The Caribbean Basin: A Strategic Concern CSC 1989 SUBJECT AREA - Foreign Policy Author Major David Burgess EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I. Purpose. To underscore the significance of the Caribbean Basin to our national security. II. Problem. We must focus greater attention on the region. III. Data A. Few appreciate the vast differences in the region between the continuous landmass which constitutes Central America and the islands that are spread across the Caribbean. B. The economic importance of the region to the U.S. is greatly underestimated by most. C. The immigration problem and the growing communist threat should besource of great concern to our national security. IV. Conclusions. Currently, our national security strategy is too heavily weighted to the defense of Europe at the expense of our own hemisphere. We must direct greater attention to the Caribbean Basin or face serious peril to our national security in the future. V. Recommendations. A. Operationally. Maintain our military presence in the region through aggressive security assistance programs and an aggressive operational exercise program. B. Strategically. (1) Place a greater priority in the security of the region in the President's annual National Security Strategy Report. (2) Intensify efforts to economically develop the region, while continuing attempts to isolate Cuba. (3) Renew, and maintain, our support for the Nicaraguan Resistence. (4) Be prepared to use military force as a means to secure vital national interests in the region. THE CARIBBEAN BASIN: A STRATEGIC CONCERN Thesis: Our national security is inextricably tied to that of our neighbors in this hemisphere. We must focus greater attention to the region, particularly those nations of the Caribbean Basin or risk jeopardizing future national security. I. Historical Perspective (U.S./Regional Relationships) A. Monroe Doctrine B. Twentieth Century (1) Pre WW II (2) Post WW II II. Regional Diversity A. Caribbean Islands B. Central America III. The Threat A. Military build-up in Cuba and Nicaragua (1) Soviet Presence B. Fostering unrest in the region IV. Countering the Threat A. Operational Level B. Strategic Level Our national strategy for over forty years has focused on preventing the Soviets from dominating the Eurasian landmass. Although successful, this strategy has been at expense of our oun hemisphere where the Soviets have established two surrogate nations while fostering political unrest in numerous others. Our geographic, or territorial, security is inextricably tied to the security of our neighbors in this hemisphere and we must focus greater attention to the region, particularly those nations of the Caribbean Basin. This volatile region should be of particular concern to those of us in the military because it is the most likely area in which we could be involved in the coming years. It is, therefore, imperative that we gain a more basic knowledge of the region and its issues in order to appreciate its strategic and operational significance to our national security. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE We have long exerted great influence over the Caribbean Basin dating back to the Monroe Doctrine. President James Monroe issued the doctrine in 1823 over growing concern of Throughout this paper the term "Caribbean Basin" will be defined as the geographic area of the Caribbean Sea, including all the rim islands (excluding The Bahamas), all littoral states (from Mexico up to Colombia), and one country not contiguous to the Caribbean, El Salvador. growing concern of European expansion in the region. The doctrine announced to the world that the United States considered the Western Hemisphere as no longer a place for European colonization and that any future act to exert influence or control over existing states in the region would be considered an act of hostility. It, in essence, established the United States as a paternal overlord for the region. A role maintained throughout the 19th century, culminating with our defeat of the Spanish in Cuba in 1898 in the Spanish-American War. In the first three decades of this century our militarily active role has been even greater. The U.S. approach during this period was a comprehensive pacification policy, the synthesis of which was "carrot" and "stick." (8:78) It provided guidelines for U.S. interventions in the Western Hemisphere during the era. These interventions were not to annex territory, but to enhance U.S. security. The Army was in the vanguard initially with action first (1906 -1909) in helping to quell an armed insurrection in Cuba against the U. S. sponsored government, and again when it occupied Veracruz, Mexico during the Mexican revolution. (8:78) The most significant action in the region during this century, however, has been undertaken by U.S. Marines. Marines landed in Nicaragua in 1912 