Technology's Impact On The Navy AUTHOR LCdr. M. C. Braunbeck, USN CSC 1989 SUBJECT AREA - Strategic Issues EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: TECHNOLOGY'S IMPACT ON THE NAVY I. Purpose: To explore the impact of technological advances on the Navy in the past, present and future. II. Thesis: Throughout modern history technology has greatly impacted the development and operation of the United States Navy. III. Data: Recent naval history is replete with examples of how technological advances have impacted the Navy's structure, organization and operation. While missions changed little, the means of carrying out those missions has. Fleets have been organized around capital ships such as battleships, and aircraft carriers. An off-shoot capital ship, the submarine, has also evolved as a result of technology. The development of mines and cruise missiles have also altered the Navy significantly. While these developments have produced positive effects on the Navy's ability to accomplish its missions, they have grown in cost. Greater emphasis on tactics development, training and development of personnel to take full advantage of advances in technology has become a necessity. So has emphasis on getting the most from budget allocations. Historically, budgetary considerations were often secondary to maintaining a strong, modern, and sizable Navy. Those days are gone, and reality has shown that keeping a modern Navy has become expensive. IV. Conclusions: Technology has driven the size, ability to execute assigned missions, and which platforms are designated to carry the Navy into battle. Decisions have impacted history greatly, and will likely continue to. The cost of state-of-the-art naval weapons systems and platforms has grown. The size of the Navy has shrunk. Parochialism must give way to unemotional logical thinking. The Navy must continue to advance with technology. The cost of not doing so will be far greater. V. Recommendations: A strong and modern Navy is required to ensure the future survival of the United States. The national economy relies on import of extensive goods and supplies over the sea lines of communication. Protection of those lines of communication is one of the many missions chartered to the Navy. As threats grow through technological advances, so must the Navy. Not effectively employing new technology will surly invite national disaster. History shows that the Navy has done well, in this respect. The future requires a strong commitment from Navy leaders to continue to use technology's advances for the good of the United States. EFFECTS OF TECHNOLOGY ON THE NAVY OUTLINE THESIS: Throughout modern history technology has greatly impacted the development and operation of the noted States Navy. I. Introduction A. The value of history II. Historic Developments A. Early advance in technology B. Battleships C. Naval aviation D. Submarines E. Mines F. Cruise missiles G. The atomic bomb III. Today's Navy A. Missions and requirements B. Threat from the Soviet Union C. Force structure D. The cruise missile option IV. The Future Navy A. Missions B. Propulsion, sensors, and weapons C. Operational squadrons again D. Tactics update E. Training and qualification F. The battle of the budget TECHNOLOGY'S IMPACT ON THE NAVY INTRODUCTION Throughout modern history technology has greatly impacted the development and operation of the United States Navy. The design end use of warships, weapons, supporting systems end tactics have demonstrated how profound the effect of technological developments have been. Review of recent naval history will show how the Navy has responded to technological developments in the past, and allow educated speculation concerning the future. A brief look at marine design and construction, propulsion developments, and weapons systems developments provides a background for future considerations. HISTORIC DEVELOPMENTS Ship design and construction remained simple until the period around the mid-1800's. The developmemt of iron-clad hulls represented a significant advance in self-protection against hostile fire. Segmentation of a hull into compartments that could be segregated into numerous air pockets improved stability and damage survival capabilities. Propulsion advanced from sail to steam-generated methods. Warships that evolved were more maneuverable, durable, and capable of operating over greater distances than their predecessors. The primary tactic of ramming gave way to gunnery as the means of conducting naval combat.1 The gun was improved in caliber, design and operation, in order to effectively counter the more durable warships that were being built. The surface warship was about to become a key instrument in developing national strategies, goals and policies. At this point, it is necessary to recall that coal-fired warships required logistics resupply ports to allow continued operation. This led the Untied States government to a series of ventures in the Caribbean, Pacific, and Atlantic littorals, to establish forward bases. It also led the Navy to begin development of a mobile logistics support fleet capable of replenishing warships while underway. Warships expanded in size and lethality through the early 1900's. Armor was increased, and steam propulsion matured from coal-fired to oil-fired boilers, and naval guns continued to grow in size and accuracy. The result of these