Tarawa: Testing Ground For The Amphibious Assault CSC 1989 SUBJECT AREA - History Author Major Douglas F. Ashton TARAWA: TESTING GROUND FOR THE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT The battle for Tarawa was the first of a series of amphibious operations which carried the United State's forces across the Central Pacific to the homeland of Japan. Tarawa was the first successful example of a sea-borne assault against a heavily defended island fortification. When the 2d Marine Division landed on Betio Island in the Tarawa Atoll on 20 November 1943, twenty years of Marine Corps doctrine, unproven to this point, was put to the acid test. Seventy-six hours after the marines landed in the face of heavy resistance, the battle was over and an important base secured with the annihilation of almost 5000 of Japan's finest troops. The cost to the Americans had been dear too. However, the lessons learned were to pay off in larger, more ambitious campaigns in the Pacific. Many changes came about as a result of Tarawa, all of which were written in the blood of the men who seized the island from its defenders. Some of these changes dealt with naval gunfire and close air support. Tarawa served to reduce the exagerated concept of what a surface and aerial bombardment could do to a heavily fortified target. The marines, upon landing, found that little. if any, damage had been inflicted on the Japanese defenders. The battle also highlighted the necessity that the timing of naval gunf ire and aerial support be made to conform with the movement of the landing craft with the first waves of the assault forces. In future operations, the length and intensity of the pre-assault bombardment would not be sacrificed to maintain secrecy. Once ashore, the landing force depends on the ship-to-shore movement of supplies. Before Tarawa, men, equipment, and supplies were loaded in boats according to prearranged schemes of maneuver which were based on a successful landing on selected beaches. This caused rigidity in the logistical plan for the amphibious operation. At Tarawa, the coral reef, combined with a very hostile foe, prevented the continuous movement of supplies ashore and led to the notion of prearranged floating dumps, giving the commander logistical flexibility ashore. Also, Tarawa brought to focus the problems associated with amphibious communications, command and control. These shortcomings were identified and corrected by later campaigns. The most dramatic change to come out of Tarawa was the use of the LVT amphibious tractors in an assault role. Due to the coral reef and unpredictable tides at Tarawa, a decision was made to employ them tactically for the first time. Their use was very successful and all future amphibious assaults would rely heavily on these vehicles. Had there been no Tarawa, these lessons would have had to have been brought home perhaps with even greater force in terms of casualties in the Marshall Islands or the Marianas later in the war. Tarawa, despite its drawbacks, was successful and proved that the American amphibious doctrine was valid. TARAWA: TESTING GROUND FOR THE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT OUTLINE Thesis statement: From lessons learned during the battle of Tarawa, the Marine Corps refined its amphibious warfare doctrine resulting in one of the most significant military concepts of the Second World War. the amphibious assault. I. Why Tarawa? A. Strategic situation B. Importance of the Gilbert Islands in the Pacific theater. II. Planning for Tarawa A. Task Force 53 Southern Pacific Attack Force B. 2D Marine Division assigned mision by VAdm Spruance C. Operation GALVANIC D. 6th Marines assigned as V Amphibious Corps reserve E. 2D Marine Division reserves III. Pre-D-Day actions on Tarawa A. US Army and Navy photo reconnaissance B. Preassault deception bombardment of Tarawa and other possible objectives C. USS Nautilus operations D. Use and allocation of amphibious tractors (amtracs) IV. Assault A. D-Day 20 Nov 1943 1. Significance of predawn naval and air bombardment 2. Beach assignments for assault elements 3. Amtracs delay H-hour 4. Commitment of corps and division reserves 5. Communication difficulties 6. Situation at the end of D-day B. D+1 C. D+2 D. D+3 V. Mopping up A. Betlo (Tarawa) island B. Tarawa atoll VI. Lessons learned A. Use of naval gunfire 1. Type shells used vs. effects sought 2. Lack of simultaneous NGF and air support B. Use of air support controlled by ground troops C. Demonstrated need for dedicated shore party control members D. Demonstrated need for better teamwork between infantry and tanks E. Communications difficulties 1. C&C ship 2. Radio equipment of assault troops F. Use of amphibious tractors 1. Lack of sufficient numbers 2. Lack of sufficient armor and firepower G. Demonstrated need for dedicated comm personnel for NGF teams and air liaison parties TARAWA: TESTING GROUND FOR THE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT Shortly after the defeat of Japan in the Second World War General Alexander A. Vandegrift, a future Marine Commandant, said the following about the Marine Corps' role In the war: Despite its outstanding record as a combat force i n the last war, the Marine Corps' far greater contribution to victory was doctrinal: that is, the fact that the basis amphibious doctrines which carried Allied troops over every beachhead of World War II had been largely shaped...by U. S. Marines.... (5:4) The assault of Betio Island In the Tarawa Atoll was the first successful attempt at crossing and securing a well defended hostile shore. From lessons learned during the battle of Tarawa, the Marine Corps refined its amphibious doctrine resulting in one of the most significant military concepts of the Second World War, the amphibious assault. Knowledge gained at Tarawa led to improvements in every field of amphibious warfare. Many of these related to a more effective delivery of air and naval gunfire support. Tarawa pointed out the value and necessity of amphibious tractors, for improvements in shore party control and in the tactics of offshore, beach and inshore fighting against a firmly established enemy. Tarawa, in short, was the testing ground for the amphibious assault. The direction to take Tarawa from the Japanese came mainly from Admiral Earnest J. King, the Navy's representative to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Admiral King reasoned that before the war could be brought home to the Japanese, large air bases with their supporting arms and services would have to be built within striking distance of Japan by long range bombers. King realized that a base in the Marianas Islands would give the Army Air Forces this capability. However, several island chains leading to the Marianas would have to be taken by force. These islands included many held by the Japanese such as the Solomons, Tarawa atoll in the Gilbert Island, the Marshalls, the Carolines, then the Marianas. (See figure 1) The island hopping, as it was called, had only one purpose. That being the eventual launching of an offensive against mainland Japan. Only islands considered essential to this purpose were invaded by the Marines, bypassing Japanese installations not essential to the control of the central Pacific. Betio island on the Tarawa atoll was one of these essential islands. According to Admiral King: Their location is of great strategic significance because they are north and west of other islands in our possession and immediately south and east of important bases in the Carolines and Marshalls. The capture of the Gilberts was, therefore, a necessary part of any serious thrust at the Japanese Empire.