to protect American lives and property and to ensure the victory of pro- American forces over rebel factions. Later, they were the primary occupying force following the breakdown of law and order in Haiti in 1915 and in Santo Domingo in 1916. The Marines would stay in the Dominican Republic until 1924. During this period they engaged in counter-guerilla operations where they gained experience and knowledge which they would use in their most notable involvement in the region, the second intervention in Nicaragua. The Marines second Nicaragua intervention in 1927, also known as the Sandino Affair, had striking similarities to events and issues which face the same area today. Marines were introduced to Nicaragua to implement an agreement between the U.S. and liberal factions trying to overthrown the conservative government. Complicating the issue was the threat, real or perceived by the U.S. government, that Mexico had hegenomic designs on the area and was acting as the Soviet Union's principal agent. Augusto Cesar Sandino was a guerilla leader opposed to the U.S. intervention and determined to rid his country of the American presence. He would conduct a successful guerilla campaign against the Marines by using neighboring Honduras as a sanctuary as well as a source for recruits and arms. (The Marines were prohibited by the U.S. government from crossing the international borders in pursuit of the guerillas. Another familiar ironic aspect is that arms for the guerillas were being smuggled in from El Salvador across the Gulf of Fonseca.) (8:80) The Marines would spend six years in the country fighting Sandino and his forces before President Hoover decided to withdraw due the deteriorating economic situation at home and the anti-interventionist pressure from both at home and abroad. (8:81) (From their involvement in the region the Marines would publish their Small Wars Manual, 1940 which has recently gained new interest within the Corps.) Upon our departure from Nicaragua, our nation would not intervene again until Marines landed in the Dominican Republic in 1965 to help quell a leftest revolt, and then again, most recently, with the Grenada intervention in 1983. With few exceptions, however, our attention has primarily centered on other parts of the world since the early decades of this century. Specifically, since the outbreak of World War II the focus of our national strategy has been on Europe, and the Western Pacific, where it has basically remained through today. REGIONAL DIVERSITY Few appreciate the significance differences, culturally and geographically, between countries of Central America and the islands which make-up the Caribbean. Central America is a continuous landmass to our south, dominated by its Spanish heritage. The Caribbean, however, consists of the islands of the Greater and the Lesser Antilles, which are very diverse in their cultural heritage. Although dominating the large islands of the Greater Antilles, the Spanish heritage is limited to Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico. All three territories were claimed by Spain in the latter part of the 14th Century. Spanish is the official language of all three, while the sugar industry, followed by the cattle and tobacco industries, dominates their agricultural and economic base. The French have also significantly influenced the islands of the region. Haiti (sharing the island of Hispaniola with the Dominican Republic) is the largest of French inspired islands. Although the majority of its population are descendants of Africa, French is the official language of the country. Haiti's primary economic base is also agricultural with its primary products being coffee, bananas, and sugar. Haiti, unfortunately, is recognized by most as the poorest and most backward country in the Western Hemisphere. The French also settled, and still control, the islands of the Lesser Antilles of Guadeloupe, Martinique, the small island of St. Barthelemy, and they share part of the island of St. Martin with the Dutch. The sugar industry is the most important product of these islands, although the tourism industry is of almost equal significance to their economies. As with practically all the islands of the Lesser Antilles, the majority of the population are descendants of Africa, with a small number of native Indians (Caribs), and also a small group of European extraction, in this case French. The Dutch settled islands include the small group of islands of Aruba, Curacao, and Bonaire (commonly referred to as the Netherlands Antilles). Further north in the Lesser Antilles, the Dutch also claim the islands St. Eustatius, Saba, and their share of the island of St. Martin, or St. Maarten. The final European nation to have established great influence over the islands of the Caribbean is, of course, the British. This influence extends from the large island