Foundations Of Excellence: Moshe Dayan And Israel's Military Tradition (1880 To 1950) AUTHOR Major Allan A. Katzberg, USMC CSC 1988 SUBJECT AREA History TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Title Page Introduction 2 1. Setting the Stage: 1880-1929 9 2. The Haganah and the Emergence of Moshe Dayan: 1930-1941 48 3. Recovery and Revolt: 1942-1947 87 4. War, Politics, and Independence: 1948-1949 118 5. Epilogue 154 Appendix A: Glossary 162 Appendix B: The Evolution of the Israel Defense Force: 1907-Present 167 Maps and Charts 1) The Middle East 8 2) Northern Israel 10 3) Partition Plans for Palestine 56 4) United Nations Partition Plan 117 5) Arab Invasion of 15 May 1948 132 6) Israel's Borders: 1949-1967 133 7) Operation Dani 144 8) Chart of the Evolution of the IDF 167 Endnotes 176 Bibliography 207 INTRODUCTION No man is an island, especially in the turbulent stream of history. To fully appreciate the validity of this concept and to grasp the essence of any historic figure, the serious person must accomplish four interrelated tasks. 1) He or she must understand the history - the social movements, cultural values, ideas, events, and personalities - that nourished the environment in which the man developed. 2) From this flood of information, the scholar must identify those specific factors that molded the man. This identification process must examine how the man's values, thoughts, and perceptions were influenced, bounded, fashioned, or otherwise tainted by the cultural, social, economic, and political components of his environment. 3) The historian must examine the relationship between the man's subsequent actions and the carefully analyzed tapestry of his past. 4) This examination can then explain how that man influenced both his environment and his fellow man. While this interpretive or indirect process disputes the "big men of history" theory, a flawed concept whose singular tenet purports that a few key personalities power history's mighty engines, it does not argue that mankind is the virtual prisoner of his past. Rather, this methodology provides a vehicle for the rational examination of the relationship between the people who "make" history and the historical circumstances that provided those individuals with the opportunity to do so. Using this methodology, this paper examines Moshe Dayan against the backdrop of Israel's history and identifies the social, military, and political foundations of his career. In simpler terms, the paper attempts to identify and explain the varied forces that made Moshe Dayan who and what he was. While concentrating on the development and application of his military thoughts, the paper does not ignore those non-military factors that influenced his world view - an examination that provides the reader with a more complete portrait of the "whole man." How can an examination of Moshe Dayan, or any other public figure, benefit the professional soldier? The old adage "know your enemy" is only half complete. The second half of that axiom is "know your ally." If knowing what makes an enemy "tick" better enables a soldier to defeat his foe, then understanding the motivations of an ally will better enable the professional to work with that ally in defeating a common enemy. This is particularly important with regard to Moshe Dayan since he played a major role in developing the military forces capable of implementing Israeli military doctrine. This paper is divided into five chapters. The first chapter covers the 50 years from the late 19th century to 1929 when, at the age of 14, Moshe Dayan joined the Haganah. While little of this chapter is devoted directly to Moshe Dayan, it provides background information concerning the socio-political environment in which he was raised. The history of Palestinian Jews and Moshe Dayan are so inexorably linked that it is impossible to understand Dayan without digesting a sizable portion of the Jewish struggle in Palestine. The chapter specifically discusses Zionism, the British Mandate in Palestine, the rise of Arab and Jewish nationalism, and the tentative beginnings of Israel's military tradition. Chapter two spans the period 1930 to 1941 and examines those personalities, ideas, political decisions, and events that played critical roles in both Moshe Dayan's military development and in the development of Jewish military forces. Included here are analyses of the evolution of Jewish military doctrine during the Arab Revolt of 1936 through 1939, the splintering of Jewish reactions to the British Mandate, and the increasing tensions between Arabs, Jews, and the British. Chapter three focuses on the years 1942 through 1947 and discusses the political, social, and military events that led to the demise of the British Mandate, Israel's War of Independence, and the creation of the Israel Defense force. Althoush Dayan played only a minor role in this five-year slice of history, the issues raised, problems resolved, and dilemmas left unanswered significantly influenced his political development - especially with regard to the close relationship he eventually shared with his future political mentor, David Ben-Gurion. Of particular importance in this chapter are the discussions centering on military-civilian relationships, the Haganah's active support of Ben-Gurion's strategy of nation-building, the use of Jewish forces to support Britain's war against Hitler, and the subsequent employment of those forces against the British Mandate in Palestine. Chapter four spans two short but eventful years, 1948 and 1949. While focusing on Israel's War of Independence, this chapter uses Moshe Dayan participation in that conflict as a mechanism to examine how the Israel is fought that war. Particular attention is paid to Dayan's style of combat leadership and his remarkable ability to apply the military concepts he learned in the small unit, guerrilla, and counter-guerrilla environment of the Arab Revolt, to the conventional battlefield of 1948. This chapter concludes with an analysis of how Dayan's political relationship with Ben-Gurion was solidified - a relationship that played an important role in his eventual rise to Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Force. Chapter five is an epilogue that briefly summarizes Dayan's social, political, and military foundations. It also provides a brief glimpse at the remaining 32-years of his life. As is evidenced by the preceding paragraphs, this-paper is more than a biographical sketch of Israel's most famous soldier. Using Dayan as a common thread running through Israel's social, political, and military history, the paper provides an examination of the development of the Israel Defense force, Israel's military doctrine, and Israel's military tradition. Initially, the paper was to have examined what made Moshe Dayan and how Dayan influenced the development of Israel's military forces. However, the author found it impossible to first divorce Dayah from Israel's early military tradition and to then separate that tradition from Israel's social, political, and diplomatic history. This expansion of purpose proved to be too massive for the time allocated which, when combined with a near terminal case of writer's block, almost resulted in disaster. Consequently, the final product only discusses the Dayan's formative years and makes no attempt to adequately examine his military and political career after Israel's War of Independence. I leave that task to a future student who, possessing greater stamina and talent than I, can finish what I failed to accomplish. That student, as well as all readers, are encouraged to make frequent use of the endnotes as they provide additional information that may be of assistance in grasping the essence of both Dayan and the modern Israeli military tradition. In addition to the aforementioned deficiencies, this paper does not contain a detailed examination of two key subjects Although forged in the heat of battle, the Israel Defense Force (IDF) was constructed upon two different military foundations - the partisan tradition embodied in the Palmach and the "purist" or British tradition symbolized in the Jewish Brigade of World War II. The precise mechanics of how that fusion was engineered on an IDF-wide basis are not discussed. Instead, the paper examines how Moshe Dayan combined those foundations when he organized and led the 89th Commando Battalion in 1948. Second, the paper briefly mentions Moshe Dayan's controversial "Open Bridges Policy" - a remarkably novel approach to solving Arab-Israeli coexistence problems in the West Bank. Once again, time constraints prevented a detailed examination of how Dayan's West Bank policies not only meshed with his concept of national defense, but how his ideas could have provided a framework for Jewish-Palestinian peace. Both of these subjects are offered as Potential topics for future research. I wish to thank several people for their direct and indirect assistance in this project. First, I would like to thank Major General Amnon Shahak of the Israel Defense Force, who took time from his busy schedule and provided me with answers to several questions regarding Dayan. His insights were particularly helpful. Second, I would like to thank my wife, Suzy. Without her patience and understanding, this lengthy project would never have been completed. Third, I would like to thank Lieutenant Colonel Bittner who patiently prodded me along and fully understood my anxieties as I battled a particularly pernicious disease - writer's block. Finally, I wish to thank my father who instilled in me a deep and abiding interest in and appreciation of history. Click here to view image CHAPTER I SETTING THE STAGE: 1880-1929 On May 4, 1915, in the small Jewish settlement of Deganiah, a son was born to Shmuel and Dvorah Dayan. This was a bittersweet moment for these newly-wed, Russian-born emigres. Not only was he their first-born, he was also the first child born in the struggling village situated near the Sea of Galilee's southern shore. As such, he was Deganiah's first sabra.* But the festivity surrounding this event was laced with sadness. The boy's proud parents named him Moshe, after Moshe Barsky, a close friend who, at the age of nineteen, had been killed by Arab bandits some eighteen months earlier. (1) As his biographer, Shabtai Teveth, records: Moshe inherited with his very name a direct association with the struggle between Jews and Arabs that would characterize the rest of his life. (2) Moshe was born in troubled times. With World War I raging in Europe, the Ottoman Empire, rulers of Palestine, looked with increasing suspicion on the small but growing cluster of Jewish settlements on the Mediterranean's eastern shore. As a member of the Central Powers, Turkey viewed these 80,000, mostly Russian- born, Jews as potential Allied sympathizers. Fearful of British attack from Egypt and concerned about pro-British sentiment * SABRA: A Jewish term of affection referring to Jews born in Palestine. The term comes from a word describing a small but resilient cactus that grew throughout Palestine. Please note that more complete definitions of Jewish terms and phrases may be found in the glossary. Click here to view image within the Jewish settlements, the Turks pursued an active policy of harassment toward the Jews in Palestine - a policy that threatened Jews with deportation, restricted Jewish immigration, and banned Jewish self-defense organizations. These actions were designed to eliminate Jewish nationalism within the Ottoman Empire. This policy split the Yishuv* as some Jews, fearful of losing all they had worked for, urged their neighbors to not only seek Turkish citizenship but to also join the Turkish army. Other Jews actively supported the Allied cause. (3) But Jews were not the only group to feel the sting of Turkish policy. Portions of the restless Arab community, a community splintered by inter-family feuds yet bonded by a growing spirit of nationalism, openly warred against Turkish domination. Although nationalistic in nature, their war was openly supported by the British who viewed the Arabs as allies in their war against Turkey and the Central Powers. Eventually the British, with Arab and Jewish assistance, removed the Turks from Palestine and, in the ensuing peace, settled down to what they considered would be the mundane business of governing their new territorial mandate. But the war's violence and the peace that accompanied it's sudden end masked a set of complex, powerful, and opposing forces in Palestine. There, nascent Arab nationalism began to grind against rising Jewish nationalism and the collision of those movements would eventually rock the world with their fury. * YISHUV: A term referring to the entire Jewish population of Palestine. As a youngster, Moshe seemed ill-prepared to survive the harsh environment of his native land. (4) At the age of one, he contracted trachoma in his left eye. At age two, pneumonia nearly killed him and by the age of five he had already survived his first bout with malaria. Moshe's mother suffered similar illnesses. In addition to contracting trachoma from her young son, she fell victim to liver disease, an abscessed breast that required surgery on two separate occasions, and repeated bouts with malaria. Since such illnesses were common in Palestine, it is not surprising that so many of these young pioneers left the region shortly after their arrival. (5) Despite these medical hardships, the Dayan's remained in Palestine. In 1922, Moshe's sister Aviva was born in the port of Haifa and four years later his brother Zohar was born in the same city. As a boy, Moshe was not a physically gifted lad and, much to his father's dismay, did not enjoy the rigors of farming. At that time, every Jewish youngster was expected to work willingly and cheerfully in the fields; however, Moshe's somewhat lazy attitude toward farming embarrassed his father. Having learned to read at age four, Moshe was an exceptionally articulate child whose precocious nature and spirit of daring adventurism earned him the reputation of a quarrelsome, somewhat aloof boy. His peers neither appreciated nor fully understood these traits. Moshe's home life was not exceptionally stable. Throughout the war, his mother moved him from village to village in search of medical assistance or an environment more conducive to physical recuperation. His father was a rising star in the Zionist movement and after the war, he frequently left his struggling family on urgent Zionist matters as he traveled to other Jewish settlements in Palestine, to Zionist meetings in Jerusalem, and to Europe and the United States on fund raising missions. While Moshe wrote very little about his childhood, two passages concerning those early years leap from the pages of his autobiography: But I grew up in an independent Jewish society that spoke Hebrew and fostered the values of Israeli Jews who had struck roots and were living in their ancient homeland. My parents had helped create that society. They had been privileged to be among the first of the redeemed - and the redeemers. And later: The atmosphere in which I was born was that of a Jew in his homeland. My children and their children have known no other state or mood. My parents, however, had been forced with the choice and the spiritual struggle. They had made it and had reached the correct decision. (6) This atmosphere of a "Jew living in his homeland" was the primal influence on Moshe Dayan. As a sabra, Moshe was one of the first tangible products of Zionism* and, as such, that movement provided the social and political foundations to his military career. One cannot fully appreciate either Moshe Dayan or the development and later application of his military thought * ZIONISM: A Jewish movement whose expressed goal was the settlement of and eventual creation in Palestine of a national Jewish state. In many respects, Zionism was the socio-political (nationalistic) outgrowth of the ancient religious attachment of Jews to Palestine, especially Jerusalem. Within a European context, Zionism was quite similar to other ethnic nationalistic movements of the 19th century. Those separate ethnic movements had created the German state, unified Italy, and had unsuccessfully pressured the European powers for an independent Poland. Without first understanding Zionism and then recognizing how that movement shaped Moshe Dayan's environment. While Theodor Herzl is recognized as the founder of the Zionist Movement, he was neither the first Zionist nor the first proponent of Jewish nationalism. (7) Herzl was, however, the first western European Jew to publicly call for the creation of a separate and distinct Jewish state. An Austrian Jewish journalist, Herzl initially advocated Jewish assimilation into European culture and society. But in view of rising anti - semitism following the Dreyfus Affair in France, he regarded that goal as unrealistic. In The Jewish State, published in 1896, Herzl articulated the concept of political Zionism, the basic premise of which stated that if external pressures forced Jews to form a nation, then Jews could only live a normal existence through concentration in one territory. Herzl's book was not well-received in western Europe where the political and economic freedoms resulting from liberalism and enlightenment enabled most Jews to assimilate into the national societies and cultures in which they lived. Non-Jewish western Europeans resented the book since its philosophical premise ran counter to existing nationalistic undercurrents. By the late 19th century, however, political Zionism was one of several related philosophies that appealed to oppressed Russian Jews. (8) In Russia, where reactionary Tsarist governments viewed liberalism and enlightenment as threats to their autocratic regimes, a growing number of Jews eagerly accepted Herzl's doctrine of a national Jewish homeland. Unlike western European Jews, Russian Jews had not been accepted by or assimilated into Russian society and, classified as aliens, were forced to live segregated lives within the "Russian Pale of Settlement."* Within the Pale, most Jews lived in tightly knit, yet impoverished communities. While there were exceptions, Russian Jews spoke their own language (Yiddish),** were usually educated in Jewish schools, practiced their distinct religion, and quietly lived within their own economic structures. They did not enjoy political or legal equality with Russian peasants and merchants living within the Pale and, from time-to-time, endured the violence of state-sanctioned, anti-Jewish pograms. Before the publication of Herzl's book, Russian Jews were divided over the proper reaction to the influences of western European liberalism and the anti-semitic practices of Tsarist Russia. While generalizations are often as dangerous to make as they are incorrect, Russian Jews in the latter half of the 19th century can be categorized into one of three broad groups: the secular assimi lationists, the orthodox, and the Zionists. Each of these groups reacted differently to liberalism and Tsarist practices. * RUSSIAN PALE OF SETTLEMENT: Usually referred to as the Pale, this was a stretch of land on the western fringe of the vast Russian Empire where the majority of Russia's five million Jews lived. This area ran from the Baltic Sea in the north to the Black Sea in the south and covered portions of the Ukraine and what is now known as Poland. After World War I, some of these territories became independent nations - Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, etc. ** YIDDISH: A specific dialect formed by a combination of Middle High German, Hebrews Polish, and Russian. Its roots can be traced to the 13th century when Jews moved east from the Rhineland. Secular assimilationists did not place an inordinate amount of faith in traditional orthodox values and hoped that the twin spirits of liberalism and enlightenment would eventually allow them to fully integrate into Russian society. While the modest reforms of Tsar Alexander II encouraged this belief, some secular Jews viewed emigration to the west as the only means to escape the bloom and uncertainty of life in Russia. Most orthodox Jews ignored state policies, endured Tsarist practices, and rejected as religiously dangerous the secular humanism inherent in liberalism and enlightenment. While some orthodox families were transitioning to either secularism or Zionism, most religious traditionalists opposed Zionism and condemned it as "the great Jewish heresy of the nineteenth century." (9) It should be noted that after the publication of The Jewish State, most western European Jews denounced the book's anti-assimilationist arguments and, in time, became powerful opponents of Zionism. (10) But a small and increasingly vocal Jewish minority, inspired by various messianic writings and growing nationalism, looked to Palestine as a place where Jews might live in peace and dignity. Although Herzl had not yet written The Jewish State, these Jews were among the first advocates of what became political Zionism. While their activities did not influence many of their peers, they prepared the way for Herzl's message. In 1881, anarchists, three of whom bore Jewish names, assassinated Alexander II. This act was a turning point in both Jewish and Russian history for it brought Alexander III to the throne and effectively ended the meager reforms of his predecessor. The new Tsar's reactionary tendencies found ardent support in his chief advisor, Konstantin Pobedonostev, a vicious anti-semite who considered democracy a leprous disease and autocratic theocracy the only rational foundation for government. Under Alexander III, the state enacted restrictive anti- Jewish laws and officially sanctioned, or at least officially ignored, a series of anti-Jewish pograms, the violence of which had not been seen since the 17th century. By the end of 1881, these riots had mauled 225 Jewish communities and it was estimated that mob violence left 20,000 Jews homeless, economically ruined another 100,000, and destroyed $80 million of Jewish property. By 1903, anti-semitic violence had swept through most Jewish communities from Warsaw to Odessa. (11) Widely condemned in western Europe, this surge of anti- semitic violence shattered Jewish hopes of assimilation and gave impetus to two dissimilar reactions - Marxist revolution in Russia and emigration from Russia. As Tsarist repression also moved against non-Jewish elements, revolutionary movements sprang-up throughout the country. The Tsar's policy of denying Jews a Russian education inadvertently assisted these movements. Those Jewish students fortunate enough to study abroad, were exposed to liberal thought, the spirit of enlightenment, and Marxist ideology. Some of those students returned to Russia and, filled with revolutionary zeal, joined the revolution. Most Russian Jews favored emigration from Russia over revolution in Russia. From 1880 to 1914, one-third of all eastern European Jews, to include nearly two million of Russia's five million Jews, departed for the United States. (12) From 1882 to 1903, approximately 25,000 Russian Jews emigrated to Palestine. Although less than 10,000 of these early pioneers stayed there, they comprised the first of five separate mass Jewish migrations or Aliyah's* to Palestine. These immigrants had little in common with the Jewish community that had lived for centuries in Palestine - a highly religious community that numbered some 25,000. First Aliyah Jews were rebels against the conservative and anti-semitic environment in which they were born and their departure from Russia was a direct response to the resurgence of anti-semitic persecution. Politically oriented and inspired with nationalistic zeal and messianic self-fulfillment, these Jews were convinced that regeneration was possible with a return to free and productive labor on the soil. (13) Finding Palestine anything but "the promised land of milk and honey", these struggling pioneers established agricultural settlements. Without organic Zionist support, these communities were not notably successful and had it not been for Baron Edmond de Rothschild's financial support, one wonders how many of those settlements would have survived. (14) Using Rothschild's money, these Jews purchased land from absentee Turkish landlords. To the Arab tenant farmers, the transfer of land from Turkish to Jewish ownership was of little consequence since the Jews rehired them as agricultural workers. This was due in part to Rothschild's insistence that the Jewish * ALIYAH: Literally meaning ascension, this term describes the various mass migrations of Jews to Palestine. settlers establish "european-style colonial plantations", an arrangement that worked out nicely since the Jews, serving as overseers, did not deprive the Arab farmers of employment. Despite Rothschild's assistance, life in Palestine was not easy. The climate was hot and muggy, disease was rampant, and much of the land was poor. Over time, the struggle to merely survive exacted a physical and spiritual toll on the settlers. By 1900, the colonists had fully integrated into the economy and, concerned with their own needs, no longer "exclusively thought of a national Jewish revival in Palestine." (15) Despite this failure, these early pioneers made an important contribution to the eventual creation of Israel - they built a small but permanent Jewish bridgehead in Palestine. As the fervor of the first Aliyah succumbed to the daily pressures of survival, two separate yet interrelated movements captured the imaginations of an ever-increasing number of Russian Jews - Herzl's concept of political Zionism and Marxist socialism. These related yet divergent movements, Jewish nationalism and international revolution, provided the foundation for the second mass Jewish migration to Palestine. (16) Following the publication of The Jewish State, Herzl organized the World Zionist Organization which, after his death in 1904, unified the various strands of Jewish nationalism into a coherent movement. While Zionism appealed to only a small minority of Russian Jews, it provided them a viable means of escape from autocratic Russian rule. At the same time, reactionary Tsarist policies alienated an increasing number of Jewish and non-Jewish Russians. Imbued with Marxist idealism and revolutionary zeal, these Russians agitated with increasing vehemence against Tsarist theocratic autocracy. A disproportionate number of these revolutionaries were Jewish. Comprising only four percent of Russia's population, by the early 1900's, 31 percent of all political exiles under surveillance in Siberia were Jews. Lenin later wrote that "Russians were too easy going, too readily tired of the revolutionary struggle. Jews on the other hand, with their stubbornness and fanaticism, made excellent revolutionaries." (17) This agitation resulted in the Revolution of 1905. The wave of pograms and repressions that followed that ill-fated revolt forced many disillusioned Jewish Marxists and Zionists to leave Russia for Palestine. The differences between the First and Second Aliyahs are as striking as they are important. Whereas first Aliyah Jews grew up under the rather benign rule of Alexander II and left Russia as a result of the pograms following his assassination, Second Aliyah Jews were raised under the harsh regimes of Alexander III and Nicholas II. Consequently, the Zionist and Marxist components of the second migration were more ardent in both the affirmation and application of their beliefs than were the pioneers of the first Aliyah. Their heightened sense of purpose and the tenacity of their approach to life, society, and nation- building, altered the relationship between Arab and Jew, and forever changed the course of Palestine's history. The most pronounced impacts of the Second Aliyah were in employment and defense. These Jews did not equate farming only with the production of food. Instead, they viewed agriculture in nationalistic terms. The spread of Jewish settlements would constitute a national land reclamation program through which the future borders of a Jewish state would be determined. Entering Palestine needing jobs and money, these emigres viewed the First Aliyah's accomplishments with skepticism. Instead of finding settlements where Jews personally worked the soil, they found Rothschild's colonial plantations where Jews, acting as overseers, employed Arab laborers. Without fully understanding the rigors faced by the earlier pioneers, Second Aliyah Jews wondered where the idealism of the First Aliyah had gone and, rejecting the concept of a planter society, denounced Rothschild for removing the burden of survival from his colonists. Israel Shochat was one of these newcomers and he described his disillusionment with the way of life he found in the small settlement of Petach Tikvah: Even the young people gave no hint of being involved in any sort of national enterprise. They seemed like the children of farmers everywhere else: except that their main job was seeing to it that the Arabs worked properly. After a week or two, my wonderment at being in a Jewish village in Palestine began to fade and blur. The magic evaporated. ... Before dawn, hundreds of Arab laborers daily streamed into Petach Tikvah to look for work, and mostly found it. Then there was the matter of language: the villagers all spoke Yiddish. To speak Hebrew was regarded as absurd, as a Zionist affectation. And the most serious thing was that Jews were considered unemployable. (18) Like other newcomers, Shochat was encouraged to go to America, Canada, or Australia to earn enough money so that he could return to Palestine and purchase his own orange grove. These Zionist-Socialists viewed personal and physical labor as "the magic key to true perception of the self" and hence, to self-redemption. (19) The concept of a Jewish "planter-elite" was anathema to their socialist ideals and they vehemently opposed what they considered to be the exploitation of Arab labor. Firmly committed to creating an economically and socially just society, Second Aliyah pioneers were determined that Jewish self-sufficiency, not the class exploitation of native labor, was the only rational mechanism through which a Jewish state could be built. If Arab labor was not exploited, they naively reasoned, then the Arabs would not object to Zionism. (20) Supplied with funds from the World Zionist Organization, the new immigrants purchased additional lands from Turkish landlords and wealthy Arab families. Refusing to employ native labor for fear of perpetuating the class struggle, they established collective settlements known as kibbutzim.