Remember Midway AUTHOR Major B. T. Fenlon, USMC CSC 1989 SUBJECT AREA - History EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: REMEMBER MIDWAY I. Purpose: To analyze the development of the operations plan for the invasion of Midway and to determine if that plan held any inherent flaws which caused it to fail so disastrous- ly. II. Thesis: In spite of the fact that the Japanese Navy possessed overwhelming combat power at Midway, it lost the battle because of a plan built on erroneous assumptions, tainted by a sense of invincibility, and supported with in- adequate intelligence. III. Data: In 1921 Japan became a party to an agreement which limited the size of her navy to sixty percent of the size of the U.S. Navy. This restriction caused the Japanese naval planners to reevaluate the traditional naval tactics and to adapt them to their current situation. The tradition- al concept of the decisive battle, where one fleet would en- gage another seeking to destroy it in the process, was no longer completely feasible for Japan. Thus, the concept of the "diminution operation" evolved. Its basic tenet was that the smaller Japanese Fleet would pare down its enemy's navy by conducting surprise attacks using destroyers, aircraft, and submarines. Once the enemy fleet was cut down, the Imperial Navy would then seek to engage it in a decisive battle. This would be conducted primarily using battleships. In this man- ner, the carrier forces of the Imperial Navy were relegated a subordinate role. This philosophy was prevalent in the Naval General Staff at the outset of WWII; it affected the strategic planning of naval operations,which were ultimately directed toward Midway. The plan to attack Midway was pressed on the Naval General Staff, by Adm. Yamamoto, against its strong opposition. It was conceived by blindly overconfident planners, who based it on an erroneous assumption: the Imper- ial Navy would be able to achieve tactical surprise in this attack. The plan never addressed the contingencies, which would eventually cause its failure. IV. Conclusion: The attack on Midway ended in disaster for the Imperial Navy, because the operations plan which brought it about was ill-conceived, inflexible, and lacked vital in- telligence support. REMEMBER MIDWAY OUTLINE Thesis: In spite of the fact that the Japanese Navy possessed overwhelming combat power at Midway, it lost the battle be- cause of a plan built on erroneous assumptions, tainted by a sense of invincibility, and supported with inadequate intel- ligence. I. Philosophy of Japanese Imperial Navy A. Decisive Battle B. "Diminution Operation" C. Battleship Navy II. War Strategy A. Strategy options 1. West to Ceylon 2. South to Australia 3. East to Hawaii B. Midway chosen III. Operation MI A. Mission B. Intent C. Assumptions IV. Flaws within Operation MI A. Erroneous assumptions B. Relaxed operational security C. Inflexibility/overconfidence D. Shallow reconnaissance planning V. Inevitable Outcome REMEMBER MIDWAY In early June of 1942 the fleets of the U.S. Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy met approximately 1200 miles north- west of Hawaii near a pair of tiny islands known as Midway. The battle which ensued became the turning point in the Pacif- ic War; its outcome determined the course of the war there- after. The results were puzzling in view of the forces in- volved. The Japanese Fleet operating in the immediate vicin- ity of Midway included six carriers, eleven battleships, sixteen cruisers, and fifty three destroyers, while the U.S. Fleet consisted of three carriers, seven cruisers, and seven- teen destroyers.1 In spite of the fact that the Japanese Navy possessed overwhelming combat power at Midway, it lost the battle because of a plan built upon erroneous assumptions, tainted by a sense of invincibility, and supported with in- adequate intelligence. To understand the rationale of Japan's Naval General Staff in conducting the early war, one must look back to the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, which took place six months prior to Midway, and to the philosophy which prompted it. The attack on Pearl Harbor was designed to destroy the U.S. Pacific Fleet. This attack, which was well conceived and skillfully executed, was not completely successful; it failed to strike the carrier forces, because they were at sea. The failure to damage any of the carriers left some unfinished business, because they represented a tremendous threat to Japan's naval forces. The philosophy which formed the Japanese Naval General Staff's thinking was a variation on the traditional philos- ophy of the decisive battle. The decisive battle was one in which the naval forces of one nation met the majority of the naval forces of another; the outcome of this encounter resulted in the destruction or capture of the other nation's navy. This time-honored concept was exemplified in May 1905, when the Russian Fleet was overwhelmed by the Japanese Fleet in the Strait of Tsushima. However, strict adherence to the concept of the decisive battle no longer seemed