Low Intensity Conflict: A War By Any Other Name
CSC 1988
SUBJECT AREA National Military Strategy
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT: A WAR BY ANY OTHER NAME
by
Major J. A. Robbs
Royal Australian Infantry Corps
Command and Staff College
Education Center
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134
9 May 1988
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
1. Introduction
Philosophy and Theory of Conflict 1
Problem 2
2. Low Intensity Conflict in General
Defining Low Intensity Conflict 6
The Conflict Spectrum and Characteristics of LIC 11
Conclusion 15
3. The Significance of Low Intensity Conflict
An Example 17
Recent Military Focus and Development 20
Western Vulnerability 28
Future Conflict 37
4. An Overview of the Main Types of LIC
Insurgency 44
Counter-Insurgency 6O
5. An Overview of other LIC
Aid-to-the-Civil-Power 77
Foreign Internal Defence 79
Terrorism and Terrorism Counter-action 80
Peacekeeping and Peacemaking 84
Peace-Time Contigencies 90
6. Guiding Strategy and Tactics
National Philosophy 92
National Security Strategy 96
Military Doctrine 98
7. A Force That Caters for LIC
National and Strategic 102
Tactical 108
8. Preparation and Training for Conflict
Higher Command 112
Operational Art 114
Tactical 116
Individual 120
9. Conclusion 126
Endnotes 128
Bibliography 138
Appendices
A. Definitions
B. Conflict Spectrum
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY OF CONFLICT
The following postulates, whether judged as empirical,
hypothetical, true or false, are a relevant starting point
for the examination of conflict.
* Harmony and disharmony are natural, inevitable, and
evolutionary characteristics of mankind.
* Disharmony is resolved by peaceful or violent
means, as reflected by a spectrum of conditions
from peaceful competition to violent conflict.
* The peaceful resolution of conflict is preferable
and common, but yet to preclude the option of
violence: models of intra-national and spiritual
harmony are neither analagous to, nor bind,
international relations at this point in time.
* Conflict and its resolution is multidimensional,
multi-level, and integrated.
* States, sub-national groups and trans-national
groups may come into conflict with each other and
prosecute this conflict with violence. Whatever the
origins of the conflict it is played out in the
environment of the "state system": often in an
attempt to alter the status quo of that system.
* Force may be employed by individuals in an
anarchical or irrational manner, but it is used by
the state and the interest group in the pursuit of
objectives.
* The use of force is limited by capacity, risk and
objectives.
* At a minimum, a state will seek a capacity of
force commensurate with the threat to its survival,
once security is achieved a state will seek the
ability to pursue interests.
* The status quo of the state, if not its survival,
can be threatened within all levels of conflict, but
the most decisive effect is achieved by unlimited
force.
* The state's ability to project violence is
institutionalized in armed forces, i.e., armies,
navies, and air forces.
PROBLEM
The objective of armed forces is to win wars: trite but
true. Armed forces may posture and project power by inference
if able to project violence by action. Military victory in
war is the reason d'etre for an army. This rationale may be
over-ridden by higher strategy, but a non-combatant or
incompetant army defies definition and justification in the
West. (1)
The role of the armed forces is supportive of the state
in the pursuit of national interests. Regardless of the level
of a conflict, military action must be integrated with action
in the political, social, economic, and psychological
dimensions of a problem. The military dimension is
predominate in the higher levels of conflict. Hitherto, the
West has considered the higher levels of conflict the
predominate threat, despite a continuing need to operate in
lower levels of conflict. (2) The rationale for this focus was
substantial, but now the concept is dated.
Success in present and future conflicts requires the
ability for integrated action in all dimensions and at all
levels in proportion to the threat or interest. This concept
is well expressed by the authors of "Integrated Strategy and
Discriminate Deterrence":
Because our problems in the real world are
connected and because budgets compel trade-offs,
we need to fit together strategies for a wide range
of conflicts: from the most confined, lowest
intensity and highest probability to the most
widespread, apocalyptic and least likely. We want
the worst conflicts to be less likely, but that
holds only if our weakness at some higher level..
