Low Intensity Conflict: A War By Any Other Name

CSC 1988

SUBJECT AREA National Military Strategy

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT: A WAR BY ANY OTHER NAME

Major J. A. Robbs

Royal Australian Infantry Corps

Command and Staff College

Education Center

Marine Corps Combat Development Command

Quantico, Virginia 22134

9 May 1988

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

1. Introduction

Philosophy and Theory of Conflict 1

Problem 2

2. Low Intensity Conflict in General

Defining Low Intensity Conflict 6

The Conflict Spectrum and Characteristics of LIC 11

Conclusion 15

3. The Significance of Low Intensity Conflict

An Example 17

Recent Military Focus and Development 20

Western Vulnerability 28

Future Conflict 37

4. An Overview of the Main Types of LIC

Insurgency 44

Counter-Insurgency 6O

5. An Overview of other LIC

Aid-to-the-Civil-Power 77

Foreign Internal Defence 79

Terrorism and Terrorism Counter-action 80

Peacekeeping and Peacemaking 84

Peace-Time Contigencies 90

6. Guiding Strategy and Tactics

National Philosophy 92

National Security Strategy 96

Military Doctrine 98

7. A Force That Caters for LIC

National and Strategic 102

Tactical 108

8. Preparation and Training for Conflict

Higher Command 112

Operational Art 114

Tactical 116

Individual 120

9. Conclusion 126

Endnotes 128

Bibliography 138

Appendices

A. Definitions

B. Conflict Spectrum

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY OF CONFLICT

The following postulates, whether judged as empirical,

hypothetical, true or false, are a relevant starting point

for the examination of conflict.

* Harmony and disharmony are natural, inevitable, and

evolutionary characteristics of mankind.

* Disharmony is resolved by peaceful or violent

means, as reflected by a spectrum of conditions

from peaceful competition to violent conflict.

* The peaceful resolution of conflict is preferable

and common, but yet to preclude the option of

violence: models of intra-national and spiritual

harmony are neither analagous to, nor bind,

international relations at this point in time.

* Conflict and its resolution is multidimensional,

multi-level, and integrated.

* States, sub-national groups and trans-national

groups may come into conflict with each other and

prosecute this conflict with violence. Whatever the

origins of the conflict it is played out in the

environment of the "state system": often in an

attempt to alter the status quo of that system.

* Force may be employed by individuals in an

anarchical or irrational manner, but it is used by

the state and the interest group in the pursuit of

objectives.

* The use of force is limited by capacity, risk and

objectives.

* At a minimum, a state will seek a capacity of

force commensurate with the threat to its survival,

once security is achieved a state will seek the

ability to pursue interests.

* The status quo of the state, if not its survival,

can be threatened within all levels of conflict, but

the most decisive effect is achieved by unlimited

force.

* The state's ability to project violence is

institutionalized in armed forces, i.e., armies,

navies, and air forces.

PROBLEM

The objective of armed forces is to win wars: trite but

true. Armed forces may posture and project power by inference

if able to project violence by action. Military victory in

war is the reason d'etre for an army. This rationale may be

over-ridden by higher strategy, but a non-combatant or

incompetant army defies definition and justification in the

West. (1)

The role of the armed forces is supportive of the state

in the pursuit of national interests. Regardless of the level

of a conflict, military action must be integrated with action

in the political, social, economic, and psychological

dimensions of a problem. The military dimension is

predominate in the higher levels of conflict. Hitherto, the

West has considered the higher levels of conflict the

predominate threat, despite a continuing need to operate in

lower levels of conflict. (2) The rationale for this focus was

substantial, but now the concept is dated.

Success in present and future conflicts requires the

ability for integrated action in all dimensions and at all

levels in proportion to the threat or interest. This concept

is well expressed by the authors of "Integrated Strategy and

Discriminate Deterrence":

Because our problems in the real world are

connected and because budgets compel trade-offs,

we need to fit together strategies for a wide range

of conflicts: from the most confined, lowest

intensity and highest probability to the most

widespread, apocalyptic and least likely. We want

the worst conflicts to be less likely, but that

holds only if our weakness at some higher level..

