Technology's Impact On The Navy
AUTHOR LCdr. M. C. Braunbeck, USN
CSC 1989
SUBJECT AREA - Strategic Issues
                          EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
I.   Purpose:   To explore the  impact  of technological  advances on
the Navy  in the past,  present and future.
II.  Thesis: Throughout  modern history technology  has greatly
impacted the  development  and operation of the United States Navy.
III. Data:   Recent  naval  history  is replete with examples of how
technological  advances have  impacted the Navy's structure,
organization and operation.   While missions changed  little,  the
means of carrying out those missions has.   Fleets have been
organized around capital  ships such as battleships,  and aircraft
carriers.   An off-shoot  capital  ship,  the submarine,  has also
evolved as a result of technology.   The development of mines and
cruise missiles have also altered the Navy significantly.   While
these developments have produced positive effects on the Navy's
ability to accomplish  its missions,  they  have grown  in cost.
Greater emphasis on tactics development,  training and development
of personnel to take  full  advantage of advances  in technology has
become a necessity.   So has emphasis on getting the most from
budget allocations.   Historically,  budgetary considerations were
often secondary to  maintaining a strong,  modern,  and sizable
Navy. Those days are gone,  and reality  has shown that  keeping a
modern Navy has become expensive.
IV.   Conclusions:   Technology has driven the size, ability to
execute  assigned missions,  and which platforms are  designated to
carry the Navy  into battle.   Decisions have impacted history
greatly,  and will  likely continue to.   The cost of
state-of-the-art  naval weapons systems  and platforms has grown.
The size of the Navy has shrunk.   Parochialism must  give way to
unemotional  logical  thinking.   The Navy must continue to advance
with technology.   The cost of not doing so will be far greater.
V.   Recommendations:   A strong and modern Navy is required to
ensure the future survival  of the United  States.   The national
economy  relies on  import of extensive goods and supplies over the
sea lines of communication.   Protection of those  lines of
communication  is one of the many missions chartered to the  Navy.
As threats grow through technological  advances,  so must the Navy.
Not  effectively employing new technology will  surly  invite
national disaster.   History shows that the Navy has done well,  in
this respect.   The  future requires a strong commitment  from  Navy
leaders to continue to use technology's advances for the good of
the United States.
     THESIS:  Throughout modern history technology has greatly
impacted the development and operation of the noted States Navy.
      I.   Introduction
           A.    The value of history
      II.  Historic Developments
           A.    Early advance in technology
           B.    Battleships
           C.    Naval  aviation
           D.    Submarines
           E.    Mines
           F.    Cruise missiles
           G.    The atomic bomb
      III. Today's Navy
           A.    Missions and requirements
           B.    Threat from the Soviet Union
           C.    Force structure
           D.    The cruise missile option
      IV.  The Future  Navy
           A.    Missions
           B.    Propulsion,  sensors,  and weapons
           C.    Operational  squadrons again
           D.    Tactics update
           E.    Training and qualification
           F.    The battle of the budget
     Throughout modern history technology has greatly impacted
the development and operation of the United States Navy.   The
design end use of warships,  weapons,  supporting systems end
tactics have demonstrated how profound the effect of
technological developments have been.   Review of recent naval
history will show how the Navy has responded to technological
developments in the past, and allow educated speculation
concerning the future.
     A brief look at marine design and construction,  propulsion
developments,  and weapons systems developments provides a
background for future considerations.
     Ship design and construction remained simple until the
period around the mid-1800's.   The developmemt of iron-clad
hulls represented a significant advance in self-protection
against hostile fire.   Segmentation of a hull into
compartments that could be segregated into numerous air
pockets improved stability and damage survival capabilities.
Propulsion advanced from sail to steam-generated methods.
Warships that evolved were more maneuverable,  durable,  and
capable of operating over greater distances than their
predecessors.   The primary tactic of ramming gave way to
gunnery as the means of conducting naval combat.1   The gun was
improved in caliber,  design and operation,  in order to
effectively counter the more durable warships that were being
built.   The surface warship was about to become a key
instrument in developing national strategies,  goals and
     At this point,  it is necessary to recall that coal-fired
warships required logistics resupply ports to allow continued
operation.   This led the Untied States government to a series
of ventures in the Caribbean,  Pacific,  and Atlantic littorals,
to establish forward bases.   It also led the Navy to begin
development of a mobile logistics support fleet capable of
replenishing warships while underway.