advances was the battleship. With the battleship as the centerpiece of its Navy, the United States followed the maritime tactics established and refined from as early as the mid-1600's. The preeminent tactic was to form in a column and maneuver in such a manner as to bring as many guns to bear on the enemy as possible. In doing so, the enemy, who was also likely to be in column disposition, would be limited in how many guns he could bring to bear. This maneuver was accomplished by passing in front of or behind, and perpendicular to, the enemy's formation. This was known as "crossing the T".2 As cruising formations evolved and threats grew the value of different ship-types came into play. Destroyers, small, fast and lethal, were placed in the van and rear of formations, in response to developing submarine and torpedo threats.3 Cruisers were placed ahead of the main battle force, near the scouting lines, to provide forward firepower. Thus, the battleship was supported by smaller surface combatants in conducting naval engagements. World War I saw little action by the Navy. Most of the efforts were centered on negating the rising menace posed by German submarines that were raiding convoys headed for Europe. The only significant surface action was between Great Britain and Germany at Jutland, in which no decisive result was achieved by either side.4 Post-war regulation ensued, in an attempt by some maritime nations to regulate other nations who were rapidly expanding their navies. A number of treaties were entered into that would shape the future and the Navy of the United States. The Washington Disarmament Treaty led to the negotiation of the Nine-Power Treaty and the Four-Power Pact. The Nine-Power Treaty, among other things, completed the endorsement of an open-door policy. The Four-Power Pact was a face-saving device for Japan to cover the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The Treaty also sought to limit the size and power of navies. The 5:5:3 ratio limited the battleship tonnage of the US and Great Britain, Japan, and France. They were also limited in gun-bore to no more than 16 inches. Cruisers were not specifically addressed, and a good deal of liberal interpretation was given by all.5 President Woodrow Wilson issued Fourteen Points, regarding peace-at-any-price, in 1919. The second of those point. established the claim of absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, in peace and war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.6 The United States was unsuccessful in addressing limitations regarding cruisers during the Geneva Convention of 1927. The London Conference of 1930 finally established limits on cruiser gun size. Japan benefited, as the ratio was set at 10:10:7. Further, parity in submarine tonnage was established. By 1935, the aggression of Germany, Japan and Italy signified to all nations that all previously established treaties were null and void.7 WORLD WAR II brought on radical developments that altered the Navy's size, force structure, and war-fighting tactics. Breakthroughs in sensors, weapons and aviation at sea were about to radically change the Navy. Ironically, Army BGEN Billy Mitchell was one of the biggest contributors to the US Navy's acceptance of air power as an offensive weapon. Mitchell's bombing exhibitions in the 1920's proved that aircraft carrying bombs could sink a battleship. On 21 July 1921, he attacked and sank the undefended (and uncompartmented) former German battleship OSTFRIESLAND.8 In the fall of 1920 the battleship INDIANA was the subject of near-miss bombing tests. During direct-hit bombing tests one 1,800 pound bomb burst her superstructure and heavily damaged her turrets.9 Every submarine, destroyer, cruiser, or battleship attacked during these tests was sunk by bombing only.10 The Navy began developing the concept of aircraft taking-off from, and landing on ships. An aircraft was catapulted from the deck of USS North Carolina in 1916. In 1919, the collier Jupiter was modified with a flat main deck, and was recommission USS Langley in 1922.11 Unlike battleships that had to stop dead in the water to recover catapulted scouting aircraft, Langley could launch and recover underway, and at speed. Langley was less vulnerable to torpedo attack as a result.12 From 1927 to 1940, eleven aircraft carriers were commissioned. Seven were in service by 7 December 1941.13 On 27 March 1934 the Vinson-Trammell Bill was passed, giving the Navy 650 aircraft in addition to the existing 1,000. In January, 1938, President Roosevelt gave the Navy another unexpected boost. He called for expansion of the entire Navy by 20%. By 1940, the Navy had 1,741 modern aircraft of a 3,000 goal. Congress authorized 4,500 by mid-June, then increased that to 10,000 the next day.14 The Navy was thereby heavily invested in aviation. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941, proved many things, perhaps the most important and far-reaching being the ability of armed aircraft to attack, damage and destroy targets far from "friendly forces". 