Elite Forces Past And Present CSC 1989 SUBJECT AREA - History Author Major George A. Biszak ELITE FORCES PAST AND PRESENT OUTLINE Special units, since World War II, have added a new dimension to warfare, but their value has only recently come to light in view of current low-intensity conflict and terrorist activity. I. Development of elite forces A. Formation of the Raider Battalions 1. Early thoughts of Commando Units 2. Designation as Raider Battalions 3. Missions of the Battalions 4. Review merits of such elite units B. Formation of Army's Green Beret 1. Mission of special unit 2. Value of "unconventional" forces C. Formation of Delta Force 1. Mission of special unit 2. Value in relation to terrorist activity II. Similarities of three units A. Well trained personnel B. Presidential contacts C. Internal struggles for existence III. Maintaining "readiness" forces EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: ELITE FORCES PAST AND PRESENT I. Purpose: To examine from a historical viewpoint and give a present day perspective on elite forces. II. Thesis: Special units since World War II have added a new dimension to warfare. Often overlooked in favor of larger campaign studies their value has only recently come to light in view of potential involvement in a low-intensity conflict or terrorist act. The military must make an all out effort to maintain these units at a high state of readiness. III. Data: During World War II the Marine Corps produced an elite within an elite in the form of its four Raider Battalions. Its purpose was to perform special operations in advance of conventional force arrival. Although deactivated in 1944 the special operations capability has been reborn in the form of present day MEU (SOC) units. The Army's elite unit the Special Forces or more commonly referred to as the Green Berets overall mission is to wage unconventional warfare with specialized training. Throughout the Viet Nam War, the Special Forces were assigned several different missions but for the most part found themselves in the position of trying to put down guerrilla insurgency in friendly territory. The flexibility of the Special Forces was demonstrated on the raid of Son Tay prison compound. Although unsuccessful because of poor intelligence their value was realized for future use. In the early Seventies with an increase of terrorist activity Delta Force was activated to suppress terrorist activity against U.S. citizens and its interests. Also unsuccessful in its attempt to free U.S. hostages in Teheran it is still an active force and in view of current terrorist activity its need has not diminished. Ironically each of these units created turmoil within their respective chain of command. IV. Conclusions: Present day elite forces are not faced with the struggle for existence that plagued these units in their conception. After several years of review and with the current possibility of a low-intensity conflict special operational forces are an active and viable asset to the military today. V. Recommendations: with todays' ever present threat of terrorist activity and possible Third World involvement it is imperative that the Special Forces and Delta Force be maintained at a high state of readiness. Having recognized the need with the formation of MEU (SOC) the Marine Corps is once again capable of performing special operations. Since the beginning of recorded warfare there have been forces in various sizes, often referred to as elite forces. Elite, as defined by Webster's dictionary is "1. the group or part of a group selected or regarded as the finest, best, most distinguished, most powerful, etc." These elite forces and their operations are often overlooked and resented in favor of larger campaign studies. Their deeds and heroics have not been disputed but their role in the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war have been questioned. Are these elite units still effective today? Do we have to many and are they feasible for future warfare? In Defeat into Victory by Field Marshall Sir William J. Slim, the Field Marshal concluded that most special units are wasteful and have more disadvantages than advantages. "He believed there was one type of special unit that should become an essential component of any modern army. This special unit is one that operates deep behind enemy lines, whose purpose is to disrupt the enemy, to collect information, to work with indigenous peoples, to sabotage enemy installations, to assassinate enemy commanders. The troops who made up this unit would require many qualities and skills not expected in the ordinary soldier and would use many methods beyond his capacity. Field Marshal Slim felt they could achieve strategic results is handled with imaginative ruthlessness."1 The Unites States Marine Corps in any book mentioning elite forces is referred to as such a unit. However during World War II the Marine Corps produced an elite within an elite in the form of its four Raider Battalions, which in March 1943 became the 1st Raider Regiment. This formation of the Raider Battalions was an epic struggle that was the result of some political desires and for the most part was disliked by most senior Marine Corps officers. The idea of elite or raider type forces was experimented with throughout the thirties. These forces were deployed in advance of the main landing force for the purpose of raiding and patrolling. Their employment was from destroyers and high speed transports and they would go ashore in rubber boats. As the Unites States continued to observe the results of the allied commando units and the success they had, President Roosevelt was intrigued with the idea of forming a United States version of the