 

Operations and Training on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said

 


that the Nicaraguan military might exceeds that country's

 

needs and that Nicaragua was a communist state intent on

 

expanding its power through Central America. 16 The

 

Sandinistas have created the largest armed forces in Central

 

America only 18 months after coming into power, and more

 

than a year before the armed democratic resistance became a

 

significant factor.17 The Sandinistan active duty armed

 

forces and security forces now number about 75,00O, plus

 

almost 44,000 in the inactive reserve and unmobilized

 

militia. 18 Nicaragua's 75,000 active duty

 

members dwarfs the defenses of the second largest active

 

duty force in Central America--that of troubled El Salvador

 

with 49,000 military members.l9

 

*Major items of military equipment provided to the

 

Sandinista armed forces by the Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc

 

countries include:

 

152            Tanks

237            Other armored vehicles

549            Surface-to-air missile

launchers (reloadable)

772            Air defense guns

370            Anti-tank guns

961            Artillery/mortar/rocket

launchers

62            Helicopters (includes 12 MI-267

HIND D "Flying Tanks")

45            MI-8/17 HIP (combat transports)

18            Fixed wing aircraft

6,000 Trucks

8            Patrol boats

8            Minesweepers

40            Radars

4            Communications intercept

facilities

252,000 Rifles

4,300 Light machine guns

3,850 Grenade launchers

*Source: U.S. Department of Defense publication: Soviet

 

 

Bloc Military Equipment Supplies to Nicaragua (July 1979-Oct

 

1988), pages 1-2

 

Finally, there is evidence that the Marxist Sandinista

 

regime is encouraging assassination/terrorism in other

 

countries--Latin American countries no less.

 

Twenty-eight terrorists who attacked an Argentine army

 

base in January in which all 28 terrorists, Seven soldiers

 

and one policeman died, had visited Nicaragua over the past

 

five years. The group, known as the People's Revolutionary

 

Army is headed by Enrique Haroldo Garriaran Merlo. The

 

Nicaraguan government said they "did nothing to encourage"

 

the terrorist attack.22

 

In published interviews, Mr. Merlo claimed participation

 

in the assassination of Mr. Somoza, the deposed Nicaraguan

 

dictator, which took place in Asuncion, Paraguay in 1980. A

 

former Argentine guerrilla and one of Argentina's most

 

wanted fugitives, Mr. Merlo also claimed participation in

 


the 1981 assassination of Maj. Pablo Emilion Salazar, a

 

Somoza National Guardsman. Maj. Salazar was one of the

 

first to take up arms against the Sandinistas. A Nicaraguan

 

resistance spokesman said his group has received information

 

from Nicaragua that Mr. Merlo had spent considerable time in

 

Nicaragua under the protection of Tomas Borge, head of the

 

Sandinista state security. Mr. Merlo has reportedly worked

 

with the Sandinistas since his exile from Argentina.23

 

In a separate report, two suspected murders of

 

Nicaraguan rebel leader Manuel Rugama said they were hired

 

by the Nicaraguan embassy to carry out the December 7, 1988

 

killing. Juan Bautista Nunez Amador of Honduras and Luis

 

Fernando 0rdonez of Nicaragua. said that they were hired by

 

the chief of security of the Nicaraguan embassy, Jose de

 

Jesus Pena.24

 

Since establishing its Marxist government 10 years ago.

 

the Sandinistas have provided the approximately three

 

million Nicaraguans with the following: inflation soaring

 

past 30,000 percent--since 1979, the year of the Sandinistan

 

revolution, Nicaragua's currency was at 11 to one dollar and

 

today it's 4.2 million to one dollar; harassment by the

 

Marxist government of Nicaraguan citizens because of their

 

Christian faith; Nicaraguans singled out for intimidation

 


by local Sandinistan defense committees for alleged

 

counter-revolutionary behavior; forcing Nicaraguans to

 

flee their own country with estimates of 75,000 to 125,000

 

settling around Miami, Florida alone; and with the Contra

 

war in a state of cessation, the Sandinistan army continues

 

to draft aggressively.25

 

Furthermore, official figures show that about 71,000

 

adult Nicaraguans out of a population of 3.7 million left

 

their country in the last six months of 1988 and didn't

 

return. Additionally, an independent nation-wide poll

 

conducted in Nicaragua and released towards the end of

 

February found that 49 percent of Nicaraguans would leave to

 

live elsewhere if they could.26

 

Now that we've covered the dangers Nicaragua imposes to

 

its Latin American neighbors, democratic governments in the

 

region, and to its own citizens, let's explore the United

 

States' role in Nicaragua's transformation from a

 

dictatorship to a Marxist government.