* Eventually, some of these new pioneers became dissatisfied with the collective regimen of kibbutzim life and formed less restrictive agrarian settlements called moshavim.** However, these land purchases stripped Arab tenant farmers and nomadic herders of their livelihood. Understanding this problem, Jews often paid more for the land than what the owner * KIBBUTZ (plural kibbutzim): A collective farming settlement that eliminated private property, personal wealth, and, stressing a communal life-style, observed the principles of social equality, mutual responsibility, and direct democracy. The first kibbutz was established in 1909 at Deganiah, Moshe Dayan's birthplace. ** MOSHAV (plural moshavim): Another form of pioneering cooperative settlement that allowed settlers to own and work their own land while sharing community resources (water and scarce farm equipment) and services (marketing of produce). demanded with the excess monies to be given to the displaced peasants in compensation for the loss of "their" land. Yet hostilities frequently erupted between Jewish settlers and dislocated Arabs. (21) Thus, the creation of a class of impoverished, landless Arabs and the naive lack of foresight on the part of Jewish settlers contributed to the developing rift between Arab and Jew. Though fostering their own nationalistic dreams, the Jews largely ignored similar tendencies developing among the Arabs. In 1905, Naguib Azuri, a Christian Arab, made a chilling prediction in a book that went largely unnoticed among both the Jewish settlers in Palestine and the leaders of the World Zionist Organization in Europe. Azuri wrote in Le Reveil de la Nation Arab: Two important phenomenon of a singular nature and yet opposed, at present manifest themselves in Asian Turkey. These are the awakening of the Arab nation and the latent effort of the Jews to reconstitute on a very large scale the ancient kingdom of Israel. The two movements are destined to combat one another until one is beaten by the other. (22) Having taken Arab acquiescence for granted and overlooking the possibility of native opposition, few Jews appreciated the growing force of Arab nationalism and fewer still viewed the Arab response to Zionism in its true perspective. As early as 1891, three years before the publication of Herzl's The Jewish State and ten years after the beginning of the First Aliyah, some Arabs had protested both the immigration to and the acquisition of land by Jews in Palestine. This was not a violent protest as the Arab complaints were sent to Turkish officials in a telegram. (23) During the first decade of the 20th century, tensions heightened as Jewish settlers moved inland from their coastal conclaves. This movement, especially to the Sea of Galilee area, resulted in minor violence, most of which concerned grazing rights. Blood feuds between Arab families and confrontations between Jewish farmers and semi-nomadic Arab herders were quite common and, in many respects, were similar to the disputes between cattlemen and "sod-busting" farmers in the American west. In 1908, the first major anti-Jewish riot occurred in the port city of Jaffa. In that year, a new Turkish government abolished press censorship and almost immediately several Arab newspapers launched editorial attacks against the Jewish settlers. Jews viewed both events in terms of an anti-Jewish pogram and not as the collision of two different cultures each of which supported separate nationalistic movements. As Amos Elon crisply states: In the first stages of their open struggle with the Arab nationalists, Zionists could not tear themselves away from European stereotypes. (24) Anti-Jewish violence in Palestine, when combined with bitter memories of Russian pograms, produced the second distinguishing characteristic of the Second Aliyah - the formation of Jewish self-defense organizations. However, this phenomenon had its historical roots in Russia. In 1903, a group of Jews in the small Ukranian town of Gomel organized self-defense units and defeated a mob bent on destroying that Jewish community. But in the aftermath of victory, the Tsar's forces moved in and, abandoning any semblance of neutrality, crushed the Jewish resistance. Four years later, one of those defenders helped organize the first Jewish self-defense unit in Palestine. Israel Shochat left Russia soon after his experience in Gomel and, upon arriving in Palestine, was impressed with the warrior spirit of the Circassians.* Shochat believed that Jews could learn a great deal from the Circassian example: Here they were, a tiny minority in the sea of Arabs, and none-the-less, they had managed to earn an honorable position for themselves. They had rooted themselves in the land, they had set up their own villages; perhaps all was not lost for us yet. It was possible, after all, I thought, to strengthen ourselves, to settle and to hold on to the land, to force our Arab neighbors to respect us. But for this we ourselves needed to be brave, and to persevere. (25) In September 1907, Israel Shochat and nine other men met in a candle-lit, upper-story room of an old house in Jaffa and formed the Bar-Giora.** These men recognized that the creation of a Jewish state was dependent upon two separate, yet interrelated tasks. First, the "conquest of Jewish labor" was of the utmost importance, for without Jewish workers there could be no Jewish homeland. Given the rise of anti-Jewish sentiments in the surrounding Arab community, they also believed that it was both the right and the duty of Jewish settlers to defend themselves. These men drafted a program that favored Jewish self-defense, * CIRCASSIANS: A people originally brought to Palestine from the northeast coast of the Black Sea by Abdul Hamid in the second half of the 19th century. However, the Circassians defended themselves so well against attacks from Bedouin bandits, that their fighting skills won them the reputation of fierce warriors. Arabs and Jews were so impressed with their martial talents that they frequently hired Circassians as guards and watchmen. ** BAR-GIORA: The first of several Jewish self-defense forces established prior to Israel's War for Independence. This organization was named after Simon Bar-Giora, leader of the Jewish revolt against Rome from 66 to 70 A.D. especially with regard to a Jewish militia, and advocated active participation in Socialist-Zionist education through which workers would be unified in a common purpose. (26) Following the meeting, the ten men swore "By blood and fire, Judea fell; through blood and fire, Judea shall rise again." Yitshaq Ben- Zvi, a future president of Israel, later wrote of that night: We felt we were standing before Mount Sinai at the Giving of the Law, and all of us were ready to sacrifice ourselves. We knew that words would not rebuild the nation, only our deeds. (27) Moving to Galilee, the Bar-Giora offered contracted security services to Jewish settlements in the area. However, only those villages that relied on Jewish labor could hire the Bar-Giora. following several encounters with Bedouin bandits, outlaws that raided Jewish and Arab villages, Shochat petitioned Zionist leaders for money and weapons. (28) While proving the validity of its concept of self-defense, the Bar-Giora never expanded its protective role beyond a few villages in upper Palestine. In April 1909, the Bar-Giora decided that their secret society was neither sufficiently strong nor politically active enough to become a force of national significance. Consequently, they reorganized and called themselves the Hashomer.* Despite its small size and limited abilities, the Hashomer represented the first melding of Jewish para-military force to a set of vaguely defined national objectives. (29) Clarifying the relationship between self-defense and the creation of new social and national values, the Hashomer is military mission was "to make the entire * HASHOMER: In English, Hashomer means "watchmen". This was the second Jewish self-defense force established in Palestine. Jewish population conscious of the needs, and implications, of self-defense." (30) In addition to establishing and defending kibbutzim in Palestine, the Hashomer actively linked the spread of Jewish settlements with the principles of nation-building and national defense. A leading Marxist force, the Hashomer's political mission "was the establishment of the dictatorship of an agrarian proletariat based in fortified collectives (which were) to serve as the vanguard of the Socialist-Zionist movement." (31) However, the Hashomer's increasingly militant leftist tendencies alienated a growing number of Jewish leaders. David Ben-Gurion was one of those leaders who had renounced his earlier faith in radical Marxist-Socialism and had grown increasingly distrustful of the para-military organization. This, when combined with Turkey's outlawing of the Hashomer during the war and the organization's inability to effectively protect Jewish interests in Palestine during the Arab Riots of 1920, culminated in a split between the Yishuv and the Hashomer and led to that organization's ultimate demise. (32) Before discussing Jewish participation in World War I and the establishment of the British Mandate in Palestine, it is necessary to reintroduce Moshe Dayan into this stream of history. While Moshe was born after the Second Aliyah had ended, both of his parents were among the 40,000 Jews that entered Palestine during that migration. Shmuel and Dvorah came from divergent family backgrounds and each arrived in Palestine with different expectations. Together, Moshe's parents embodied the two driving forces behind the Second Aliyah - Zionism and Marxist-Socialism. Born in 1890, Shmuel Dayan came from an impoverished family of orthodox Jews living in Zaskow, a small Ukrainian town near Kiev. At one time, Shmuel's family had been quite prominent in religious circles. His great grandfather had been a dayan - a religious or rabbinical judge - and it was that man who gave the family its name. Despite his family's poverty, Shmuel learned to read and write Russian, Hebrew, and, of course, Yiddish. In keeping with tradition, Shmuel's father maintained a strict, religious home. However, this struggling merchant was one of a growing number of orthodox Jews who viewed Zionism with lessening skepticism. Among the sacred writings in the family library, young Shmuel found Zionist pamphlets and copies of ihe Zionist Worker, a Labor-Zionist newspaper describing the Jewish struggle in Palestine. During the dark days of pograms and repressions following the 1905 Revolution, Shmuel read a particularly inspirational appeal from Palestine. Reflecting on life in Russia, Shmuel later wrote that the pamphlet's message was "a consolation to an aching soul." (33) In 1908, against the wishes of their father, Shmuel and his older brother Eliyahu left for Palestine as ardent Zionists. But each brother expressed his Zionist fervor differently. Eliyahu "resolutely turned his beliefs into practice" and refused "to engage in political activities", establishing a farm before sending for his wife and children. (34) Shmuel was more interested in politics and public affairs than he was in farming. After arriving in Jaffa, he wrote for a Hebrew Labor Movement newspaper and became an active member of that that political party. Within a year, he purchased an old Turkish pistol and left the coastal plains for Galilee where he hired himself out as a guard for a Jewish farm. (35) In 1911, Shmuel joined a group of young pioneers who had recently established the kibbutz at Deganiah. While living at Deganiah, Shmuel participated in an endless series of political debates that alienated many of his peers. This alienation was caused by his debating style and by his expressed dissatisfaction with rigid collectivism. After the war, Shmuel helped found the first moshav at Nahalal. Additionally, Shmuel worked in the fields by day, guarded the settlement by night, and, in response to a Hashomer request, protected neighboring villages where he helped drive "away the local Arabs who tried to harvest wheat in the settlement fields." (36) Moshe's mother, Dvorah Zatulovsky, was born in 1890 in the Ukranian village of Prochorovka. Unlike her future husband, Dvorah came from a wealthy secular family and had been given a Russian education. (37) Although her father had pro-Zionist tendencies, Dvorah did not share his interests in either that movement or in Hebrew culture. Instead, she was caught up in the revolutionary fervor of the times and, devoting "herself to the movement for the emancipation of the proletariat", she joined the student faction of Lenin's Social Democratic Party. (38) After serving as a volunteer nurse in the Balkan War of 1911-1912, she grew dissatisfied with the progress of the revolutionary struggle in Russia while becoming increasingly aware of her Jewish heritage. After reading several letters written to her father by Zionists, she decided that Palestine "is where the workers of my people are. I shall join them." (39) Like Shmuel's father, Dvorah's parents were dismayed with her decision. After initially meeting in 1913, Shmuel and Dvorah, the Zionist and the fading Marxist, were married in the autumn of 1914. In May of the following year, Moshe was born. While World War I halted Zionist work in Palestine, the conflagration provided the movement with a golden opportunity. Since most Zionists believed that the Ottoman Empire would not survive the war and since, as a member of the Central Powers, Turkey was at war with England, the World Zionist Organization moved its headquarters from Berlin to Copenhagen and later to London. Influential Jewish leaders like Dr. Chaim Weizmann, an English chemist and future leader of the World Zionist Organization, believed that the only Zionists who would have any influence by the time of the peace settlement would be Zionists who had taken a side: the one that proved to be a winner." (40) Dr. Welzmann and the British government developed a symbiotic relationship as each party possessed something the other desperately needed. Weizmann, the Anglophile, recognized that Britain was the only major European power with territorial holdings and vital strategic interests in the Middle East. He correctly reasoned that Britain might support the establishment of a friendly Jewish community in Palestine and might, therefore, support Zionist goals. The British increasingly viewed the Arabs and the Jews as potential allies in a post-war struggle to stymie french ambitions in the Middle East. Possessing solid connections in the British government and fully understanding British Middle-Eastern concerns, Dr. Weizmann urged Lloyd George's government to establish a national Jewish homeland in Palestine. (41) In 1916, Britain and France concluded a secret agreement outlining their intentions regarding the post-war disposition of the Ottoman Empire. Known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the document initially called for the internationalization of Palestine, the creation of French protectorates in Lebanon and Syria, and British control of Mesopotamia (modern Iraq). Growing increasingly concerned about post-war French intentions in the region, the British began exploring ways in which they could thwart French aims while protecting their own strategic interests. Of vital concern to them was the post-war disposition of Palestine. (42) In pursuing this objective, the British had already engaged the Arabs in a revolt against the Turks. In return, they indicated that the Empire might support the creation of an independent Arab kingdom in Palestine. The Arabs interpreted this "indication" as a direct British promise. (43) The British also enlisted Jewish assistance in both the war against the Central Powers and in their gambit against the French. However, British Middle-Eastern policies did not completely coincide with Zionist intentions. Joseph Trumpeldor and Vladimir Jabotinsky offered to raise all-Jewish units to fight for the British in Palestine. (44) These Russian-born Jews believed that the establishment of a Jewish homeland was the first step toward the eventual creation of an independent Jewish state. They argued that the Yishuv must abandon its passive posture since "only if the Jews fought for Palestine .. . would they be able to stake a claim to it come peace." (45) Sensing potential problems, the British rejected the offer and instead formed the Zion Mule Corps. Serving with distinction at Galipoli in 1915, this 650-man unit was disbanded in 1916 when it refused to quell anti-British riots in Ireland. With help from Dr. Weizmann, Trumpeldor and Jabotinsky convinced Lloyd George's cabinet to form the Jewish Legion. Eventually, three Jewish battalions were raised, two of which fought in Palestine under British command. While fewer than 5000 Jews served in the Legion, the formation of that unit was an important accomplishment since it "signaled the official emergence of the Jewish people from their traditional state of neutrality" and, to Zionists, it was the first expression of the British commitment to the Zionist cause." (46) On a more practical level, members of the Jewish Legion received valuable military training and combat experience, and some of those veterans eventually joined Jewish para-military units in Palestine. In the diplomatic arena, the British, following heated negotiations with Dr. Weizmann, issued the Balfour Declaration on 2 November 1917. The British hoped to use this document for propaganda purposes. (47) First, they hoped that the declaration would rally Jewish opinion, especially in the United States, to the side of the allies. After the capture of Jerusalem in December 1917, the British covertly distributed leaflets among Jewish soldiers in Central European countries that stated the Allies were giving "the land of Israel back to the children of Israel." finally, given their strategic concerns in the region, the British hoped that the declaration would lead to the settlement in Palestine of a Jewish population attached to Britain through ties of sentiment and common interests. The Balfour Declaration was a masterpiece of carefully worded ambiguity, and hence could and was misinterpreted by Arabs and Jews alike. The second of its three paragraphs stated: His Majesty's Government views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country. While most Jews overestimated the importance of the Balfour Declaration, the Arabs interpreted its vague phrases in the most extreme context possible. (48) However, after receiving Allied endorsement at the San Remo Conference of 1920, the document became an instrument of British and international policy. Influenced by the altruistic concepts embodied in the declaration, in 1922 the League of Nations officially granted Britain a mandate over Palestine. (49) But this official action ignored the powerful nationalistic undercurrents in Palestine. Arab nationalists wanted immediate independence and viewed the Balfour Declaration and the Sykes- Picot Agreement as British attempts to nullify their pledge to support an independent Arab-Palestinian state. (50) Zionist leaders in Palestine wanted to cultivate conditions conducive to the development of a Jewish state and, holding "no illusions about British intentions" decided to "use the Balfour Declaration for their own needs." (51) The British, and to some extent the French, sought to strengthen their respective strategic and economic positions in the Middle East largely at the expense of Arab interests. Thus, as early as 1919, the stage was set and the principle players, each having established their mutually exclusive objectives, began a 30 year drama that eventually resulted in the ousting of European power from Palestine, the creation of a Jewish state, and the tragic deepening of Arab-Jewish hostilities. Many European Jews viewed the Balfour Declaration as a godsend and it was that document, the dislocations caused by war, and the disastrous Russian Revolution and the ensuing civil war that provided the basis for the Third Aliyah. Lasting until 1924, this migration brought over 35,000 Jews to Palestine and breathed renewed life into the Zionist movement there. (52) Increased Jewish immigration, when combined with what Arab nationalists viewed as British duplicity regarding the formation of an independent Arab state, resulted in the Arab Riots of 1920- 1921. This rioting was partly fueled by the pro-Arab stance of the British military government in Palestine - a position rooted in traditional, yet benign, English anti-semitism. Following an inflammatory speech by the British Governor of Jerusalem, Arabs attacked the Jewish quarter in the Old City of Jerusalem. (53) Arab police sided with the rioters and had to be disarmed and withdrawn. In direct violation of British regulations, Vladimir Jabotinsky organized Jewish self-defense units and he and his principle supporters were disarmed, arrested, and jailed. (54) Rioting spread to other areas of Palestine, to include Jaffa, the principle port through which Jews entered the region. Anxious to remove European influence from northern Palestine, Arabs attacked Jewish settlements in the Sea of Galilee area and in so doing, they inadvertently provided the Yishuv with its first national folk hero. Joseph Trumpeldor, hero and co-founder of the Jewish Legion, led Jewish settlers in a determined but futile defense of Tel Hai. Killed after a valiant stand, Trumpeldor's dying words were alleged to have been "It is good to die for our country." (55) His death and the popular mythology surrounding the destruction of Tel Hai fired the resolve of future Jewish defenders. Zionists viewed these riots as an anti-semitic pogram and accused the British of not doing enough to halt them. Although largely directed against Jews, these attacks were part of a larger movement choreographed by Arab nationalists opposed to European domination. During the summer of 1920, 90,000 British troops crushed a revolt in Iraq and by 1925, the French used an even larger force to quell a similar rebellion in Syria. (56) The Arab Riots profoundly affected Palestine and seriously damaged the already sensitive relationships between Arabs, Jews, and the British. (57) In the summer of 1920, British military rule was replaced with Sir Herbert Samuel's civilian administration. A British Jew, Samuel believed that Arab aspirations and Zionist aims were not mutually exclusive and that both movements could be satisfied within the framework of the British Mandate. After legalizing Jewish immigration and approving further land sales to Zionists, Samuel pardoned Jabotinsky and the Arab leaders of the recent riots. His administration also established a Palestinian Constitution that authorized the formation of an elected assembly. While comprising less than 15% of Palestine's population, the Yishuv accepted the concept of representative government and viewed increased immigration as the key to future political survival. The Arabs, distrusting British intentions and committed to a policy of non-cooperation as long as the Balfour Declaration was not revoked, rejected the proposal. Although the Arab community was divided by factional and inter- family political strife, Haj Amin al-Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, served as that community's principal political and religious spokesman. Unable to establish a cooperative Palestinian state, Samuel authorized Arabs and Jews to form separate governing agencies through which each community could manage its own affairs. While this political partition led to nearly a decade of peace, the formation of parallel governments increased Arab and Jewish alienation as each community pursued its nationalistic goals largely at the expense of each other. These separatist tendencies gained additional momentum through Samuel's unwillingness to show favoritism to either side. Refusing to placate either community by acquiescing to their major, and usually unreasonable demands, the British sought to defuse tensions by granting minor concessions to both sides. As would be expected, these concessions never violated British strategic interests and security concerns in the region. In 1922, the British Colonial Office issued the first of several White Papers regarding Palestine. A document that sought to placate both communities, it suffered a fate typical of most compromise policies. Refusing to repudiate the Balfour Declaration, the paper did separate the Trans-Jordan from Palestine. While this angered the Jews, it did not satisfy Arab demands that England honor its promise to support an independent Arab state. Although the paper officially limited Jewish immigration based upon the "absorptive capacity" of the region, a move that dismayed the Yishuv, the document failed to meet Arab demands that all Jewish immigration be halted. In January 1922, the Arabs formed the Supreme Muslim council led by Haj Amin al-Husseini , the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. Soft- spoken, blue-eyed, well-groomed, and resembling "Alec Guinness dressed as an Arab", the British granted Haj Amin political, financial, and legal powers over Palestinian Muslim affairs. Samuel's administration granted Haj Amin these powers for two reasons. Not only did the Mandate want to develop a more cooperative working relationship with the Arab community, the authorities also hoped that this move would soften Haj Amin's militant political views. However, this gambit failed backfired. Now possessing formidable political and religious influence, Haj Amin became the most powerful and important Arab in Palestine - a position he used to further his nationalist agenda. (58) The Yishuv was concerned over this turn of events. Fearing his militant tendencies, Jews believed Haj Amin to have been the instigator of the riots and blamed the British for his rise to power. The Arab Riots also produced far-reaching changes within the Yishuv. Given Britain's inability to protect Jewish interests during the riots and the Hashomer's meager performance, the Yishuv reevaluated its self-defense policies. Inexorably linked to self-defense was the strategy of nation-building. One particularly candid Jewish activist argued: We cannot claim what we cannot defend. There are no borders. There is no problem here of local defense. If we fall in Galilee, we shall also fall in the (Negev) desert. If we leave Tel Hai ... history will record that this was our first retreat. (59) Trumpeldor's death, the loss of Tel Hai, and the destruction of other farming settlements, to include Moshe Dayan's new home at Deganiah B, underscored the need for a national defense organization. (60) However, the successful defense of other communities reemphasized the advantages of a cooperative self- defense strategy based on an available, mobile, armed, and fully- trained militia capable of protecting Jewish lives and property throughout Palestine. In 1920, Jewish leaders abolished the politically radical and militarily ineffective Hashomer, expressed their dissatisfaction with the Labor and Defense Battalions*, and called for the creation of a nation-wide Jewish self-defense force. The following year, the Haganah** was organized. In addition to reevaluating the tactics of self-defense and the strategy of nation-building, the Yishuv addressed political and economic affairs. British policy regarding the formation of * LABOR AND DEFENSE BATTALIONS: Established by Trumpeldor, the Gdud Ha'Avoda were designed to promote the development of the Jewish state through civil construction projects and, as envisioned by Trumpeldor, these units were to serve as a "people's militia". ** HAGANAH: Literally meaning "defense" in Hebrew, the Haganah was the third, most famous, and most successful of Israel is pre- independence defense organizations. Arab and Jewish governments within the Mandate legitimized both the existence and functions of the Jewish Agency.