(5:182) Accordingly Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, was alerted on 20 July 1943 to plan and prepare for operations in the Gilbert Islands. In October, Admiral Nimitz placed several units of the Pacific fleet under the command of Vice Admiral R. A. Spruance. His new organization, the Central Pacific Force, consisted of three major groups: Task Force 50, an aircraft carrier force; Task Force 54, the assault force under Rear Admiral R. K. Turner; and Task Force 57, the defense force and shore based air support under Admiral J. H. Hoover. Admiral Turner's Task Force 54 (Fifth Amphibious Force) was subdivided into two major units for operations in the Gilberts: Task Force 52, made up of elements of the U. S. Army's 27th Infantry Division, whose mission was to capture Makin atoll, north of Betlo Island. The division was commanded by Major General Ralph C. Smith. Task Group 53.5, the 2d Marine Division, under Major General Jullan C. Smith USMC, was to capture Tarawa then Apamama atoll, in that order. Betio was the southern most island in the Tarawa Atoll located two degrees north of the equator in the central Pacific. The capture of the atoll was given to Task Force 53 commander, Rear Admiral H. L. Hill. Hill was assigned the following task groups: Rear Admiral H. F. Kingman's Support Group with five fire support sections; the Northern Landing Force under General Ralph Smith, the Southern Landing Force under Major General Jullan C. Smith; Transport Group under Captain H. B. Knowles; a minesweeper group and a carrier group with five escort carriers commanded by Rear Admiral V. H. Ragsdale. Southern Landing Force consisted of the 2d Marine Division, minus the Sixth Marine Regiment whose mission was to be V Amphibious Corps' reserve. The mission given the 2d Marine Division consisted of two parts. The first was to land at H-hour, on D-day, on Betio Island in order to seize and occupy the island. The second part was to prepare for further operations ashore on Tarawa Atoll. The code name for Betio Island was HELEN. The Second Marine Division received this mission while in garrison at Wellington, New Zealand. There the division was training and recuperating from operations on Guadalcanal in the Solomons. It was a seasoned outfit, however, with the exception of the Second Marine Regiment, the division had yet to participate in an amphibious landing, much less an opposed amphibious assault. The Second Marines had served on Guadalcanal from 7 August 1942 until mid-January 1943. The division arrived in New Zealand with 12,500 diagnosed cases of malaria from the campaign on Guadalcanal. As late as October 1943 the division still had almost 1400 ineffectives and daily admissions for malaria averaged forty. However, the arrival of replacements and intradivisional transfers soon brought the division up to strength in anticipation of the upcoming operation. The operation order for Tarawa was completed on 25 October 1943 and called for Combat Team 2 (2d Marine Regiment reinforced, 2d Battalion, Eighth Marines attached) to make the assault landing. The other two battalions of the Eighth Marines, as well as the regimental headquarters, were to constitute the 2d Marine Division's reserve. The Sixth Marine Regiment, fully one-third of the division's strength, was held as the V Amphibious Corps' reserves. V Corps commander, Major General Holland M. Smith, had doubts about the capabilities of the army's 27th Division, however it was destined for Makin Island which was known to be lightly defended. There were only about 250 first-line Japanese troops in a few prepared installations, some of which were found to contain dummy weapons. With transport assets at a premium, Holland Smith selected the most thoroughly trained army regimental combat team of the 27th Division, the 165th, to take Makin. For his corps reserve he picked the Sixth Marines, leaving the Second Marine Division only two reinforced rifle regiments, the Second and the Eighth, with which to plan the seizure of Tarawa. As will be seen later, General Smith's fears about the army's performance were unfounded. The Sixth Marines were eventually committed on Tarawa because of the relatively easy time the army had on Makin atoll and the ferocious fight in which the 2d Marine Division became involved. The assault regiment, Second Marines, was commanded by newly promoted Colonel David M. Shoup, who assumed command when the former commander suffered a mild heart attack. Shoup's plan called for three battalions to land abreast with one battalion from Second Marines in regimental reserve. The assault's reinforcing elements were strong. They consisted of a company of medium tanks, a special weapons group, combat engineers, shore party engineers (pioneers), eight shore fire control and air liaison teams, medical and service units and a battery of 75-mm pack howitzers. The pack howitzers would be the only artillery ashore on Betio. A plan had been examined whereby a battalion of Tenth Marines (2d Marine Division's organic artillery) would land on Bairiki island, adjacent to Betio, and provide artillery support for the assault. (See figure 2) This plan was abandoned because of the lack of suffient transports to make a separate landing on the atoll. Even with the Sixth Marine Regiment, the marines only had twice the strength the Japanese were known to have on Tarawa. It had long been recognized that in assaulting a defended shore, the attacker should have at least a three to one advantage over the defender. The division chief of staff, Colonel Merritt A. Edson of Guadalcanal fame, summarized the situation: ...the relative superiority of strength with the troops now available to us as opposed to the hostile strength on Betio alone ... does not permit the detachment of any part of the Second Marine Division for a secondary landing. Reliance must be placed on supporting air and naval forces neutralize or destroy hostile weapons which may successfully interfere with our landing on Betio.