     Warships expanded in size and lethality through the early
1900's.    Armor was increased,  and steam propulsion matured
from coal-fired to oil-fired boilers,  and naval guns continued
to grow in size and accuracy.   The result of these advances
was the battleship.
     With the battleship as the centerpiece of its Navy, the
United States followed the maritime tactics established and
refined from as early as the mid-1600's.   The preeminent
tactic was to form in a column and maneuver in such a manner
as to bring as many guns to bear on the enemy as  possible.
In doing so, the enemy, who was also likely to be in column
disposition, would be limited in how many guns he could bring
to bear.   This maneuver was accomplished by passing in front
of or behind, and perpendicular to, the enemy's formation.
This was known as "crossing the T".2    As cruising formations
evolved and threats grew the value of different ship-types
came into play.   Destroyers, small, fast and lethal, were
placed in the van and rear of formations,  in response to
developing submarine and torpedo threats.3  Cruisers were
placed ahead of the main battle force, near the scouting
lines, to provide forward firepower.   Thus, the battleship was
supported by smaller surface combatants in conducting naval
     World War I saw little action by the Navy.   Most of the
efforts were centered on negating the rising menace posed by
German submarines that were raiding convoys headed for Europe.
The only significant surface action was between Great Britain
and Germany at Jutland, in which no decisive result was
achieved by either side.4
     Post-war regulation ensued,  in an attempt by some maritime
nations to regulate other nations who were rapidly expanding
their navies.   A number of treaties were entered into that
would shape the future and the Navy of the United States.
     The Washington Disarmament Treaty led to the negotiation
of the Nine-Power Treaty and the Four-Power Pact.   The
Nine-Power Treaty,  among other things,  completed the
endorsement of an open-door policy.   The Four-Power Pact was a
face-saving device for Japan to cover the abrogation of the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance.   The Treaty also sought to limit the
size and power of navies.   The 5:5:3 ratio limited the
battleship tonnage of the US and Great Britain,  Japan,  and
France.   They were also limited in gun-bore to no more than  16
inches.   Cruisers were not specifically addressed,  and a good
deal of liberal interpretation was given by all.5
     President Woodrow Wilson issued Fourteen Points,  regarding
peace-at-any-price,  in  1919.   The second of those point.
established the claim of absolute freedom of navigation upon
the seas,  outside territorial waters,  in peace and war, except
as the seas may be closed in whole or part by international
action for the enforcement of international covenants.6
     The United States was unsuccessful in addressing
limitations regarding cruisers during the Geneva Convention of
1927.   The London Conference of 1930 finally established
limits on cruiser gun size.   Japan benefited,  as the ratio was
set at  10:10:7.   Further,  parity in submarine tonnage was
established.   By  1935, the aggression of Germany,  Japan and
Italy signified to all nations that all previously established
treaties were null and void.7
     WORLD WAR II brought on radical developments that altered
the Navy's size,  force structure,  and war-fighting tactics.
Breakthroughs in sensors,  weapons and aviation at sea were
about to radically change the Navy.
     Ironically,  Army BGEN Billy Mitchell was one of the
biggest contributors to the US Navy's acceptance of air power
as an offensive weapon.   Mitchell's bombing exhibitions in the
1920's proved that aircraft carrying bombs could sink a
battleship.   On 21 July 1921,  he attacked and sank the
undefended (and uncompartmented)  former German battleship
OSTFRIESLAND.8   In the fall of  1920 the battleship INDIANA was
the subject of near-miss bombing tests.   During direct-hit
bombing tests one  1,800 pound bomb burst her superstructure
and heavily damaged her turrets.9   Every submarine,  destroyer,
cruiser,  or battleship attacked during these tests was sunk by
bombing only.10
     The Navy began developing the concept of aircraft
taking-off from,  and landing on ships.   An aircraft was
catapulted from the deck of USS North Carolina in 1916.   In
1919,  the collier Jupiter was modified with a flat main deck,
and was recommission USS Langley in 1922.11   Unlike
battleships that had to stop dead in the water to recover
catapulted scouting aircraft,  Langley could launch and recover
underway,  and at speed.   Langley was less vulnerable to
torpedo attack as a result.12   From 1927 to 1940,  eleven
aircraft carriers were commissioned.   Seven were in service by
7 December 1941.13
     On 27 March 1934 the Vinson-Trammell  Bill was passed,
giving the Navy 650 aircraft in addition to the existing
1,000.   In January,  1938,  President Roosevelt gave the Navy
another unexpected boost.   He called for expansion of the
entire Navy by 20%.   By 1940,  the Navy had 1,741  modern
aircraft of a 3,000 goal.   Congress authorized 4,500 by
mid-June, then increased that to 10,000 the next day.14   The
Navy was thereby heavily invested in aviation.