* Formerly known as the Zionist Executive, the Jewish Agency had already begun to coordinate the actions of Weizmann's World Zionist Organization with those of the Yishuv. During the next 25 years, the Agency formed a shadow government within Palestine and established national policies regarding fund raising, immigration, weapons procurement, and the use of military force. The Yishuv also founded the Histadrut**. Embracing all aspects of Jewish labor to include trade unions and agrarian collectives, the Histadrut's function was "to consolidate and politically centralize the work of the pioneers." (61) Frequently hailed as Israel's founding fathers, Second and Third Aliyah Jews were directly responsible for establishing the Jewish Agency, the Histadrut, and the Haganah. These institutions provided the lasting political, economic, and military foundations upon which both a national character and a national state were constructed. Although later migrations augmented Jewish ranks, those immigrants conformed to the patterns of social and political life established during the years 1904 to 1924. (62) By the mid-1920's, the organizational * JEWISH AGENCY: Formerly known as the Zionist Commission or the Zionist Executive, this organization was responsible to the World Zionist Organization for all Jewish matters in Palestine. Officially recognized under the Mandate Charter (Article 4), the British allowed the organization to govern Jewish Palestinians. ** HISTADRUT: The General federation of Jewish Labor was an economic and political organization designed to promote the formation of the Jewish state through the consolidation and unification of all Jewish workers, political parties, and interest groups. embryo of a Jewish state had been formed. But Zionists were not as politically or as philosophically united as one might imagine. (63) The Arab Riots, the lackluster British response to chose disturbances, and the Yishuv's distrust of British objectives, split the movement into three camps. As President of the World Zionist Organization, Dr. Weizmann was primarily concerned with the political processes leading to the eventual formation of a Jewish state. Headquartered in London, Weizmann was a confirmed gradualist who maintained that a Jewish state could be developed only within the framework of British guidance and support. While endorsing Weizmann's gradualism, David Ben-Gurion was a political pragmatist who was convinced that Jews must rely on their own abilities and resources in constructing a nation. As the future leader of the Jewish Agency, he viewed nation-building in tactical terms and argued that the Yishuv must not depend exclusively on external, and frequently restrictive, British support. Through his hard work and grass-roots activism, Ben- Gurion obtained the political experience necessary to eventually assume the mantle of Jewish leadership from Dr. Weizmann. While both men agreed on the ultimate goal, their different perspectives led to disagreements concerning the specific means required to achieve that end. Those differences, however, were insignificant when compared to Vladimir Jabotinsky's tactical approach to achieve his strategic goals. Having already run afoul of British authority, Jabotinsky rejected the concept of a geographic partition of Palestine, recoiled at the thought of cooperating with the British, and believed that the Jewish state must encompass all of pre-1922 Palestine to include the Trans- Jordan. He advocated a policy of mass migration as a means to create a Jewish majority in Palestine. Somewhat of a cultural supremacist, Jabotinsky, in response to moderates who feared that his policies would lead all-out war with the Arabs, rhetorically asked "whether during the colonization of America or Australia anyone had bothered to beg the native's for permission." (64) Forming the Revisionist Party* in 1925, Jabotinsky's extreme, nationalistic sabre-rattlings produced few die-hard converts. While his political influence waned during the uneasy peace of 1922 through 1928, his radical pronouncements concerned both the Arabs and Jewish moderates. Ultimately losing control of his movement to younger and more aggressive Jewish nationalists in the late 1930's, his brand of militant nationalism captured the imaginations of less restrained individuals and led to the formation of two terrorist gangs - the Irgun and the Stern Gang - that openly warred against British rule and defied Ben-Gurion's policies of structured nation- building. From 1922 through 1928, Palestine enjoyed relative peace as Arabs and Jews managed an uneasy coexistence. But in August 1929, anti-Jewish violence broke out once again. Primarily an * REVISIONIST PARTY: Unlike its Social-Zionist counterparts, this political organization did not envision the creation of a Socialist Jewish commonwealth based on a cooperative economic structure. Rather, it campaigned for the creation of a political democracy with a strong capitalist economy. Revisionists also preached a vigorous form of nationalism and believed that the borders of the eventual Jewish state must coincide with the borders of ancient Israel - a territory that would include much of modern Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. expression of Arab nationalism, this renewed violence was preceded by a vigorous propaganda campaign that alleged the Jews were a threat to Moslem Holy Places. Carefully orchestrating this religious campaign in mosques and the Arab press, Haj Amin, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, united Arab factions under his spiritual and political leadership. Following a series of religious disputes in Jerusalem, Arab mobs attacked Jews in that city. These riots soon spilled into the surrounding countryside and, eventually engulfing most of Palestine, produced a level of violence that surpassed the riots of 1920 and 1921. (65) Lacking sufficient troops to effectively control the situation, the British were unable to protect every Jewish community The Jews also lacked sufficient self-defense resources and, recognizing that their best chance for survival "lay in banding together in exclusively Jewish settlements and neighborhoods," the Yishuv abandoned communities located in predominantly Arab towns. Since many Jews no longer trusted British intentions in Palestine, England's inability to protect every Jewish settlement provided the basis for the Yishuv's perception that the British military had been unwilling to halt the riots. (66) While popular history explains the 1929 riots as an Arab react ion against Jewish immigration, there were other more fundamental, yet subtle, causal factors. Ironically, Arabs and Jews agreed on one key point. British attempts to placate Arab opinion, especially with regard to the Trans-Jordan, led some Arab nationalists and many Jewish leaders to assume that London was retreating from its pro-Zionist policies. This belief, when combined with British troop reductions in Palestine, created an attitude among competing Arab nationalists that Britain might be unwilling to use military force to protect the Jews. (67) Although badly battered, the Yishuv survived the ordeal of 1929, primarily because British troops intervened and reestablished order. However, because the British were unable to promptly react to every Arab attack, the Jews resolved to strengthen their own defensive arrangements and practices. In the autumn of 1929, the Haganah began operating out of Moshe's village of Nahalal and, at the age of 14, Moshe joined that organization. An early photograph shows a lean, dark-haired boy standing in a jaunty pose, his characteristic smile drooping sarcastically across his face. Spending most of the remaining 52 years of his life learning and practicing the art of war, by the time of his death in 1981 Moshe Dayan was hailed as Israel's most brilliant warrior. Unfortunately, all too many military buffs dismiss as unimportant the socio-political foundations upon which military careers are based. By refusing to examine these non-military influences and forgetting that military concepts are neither created nor applied in a vacuum, these individuals fail to understand the essential link between a society's perception of its environment and its use of military force. This is especially important with respect to Moshe Dayan. To him, the history of Palestine from 1915 through 1929 was not history at all. Rather, it was part of his life and it was difficult for him to view those years with scholarly detachment. Although based on fact, his perceptions of those eventful years were influenced by the environment in which he was raised - an environment that emphasized the teachings and historical justification of Zionism. While the roots of that environment predated his birth by at least 40 years, Moshe's parents established the quality and structure of his early life. Energetic members of the Second Aliyah, Shmuel and Dvorah Dayan were living examples of Zionism in action. A political activist, Shmuel worked in Jaffa and Jerusalem for the World Zionist Organization, served on the Zionist Agricultural Committee, briefly worked in the Labor Battalions, was offered a position in the Agricultural Center of the Histadrut, and was a founding member of the moshav settlement at Nahalal . While the responsibilities of motherhood curtailed her political activities, Dvorah was a delegate to the Woman's Labor Council and worked for the Bureau for the Location of Relatives. (68) Shmuel's letters to his wife and son reinforced the twin concepts of Zionism and a Jewish nation. In 1919 he wrote: Let us live in the great hope that lights the path of our nation and find strength together ... in this our country that our hands shall conquer. In 1921, Shmuel wrote his son: And when was this land plowed by Jews? A great many years ago ... two thousand years ago, the Jews were driven out of this land and went into exile. Since then they have not dared to return to our country ... I yearned for this land, to conquer it once again. (69) Having been born in Palestine and raised by active Zionists who spoke of "our land", "our country", and "our nation", Moshe's perception of himself was more than merely a "Jew living in his homeland." When he joined the Haganah in 1929, Moshe Dayan, like his predecessors in the Bar-Giora and the Hashomer, began serving his people and protecting his land and took his first step toward becoming a defender of his nation. Like other Jews, Moshe followed with great interest the progress of the British Royal Commission sent to Palestine to investigate the disturbances. The hearings were widely covered in the local press and guests visiting the Dayans remembered that Moshe could: quote everything that had been said at the Royal Commission, adding his own comments on who testified well, which testimony might cause harm to Jewish interests and which might benefit them. He lived the entire affair. (TO) The Riots of 1929, the White Paper of 1930, the widespread Jewish belief that the British had not done enough to protect their lives and property during the violence, and the perception that Britain was changing its policies concerning a Jewish homeland, taught Moshe that the Yishuv must become self- sufficient and that future Jewish survival could not be based entirely on external, British protection. (71) This belief in self-sufficiency eventually evolved into a strong distrust of foreign governments and a skeptical view of their ultimate reliability. Although he was the product of an environment already engaged in nationalistic competition with the Arabs, Moshe Dayan broke from the prejudicial confines of that environment. Viewing Arabs through the eyes of a Russian Jew, Shmuel Dayan believed and tried to raise young Moshe to believe "that the Arabs were by nature men of violence, marauders, and a source of disturbances." As a youngster, Moshe mingled and became friends with Arabs from surrounding villages and encampments and sharply disputed his father's opinion. From his boyhood days, he found it easy to get along with Arabs and while he defended his village's land against individual Arab trespassers, his attitude toward the Arabs as a people: was always positive and friendly. I liked their way of life and I respected them as hard workers, devoted to the land and to our common natural environment. I had no doubt that it was possible to live at peace with them. (72) This unusually liberal and enlightened attitude was demonstrated on repeated occasions. In 1935, Moshe was involved in a dispute with neighboring Arabs concerning grazing rights. The dispute turned violent and Moshe was injured by a boyhood Arab friend. Six months later, Moshe not only invited the Arab and his family to his wedding, but made the unprecedented move of inviting the entire Arab vilage. (73) Moshe's ability to understand, feel compassion for, and negotiate with Arabs, set him apart from many of his peers and provided Israel with a valuable asset during times of war and times of peace. It is interesting to note that Moshe Dayan was one of the few important Jewish military and political leaders who bothered to learn Arabic. While defending his nation's right to exist, he refused to ignore the plight of Arabs caught in the crossfire of war and eventually formulated a most controversial peace initiative now known as the "Open Bridges Policy." (74) As his biographer Shabtai Teveth records: it was only the quirks of history and the bitter destiny of the Jewish people that placed him at the head of troops who recurrently fought the Arabs. (75) Thus, the initial foundations of Moshe Dayan's military career were laid during the first fourteen years of his life, a period in which he saw no military service. CHAPTER II THE HAGANAH AND THE EMERGENCE Of MOSHE DAYAN: 1930-1941 If the years prior to 1929 were characterized by the development of the economic and political foundations required to create the Jewish state, then the years through 1948 were characterized by the development of the military forces needed to secure and defend that state. To Moshe Dayan, those years were crucial to his development as a professional soldier and formed the environment in which he developed the standards of excellence by which he judged himself and measured others. Creating a natiohal military force was an arduous task that evoked considerable debate and forced Jewish leaders to make several controversial decisions. Debates centered on three separate, yet interrelated issues: establishing and clarifying the relationship between civilian authority and the military, changing military doctrine, and the proper use of military force to secure national objectives. As always, political realities greatly influenced these decisions which, in turn, produced actions that modified political behavior. The Riots of 1929 had an even more profound affect on Palestine than did the violence of 1920-1921. The bloodshed widened the chasm between Arabs and Jews, hardened each group's attitude, increased their suspicions concerning British Mandate policies and the Empire's regional intentions, and gave rise to militant elements within both communities. Having incorrectly assumed that Britain would not intervene on behalf of the Jews, Arab nationalists were angered by what they viewed as the use of external military force to rescue Zionism in Palestine. While the British blamed Haj Amin for not having exerted his influence to halt the riots, they refused to accuse him of instigating the violence. This refusal strengthened the Mufti's position as the most powerful political, religious, and nationalist Arab leader in Palestine. (1) The British formed two Royal Commissions to investigate the violence and then published the White Paper of 1930. Blaming the riots on Jewish immigration and Jewish land purchases, the Passfield Paper recommended that the Mandate restrict both activities. Never mentioning the Balfour Declaration, the paper proposed forming a Palestinian legislative council - an elected assembly - with Jewish and Arab representation based on their population strengths. Since the White Paper recommended restricting Jewish immigration, Zionists rejected the proposed council. Arab nationalists aso rejected the concept for two reasons; they did not trust British intentions and, they did not want to be viewed as cooperating with the British in the construction of a non-Arab Palestinian state. More important, the document suggested that Britain had conflicting obligations regarding the Arab and Jewish communities and hinted that the Empire had already discharged its responsibilities concerning a Jewish homeland. (2) Vacillating British policy, when combined with Jewish suspicions regarding London's resolve to forcefully suppress the riots, worried and infuriated the Yishuv. This reaction produced additional casualties. Although angered over the White Paper, Dr. Weizmann still encouraged continued reliance on Britain. As a result, his popularity and political influence within the Yishuv declined and these reversals led to David Ben-Gurion's emergence as the leader of Jewish Palestine. Additionally, Jewish groups advocating reconciliation with the Arabs found the political environment too hostile to support their tentative efforts. (3) Although formed in the early 1920's, the Haganah was ill- equipped and too poorly organized to effectively protect the Yishuv during the Riots of 1929. The relative calm of the late 1920's had lulled the Jewish community into a sense of false security and, complacent about self-defense, Jews provided the Haganah with minimal financial support. (4) This lack of preparedness and the renewal of anti-Jewish violence resulted in a reorganization of and an eventual split within the Haganah. Relinquishing control of the Haganah, the Histadrut made the Jewish Agency responsible for the defense organization. With emotions running high and not wanting the Haganah to be controlled by factional interest groups, the Haganah was placed under the direct control of a 5-man bi-partisan committee composed of 2 representatives from socialist parties, 2 men from non-socialist groups, and a neutral chairman. But even this act of consensus did not prevent the formation of separate para-military organizations that pursued national objectives defined by their political masters. Rational military actions are not executed in a vacuum. Instead, they are the physical manifestations of political necessity and national policy. Since there was no nation and hence, no binding consensus regarding "national" policies and objectives, the growing rift between the Ben-Gurion/Weizmann moderates and Jabotinsky's ultra-nationalistic Revisionists split the Yishuv. This crack in the political structure produced a similar split within the Haganah which, in turn, led to the formation of a rival, para-military organization, the Irgun Zvai Leumi*, in 1931. (5) Never attracting a sizable following, the Irgun created problems for Ben-Gurion and the Jewish Agency from the instant of its creation until its demise in 1948. Despite the Irgun and although it was still in its infancy, the Haganah now had the popular support, the political backing, and the funding necessary to strengthen its organization, expand its scope of operations, and emerge as the national instrument of self-defense. Working clandestinely under the direct supervision of the Jewish Agency, the Haganah participated in illegal immigration operations, weapons purchases, and recruitment activities. These operations were essential elements of an overall policy designed to enhance Jewish self-defense capabilities and strengthen the foundations upon which a future Jewish state could be constructed. While the British did not implement the recommendations contained in the White Paper of 1930, a failure that convinced Arab nationalists that favorable concessions made to them could always be annulled by Zionist pressure in London, the British did * IRGUN ZVAI LEUMI: Referred to as the IRGUN, in Hebrew the phrase is translated "National Military Organization." While not gaining much recognition until the post-World War II struggle with Britain, this organization refused to accept Ben-Gurion's policies and directly violated the Yishuv's policy of self-restraint through its attacks on non-combatant Arabs. attempt to limit Jewish immigration. These restrictions came at a time when Jews, in ever-increasing numbers, were fleeing Nazi Germany and her neighboring Central European countries. Early on, the Nazi regime "worked" with the Jewish Agency on immigration issues and between 1933 and 1939, nearly 50,000 Jews fled the Reich and sought refuge in Palestine. (6) While not baring wealthy Jews from entering Palestine, the Mandate strictly regulated the number of impoverished Jews a lowed to enter the region. This was accomplished through Labor Certificates without which poor Jews were denied entry into Palestine. From 1933 through 1939, the Jewish Agency applied for over 170,000 certificates, of which the British granted less than 60,000. Thus, the Jewish Agency, with assistance from the Haganah, began to smuggle Jews into Palestine. While the Haganah's pre-World War II smuggling operations were neither as bold nor as large as its post-war efforts, with Haganah assistance the Jewish population in Palestine increased from 160,000 in 1931 to nearly 450,000 in 1939. (7) Since the Mandate declared it illegal for Arabs or Jews to possess rifles or pistols, the Haganah purchased weapons and munitions from overseas sources. When possible, they attempted to augment those supplies with locally produced explosives. (8) Finally, the Haganah began extensive recruiting efforts among Jewish communities and provided its new recruits with minimal military trainigs. In 1930 and 1931, Moshe's initial training consisted of small arms familiarization, instruction in hand-to-hand combat, and sentry duty. (9) However, as the Haganah expanded its influence and its operational capabilities, it still lacked the means to aggressively accomplish its mission. As Moshe later wrote, "My Haganah duties at this time did not take up much of my energies, so I was comparatively free." (10) It was during the years 1929 to 1935 that Moshe's exceptional leadership qualities emerged. As a member of a small horse-mounted unit, Moshe helped protect his village and drove away Bedouin herders who allowed their sheep to graze on the wheatfields of Nahalal. Practicing wild Cossack-style cavalry charges and demonstrating personal courage, Moshe alertly led the troop with innovative daring and consistently displayed a personal trait that would be one of the hallmarks of his subsequent military career - that of leadership by example. One boyhood friend later recalled: It was always good to go out to fight with Moshe. He was very daring. He never looked twice; he simply ran forward. We all noticed that nothing seemed to frighten him, nor did he care a whit what might happen to him. And in fights he knew no mercy. (11) As the fame of this mounted patrol spread, neighboring settlements increasingly requested its assistance. At the same time, Moshe openly displayed a personal aversion to politics and participation in organized political activities. Highly critical of Jewish political parties and their associated youth movements, Moshe was reluctant to participate in those organizations and bluntly stated, "I was not attracted to party work." In fact, Moshe "became involved in party affairs only after the loss of his eye, when he believed his military career was at an end." Throughout his life, Moshe was impatient with politicians and party functionaries and frequently displayed a preference for decisive action to the painfully slow process of political decision-making. Shabtai Teveth suggests that this trait was rooted in his childhood when his father frequently "abandoned" his family and went on lengthy political trips. (12) But as Moshe guarded Nahalal and as the Haganah slowly adjusted to its role as the national Jewish defense force, events in Europe captured British attention and, to a considerable extent, disrupted the delicate balance in Palestine. Hitler's rise to power constituted a continental threat to Britain and provided the Arabs with a potential ally in their struggle for self-rule. Although the Nazis never successfully exploited Arab nationalism, the British were keenly aware of German threats to Middle Eastern stability. Some authors have argued that British attempts to placate the Arabs during and after the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939 were predicated on London's desire to thwart German encroachment into the region. (13) Arab nationalists were also aware of Britain's concerns regarding the Axis Powers and viewed Italian successes in Lybia and Ethiopia as signs of British vulnerability. This perception, when combined with Britain's failure to halt Jewish immigration and land purchases, heightened Arab resentment of western rule, especially non-Arab Christian rule over Arab Muslims. (14) In April 1936, following anti-Jewish violence and the Irgun's unauthorized retaliatory murder of two Arabs, Haj Amin declared a general strike. As both the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and the recently selected leader of the Higher Arab Committee, a "political action group" designed to unite Palestinian Arabs in common cause, Haj Amin declared that until the British suspended Jewish immigration and land purchases, no Arab would work in Palestine. While the strike lasted until the fall harvest, it created little economic disruption as Jewish workers quickly filled vacated Arab jobs. However, the strike was the first round in an escalating cycle of violence referred to as the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939. (15) By early summer, strike related violence subsided and although attacks against Jewish communities continued, Arab guerrillas began focusing their efforts on the British. Angered over attacks against their installations and the repeated sabotage of the Iraq Petroleum Pipeline, British patience finally broke and London poured troops into Palestine. While the fighting did not spread to neighboring territories under British rule, Egypt and the Tran's-Jordan, a significant number of Arab volunteers joined the Arab Palestinians in their fight against the British and the Jews. Despite these volunteers, "there was no attempt, throughout the period of the revolt, at any kind of concerted action by the Arab governments against Britain." (16) British troops neutralized the rebels by October and in November, another royal commission, headed by Lord Peel, arrived to study the situation. Although the Arabs largely boycotted the hearings, the British preferred a negotiated settlement to a military victory and in July 1937 the commission published its sensational findings. Attributing the revolt to Arab desires for independence and their fears concerning a national Jewish homeland, the Peel Report declared the Mandate unworkable and stated that ultimate peace lay in geographic partition. In a White Paper issued simultaneously with the report, the British proposed establishing two independent states within Palestine - Click here to view image one Arab and one Jewish. Holy places sacred to Christians, Jews, and Muslims would be placed in an international conclave under British control. Arabs denounced the plan, but most Jews, with the notable exception of Jabotinsky's Revisionists, accepted the proposal. (17) While scattered violence continued during and after the Peel Commission's deliberations, massive violence erupted in September 1937 when Lewis Andrews, Acting District Commissioner of Galilee, was assassinated in Nazareth by unknown Arab assailants. Viewing his murder as a declaration of rebellion, the British responded with force. Removing Haj Amin as leader of the Supreme Muslim Council, the British outlawed the Higher Arab Committee and issued arrest warrants for members of that organization. Fearing arrest, Haj Amin fled to Beirut where the French granted him political asylum. Never returning to Palestine, Haj Amin fled to Germany following his participation in an abortive pro-Nazi revolt in Iraq in 1941. (18) Arab nationalists met force with force and attacked British installations and Jewish settlements with renewed vigor. Once again, Arab volunteers augmented local guerrilla forces. Arab irregulars in northern Palestine posed a particularly troublesome problem. Led by Fawzi el-Kaukji, a former officer in the Turkish army, these guerrillas infiltrated Palestine from Syria and Lebanon and, operating at night, repeatedly sabotaged the Iraq Petroleum Pipeline. Despite heavy patrolling, the British were unable to capture el-Kaukji or destroy his force. (19) British attempts to quell the revolt were massive but largely ineffective. Eventually bringing two divisions into Palestine, the British relied on traditional tactics. Seldom operating at night, the British conducted search and destroy operations, fined villages suspected of harboring terrorists, and destroyed homes in which illegal weapons were found. Martial law, night-long curfews, and massive detentions failed to end the revolt. Even the Teggart Forts, a series of fortified police stations a long the frontier with Lebanon, Syria, and the Trans- Jordan, failed to halt guerrilla infiltration. (20) Although Jewish leaders "regarded the riots as a series of preliminary skirmishes in the battle for the establishment of the Jewish State," the Yishuv's response to the Arab Revolt was one of self-restraint and static, position-oriented defense. (21) During the tense summer of 1936, the Yishuv reached a collective and highly controversial decision regarding the proper Jewish response to Arab attacks. Officially known as Havlagah,* the policy ordered the Haganah to limit its actions to direct self- defense measures and strictly forbade any offensive counter- strike against the Arabs. There were military and political reasons to support this decision. Militarily, the Haganah was not yet sufficiently strong to execute offensive operations. Still viewed by the British as an illegal organization, the Haganah operated clandestinely and lacked sufficient weapons to launch vigorous counterattacks. A second problem involved the overall quality of the Haganah's * HAVLAGAH: The Yishuv's policy of self-restraint adopted during the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939. The policy specifically forbade any