(5:212) Jullan Smith had no freedom of action. He asked for this to be expressed in his orders from his superior and Holland Smith minced no words. The division was about to embark on its most difficult and costly mission to date. Preparations could now be made for the assault. First and foremost was the gathering of intelligence on Tarawa as to enemy size and disposition. Aerial and submarine photographic reconnaissance were the chief means for obtaining intelligence on Tarawa. Pictures taken by the USS Nautilus in late October 1943 showed the island as a flat cluster of palms and undergrowth whose total land area was roughly one-half square mile. The highest terrain was less than twelve feet and the island was without natural defilade positions. From the air the island appeared thin. The long axis ran east-west for almost two and one-half miles. In the thick center of the island there was an airstrip and two taxiways forming an obtuse triangle. The south shore, concave and open to the Pacific, was ruled out as a viable landing site due to the high surf conditions and heavier defenses. The lagoon side was on the north shore with a long seaplane pier extending about 800 yards out into the lagoon. (See figure 2) The aerial photography of the atoll was so accurate that an estimated ninety percent of the Japanese defensive positions were pinpointed before the target date. The number of enemy on the island was estimated in a rather unusual way. From the aerial photographs, the number of privies were tallied and from intelligence of Japanese health and comfort requirements, the number of troops on the island were determined. After the battle, it was determined that the estimate was accurate to within 100 men.(9:10) From information gleaned from the British and New Zealanders that had lived on the island before the Japanese occupation in 1941, it was determined that the coral reef on the north side of the island ran out between 500 and 700 yards. Further, tide information on Betio was unknown and estimated to be about four to five feet at high tide. The LCVPs (Landing Craft, Vehicle and Personnel) would require a minimum of three and one-half feet to cross the reef. The tide cycle was also unknown and further complicated by a "dodging" (non-diurnal) tide, a phenomemon known only on Tarawa. The element of suprise for Operation GALVANIC, as the invasion of Tarawa was code named, was to be maintained until the last possible moment. Therefore, there was no pre-invasion naval shelling nor aerial bombardment that would precede opposed landings later in the war. Some random strikes were made against military targets in the Gilberts and Marshalls from 13-16 November in an effort to confuse the Japanese on the exact target for the upcoming invasion. These missions were flown by B-24s of the Seventh Air Force and elements of Task Force 57, launched from aircraft carriers operating in the area.(8:11) Because of the fringing coral reef around the island and the unknown nature of the tides, a decision was made to use amphibious tractors tactically for the first time. Heretofore these had been used only in a support role to bring logistics ashore and beyond the beachhead. At Tarawa however, they were to carry as many of the assault troops ashore as possible. With the cooperation of the Navy, extensive tests were successfully held to prove the feasibility of crossing coral reefs with these vehicles. Machine guns were mounted forward and boiler plate was rivited to the bow in an effort to add some protection to the area most exposed to enemy fire. A total of 125 tractors were obtained by the V Amphibious Corps for the operation. The last fifty of the amtracs, short for amphibious tractor, joined the division the morning of D-day, 20 November 1943. Smith's plan called for the employment of 100 amtracs to carry the first three assaualt waves over the reef and onto the beach. Twenty-five of the older models (LVT(1)) were held in reserve, a wise move for otherwise many needed supplies would have never reached the beach on, or after, D-day.(3:44) The Japanese defenses of Tarawa atoll were concentrated on Betio Island. The bulk of the big guns on the island were on the three corners of the somewhat triangular shaped island. In between the 8-inch coastal defense guns on the corners were everything from 140mm cannons to 7.7mm machine guns. The Japanese defenses consisted of fourteen coastal defense guns, thirty-three antiaircraft guns and eighty-seven beach defense and antiboat guns. Many of the gun emplacements were built using reinforced concrete with eight inch coconut logs and six feet of sand piled over that. In the surf there were antiboat obstacles to impede the movement of landing craft and force them into prearranged fire lanes, where the carefully emplaced defensive weapons could be used to maximum advantage. The stage was now set for the fight. The Americans conducted two rehearsals enroute to Tarawa while the Japanese prepared their final defenses. The marine's rehearsals were held at Mele Bay at Efate Island in the New Hebrides, while simulated fire support was rehearsed on Pango Point. Meanwhile, the commander of the Japanese Special Naval Land Forces concentrated on building defenses on the southern side of Betlo but had erected some defenses on the northern shore where the Marines would actually land. The Japanese garrison of almost 5000 waited for the 2d Marine Division. Task Force 53 reported their arrival in the operation area at 0320 on 20 November. However, the transports were determined to be in the alternate transport area (Baker) and were ordered north to the primary area (Able) before unloading their troops. (See figure 2) This resulted in some initial confusion as some of the smaller crafts, trailing the transports, were separated from their mother ships in the early morning darkness. Unloading and debarking was delayed, changing the time table and contributing to a delay in H-hour later on in the morning. Japanese shore batteries opened fire on the ships at 0507 and the battle of Tarawa had begun. The flagship, USS MARYLAND as well as other fire support ships answered the challenge. As a result the MARYLAND lost communications when her 16-inch batteries were fired. This was a recurrent problem for General Smith on the MARYLAND and would plague him for the remainder of the seventy-six hour battle. The naval bombardment lasted nearly four hours. The plan had called for the Navy to pound the island with gunfire until thirty minutes before the first wave was to land. Then the carrier air support was to take over until the LVTs were yards from the beach and about to debark their marines. At this stage in the development of amphibious doctrine, it was believed that air strikes and naval bombardment could not be carried out simultaneously. It was believed that because of the smoke and dust caused by naval gunfire, the pilots would not be able to see their targets and that the naval projectiles would present an unacceptable hazard for the aircraft. In any case, the air strike did not arrive on time and Admiral Hill ordered the naval bombardment to resume. During the ceasefire period, the Japanese were able to fire unmolested at the transports but fortunately their accuracy was poor and they inflicted minimal damage to the landing forces. The airstrike arrived at sunrise and conducted its attack against targets in the center of the island. Their efforts were minimal, although the returning pilots claimed that nothing could be left alive on the island after the naval bombardment and air strikes were finished. Nothing could be farther from the truth. In fact, the preparation