15 It also led to the decline of battleships as the centerpiece of the Navy's fleets. Aircraft carriers replaced them, using aircraft that could accurately strike afloat or shore targets at great distances from the fleets. Improved flexibility had been achieved, while retaining survivability, so long as the carrier remained sufficiently defended. The carriers, and their aircraft, became the offensive striking arm of the Navy. The surface fleet was relegated to protecting the carriers. Although battleships and cruisers saw action without involvement of the carriers, they had passed their heyday, and were destined for mothball fleets. Naval tacticians understood that aircraft were effective daytime weapons against surface targets.16 But the concept of employment shifted from air offense back to defense, as the aircraft carriers became preeminent targets. 17 Carriers were operated at further from each other to increase their survivability against attack. Their air wings were massed in the skies to regain overwhelming striking power. As the quality and capability of resident aircraft improved, so did their lethality. Thus, the Navy organized for combat by creating successive layers of defense around the carriers. The carriers' aircraft became the primary offensive striking force. 18 Admirals with aviation backgrounds controlled the operation and development of the Navy after World War II. Since aircraft and their carriers were the backbone of the Navy during the War it was hardly surprising that the Navy organized its striking fleets around its aircraft carriers. Forward striking capability was vested entirely in the air wings.19 The rest of the Navy suffered slow degradation. The threat posed by Soviet cruise missile developments led to vocal dissatisfaction among the Navy's surface force officers in the 1960's. Development of Soviet OSSA and KOMAR class missile patrol boats, as well as the sinking of the Israeli destroyer EILAT by a cruise missile in October 1967 proved to be a turning point for the Navy.20 Grudgingly the Navy's air systems command agreed to develop a cruise missile. Stipulations placed on development were that the missile be air, as well as surface-launched, and that its range be limited to no more than 50 nautical miles.21 The resultant missile was named Harpoon. It was developed for launch from the air, surface, and sub-surface platforms, and finally gave back offensive striking capability to surface ships, in particular. Since the Soviet navy was built largely to conduct anti-aircraft carrier warfare, and cruise missiles offered our Navy offensive options that could preclude putting the carrier at risk, the carrier has lost some of its significance. WORLD WARS I and II also saw the development of submarines as offensive strike platforms. The German navy nearly won both wars by conducting open-ocean submarine warfare against surface shipping. The United States Navy enjoyed exceptional success in the World War II Pacific theater, conducting similar operations against the Japanese navy. The single greatest limiting factor that held back submarines was their inability to operate independent of external sources for any length of time. Also, diesel-electric propulsion plants required the submarine to operate on the surface while charging batteries used when submerged. Submarines were highly vulnerable during this period. TheGerman Schnorkle helped reduce this vulnerability by allowing the submarine to stay submerged, near the surface, while operating on diesels. A far superior propulsion method was soon to be developed by the Navy that would boost the combat capability of submarines. "UNDERWAY ON NUCLEAR POWER" was sent by USS NAUTILUS (SSN-571), as she came into commissioned service in 1954.22 Nuclear power made submarines as nearly self-sufficient as they could be. Missiles gave them exceptional striking ranges. Whether the missile be an intercontinental ballistic or cruise missile, the submarine, remaining silently submerged could hold fleets, and nations at risk. Nuclear-powered submarines took on the missions of strategic deterrence and offensive strike warfare. Employment of the attack submarines has been hotly debated ever since these major technological advances became operational realities. At issue has been whether they should be concentrated in groups similar to the German wolf-packs, or allowed to act independently. The nature of the advances in technology generally favored the later. So has the Navy.23 Throughout the period being considered a significant, yet often overlooked weapon evolved. Mines were inexpensive, unsophisticated, yet highly effective weapons against all water-borne craft and ships. The first recorded use of unattended underwater explosives was in the Delaware River, at Philadelphia in 1777.24 They were also used during the Civil War. Tethered to anchors, explosive kegs sent many unsuspecting ships to the bottom during this period. During the Russo-Japanese War mines broke free of their moorings end posed an indiscriminate threat to all shipping in the region. The Hague Convention of 1907 was convened to address this. The conferees agreed to a number of provision. that were ambiguous and unenforceable. Those tenets were ignored by Germany and Great Britain in World War I. The United States and some other participants had not even ratified them. A follow-on to reconsider the Convention was to be held in 1914, however World War I intervened. Thus, the Hague Convention of 1907 has remained the only legislative attempt to control mine warfare.25 Mines have varied in type, triggering mechanisms, and method of employment. The least sophisticated mine has remained the floating mine. More sophisticated