..does not invite such raising of the ante. For

genuine stability, we need to assure our adversaries

that military aggression at any level of violence

against our important interests will be opposed by

military force. (3)

The logic of "Integrated Strategy and Discriminate

Deterrence" (4) is relevant to all Western nations,

irrespective of size. Even in a relatively benign strategic

environment such as Australia enjoys currently, defence

preparedness must address the maintenance of capabilities

applicable to other levels of conflict than the near term

threat. (5)

Within the combat environment of the future (6) the

objective of armed forces remains to win wars, regardless of

type or complexity. The question remains, "How?". There are

two extreme solutions: with unlimited resources a nation may

structure, equip, and train forces for each type and region

of conflict; or, with limited resources, have one force

attempt to do everything. The reality is a compromise

tailored to each nation's situation. Perhaps with the

exception of the United States, there are few Western nations

that can afford the maintenance of large "specialized

modules" within an army. Even the United States is limited in

this regard by the number and variety of contingencies it

must face; For example, the US Marine Corps, must retain a

diversity of war-fighting skills for employment world-wide.

These tasks range from the amphibious assault by conventional

forces to hostage rescue in a foreign country. (7) An example

of the flexible use of armed forces has been illustrated by

the United Kingdom of Great Britain. The same units of this

force have operated proficiently in counter-insurgency in

Northern Ireland, in mechanized operations with the British

Army on the Rhine, and fought in the Falklands War.

For reasons that will be examined later, most Western

states already possess significant professional armies for

fighting in the higher levels of conflict. However, the

recent wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan, the conflicts in

Northern Ireland and Latin America, and modern terrorism,

illustrates that such conventional armies may not win easily

in lower levels of conflict. Even if a conventional army is

not defeated in such a conflict, it is likely to be

debilitated.

The armed forces and the interests of the West have been

debilitated in the past by Low Intensity Conflict. For this

reason, and others discussed in Chapter Three, the West is to

continue to be engaged in Low Intensity Conflict. It is the

most likely combat environment in the near future. Western

democratic states possess inherent vulnerabilities in this

environment which are likely to make LIC an increasingly

attractive option for those unable to "win" by other means,

peaceful or violent.

The problem for a Western democratic nation is to

maintain and employ an appropriate strategy, force and

tactics for the conduct of Low Intensity Conflict while

meeting the other requirements of national strategy and

without denigrating the ability of the state to conduct a

higher level of war.

CHAPTER TWO

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT IN GENERAL

DEFINING LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

There is a plethora of terminology covering the subject

of Low Intensity Conflict. Many of the terms are abstract and

have a political and philosophical context as well as a

military definition. In addition, there are both subtle and

distinct differences among single service, joint service, and

international terminology in this field. For the purpose of

clarity, a table of comparative definitions is included as

Appendix A.

Colonel Richard H. Taylor, US Army, provided a useful

definition of Low Intensity Conflict in the Military Review

of January 1988 when he described it as an environment in

which:

Interests are contested; organized violence

is used to effect or influence outcomes; all

elements of national power are employed; the

military dimension is employed primarily for its

political, economic and informational effect;

military violence is employed indirectly or limited

by time and objective." (1)

It is an environment that spans a range of struggles of

varying nature and intensity. Figure 1 lists these struggles

by military definition. (2) These struggles, or operations,

are generally considered as above the environment of

"peaceful competition", but below the threshold of "war".(3)

The boundaries that differentiate LIC from peaceful

competition and higher conflict are blurred. Each conflict

must be analysed in detail to determine its precise nature

Figure 1

EXAMPLES OF LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

Offensive Operations Defensive Operations

* Insurgency * Counter Insurgency

* Aid-to-the-Civil Power (4)

* Foreign Internal Defence

* Terrorism (5) * Terrorism Counter-Action

* Peacemaking Operations * Peacekeeping Operations

* Peacetime Contingency * Peacetime Contingency

Operations Operations

and the appropriate response. Conflict easily transitions

between levels and many of the strategies found in the LIC

environment concentrate on controlling the time and place of

transition. This is the case for the revolutionary strategies

of Leninism, Maoism, and the Cuban model.