fires had inflicted little damage to the defensive installations. The planners of the assault had called for destruction fires but had used either the wrong shell-fuse combination or the wrong trajectory to achieve the desired results. What had been achieved was neutralization fire from which the Japanese were able to recover and inflict much damage on subsequent waves landing in LCVP's which were unable to cross the reef. The three initial assault battalions consisted of Second Battallion, Second Marines; Third Battalion, Second Marines; and Second Battalion, Eighth Marines. The landing beaches, Red 1, 2 and 3, were located on the northern side of the Island. Red 1 ran from the western end to a point half way to the seaplane pier. Red 2 ran from the end of Red 1 to the pier. Red 3 ran east from the pier to a point even with the eastern end of the airstrip. (See figure 3) Each beach was approximately 600 yard wide. Third Battalion, Second Marines was assigned Red Beach 1; Second Battalion, Second Marines was assigned Red Beach 2; and Second Battalion, Eighth Marines, Red Beach 3. On the southern side of the island was Black Beach 1 and 2. The short, western end of Betio was designated Green Beach. H-hour had to be delayed due to the LVTs arriving late at the line of departure. Also, the speed of the tide had been underestimated, causing the amtracs to fall further behind schedule. H-hour had been set at 0830. General Smith adjusted H-hour twice due to the speed of the LVTs and the time lost in the confusion in the transport area earlier in the morning. The first unit to reach its beach was Third Battalion. Second Marine Regiment on Red 1. The tractors first came under enemy fire 3000 yards out from the beach. Second Battalion, Eighth Marines reached its beach next. They came under intense enemy fire from 3000 yards also and within 200 yards they received intense fire from the enemy's 3-inch batteries. Immediately the battalion was pinned down just yards in on the beach. A sea wall, three feet high, gave the marines protection from the Japanese machine guns that seemed to have every foot of the beach covered. Two tractors were able to crawl through a break in the sea wall and pushed inland as far as the airstrip. The remainder of the LVTs were stopped by the sea wall barricade and the troops dismounted there. Of 522 men, less than twenty-five became casualties initially.(5:16) Second Battalion, Second Marines reached Red Beach 2 at 0922. Resistance was fierce and only a shallow foothold was established. Units were scattered and disorganized due to the heavy fire to which the battalion was subjected on their way to the beach. Of the three assault battalions, their situation was most precarious. Behind the first three waves of the landing teams, those loaded in the new LVTs, were the other waves in LCVPs that drew three and one-half feet of water. General Smith was aware of the possibilitiy that instead of the estimated five feet of water over the reef, that there might be as little as three feet at high tide on D-day. His worst fears came true. The LCVPs grounded from 600 to 1100 yards from the beach. Troops on the LCVPs were briefed to be ready to disembark and wade ashore. These marines had to wade ashore through waist deep water directly in front of Japanese machine guns. Many were easy targets for enemy gunners, as acurate fire rained unmercifully upon the marines. Others, heavily laden with gear, drowned when they fell into hidden craters in the surf where the water was much deeper. Fortunately, casualties had been light for those marines embarked on the LVTs. This was in part due to the armor on the tractors and perhaps to the effects of the "destruction" fires from the preinvasion bombardment, which had temporarily neutralized the Japanese defenses. That was not the case by the time the LCVPs made their way to the beach in subsequent waves. Marines who survived the wade ashore and attempted to cross the sea wall met intense enemy fire from reinforced blockhouses, pillboxes and row after row of concealed machine guns. Rifle fire alone was of no avail in reducing these fortifications. Their destruction could only be accomplished through the use of demolition charges and flamethrowers. Information was extremely slow and sketchy in reaching General Smith on board the Maryland. He was, however, aware of the seriousness of the situation ashore and started to commit his reserve units. Earlier, Colonel Shoup had committed his regimental reserve, First Battalion, Second Marines, to land on Red Beach 2 and to work their way west to assist Third Battalion, Second Marines. In the process the battalion was split; the first half landed on the western part of Red 1, the rest landed on the left half of Red 2. Both groups suffered heavy losses. General Smith ordered Third Battalion, Eighth Marines into the fray at 1018, using half of his divisional reserve. Control of the battalion passed from Smith to Shoup. The battalion was directed to land on Red 3 and support Second Battalion, Eighth Marines. However, Third Battalion was not as fortunate as the Second Battalion had been coming ashore. Third battalion had boated in on LCVPs, and once grounded on the reef, the marines debarked and became easy targets for the Japanese. Only 100 marines of the first wave of Third Battalion, Eighth Marines reached the beach. Many of the officers and noncommissioned officers were either killed or wounded. The landing experience had left the battalion badly shaken and disorganized.(8:47) By now the neutralizing effect of the bombardment had worn off and the accuracy of the Japanese gunners was beginning to take its toll. In the initial assault wave there were forty-two LVTs, twenty-four in the second wave and twenty-one in the third. Eight had been destroyed prior to reaching the beach and about fifteen sank upon reaching deep water from holes in the hull from rifle, machine gun, antiboat gun and mortar fire.(8:18) Colonel Shoup's command post ashore had suffered from intermittent communications with his assault battalions due to poor radio equipment. Marine communicators struggled with antiquated TBX and TBY radios, which became inoperative when exposed to saltwater or subjected to rough treatment. This was a common problem as most of the radios were doused coming ashore and many were riddled with bullet holes. Radio operators would cannalbalize broken sets to make one sat operable. Both air-to-ground and ship-to-shore communications were affected, resulting in difficulties for air liaison teams and naval gunfire spotters in the performance of their duties. The antiquated communications equipment of the Maryland prevented General Smith from getting a complete picture of the battle ashore. He was later to send his Assistant Division Commander, Brigadier General Leo D. Hermle, to the beach to size up the situation and report back. This, General Hermle was unable to accomplish due to poor communications on the Maryland. Even with the poor communications, it was adequate for Jullan Smith to realize that the division's situation was precarious, if