nation of Jamaica, to the British Virgin Islands, and to the majority of the islands of the Lesser Antilles, to include: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, St. Christopher and Nevis, Montserrat, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Barbados, Grenada, and Trinidad and Tobago. The English still exert control over the islands of Anguilla, Montserrat, as well as the British Virgin Islands. (Also controlled by the English are the Cayman Islands which lie directly below Jamaica.) In all of these islands English is the official language, and sugar their primary agricultural product, although tourism is equally critical to their economies. In Central America, as previously stated, the Spanish heritage dominates, however, by no means is this domination total. In Belize, formerly British Honduras, the English still wield influence, while there is considerable native Indian population in each of these nations. In actuality, the bulk of the population is a mix of the native Indians and the European settlers, primarily the Spanish. Spanish is the predominate language throughout Central America, while the economies are agriculturally based with sugar, bananas, and tobacco as their primary products. THE ISSUES The economic importance of the Caribbean Basin to the U.S. is underestimated by most. With the exception of Canada and Western Europe, the countries that constitute the region are the greatest consumers/importers of U. S. goods in the world. Our imports of $30m a year from the region, also represent one of the highest rates relative to other nations/regions of the world. (3:541) We are dependent on the countries of Central America for such strategic raw materials as antimony, manganese and tin. Further, we receive 96 percent of our bauxite, and 40 percent of our petroleum (including our entire strategic reserve) from the region. (7:19) Investment opportunities are also abundant in the region. The population is expected to grow to 549 million by the end of the century. Currently, 20 percent of our total foreign investment and 72 percent of our entire investments in the Third World are in Central America, a region with enormous economic growth potential. (8:19) Equally significant, are the Caribbean sea lines of communication (SLOCs) which are vital arteries of our shipping, both commercial and military, from the major U.S. ports on the East, West, and Gulf Coasts to every area of the world. In event of a European war, these SLOCs would carry half of the supplies required by the NATO forces. (5:vi) The Basin accounts for over 35 percent of the legal immigrants into the U.S. each year, not to mention the untold millions of illegal aliens. They register more than 50 percent of our annual growth rate and live on the margins of our society. We currently have the fifth largest Spanish- speaking population in the world. (7:21) The numbers of illegal immigrants tend to increase relative to the political unrest in a particular area. From El Salvador the number of immigrants to the U.S. (legal) increased from 6. 1 million in 1980 to 10. 1 million in 1985. (3: ) Presently, Nicaragua has the highest refugee rate from the Basin with an estimated 500,000 to 750,000 having fled the country since the Sandinista Revolution. (4: A27) Recently, U.S. Attorney General Richard Thornburgh called the situation with immigrants coming across the Texas border "very acute." In 1987, 405 refugees crossed the Texas border seeking asylum, however, in the last six months of 1988, 28,810 applied. Of those, 47 percent were Nicaraguans, 22 percent Salvadorans, 11 percent Guatemalans, and 11 percent Hondurans. (1:A2O) Also acerbating this problem is the young age structure and high fertility rates of many Basin countries. Most of these countries can expect to have their populations double by the turn of the century. Of these nations, Mexico's population growth represents our most severe concern. Population increases among young Mexicans are likely to result in an even heavier influx of Mexican immigrants into the U.S. in the coming years. We share a common border of almost 2000 miles with Mexico and it is by far our largest source of immigrants, legal and illegal. If Mexico were to experience widespread political unrest through a communist insurgency, our current refugee problems will be comparatively minor. THE THREAT The Soviets appreciate the importance of the area. They are committed to their two surrogates and in further spreading their influence in the area which they refer to as our "strategic rear." Cuba and Nicaragua have developed two of three largest (Mexico being the third), and certainly the two most sophisticated, military forces in the Caribbean Basin. Cuba has one of the largest and most advanced armed forces in the world and it continues to grow. In 1970, 1.3 percent (109,000 personnel) of population were in the