..does not invite such raising of the ante. For
genuine stability, we need to assure our adversaries
that military aggression at any level of violence
against our important interests will be opposed by
military force. (3)
The logic of "Integrated Strategy and Discriminate
Deterrence" (4) is relevant to all Western nations,
irrespective of size. Even in a relatively benign strategic
environment such as Australia enjoys currently, defence
preparedness must address the maintenance of capabilities
applicable to other levels of conflict than the near term
threat. (5)
Within the combat environment of the future (6) the
objective of armed forces remains to win wars, regardless of
type or complexity. The question remains, "How?". There are
two extreme solutions: with unlimited resources a nation may
structure, equip, and train forces for each type and region
of conflict; or, with limited resources, have one force
attempt to do everything. The reality is a compromise
tailored to each nation's situation. Perhaps with the
exception of the United States, there are few Western nations
that can afford the maintenance of large "specialized
modules" within an army. Even the United States is limited in
this regard by the number and variety of contingencies it
must face; For example, the US Marine Corps, must retain a
diversity of war-fighting skills for employment world-wide.
These tasks range from the amphibious assault by conventional
forces to hostage rescue in a foreign country. (7) An example
of the flexible use of armed forces has been illustrated by
the United Kingdom of Great Britain. The same units of this
force have operated proficiently in counter-insurgency in
Northern Ireland, in mechanized operations with the British
Army on the Rhine, and fought in the Falklands War.
For reasons that will be examined later, most Western
states already possess significant professional armies for
fighting in the higher levels of conflict. However, the
recent wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan, the conflicts in
Northern Ireland and Latin America, and modern terrorism,
illustrates that such conventional armies may not win easily
in lower levels of conflict. Even if a conventional army is
not defeated in such a conflict, it is likely to be
debilitated.
The armed forces and the interests of the West have been
debilitated in the past by Low Intensity Conflict. For this
reason, and others discussed in Chapter Three, the West is to
continue to be engaged in Low Intensity Conflict. It is the
most likely combat environment in the near future. Western
democratic states possess inherent vulnerabilities in this
environment which are likely to make LIC an increasingly
attractive option for those unable to "win" by other means,
peaceful or violent.
The problem for a Western democratic nation is to
maintain and employ an appropriate strategy, force and
tactics for the conduct of Low Intensity Conflict while
meeting the other requirements of national strategy and
without denigrating the ability of the state to conduct a
higher level of war.
CHAPTER TWO
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT IN GENERAL
DEFINING LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT
There is a plethora of terminology covering the subject
of Low Intensity Conflict. Many of the terms are abstract and
have a political and philosophical context as well as a
military definition. In addition, there are both subtle and
distinct differences among single service, joint service, and
international terminology in this field. For the purpose of
clarity, a table of comparative definitions is included as
Appendix A.
Colonel Richard H. Taylor, US Army, provided a useful
definition of Low Intensity Conflict in the Military Review
of January 1988 when he described it as an environment in
which:
Interests are contested; organized violence
is used to effect or influence outcomes; all
elements of national power are employed; the
military dimension is employed primarily for its
political, economic and informational effect;
military violence is employed indirectly or limited
by time and objective." (1)
It is an environment that spans a range of struggles of
varying nature and intensity. Figure 1 lists these struggles
by military definition. (2) These struggles, or operations,
are generally considered as above the environment of
"peaceful competition", but below the threshold of "war".(3)
The boundaries that differentiate LIC from peaceful
competition and higher conflict are blurred. Each conflict
must be analysed in detail to determine its precise nature
Figure 1
EXAMPLES OF LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT
Offensive Operations Defensive Operations
* Insurgency * Counter Insurgency
* Aid-to-the-Civil Power (4)
* Foreign Internal Defence
* Terrorism (5) * Terrorism Counter-Action
* Peacemaking Operations * Peacekeeping Operations
* Peacetime Contingency * Peacetime Contingency
Operations Operations
and the appropriate response. Conflict easily transitions
between levels and many of the strategies found in the LIC
environment concentrate on controlling the time and place of
transition. This is the case for the revolutionary strategies
of Leninism, Maoism, and the Cuban model.