form of counter-strike that might injure or kill Arab non- combatants and was implemented again in post-World War II Palestine when when Jews battled the British for independence. forces. Although centrally controlled and directed, its training standards, overall military skills, and the quality of its small unit leadership varied markedly among the various Haganah cells. Finally, the selection of local commanders was often based on political considerations rather than on tactical skills, a factor that greatly reduced the Haganah's ability to operate effectively throughout Palestine. (22) The policy of Havlagah was also dictated by political necessity. Not wanting to attack innocent Arabs in retaliatory raids, Dr. Weizmann persuaded the Yishuv that it was in their best political interests to refrain from offensive action. Passive resistance, he maintained, would serve the Yishuv's long- term interests better than offensive operations against Arab guerrillas. Anxious to dissuade British beliefs that the revolt was a war between Arabs and Jews, even Ben-Gurion reasoned that self-restraint might deter the British from suspending further Jewish immigration and might even persuade them to provide aid in Jewish self-defense efforts. While most Jews embraced the policy, the Irgun openly opposed Havlagah and actively pursued an aggressive policy of retaliation and counter-attack against the Arabs. Some of these strikes were clearly terrorist in nature and were widely condemned by the Yishuv and the British. (23) Despite Havlagah, the Yishuv realized that the construction of new settlements could influence the future borders of that state. Using their own land, the Yishuv launched a vigorous settlement campaign known as Operation Stockade and Tower. New settlement sites were selected for their strategic and political value and were frequently located near guerrilla infiltration routes on the Syrian and Lebanese borders. The Haganah, supplemented by engineer units and farmers, would construct a prefabricated watchtower with searchlight, homes, and fortified outer wall, all of which was then encircled with barbed wire and, when available, primitive minefields. Frequently completed in one day, these farming settlements often became para-military bases for Haganah training exercises and self-defense operations. Augmented with Haganah units, the settlers farmed by day and defended their settlements by night. Depending on the situation, Arab assaults lasted from a few nights to several months. From 1936 through 1938, during the height of the Arab Revolt, 36 settlements were established on some 21,000 acres of land and, despite Arab attacks, no farming settlements were abandoned. (24) As the revolt intensified, the Yishuv's policy of self- restraint impressed the British. Viewing the Jews as potential, short-term allies in their struggle against Arab guerrillas, in 1936 the British reluctantly accepted the Jewish Agency's offer to augment local police forces. The British understood that most if not all of these augmentees would be Haganah members. But since the Arabs held the initiative, the British could not reject the offer. During the next decade, British-Jewish cooperation was tenuous at best and was evident only when British interests in the Middle East were threatened. (25) However, British support was essential for Jewish survival since it provided the Haganah with time to strengthen its organization and expand its operations without risking major British reprisals. (26) Operational cooperation between the Haganah and the Mandate also provided Moshe Dayan with his first real military experiences. Since British troops could not be everywhere at once, the Mandate agreed to arm, train, and pay Jews for a variety of military and para-military services. Although Haganah members, these Jews were under the direct operational control of the Mandate authorities and, as such, they served as guides for British patrols, filled the ranks of the Supernumary Police or Jewish Settlement Police, and worked as ghafirs or lightly armed police militia. Providing a direct physical link between the Haganah and the British military, these organizations, collectively known as the notrim*, allowed the Jewish underground to acquire legal cover for their illegal operations. Even more important, notrim members received British military training. By the autumn of 1936, nearly 750 notrim were on the British payrolls while an additional 1,800 were subsidized by the Jewish community. By July 1938, the most important of these notrim organizations, the Jewish Settlement Police, had grown to an astounding 22,000 members. As one Jewish historian has written: The notrim were a substitute for a real militia, a surrogate for a Jewish army ... (and) ... widened the mainstream of Jewish self-defense. (27) In the spring of 1937, Moshe Dayan was issued a legal pistol, a ghafir's uniform, paid a monthly salary of 8 Palestinian pounds, and served as a guide to units of the King's Own Scottish Regiment and the Yorkshire Fusiliers. The specific * NOTRIM: A collective term referring to any of three Jewish organizations supported or authorized by the British during the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939: the Jewish Settlement Police, the ghafirs, and guides for British army patrols. missions given these units were to seal the Lebanese and Syrian borders to guerrilla infiltrators and to protect that portion of the Iraq Petroleum Pipeline running across northern Palestine. Moshe served as a guide for eight months and was highly critical of both the tactics employed by and the overall combat proficiency of those units. Although the British troops had little or no reconnaissance training, Moshe criticized their lack of initiative and their inability to improvise when the situation demanded. Recognizing these deficiencies, he fully understood: the ineffectiveness of regular troops, using routine methods with fixed times and routes of patrol, against saboteurs who knew the terrain, moved stealthily on foot, could lose themselves in the local population, and could choose the convenient time and place for their operations. He also subjected British officers to a scathing indictment over their lack of mission-oriented purpose and later wrote that these officers "assumed that they had fulfilled their task if they simply showed their presence by patrolling the area." (28) Moshe maintained that these deficiencies resulted from inadequate training in fieldcraft, uniforms and equipment not suited for the mission, and a lazy attitude that led to slipshod patrols and inadequately prepared ambushes. (29) Despite these critical observations, Moshe's performance did not go unnoticed by either the British or the Haganah. Following his service as a guide, Moshe returned to his new home at Shimron and, as a member of the Jewish Settlement Police, was promoted to sergeant and appointed commander of a mobile squad composed of six ghafirs and a truck. Clearly violating the spirit of Havlagah but working within the legal constraints imposed by British authorities, Moshe actively patrol led the Nahalal District and helped ambush Arab terrorists. Although these actions defied the policy of self-restraint, they were the first manifestations of another character trait - that of seizing the initiative whenever possible. Years later, he justified his actions within the context of military tactics: It became clear to me that the only way to fight them (Arab guerrillas) was to seize the initiative, attack them in their bases, and surprise them when they were on the move. (30) Yet Moshe was not the first Jew to express dissatisfaction with the doctrine of a static and position-oriented defense. While condemning the Irgun's irresponsible application of indiscriminate military force against both combatant and innocent Arabs, other military leaders openly questioned the policy of Havlagah and demanded that the Haganah be allowed to launch counter-strikes against Arab guerrillas. The most prominent of these constructive dissidents was Yitzhak Sadeh. A Polish Jew, Sadeh was a highly decorated veteran of the Tsar's army. Active in the Russian Revolution, Sadeh served as an officer in Lenin's army and it was there that he met Joseph Trumpeldor. Trumpeldor persuaded Sadeh to emigrate to Palestine and Yitzhak, short of funds, entered wrestling tournaments to earn money for his passage. Participating in the defense of Jerusalem during the 1920-1921 riots, Sadeh's leftist predilections led him to join Trumpeldor is Labor and Defense Battalions. Once those units were disbanded, Sadeh retired from public life and did not resurface until 1936 when he offered his services to the Haganah. (31) Although Haganah leaders officially supported Havlagah, Sadeh vehemently opposed total reliance on static, position- oriented defensive tactics and forcefully argued in favor of an active, aggressive, mobile defense. Convincing his superiors that a solid defense must be offensive in nature, Sadeh received reluctant permission to test his theory. He quickly formed and trained a mobile patrol whose mission was to seek-out, close- with, and destroy Arab guerrillas operating near Jerusalem. (32) Later known as "The Flying Squad", this small, foot-mobile unit was much more than an ambush and patrol force. Instead, it was the first officially sanctioned Jewish force capable of independent offensive operations and it represented the first tangible break with the doctrine of static defense. Using deception and moving at night, the all-volunteer force employed what Sadeh called "the hammer and anvil technique." (33) Upon learning of a possible Arab night assault against a Jewish village, the squad would deploy to a staging area near the settlement. Once the Arabs attacked, the squad would vigorously strike the enemy from the flank or rear and drive the disorganized unit into the village's static defense. Later permutations involved two patrols - one mobile and one lying in ambush. The roving patrol would locate an enemy unit and, using fire and maneuver, either lure or drive the Arabs toward the ambush site. Once in range, the ambush unit would launch a violent aisault against the confused Arab band. Since "The Flying Squad" was rather small and mostly comprised of teenagers, Sadeh carefully selected both the enemy to be engaged and the terrain on which the night action would take place. Sadeh believed that psycho logical preparation was another key to success and, by continually preaching that the "fellowship of fighters is the foundation of life, the inner-most heart and soul of comradship", he ensured that his hand-picked men developed a strong sense of unit cohesion. (34) In 1937, Sadeh was authorized to expand this concept and, drawing from notrim forces, he organized the FOSH.* In July 1937, the FOSH was placed under the direct control of the Haganah High Command, and by March 1938 these field companies boasted a trained strength of 1,000 men organized into thirteen regional groups. Containing organic, yet primitive, combat service support units to include quartermaster, topographic, education, and intelligence teams, the FOSH was a well-trained and aggressively mobile force that the Haganah High Command could employ throughout Palestine without "having to rely on the resources and goodwill of the local branches of the Haganah, with their parochial concerns and uneven leadership." (35) But Jewish political leaders never fully accepted the FOSH and feared the organization represented a growing military elite that would eventually reject civilian authority. Equally damning were the accusations of political moderates who feared the FOSH's aggressive nature would encourage Arab reprisals, jeopardize British-Jewish cooperation, and undermine any chance of a peaceful coexistence with the Arabs. Despite its own * FOSH: Known as the Plugot Sadeh, these field companies were the first Jewish units developed for offensive operations and provided the foundation upon which the Palmach - the Haganah's elite "shock troops" of the 1940's - were constructed. reservations regarding the political reliability of the FOSH, the Haganah High Command supported the field companies until they were abolished in 1939. (36) However, the importance of Sadeh is unconventional approach and revolutionary ideas in the transformation of existing Jewish military doctrine must not be underestimated. Yigal Allon provides the best description of Sadeh the man and Sadeh the military thinker: Possessed of limitless personal courage and endowed with a rare quality of leadership, Sadeh was one of the few high-ranking members of the Haganah able, at all times, to project his own unconventional insights into the real meaning of self-defense ... It was Sadeh - that bespectacled, warm, crumpled, ordinary-looking bon-vivant-cum-poet, that great lover of country, of women, and of the implacable logic of history who symbolized most vividly the fighting spirit of the underground, and who discovered and taught war to a group of teenagers destined, within only a few years, to lead the army of Israel. (37) One of those young men was Moshe Dayan. Elements of Sadeh's old "Flying Squad" were incorporated into the largest notrim organization, the Jewish Settlement Police and, with British approval, they evolved into mobile guard units. While the mobile guards were legally constituted units under British control, they were also Haganah units reporting directly to the Jewish underground. Their legal mission was to prevent Arab attacks against Jewish settlements and, in the case of attack, serve as aggressive counter-attack forces. Their illegal mission was to provide on-the-job training for new Haganah recruits. By the spring of 1939, there were 62 mobile guard units with nearly 600 men, supplied with British vehicles and British weapons. (44) As a mobile guard unit leader, Moshe was selected to attend a Haganah Platoon Commander's Course in December 1937. His instructor was Yitzhak Sadeh. Although 25 years younger than his, teacher, Moshe instantly recognized that Sadeh: was a man after my own heart. Bursting with original ideas, he grasped the essence of a problem and demanded of us great daring, bordering at times on recklessness. (39) While neither Moshe nor his biographer discuss the course in any detail, one can only conclude that Sadeh reinforced Moshe's belief that victory depended on the seizure of the initiative through prompt, aggressive action and personal leadership. Upon completing Sadeh's course with its "realistic battle exercises", the British ordered Moshe to attend a school for Jewish Settlement Police sergeants. Held at a British military camp, Moshe described the training with humorous contempt: I did not care for the highly disciplined inspection parades with the strict adhernce on shiny boots and smartness of dress. And the content of the military instruction served no use whatsoever for ensuring the safety of the Nahalal region and the rest of the Jezreel Valley. Yet I found it interesting, and I realized that in order to run an empire, there may have been some virtue in the spit and polish of British army tradition. (40) Even though Moshe had little use for non-mission oriented military training, he led by example and demanded perfection from his men. One of his peers recalled that Moshe: took drill very seriously. He would take his men out to the main road with clean rifles and polished shoes and drill them until they excelled at it, even though he hated all of it. (41) In 1938, Moshe was appointed a Haganah instructor in the Nahalal district and, reflecting what he had learned from the British, from Sadeh, arid from his personal experiences, he wrote a training manual titled "Fieldcraft". While largely critical of the "external mannerisms that were an integral part of the British Army", the manual outlined detailed training methods that went far beyorid weapons familiarization and drill formations. Stressing the importance of terrain analysis and emphasizing methods designed to exploit the tactical features of any piece of land, the booklet also discussed infiltration and ambush techniques. After reading the manual, Ya' akov Dori , the Haganah commander of northern Palestine, personally commended Moshe for his work. (42) As an instructor, Moshe implemented his ideas in the field. Emphasizing infiltration and stressing the importance of surprise, innovative thinking, and personal leadership, Moshe led his class on unauthorized night raids against Jewish settlements. Without informing his Haganah superiors or village leaders, Moshe and his pupils would approach a settlement, cut through fences, slip past armed guards, and make their way to the center of the community. While commending him for his unorthodox teaching methods, his superiors reminded him of the consequences if a settlement guard mistook the class for Arab guerrillas. When ordered to stop these raids, Moshe reluctantly agreed even though: I knew in my heart that as long as I was crawling at the head of my men to break through a guarded fence, we would not fail. (43) His innovative, daring, and aggressive approach to combat training made a lasting impression on his students and one of them later recalled: He began giving us lessons in fieldcraft in Nahalal It was a great turning point in the Haganah. Before that we had only learned how to handle weapons or routine drill ... Did we love him? Yes and no. Actually we respected him. We were always ready to follow him as a leader, but I couldn't possibly define our feelings for him as love. He was never aloof from us, and we could always go up and talk to him; yet somehow he remained distant. (44) While the art of small unit, mobile, aggressive warfare was being learned in the field, Jewish leaders still thought in terms of a static, national defense. Against the objections of the Mandatory, Ben-Gurion authorized the establishment of several new settlements along the Lebanese border in western Galilee. Politically, the Yishuv believed that partition was imminent and that the borders of the future Jewish state would be determined through diplomatic negotiations. Since western Galilee had no Jewish settlements, Jewish leaders feared the area would not be included in the Jewish state. Militarily, the settlements would help seal infiltration routes and, once the state was established, would form a first line of defense against organized Arab invasion from the north. As part of Operation Stockade and Tower, the Haganah ordered Sadeh to select a group of volunteers to help construct and defend these settlements. Sadeh named two of his star pupils as deputy commanders - Yigal Allon and Moshe Dayan. On 21 March 1938, in the largest operation of its kind, 400 men began constructing the settlement of Hanita. That night and for several weeks thereafter, Arab guerrillas attacked Hanita and, despite Sadeh's request that Allon and Dayan be allowed to lead a counterattack, the regional Haganah commander, Ya' akov Dori, rejected the proposal as irresponsible and dangerous. Consequently, Sadeh's forces assumed static defensive positions and the Arabs retained the initiative. (45) Despite his inspiring leadership, proven tactical abilities, and innovative ideas, Sadeh could not overcome the Haganah's defensive orientation. Thinking in terms of a static defense built around heavily fortified settlements, Haganah leaders could not fully accept the concept of a mobile and aggressive defense. In an ironic twist of fate, it was an English officer who not only proved the validity of Sadeh's approach but forever changed the military thinking of an entire people. Posted to Palestine as an intelligence officer, Orde Charles Wingate arrived in Haifa in September 1936. A captain in the British army, Wingate was an unusual and highly eccentric individual whose strange habits included a diet of onions, nudity, and a bizarre personal grooming regimen that included massaging his entire body with an old toothbrush. His boyishly handsome face was framed by a thick crop of black hair and his eyes, dark and piercing, had the gleam of either a dreamer or a fanatic. (46) Born in India in 1903, his father was an army officer who be longed to an unusual religious sect - the Plymouth Brethern. Wingate's Scottish grandfather had worked as a missionary to convert "God is chosen people" - the Jews - to Christianity. Although he was not Jewish, Wingate held the rather peculiar belief "that the inhabitants of Great Britain (were) descendants of the ten lost tribes of Israel who did not return to the land of Canaan from the Babylonian captivity." (47) Prior to his departure for Palestine, Wingate held pro-Arab sympathies. While there is some question as to when he became a convinced Zionist, his pro-Jewish beliefs alienated him from most of his fellow officers serving in Palestine. (48) Within a few months of his arrival, Wingate met notable Jewish leaders to include Dr. Weizmann, David Ben-Gurion, the Haganah's chief intelligence officer, and the Haganah Chief of Staff. Wingate's forceful and frequently aggressive pro-Jewish outbursts both impressed and confused these Jewish leaders. Concerning the Zionist Movement in Palestine, Wingate said: I believe that the very existence of mankind is justified when it is based on the moral foundation of the Bible. Whoever dares lift a hand against you -the Jews) and your enterprise here should be fought against. (49) And later: God give it to us to slay the enemies of the Jews, for the enemies of the Jews are the enemies of all mankind. (50) Such statements, coming as they did from an English intelligence officer, led many Jews to consider Wingate a spy. Over time, the Yishuv and the Haganah accepted Wingate and in honor of his unusual stance, called him "Hayedid" - the Friend. (51) Displeased with Britain's diplomatic and military efforts to end the Arab revolt, Wingate wrote a letter to his cousin, Sir Reginald Wingate, the former British High Commissioner of Egypt. In this remarkable letter, Wingate outlined his plan for safeguarding British interests in Palestine while simultaneously assisting the Zionist cause. In Wingate's mind, British and Jewish interests were inseparable: The Arabs of Palestine are making a great song and dance about what they will do if the findings of the [Peel] Commission are not 90% in their favour. Supposing they do all they threaten, i.e., rise en masse, we need only (a) arm the Jews, (b) proclaim martial law and arrest and exile every Arab notable; to find ourselves able to master the revolt with no more than the eight battalions already here ... The military strength, past, present, and future of the whole Arab group is quite negligible ... The potential military strength of the Jews, especially if we adopt my recommendations, is equivalent to at least two British Army Corps when trained and organized ... Palestine is essential to our Empire - our Empire is essential to England - England is essential to world peace . .. Islam is out of it. [We have] the chance to plant here in Palestine and Transjordan a loyal, rich and intelligent nation, with which we can make an everlasting treaty, and which will hold for us the key to world dominion without expense or effort on our part. In addition to arming the Jews, Wingate recommended that the British-supported Arab government in the Trans-Jordan be overthrown and that the High Commissioner of Palestine, Sir Arthur Wauchope, be removed. Highly opinionated, disputatious, and occasionally disrespectful, Wingate "never appreciated the dangers of extremism or the values of moderation." (52) Wingate carefully studied Jewish and British military responses to Arab attacks. Dismayed over the Jewish penchant for static, position defense, Wingate told Haganah leaders: So long as you sit in your settlements and wait to fight and die, you will die before you have a chance to fight. (53) Wingate was equally appalled with Britain's mech-heavy, road-bound, and inadequately coordinated combined arms approach to waging counter-guerrilla warfare. He specifically objected to the tactics employed in engagements with Arab guerrillas. After allowing themselves to be ambushed, the British would dismount, seek cover, return fire, and call for air support. Seldom seizing the initiative, British patrols were reluctant to engage the guerrillas in close combat. He was equally critical of manpower intensive search and destroy operations, and was dismayed at the lack of regular night operations. (54) These deficiencies were amplified when the revolt exploded with renewed ferocity in the fall of 1937. In the spring of 1938, Captain Wingate received permission from Sir Archibald Wavel, the new British Military Commander in Palestine, to establish a military intelligence network among the Jewish settlements in northern Palestine. This network would help identify infiltration routes used by terrorists and irregular Arab forces to enter Palestine from Lebanon, Syria, and the Trans-Jordan. The British were specifically concerned with Fawzi el-Kaukji's renewed attacks against British installations and the Iraq Petroleum Pipeline. (55) Upon completing his mission, Wingate returned to Haifa and requested permission to organize special units composed of the Jewish Settlement Police with a "proper stiffening" of British troops. Wingate argued that these units would operate at night and, through aggressive offensive action, end guerrilla attacks against the pipeline and clear northern Palestine of rebel bases. After considerable debate among his superiors and separate discussions among Jewish leaders, Wingate's proposal was accepted and the Special Night Squads were formed. (56) Unknown to British authorities at that time, Wingate had already tested his concept during his reconnaissance of northern Palestine during the spring. Visiting Hanita in April, Wingate and Dayan met for the first time and shortly thereafter Wingate led Dayan and a small Jewish contingent on an ambush patrol. Wingate demanded that the ambush be set on the outskirts of an Arab village. While the concept of limited offensive actions against Arab guerrillas had already been advanced by Sadeh, Wingate's concept of carrying the fight to the enemy and attacking him in his own villages and bases was an approach of revolutionary magnitude. Moshe later wrote: This concept was new to us, for we had always set our ambushes near the approaches to the Jewish settlement to be defended and not near the exit from an Arab village serving as a terrorist base. (57) After gaining Sadeh's support, Wingate formally established the Special Night Squads in May 1938. Composed of 80 Haganah representatives, 30 British troops, and a large contingent of Jewish Settlement Police, Wingate formed and trained nine individual squads capable of independent and combined operations. By early June, the squads were deployed. (58) Demanding excellence from his troops and perfection from his NCOs and junior officers, Wingate was a strict disciplinarian who, at times, resembled a merciless tyrant. Known to strike subordinates for bad map-reading, he once butt-stroked an man for making too much noise while on patrol and beat an NCO who drank water from a pool before allowing his men to quench their thirsts. But in garrison, he ran his unit as a democracy. (59) Emphasizing the importance of secrecy, surprise, mobility, deception, and the proper exploitation of the tactics of terrain, Wingate carefully trained his men in night-fighting skills and constantly told them: The Arabs think the night is theirs, that only they can fight us in the dark. The British lock themselves up in their barracks at night. But we, the Jews, will teach them to fear the night more than the day. (60) A meticulous planner who regarded his men as partners in thought and action, Wingate stressed that each soldier, regardless of rank, must fully understand a plan before implementing it. At the same time, he delegated leadership responsibilities to his subordinates and taught them how to improvise when a plan collapsed during execution. Wingate also served as a role model for Dayan's evolving view of combat leadership. Reinforcing Moshe's belief that a good leader lead his men from the front of a column, Wingate frequently walked point on night patrols. From Wingate, Dayan and others learned that independent action within the context of an operational plan was the key to seizing and maintaining the initiative and was essential for successfully carrying the fight to the enemy. Although crudely implemented when compared with Israel Defense force operations in the 1950's and 1960's, this concept provided the basis for Dayan's strong belief in a structure of command and control known as "maintenance of the objective" or optional control. Finally, Wingate taught Dayan the value of instant retaliation as a means to break the enemy's will while simultaneously maintaining the initiative. (61) Dayan accompanied Wingate on numerous patrols together, and Moshe, a quick learner, viewed Wingate as "a genius, an innovator, and non-conformist". (62) Moshe was also impressed with Wingate's "iron will" and his desire to "carry the fight to the enemy." After several months of vigorous operations, Wingate's Special Night Squads fought their most important engagement at Dabburiyah and, in a 14 hour battle, defeated a large guerrilla force. Critically wounded, Wingate refused medical attention until enemy resistance collapsed. The battle marked the end of major guerrilla operations in northern Palestine. Although minor assaults continued against Jewish settlements, British installations, and the pipeline, they did not pose a serious threat to Jewish survival or