 

For half a century, the Somoza family had ruled

 

Nicaragua as its personal kingdom. 27 During this time, the

 

Somoza family seized most of the wealth of Nicaragua, to

 

include land the size of Massachusetts, when 200,000

 

peasants had no land.28 Just how closely tied was the

 


Somoza government and the United States?

 

According to the Department of the Army publication,

 

Nicaragua: A Country Study:

 

Feeling betrayed after the victory of the

revolution, Somoza declared that no president

anywhere had supported the policies of the United

States more devoutly than he did. United States

support for the Somozas had been similarly

unqualified until the mid-1970s.29

 

What is ironic, however, is that the insurgents battling

 

the American-backed Somoza's formed the Sandinista National

 

Liberation Front, taking its name from General Augusto Cesar

 

Sandino, who had rebelled against the United States

 

Marines' occupation of Nicaragua in the 1920s and 1930s.30

 

The Reagan administration's opposition to the Marxist

 

Sandinista government was well known. However, what is

 

apparently not well know is the initial economic generosity

 

and overall assistance the U.S. provided to the Sandinistas

 

when they came to power in 1979.

 

The U.S. supported, through various means, the

 

establishment of a democratic government in Nicaragua prior

 

to and immediately after the Sandinistas took power,

 

according to Ms. Kirkpatrick.31

 

The U.S. accomplished this, she says, by undertaking the

 

following:

 

--supporting efforts to replace Somoza by helping


 

to negotiate his departure and by supporting the

 

Organization of American States resolution that called for

 

his ouster

 

--by providing $25 million in emergency food and

 

medical aid in the first week the Sandinistas came to power

 

and $115 million in

 

prompt economic aid

 

--by offering assistance relevant to the

 

development of democratic institutions, even though the

 

Sandinista junta gave early signs of claiming a monopoly of

 

power and imposing censorship

 

--supported, inside the international fiscal

 

institutions, such as the Inter-American Development Bank,

 

Nicaraguan loan applications enabling it to secure from

 

these institutions more assistance than the Somoza regime

 

had received from international fiscal institutions in the

 

previous 20 years.32

 

Despite the U.S. government initial generosity to the

 

Sandinistas and offers to help establish a democratic

 

government, the Sandinistas rejected U.S. peaceful

 

intentions only to establish the Marxist government they

 

wanted all along.


 

The Marxist-Sandinistas have had numerous opportunities

 

to make the turn towards democracy. Shortly before their

 

revolutionary triumph, they made a written statement to the

 

Organization of American States that they would establish

 

true democracy in Nicaragua "within months." Their second

 

pledge to democracy was in 1987, under the "Arias Plan,"

 

when the Sandinistas committed themselves to a series of

 

major reforms by November 1987, most of which were never

 

honored. And the third promise for taking steps to

 

democracy was under the Esquipulas II accords, signed last

 

March. Here the Sandinistas again promised reforms similar

 

to those reached earlier, but soon turned against internal

 

opponents by assaulting a protest march that month and

 

jailing opposition leaders.33

 

The latest peace negotiations by the five Central

 

American president's negotiated a regional peace plan which

 

will result in the disarming the anti-Sandinista freedom

 

fighters (Contras) and closing their bases in Honduras. In

 

return, Nicaragua has promised to hold general elections by

 

25 February 1990, if not sooner.34

 

This latest agreement cannot bode well for democracy

 

when the president of Nicaragua, Mr. Daniel Ortega, is

 

quoted as saying "What we are doing here is burying the

 


cadaver of the Contras." He also said the regional peace

 

agreement was a political victory for his Marxist regime and

 

the defeat of the U.S. policy of support for the Nicaraguan

 

resistance (Contras).35 In order to initiate democracy in

 

Nicaragua, all Mr. Ortega has to do is hold

 

elections--something he as promised at least three times in

 

10 years but has yet to carry out.

 

Why did the democratically elected president of five

 

Central American countries make what obviously seems to be a

 

lop sided agreement with Nicaragua? Because a void has been

 

created from the lack of Central American policy initiatives

 

by the Bush administration, in particular Secretary of State

 

James Baker. (The only evidence of any type of policy

 

towards the Nicaragua/Contra situation is the current $27

 

million humanitarian aid for the Contras, left over from the

 

Reagan administration, which runs out at the end of March.