feasible for Japan. In 1921 Japan agreed to the tenets of the Washington Con- ference which restricted the size of her navy to sixty percent of the tonnage of the United States' capital ships. This agreement was renewed by the London Conference of 1930. Be- cause Japan's navy was to be smaller than that of her poten- tial adversary, the Naval General Staff was forced to recon- sider this idea of the decisive battle. "Therefore, our navy modified its strategic policy from one of the `decisive bat- 2 tIe' to one of the `diminution operation.'" The "diminution operation" was a strategy of judicious attrition. This operation involved the adoption of a policy of "offensive defense." Our major units were to remain on the defensive strategically... .Meanwhile, our forces of submarines, destroyers, and aircraft were to go into ac- tion and inflict such damage upon the enemy as to bring about parity between the two main forces. At this point the "decisive battle" would be fought.3 This concept was characterized by air strikes using land-based and carrier aircraft, submarine attacks, and night engagements employing destroyers. The battleships were still considered the strategic force, which would be the key to the decisive battle.4 Much to the chagrin of the Japanese naval aviators, the aircraft carriers-were viewed as having primarily a subordi- nate role to the battleships. Emphasis was placed on arming them solely with dive bombers and torpedo planes. However, in the mid 1930's this concept was strongly contested. One of the primary challengers, who was then a student at the Naval War College, was Cdr. Minoru Genda. He proposed that the battleship force be abolished and replaced with aircraft carriers. His reasoning was based on the results of previous naval exercises and war games, which continually demonstrated that the larger force, assuming a similar composition, emerged victorious. He further argued that battleships could be sunk by aircraft alone. As a corollary, because battleships could be sunk by aircraft, enemy battleships would never come within range of their own; thus, they were obsolete and would only serve as targets for enemy aircraft.5 Similar arguments were put forth by other officers within the Naval Air Corps. Cdr. Mitsuo Fuchida, a classmate of Cdr. Genda's, came to a similar conclusion. "Battleships rather than carriers constituted the main battle strength of the Fleet. Instead of employing the battleships to screen and reinforce the carriers, it was the carriers which were placed in the sup- porting role."6 Such radical arguments encountered strong op- position within the hierarchy of the Imperial Navy and were overall disregarded. Such disregard of this evolutionary thinking would reap disastrous consequences at Midway. When the Japanese initiated hostilities at Pearl Harbor, they were exercising their tactical concept of the "diminu- tion operation." The destruction of the Pacific Fleet bat- tleships was the result. The Imperial Navy had succeeded in paring down the Pacific Fleet, so that "...the Pearl Harbor operation did achieve its strategic objective of preventing the U.S. Pacific Fleet from interfering with the Japanese op- erations in the south. Yet in spite of this tremendous success, there was still a persistent concern regarding the survival of the U.S. Navy's aircraft carriers. From the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor until May 1942, Japan's armed forces were busy, especially the Imperial Navy's Carrier Striking Forces. The Japanese Empire extended to the southwest to Borneo, including the conquest of Burma, Thailand, and the Malay Peninsula down to Singapore; to the south into the Philippines and down to the Dutch East Indies; and to the east including Guam, Tarawa, and Wake Islands. The carriers engaged in four major operations ranging from the mid-Pacific to the Indian Ocean. The results of these engage- ments were numerous successful air raids , in addition to the sinking of seven warships from the British, U.S., and Austra- lian Fleets. Meanwhile, a large portion of the Japanese Fleet, including the battleships, lay idle in the home waters. The primary focus in expanding the Empire was to gain the necessary raw materials and oil to sustain the nation and her military efforts. Having succeeded in that endeavor the nation was somewhat at a loss regarding where to project her further efforts. At the start of the Pacific War, Japan's strategy-makers had been so engrossed in the immediate problem of acquir- ing oil resources that they had formulated no concrete strategic program for the ensuing course of hostilities after these resources had been won. Also, they had been keenly conscious of the many risks involved in the ini- tial operations...and had been by no means certain of the outcome. They therefore had decided to wait and see how the operations progressed before attempting to formulate subsequent war strategy. The future course of operations held several options for the Japanese strategists. The Japanese forces could continue to operate offensively