British interests. (63) Awarded a D.S.O. and promoted to major, Wingate's days in Palestine were numbered. British opposition to his pro-Zionist favoritism peaked in late 1938 as Wingate opened two NCO schools for the Haganah. (64) In May 1939, Wingate was ordered to leave Palestine and his commanding officer wrote the following in his official record: Orde Charles Wingate, D.S.O., is a good soldier, but, so far as Palestine is concerned, he is a security risk. He cannot be trusted. He puts the interests of the Jews before those of his own country. He should not be allowed in Palestine again. (65) After leading guerrilla operations against the Italians in Ethiopia, he eventually rose to the rank of general and led the "Chindit" guerrillas against the Japenese in Burma. He died in a plane crash in 1944. Wingate's most important contribution was not in the tactics of small unit combat, but rather in the correct application of the right tactics to secure strategic objectives and national goals. In this, he accomplished something that Sadeh had tried in vain to achieve. Wingate convinced Jewish leaders that a strategy of static, position-oriented, self-defense and could not succeed and that the survival of a future Jewish state would depend on an aggressive, active defense that, at the right time, could be unleashed in decisive, offensive action. While Sadeh's aggressive approach paralleled Wingate's beliefs, even Yitzhak gave credit to Wingate's accomplishments: Eventually, we would have done by ourselves what Wingate did, but we would have done it on a smaller scale, and without his talent. We were following parallel paths until he became our leader. (66) Even though Wingate's efforts were essential to the transformation of Jewish doctrine during the 1930's, one should not forget Sadeh's contributions in that area. Moshe Dayan wrote: The seeds of Wingate's novel ideas and tactics had already been implanted in us by Yitzhak Sadeh, the pioneer of the "emerge-from-the-fence" school. Yet there was something different about Wingate that appealed to Dayan: But there was a professionalism about Wingate, a positiveness, a stubborn lack of compromise. A dominating personality, he infected us all with his fanaticism and faith. (67) Always favoring a diplomatic solution to the Palestine problem, the British attempted to resolve the dispute in direct negotiations with Arab and Jewish diplomats. That attempt failed miserably, and with the Arab Revolt over and the possibility of war with Germany looming on the dark horizon, the British could not afford to further damage Anglo-Arab relations. (68) Just prior to Wingate's departure, the British issued the White Paper of 1939 - a document that completely reversed existing policy. Rejecting both the Peel and Woodhead Commissions' recommendations for partition, the document contained other startling provisions. The paper called for the creation of an independent Palestinian state within 10 years and directed that Jewish immigration be limited to only 75,000 through 1945, after which there would be no further Jewish immigration unless a majority of the people in Palestine (the Arabs) approved. Future Jewish land purchases were virtually eliminated. Even though the document stipulated that there would be no independent Palestinian state unless the rights of minorities were protected, the Yishuv viewed this shocking reversal of British policy as a repudiation of the Balfour Declaration and as the death of both a Jewish homeland and a Jewish state. Ironically, the Arabs also rejected the plan, although for totally different reasons. (69) Although the Haganah had cooperated with the British in their struggle against Arab guerrillas, the British still viewed that organization as an illegal army. Searching for weapons, training camps, and Haganah leaders, the British dissolved the Special Night Squads, curtailed their support for the notrim, and drove the Haganah deep underground. In August 1939, Moshe was ordered to teach field tactics in a Haganah Platoon Commanders Course. Although the course was conducted in secrecy, on 4 October 1939 Moshe Dayan and 42 other Haganah members were arrested for the illegal possession of firearms. Tried and convicted, Moshe was sentenced to 10 years in prison. (70) While Moshe and his fellow inmates served their sentences in the prison-fortress at Acre, World War II raged in Europe. Slowly spreading to North Africa and threatening the Suez Canal, the war temporarily altered British-Jewish relations which, in turn, profoundly affected Moshe Dayan. Still bitter over the White Paper of 1939, most Palestinian Jews viewed Nazi Germany as an immediate and far more dangerous threat to Jewish survival than fickle British Middle-Eastern policies. As Chairman of the Jewish Agency, Ben-Gurion succinctly defined the Yishuv's position regarding both the hated White Paper and the war against Germany: We shall fight the war as if there is no White Paper, and we shall fight the White Paper as if there is no war. (71) Following the shocking German victories in April and May 1940, Ben-Gurion shifted the emphasis of the policy to fighting the war: the participation of the maximum Jewish force in the defense of Palestine and in bringing about Hitler's defeat - that, to my way of thinking, has to be our whole program of activity until the victory. (72) Politically and diplomatically sound, Ben-Gurion's policy was the only rational course of action available to the Jews. That policy, however, strongly implied not only Jewish cooperation with the British, but also active Jewish support of Britain's war effort. Implementing that policy - a policy demanding resistance to the White Paper and war against Hitler - proved to be a difficult and politically treacherous task. The Jewish struggle against both the Nazis and British policies also affected the Yishuv and the Haganah militarily. Although driven underground, the Haganah was not idle and, building on previous organizational changes, secretly improved its command structure and strengthened its operational capabilities. Emerging from its cocoon as a loosely-knit, self- defense force in 1937, by 1941 the Haganah was an efficient, centrally controlled, underground militia army complete with a general headquarters and a general staff that included logistics, planning, operations, training, education, and manpower branches. (73) These improvements were due in large part to the Jewish Agency. Having been officially sanctioned by the British in the early 1920's and made responsible for the Haganah by the Yishuv in the early 1930's, the Agency carefully protected the national defense organization during the dark months following the publication of the White Paper of 1939. In return, the Haganah assisted the Jewish Agency in illegal immigration and weapons procurement operations and, despite British opposition, helped establish new Jewish farming settlements through a revived Operation Stockade and Tower. (74) However, the British still viewed the Haganah as an illegal organization and despite the war against Germany, sought to destroy both its capabilities and command structure through arrests, raids, and weapons seizures. The elimination of the FOSH and the Special Night Squads and the substantial curtailment of British support for the notrim, especially the Jewish Settlement Police, severely restricted the Haganah's ability to protect the Yishuv. (75) This situation was further aggravated by a dwindling supply of manpower as roughly 30,000 Jews, many of them Haganah members, joined the British army. (76) Faced with manpower shortages, British hostility, British control of remaining notrim forces, and the emerging Axis threat to Palestine, Haganah leaders urged the Yishuv to create an independent military force under direct Haganah control. Initially opposed to the idea, political leaders argued that service in the British army would not only provide a free military education, but might even persuade the British to nullify the White Paper of 1939. Already negotiating with the British for the creation of a Jewish Brigade, Jewish leaders believed that active participation in the war against Hitler might even influence the British to reaffirm its obligations spelled-out in the Balfour Declaration of 1917. The Haganah High Command "questioned the wisdom of putting all of the Yishuv's military resources in one basket, a basket held by provenly hostile hands" and vigorously argued that without trained forces to augment its ranks, the Haganah would be unable to defend the Jews against either the Germans or the Arabs in the case of a British defeat in North Africa. (77) In 1940, the Jewish Agency authorized the Haganah to organize and train permanent reserve forces drawn primarily from Jewish agrarian settlements. Known as the HISH,* these light infantry units augmented local Haganah branches, assisted in self-defense activities, and served as a part-time militia of unpaid volunteers capable of rapid mobilization in times of "national" emergency. Unlike the FOSH, the HISH was not a full- time force and, given the limited military training it received, operated much like a "territorial home guard." However, the HISH expanded the Haganah's military capabilities, broadened its base of support, and served as a capable fighting force during the initial stages of Israel's War for Independence. (79) * HISH: An acronym formed from the Hebrew term Chail Sadeh, which roughly translates into "field corps" or field force". But a part-time militia was not what the Haganah wanted or the Yishuv needed. In May 1941, Rommel's first North African campaign reached the Lybian-Egyptian border and both the British and the Palestinian Jews feared a Nazi invasion of the Middle East. On 15 May 1941, a new Haganah National Command was formed to integrate the existing self-defense efforts of the HISH and the regional Haganah command with a new, full-time military organization known as the Palmach.* Organized and led by Yitzhak Sadeh, Palmach ranks were filled with former members of the FOSH and the Special Night Squads. By mid-summer, nine Palmach companies were ready for active service and their missions were to defend the Yishuv against Arab attacks, to cooperate with British forces in defending Palestine, and, in the event of British defeat, defend Palestine against the Axis and Arab invaders. When possible, this defense was to be conducted through limited offensive action. (79) It was at this point the Moshe Dayan reentered the stream of history. After serving only 16 months of a sentence that had been reduced from ten years to five, Moshe and his 42 fellow inmates were released from prison on 16 February 1941. Although Dr. Weizmann and Jewish Agency officials had negotiated with the British government for their release, those discussions, in and of themselves, did not secure Moshe's * PALMACH: From the Hebrew "Plugot Mahatz", the term is best translated as either "striking companies" or "shock troops". The Palmach was the first, permanently manned, and Jewish controlled combat element capable of executing offensive operations. This organization provided the basis upon which the Israel Defense Force was constructed in 1948. freedom. With Rommel's Afrika Korps to the west and Vichy French forces occupying Syria and Lebanon to the north, the prisoner release was a calculated British action designed to solicit Jewish support in defending British Middle-Eastern interests from Nazi attack. (80) After all, a friendly Jewish population in Palestine would provide a "safety-buffer" between Nazi- collaborationist forces to the north and the vital Suez Canal to the west. The Palmach's creation coincided with Rommel's first offensive lunge toward Egypt. With their own forces stretched dangerously thin, the British recognized the Palmach's military potential and initiated negotiations with the Jewish Agency regarding joint operations between the Palmach and British forces. While neither side was totally comfortable with the idea, a marriage of convenience was unofficially arranged whereby the Palmach would assist the British army without becoming an official component of that army. Since Palmach light infantry companies would have little impact against Rommel's forces, the British decided to use those combat units in support of an Allied invasion of Syria and Lebanon. Specifically, the Palmach would support the attack through pre-invasion reconnaissance patrols and special operations missions. (81) As Palmach leader, Sadeh had already selected his company commanders and had based his personal choices on those individuals' previously demonstrated aggressiveness, combat experiences, and leadership abilities. Among those selected were two of Sadeh's former pupils, Yigal Allon and Moshe Dayan. Since time was of the essence and demonstrating complete trust in his subordinates, Sadeh allowed his company commanders to recruit their own men. (82) In late May, Sadeh informed his company officers that the Allied invasion of Lebanon and Syria would begin on 8 June and provided each commander with his unit's missions. Moshe's unit was given the following missions: conduct pre-invasion patrols to determine enemy troop strengths and dispositions; gather information regarding off-road routes of advance able to support motorized assaults; on D-1, lead an advance force approximately six miles into Lebanon to seize and hold two vital bridges on the coastal highway leading to Beirut. (83) Few of the 30 men Moshe had selected were familiar with the southern-Lebanon countryside and this, when combined with his plan to divide the force into small reconnaissance teams, presented Moshe with a potentially disastrous problem. Undaunted and eager for action, Moshe quickly solved the problem in a most unconventional manner - he hired trustworthy Arabs who, being familiar with Lebanon, would guide his Palmach patrols. Dressed as Arabs, operating only at night, and under strict orders to avoid clashes with enemy troops, Moshe and his men successfully conducted several intelligence-gathering forays into Lebanon during the first week of June. After each night's patrols, Moshe personally reviewed each of his team leaders' after action reports before forwarding those documents to the British. On Saturday evening, 7 June, Moshe's commando force assembled near his home at Hanita. Consisting of ten Australians, five Jews, and one Arab, the group waited until night before crossing into Lebanon. By 0100, the Australian-led force reached its objective and, finding the two bridges neither guarded nor rigged for demolition, secured both structures within an hour. After deploying to defensive positions, the group waited for the British forces that were expected to arrive by 0400. At sunrise, however, there was no sign of the invasion force. Realizing that their position was exposed, Moshe immediately suggested that the group seize a nearby police station that would provide a solid defensive position while allowing the commando force to control both bridges by fire. The Australians agreed. Unfortunately, no one knew that Vichy French forces held the station and, while approaching the building, the 16 man commando team was taken under heavy fire and pinned down. With ammunition running low, Moshe characteristically suggested that the best form of defense would be a rapid assault on the enemy's position. After a brief firefight, several French defenders were killed and the remainder quickly routed. (84) The men quickly consolidated their position and, augmenting their meager ammunition supplies with captured French weapons, prepared to defend themselves against a counterattack. Since the police station served as a regional Vichy command post, French reinforcements surrounded the building and brought it under heavy fire. What happened next is best described in Moshe's own words: I took up my field glasses to try to locate the source of the shooting. I had hardly got them into focus when a rifle bullet smashed into them, splintering the lens and the metal casing, which became embedded in the socket of my left eye. I immediately lost consciousness. (85) Wounded shortly after 0700, Moshe remained on his back, in considerable pain, drifting in and out of consciousness, until 1300 when the first elements of the British invasion force finally reached the station's beleaguered defenders. Eventually medivaced to a hospital in Haifa, surgeons could do little except carefully remove the metal and glass fragments and close the now- empty eye socket. Since the bones surrounding the socket had been shattered beyond repair, later attempts to outfit Moshe with a glass eye failed. (86) Thus, at the age of 26, Moshe Dayan adopted his now-famous trademark - a black eye-patch. For the next 40 years, that leather patch reminded him of war's human costs and eventually provided his fellow Israelis and the world with a permanent physical symbol of military excellence. CHAPTER III RECOVERY AND REVOLT: 1941-1947 To Dayan, the loss of his left eye was more than a physical wound - it represented the probable end of his military career. Relieved of command, Moshe's personal anguish intensified as he watched his Haganah and Palmach contemporaries advance. A highly competitive man, the thought of losing ground to his peers, especially to Yigal Allon, tore at Moshe's soul and his personal descent into depression is best captured in his own words: I almost gave up hope of ever recovering my fitness to fight, and I reflected with considerable misgivings on my future as a cripple without a skill, trade, or profession to provide for my family. (1) The wound also caused him extreme embarrassment. Six years after losing his eye, Moshe was: ready to make any effort and stand any suffering if only I could get rid of my black eye patch. The attention it drew was intolerable to me. I preferred to shut myself up at home, doing anything, rather than encounter the reactions of people wherever I went. (2) Late in the summer of 1941, Dayan accepted a position with the Political Department, special Services Branch, of the Jewish Agency. Later calling this his "entrance into the political field", Dayan's duties were primarily military. As a junior action officer, however, his performance of those duties and his crystallizing political convictions, eventually brought him to the attention of his future political mentor - David Ben-Gurion. Although Dayan's exceptionally strong political bond with Ben- Gurion did not mature until 1948, the seeds of that relationship were sown during the years 1941 through 1947. While Wingate and Sadeh provided Dayan with his military foundations, it was Ben- Gurion who nurtured Moshe's political foundations, a process that ultimately provided Dayan with an avenue to greatness. Thus, while the period 1941 through 1947 has little to do with Dayan directly, those years are crucial to an understanding of Dayan the soldier and Dayan the politician. Although the pro-Nazi threat in Syria and Lebanon had been neutralized, the Afrika Korps still threatened both the British 8th Army and the Suez Canal. Consequently, the British asked the Jewish Agency to establish an intelligence network in Palestine which, in the event the region was lost to German forces, could provide information to the Allies. Moshe's first task as an action officer in the Special Services Branch was to organize and implement that network. Plunging into the project with characteristic vigor, by mid- August Moshe presented his superiors with a detailed plan that proposed creating a series of intelligence-gathering and transmission cells located in key areas of Palestine. In late September, the British approved the plan and provided radio training to the Jews operating those cells. Although under British operational control and officially named the "Palestine Scheme", the espionage ring worked closely with the Haganah and was usually referred to as "Moshe's Network". (3) In October, Dayan suggested that the Palmach expand its special operations capabilities by organizing two unique platoons - one fluent in German and the other fluent in Arabic. Moshe envisioned using these forces behind enemy lines in Europe and, if the British evacuated North Africa, as partisan units in Palestine. After considerable debate, the British accepted the proposal in July 1942 and eventually parachuted some 33 out of the 150 Palmach commandos into the Balkans. While agreeing with the British that these commandos were tools of war, the Haganah and the Jewish Agency also viewed them as a means to both contact the persecuted Jewish communities of Europe and strengthen Jewish resistance efforts. Historians have estimated that these commandos helped 10,000 Jews escape from Europe. (4) Ostensibly organized to assist the British war effort, Dayan's intelligence network and the special Palmach platoons were integral parts of an overall Jewish plan to defend the Yishuv against both the Arabs and the Germans in the event the British evacuated Palestine. Known as the Carmel Plan, Haganah strategists planned to create a large Jewish conclave located in and around the Carmel mountains and their adjoining foothills. This region, running east from Haifa to the valleys of western Galilee, was easily defendable, open to naval resupply, and sufficiently large and fertile to provide enough arable land to temporarily support the nearly half-million Palestinian Jews. The authors of the plan - Yohanan Rattner of the Haganah High Command and the "old night fighter" Yitzhak Sadeh - viewed the enclave as: a giant emplacement from which the enemy could be attacked . . . from which night raids could be carried out, and from which enemy lines of communication and resupply could be disrupted and destroyed ... [and) ...that the Carmel fortress could be used as a bridgehead for an Allied landing, were a counter- invasion take place. (5) While modern strategists may scoff at the overly optimistic nature of the Carmel Plan, that plan demonstrated the Haganah's ability to carefully develop a detailed and potentially executable "national defense" plan. Even more important, it showed that the lessons learned during the Arab Revolt were being correctly applied and that the concept of an active and aggressive defense had replaced the predominantly passive, static, position-oriented mindset of the 1930's. Having already developed their own evacuation plan, the British immediately concurred with the Carmel Plan. As Rommel steadily advanced toward Cairo during the spring of 1942, Anglo-Jewish cooperation intensified. With the Haganah already training Palmach platoons in kibbutzim base camps in northern Palestine, the British offered to officially support sabotage, demolition, and partisan warfare training for an additional 300 Palmach members. The British offer was not totally altruistic and was based on their desire to create an effective partisan force which, in the event Rommel seized the Suez Canal and Palestine, could wage guerrilla war against the Germans. Short of funds, the Jewish Agency immediately accepted the offer and in June 1942, a British-sponsored training facility was established in the Jezreel Valley. Although British officers served as instructors "in some of the more esoteric para-military arts", their duties were largely confined to liaison activities. Most of the active instructors were seasoned Haganah veterans whose experiences dated back to the days of the FOSH and the Special Night Squads. As Palmach commander, Sadeh placed his characteristic stamp on both the nature and tempo of the training, insisting that the students receive intensive instruction in topography, small unit leadership, mobile guerrilla tactics, tracking, scouting, and related partisan skills. Since future Palmach operations would probably be conducted with an inadequate supply of weapons, Sadeh required his men to familiarize themselves with a wide variety of weapons. This was in keeping with his axiom - "We must learn to fight with whatever is available rather than with what is theoretically desirable." (6) Although the Afrika Korps was not defeated until November 1942, in August of that year, field Marshal Montgomery's 8th Army halted Rommel at the first Battle of El Alamein. That initial victory eased London's anxieties concerning the Suez Canal and the Empire's Middle-Eastern interests which, following Montgomery's final victory in November, resulted in the termination of direct cooperation between British forces and independent Jewish military units. London reasoned that with the German threat neutralized, it was neither in their best interest nor in the best interest of future Palestinian stability to continue training independent Jewish military units. (7) Shortly after halting Rommel's offensive in August, the British abandoned the "Palestine Scheme". Although "Moshe's Network" reverted to secret Haganah control, Dayan no longer had any official duties with the Special Operations Branch. In late summer, he returned with his family to Nahalal. (8) Before returning to civil ian life, Moshe volunteered for a clandestine Haganah mission to Iraq. Its purpose was to smuggle weapons to the local Haganah cell in Baghdad and reestablish a link between Jewish leaders in Palestine and the persecuted Jewish community in Iraq. Like other sephardic* communities in Arab lands, Iraqi Jews had been the victims of recent Arab discontent. (9) In April 1941, prior to the Allied invasion of Syria and Lebanon, the pro-British Iraqi government was overthrown by the pro-Nazi, Rashid Ali Beg Gailani . In response to British landings at Basra, Iraq's Persian Gulf port, Rashid appeaied to Hitler for assistance. The fuhrer, busy preparing for Germany's invasion of Russia, dispatched some Luftwaffe elements which using Syrian bases, provided meager air support to Rashid's embattled forces. In May, Haj Amin, the deposed Grand Mufti of Jerusalem now living in Baghdad, sided with the Germans and declared a jihad or holy war against England. Shortly before British forces recaptured Baghdad, Haj Amin's militant followers slaughtered some 400 Jewish residents of the city. Haj Amin then fled to Iran before eventually making his way to Berlin. (10) Although British forces controlled Iraq in 1942, they were unable to protect Iraqi Jews against attacks by militant Arabs. Consequently, the transfer of weapons to the Haganah cell was part of a larger mission whose purpose was to help: * SEPHARDIC: A term describing those Jews who lived in moslem countries running from Pakistan in the east to Morocco in the west. Having experienced life in increasingly hostile Arab countries, Sephardic or "Oriental", Jews often took (and still do) a much harder stand on issues relating to Arabs than do Ashkenazi Jews. ** ASHKENAZI: A term referring to European Jews who, because of their exposure to the western concepts of liberalism and enlightenment, generally take a less hawkish stance on Arab- Jewish relations than do their "Oriental" or Sephardic counterparts. organize [Jewish) self-defense against future attacks and to overcome Iraqi impediments to the departure of Jews from Iraq and the British ban on their entry into Palestine by establishing clandestine routes. (11) After delivering the weapons, Moshe returned to Nahalal and spent the next two years farming. Following Rommel's retreat toward Tunisia in December 1942, London reevaluated its military arrangements with the Yishuv and, except for the "German" platoon, terminated all support of the Palmach. By early 1943, the British disbanded their Palmach training facility, tried to determine the real identities of those Haganah members who had received British-sponsored training, and confiscated weapons previously issued to the Haganah and the Palmach. Quickly responding to what it considered the illegal seizure of Jewish weapons, the Haganah broke into British armories and recaptured the weapons. (12) The end of the British-Jewish partnership, London's steadfast refusal to rescind the hated White Paper of 1939, and Britain's apparent insensitivity toward European Jews trapped within Hitler's Third Reich, polarized relations between the Yishuv and London. This polarization intensified the internal debates between various Jewish political groups over the issues of support for London's war effort and the struggle against the White Paper. These debates divided the Yishuv, significantly altered Jewish attitudes concerning the use of Jewish military force, and gave rise to extremist elements within the Jewish community. Since each of these factors - political, diplomatic, and military - are inexorably linked in a complex cause-and- effect relationship, each must be briefly discussed. This discussion is all the more important since those forces shaped Dayan's environment and provided him with the opportunity to reenter military service. The official end of Anglo-Jewish cooperation had been preceded by a fierce debate within the Irgun - a debate that centered on London's enforcement of the Mandate's anti-Jewish immigration provisions. By early 1940, that paper stood as a wall between the rescue and the annihilation of European Jewry. In November 1940, the first of several unseaworthy craft limped into Palestinian waters carrying Jewish refugees fleeing Europe. The British promptly intercepted the ship, transferred its passengers to the S.S. Patria, and announced that these illegal aliens would be exiled on Mauritius - an island in the Indian Ocean. While attempting to scuttle the vessel in Haifa harbor, the Haganah inadvertently destroyed the ship, killing 257 refugees. Similar, although less deadly fates awaited other Jews entering Palestine by sea as most were immediately quarantined