 

However, the Bush administration says, to date, they will

 

not let humanitarian aid for the Contras elapse.) The five

 

Central American president's agreed to Nicaragua's proposal

 

because they saw the existing vacuum in U.S. policy towards

 

Nicaragua along with no forthcoming policy.36

 

Representative Mickey Edwards, ranking Republican on the

 

Appropriations' Foreign Operations Subcommittee was more

 


specific as to why the U.S. is not involved in the Central

 

American peace process: The U.S. has been absent from the

 

peace process in Central America because of the slow pace of

 

the Bush administration in appointing personnel to key

 

foreign policy posts."37

 

Should the Contras look at recent U.S. history

 

concerning American government support for a third world

 

ally, what would they find? They would find a dismal record

 

of former, fallen allies like Cuba, Iran, Vietnam, People's

 

Republic of China and last, but certainly not least,

 

Nicaragua. These countries were once supported by the U.S.

 

but are now anti-U.S. or communist countries.

 

The Contras are Nicaraguans too and they seem to have

 

made the oldest mistake in the freedom fighter's

 

manual--they trusted American promises . . .38

 

Winston Churchill II, the grandson of one of Great

 

Britain's late prime minister's, posed this question for the

 

United States to ponder.

 

If you fail in Nicaragua, we must ask, where will

you fail next? If freedom and democracy are not

worth defending in your own hemisphere, where are

they worth defending? The Free World awaits your

answer. Its enemies are waiting, too.

 

So we await the answer. Will the Bush administration

 

show political courage and provide humanitarian aid to the


 

Contras? More importantly, will congress support a bill for

 

military aid to the Contras? Will Congress see the dangers

 

in allowing a Marxist government to continue to threaten

 

democracy in Central America? Where will the United States

 

draw the line to stop Marxist governments, if not in Central

 

America? These questions will only be answered as the Bush

 

administration hammers out its foreign policy.

 

However, the most important question to ask ourselves as

 

benefactors of ever 200 years of democracy is will we

 

support freedom in Central America? That is the question

 

for which we will be judged by history, for freedom once

 

lost is rarely regained.

 

 

RUNWAY LENGTH

AIRFIELD (METERS) REMARKS

Punta Huete 3,000+ runway completed;

 

support facilities

incomplete; currently

used operationally

Sandino 3.000+ civilian/military

International use

Bluefields 2,000-3,000

Montelimar 2,000-3,000

Puerto Cabezas 2,000-3,000

La Rosita 1,000-2,000

Esteli 1,000-2,000

*Source: U.S. Department of Defense publication: Soviet

Bloc Military Equipment Supplied to Nicaragua (July 1979-Oct

1988), page 4

FIGURE 1

*SOVIET AIRCRAFT CHARACTERISTICS

COMBAT MAX NUCLEAR

AIRCRAFT RADIUS (MI) PAYLOAD CAPABLE

MIG-21 FISHBED 465 1,000 KG bombs Y

MIG-23 FLOGGER 750 3,000 KG bombs Y

MIG-27 FLOGGER 375 3,000 KG bombs Y

MIG-31 FOXHOUND 1,30 8 X air-to-air N

missiles

SU-17 FITTER 340 3,000 KG bombs Y

SU-124 FENCER 800 3,000 KG bombs Y

SU-25 FROGFOOT 186 2,000 KG bombs N

TU-16 Badger 1,925 9,000 KG bombs Y

air-to-surface

missiles

TU-22 BACKFIRE 2,500 12,000 KG bombs, ASM Y

TU-95 BEAR 5,150 12,000 KG bombs, ASM Y

TU-95 BEAR H 5,150 Cruise missiles Y

*Source: U.S. Department of Defense publication "Soviet

Bloc Military Equipment Supplies to Nicaragua (July 1979-Oct

1988), page 5

Figure 2

 


 

ENDNOTES

 

1. The Challenge of Democracy in Central America

(Washington D.C. :Department of State and Department of

Defense, October 1986), pp. 3-4.

 

2. Soviet Bloc Militaryv Equipment Supplied to Nicaragua

(July 1979-October 1988) (Washington D.C. :Department of

Defense, 1988), p. 3.

 

3. Ibid., pp. 3-4.

 

4. Ibid., p. 4.

 

5. Ibid.

 

5. Ibid.

 

7. Ibid., pp. 4-5.

 

8. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, "The Superpowers: Is There a

Moral Difference?", The World Today, May 1984, p. 183.

 

9. Soviet Bloc Military Equipment Supplied to Nicaragua

(July 1979-October 1988) (Washington D.C. :Department of

Defense, 1988), p. 1.

 

10. Ibid., p. 2.

 

11. "Bush Links Soviet Aid to Nicaragua Posture," The

Washington Times, 08 March 1989. p. A3.