commando units. Shortly after Pearl Harbor, Captain James Roosevelt, USMCR, the Presidents son, wrote to the Commandant of the Marine Corps proposing the formation of a commando type of unit along the lines of the British commandos and Chinese guerrillas. The Marine Corps had already initiated a program in the form of redesignating the 1st Battalion 5th Marines as the 1st Separate Battalion with a mission to raid and act as an advance force to larger forces. In addition Major General Thomas Holcomb, Commandant of the Marine Corps, indicated that the overall mission of the Marine Corps and the training Marines received was similar to the commandos training and there was no need for a special name.2 The Commandant of the Marine Corps on 14 January, 1942 requested Major General Holland M. Smith, Commanding General, Amphibious Force Atlantic and Major General Charles F.B. Price, Commanding General, Department of the Pacific, to comment on a proposal to appoint Colonel William J. Donovan, USA, to Brigadier General, USMCR, with duty as the commanding officer of the Raider unit.3 General Smith recommended against the appointment of Colonel Donovan as well as the overall raider concept. This was based on similar views of the Commandant that Marine units could be trained to accomplish raid or commando type operations without the help of outside personnel or an elite unit designation. General Price viewed the project as acceptable only if the personnel were recruited directly and not taken from existing units as to further weaken the shortage of qualified officers and senior NCO's in the expanding force .4 On 4 February 1942, in response to a Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet directive, the Commandant of the Marine Corps ordered organization of the 2nd Separate Battalion on the west coast. In addition partly to avoid a political appointed as a leader of the 1st and 2nd Separate Battalions, Lieutenant Colonels Merrit A. Edson, and Evans F. Carlson, were assigned to command the redesignated 1st and 2nd Raider Battalions.5 LtCol Edson had served in France in World War I, had been a Marine pilot, an observer of the Sino-Japanese hostilities and captain of the Marine Corps rifle and pistol team. The executive officer for 1st Raider Battalion was Major Samuel B. Griffith who had observed the British commando training program. LtCol Carlson had travelled extensively with the Chinese (Communist) Eight Route Army guerrillas and had observed their tactics. The executive officer for the 2nd Raider Battalion was Major James Roosevelt. "The mission of the two new raider units was threefold: to be the spearhead of amphibious landing by larger forces on beaches generally thought to be inaccessible; to conduct raiding expeditions requiring great elements of surprise and high speed and to conduct guerrilla type operations for protracted periods behind enemy lines . "6 After extensive training both units departed stateside with the 1st Raider Battalion going to Samoa and the 2nd going to Hawaii. The 2nd Marine Raider Battalion, for the most part, became the more publicized Battalion of the eventual four battalions. The 2nd Raider Battalion first saw action on 24 August 1942, on the island of Makin. The raid was to divert Japanese reinforcements from reaching Guadalcanal. Of the 221 men who landed, the Raiders lost 30, the Japanese about 100 with extensive damage to their supplies. The 2nd Raider Battalion's success in the Makin raid was wildly acclaimed back in the States. However the Marine Corps evaluation of the raid was mixed. The end result was valuable lessons had been learned and the Raider concept could be of value in later operations.7 On 20 September 1942, the 3rd Raider Battalion was activated and on 23 October 1942, the 4th Raider Battalion was activated. The Commandant of the Marine Corps was opposed to the added raider battalions but it had been determined at a higher level of command that the activation would take place.8 On 3 November 1942, the 2nd Raider Battalion landed at Aola Bay on Guadalcanal. It was this operation that silenced many of the critics of the raider concept. With orders to cut off and annihilate the feared 230th Japanese Infantry Regiment the end result was the Raiders killed over 500 enemy soldiers using the guerilla tactics that Lieutenant Colonel Carlson had learned from the Chinese 8th Route Army several years earlier. After this 30 day patrol, with the loss of only 17 of their own men, General Vandegrift cited the Battalion for outstanding service.9 The Raider Battalions continued to perform in a similar fashion throughout the south Pacific. Finally on 26 January 1944, the Battalions were redesignated as the 4th Marine Regiment which had been lost in the Philippines in 1942. One of the greatest assets of the Raider Battalions was a constant reappraisal of troop organization, an intense review of weapons and tactics which eventually helped form the foundations for small unit tactics in the Marine Corps today. It appears that the Raider Battalions main enemy was not the enemy on the field of battle,but personnel within its ranks who did not desire this type of elite unit. The leaders of these elite battalions were without a doubt some of the finest in the Corps. Highly professional, experienced and innovative, they are examples to be followed. It is my personal opinion that the recent designation of MEU (SOC) Marine Expeditionary Unit - Special Operations Capable is similar to the Raider Battalions of World War II, in that they receive additional training in special operation, weapons and tactics. And unlike the Raider Battalions they are perceived as a valuable asset to the Marine Corps. The Armys' elite