     The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor,  7 December 1941,
proved many things,  perhaps the most important and
far-reaching being the ability of armed aircraft to attack,
damage and destroy targets far from "friendly forces". 15   It
also led to the decline of battleships as the centerpiece of
the Navy's fleets.   Aircraft carriers replaced them,  using
aircraft that could accurately strike afloat or shore targets
at great distances from the fleets.   Improved flexibility had
been achieved, while retaining survivability,  so long as the
carrier remained sufficiently defended.
     The carriers,  and their aircraft,  became the offensive
striking arm of the Navy.   The surface fleet was relegated to
protecting the carriers.   Although battleships and cruisers
saw action without involvement of the carriers,  they had
passed their heyday,  and were destined for mothball fleets.
     Naval tacticians understood that aircraft were effective
daytime weapons against surface targets.16   But the concept of
employment shifted from air offense back to defense,  as the
aircraft carriers became preeminent targets. 17   Carriers were
operated at further from each other to increase their
survivability against attack.   Their air wings were massed in
the skies to regain overwhelming striking power.   As the
quality and capability of resident aircraft improved,  so did
their lethality.   Thus, the Navy organized for combat by
creating successive layers of defense around the carriers.
The carriers'  aircraft became the primary offensive striking
force. 18
     Admirals with aviation backgrounds controlled the
operation and development of the Navy after World War II.
Since aircraft and their carriers were the backbone of the
Navy during the War it was hardly surprising that the Navy
organized its striking fleets around its aircraft carriers.
Forward striking capability was vested entirely in the air
wings.19   The rest of the Navy suffered slow degradation.
     The threat posed by Soviet cruise missile developments led
to vocal dissatisfaction among the Navy's surface force
officers in the 1960's.   Development of Soviet OSSA and KOMAR
class missile patrol boats,  as well as the sinking of the
Israeli destroyer EILAT by a cruise missile in October 1967
proved to be a turning point for the Navy.20   Grudgingly the
Navy's air systems command agreed to develop a cruise missile.
Stipulations placed on development were that the missile be
air, as well as surface-launched,  and that its range be
limited to no more than 50 nautical miles.21   The resultant
missile was named Harpoon.   It was developed for launch from
the air,  surface,  and sub-surface platforms, and finally gave
back offensive striking capability to surface ships,  in
     Since the Soviet navy was built largely to conduct
anti-aircraft carrier warfare,  and cruise missiles offered our
Navy offensive options that could preclude putting the carrier
at risk, the carrier has lost some of its significance.
     WORLD WARS I and II also saw the development of submarines
as offensive strike platforms.   The German navy nearly won
both wars by conducting open-ocean submarine warfare against
surface shipping.   The United States Navy enjoyed exceptional
success in the World War II Pacific theater,  conducting
similar operations against the Japanese navy.   The single
greatest limiting factor that held back submarines was their
inability to operate independent of external sources for any
length of time.   Also,  diesel-electric propulsion plants
required the submarine to operate on the surface while
charging batteries used when submerged.   Submarines were
highly vulnerable during this period.   TheGerman Schnorkle
helped reduce this vulnerability by allowing the submarine to
stay submerged,  near the surface,  while operating on diesels.
A far superior propulsion method was soon to be developed by
the Navy that would boost the combat capability of submarines.