before being sent into exile. However, in February 1942, the S.S. Struma was refused docking privileges in Turkey and Lord Moyne of the British Colonial Office refused to grant its Jewish passengers entry visas into Palestine. Once out at sea, the vessel sank, drowning 767 refugees. This tragedy further alienated the Yishuv from London. (13) Obeying Ben-Gurion's policy regarding the war against Germany and the struggle to overturn the White Paper, the Irgun had temporarily halted its anti-British terrorist campaign. However, a small dissident group within the Irgun found the idea of cooperating with the British so unpalatable that in 1941, they formed the Lohamei Herut Israel (LEHI)* - better known to the British as the Stern Gang. Led by Avraham Stern, a firey, 35 year-old intellectual who viewed Britain and not Germany as the real enemy, LEHI "declared war" on the British. Although British police killed Stern in 1942, his gang survived and, completely rejecting the policies and authority of Ben-Gurion and the Jewish Agency, conducted an unrestrained terrorist campaign against the British. (14) The debate that had fractured the Irgun and had spawned the Stern Gang also widened the chasm between Ben-Gurion and Weizmann. Although both men staunchly supported England's war effort, Weizmann still hoped that the differences separating the Yishuv and Britain could be reconciled and that the Jewish homeland could gradually acquire its independence within a political framework established by London. While appreciating the necessity of British support, Ben-Gurion grew increasingly impatient with London's immigration policies and in this matter he was more attuned to the Yishuv's attitudes than was Weizmann. Departing from Weizmann's penchant for moderation, Ben-Gurion became convinced that diplomatic overtures directed toward the United States and its sizable Jewish community might induce that nation to pressure London into rescinding the White Paper and its anti-Jewish immigration policies. (15) The personal battle between the two men boiled into heated * LEHI: Lohamei Herut Israel is translated "fighters for the freedom of Israel." Better known as either LEHI or the Stern Gang, the Yishuv repudiated the small but extremely militant group and deplored its violent, destructive, anti-British terrorist activities. public debate in May 1942 during an American Zionist conference held at New York City's Biltmore Hotel. Despite Weizmann's eloquent protests, the conference endorsed the Biltmore Resolution that called for the immediate opening of Palestine to two million Jewish immigrants, the transfer of all authority over immigration and Jewish Palestinian affairs to the Jewish Agency, and the establishment of a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine under the auspices of the recently proposed United Nations. As one historian has described this remarkable turn of events, "the entire program represented a complete [Ben-Gurion] triumph over Weizmann's gradualist, pro-British approach." Defeated and disappointed, Weizmann returned to England while Ben-Gurion returned victorious to Palestine. Although the split raised considerable controversy within the Jewish community, it was Ben- Gurion, not Weizmann, who emerged as Yishuv's political spokesman and as the "de facto Prime Minister of his country." London, however, viewed Ben-Gurion's ascendancy with concern since it "classified the Zionists into moderates, headed by Weizmann, and extremists, headed by Ben-Gurion." (16) The Irgun-LEHI split, Ben-Gurion's victory over Weizmann, and the end of direct Anglo-Jewish military cooperation were quickly followed by shocking revelations coming from Europe. In November 1942, a group of Polish Jews brought news of Hitler's "Final Solution" and in December, Allied governments corroborated that information. (17) News of the Holocaust, when combined with London's refusal to open Palestine to Jewish immigration, increased the Yishuv's resentment of England, breathed renewed life into LEHI, and convinced a number of Revisionists and a larger number of sephardic Jews to join the Irgun. Among these recruits was Menachem Begin, a young Polish Jew stationed in Palestine as a member of the Andres free Polish Army. Released from his military duties in 1943, Begin was appointed the Irgun's Commander-in-Chief in May 1944. (18) A small, bespectacled man, Begin had previously led Betar - a militant Revisionist youth movement in Poland during the 1920's and 1930's. Upon meeting Jabotinsky, the spiritual master of the Revisionist Party, Begin found both his leader and his political mentor. (19) There was, however, a significant philosophic difference between the two men. Despite his bold and even inflammatory rhetoric, Jabotinsky never abandoned his "dedication to legal military action and Zionist diplomacy." Begin, on the other hand, viewed terrorism as a viable, if not legal means to secure valid political objectives. (20) Under Begin's charismatic leadership, the Irgun grew in both size and strength. Demonstrating superb organizational skills, Begin reshaped the Irgun into what he hoped would become the "militarily active successor to Revisionism." This dream contained political and military components, each of which supported his ultimate objective - the establishment in Palestine of an independent Jewish state whose border would include all of the territories once held by the ancient Kingdom of Israel. Politically, Begin hoped to unite the Irgun, LEHI, the Haganah, and the political groups supporting those military elements into a unified organization capable of implementing his military objective - the complete removal of the British from Palestine. But as long as war raged in Europe, Begin's Irgun received no political support from Ben-Gurion and no military assistance from the Haganah. Consequently, he formed a coalition with LEHI and launched his own anti-British terrorist campaign. (21) This campaign produced disastrous results and was largely responsible for the deterioration of Winston Churchill relationship with responsible Jewish leaders. In late 1943, Churchill, the conservative Prime Minister of Britain and a verbal ally of Zionism, recommended that partition based upon the 19:37 Peel Report was the only practical solution to the Palestinian problem. However, increasing levels of anti-British violence in Palestine eventually culminated in Lord Moyne's assassination by LEHI gunmen in Cairo on 6 November 1944. Moyne, the British Minister Resident in Cairo, was a close personal friend of Churchills' and his murder dampened the Prime Minister's pro-Zionist stance. In a speech before the House of Commons, Churchill condemned the atrocity: If our dreams for Zionism should be dissolved in the smoke of the revolvers of assassins and if our efforts for its future should provoke a new wave of banditry worthy of the Nazi Germans, many persons like myself will have to reconsider the position that we have taken so firmly for such a long-time. (22) Later Irgun attacks totally alienated Churchill who, in August 1946, endorsed the new Labor government's party doctrine "which divorced Palestine from the Jewish refugee problem." (23) Appalled at this act of terror and fearing British reprisals, Ben-Gurion immediately ordered the Haganah to cooperate with Mandate authorities in their search for the terrorists. Later dubbed the "saison" - a French term referring to the "hunting season " - the Haganah identifed suspected terrorists and turned over non Haganah arms caches to Mandate authorities. Although LEHI had committed the atrocity, it was Begin's Irgun that suffered the most. By early 1945, British constabulary and military forces had arrested 403 out of 531 identified suspects. Drawing a riot altogether fanciful comparison between the "saison" and a political purge, one historian has written: For Ben-Gurion, it [the "saison"] was yet another example of squashing incipient rival forces, a matter of preserving the unity of the Yishuv and keeping its political and military structures under one umbrella, the umbrella of Socialist-Zionism, Labor, and Mapai.* (24) Throughout this period of political infighting and deteriorating relations with London, the seeds of the future Israel Defense Force, planted during the Arab Revolt and carefully nurtured by the Jewish Agency, slowly matured. However, this development was complicated by Ben-Gurion's policy requiring direct Jewish support of Britain's war against Germany and the Yishuv's simultaneous support of the Jewish Agency's struggle against London's Palestinian policies. While Ben-Gurion viewed the struggle against the White Paper primarily in non- violent, political terms, other individuals believed that the issue might only be resolved militarily. These activists also were concerned that if Jewish support of the war against Hitler did not produce "a new Balfour Declaration with a cleaner and * MAPAI: Founded in 1930 as Israel's Labor Party, Mapai advocated slightly "left-of-center" social-democratic policies. Until the late-1960's, Mapai was Israel's strongest political party and was the party to which Ben-Gurion belonged. firmer British commitment to Jewish statehood", then a total commitment of Jewish forces to England could leave the Yishuv defenseless in the post-war period. (25) In a thinly veiled threat, Yitzhak Sadeh concurred with these sentiments: The Allied victory will be our victory, the victory over the most terrible of all our enemies, but it will not be the ultimate victory. That will come only when we have won our war of national liberation - a war which may very well start when this World War is over. (26) Despite the Yishuv's limited financial and manpower resources and its heated debates over military priorities, Palestinian Jews managed to physically support England's war effort while simultaneously developing their own independent military forces. Since 1940, Weizmann, and to a certain extent Ben-Gurion, had urged Palestinian Jews to join the British army. (27) These men believed that active Jewish participation in the war as British soldiers would produce several benefits - the formation of an all-Jewish combat unit under British command, the provision of free military training to Jewish volunteers, and the possible rededication of British support for an independent Jewish state. By war's end, approximately 30,000 Palestinian Jews had entered the British army. Even more important, on 20 September 1944, London formed the 5,000-man Jewish Brigade. While this all- Jewish unit was organized too late to play a significant role in the war, the Jewish Brigade was a fully trained and: independent fighting force, equipped with its own staff, services, and supporting arms, that became a a training ground where hundreds of Palestinian officers and NCO's, for the first time, learned logistics, organization, and tactics on a brigade level. (28) Seeing little combat, the Brigade's officers and NCO's were well- trained in and familiar with the technical, administrative, and combat service support requirements needed to sustain offensive operations and in 1948, these veterans played an important role in Israel's War of Independence. (29) After the Anglo-Jewish partnership collapsed, the Jewish Agency lacked sufficient funds to support the Palmach's training, logistics, and operational needs and considered dissolving the Haganah's elite "shock companies" - an option previously debated during the summer of 1941. (30) Consequently, Sadeh and the Haganah High Command eagerly accepted an innovative solution proposed by Yitzhak Tabenkin. An ardent admirer of Lenin, Tabenki was the leader of one of the largest agrarian federations in Palestine - the United Kibbutzim Movement. (31) Tabenkin proposed attaching Palmach platoons to individual kibbutzim associated with his federated movement where, in exchange for food and shelter, the soldiers would devote two weeks each month to farming. The remainder of the month could then be devoted to military training. (32) Not overjoyed with this arrangement, some disgruntled Palmachniks* immediately joined the British army. However, most accepted the offer and thereby formalized the direct link between agrarian settlements and the standing Jewish army. Thus, the tradition of the farmer-soldier and the citizen-warrior was born - a tradition that provided one of the foundations upon which the Israel Defense force's reserve system was constructed. * PALMACHNIK: A slang Jewish expression describing a member of the Palmach. Although some Palmach leaders viewed this relationship as the basis for transforming their organization into a "true people's army", this marriage of convenience provided the Haganah with a means to protect the Yishuv while simultaneously training its forces without overly arousing British suspicions. In describing this relationship, one Palmach commander wrote: Just as ... Tito's Partisans ... hid out in the woods and thickets, so the Palmach used the kibbutz movement as its forest. (33) As would be expected, Sadeh - the "old guerrilla fighter" - was elated with this turn of events since: he was determined to return the Palmach to underground conditions, to remind it collectively that it was a Jewish force, and to wean it away from what he thought might be the weakening effect of cooperative action with regular army forces. (34) By mid-1943, the Palmach numbered some 1,000 active duty members with another 400 in reserve. With these forces attached by platoon to some 28 separate kibbutzim, mobilization and training exercises were difficult to organize and manage. Taking advantage of what others would have considered an insurmountable obstacle, Sadeh and the Haganah staff developed effective training and mobilization plans whereby platoons in adjoining kibbutzim would form companies and adjacent companies would form battalions. This arrangement relied heavily on the ability of separate platoons to rapidly merge and form a company-sized "strike task force." (35) Expanding upon the lessons learned during the Arab Revolt, Sadeh insisted that his men be trained in the tradition of the flying Squad, the FOSH, and Wingate's Special Night Squads. Emphasizing unit cohesion and combat leadership at all levels, Sadeh's physically demanding training program placed a premium on both the skill of the individual soldier and high unit morale as a means to compensate for the Palmach's lack of heavy weapons. All members, regardless of rank: were educated to think and function in terms of the utmost flexibility and to accommodate themselves to the needs of the hour. (36) Despite its previous association with the British army, the Palmach's approach to combat owed little to that earlier contact. Echoing Dayan's disparaging comments concerning the training he had received from the British in the 1930's, commanders argued that Palmach training must not mimic the British approach. One commander succinctly explained not only the differences between the two approaches to training and combat, but also the underlying reason for that divergence: Infantry training in the British Army was orderly and schematic, while the Palmach stressed individual ability and collective flexibility. Where British instructors taught their men that enemy positions could be softened by heavy artillery barrages or from the air, the Palmach, lacking either possibility, emphasized the use of darkness and explosives. Where British army tacticians thought in terms of formal and inflexible arrangements such as infantry, artillery, and engineers, etc., the Palmach regarded itself as a single, multi-purpose force. (37) Perhaps the most striking difference between the British army, with its heavy reliance on traditional tactics and clearly defined chains of command, and the Palmach, with its informal approach to both tactics and personal relations between the ranks, was in the area of NCO training. In the Palmach: section commanders were not trained as NCO's but as officers; they were taught to make decisions alone - each soldier and his weapon was considered as the basic unit of the force. Unconventional tactics were advocated and the Palmach (NCO) was drilled to anticipate unconventionality from the enemy. (38) Even if no command billet was available, every promising soldier attended the Palmach Squad Commander's Course. This course emphasized developing a potential commander is ability to react quickly and to think logically in any situation. Candidates were expected to use terrain, darkness, and even the weather to the maximum and most favorable extent possible. Perhaps the most revealing aspect of this rigorous training regimen was that of the 493 training-hours available, 79 were dedicated to "The Independent Commander" while only 25 were spent studying "The NCO and the Platoon." This environment helped codify the doctrinal link between seizure of the initiative and independent decision- making - a vital relationship still taught and practiced in today's Israel Defense force. As would be expected in any Sadeh- developed course, 121 hours were devoted to social, political, and cultural indoctrination. (39) Although best categorized as light infantry, by the end of World War II, 4 Palmach battalions were ready for action. In early 1948, Yigal Allon, who succeeded Yitzhak Sadeh as Palmach Commander in 1945, had 6 fully-trained battalions at his disposal each of which contained 4 companies. By the early summer of that year, the Palmach contained 9 battalions and was capable of sustained, brigade-level offensive operations. The Palmach also helped support the Haganah's small air force and fledgling navy. (40) When the war in Europe ended on 8 May 1945, the Yishuv was confident that its support of Britain's war effort, when combined with the ghastly details of the Holocaust, would result in the cancellation of the White Paper of 1939. When Churchill's government made no effort to either lift the anti-Jewish immigration restrictions or renew London's nearly 30 year-old commitment to a Jewish homeland, the Yishuv withdrew its support of the "saiso." In July, Clement Attlee's Labor Party replaced Churchill's conservative government and once again, the Yishuv looked hopefully to London. Despite its previous condemnations of the White Paper, once in office the Labor Party made no attempt to alter existing Mandate policies. Even mild diplomatic pressure from President Truman, who urged Attlee to allow 100,000 Jewish refugees enter Palestine, had no effect. (41) In August, his patience wearing thin, Ben-Gurion warned London that: If for some reason or another, it [the Labor Party] maintains the White Paper for an unlimited period ... we in Palestine will not draw back in the face of England's great power and we shall fight against her. (42) In September, London agreed to admit 1,500 Jewish refugees to Palestine each month. But with nearly a million Holocaust survivors crowding Displaced Persons camps in Europe, even Weizmann criticized this gesture. Noticing that a sizable number of non-Jews were also detained in these camps, Ernest Bevin, Britain's new foreign Minister, responded to this criticism: If the Jews, with all their sufferings, want to get too much at the head of the queue, you have the danger of another anti-Semitic reaction through it all. Weizmann, the moderate, angrily retorted: Is it getting too much to the head of the queue if, after the slaughter of six million Jews, the remnant ... implore the shelter of the Jewish Homeland? (43) By early autumn, Zionist policy, with its linked demands for an independent Jewish state and a rapid resolution of the Jewish refugee problem, was clearly at odds with Britain's official Mandate policies. However, London's post-war Palestinian policies had not been created in a diplomatic vacuum. Harold Beeley, Britain's secretary to the Anglo-American Committee on Palestine, emphasized this point in 1947 when he stated: The Zionists believe that Palestine itself is of first class strategic importance to us. What is important, I think, is the effect upon our Middle Eastern position generally of our policy in Palestine. (44) London' s Mandate policies were indeed rooted in a larger Middle Eastern strategy designed to protect England's interests while thwarting Soviet ambitions in the region. With both Turkey and Persia (Iran) under Russian pressure and with moslems demanding that an independent, non-Hindu state (Pakistan) be carved out of the western provinces of the soon-to-be-created Indian state: It seemed to any reasonable British minister or service chief as vital as ever it had been to appease anxieties in the world of Islam, and to maintain the British garrisons stationed, or rather left there in force by the accident of war, in Egypt, and the Arab lands to the East. (45) To a certain extent, Britan's Middle Eastern policies were also founded upon what London viewed as potential rivalry with the United States. Prior to the end of the war, Anthony Eden remirided Churchill's cabinet of England's dependency on Middle Eastern oil when he said: If we lose Arab goodwill , the Americans and the Russians will be on hand to profit from our mistakes. (46) To Ben-Gurion and the Yishuv, however, London's regional interests paled to insignificance when compared to the plight of Jewish refugees and the Zionist goal of an independent Jewish state. Recognizing that diplomacy would neither resolve the refugee issue nor obtain Jewish independence, in October 1945 Ben-Gurion authorized the Haganah to establish a para-military coalition with both the Irgun and LEHI and further directed the Haganah to initiate a revolt against British domination. This was a controversial decision as members of the Haganah. and particularly the Palmach objected on the grounds that a: proliferation of underground movements was undesirable (since) a multiplicity of military forces would be fatal to the concept of one nation, one authority, one army. (47) Yet despite their deep philosophic differences and the Irgun's disregard of the Jewish Agency's political authority, the Haganah, the Irgun, and LEHI formed a loosely-coordinated, but highly effective, and frequently tempestuous partnership. Realizing that brute force alone would not secure national objectives, the Yishuv launched a multi-faceted campaign using social, diplomatic, and military means. Together, these distinct yet mutually supporting campaigns formed the framework of a national resistance movement which, just 32 months later, saw Ben-Gurion announce the format ion of the independent Jewish state of Israel. From 1945 through May 1948, the Jewish Agency skillfully directed this movement, to include the coordination of most military strikes, and it is not unreasonable to state that it functioned as a provisional Israeli government. (48) Jewish para-military forces played an important role in this resistance movement. Not only did they fight a successful partisan campaign, the Haganah-Irgun coalition served in other non-traditional capacities and in so doing, helped create the nation of Israel. The social or "nation-building" campaign involved illegal immigration and the construction of new agrarian settlements - two operations in which the Haganah played a key role. Between August 1945 and the end of 1947, nearly 70,000 European Jews attempted to enter Palestine by sea. As the Jewish Agency's military arm, the Haganah was largely responsible for staging the refugees in Europe, transporting them to Palestine, and once there, helping them "disappear" into the population. Despite these efforts, the British navy intercepted most of the vessels and interred nearly 50,000 Holocaust victims in detention camps in northern Palestine and in Cyprus or, in the case of the Exodus, returned the refugees to German soil. With assistance from both the Haganah and Jewish soldiers in the British army still stationed in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Lebanon, sephardic Jews from neighboring Arab lands also poured into Palestine. Since this overland migration received no publicity, precise figures regarding the number of sephardic immigrants are not known. (49) In direct defiance of Mandate regulations, the Haganah revived Operation Stockade and Tower and helped construct new Jewish farming communities. This campaign was a continuation of Jewish policy established in the 1920's, a policy that viewed land reclamation in both economic and diplomatic terms. Economically, the settlements provided Jewish refugees with the means to become contributing members of society. Diplomatically, the settlements defined the borders of the future Jewish state. Although Mandate police and British military units occasionally leveled these communities, Jewish workers and Haganah guards, quickly rebuilt them. (50) The Jewish Agency effectively linked its immigration operation to its diplomatic campaign - a strategy designed to elicit sympathy for the Jewish cause while depicting the British as insensitive to the plight of Jewish refugees. The American public, still shocked over Holocaust atrocities, were not favorably impressed with British Mandate policies especially after news reports, photographs, and film footage described British forces intercepting and interring Jewish refugees. As one historian has described this campaign: Where the passengers [refugees] got through, it was a gain for the Yishuv in people. When they were apprehended, it was a gain for the Zionist cause, in propaganda terms. (51) Aware of growing, pro-Jewish sentiments in the United States, London was eager to gain American assistance in resolving the troublesome Palestine question. In late 1945, a joint Anglo- American Committee of Inquiry was organized to seek solutions to both the Jewish refugee problem and the Palestine problem. After interviewing refugees in Europe's Displaced Persons camps and touring Palestine, the commission reported its findings in May 1946. (52) Repudiating existing Mandate policies, the committee recommended that 100,000 Jews be immediately admitted to Palestine, that regulations restricting land sales to Jewish Palestinians be terminated, and that a bi-national Palestinian state be established under a United Nation's trusteeship. Although Truman endorsed the proposal, Attlee made it quite clear that "unless the United States would be prepared to share in the additional military and financial responsibilities", Britain could not accept the recommendations. Attlee also indicated that London would not change existing policies until the Yishuv disbanded its underground forces. Since the report contained no reference to a Jewish state, Jewish leaders withheld their approval, a position the Arabs supported. (53) Arab disapproval was based on similar attitudes. Since the commission had not recommended the creation of an Arab state encompassing all of Palestine, Haj Amin, now living in Egypt, and other Arab leaders rejected the proposal. Continued Arab intransigence further complicated the already delicate situation. In September 1946, Arab diplomats attending negotiations in London not only rejected the concept of an independent Jewish state, they demanded the formation of an Arab state in Palestine riot later than 31 December 1948. Their implacable opposition to a Jewish state was based on their belief that: the creation of an autonomous Jewish province, with substantial control over its own immigration, would give the Zionists an irreversible demographic, economic, and political advantage [and that] an independent Jewish state in Palestine would become the bridgehead for Jewish political and economic penetration, first into the rest of Palestine and thereafter into Transjordan, Syria, and the whole Arab world. (54) Following Truman's tentative endorsement of a Palestinian Jewish state, Iraq and Syria even tried imposing economic sanctions against the United States in October 1946. (55) Militarily, the Haganah and the Palmach were uniquely qualified to lead the anti-British rebellion. With their guerrilla training having been frequently enriched with British combat training, these underground forces not only understood Britsh tactics and organizational practices, they also appreciated London's political weaknesses. Fully prepared to conduct a guerrilla campaign against British, the Haganah and its shock companies accepted the Jewish Agency's control of its partisan operations. Although the Irgun and LEHI cooperated with the Haganah militarily, their political goals did not coincide with those of the Jewish Agency. Unlike Ben-Gurion, Begin the Revisionist believed that all of Palestine, plus additional territories in Lebanon, Syria, and the Transjordan - territories formerly belonging to ancient Israel - must be included in any new Jewish state. Consequently, the Irgun and LEHI conducted their own independent guerrilla war - a partisan campaign the frequently ignored Ben-Gurion's policy of Havlagah. (56) Havlagah was still a potent policy within the Yishuv and Ben-Gurion was adamant that this tradition carried over from the Arab Revolt would not be violated. Although the Haganah was authorized to engage in sabotage and reprisal activities, they were to avoid personal terror. Furthermore, each partisan strike was to be carefully planned and executed so as to create the maximum damage possible while simultaneously avoiding human casualties. (57) Accepting these rule of engagement as guidance and not as limitations, the Haganah launched its campaign. On 10 October 1945, 250 Haganah commandos overpowered the guards at the Atlit detention camp and freed hundreds of Jewish refugees previously captured by the British navy. Just 21 days later, the Haganah, the Irgun, and LEHI attacked the Palestine railway