military. By the end of 1981, that figure had doubled to more than 227,000, regular and ready reserve personnel. This figure represents over 2.3 percent of a population of close to 10 million, and, as comparison, is almost ten times that of its regional neighbors. These forces are well-trained and many have gained combat experience in campaigns overseas in Angola and Ethiopia. The Cuban offensive capability is second only to that of the U.S. in the region. The Air Force has over 200 MIG intercepters, including MIG-23's. The Navy has two Foxtrot and Whiskey class submarines, a Koni-class frigate, and over 20 fast-attack missile craft in addition to numerous patrol craft. In the event of a U.S. - Soviet confrontation, the Cuban offensive capability possesses a considerable threat to tie down a substantial number of our forces. (5:v) Of increasing concern is the growth of the Nicaraguan armed forces. They are currently dedicating over 50 percent of their national budget to the military, estimated to be 74,000 strong (three times the size of the former forces of Anastasio Somaza). (7:21) These numbers compare to El Salvador's 44,000, Guatemala's 32,000. Honduras' 18,000, and Costa Rica's small civil guard of 8,000. In sophistication, Nicaragua owns more tanks and armored vehicles than all of the above countries combined. (For those that would argue this is in response to U.S. aggression, the Sandinista's initiated this build-up at a time when their revolution still enjoyed strong support at home and abroad. ) Their is also an overt Soviet military presence in the Basin, using Cuba as a forward staging base: - Soviet reconnaissance aircraft regularly deploy to and from Cuban bases; the naval ship visit program, begun in 1969, continues to send task groups into the Caribbean, making port calls in Cuba. - A Soviet intelligence-collecting station (the largest outside the USSR continually monitors U.S. telecommunications traffic. - A special Soviet brigade, consisting of approximately 3000 personnel, continues to billeted near Havana. (5:xi) There are 25 Marxist insurgent groups operating in Central America, most supported by the Soviet bloc, Cuba and Nicaragua. All of these groups share a contempt for democratic rule. To assist, Soviet aid to Cuba exceeds what they provide to the rest of the world combined (some $6.3 billion in 1987). (7:20) In El Salvador, Cuba and Nicaragua have played key roles in serving as transshipment centers for the arming of the Salvadoran guerillas, as well as unifying the insurgents efforts and giving them strategic direction. While there is little doubt of Cuban and Nicaraguan training of Salvadoran guerillas, there is also evidence of Cuban training of the insurgents in Guatemala, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic. In Guatemala, for instance, many of the more than 2000 active guerillas have received Cuban training. (5:55) COUNTERING THE THREAT OPERATIONAL LEVEL General F. F. Woerner, USCINCSOUTH, recently stated: "When referring to possibility of warfare in Southern Command's theater of operations,. ..call it high probability instead of low-intensity conflict. This type of warfare will not be won solely with the technological quick fixes. Rather, the campaign plans are time intensive and require credible consistency over the long haul. Progress will be measured in small increments rather than the quick successes to which we and the American public are more attuned and have come to demand as a matter of course." (7:18) The challenge for the U.S. military in the Basin is great, particularly considering, in contrast to the Soviets, our actual presence in the region has decreased since the 70's and early 80's. Military reductions in the Basin have included the closing of Ramey Air Force Base and Fort Brooke in Puerto Rico as well as force cuts at the facilities in Puerto Rico, Panama, and Guantanamo. Probably most disturbing is the recent news that U.S. Forces Caribbean will soon close. U.S. Forces Caribbean, located in Key West, Florida, was formed from the Caribbean Contingency Joint Task Force (CCJTF) which, in turn, was born out of concern over the Soviet brigade in Cuba in 1979. A sub-unified command of USCINCLANT, U.S. Forces Caribbean area of responsibility includes the Caribbean (all the islands) and the waters adjacent to Central America and South America. (USSOUTHCOM, located in Quarry Heights, Panama, is responsible for the landmass of Central America and South America. ) This will leave us with three major facilities in the Caribbean Basin: Roosevelt Roads in Puerto Rico, our bases in Panama, and the Guantanamo Naval Station in Cuba. These three bases, however, are strategically located: 1. Puerto Rico, at the gateway to the Caribbean. 2. Panama, at the Canal Zone and at the southern rim of the Basin. 