with the ultimate goal of demoralizing the Allied forces to the point of forcing a quick cessation of the hostilities. Alternatively, Japan could go on the de- fensive in an effort to protect the vast territory and wealth, which she had already gained. The proponents of continuing to operate offensively won out over those leaders who recom- mended shieding her acquisitions. Operating under the premise that Japan would continue to expand her conquests, the strategic planners had to determine the direction, which further advances would take. Basically, there were three paths from which they could choose; they could advance southwest toward Ceylon, south toward Austra- lia, or east toward Hawaii. Because the Japanese Army argued that it could not support an operation in Ceylon, due to a perceived threat from the Soviet Union, that option was re- jected outright. The choice between Australia and Hawaii was hotly debated. Within the organization of the Japanese Imperial Navy there were two strategy planning staffs: the Naval General Staff and the Combined Fleet Staff. The Chief of the Naval General Staff was Adm. Osani Nagano. His staff favored a move toward Australia, because it represented a serious threat to Japan's southern flank. The staff reasoned that Australia would be used as the line of departure for an Allied counteroffen- sive. Thus, to protect her perimeter Japan would have to iso- late Australia, thereby severing the sea line of communication with the United States.9 The Combined Fleet Staff, under Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto, exhorted a thrust toward Hawaii. Yamamoto's argument was based on two premises. First, if Midway was attacked, the survivors of the Pearl Harbor attack would be drawn out to defend it; such an event would present the Imperial Navy the opportunity to engage the remnants of the U.S. Pacific Fleet in a decisive battle. Second, that the occupation of Midway would allow the establishment of an observation post and serve to strengthen Japan's eastern flank.10 Midway had great stra- tegic value; it "...offered to whoever held it the opportunity of controlling the central Pacific through its air, sea, and communications link to Hawaii."11 The debate between the two staffs began in earnest in the first week of April 1942. The Naval General Staff presented its major arguments against the Midway operation: 1. Because Midway was close to Hawaii its defenses could be easily reinforced; as a result of the attack on Pearl Harbor the Japanese Fleet was unlikely to achieve surprise. 2. The Japanese forces would be operating without the benefit of land-based air support. 3. Could Japan afford to defend and supply Midway, if it was successfully occupied? 4. There was currently a shortage of aircraft.12 In spite of the Naval General Staff's misgivings, the Combined Fleet Staff pressed home its arguments,so that Nagano's staff ultimately acquiesed to Yamamoto's urgings. On 18 April an event took place which served as a power- ful reinforcement of Yamamoto's strategy for attacking Midway. A squadron of B-25's, which were launched from aircraft car- riers 700 miles away, bombed Tokyo and several other Japanese cities. The physical damage which the raid inflicted was in- significant; however, the consternation which the attack caused was measurable. The raiders, led by Lt.Col. Doolittle, man- aged to slip through Tokyo's air defenses. This strike was a slap in the face to the Japanese military leaders; Yamamoto was humiliated; he felt he had personally failed to protect his Emperor. This foray steeled the resolve of the Imperial Navy to seek out and destroy the U.S. Pacific Fleet. The basic plan, designated Operation MI, involved an am- phibious assault to secure Midway; it would take place on 7 June. The assault would be preceded by a massive air attack against the airfields and installations on Midway. Preceding the attack on Midway, an element of the Combined Fleet, des- ignated as the Northern Force, would strike and capture Attu, Adak, and Kiska in the Aleutian Islands. This assault was designed to destroy the military installations there and to serve as an outpost in order to bolster Japan's northern flank. In addition, it would serve as a diversion for the main attack at Midway. At the time the Midway operation was conceived, the planners had seven heavy aircraft carriers available to employ against the supposed four, which the Americans could muster. To support Operation MI the staff devised an elaborate reconnaissance plan employing two separate elements. The first element involved two long range seaplane bombers which were to conduct deep reconnaissance, concentrating on the Fleet activities at Pearl Harbor. They would depart from Wotje, in the Marshall Islands, refuel from submarines, and reconnoiter Pearl Harbor. Upon completing this mission, they would re- turn to Wotje and report their findings. This mission was scheduled for 31 May - 3 June. The second element of the reconnaissance plan involved the Submarine Force, which was to establish two cordons to the