(SSN-571),  as she came into commissioned service in 1954.22
Nuclear power made submarines as nearly self-sufficient as
they could be.   Missiles gave them exceptional striking
ranges.   Whether the missile be an intercontinental ballistic
or cruise missile, the submarine,  remaining silently submerged
could hold fleets,  and nations at risk.   Nuclear-powered
submarines took on the missions of strategic deterrence and
offensive strike warfare.   Employment of the attack submarines
has been hotly debated ever since these major technological
advances became operational  realities.   At issue has been
whether they should be concentrated in groups similar to the
German wolf-packs,  or allowed to act independently.  The
nature of the advances in technology generally favored the
later. So has the Navy.23
     Throughout the period being considered a significant,  yet
often overlooked weapon evolved.   Mines were inexpensive,
unsophisticated,  yet highly effective weapons against all
water-borne craft and ships.
     The first recorded use of unattended underwater explosives
was in the Delaware River,  at Philadelphia in 1777.24   They
were also used during the Civil War.   Tethered to anchors,
explosive kegs sent many unsuspecting ships to the bottom
during this period.
     During the Russo-Japanese War mines broke free of their
moorings end posed an indiscriminate threat to all shipping in
the region.   The Hague Convention of 1907 was convened to
address this.   The conferees agreed to a number of provision.
that were ambiguous and unenforceable.   Those tenets were
ignored by Germany and Great Britain in World War I.   The
United States and some other participants had not even
ratified them.   A follow-on to reconsider the Convention was
to be held in 1914, however World War I intervened.   Thus, the
Hague Convention of 1907 has remained the only legislative
attempt to control mine warfare.25
     Mines have varied in type, triggering mechanisms, and
method of employment.   The least sophisticated mine has
remained the floating mine.   More sophisticated mines included
bottom laid (shallow water) mines and moored (deep water)
mines.   Countering mines has centered on mine hunting and mine
sweeping.   Effectiveness in countering mines has depended on
whether the mine could be found, and on whether the mine
sweeper had gear that could counter the mine.   Countered or
not, mines have remained capable of delaying or stopping
entire fleets when employed in strategic maritime choke
     As was recently demonstrated when Samuel B. ROBERTS struck
a floating mine in the Arabian Gulf, a single, relatively
unsophisticated weapon demonstrated that it can inflict
lethal,  if not fatal damage to a ship.   Any hostile faction
can procure and employ mines against specific or general
targets.   The result can be significant,  in light of a
relatively inexpensive initial cost.
     Throughout World Wars I and II,  Korea,  and Vietnam mine
warfare has been employed by the United States as a means of
passive offensive war at sea.   Three general conclusions about
mine warfare remain pertinent.   First, the ever-growing role
of mine warfare in world events cannot be neglected or
ignored.   Second,  a continuing need for readiness in regard to
mine warfare remains.   Finally,  the dependence of mine warfare
on technological developments suggests that future mines will
increase in operational lethality.26   Although unglamorous,
and easily overlooked, mines must remain a key weapon in the
war plans of the Navy,  now and in the future.
     The atomic bomb was another development that significantly
altered the Navy's operation.   Because a single weapon could
destroy entire fleets, cruising formations had to spread over
vast areas of ocean to improve survivability.   Mutual support
was reduced,  as a result.   Command and control became
difficult,  if not impossible.27   Communications suffered
likewise.   Ships were built with the citadel concept that
employed an air-tight envelope,  and salt-water washdown
systems as their primary defense against nuclear,  chemical,
and biological weapons.   Tactical data networks,  improved
communications (as well as renewed emphasis on continuous wave
Morse communications),  longer range surface-to-air, surface,
and sub-surface weapons,  and tactics evolved.
     With this background,  today's Navy is designed to perform
the functions of prompt and sustained combat at sea.   It must
be capable of joint amphibious operations,  strategic nuclear
warfare,  providing strategic sealift forces,  and coordination
of the peacetime maintenance of the Coast Guard.   It must
remain capable of performing the traditional missions of sea
control,  sea denial,  and projection of power.   These missions
are broken down into functional areas of anti-air warfare
(AAW), anti-surface warfare (ASUW),  anti-submarine warfare
(ASW),  mine warfare, amphibious warfare,  and special
operations warfare.   Strike warfare encompasses ASW,  ASUW, and
operations against land.