3. Guantanamo, in Castro's Cuba, on the northern rim of the Basin. (5:62) With a force build-up in any of these facilities unlikely, the U.S. military must continue to provide a signifcance presence in the Basin in order to counter Soviet encroahment in the region. This must be done through aggressive security assistance (Foreign Military Sales [FMS], Military Assistance Program [MAP], and the International Military Education and Training Program [IMET]) and a consistent, active operational exercise program. STRATEGIC LEVEL The importance of preventing the Soviet Union from dominating Western Europe, Asia, and the Middle East cannot be under-emphasized. We are often preoccupied, however, with the other areas of the world at the expense of our own hemisphere. We have carried an excessive burden in the defense of Europe far too long. Earlier, the presence of our forces in Europe surely deterred Soviet aggression. Currently, though, this argument is losing validity. The Soviets realize they would gain far greater problems than they would solve by attempting to militarily dominate Western Europe. Recently, former Navy Secretary James Webb argued a similar point, recommending that it is time we bring a large percentage of our European forces home. He believes that our force structure in Europe is strategically vulnerable, stating: ". . .the potential loss of much of our Army and aviation assets in an initial communist thrust would affect our worldwide operations far more quickly than the Soviets." (He further states that such a reduction would help to ease, or reduce, our nation's budget deficit and trade deficit by eliminating military bases which, ". . .pump billions of dollars into the economies of our trade competitors....") (6:C2) If we are to avert serious peril to our national security, we must begin easing our preoccupation with the defense of Europe and immediately focus greater attention, means, and effort in preventing communist gains in the Caribbean Basin. In doing so the National Command Authority should consider, or attempt, the following: - Place a greater priority on the security of the region in the President's annual National Security Strategy Report, a document which announces to all what we consider vital to our national interest. In the most recent edition of the report, January 1988, maintaining the security of the Europe dominates our national strategy, while the Western Hemisphere is relegated to secondary, if not tertiary, concern. - Intensify efforts to economically develop the region. - Intensify efforts to economically isolate Fidel Castro's Cuba. He is hub of all communist activity in the Basin. - Renew, and maintain, our military support for the Nicaragua Resistance (Contras). Any desire that the Sandinistas will ever fully implement the Guatamala Peace Accords is unrealistic. They have made similar promises in the past which were broken. We cannot afford to wait under false hopes that they will eventually honor the accords, while their only current organized resistance is disassembled due to lack of support/resolve on the part of the U.S. Government. Finally, the National Command Authority, as a last resort, must be prepared to use military force in the region to ensure the protection of our vital national interests. President Johnson upon deciding to use the military to intervene in the Dominican Republic in 1965, stated: "We have resisted communism all over the world: Viet Nam, Lebanon, Greece. What have we done on our own doorstep. .. . If I intervene, I can't live in this hemisphere. If I don"t I can"t live in this country." (2: 19) If we fail to direct greater attention to this critical area in the near-term, President Johnson's thoughts will again find relevance, only this time the stakes will be much higher. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Bradlee, Benjamin C., ed. "U.S. May Detain Nicaraguans While Asylum Is Decided. " The Washington Post (February 8, 1989). 2. Brownlee, Kenneth L. "AMERICAN ACTIONS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND GRENADA." NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL, Monterey, California, THESIS (June 1985). 3. Hoffman, Mark S., ed. The World Almanac and Book of Facts, 1988. 4. Krauthammer, Charles. "Wright's Failed Nicaragua Policy." The Washington Post (February 10, 1989). 5. Stodder, Joseph H. and Kevin F. McCarthy. "PROFILES OF THE CARIBBEAN BASIN IN 1960/1980: CHANGING GEOPOLITICAL AND GEOSTRATEGIC DIMENSIONS." A RAND NOTE, published for the U.S. Air Force (December 1983). 6. Webb, James H. "Five Quick Fixes for 89: Bring the Boys Home." The Washington Post (January 8, 1989). 7. Woerner, Fred F., General, U.S. Army. "THE STRATEGIC IMPERATIVES for the United States in Latin America." Military Review (February 1989). 8. Yates, Lawrence A. "From Small Wars to Counterinsurgency: US Military Interventions in Latin America since 1898." Military Review (February 1989).