not perilous. He still had one battalion in reserve but was reluctant to use it and be left with only support troops as a reserve. Early in the afternoon, General Smith radioed Major General Holland Smith requesting that Combat Team 6 (Sixth Marine Regiment) be released to the control of the 2d Marine Division. Within an hour, the V Amphibious Corps Commander granted the request. Jullan Smith now sent his last division reserve unit ashore, comfortable with the Sixth Marines now under his control. Later in the afternoon General Smith ordered the remainder of the Eighth Marines to land on the extreme eastern end of the island. The landing time was set at 1745. However, the message never reached the regimental commander, Colonel Elmer E. Hall. Ashore, Colonel Shoup was under the impression that First Battalion, Eighth Marines and the regimental headquarters had already landed. The problem was that Hall, who had sailed on the USS Monrovia had expected to receive his orders via radio from the USS Pursuit, the ship located at the line of departure, but the message was sent to the Monrovia. It was not until after midnight that those at the division realized that Hall and his units were still at the line of departure awaiting orders. Meanwhile, General Smith had sent Gerneral Hermle a message directing him to take command ashore and report when a command post had been established. Again, because of communications problems from ship-to-shore, General Hermle did not receive the message. The command ashore, now two full regiments, was to remain the responsibility of Colonel Shoup for another day. The situation at the end of the first day was as follows. On the extreme western portion of the island, Third Battalion, Second Marines held on to the northern most tip of the island, having been pushed back somewhat from the center of Green Beach towards Red 1. Combat Team 2 and both First and Second Battalions, Second Marines occupied positions up to the western taxiway and the infield portion of the airstrip where they linked up with Third Battalion, Eighth Marines. Second and Third Battalion, Eighth Marines held a toehold from the center of the airfield to the middle of Red 3. There was no continuous line of defense; the perimeter was held by small groups of men who occupied shell holes or huddled behind coconut tree stumps. A large gap existed between Third Battalion, Second Marines on the far western edge of Red 1 and First Battalion, Second Marines on Red 2. Smith's worse fears on the night of 20 November were that the Japanese would mount a counterattack and push the marines off their hard won real estate during the night. Fortunately, this did not happen. After the battle, it was surmised that this was due to the bombardment having severed the communications wire from the Japanese commander, Rear Admiral Shibasaki, to his subordinates. Without communications, the Japanese were unable to coordinate this much feared counterattack. According to Colonel Shoup's Japanese language translater, Captain Eugene P. Boardman: Strangely enough, the naval troops on Tarawa used no field message blanks. In previous operations, as on Guadalcanal, field message blank constituted a prominent part of the "take" of captured Japanese documents. The total absence of message blanks suprised us. It showed, I believe, the complete doctrinal reliance of the defenders of Betio upon wire communication and indicated a lack of training in using runners. The effectiveness of the preliminary naval bombardment in breaking up the Japanese wire communication system was possibly all the more fateful on this account.(8:28) The first night ashore was a stark contrast to the brutal fighting that had ocurred earlier that day. There was remarkable fire discipline on Betio, with only sporatic shots fired when a wandering Japanese would stumble near the foxhoies of the marines. The division staff, on the Maryland, was greatly relieved when the night passed without an enemy counterattack. During the night Colonel Hall's headquarters and First Battalion, Eighth Marines remained in their landing craft at the line of departure awaiting orders. Once their disposition was discovered by the division, the battalion was directed by General Hermle to land on Red 2 at once and attack to the west. At dawn, the first wave of First Battalion, Eighth Marines climbed out of the landing craft after nearly twelve hours aboard and began a 500 yard wade to Red 2. Casualties were very heavy from direct fire weapons. By 0800, Major L. C. Hayes Jr. had half of his battalion ashore and reported to Colonel Shoup for orders. Shoup instructed Hayes to gather his men to the west of Red 2, and when fully organized, attack west and establish contact with the Third Battalion, Second Marines. By early afternoon Hayes had his battalion ready for the attack. During the night, no units did any tactical maneuvering. Their main concern had been the anticipated counterattack that had not come. Units had arrived on the beach in piecemeal fashion. Parts of marine units were spread all along the north coast in desparate pockets. Many of the officers had been killed on the first day, some outfits were without officers or due to the haphazard disposition of units, some now had officers in charge that they did not know. The coming of dawn of the second day of the fight for Tarawa served notice that the bitter fighting of the day before was about to resume. Colonel Shoup realized that his only chance of success lay in splitting the Japanese forces ana expanding the beachhead as quickly as possible. Shoup directed First and Second Battalions of Second Marines to attack south to seize the southern coast of the island, a mere 500 yards away from their present position. First Battalion, Second Marines began its push accross the airfield towards the south shore. During the night, enemy machine guns had been set up to sweep the taxiways. Air liaison and the naval gunfire spotting teams were used to silence the gun positions once the sun came up. By early afternoon both battalions had crossed the main runway and occupied empty Japanese defensive positions on the southern shore of the island. On the western edge of Red 1, Third Battalion, Second Marines prepared to drive south in order to secure Green Beach, which was the entire western side of the island. Naval gunfire was directed on the remaining 5-inch Japanese emplacements that were still effective on the southwestern corner of the island. One, then eventually two destroyers were brought to bear on the enemy positions. These ships brought extremely accurate fire on the concrete emplacements. Once the fires were complete, the hodgepodge of troops moved out in the attack. Within an hour, the western side of the island was secured and the marines built a defensive line accross the western end of the island about 200 yards inland from the beach. Events did not go that smoothly on the eastern end of the island for Major Crowe's Second Battalion, Eighth Marines. The battalion had resumed its fight with the Japanese near the Burns-Philps pier. An effort to reduce the enemy's