system, destroying track in over 150 places. Later called "The Night of the Railways", rolling stock and locomotives were also destroyed as were three police launches anchored in Haifa harbor. In June 1946, a similar attack destroyed 10 out of the 11 bridges connecting Palestine with her neighboring Arab states. On occasions, these coordinated attacks were launched in direct support of other facets of the Jewish resistance campaign. In June 1947, two British radar installations used to track ships bringing refugees to Palestine were attacked and destroyed. Carefully planned, each attack was conducted at night and was fully described in a detailed after action report. These reports outlined the operational plan, discussed how that plan was implemented, noted the strengths and weaknesses of the plan's execution, and provided tactical tips to assist future assaults. for example, after attacking the Allenby Bridge linking Palestine with the Transjordan, the after action report noted: "The enemy used tracer bullets. This helped us." (58) London's response was predictable. In May 1945, some 50,000 British troops were stationed in Palestine, a number that climbed to nearly 80,000 by December. By 1947, over 100,000 British soldiers patrolled Palestine while a sizable naval flotilla blockaded its shores. (59) On 29 June, the British launched Operation Agatha and for the next two weeks, some 17,000 British troops conducted a massive search-and-arrest operation. Although catching the Yishuv by surprise and arresting over 2,700 Jews to include high ranking members of the Jewish Agency, the operation failed to either break the Haganah militarily or silence activist Jewish leaders. Instead, it intensified Jewish resolve and helped pave the way for the Irgun-LEHI counteroffensive. (60) Shortly thereafter, the Irgun struck the first of several deadly blows designed to embarrass Mandate authorities and weaken British morale. With key Mandate administrators, elements of the British military command, and British intelligence offices housed in Jerusalem's King David Hotel, the Irgun attacked this lucrative target on 22 July and destroyed that building's south wing. The explosion killed 92 and wounded dozens more. Although the Haganah had sanctioned the attack, Begin's forces either failed to warn the British as had been agreed upon or the British had not taken the bomb threat seriously. (61) Instead of breaking British morale, the assault solidified British opinion and shocked Jewish moderates. Later Irgun attacks were directed against the British embassy in Rome, the central income tax office in Jerusalem, and the oil refineries in Haifa. These attacks not only violated the very essence of Havlagah, they clearly demonstrated tat the political contradictions in the Haganah-Irgun alliance were beginning to split the joint resistance movement. Although the Haganah restricted its own actions and took great care to avoid, when practicable, inflicting casualties on British forces, it could not restrain the activities of the Irgun - activities that soon disintegrated into a "personal" war between the British and the dissidents. After two Irgun youths were given 18 lashes for their participation in a bank robbery, the Irgun kidnaped a British major and 3 sergeants and before releasing them, administered punishment in kind. On 29 July 1947, Mandate authorities hanged 2 Irgun gunmen for having killed British soldiers during a raid on a prison. The next day, the bodies of 2 British sergeahts were found dangling in an orchard. Unfortunately, the British troops recovering the bodies set off a booby trap and the resulting explosion seriously injured a British captain. (62) Incidents like these infuriated London. Citing the deaths of 99 British soldiers and policemen between 1 October and 18 November 1946, field Marshal Montgomery urged the British government to use whatever military force was required to apprehend the terrorists and crush their base of popular support. Clement Attlee, the British Prime Minister, reminding Montgomery that Operation Agatha had not broken the Yishuv militarily, took no action on the general in impassioned plea. In Palestine, however, British troops reacted to these outrages and, in some instances, acted as vigilantes - beating civilians, destroying shops, and in one instance, murdering a detainee. By May 1947, Ben-Gurion had had enough of the Irgun and ordered the Haganah to begin operations against the dissidents. Unlike the "saison", the Haganah did not actively cooperate with the British. Instead, they acted independently, almost as policemen. Fearing a return to the "saison" and not particularly pleased with the thought of attacking fellow Jews, Yigal Allon, the Palmach Commander, did not allow his troops to participate in this internal affair. For the next several months, the Haganah thwarted an Irgunist attempt to blow-up the British Military Headquarters in Jaffa, prevented an attack on the British army camp at Rehovet, and foiled an assassination attempt on General MacMillan, the military governor of Palestine. For the next 5 months, the Haganah continued to work against Begin's Irgun and, on occasions, won the praise of the British. However, its actions could not and did not break the Irgun. Ben-Gurion, furious with Begin, could only wait for a more propitious moment to silence his opponent. (63) Still suffering economically after World War II, faced with increasing levels of anti-British violence in Palestine, disappointed with continued Arab non-cooperation regarding a settlement of the Palestine debate, and not wanting to alienate Arab opinion by taking any action that might be construed to be anti-Arab, on 18 February 1947, the British government announced: His Majesty's Government have of themselves no power under the terms of the Mandate to award the country to the Arabs or the Jews, or even to partition it between them ... We have therefore reached the conclusion that the only course open to us is to submit the problem to the judgment of the United Nations. (64) Although the Irgun's attacks against the British and British retaliatory strikes against the dissidents continued, the wheels of diplomacy were set in motion. On 29 November 1947, following several months of debate, negotiations, and diplomatic maneuverings, the United Nations voted to terminate the British Mandate and to partition Palestine into three areas - one for the Jews, one for the Arabs, and an international conclave encompassing the various religious sites in and around Jerusalem. Of the 56 nations voting, 33 voted in favor, 13 voted against (to include all 11 Arab states), and 10 nations, to include Great Britain, abstained. (65) Designed to guarantee independence to two separate national and religious groups, the decision instead provided the spark that ignited the 14-month long war known as Israel's War of Independence. That spark also provided Moshe Dayan with the opportunity to reenter full-time military service. Click here to view image CHAPTER IV WAR, POLITICIS, AND INDEPENDENCE: 1948-1949 Beginning in late November 1947 and lasting until early 1949, Israel's War of Independence was one of the most remarkable, unique, and complicated of this century's numerous conflicts. Initially confined to Palestine, the war started with sporadic outbreaks of scattered violence. Within a few months, however, the frequency and ferocity of that violence increased. Riots, bombings, and snipings gave way to guerrilla raids and vicious skirmishes which, in turn, led to a conventional war involving not only Arab and Jewish Palestinians, but also several Middle Eastern Arab states. Just as the war did not begin everywhere at the same time, neither did it end for everyone on the same date. In February 1949, Egypt was the first Arab state to sign an armistice agreement. Iraq merely withdrew its troops and never negotiated a settlement. Given the events of the last 40 years, it is not unreasonable to argue that Israel is still fighting its war of independence or, at a minimum, the consequences of that war. Despite its relatively short duration, its gradual escalation, and the lack of sophisticated weaponry used in its execution, the war was an exceptionally bloody affair. While precise Arab casualty totals are not known, it has been estimated that 15,000 Arabs from Palestine.and its neighboring states were killed. Over 6,O00 of the 650,000 Palestinian Jews died during the 14-months of war. This equates to nearly 1% of the total Jewish pupulation or, put in more graphic terms, the United States would have to sustain over 25 million war dead to proportionately approximate Jewish losses! (1) Of lasting importance was the affect the war had as a stimulus for mass migration. By the end of 1948, 700,000 Arabs, including a majority of the community's political and regilious leaders and a large segment of its commercial and social elite, had fled Palestine and taken up frequently unwelcome residence in neighboring Arab states. (2) The departure of Palestinian Arabs was matched by an equally sizable number of Jews emigrating to Israel. Between 1948 and 1951, nearly 730,000 Jews arrived in Israel, a large number of which were sephardic Jews who had fled their homes in Arab countries in search of economic, social religious, and political freedoms in Israel. In 1951, 400,000 of Israel's 1.4 million Jewish residents had been born in moslem countries. (3) Perhaps the most singularly unique aspect of the war involved Jewish military forces. Beginning the war as light infantry units and as partisan saboteurs, Jewish forces belonged to three separate groups (the Haganah, the Irgun, and LEHI) and generally were capable of conducting only company-sized operations. In May 1948, all of these forces were combined to form ZAHAL,* the Israel Defense Force (IDF). By war's end, the IDF was a mobile, partially mechanized, unified army capable of conducting conventional, multi-brigade, combined arms operations. This transformation was all the more remarkable considering that * ZAHAL: An abbreviation of "Zva Ha-Haganah Le-Israel", more commonly referred to in English as the Israel Defense Force (IDF) it occurred during Israel's fight for survival. Since the war ultimately involved more than Arab and Jewish Palestinians, any discussion of either side's advantages and disadvantages must include the strengths and weaknesses of the five Arab nations - Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Jordan - that invaded Israel in May. (4) In 1947, Arab Palestinians outnumbered their Jewish rivals by a nearly 2-to-1 margin (1.2 million Arabs to 650,000 Jews). With its population concentrated in Jerusalem, in coastal cities, and in some 300 settlements clustered in western Galilee, the Jezreel Valley, and along the coastal plain from Haifa in the north to south of Tel Aviv, the Yishuv's geographic position was tenuous at best. Portions of the area allotted to the Jews were either predominantly Arab or, in the case of both western Galilee and the Negev, were isolated from other areas of Jewish demographic strength. Of critical importance to the Yishuv was the fact that Jerusalem, a religiously significant city containing 15% of the total Jewish population of Palestine, was in the International Area, an enclave completely surrounded by Arab territory. Furthermore, a large number of Jewish settlements (the Etzion Block) near Jerusalem were located in territory granted to the Arabs. (5) The Yishuv's geographic disadvantages were exacerbated by several additional factors. Even predominantly Jewish areas contained sizable Arab populations. While kibbutzim in those areas occupied the fertile valleys, Arab villages were frequently located in the hills. Tactically, this situation not only provided local Arabs with easily defendable terrain, those hills often overlooked the roads linking Jewish settlements. Additionally, the roads connecting both western Galilee and the Negev with the coastal plains passed through territory partitioned to the Arabs. Consequently, these vital Jewish lines of communication, resupply, and reinforcement were susceptible to ambush and interdiction. Finally, unlike Arab Palestine, the Jewish state did not share a common border with any friendly nation and its most secure frontier was its shoreline along the Mediterranean. Despite its traditions of self-defense and partisan tactics and its recently acquired expertise in conventional warfare, the Yishuv's overall military posture was not particularly strong. Although considerably better prepared than their Palestinian Arab counterparts, on paper the Jews did not possess sufficient military strength to oppose the military forces of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan. Theoretically, the Yishuv could muster some 85,000 males of fighting age (18 to 32). In reality, the effective Jewish fighting strength as of November 1947 was a mere 15,000. Although the Haganah boasted a membership of 45,000, its full-time strike force, the Palmach, consisted of 4 battalions with a total force structure of only 3,000 men. The Haganah's remaining forces consisted of the 9,500 men and women of the HISH and various homeguard units containing some 30,000 poorly trained and ill-equipped men, women, and teenagers who were of little value in offensive operations. The Haganah's military partners did not significantly improve this bleak picture. With a strength of roughly 3,000 urban guerrillas, the Irgun could barely equip and field half of its street fighters and saboteurs. LEHI strength was estimated to be 500. (6.) Inadequate supplies of weapons further reduced the Yishuv's military capabilities. While estimates vary, the Haganah possessed between 10-16,000 rifles of various makes and calibers (many of which were antiquated relics dating back to before the Arab Revolt), less than 1,000 light and medium machine guns, and a variety of two-inch and three-inch mortars. Many of these weapons had been either produced locally or smuggled into the country by Rekhesh - the Haganah's arms procurement branch. Other weapons and related war materiel had been stolen from British armories or hijacked from trains. Unlike the Arab armies that invaded Israel in May, the Haganah possessed no artillery, no tanks, and only a meager air force consisting mainly of Piper Cubs. (7) The continued British presence in Palestine adversely affected Jewish military preparedness. Despite its best efforts, the Haganah was not always able to evade British arms raids - raids that were conducted primarily against Jewish, not Arab, arms caches. (8) Britain's naval cordon further restricted the Yishuv's arms procurement operations as the Royal Navy was almost as successful in seizing illegal arms shipments as it was in intercepting Jewish refugees. London maintained this embargo until the Mandate expired in May - a policy that seriously hampered the Yishuv's ability to not only prepare for war, but to defend itself against Arab irregular forces infiltrating Palestine from Syria and Lebanon. The British naval blockade had no affect on the Arabs as most of their weapons were safely stored in nieghboring Arab states. (9) Supporting the nearly 50,000 Palestinan Arab irregulars were the "modern" armies of five Arab states whose combined forces used in the May invasion numbered over 30,000. These forces included armor, artillery, and, in some instances, aircraft. Of particular importance was Jordan's Arab Legion. Perhaps the best military unit in the region, this British- trained and British-equipped force of 7,000 men was led by a British officer, Lieutenant General Sir John Bagot Glubb - affectionately known to his men as "Glubb Pashall. In addition to these conventional forces were Haj Amin's Army of Salvation, numbering some 5,000 militants bent on conducting a jihad, and Fawzi al-Kaukji's 5,500-man Arab Liberation Army. (10) Despite their superiority in men and materiel, Arab forces lacked the organizational cohesion and tactical flexibility that had been bred into Jewish partisan units. Trained as colonial European armies, their inability to either deveop or implement innovative tactical solutions to fit the immediate situation frequently worked against them. Leading the successful defense of Deganiah against invading and numerically superior Syrian forces, Moshe Dayan took advantage of these deficiencies and later wrote "the Syrians advanced according to the book." (11) As Commander of the Palmach, Yigal Allon later attributed Arab military failures to a number of related problems: The Arab commanders tended to be unreliable and had no echelon of experienced junior officers under them. The various Commands were made up of often brilliant and brave individuals who were incapable of, and unused to teamwork. Noteworthy as "hit and run" snipers, the Arabs did poorly whenever well-planned operations, requiring group effort, were called for. (12) Despite their demographic and geographic advantages and their quantitative superiority in men and materiel, the Arabs were unable to implement a coordinated plan for the conquest of Jewish Palestine. This failure contributed greatly to the Arab's ultimate defeat and was rooted in the intense political rivalries between the "allied" Arab states - each of which feared the territorial and political ambitions of the other. Appointed in April as the Arab commander of all invading forces, King Abdullah of Jordan, later wrote: Unity of command existed in name only and the Commander in Chief (Abdullah) was not permitted to inspect the forces which were supposed to be under him. The Arab troops entered Palestine and their lack of progress, their confusion and absence of preparation, were complete. ... History will record the consequences (of this invasion) with pain and regret, the grandsons of these men will blush with shame at the deeds of their grandsires. (13) Central in these disputes were Haj Amin, now living in Lebanon, and King Abdullah. As members of the Arab League, an organization formed in 1944 to promote Arab unity and to ensure that "the rights of the Arabs in Palestine could not be infringed upon without danger to the peace and stability of the Arab world", both men sought the League's approval of their individual designs on Palestine. (14) Haj Amin demanded that the League transfer complete control of Arab Palestine's political affairs to his Higher Arab Committee and that one of his deputies be appointed to the League's general staff. Not particularly anxious to establish a Palestinian state under the Muft is political and religious control, the League rejected his demands in February 1948. (15) King Abdullah, on the other hand, had visions of annexing Arab Palestine, an ambition Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Haj Amin adamantly opposed. Since one of Abdullah's goals was the creation of a Jordanian-Syrian federation under his control, the Syrian, quite naturally, took a dim view of Abdullah's Palestinian aspirations. Saudi Arabia and Egypt opposed Abdullah's territorial ambitions - the former for fear that Jordanian control of the Negev Desert would threaten Saudi interests on the Red Sea and the later for fear that such territorial gains would provide Jordan with direct access to both the Sinai and the Mediterranean Sea. For obvious political reasons, Haj Amin opposed Abdullah's grand territorial aspirations. (16) While discouraging Abdullah's Syrian designs, London quietly supported his plans to annex Arab Palestine. Already enjoying relatively close ties with the Jordanian monarch, the British were initially quite confident that: in the long run the Jews would not be able to cope with the Arabs and would be thrown out of Palestine unless they came to terms with them. (17) Preferring not to deal with the radical and unreliable Haj Amin, London believed that Abdullah's annexation of Arab Palestine would ultimately lead to his control of all of Palestine and would, therefore, help safeguard regional British interests. Whitehall also concluded that British support of the King would help maintain its solid relationship with a future Arab power. (18) However, as the Arab military position in Palestine slowly decayed during the spring of 1948, Abdullah's neighbors, highly suspicious of his plans to annex only Arab Palestine, pressured him to join the combined invasion. Unlike the Arabs, the Yishuv was united in purpose and viewed the coming hostilities as a war of survival. Having survived the Holocaust, Jewish resolve was best epitomized in the words of Enzo Sereni . A Palmach commando parachuted into Italy and later executed at Dachau, Sereni wrote: If we want to live, we must be ready to die, and to kill, to go out towards the looming dangers ... even in death, there are the seeds of life. (19) Given the war's diplomatic, political, and military complexities, the best way to examine the conflict is to divide it into four periods: - Phase One - 29 November 1947 through late March 1948; - Phase Two - early April to 15 May; - Phase Three - 16 May to 11 June; and - Phase four - 11 June 1948 through January 1949. While it is not possible to examine these phases in detail, the following paragraphs provide a brief discussion of the significant events that took place during each phase. This discussion will then be used to briefly analyze the evolution of the Israel Defense force and to examine Moshe Dayan' s participation in that war. (20) The dominant characteristics of Phase One were the chaos created by the British withdrawal and the Yishuv's inability to seize the military initiative. Throughout this period, London was concerned with the safe evacuation of its forces, a withdrawal designed to protect British lives. On 11 December, the British Foreign Office announced that the Mandate's civil administration would end on 15 May and that British military units would be withdrawn in a phased operation commencing in February and ending by 31 July. The Foreign Office also announced that while Britain would not obstruct the United Nations partition plan, it would neither assist in implementing that plan nor permit its troops to maintain law and order in evacuated areas. (21) This policy, London's continued enforcement of Mandate regulations in those areas from which British authority had not yet been withdrawn, and the sequence of the British withdrawal - first from Arab-held territories, then from mixed territories, and lastly from predominantly Jewish territories - prompted Yigal Allon to later charge that the British withdrawal was phased: in accordance not only with the organizational requirements of the British Army, but with those of the Arabs. ... The British planned their evacuation in such a manner that it would be easy for the Arabs to take over from them. (22) But as the tempo of fighting between Arabs and Jews increased, London accelerated its withdrawal. Since the precise withdrawal schedule was not announced to either side, however, unexpected British evacuations created a political and military vacuum - a vacuum that produced chaos. As the British withdrew from major cities like Jerusalem, Haifa, Safed, and Jaffa, street fighting erupted. Sometimes lasting for days, these bloody encounters killed hundreds. Militarily, British withdrawal policies forced the Haganah High Command to employ tactics that complimented Arab strategy. Realizing the simplest way to defeat the Jews was to isolate their settlements, the Arabs quickly blocked key road networks running through their territories thereby force the Haganah to resupply and reinforce those settlements using convoys. Acting in accordance with existing policy, British troops usually refused to allow either side to occupy territory not ceded to them under the partition plan. Prevented from securing terrain overlooking roads that ran through Arab territory or that connected Jewish settlements within Arab territory, the Haganah was forced to defend individual convoys - a costly and manpower intensive tactic that could not break the Arab's strangle hold. Arab forces quickly laid siege to the Jewish quarter of Jerusalem and to the Etzion Block settlements. Repeated Jewish attempts to relieve those beleaguered communities were largely ineffective and ultimately led to the loss of both Jerusalem and the Etzion settlements. With the Arabs possessing the initiative and with elements of al-Kaukji's Arab Liberation Army infiltrating Palestine, the Jewish situation deteriorated rapidly during the first three months of 1948. With casualties sustained in the defense of individual settlements and in running Arab ambushes and blockades reaching unacceptable levels (during the last week of March 100 Jews were killed trying to keep the roads open), some members of the Haganah High Command suggested abandoning isolated or outlying communities. This move, they argued, would conserve limited military resources while a lowing Jewish forces to concentrate in vital areas. Ben-Gurion, the acting Minister of Defense, emphatically rejected this proposal as did Yigal Yadin, the army's Chief of Operations. (23) Remembering the lessons of the Arab Revolt, Yadin advocated launching quick strikes against Arab bases and supply depots and even suggested that the bridges linking Palestine with Syria and the Transjordan be destroyed to stem the influx of Arab "volunteers" pouring into Palestine. While the Haganah was not yet capable of implementing this bold suggestion, Yadin's proposal resulted in the development of "Plan D" whose strategic goals were: To gain control of all the area allotted to the Jewish State and defend its borders, and those of the blocks of Jewish settlements and such Jewish population as were outside those borders, against a regular or para- regular enemy operating from bases outside or inside the area of the Jewish state. (24) Calling for the permanent seizure of Arab villages as well as Arab territory containing Jewish settlements, "Plan D" and the various operations conducted in its implementation have often been cited as one of the principle reasons for the mass migration of Arabs out of Palestine. (25) The implementation of "Plan D" marked the end of Phase One. On 3 April, the Haganah, with Palmach support, launched "Operation Nachshon", the first of 39 offensive operations Jewish forces conducted during the war. The operation's objective was to open a supply corridor running from the coastal plains to both Jerusalem and the Etzion Block settlements. To accomplish this, Jewish forces were required to seize and hold key terrain along the winding road leading to Jerusalem. Although Jewish forces had previously operated only in company-sized formations, a mobile brigade was quickly formed and for two weeks it fought to clear the road. While relief columns did reach Jerusalem, Arab forces launched a series counterattacks and resealed the road. Despite this failure and the significant logistics problems encountered during the operation, "Nashchon" marked a significant turning point in the war. It not only demonstrated that Jewish forces could conduct offensive operations at the brigade level "Operation Nashchon" signaled the end of the defensive mindset that had paralyzed the Jewish war effort. (26) Unfortunately, the first of many of atrocities were committed during the operation. On 9 April, Begin's Irgun, supported with LEHI elements, attacked Deir Yassin, a small Arab village located on the outskirts of Jerusalem. During the fighting, over 200 Arab villagers were slaughtered. Claiming the villagers fired first, Begin argued that the capture of Deir Yassin was vital to operation. Ben-Gurion was outraged and condemned both massacre and its perpetrators. On 13 April, the Arabs retaliated. Attacking a medical convoy headed for Jerusalem, Arabs butchered some 80 doctors and nurses. Although British troops were stationed less than one mile away, they took no action. (27) With "Operation Nashchon" striking at Jerusalem, Yigal Allon's Palmach launched attacks in northern Palestine and cleared Arab forces from Safed and western Galilee. (26.) By early May, "Plan D's" objectives had been largely accomplished. With the exception of Jerusalem and the hilly regions of central Palestine running south from Galilee to Samaria and Judea, Jewish forces held most of the territory allocated to the Yishuv under the United Nations partition plan as well as some Arab territory containing Jewish farming communities. With the formal termination of the British Mandate on 14 May, Ben-Gurion promptly announced the formation of the State of Israel. The Arabs, having already met in April to develop invasion plans, quickly launched their offensive - an invasion designed to rescue Palestinan Arabs and to protect each invading nation's regional interests. The invasion marked the end of Phase Two as the Arabs regained the initiative. Attacking from Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt, the Arab invasion lacked crisp coordination and sound execution. Instead of bypassing outlying Jewish settlements, Syrian and Egyptian forces usually engaged those communities in time consuming attacks. Although the Egyptian forces fought their way to within 20 miles of Tel Aviv, their refusal to skirt fortified kibbutzim seriously retarded their offensive thrust and allowed Jewish forces to form 501 id defensive positions on key terrain protecting the southern approaches to Tel Aviv. Syrian attacks made even less progress and Lebanese forces were quickly expelled. The Arab Legion, perhaps in the best position to cut Israel in half with a quick thrust to the coast, generally confined its activities to consolidating Jordanian control over what is now referred to as the West Bank. This prompted Haj Amin to vehemently