unit, the Special Forces, was formed on 9 July 1942. Originally called the First Special Service Force, a joint American - Canadian unit, it was commanded by Major General Robert Frederick. The mission of the force was to perform sabotage operations in Norway, but instead were sent to Europe. They served with distinction in the battle for Monte La Difensa in the Mount Maggiore hill mass. Later they were deactivated after service in France.1O They were activated in 1952 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Unlike the epic struggle for existence that the Raider Battalions of the Marine Corps faced, the Special Forces struggle was for adoption of the green beret. President John F. Kennedy was an advocate of Special Forces based on his conviction that this type of unit had a great potential as a counterinsurgency force.11 During September 1961, while visiting the Special Warfare Center, President Kennedy authorized the wearing of the green beret by Special Forces troops. The overall mission of the Special Forces is unconventional warfare with the individual soldier being trained in five basic military occupational specialties: U.S. and foreign weapons; medical techniques; communications; intelligence operations and engineering. The Special Forces found itself playing a peculiar role in South Viet Nam. Trained to wage unconventional war under conventional war conditions, the war in Viet Nam never fell into the conventional category. The end result was that Special Forces found themselves in the position of trying to put down guerrilla insurgencies in friendly territory. Throughout the Viet Nam war, the Special Forces assumed many different missions including the establishment of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) whose job was to develop the ethnic minority groups of the country into fighting units. In the mid 60's Project Leaping Lena eventually became Project Delta. The mission was for Special Forces A detachments to train Viet Nam Special Forces and CIDG troops in techniques of long range patrolling with a mobile strike force to react to this information. In addition mobile strike forces were capable of conducting raids, ambushes, combat patrols and other small-scale combat operations. Special Forces troops with CIDG troops were used with conventional forces in conventional combat operations.12 However one of the more daring operations was the raid on SonTay prison. A ground force of 56 U.S. Special Forces men commanded by Colonel Arthur D. Simons, a highly experienced unconventional warfare expert, attempted to rescue American prisoners of war supposedly being held at SonTay prisoner of war camp 23 miles west of Hanoi. Several months of intensified training resulted in a failed rescue attempt because intelligence had not ascertained that the prisoners had been moved four months earlier to another prison camp. Final approval for this mission was given by President Nixon13 and although no prisoners were found, no lives were lost and one of the ground elements killed 100 to 200 Chinese or Russian advisors.14 With the end of the Viet Nam war, Special Forces lost some favor within U.S. Army circles. From almost 13,000 men in 1969 to less than 3000 by 1980 there future looked bleak.15 However, faced with the reality of a possible low-intensity conflict, it has been realized the valuable asset these forces can play in the various strategic levels of war and their potential, if used properly, for dealing with low-intensity conflicts. Special Forces, with their groups prepared for operations in certain geographic regions, are invaluable in the event follow-on conventional forces are committed. Their tactical and technical expertise along with their knowledge of the geographies, language, climate and abilities to train local friendly forces expands the United States' abilities to conduct and win a low- intensity conflict or aid other friendly nations in fighting them. It is my opinion that through most of the Viet Nam War, the Special Forces were not properly used. This, I feel, is due in part to political constraints and the somewhat conventional mindset that some of the military leaders were in at the time. However the numerous type missions the Special Forces were tasked with provided invaluable tactical and technical expertise for the present day forces to employ. Through their professionalism, they enlightened the military world as to the value of having an unconventional type force and have established the foundation for other forces such as the Navy Seals, Delta Force, and, to a degree, the Russian SPETSNAZ forces. Special Forces truly represents the meaning of an "elite" force. In late August, 1976 a conference was conducted at the Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, to examine the role of the light infantry division. This conference was chaired by General Bill DePuy. General Kingston was tasked to explain what Special Forces could do in support of the light infantry. In general discussion, following General Kingston's brief, General DePuy talked about special operations and the British SAS forces and how the Army should organize a similar unit. For Colonel Charlie A. Beckwith, commandant of the Special Forces School in attendance at the conference it was a dream come true. A long proponent of this type of force, having spent a tour with the 22 SAS Regiment, he along with Colonel Tom Henry were assigned the task of developing this special force. During the many months of development, Colonel Beckwith suggested to General DePuy the name of Delta. General DePuy approved his recommendation.16 The mission of Delta Force is to deal with terrorist incidents affecting the United States and its' interests. The