fortifications in that vicinity resulted in no new territory gained. In fact, the best the battalion could do during the second day was to strenghthen its postion and prepare for the next days attack. By the second day, the supply situation ashore had reached critical proportions. Ammunition, water and rations were being used up quickly by intense fighting in the stifling heat and the supplies were not reaching the units. Supplies were being shuttled to the long pier that divided beaches Red 2 and 3. There were still Japanese snipers in the pilings along the beach. Dead marines bobbed in the surf along the beach, victims of the snipers, killed while trying to get supplies to the troops. The assistant D-4, Major B. Weatherwax, was sent ashore to assess the supply situation. Working with the shore party commander, Lieutenant Colonel C. J. Salazar, the supply situation began to clear up as control was established ashore. LVTs were pressed into service and supplies left the pier for the units whose supplies were quickly running out. The division artillery situation began to take shape on the second day. The organic 105-mm howitzer had been replaced by smaller, more mobile 75-mm pack howitzer for the operation on Betio. A plan had been proposed to land the 105s on the next island, Bairiki, some 4000 yards to the east of Betlo, to provide artillery support to the division during the initial assault, but because of the lack of sufficient transports, the pack howitzer were opted for instead. The smaller 75-mm guns could be brought ashore in pieces using rubber boats and life rafts. By the second night, First Battalion, Tenth Marines was ashore on the eastern side of the island. They were used very effectively in destroying blockhouses that had stopped the Second Battalion, Eighth Marines from advancing the day before, and had also inflicted the murderous fire against First Battalion, Eighth Marines on their way to join the fight. Late on the afternoon of 21st, the great pressure that had been put on the enemy appeared to be paying off. A turning point had been reached and the battle slowly began to take a turn for the marines. Shoup sized up the progress made during the second day and sent the following short message to General Smith on the Maryland: "Casualties many. Percentage dead not known. Combat efficiency--We are winning. "(6:27) To this point General Smith had not seen fit to commit the Sixth Marines because of the lack of information from Betio. Once Smith felt that progress was being made, he met with Colonel Maurice G. Holmes, the commanding officer of the Sixth Marine Regiment and told him to prepare to land on Green Beach, execute a passage of lines with Third Battalion, Second Marines and attack east. First Battalion, Sixth Marines came ashore and found little opposition from enemy defenders. Early the next morning, the battalion passed through Third Battalion, Second Marine's lines and pushed east along the southern coast to attempt to link up with First Battalion, Second Marines south of the airstrip. Second Battalion, Sixth Marines was diverted from following First Battalion, Sixth Marines on Green Beach and the Second Battalion was directed to land on Bairiki to stop any attempt by the Japanese to escape from Betio. As First Battalion, Sixth Marines attacked along the southern shore, Second Battalion, Eighth Marines, supported by fires of the pack howitzers of First Battalion, Tenth Marines, had overrun the strong enemy position north of the eastern taxiway. By the end of the third day the enemy, with the exception of the forces faced by First Battalion, Eighth Marines, on the boundry of Red 1 and 2, was compressed into the eastern tail of Betio, east of the airstrip. Again the marines prepared for a counterattack. Major W. K. Jones of the First Battalion, Sixth Marines organized his battalion that night for a counterattack from the strongest Japanese position located on the eastern tip. By now, General Smith had come ashore to assume tactical command of the division. A conference was held and plans were made to bring in the last fresh battalion from the transports and attack the last remnants of Japanese resistance. During the conference the Japanese did counterattack the lines held by the First Battalion, Sixth Marines. At first, the counterattack was small: its purpose had been to infiltrate the marine's lines and gain troop disposition information for the main counterattack that was to follow. However the excellent fire support from the First Battalion, Tenth Marines, reinforced by fires from Second Battalion, Tenth Marines, now on Bairiki, formed a very effective crossfire and eliminated the enemy's front lines. The marines resistance consisted of close-in fighting with bayonets and handgrenades and because of the marine's fire discipline, the Japanese were unable to locate the marine's positions. A second probing attack occurred two hours later, again to gain information. This attack was also repulsed and the enemy was left with little idea of where the marine's strength was. The main counterattack came at 0400 on 23 November. Through bitter hand-to-hand fighting and by calling in artillery fire within seventy-five yards of their own position, over 300 Japanese were killed and the counterattack failed. Again naval gunfire proved its worth by keeping the enemy pinned down on the beach while the marines repulsed the attack. The last fresh battalion brought ashore on 22 November assisted First Battalion, Sixth Marines in repelling the counterattack early in the morning of the 23d. Third Battalion, Sixth Marines, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel K. F. McLeod, started the last push towards the eastern tip at 0800 on the 23d. The battalion met little opposition and with the aid of two medium and seven light tanks, reached the tip of the island by 1310. Many of the Japanese defenders were found killed by their own hand rather than being killed or captured by the Americans. The Japanese had 475 killed and fourteen Korean laborers were taken prisoner. McLeod lost nine men killed, and twenty-five wounded. At 1330 on 23 November 1943 General Jullan Smith declared that the enemy no longer offered organized resistance and the entire island was in American hands. This did not mean that all the Japanese had been discovered though. Snipers would continue to kill marines for the next three days and have to be burned out by flamethrowers or blown up by demolitions teams. With the capture of Betio, half of the 2d Marine Division's mission was complete. The other half, that of eliminating the Japanese on the remaining islands of the Tarawa atoll, fell to the Second Battalion of the Sixth Marine Regiment. This battalion had seen relatively little action during the fight for Betio and had the fewest casualties of any of the other eight battalion of the division. Their task began on the morning of 25 November. By that evening the lead elements of the battalion were well up the atoll and had not encountered an enemy force although evidence of their rapid evacuation indicated that some Japanese were