     The Soviet navy espouses a naval doctrine that calls for
massed action through combined operations.   The idea is to
create an overwhelming three-dimensional attack against an
adversary (read US Navy).   They then develop the ships,
aircraft,  weapons and tactics to accomplish this.   They are
now the United States Navy's most capable potential adversary.
     Advances in Soviet naval weapons systems have brought into
question the ability of the Navy's tactical aircraft to
successfully perform strike warfare missions.   Given improved
stand-off weapons,  and cruise missile support,  some argue that
the aircraft can remain an effective weapon for anti-surface
warfare.   Whether the desire to maintain a human interface
created by placing a pilot in the airframe remains, or the
unmanned cruise missile replaces the aircraft as the offensive
"weapon of choice" remains to be seen.   The answer to this
issue will impact the force structure,  and operation of the
Navy in executing its missions.
     Since the military build-up of the 1980's, the Navy has
maintained that it needs a six-hundred ship force structure
to accomplish its missions.   This centers on the call for
fifteen aircraft carrier battle groups.   Debate over the
utility and size of aircraft carriers has raged,  especially
since the shrinking budget has factored more heavily in force
planning.   Arguments have ranged from a call for more
"big-decks" to building small carriers similar to the World
War II "jeep" carriers.   Few,  however,  argue that sea-going
airpower should be disestablished.
     Recent military action during the Falkland crisis
highlighted the need for air superiority at sea during naval
operations.   Lacking sufficient carrier assets, the British
Navy was forced to put portable decking over the top of
containers being carried aboard merchant container ships a
Then Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing (VSTOL) or rotary
wing aircraft were attached to these ships.   Defensive
capability was then available in otherwise vulnerable ships
and groups.   In effect, small "poor-man's aircraft carriers"
were created.   This helped to alleviate the lack of "big deck"
carriers Faced by Great Britain.   It also highlighted their
need,  and value,  in establishing and maintaining air
superiority for naval operations.28
     Reintroduction of the battleship in the Navy provides the
ability to form surface striking groups without a carrier as
the centerpiece.   These groups operate as an autonomous
offensive maneuver force capable of conducting high-speed,
long-range strikes against surface or land targets,  and to
carry out a limited sea control mission in low air threat
     A number of factors are at work,  in causing the Navy to
return part of the surface strike role to its surface ships.
First,  consistently increasing range and accuracy of the
surface-to-surface missile has forced the offensive carrier
battle group back beyond its nominal operating horizon.
Second, tactical aircraft have become more vulnerable to
exceptionally well-defended Soviet warships.   They must,
therefore, be saved for the right moment,  or written-off early
in any future combat.   Third,  limited attack submarine assets
will largely limit their employment to ASW, vice ASW and ASUW.
Fourth,  surface ship AAW point defensive systems are improving
so rapidly that only heavy saturation or nuclear attacks will
likely succeed against them.  Finally,  surface ships are now
receiving the types of combat systems necessary to conduct
overwhelming ASUW attacks.30
     By installing surface-to-surface cruise missiles in
destroyers,  cruisers,  battleships and submarines,  all
contribute to the strike warfare mission.   Cruise missiles
have freed aircraft to engage in other tasks, thus enhancing
the Navy's overall ability to secure use of the seas.   The
cruise missile's most important short-term effect is that it
greatly strengthens the Navy's anti-surface striking
capability at a time when the Soviet Union is building a large
and highly sophisticated surface navy.   The cruise missile
also provides the Navy with a strong option in Third World
scenarios.   Land attack cruise missiles,  in particular,  place
many potential adversaries at considerable risk,  thus
deterring aggression on their part.31
     The fleet of the future will likely retain the same
missions as are presently assigned.   The United States is
dependent on overseas economies for its own survival.   Access
to and controlled use of the seas remain in the national
interest.   Advances in technology will continue to influence
the Navy's capabilities, organization for combat,  and tactics.
Some of those advances are now becoming reality and span every
facet of sea-going warfare.