east of Midway. The submarines' task was "...to report any enemy warships coming out of Hawaii . . .then intercept and sink them."13 This force was to be in position by 2 June. The Combined Fleet would sortie between 27-29 May from the Japanese home waters and advanced bases located in the Mariana Islands. The mission for the main attack included two specific objectives: first, the seizure of Midway for use as an advanced air base; second, the drawing out of the U.S. Pacific Fleet to engage and destroy it. According to Yamamoto's staff the priority was placed on the first objec- tive. On one occasion Cdr. Genda queried Capt. Kuroshima, a senior staff officer, regarding Yamamoto's true intent. Kuroshima affirmed, "`The primary mission of the task force is to support the Midway invasion.'"14 Yamamoto's priority caused serious concern among many of the other officers with- in the Combined Fleet. In creating this plan the one, key assumption was that the Combined Fleet would achieve tactical surprise in execut- ing this mission. The invasion of Midway would be well under way before the Pacific Fleet could possibly arrive on the scene. The issue of surprise was never seriously challenged by any of the staff. "Combined Fleet planners completely failed to provide for the contingency that the enemy might somehow learn of our intentions in advance and thus be able to deploy his forces for an ambush attack."15 During the war games which preceded the operation, a question was raised re- garding the Fleet's plan to meet the possibility of U.S. car- riers appearing while the Japanese carriers were conducting strikes on Midway. The staff had no adequate response, nor did it appear to have devised one subsequently.16 Assuming that the Combined Fleet surprised the U.S. forces by attacking Midway, the two primary objectives of the operation were attainable. Yet, if the U.S. Navy had been forewarned and had deployed its carriers, then the two objec- tives would become antithetical. In one case, the Fleet's as- sets would be tied to supporting the invasion, which had the higher priority. While the other case would require that the Fleet attack the enemy carriers to accomplish its secondary objective and to ensure its own survival. Now the Commander of the Carrier Striking Force, Adm. Nagumo, would have a dilemna to act upon. Under the best possible case he would launch his aircraft against the enemy carriers. However, he might not have that option, if his forces were already engaged in attacking Midway, in which case, he would be highly vulner- able. Ironically, the key to the Combined Fleet's success was also the key to its ultimate defeat. While the staff finalized and issued its plan, the U.S. Navy's cryptanalysts were work- ing frantically to decipher and piece together intercepts of this plan. By early May Adm. Nimitz was aware that the Jap- anese were planning a major operation, probably against Mid- way. (In March and April of 1942, the U.S. Navy specialists had begun-to break the Imperial Navy's operational code.) Security surrounding the operation became a real concern for the Japanese. Prior to the Pearl Harbor attack security had been paramount, but it seemed to be less strict for this op- eration. Cdr. Fuchida voiced his concern to Cdr. Genda as the Combined Fleet sailed "`...One thing worries me is the way information about the sortie has leaked out. Everybody seems to know about it.'"17 The United States was most fortunate in that portions of the force designated to attack Midway were forward based in the Mariana Islands. As a result, U.S. Navy communicators intercepted the bulk of the operations plan for the Midway offensive. Ironically, Genda, as well as other senior of- ficers, had recommended that the Fleet deploy and initiate this operation from a forward base. Due to a time schedule, which was deemed critical to meet, this suggestion was re- jected. A high degree of inflexibility began to manifest itself within the Combined Fleet Staff once the plan was generated. As it was previously mentioned, the set schedule would be ob- served. This rigidity was due in part to the psychological impact, which the Doolittle raid had on Yamamoto. Following the conduct of the Midway war games, the Battle of Coral Sea took place. The outcome resulted in the loss of an entire carrier division, consisting of two heavy carriers, for the Midway operation. despite a significant reduction of its offensive striking power, the Combined Staff neither delayed the action nor realigned the composition of its forces. Coupled with this inflexibility in the planning of Oper- ation MI, there was strong evidence of an unhealthy overcon- fidence developing within the staff. The basis for this fault was the unprecedented string of victories which Japan's military forces had amassed since Pearl Harbor. Fuchida termed the psychological result of their successes as the "Victory Disease." 