still on the atoll. On the second day of their advance up the eastern side of the atoll, the two lead companies found the enemy's positions. The Japanese had dug in and waited until the marines were practically on top of them before they opened fire. The vegetation was thick and the fighting was reminiscent of the jungle fighting the division had encountered on Guadalcanal. After several hours of close-quarter fighting, the enemy resistance was overcome and the battalion continued north until the last island of Naa was reached on 28 November. The battle of Tarawa was over. The toll for Tarawa was shocking to the American public. Few citizens were prepared for the cost involved in pressing an amphibious assault against a strongly held enemy island. The marine's casualties were 3,301 killed or wounded in action. The Japanese lost 4,690 men killed. Only seventeen were captured alive. In just seventy-six hours the 2d Marine Division had captured what the Japanese defenders said would take a million Americans 100 years to take. This, coupled with the capture of Makin Atoll by the army, gave the United States control of the Gilbert Island Archipelago and consequently the bases from which an attack could be launched against the highly stategic Marshall Islands. (3:231) The assault on Betio was the first time in history that a sea-borne attack was successfully launched against a heavily defended enemy island. It differed from an amphibious landing as the size of the island made an attempt to land on any beach on Betio an opposed landing and hence an assault vice an unopposed landing. As a result of this, Tarawa served two purposes. It demonstrated the soundness of the United State's amphibious doctrine, and perhaps more noteworthy, it pointed out the inevitable weaknesses in its technique. Although not as polished as future assaults that the Marine Corps would conduct later on in the Pacific war, it served as a laboratory in which the Marine Corps refined its doctrine and eventually the doctrine of any amphibious force going against a well entrenched foe defending a shoreline. There were many lessons that emerged from the fight for Tarawa. Most of the lessons were refinements to the doctrine developed during the 1920's and 30's by the pioneers of modern amphibious warfare. Some of the lessons learned dealt with naval gunfire. The preassault bombardment had failed to achieve the desired results and was found to be insufficient. The nature of the targets on Tarawa, fortified reinforced concrete gun emplacements, carefully positioned by its defenders, called for destruction rather than neutralization fires. Prior to Tarawa, it was thought impossible to do more than neutralize shore targets. The assault on Betio revolutionized the concept of naval gunfire. It prove that destruction was not only feasible, it was essential. During the assault, it was discovered that the bombardment had not achieved the expected results. It was discovered that the number of armor piercing and time delayed shells were not sufficient. The naval gunfire support commander, Rear Admiral H. F. Kingman said: Our high capacity projectiles, with super quick fuses, made a grand display but accomplished little if any real destruction of installations or personnel (5:233) Examination of the defenses after the battle revealed that each position could have been penetrated if hit by the proper trajectory and type of shell. An armor piercing shell with a plunging trajectory would have knocked out the strongest installation on Betio, a reinforced concrete command post with a roof six and one-half feet thick. A longer preparatory bombing and shelling on Betlo had been sacrificed to maintain the element of suprise. It was discovered that in terms of lives lost, that suprise was less important than a long, deliberate shelling of key targets on the beach whose purpose it was to destroy the initial positions that would be faced by the marines. The simultaneous use of naval gunfire and air support was not deemed possible prior to the battle. The preparation of the island prior to the invasion was a two phased operation. The first was the naval shelling of the island to be lifted for the second part, that of the aerial bombardment. By the end of the battle, both naval gunfire and air support were used on the same targets with no reports of danger to the aircraft or pilots. The only drawback was that the smoke and dust from the radar controlled naval gunfire tended to obscure the targets from the pilots. Although the use of air support at Tarawa did little to win the battle, it proved that aircraft in direct support of troops on the ground was feasible. The problems encountered in the use of air in the assault were similar to those that had plagued the naval gunfire support. One problem indicated that effective air support was not possible unless pilots and the ground troops they supported had trained as a team. Holland Smith recommended that marine aviators, thoroughly trained in the principles of direct air support, be assigned to escort carriers and that these carriers be included in any future amphibious operation undertaken by a marine division.(5:249) The invasion of Betio pointed out needed improvements in the execution and quality of beachhead logistics for future operations. It improved the concept of ship to shore movement by giving the tactical troop commander, through his shore party officer, control over the priority in unloading of supplies from ship to shore. It further showed the need for control and transfer points offshore. The use of a pier as a logistical staging point could not be relied upon in future operations. Therefore the idea of floating dumps of prestaged, critical supplies, loaded in boats and ready to go at the line of departure, was born.(5:251) Teamwork between the infantry and their supporting tanks at Tarawa was very poor. "We did not lose a man inside a tank," recalled Lieutenant Colonel A. B. Swenceski, commanding officer of the Second Tank Battalion, "but most of them were lost getting out and trying to communicate with the infantry."(5:219) Part of the problem was the fact that the medium tanks had joined the division directly from New Caladonia and were never fully integrated into the battalion training. On the other hand, the light tanks had been with the division since they left the States and it was evident that the coordination between the riflemen and the light tanks was better than between the infantry, worming their way forward on their bellies, and the medium tanks. Also, both type of tanks had different radio sets than the infantry carried, compounding the lack of coordination between the forces. The light tank's problem was their main gun, a 37-mm cannon. The gun proved to be too light against the defenses at Betio. The most effective means of clearing out the machine gun positions was found to be flamethrowers. It was suggested following Betio that the 37-mm cannon be replaced with a tank mounted flamethrower. Later in the war in the Pacific this was done with very positive results at Saipan and Iwo Jima.