     Sophisticated propulsion plants are in already in use.
Nuclear plants propel all modern submarines,  some surface
cruisers,  and half of the aircraft carriers.   Steam turbine
propulsion is giving way to smaller,  lighter,  and more
efficient marine gas turbine plants.   Microprocessor
controlled gas turbine plants are used in PERRY,  SPRUANCE,
TICONDEROGA, and BURKE class ships.   The BURKE plant is so
advanced that it will be controlled by its own dedicated
AN/UYK-44 computer.32   Electric drive is a proven method about
to re-enter the fleet.   Diesel  and nuclear powered submarines
already employ this concept of propulsion.   Use of electric
drive is also being considered in the Small Water-Area
Twin-Hull (SWATH) design concept for the future DDGLX class
     A multi-threat environment has been created by extremely
quiet submarines capable of accurately targeting and firing
cruise missiles over long ranges.   High performance, long
range bombers launching supersonic cruise missiles from low
altitudes compound the targeted force's problem.   Toss in the
surface ships firing their cruise missiles, and the strike
triad is completed.   This has led to a revolution in AAW and
ASUW radar, and ASW sonar technology.34    Extremely
sophisticated, computer controlled systems now lacate and
classify contacts, and guide weapons to designated targets.
Weapons range from unsophisticated gun projectiles and iron
bombs to precision guided munitions, and autonomous torpedoes
and missiles.   Future weapons systems will likely incorporate
laser and particle beam concepts.   As always, there will
remain a place for the venerable and patient mine.
     Surface ship construction will likely take advantage of
the concept of modularization.   That is to say, a generic
hull, complete with propulsion system,  is provided with space
designed to "plug in" weapons system modules necessary for
upcoming missions.   This is an expansion of the concept that
produced the vertical-launch missile system.   Sensor modules
will come packaged, too.  Ships will be configured for tasked
missions such as all-AAW, ASW,  ASUW, or whatever mix the force
commander desires.   Generic hulls will be less expensive to
build,  and be easier to logistically supportand maintain.
     As history demonstrates,  technology effects hardware,  and
hardware effects tactics.   New developments in surface ship
warfighting capabilities require refinement of old tactics,  or
development of new ones,  so that all the benefits of new
technology can be realized.
     Naval tactics are generally developed on five
fundamentals.   The first is that naval warfare centers on
attrition caused by the successful delivery of firepower.
Second,  localizing an enemy,  sufficiently to target and
deliver firepower is crucial to the development and employment
of tactics.   Third, the command and control process transforms
firepower and targeting into delivered combat force.   Fourth,
since naval combat is force-on-force attrition,  any effect on
the first three presumptions may well cause a significant
impact on the final  outcome.   Finally,  well-thought maneuver
allows the ability to localize, target,  and engage an enemy.35
Now technological advances factor heavily,  since they are the
determinants of how effectively any navy can address these
     An old concept, that of operational squadrons, has proven
its worth in recent nautical history.   The Navy stopped using
this concept, opting for task organized operating forces.
This is a result of the shrinking pool of combatants
available.   The operational squadron offers advantages that
make it worth reconsidering.    Through rigorously training and
drilling a squadron of ships is molded into a cohesive team
capable of executing their commodore's intentions without
having to be told what to do, when to do it, or how to do it.
By familiarity from operating together all know their part in
the overall scheme of maneuver and combat.   Anticipating the
total chaos in future conflicts at sea, the Navy should return
to the operational squadron concept, fleet-wide.
     War at sea, which ultimately becomes a war of attrition,
has backed up one level, to an attrition of weapons.   The fate
of the remaining ships will then be decided.   High and medium
intensity conflict will be characterized by voluminous
exchanges of weapons, obliteration of the electromagnetic
spectrum, and massive destruction.   Modern warfare finds the
commander striving to mass firepower by committing forces at
the right moment, while denying the enemy the opportunity to
do the same.36  Effective delivery of ordnance will produce
victory.   This will come as a result of crews who are well
spell early deFeat.
     Also demonstrated throughout history, once technological
advances alter tactics, training must be conducted to ensure
the sailors know how best to maintain and fight their ships.