18 The basic plan never really considered the possibility of the Pacific Fleet lying in ambush, nor did the war games, which tested it, allow for the enemy to project any real offensive power, once it arrived in the area. This overconfidence was not limited to the planners, rather it infected the operational forces to the extent that they felt they had little to fear from the enemy. Fuchida sum- marized this conceit aptly: "We were accustomed to success and so sure of our superior strength that no thought was given to the possibility that things might not go exactly as planned."19 The execution of Operation MI suffered drastically from the shortcomings of the reconnaissance plan, which was design- ed to support it. The two primary means of gathering intel- ligence for the operation revolved around the use of the long range seaplanes and the establishment of the submarine cor- dons between Midway and Hawaii. This plan was aggressive but shallow; it never addressed the possibility of these elements failing to complete their missions. In fact, the long range reconnaissance by the seaplanes had to be cancelled, because two U.S. Navy ships were stationed at the refueling point. The submarine cordons were established two days late, because overhaul repairs had delayed this force's departure. The sub- marines missed the passage of the Pacific Fleet. Thus, the Imperial Navy was operating without any long range surveillance. It no longer enjoyed the luxury of having diplomats located in Hawaii to monitor and report the activities of the Pacific Fleet, as it did prior to Pearl Harbor. A further intelligence gap developed during the execu- tion, when Yamamoto's flagship intercepted radio traffic from Pearl Harbor, which indicated the possible sortie of the Pa- cific Fleet. Yamamoto, operating 300 miles behind the Carrier Striking Force, neglected to relay this critical information to Nagumo, who had not picked it up. The coup de grace was administered by the Naval General Staff, which reported that radio intercepts indicated that the American carriers were operating in the vicinity of the Solomon Islands, well out of the picture. This information came courtesy of Adm. Nimitz, who had stationed a cruiser in the Solomons for the sole purpose of creating a deception. The outcome of the engagement at Midway has been well documented. Beyond the destruction of a major portion of the Imperial Navy's Carrier Striking Force, this decisive battle, which the Japanese had so long sought, ended Japan's offensive operations. From this battle the Imperial Navy would never fully recover. Yet, from its inception Operation MI was doomed to fail. It was conceived by planners who were blind- ly overconfident, who based it on outmoded tactical concepts and erroneous assumptions, and who were reacting to ill-de- fined national strategic goals. This plan's collapse was assured, when the reconnaissance plan failed to support it. The lessons of the failure of Operation MI must not be lost in the pages of history. FOOTNOTES 1Gordon W. Prange,Miracle at Midway(New York: Penguin Books, 1982) ,p. 128. 2Gen. Minoru Genda,JSDF,"Tactical Planning in the Imperial Japanese Navy,"Naval War College Review(0ctober 1969),p.45. 3Genda,p.45-46. 4Genda,p.46. 5Genda,p.46-47. 6Capt.Mitsuo Fuchida and Cdr.Masatake Okumiya,Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan(Annapolis,Md.: U.S. Naval Institute, 1955) ,p98. 7Fuchida,p. 34. 8Fuchida,p.48. 9Fuchida,p. 54-55. 10LtCdr.Thomas E. Powers,USN,"Incredible Midway,"U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings(June1967),p.65. 11VAdm.William Ward Smith,USN(Ret),Midway: Turning Point of the Pacific(New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company,1966),p.66. 12Fuchida,p.57-59. 13LtCdr.Yahachi Tanabe,IJN,"I Sank the Yorktown at Midway,"U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings(May,1948),p.60. 14Prange,p.37. 15Prange,p. 37. 16Fuchida,p. 134. 17Fuchida,p.97. 18Fuchida,p. 8. 19Fuchida,p.245. 20Fuchida,p. 134. BIBLIOGRAPHY Buell, Thomas B. The Quiet Warrior: A Biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1974. Ferrier, H. H. Lt., U.S. Navy. "Torpedo Squadron Eight: The Other Chapter." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, (October 1964), 72. Fuchida, Mitsuo Capt., IJN and Masatake Okumiya, Cdr., IJN. Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan. Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute, 1955. Genda, Minoru Gen., JSDF. "Tactical Planning in the Imperial Japanese Navy." Naval War College Review, (October 1969), 45. Potter, E. B. Nimitz. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1976. Powers, Thomas E. LtCdr., U.S. Navy. "Incredible Midway." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, (June 1967), 64. Prange, Gordon W. Miracle at Midway. New York: Penguin Books, 1982. Robinson, Walton L. "Akagi, Famous Japanese Carrier." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, (May 1948), 578. Smith, William Ward. VAdm., U.S. Navy (Ret). Midway: Turning Point of the Pacific. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1966. Tanabe, Yahachi LtCdr., IJN. "I Sank the Yorktown at Midway." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, (May 1963), 58.