The Vietnam War, for example, was played across three
levels of conflict: firstly, insurgency by the Viet Cong
against the South Vietnamese and their allies; secondly,
guerrilla war and limited war by the Viet Cong and North
Vietnamese Army against the South Vietnamese and their
allies; and, finally, general war between North and South
Vietnam. (6) The transition from one level of conflict to
another during the Vietnam War was indistinct, with different
levels of violence conducted simultaneously in different
regions or even within the same area but by different
forces. (7)
A fundamental lesson in preparing for LIC is to be wary
of templating a response in accordance with the academic or
political categorization of the conflict. Each conflict is
unique and unlikely to fit exactly within a military
definition. For example, the Multinational Force II in Beirut
in 1983 was committed with an implied mission of
"peacekeeping": world there have been a more appropriate
tactical emphasis by the commander of US Marines in MNF II if
the mission had stressed a role of Foreign Internal Defence
instead of "presence"? (8) Commanders at all levels,
including politicians, must remember that a classification of
a conflict is of little consequence to soldiers ambushed and
killed, whether by insurgents or by regular troops.
The further lesson to be derived from a comparison of
the definition and reality of Low Intensity Conflict is the
need to be prepared to fight above or below the initial level
of violence. Not only can the transition be swift, but what
constitutes Low Intensity Conflict and what is "war" is a
relative perception. There are aspects of Peacetime
Contingency or Peacemaking Operations that in a microcosm are
war, i.e., operations that are tactically and strategically
the same as those effected during a higher level of conflict.
In some cases, the difference is that the LIC is regionally
confined. If an environment of LIC has been established then
it normally requires more than police work. In order to be
successful in this environment armed forces may act as a
police force but they must be trained as if for war. An army
is capable of carrying out police work, but a police force
cannot be effective beyond the domestic state of peaceful
competition unless it becomes an army.
By the current definitions Low Intensity Conflict is not
war. However, many aspects of these types of conflict are
analogous to war and the conflict itself may be a campaign
within or complementary to a war. Future warfare is likely to
be less coherent, less compartmentalized, and conducted
without much regard to current definitions and perceptions of
what is, or what is not, war. (9) Already, there are few
constitutionally declared wars. The United States and the
Soviet Union possess the ability to oppose each other
directly, indirectly, or through a combination of both.
These states are able to wage conflict in any combination of
level, region, and time frame. The United States perception
of Low Intensity Conflict, for example, places such conflict
within the frame-work of contest between the Soviet Union and
the West:
While the Soviets cannot be branded as
instigators of all revolutionary movements, their
strategy clearly is to exploit domestic vulnerabilities
in foreign countries to promote the emergence of
regimes under Soviet influence control. All this is
accomplished under the rubric of "peaceful coexistance"
with the United States and the West, defined as a
continuing contest in which all forms of struggle
are permissible short of all-out war. (10)
Certainly there are other causes of international
conflict in the world apart from USA-USSR rivalry: there is a
larger ideological rivalry of East-West; the competition
between the developed and undeveloped nations; a potential
challange to other religions by Islam; and, the destability
offered by various combinations of sub-national groups and
states attempting to subvert the "state system". As more
states, and even sub-states, gain high-technology, wealth,
and international influence, the pursuit of interests by
armed conflict will be less constrained by region and method.
The advantage in this environment will be held by the state
or group able to orchestrate efforts across a spectrum of
conflicts. A Low Intensity Conflict may constitute only one
"battlefield" in a larger war.
Low Intensity Conflict may not be defined as "war", but
it is best approached by politicians and the military alike
with the same philosophy and determination that a higher
level of violence would command. Such an approach aids in
establishing the continuity of intention from the leader of
the state to the soldier in the "war", and across all the
dimensions of the conflict. Thinking of the conflict in terms
of a "Small War" (11) does not prejudice the conduct with
inappropriate tactics, but makes it easier to translate the
intention into understandable and achievable objectives in
the field. It should be noted that the revolutionary
strategies to be found in the LIC environment aim to destroy
this continuity. The first disconnection within the West is
that the struggle may not be perceived as "war", that it may
not command the same respect or effort as "war". The counter
is found in the education of the politicians, military, and
public on the nature of specific conflicts and conflict in
general:
Clearly, only well informed opinions can serve
our nations. This is one of the main reasons why it
is necessary to develop an appropriate policy
framework for open, declaratory statements that
educate the people of the free world on the reality,
nature, and long term impact of modern insurgency. (12)