Time will remain the decisive element in achieving victory or
suffering defeat.   Time advantage is gained through training,
so all know instinctively what to do, and then do it.   Only
effective training can allow the crew any hope of victory.
Training must focus on individual basic skills.   Then the
individual can contribute to team efforts.   Teams must then be
organized and riggorously trained to operate as a synergistic
entity.   The process of qualifying individuals and teams must
be revisited, and made more meaningful.   Well trained teams
will bring victory, as history proves.
     Career development of warfighters must be also be
relooked.   For years the US Navy has opted for the
unrestricted line officer concept which produced officers
versed in a broad spectrum of warfighting.   Other navies
developed officers specialized in limited aspects of their
service.   Possibly a more logical "middle-ground" would be to
develop officers specialized in specific aspects of combatant,
amphibious, mine and supporting forces operations.   Developing
career paths in these functional areas would still provide
well-rounded specialists, so long as the Navy does not allow
any particular group to become more "desirable" than another.
     One final consideration, and possibly the single most
important one, for the future Navy to take into account is
that of the budget.   Technology has a high price.   It will
remain to be seen if the United States has the resolve to
pursue the future development and employment of its Navy,  in
light of its high cost.
     History dramatically illustrates technology's effects on
how the United States Navy haf evolved.   Force structures have
often altered to accommodate technological advances.   The only
draw-back has been reluctance of the leaders to accept and
advance with technology.   In order to ensure future access to
overseas economies the Navy must remain strong and modern.
The cost of doing so will be high.   The cost of not doing so
will be dear.   It may well be our very way of life.
1   Hughes,  Wayne P.,  CAPT,  USN (Ret.),  Fleet Tactics,
(Annapolis:  US Naval Institute Press,  1986),  pp. 54-69.
2   Hughes,   p. 69.
3   Hughes,   pp.  70-81.
4   MacIntyre,  Donald, CAPT,  R.N.,  The Thunder Of Guns (New
York:  W.W. Norton,  1959), p.  98.
5   Whitehouse,  Arch,  Fighting Ships (Garden City, NY:
Doubleday,  1967),  pp. 52-54.
6   Ibid.
7   Whitehouse,    p. 57.
8   Whitehouse,    pp.  102-106.
9   Turnbull,  A.D.,  CAPT,  USNR,  et al,  History Of United
States Naval Aviation (New Haven:  Yale University Press,
1949),  pp.  193-204.
10   Ibid.
11   Whitehouse,  p. 103.
12   Ibid.
13   Ibid.
14   Turnbull,  pp.  284-295.
15   Whitehouse,  p. 64.
16   Hughes,  p.  109.
17   Ibid.
18   Betts, Richard K.,  ed,  Cruise Missile. (Washington,  D.C.:
The Brookings Institute,  1981),  pp.  379-380.
19   Ibid.
20   Betts,  pp.  381-384.
21   Ibid.
22   Chatham,  R.E.,  LCDR,  USN,  "A Quiet Revolution",  US Naval
Institute Proceedings,  September 1984,  pp. 42-46.
23   Ibid.
24   Hartmann,  G.K.,  Weapons That Wait  (Annapolis: US Naval
Institute Press,  1979),  p.  17.
25   Hartmann,  pp. 40-42.
26   Hartmann,  pp. 42-85.
27   Hughes,  p.  161.
28   Mulquin, J.J.,  LT, USNR (Ret.),  "Merchant Ship TACAIR",
US Naval  Institute Proceeding.,  March 1985,  pp.  168-170.
29   Power.,  R.C.,  CAPT, USN,  "Creating The Surface Strike
Group",  US Naval Institute Proceeding.,  August 1983,  pp.
30   Shield.,  R.B.,  LCDR,  USN,  "The Renaissance Of Surface-To-
Surface Warfare",  US Naval Institute Proceeding.,  February
1985, pp.  128-132.
31   Betts,  pp.  231-273.
32   Preisel,  J.H.,  CDR,  USN,  "High-Tech Below The Main Deck",
US Naval  Institute Proceeding.,  October 1988,  pp.  121-124.
33   Ibid.
34   Hughes,   pp.    111-139.
35   Hughes,   pp.    140-215.
36   Ibid.
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