struggle for the formation of Delta was met with a great deal of opposition within the Special Forces and Ranger communities, however on 19 November 1977, Delta Force was activated. A little less than 2 years later a group of Iranians seized the American embassy compound in Teheran and took 53 occupants hostage.17 On 16 April, 1980, President Jimmy Carter authorized the usage of Delta Force to rescue the American hostages. On 24 April, 1980, operation "Eagle Claw" commenced. Although the rescue attempt failed, it was not the fault of the Delta Forces on the ground. The reason for failure was attributed to logistics and poor weather intelligence along with less than adequate training among the various units involved.18 Delta Force is still an active force and more than likely will appear again if U.S. citizens are threatened by some form of terrorist activity. Although each of these units, the Raider Battalions, Special Forces and Delta Force were activated in different decades and for different reasons, there are many similarities that are common to each of these units. Their missions can all be classified as offensive in nature. To take the fight to the enemy and strike at the right time with a well trained and well rehearsed unit for whatever purpose. Highly trained, these forces often provided to the conventional forces invaluable knowledge in the areas of tactics, weaponry and troop organization. Elite or special type forces are often depicted in movies like the "Dirty Dozen" as misfits or jail birds, however with these three units that is not the case. The men that served in these units were hand picked by the men who were to lead them. The leaders of these units understood their missions, knew the demands that would be required and selected the best men available for their units. These men were highly disciplined, dedicated and truly professionals at waging unconventional warfare. Bold and innovative, their rules for tactics were more often than not based upon their own personal experiences. They were men who knew the enemy as well as themselves and continually did the unexpected. They were disciples of Stonewall Jackson's motto `mystify, mislead, and surprise'. Their training was the envy of conventional force commanders. They were allotted resources in training areas, weapons and ammunition however extremely small in comparison to the overall allocations by conventional forces. Their unconventional training was often misunderstood by conventional commanders but usually provided some form of tactical or technical expertise to the conventional commanders. Ironically, each of these units had some form of Presidential contact. In the case of the Raiders, it was President Roosevelt's desire to have such a unit. The Special Forces were authorized by President Kennedy to wear the Green Beret and it was President Nixon who gave the approval for the rescue attempt of the prisoners of war at SonTay. With Delta Force, it was President Carter who authorized the attempt to rescue the hostages in Teheran. With such presidential interest in these units, one can conclude that some form of envy existed among the conventional forces. In addition, these units had to continually fight for their existence. The Raiders were disbanded in the latter part of World War II. The Special Forces saw a severe cutback in personnel and assets after Viet Nam. Delta Force, from its very beginning, was in competition with a force called Blue Light, which, in the end, Delta Force eliminated from the competition. Then, after the failed rescue attempt, they were carefully reviewed for future use. Both the Special Forces and Delta Force remain a strategic part of our armed forces today. With a high probability of future involvement in a low- intensity conflict or some form of terrorist activity against the Unites States, it is imperative that the Special Forces and Delta Force be maintained at a high state of readiness. Although the Raider Battalions were deactivated over 45 years ago the realization of their value has not gone unnoticed. With the recent addition of MEU (SOC), the Marine Corps is once again capable of performing, if needed, special operations. Bibliography Beckwith, Col. Charlie A., and Donald Knox. Delta Force. New York: Dell Publishing Co. ,Inc. 1983. Collins, John M. Green Berets, SEALS, & SPETSNAZ. Great Britain: A. Wheaton & Co. Ltd., Exeter, 1987. Eshel, David. Elite Fighting Units. New York: Arco Publishing, Inc., 1984. Hoffman, Bruce. Commando Raids: 1946-1983. Santa Monica: The Rand Corp., 1985. Knight, David C. Shock Troops. Greenwich: Bison Books Corp., 1983. Quarrie, Bruce. The World's Elite Forces. New York: Berkley Publishing Group, 1985. Schemmer, Benjamin. The Raid. New York: Harper and Row, 1976. Updegraph, Charles L. Jr. U.S. Marine Corps Special Units of World War II. Marine Corps Historical Reterence Pamphet. Washington, D.C., 1972. 1.Col Charlie A. Beckwith and Donald Knox, Delta Force (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1983), P.44. 2.Charles Updegraph, Jr, U.S.Marine Corps Special Units of World War II (Marine Corps Historical Reference Pamphlet, 1972), pp.1- 2. 3.Ibid. ,p.2. 4.Ibid. 5.Ibid. pp 2-3. 6.Ibid.p.3. 7.David C. Knight, Shock Troops (Greenwich: Bison Books Corp., 1983), p.115. 8.Updegraph, pp .15-17. 9.Knight, p.116. 10.Ibid.p.159. 11.Ibid.p.161. 12.Ibid.pp.168-169. 13.Benjamin Schemmer, The Raid (New York: Harper and Row, 1976) ,p.115. 14.Ibid.p.171. 15.David Eshel, Elite Fighting Units (New York: Arco Publishing, Inc. ,1984) ,p.168. 16 .Beckwith,p .95. 17.Bruce Hoffman, Command Raids: 1946 - 1983 (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation. , 1985) , p .47. 18 .Hoffman, pp .47-48.