The Vietnam War, for example, was played across three

levels of conflict: firstly, insurgency by the Viet Cong

against the South Vietnamese and their allies; secondly,

guerrilla war and limited war by the Viet Cong and North

Vietnamese Army against the South Vietnamese and their

allies; and, finally, general war between North and South

Vietnam. (6) The transition from one level of conflict to

another during the Vietnam War was indistinct, with different

levels of violence conducted simultaneously in different

regions or even within the same area but by different

forces. (7)

A fundamental lesson in preparing for LIC is to be wary

of templating a response in accordance with the academic or

political categorization of the conflict. Each conflict is

unique and unlikely to fit exactly within a military

definition. For example, the Multinational Force II in Beirut

in 1983 was committed with an implied mission of

"peacekeeping": world there have been a more appropriate

tactical emphasis by the commander of US Marines in MNF II if

the mission had stressed a role of Foreign Internal Defence

instead of "presence"? (8) Commanders at all levels,

including politicians, must remember that a classification of

a conflict is of little consequence to soldiers ambushed and

killed, whether by insurgents or by regular troops.

The further lesson to be derived from a comparison of

the definition and reality of Low Intensity Conflict is the

need to be prepared to fight above or below the initial level

of violence. Not only can the transition be swift, but what

constitutes Low Intensity Conflict and what is "war" is a

relative perception. There are aspects of Peacetime

Contingency or Peacemaking Operations that in a microcosm are

war, i.e., operations that are tactically and strategically

the same as those effected during a higher level of conflict.

In some cases, the difference is that the LIC is regionally

confined. If an environment of LIC has been established then

it normally requires more than police work. In order to be

successful in this environment armed forces may act as a

police force but they must be trained as if for war. An army

is capable of carrying out police work, but a police force

cannot be effective beyond the domestic state of peaceful

competition unless it becomes an army.

By the current definitions Low Intensity Conflict is not

war. However, many aspects of these types of conflict are

analogous to war and the conflict itself may be a campaign

within or complementary to a war. Future warfare is likely to

be less coherent, less compartmentalized, and conducted

without much regard to current definitions and perceptions of

what is, or what is not, war. (9) Already, there are few

constitutionally declared wars. The United States and the

Soviet Union possess the ability to oppose each other

directly, indirectly, or through a combination of both.

These states are able to wage conflict in any combination of

level, region, and time frame. The United States perception

of Low Intensity Conflict, for example, places such conflict

within the frame-work of contest between the Soviet Union and

the West:

While the Soviets cannot be branded as

instigators of all revolutionary movements, their

strategy clearly is to exploit domestic vulnerabilities

in foreign countries to promote the emergence of

regimes under Soviet influence control. All this is

accomplished under the rubric of "peaceful coexistance"

with the United States and the West, defined as a

continuing contest in which all forms of struggle

are permissible short of all-out war. (10)

Certainly there are other causes of international

conflict in the world apart from USA-USSR rivalry: there is a

larger ideological rivalry of East-West; the competition

between the developed and undeveloped nations; a potential

challange to other religions by Islam; and, the destability

offered by various combinations of sub-national groups and

states attempting to subvert the "state system". As more

states, and even sub-states, gain high-technology, wealth,

and international influence, the pursuit of interests by

armed conflict will be less constrained by region and method.

The advantage in this environment will be held by the state

or group able to orchestrate efforts across a spectrum of

conflicts. A Low Intensity Conflict may constitute only one

"battlefield" in a larger war.

Low Intensity Conflict may not be defined as "war", but

it is best approached by politicians and the military alike

with the same philosophy and determination that a higher

level of violence would command. Such an approach aids in

establishing the continuity of intention from the leader of

the state to the soldier in the "war", and across all the

dimensions of the conflict. Thinking of the conflict in terms

of a "Small War" (11) does not prejudice the conduct with

inappropriate tactics, but makes it easier to translate the

intention into understandable and achievable objectives in

the field. It should be noted that the revolutionary

strategies to be found in the LIC environment aim to destroy

this continuity. The first disconnection within the West is

that the struggle may not be perceived as "war", that it may

not command the same respect or effort as "war". The counter

is found in the education of the politicians, military, and

public on the nature of specific conflicts and conflict in

general:

Clearly, only well informed opinions can serve

our nations. This is one of the main reasons why it

is necessary to develop an appropriate policy

framework for open, declaratory statements that

educate the people of the free world on the reality,

nature, and long term impact of modern insurgency. (12)