mines included bottom laid (shallow water) mines and moored (deep water) mines. Countering mines has centered on mine hunting and mine sweeping. Effectiveness in countering mines has depended on whether the mine could be found, and on whether the mine sweeper had gear that could counter the mine. Countered or not, mines have remained capable of delaying or stopping entire fleets when employed in strategic maritime choke points. As was recently demonstrated when Samuel B. ROBERTS struck a floating mine in the Arabian Gulf, a single, relatively unsophisticated weapon demonstrated that it can inflict lethal, if not fatal damage to a ship. Any hostile faction can procure and employ mines against specific or general targets. The result can be significant, in light of a relatively inexpensive initial cost. Throughout World Wars I and II, Korea, and Vietnam mine warfare has been employed by the United States as a means of passive offensive war at sea. Three general conclusions about mine warfare remain pertinent. First, the ever-growing role of mine warfare in world events cannot be neglected or ignored. Second, a continuing need for readiness in regard to mine warfare remains. Finally, the dependence of mine warfare on technological developments suggests that future mines will increase in operational lethality.26 Although unglamorous, and easily overlooked, mines must remain a key weapon in the war plans of the Navy, now and in the future. The atomic bomb was another development that significantly altered the Navy's operation. Because a single weapon could destroy entire fleets, cruising formations had to spread over vast areas of ocean to improve survivability. Mutual support was reduced, as a result. Command and control became difficult, if not impossible.27 Communications suffered likewise. Ships were built with the citadel concept that employed an air-tight envelope, and salt-water washdown systems as their primary defense against nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Tactical data networks, improved communications (as well as renewed emphasis on continuous wave Morse communications), longer range surface-to-air, surface, and sub-surface weapons, and tactics evolved. TODAY'S NAVY With this background, today's Navy is designed to perform the functions of prompt and sustained combat at sea. It must be capable of joint amphibious operations, strategic nuclear warfare, providing strategic sealift forces, and coordination of the peacetime maintenance of the Coast Guard. It must remain capable of performing the traditional missions of sea control, sea denial, and projection of power. These missions are broken down into functional areas of anti-air warfare (AAW), anti-surface warfare (ASUW), anti-submarine warfare (ASW), mine warfare, amphibious warfare, and special operations warfare. Strike warfare encompasses ASW, ASUW, and operations against land. The Soviet navy espouses a naval doctrine that calls for massed action through combined operations. The idea is to create an overwhelming three-dimensional attack against an adversary (read US Navy). They then develop the ships, aircraft, weapons and tactics to accomplish this. They are now the United States Navy's most capable potential adversary. Advances in Soviet naval weapons systems have brought into question the ability of the Navy's tactical aircraft to successfully perform strike warfare missions. Given improved stand-off weapons, and cruise missile support, some argue that the aircraft can remain an effective weapon for anti-surface warfare. Whether the desire to maintain a human interface created by placing a pilot in the airframe remains, or the unmanned cruise missile replaces the aircraft as the offensive "weapon of choice" remains to be seen. The answer to this issue will impact the force structure, and operation of the Navy in executing its missions. Since the military build-up of the 1980's, the Navy has maintained that it needs a six-hundred ship force structure to accomplish its missions. This centers on the call for fifteen aircraft carrier battle groups. Debate over the utility and size of aircraft carriers has raged, especially since the shrinking budget has factored more heavily in force planning. Arguments have ranged from a call for more "big-decks" to building small carriers similar to the World War II "jeep" carriers. Few, however, argue that sea-going airpower should be disestablished. Recent military action during the Falkland crisis highlighted the need for air superiority at sea during naval operations. Lacking sufficient carrier assets, the British Navy was forced to put portable decking over the top of containers being carried aboard merchant container ships a Then Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing (VSTOL) or rotary wing aircraft were attached to these ships. Defensive capability was then available in otherwise vulnerable ships and groups. In effect, small "poor-man's aircraft carriers" were created. This helped to alleviate the lack of "big deck" carriers Faced by Great Britain. It also highlighted their need, and value, in establishing and maintaining air superiority for naval operations.28 Reintroduction of the battleship in the Navy provides the ability to form surface striking groups without a carrier as the centerpiece. These groups operate as an autonomous offensive maneuver force capable of conducting