 

12. Soviet Bloc Military Equipment Supplied to Nicaragua

(July 1979-October 1988) (Washington D.C. :Department of

Defense, 1988), p. 2.

 

13. "Soviet Arms Shipments to Nicaragua Increased Last

Year," The Washington Times, 28 February 1989, p. A10.

 

14. Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United

States in Central America (New York and London:W.W. Norton

and Co., 1983), p. 11.

 

15. Jeane K. Kirkpatrick, "Democratic Elections and

Democratic Government," World Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 2

(Fall) (1984), p. 58.


 

16. "Honduras Shows Copter of Nicaraguan Defector," The

Washington Times, 08 February 1989, p. A2.

 

17. The Challenge of Democracy in Central America

(Washington D.C. :Department of State and Department of

Defense, October 1986,), p. 19.

 

18. Ibid., p. 22.

 

19. Ibid., p. 23.

 

20. Soviet Bloc Military Equipment Supplied to Nicaragua

(July 1979-October 1988) (Washington D.C. :Department of

Defense, 1988), pp. 5-6.

 

21. Ibid., p. 6

 

22. "Nicaraguan Link Cited in Argentine Base Attack," The

Washington Times, 15 February 1989, p. A7.,

 

23. Ibid.

 

24. "Murder Suspects Blame Nicaraguans," The Washington

Times, 07 February 1989, p. A2.

 

25. "Refugees Trade Certain Poverty for Uncertain Asylum in

U.S.,"The Washington Times, 13 February 1989, p. A1 and

"Nicaraguans Flee North Despite U.S. Crackdown," The

Washington Post, 12 March 1989, p. A3O.

 

26. "Nicaraguans Flee North Despite U.S. Crackdown," The

Washington Post, 12 March 1989, p. A30.

 

27. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Nicaragua: A

Country Study (Area Handbook Series) (Washington D.C.,

second edition, 1982), p. 145.

 

28. Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United

States in Central America (New York and London) :W.W. Norton

and Co., 1983), p. 176.

 

29. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Nicaragua: A

Country Study (Area Handbook Series) (Washington D.C.,

second edition, 1982), p. 176.


 

3O. Ibid., p. 145, 146-147.

 

31. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, "The Superpowers: Is There a

Moral Difference?", The World Today, Mary 1984, p. 183.

 

32. Ibid.

 

33. "Quayle Leery of Promises of Elections in Nicaragua,"

The Washington Times, 16 February 1989, p. A5

 

34. Title Unknown, The Washington Times, 17 February 1989,

p. A1.

 

35. Ibid.

 

36. Ibid.

 

37. "Don't Abandon Contras, House GOP Urges Bush," The

Washington Times, 22 February 1989, p. A4.

 

38. Paul Greenberg, "Listening to Familiar Echoes of

Gullibility," The Washington Times, date unknown, p. F1.


 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

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2. "Don't Abandon Contras, House GOP Urges Bush." The

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3. Greenberg, Paul. "Listening to Familiar Echoes of

Gullibility." The Washington Times, date unknown,

p. Fl.

 

4. Headquarters, Department of the Army. "Nicaragua: A

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D.C. :second edition, IQ82.

 

5. "Honduras Shows Copter of Nicaraguan Defector." The

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6. Kirkpatrick, Jeane J. "Democratic Elections and

Democratic Government." World Affairs, Vol. 47, No.

2 (Fall) (1984). p. 68.

 

7. Kirkpatrick, Jeane J. "The Superpowers: Is There a

Moral Difference?" The World Today, May 1984, p.

183.

 

8. LaFeber, Walter. Inevitable Revolutions: The United

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London:W.W. Norton and Co., 1983.

 

9. "Murder Suspects Blame Nicaraguans." The Washington

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10. "Nicaraguans Flee North Despite U.S. Crackdown." The

Washington Post, 12 March 1989, p. A30.

 

11. "Nicaraguan Link Cited in Argentine Base Attack." The

Washington Times, 15 February 1989, p. A7.

 

12. "Quayle Leery of Promises of Elections in Nicaragua."

The Washington Times, 16 February 1989, p. A5.

 


13. "Refugees Trade Certain Poverty for Uncertain Asylum in

U.S." The Washington Times, 13 February 1989, p.

A1.

 

14. "Soviet Arms Shipments to Nicaragua Increased Last

Year." The Washington Times, 28 February 1989, p.

A1O.

 

15. Soviet Bloc Military Equipment Supplied to Nicaragua

(July 1979-October 1988). Department of Defense,

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Department of State and Department of Defense,

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17. Unknown Title. The Washington Times, 17 February 1989,

p. A1.

 



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