(1:21) Communications difficulties plagued the Americans at Tarawa from the beginning to end. Maryland's faltering voice and ears were more than duplicated by failures in both ship to shore and beach to beach nets. The Maryland's problem lay in the fact that she had not been set up to be a command and control ship for ship-to-shore movement of troops and the necessary radio equipment had been installed as an afterthought. Even then, the equipment was not tested in battle conditions prior to the actual assault when her 16-inch batteries knocked out her ship-to-shore radio capabilities. A need for a dedicated command and control ship was clearly demonstrated resulting in the navy investing in AGC (Auxillery, General, Communications) ships which first saw action in the Marshalls in 1944. The division suffered because of difficulties with their TBX and TBY radios, used for beach-to-beach communications. The fault lay with the bulky and hard to handle radios which were not waterproof or shockproof. Once wet, as happened to every set sent ashore, they were inoperable until dried out. This not only complicated both the control of naval gunfire and air support, it more seriously perhaps kept Colonel Shoup and General Smith in the dark tactically and caused both to make decisions on the basis of inadequate knowledge of the situaion. The problems with the radios were well documented at Tarawa and immediate replacements were sought which would eliminate this problem in the future. Not only did the communication equipment used by the assault troops leave room for improvement, so did the training of the troops that used it. The communications personnel assigned to the air liaison and naval gunfire spot teams were not trained in the intricacies of calling and adjusting supporting arms fires. They only operated the radios. If the actual spotter or liaison team member was wounded or killed, then that team became ineffective. After Tarawa, dedicated communications personnel were assigned to these teams and were trained not only on their own equipment, but also in the actual mechanics of calling for, and adjusting close air support and naval gunfire. Similarly, loglstically, infantrymen were no longer tasked with moving supplies to the units in need. Permanent shore party teams were organized and trained in an effort to push the supplies to the troops instead of the troops pulling the supplies to themselves. These communications and logistical problems, brought to light after Tarawa, were serious enough so that the Joint Chief of Staff became interested in the problem. Following recommendations by Generals Vandegrift and Holland Smith after Tarawa, the Joint Chiefs directed that naval gunfire, air liaison, and shore party communications personnel be pooled into Joint Assault Signal Companies to be trained by V Amphibious Corps and that one such company be allocated to each division assigned to an amphibious assault.(3:147,5:252) Perhaps the most significant innovation to come out of Tarawa was the use of amphibious tractors in the assault waves at Tarawa. It was there that the Marine Corps realized the need for LVTs in the assault because of the shallow reef surrounding the island. The vehicles proved their value when they carried ashore the first three waves of the assault with relatively few casualties while the follow-on waves, embarked in LCVPs, were forced to disembark at the reef and wade ashore under withering fire. The only drawback with the LVTs at Tarawa was that there were not enough of them to lift all the assault ashore. Jullan Smith recommended that a minimum of 300 of the craft be assigned to each marine division and that they be more heavily armed, faster, and be equipped with a ramp or crane for unloading cargo. James Forrestal, then Undersecretary of the Navy, concurred and recommended that production be increased immediately. He warned that heavy casualties were to be expected in future amphibious assaults in the Pacific, but added that the more amphibious tractors available, the less would be the loss of American bloods ...in the most hazardous of military operations, the landing on a hostile shore in the face of a determined, experienced, well equipped enemy... success of invasions to come will depend on the sweat that we put into these landing craft today. The sooner that they are built, the sooner will the war be over and the lower the cost in human lves.(5:210) It is interesting to ponder the difference in casualties incurred by the marines if more tractors had been provided for the Second Marine Division at Tarawa. Their successful use in later operations tends to point a beacon towards Tarawa. Many other lessons were learned at Tarawa. The reports submitted at the end of the operation are filled with them. Constructive criticism, comments and suggestions were all aimed at improving the now tried and true doctrine that the Marine Corps had developed. Had there been no Tarawa, these lessons would have remained unlearned until they were driven home with even greater force in the Marshalls, Marianas, Saipan or Iwo Jima. In the end though, the key to Tarawa did not lay in the machines or tactics used on Betio. It rested on the Individual marines, attempting to wrest the island from a foe that believed that a million marines could not take the island in 100 years. They did, and in only seventy-six hours. Said military historian S. L. A. Marshall of the Marine Corps In World War Two: The most important contribution of the United States Marine Corps to the history of modern warfare rests in their having perfected the doctrine and techniques of amphibious warfare to such a degree as to be able to cross and secure a very energetically defended beach. (5:4) The battle forTarawa was small in comparision to other battles to occur later in the war. But without the experiences gained at Tarawa, the success of those assaults would have been doubtful. Tarawa was the testing ground of the amphibious assault and therefore worthy of study for its accomplishments and shortfalls. Bibliography 1. Anderson, Morris. Tarawa: Testing the Theory. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms International, 1982. 2. Croizat, Victor J., Col. USMC (Ret). "Fifty Years of Amphibious Tractors", Marine Corps Gazette (March 1989), 69. 3. Gregg, Charles T. Tarawa. New York: Stein and Day, 1984. 4. Hannah. Richard, Staff Sergeant, USMC. Tarawa. The Toughest Battle in the Marine Corps History. Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1944. 5. Isely, Jeter A. and Crowl, Philip A., The U. S. Marines and Amphibious Warfare. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1951. 6. Santelli, James S. A Brief History of the 8th Marines. Washington, D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office, 1976. 7. Sherrod, Robert L., Tarawa. The Story of a Battle. Fredericksburg, Texas: Admiral Nimitz Foundation, 1973. 8. Stockman, James R., Capt. USMC (Ret). The Battle for Tarawa. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1947. 9. Wilson, Earl J., et al. Betio Beachhead. New York, G. P. Putnum's Sons, 1945. Click here to view image