high-speed, long-range strikes against surface or land targets, and to carry out a limited sea control mission in low air threat environments.29 A number of factors are at work, in causing the Navy to return part of the surface strike role to its surface ships. First, consistently increasing range and accuracy of the surface-to-surface missile has forced the offensive carrier battle group back beyond its nominal operating horizon. Second, tactical aircraft have become more vulnerable to exceptionally well-defended Soviet warships. They must, therefore, be saved for the right moment, or written-off early in any future combat. Third, limited attack submarine assets will largely limit their employment to ASW, vice ASW and ASUW. Fourth, surface ship AAW point defensive systems are improving so rapidly that only heavy saturation or nuclear attacks will likely succeed against them. Finally, surface ships are now receiving the types of combat systems necessary to conduct overwhelming ASUW attacks.30 By installing surface-to-surface cruise missiles in destroyers, cruisers, battleships and submarines, all contribute to the strike warfare mission. Cruise missiles have freed aircraft to engage in other tasks, thus enhancing the Navy's overall ability to secure use of the seas. The cruise missile's most important short-term effect is that it greatly strengthens the Navy's anti-surface striking capability at a time when the Soviet Union is building a large and highly sophisticated surface navy. The cruise missile also provides the Navy with a strong option in Third World scenarios. Land attack cruise missiles, in particular, place many potential adversaries at considerable risk, thus deterring aggression on their part.31 THE FUTURE NAVY The fleet of the future will likely retain the same missions as are presently assigned. The United States is dependent on overseas economies for its own survival. Access to and controlled use of the seas remain in the national interest. Advances in technology will continue to influence the Navy's capabilities, organization for combat, and tactics. Some of those advances are now becoming reality and span every facet of sea-going warfare. Sophisticated propulsion plants are in already in use. Nuclear plants propel all modern submarines, some surface cruisers, and half of the aircraft carriers. Steam turbine propulsion is giving way to smaller, lighter, and more efficient marine gas turbine plants. Microprocessor controlled gas turbine plants are used in PERRY, SPRUANCE, TICONDEROGA, and BURKE class ships. The BURKE plant is so advanced that it will be controlled by its own dedicated AN/UYK-44 computer.32 Electric drive is a proven method about to re-enter the fleet. Diesel and nuclear powered submarines already employ this concept of propulsion. Use of electric drive is also being considered in the Small Water-Area Twin-Hull (SWATH) design concept for the future DDGLX class destroyer.33 A multi-threat environment has been created by extremely quiet submarines capable of accurately targeting and firing cruise missiles over long ranges. High performance, long range bombers launching supersonic cruise missiles from low altitudes compound the targeted force's problem. Toss in the surface ships firing their cruise missiles, and the strike triad is completed. This has led to a revolution in AAW and ASUW radar, and ASW sonar technology.34 Extremely sophisticated, computer controlled systems now lacate and classify contacts, and guide weapons to designated targets. Weapons range from unsophisticated gun projectiles and iron bombs to precision guided munitions, and autonomous torpedoes and missiles. Future weapons systems will likely incorporate laser and particle beam concepts. As always, there will remain a place for the venerable and patient mine. Surface ship construction will likely take advantage of the concept of modularization. That is to say, a generic hull, complete with propulsion system, is provided with space designed to "plug in" weapons system modules necessary for upcoming missions. This is an expansion of the concept that produced the vertical-launch missile system. Sensor modules will come packaged, too. Ships will be configured for tasked missions such as all-AAW, ASW, ASUW, or whatever mix the force commander desires. Generic hulls will be less expensive to build, and be easier to logistically supportand maintain. As history demonstrates, technology effects hardware, and hardware effects tactics. New developments in surface ship warfighting capabilities require refinement of old tactics, or development of new ones, so that all the benefits of new technology can be realized. Naval tactics are generally developed on five fundamentals. The first is that naval warfare centers on attrition caused by the successful delivery of firepower. Second, localizing an enemy, sufficiently to target and deliver firepower is crucial to the development and employment of tactics. Third, the command and control process transforms firepower and targeting into delivered combat force. Fourth, since naval combat is force-on-force attrition, any effect on the first three presumptions may well cause a significant impact on the final outcome. Finally, well-thought maneuver allows the ability to localize, target, and engage an enemy.35 Now technological advances factor heavily, since they are the determinants of how effectively any navy can address these fundamentals. An old concept, that of operational squadrons, has proven its worth in recent nautical history. The Navy stopped using this concept, opting for task organized operating forces. This is a result of the shrinking pool of combatants available. The operational squadron offers advantages that make it worth reconsidering. Through rigorously training and drilling a squadron of ships is molded into a cohesive team capable of executing their commodore's intentions without having to be told what to do, when to do it, or how to do it. By familiarity from operating together all know their part in the overall scheme of maneuver and combat. Anticipating the total chaos in future conflicts at sea, the Navy should return to the operational squadron concept, fleet-wide. War at sea, which ultimately becomes a war of attrition, has backed up one level, to an attrition of weapons. The fate of the remaining ships will then be decided. High and medium intensity conflict will be characterized by voluminous exchanges of weapons, obliteration of the electromagnetic spectrum, and massive destruction. Modern warfare finds the commander striving to mass firepower by committing forces at the right moment, while denying the enemy the opportunity to do the same.36 Effective delivery of ordnance will produce victory. This will come as a result of crews who are well spell early deFeat. Also demonstrated throughout history, once technological advances alter tactics, training must be conducted to ensure the sailors know how best to maintain and fight their ships. Time will remain the decisive element in achieving victory or suffering defeat. Time advantage is gained through training, so all know instinctively what to do, and then do it. Only effective training can allow the crew any hope of victory. Training must focus on individual basic skills. Then the individual can contribute to team efforts. Teams must then be organized and riggorously trained to operate as a synergistic entity. The process of qualifying individuals and teams must be revisited, and made more meaningful. Well trained teams will bring victory, as history proves. Career development of warfighters must be also be relooked. For years the US Navy has opted for the unrestricted line officer concept which produced officers versed in a broad spectrum of warfighting. Other navies developed officers specialized in limited aspects of their service. Possibly a more logical "middle-ground" would be to develop officers specialized in specific aspects of combatant, amphibious, mine and supporting forces operations. Developing career paths in these functional areas would still provide well-rounded specialists, so long as the Navy does not allow any particular group to become more "desirable" than another. One final consideration, and possibly the single most important one, for the future Navy to take into account is that of the budget. Technology has a high price. It will remain to be seen if the United States has the resolve to pursue the future development and employment of its Navy, in light of its high cost. History dramatically illustrates technology's effects on how the United States Navy haf evolved. Force structures have often altered to accommodate technological advances. The only draw-back has been reluctance of the leaders to accept and advance with technology. In order to ensure future access to overseas economies the Navy must remain strong and modern. The cost of doing so will be high. The cost of not doing so will be dear. It may well be our very way of life. NOTES 1 Hughes, Wayne P., CAPT, USN (Ret.), Fleet Tactics, (Annapolis: US Naval Institute Press, 1986), pp. 54-69. 2 Hughes, p. 69. 3 Hughes, pp. 70-81. 4 MacIntyre, Donald, CAPT, R.N., The Thunder Of Guns (New York: W.W. Norton, 1959), p. 98. 5 Whitehouse, Arch, Fighting Ships (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967), pp. 52-54. 6 Ibid. 7 Whitehouse, p. 57. 8 Whitehouse, pp. 102-106. 9 Turnbull, A.D., CAPT, USNR, et al, History Of United States Naval Aviation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949), pp. 193-204. 10 Ibid. 11 Whitehouse, p. 103. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Turnbull, pp. 284-295. 15 Whitehouse, p. 64. 16 Hughes, p. 109. 17 Ibid. 18 Betts, Richard K., ed, Cruise Missile. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1981), pp. 379-380. 19 Ibid. 20 Betts, pp. 381-384. 21 Ibid. 22 Chatham, R.E., LCDR, USN, "A Quiet Revolution", US Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1984, pp. 42-46. 23 Ibid. 24 Hartmann, G.K., Weapons That Wait (Annapolis: US Naval Institute Press, 1979), p. 17. 25 Hartmann, pp. 40-42. 26 Hartmann, pp. 42-85. 27 Hughes, p. 161. 28 Mulquin, J.J., LT, USNR (Ret.), "Merchant Ship TACAIR", US Naval Institute Proceeding., March 1985, pp. 168-170. 29 Power., R.C., CAPT, USN, "Creating The Surface Strike Group", US Naval Institute Proceeding., August 1983, pp. 111-112. 30 Shield., R.B., LCDR, USN, "The Renaissance Of Surface-To- Surface Warfare", US Naval Institute Proceeding., February 1985, pp. 128-132. 31 Betts, pp. 231-273. 32 Preisel, J.H., CDR, USN, "High-Tech Below The Main Deck", US Naval Institute Proceeding., October 1988, pp. 121-124. 33 Ibid. 34 Hughes, pp. 111-139. 35 Hughes, pp. 140-215. 36 Ibid. 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