condemn King Abdullah and brand him a traitor to the Arab cause. The combined Arab attacks continued until 11 June when the first United Nations truce went into affect. While this brief summary might suggest that the Jewish forces handled the invading Arab armies with relative ease, nothing could be further from the truth. Although Jewish settlements had effectively delayed many of the Arab advances thereby permitting Jewish forces to shift their 12, newly-formed mobile brigades to stop all major attacks, Israel's position was desperate. During the truce, its position was precarious at best. Click here to view images Like the Arabs, Israel took advantage of the 30-day truce to rest and rearm its forces. However, the new state also used the ceasefire to complete several other vital tasks. Israel used the respite to complete the reorganization of its military forces begun on 26 May with the creation of the Israel Defense force (IDF) - a consolidation that combined all Jewish military and para-military organizations under a single, national command. No longer under British restrictions, Israel also intensified its efforts to acquire additional weapons as well as to absorb the arms and immigrants that had begun to pour into it sports following the British withdrawal. Finally, the new IDF general staff carefully studied the experiences of the previous six months and developed plans for resuming the war once the truce expired. Taking advantage of Israel's interior lines and the Arabs inability to prosecute a coordinated military campaign, the IDF decided to regain the initiative and keep the Arabs off- balance by launching a series of operations requiring rapid shifting of concentrated combat power from one sector to another. Each shift would result in a concentrated assault designed to regain lost territory, relieve threatened settlements, and defeat their numerically superior opponents. These preparations resulted in "Operation Dani", Israel's first counter-offensive since the 15 May Arab invasion. Since that offensive helped to permanently regain the initiative for Israeli forces, it is not unreasonable to infer that Phase four began 11 June 1948 and ended in January 1949 when the Egyptians were outmaneuvered and defeated in the eastern Sinai . During the next 7 months of bitter fighting, the IDF successfully defeated each Arab army and neutralized the guerrilla forces operating within Israel's borders. Building on its experiences and learning from its mistakes, the IDF launched operation after operation, each more finely tuned and more crisply executed than the last. As its expertise grew, so did the size of its operations and by the end of the war, the IDF was capable of planning and executing highly mobile, partially mechanized, combined arms, multi-brigade attacks. This evolutionary transformation of Jewish military capabilities was the result of a complex melding process begun with the creation of the IDF in late May 1948. Containing every Jewish military organization from the Haganah and the Palmach to the Irgun, and from LEHI to the veterans of the Jewish Brigade and the British army, the IDF was the product of the fusion of two distinct, yet complimentary military traditions. The Jewish Brigade and the other Jewish veterans of the British army represented one of these military traditions. British military training, organization, and combat techniques had been inculcated into the Jewish Brigade, thereby forming the IDF's traditional or "military purist" foundation. Knowledgeable in brigade level tactics and combat service support requirements for large scale offensive operations, these veterans of conventional war used their technical talents and staff planning skills to correct the logistical and coordination problems that had plagued many of the earlier Jewish operations. By harnessing, but not constraining, the aggressive spirit and collective abilities of the Jewish underground, these forgotten heroes enhanced the IDF's ability to wage conventional war in a doctrinally unconventional manner. (29) This foundation was complimented by the Haganah's partisan approach to war. Emphasizing individual and small unit combat skills, the Haganah and its elite shock companies, the Palmach, had fostered the development of non-traditional military tactics that were neither based upon nor hampered by a stable rear-area with its dependence on secure routes of communication, resupply, and transportation. While the fusion of the "purist" and the partisan approaches to combat was not an easy process, the melding of those foundations provided the Israel Defense force with its unique and highly effective approach to combat. (30) As the size and complexity of Israeli operations increased and as the number of Jewish soldiers rose from 15,000 regulars in November 1947 to nearly 80,000 in October 1948, the army's command structure underwent a series of modifications. Each of these evolutionary changes attempted to provide better coordination and greater flexibility in both offensive and defensive operations. In February 1948, Ben-Gurion, the acting Minister of Defense, divided Palestine into nine military districts with each district sitting astride probable invasion routes. These districts contained a "mix-master" of various Haganah units from Palmach and HISH battalions to local self- defense units, all of which reported to the district commander who, in turn, received his orders from the Haganah High Command. While this arrangement was adequate during the defensive battles of February and March, it proved too inflexible when Jewish forces launched their offensives in April and May. During those operations, the High Command found it difficult to coordinate actions between districts, to effectively control mult-brigade operations within a district, to solve debilitating combat service support problems, and to settle command relationship disputes between Palmach commanders and district commanders. Following the creation of the IDF, Ya'akov Dori , the IDF Chief-of-Staff, and his Chief-of-Operations, Yigal Yadin, took advantage of the first United Nations truce and established a layer of intermediate commands between the districts and the IDF headquarters. Those commands were responsible for coordinating multi-unit operations within a district and for efficiently controlling military actions involving two or more districts. While increasing operational flexibility and reducing confusion, even this command and control arrangement proved too cumbersome. In the fall, shortly after Ben-Gurion disbanded the Palmach, IDF units were divided between four commands - the Northern, Central, Southern, and the Jerusalem fronts - each of which contained a staff of sufficient quality and size to efficiently direct military campaigns within their areas of geographic responsibility. (31) Despite this imposition of a formal command and control structure rooted in the traditional or "military purist" foundation, commanders within those fronts were expected to lead their units in the partisan tradition. Once given a mission (or aim), each unit was expected to push and to fight on in one continuous battle (maintain) until the assigned objective was gained. While front commanders developed the overall concept of operations and provided subordinate commanders with their aim maximum discretion was given to unit commanders who were held responsible for the "maintenance" (attacks) required to secure that aim. Commonly referred to as "maintenance of aim" or "maintenance of the objective", this loosely-structured battlefield command and control system relied heavily on the small unit leader's daring, resourcefulness, fighting spirit, and sound judgment. During the Sinai Campaign of 1956, Moshe Dayan, a great proponent of this "structured-partisan" approach to war, provided the following description of its use: Our units must stick to "maintenance of aim", and continue to advance until their objective is gained. They must therefore be self-contained, carrying with them all they will need to reach their final target, and not be dependent on outside supplies. Once the roads are clear, they must press forward and not stop to clean up isolated enemy positions. We should avoid analogies whereby Egyptian units would be expected to behave as European armies would in similar circumstances. (32) Although he eventually became the IDF Chief-of-Staff, Moshe Dayan best epitomizes the IDF is partisan traditions. While recognizing the importance of the "purist" military tradition, Dayan believed that the values and spirit of the IDF's "partisan" tradition were of the utmost importance and throughout his career, he fostered and nurtured that tradition. When asked what Dayan's greatest strengths and weaknesses were, one Israeli general replied: Dayan's greatest contribution was in the field of developing the IDF's fighting spirit and self- sacrifice, initiative, inventiveness and original thinking. .. . Dayan's main weakness was perhaps a certain disregard for the subjects of logistics, order and discipline; the rights and obligations of regular and reserve soldiers, and his tendency to ignore orderly staff procedures. (33) These remarks underscore the importance Dayan placed on reviving and maintaining the IDF's partisan heritage within the confines of conventional, "traditional" war. Although Dayan fought in three separate actions - the defense of Deganiah against the Syrians in May 1948, "Operation Dani" against the Arab Legion in July, and later in that month against the Egyptians in the Negev desert - "Operation Dani" provides the best example of his tactical skills and aggressive style of combat leadership, traits that he demanded his officers and NCO's adopt during his tenure as IDF Chief-of-Staff. (34) Dayan began the war as the Haganah's Staff Officer for Arab Affairs, a post he had held since early 1947. Since his earliest childhood, Dayan had developed a special interest in and felt deep compass ion for Palestinian Arabs and, as an adult, was one of the few Israeli leaders who bothered to learn Arabic. While not completely understanding Dayan's special relationship with his Arab neighbors, the Haganah asked him to gather intelligence information regarding various Arab families and how those clans would react when war came to Palestine. While little is written concerning the effectiveness of his operation, in March 1948 he provided a great service to his nation. In that month, his younger brother was killed while defending a settlement in northern Palestine against Druze militia operating under Fawzi al-Kaukji is command. After the battle, Dayan met with the Druze leader and not only persuaded him to withdraw his units from al-Kaukji's control, but to also enter the war on Israel's side! After Israel's War of Independence, the Druze living in northern Israel demanded that they be allowed to-serve in the IDF, a request that was immediately granted. (35) In May, Yitzhak Sadeh invited Dayan to form an independent raiding battalion that would operate as part of his 8th Armored Brigade. Dayan eagerly accepted the challenge but before he could organize his battalion, the Haganah High Command sent him to Galilee to coordinate the district's defense against the invading Syrians. Although he had been instructed that the troops in the Jordan Valley did not come under his command, after meeting with the district commander and fully appreciating the gravity of the Jewish position, Dayan: ceased to be bothered by who was subordinate to whom. The situation appeared to be so desperate that the problem was not who was to give orders but what was to be done. (36) Displaying a characteristic disregard for formal chains of command, Dayan personally led the defense of Deganiah - the first kibbutz founded in Israel and also his birthplace - against a numerically superior Syrian force equipped with tanks, artillery, and aircraft. In a 9-hour battle on 20 May, Dayan's tiny force not only held Deganiah, but forced the Syrians to retreat. This epic stand brought Dayan instant fame and national acclaim at a time when Israel's prospects of survival appeared to be non- existent. Following the stunning victory at Deganiah, Dayan began organizing the 89th Commando Battalion. Equipped with half- tracks and Jeeps, the 89th Commando Battalion's primary function was, in Dayan's words: "to penetrate deep into enerny territory and operate behind enemy lines." (37) This mission suited Dayan perfectly for it allowed him to operate in an environment that demanded independent action - an environment that suited both his partisan training and his partisan talents. With Israel short of equipment and with its trained personnel already assigned to combat units, Dayan formed his battalion in a most unorthodox, yet at that time accepted manner. Although selected brigades had been ordered to provide his unit with a quota of 40 prospective recruits each, Dayan frequently persuaded men from other units to join his battalion - a practice that infuriated commander's whose units had already been depleted in combat. During the first United Nations truce, the IDF general staff ended this practice by strictly regulating the formation of new units and by establishing a mobilization system that funneled new troops into existing units. Dayan's approach to gathering equipment was equally novel. He authorized and occasionally led his growing band in the theft of civilian and military jeeps. (38) Dayan is reliance on the partisan approach to war was also evidenced in the different priorities he established while forming his battalion. Dayan carefully screened each prospective recruit since he was primarily concerned with finding men full of: confidence and fighting spirit, the will to get into action and strike the enemy. This was the very quality I was looking for and I did everything to encourage it. (39) When it came to administrative, logistical, and combat service support matters, Dayan took a different approach: I left them (those matters) to my deputy, Yohanan Peltz, an experienced officer who had served in the Jewish Brigade of the British army in the world war and who was more of an "organization man," more familiar with administration and logistics. (40) By late June, his battalion of 350 hand-picked men was organized and ready for action. Consisting of five companies - one jeep, two mechanized infantry, one support/reconnaissance, and one command - Dayan later wrote that some of these companies were "hardly larger than a platoon." (41) Shortly thereafter, Ben-Gurion asked Dayan to represent Israel at the funeral of Colonel David "Mickey" Marcus. A West Point graduate who had volunteered his services in Israel's battle for survival, Marcus had been accidentally killed by his own troops near Jerusalem. Dayan did not return to Israel from the United States until 9 July, a few hours before the truce was to expire. While in New York, Dayan met with Abraham J. Baum who had served in the 4th Armored Division under Colonel Creighton Abrams. Since Dayan had no experience in mechanized warfare, the two men discussed various theories on the subject and to Dayan's amazement: Baum's words fitted my own ideas, and I still remember our conversation. He preached the supreme importance of speed and mobility in battle. According to him, it was best not to undertake preliminary reconnaissance patrols to the projected target of attack, for the information thus received was usually meager, and by tipping off the enemy, the element of surprise was lost. It was best to go straight to the assault positions, with the reconnaissance unit moving ahead, observing, sensing, feeling out the situation, reporting back, and guiding the main force. Baum's experience was born of a different kind of war, but several of his points seemed to me to be applicable to us, too. One was the need to maintain continuous movement. Another was to have the commander direct the action from the front line so that he could see what was happening with his own eyes, rather than rely on second hand-reports. (42) Baum also urged Dayan to concentrate his force in narrow penetration formations and to use his unit's fire power more as "a psychological factor than as a weapon of death." (43) Baum's idea of directing the battle from the front line also coincided with Dayan's concept of a commander's proper role in combat. Having always advocated and practiced this belief from his early days as a Haganah instructor through his active participation in the defense of Deganiah, Dayan was dismayed with other IDF commanders who "stayed at the rear base and `directed' the battle from there." He privately wondered: how it was possible to "control the operation" without being on the spot with one's own battalion. It was possible to receive reports and transmit orders by radio, but a commander could lead a unit into battle only by fighting with them, not by remote control, and not by sitting safely in the rear ordering one's men to storm the enemy. (44) Returning to Israel on 9 July, just a few hours before the start of "Operation Dani", Dayan was quickly briefed on the overall operation and the 89th Commando Battalion's specific mission. Led by Yigal Allon and directed against the Arab Legion, the two-phased, multi-brigade operation was planned to accomplish the following tasks - relieve Jerusalem, push the Arab Legion back from its positions near Tel Aviv, secure the Lod airport, and provide the IDF with better defensive positions from which future attacks would be launched. During phase one, the towns of Lod (Lydda) and Ramle were to be seized in a pincer movement with one arm moving from the north and linking up with the southern thrust near the besieged Jewish settlement of Ben Shemen. During the second phase, Arab fortifications at Latrun and Ramallah were to be captured thereby opening a portion of the road leading to Jerusalem. Dayan's 89th Commando Battalion was to strike from the north and seize the Arab villages of Kula Click here to view image (Kule), Tira, and Deir Tarif, all of which were opposite the defensive positions occupied by Glubb Pasha's Arab Legion. (45) Linking up with his unit on the evening of the 9th, Dayan quickly changed the battalion's operational plan developed in his absence by Yohanan Peltz, his executive officer and a former officer on the Jewish Brigade. According to Dayan, Peltz's scheme was a "good plan for fighting against a European Regular Army. But we were fighting Arabs, not Germans. " Additionally, Dayan did not particularly care for the "long softening up preparation by our 81mm mortars. I favored the quick dash." (46) Dividing his battalion so that it could strike Kula and Tira simultaneously on the 10th, Dayan was dissatisfied with the battalion's excessive reliance on indirect weapons. Instead of diving full expression to its fighting capacity, flinging its entire weight against the target, using all of its firepower, and storming the enemy's positions, the battalion merely fired off half a dozen mortars. This was not the real thing. Something had to be done. So I went over to Akiva Sa'ar [the company commander leading the assault on Kula] and told him to stop using kid gloves. He should break into Kula without delay, and I would take the second company and storm the neighboring village or Tira. (47) Both villages fell and before dark, the Arab strong point at Deir Tarif some two miles south of Tira was also in Moshe's hands. During the evening, Dayan was summoned to Tel Aviv and in a meeting with Ben-Gurion, was offered command of the Jerusalem Sector. Dayan refused the request since: Under no circumstances would I wish to leave it [the 89th], relinquishing command of a combat unit with the responsibility of personally leading it into action. In the Jerusalem Command I would be ordering others to fight. Here I would be fighting together with my men. (48) Returning to his unit the next morning, 11 July, Dayan found that the battalion had been dispersed between Tira and Deir Tarif with portions of his unit assigned to positions previously held by the 82nd Tank Battalion. Dayan was furious! I failed to understand why the 82nd Tank Battalion had retired and how a jeep unit was expected to fight armor without any armor of its own. ... What angered me most was that instead of using our battalion as a concentrated iron fist, spitting fire and storming the enemy, it had been broken up and used piecemeal, some detachments being assigned to guard Arab villages that had already been captured. (49) Reassembling his command, Dayan surveyed the situation. Looking south from a vantage point atop a hill, Dayan could see the Arab Legion's positions to the east and "Operation Dani's phase one objective (the town of Lod) three-and-one-half miles to the south. With no enemy forces between his position and the eastern approaches to Lod, Dayan quickly developed a plan for an assault on that key village. Leaving half of the battalion at Deir Tarif to tie down the Arab Legion, Dayan planned to lead 150 men in a quick strike against Lod. (50) At that moment, however, fate intervened, not once, but twice. First, the commander of the Yiftak Brigade, the unit previously designated to capture Lod with an attack from the southwest, radioed Dayan and mistaking the 89th Commandos for a tank battalion, asked Dayan if he could support the attack? Never informing the brigade commander of his mistake, Dayan's immediate response was an unqualified "Yes." Second, Dayan's men retrieved a disabled Jordanian armored car mounting a 2-pound cannon. Renamed "The Terrible Tiger", the vehicle led Dayan's column in its assault. The rest is history. Ordering his men that if the column's lead elements were stopped, the rest of the column would "deploy promptly to the flanks and storm the enemy position from a sides", Dayan successfully led an attack against both Lod and Ramle. Mounted on only half-tracks and jeeps and with "The Terrible Tiger" in the lead, Dayan's men stormed through strong Arab positions on the northern outskirts of Lod, raced through the town firing in all directions, and exited Lod to the south. After streaking through Ramle, Dayan reassembled his unit, turned the column around, and retraced its path back through both towns, again firing in all directions. The speed, ferocity, and unexpected nature of the attack so demoralized the Arab defenders that many of them hastily retreated to the east and to safety - enabling the Yiftak Brigade to capture Lod as originally planned. Although this daring attack had been conducted in full daylight, the 89th Commando Battalion's casualties were only 9 killed and 17 wounded. Once again, Dayan was acclaimed as a national hero and once again Ben-Gurion asked him to take command of the Jerusalem Sector. Dayan declined the offer. Briefly describing his private meeting with Ben-Gurion, Dayan wrote: He [Ben-Gurion] did not agree with my implied thesis that the best way to get past the first line of enemy positions was through the fast and daring dash. To him, an attack should be planned and carried out methodically and steadily like the movement of a steamroller. We ended our brief exchange with him regarding me as a bold enough commander but somewhat of a partisan, and my regarding him a wise and inspiring political leader who had learned and heard much of the Arabs and of war, but who had no close, personal, first-hand knowledge of either. He knew about them, but he did not know them. (51) Despite these differences, Ben-Gurion continued to pressure Dayan to take command of the Jerusalem Sector. In August 1948, after leading the 89th in action against the Egyptians in the Negev Desert and after being promoted to Lieutenant Colonel, Dayan accepted Ben-Gurion's offer. This marked an important turning point in Dayan's career. Spending the rest of the war negotiating with the Jordanians over ceasefire lines, Joint peacekeeping operations, truces, and prisoner exchanges, the post provided Dayan with his first real taste of politics and diplomacy and forever cemented his relationship with Ben-Gurion, Israel's first Prime Minister. (52) Dayan's political association with Ben-Gurion began during the during the dark days of the "saison". In 1944, Dayan rejoined the Haganah and taking part in the "saison", described it as "a very unhappy season." While neither Dayan nor his biographer, Shabtai Teveth, describe his precise role in the affair, Dayan did hold discussions with Begin and his subordinates. Although understanding their motivations and respecting their spirit of self-sacrifice, Dayan wrote: I remained a "Haganah" man in the eyes of these men of the dissident underground. I was completely at one in my way of thinking and my actions with the path marked out by Ben-Gurion who was firmly opposed to the dissidents and called for an end to their terror activities. (53) It is not known whether or not Dayan's firm stance brought him to Ben-Gurion's attention. What is known is that by 1945, Dayan had made an important politcal decision in choosing to actively support Ben-Gurion and his policies. In 1946, Dayan officially joined Ben-Gurion's Mapai Party and in December, he attended the 22nd World Zionist Congress held in Basle. During that conference, Ben-Gurion and Weizmann clashed one last time over whether the Yishuv should actively pursue its national goals independent of London or whether Jews should adopt Weizmann's policies of moderation and cooperation with London. As in 1942 at the Biltmore Conference, Ben-Guirion won. Describing himself as an "enthusiastic `Ben-Gurionst'", Dayan fully supported: the activist line urged by Ben-Gurion, in contrast to Chaim Weizmann's policy of moderation toward the British administration. The World War had ended, Hitler had been defeated, and there was no point in continuing to cooperate with the British, who harshly restricted Jewish immigration into Palestine and Jewish settlement and development in the country. In my view, this (Ben-Gurion's) approach included not all defense matters but all Zionist aims, particularly land settlement and immigration. (54) At the conference, Dayan addressed an internal meeting of the Mapai Party delegation and expressed his complete support of Ben- Gurion's activist approach. Apparently pleased with these comments, Ben-Gurion publicly endorsed Dayan's "wide definition of `activism'". While Ben-Gurion later claimed that he did not know Dayan until May 1948, both Ya'akov Dori and Yigal Yadin state otherwise. During 1947 and 1948, these future Israel Defense force Chief's-of-Staff were ranking member of the Haganah High Command and Dayan worked for them as the Haganah Officer for Arab Affairs. Both men recall that Dayan not only had free access to Ben-Gurion through these years, but that he frequently exercised that privilege without their prior knowledge or approval. Even as a junior staff officer, Moshe Dayan displayed his characteristic disregard for formal chains of command and proper command relationships - traits he carried with him as he rose through the ranks to become IDf Chief-of-Staff. (55) The important thing to remember about Dayan's formal entry into politics - joining the Mapai Party, publicly praising Ben Gurion's "activist" approach, and his free access to the Head of the Jewish Agency while only a junior staff officer - is that Ben-Gurion and Dayan formed an exceptionally strong political relationship before Israel's War of Independence. This relationship later provided Dayan with an "inside edge" over his Haganah contemporaries, an edge that in 1953 resulted in Ben- Gurion's appointment of Dayan as IDF Chief-of-Staff. This does not argue that Dayan was unqualified for that position or that his selection was made at the expense of other, more qualified professionals. Instead, the unbreakable political bond between Dayan and Ben-Gurion complimented and strengthened Dayan's growing military reputation to such an extent that prior to his first retirement as Israel's Prime Minister in January 1954, Ben-Gurion selected Dayan as Chief-of-Staff - an appointment frequently interpreted as Ben-Gurion's way of perpetuatirig his national policies. (56) This political bond had been formed and later tested during a particularly sensitive era. While Ben-Gurion recognized that Israel's external security rested on the strength of its military forces, he demanded that those forces fully support Israel's elected government. To Ben-Gurion, the last problem Israel needed to face was that of a highly political military force (or forces) committed to political, not national goals. Consequently, many of the actions he took against the Irgun and later against the Palmach were the direct result of his beliefs regarding military-civilian relations. The "saison" had not endeared Ben-Gurion with Begin's right-wing Irgun. Ben-Gurion's concerns over the Palmach's leftist tendencies also made him suspicious of that organization's political intentions and would, in October 1948, influence his controversial decision to disband that elite force. The Palmach's founding father, Yitzhak Sadeh, had the reputation of a social revolutionary and Tabenkin, the individual whose proposal rescued the Palmach in late 1942, was an avowed Marxist. To further complicate matters, Yigal Allon, appointed Palmach Commander in 1945, had broken away from Mapai in 1942 and in 1944, had helped form a separate labor party which, in 1948, became Mapam* - Israel's communist party. Furthermore, nearly 40% of the Palmach's rank and file either belonged to or were associated with Tabenkin's leftist kibbutzim federation. Although a member of Mapai, Ben-Gurion was also Head of the Jewish Agency and neither of these organizations had political authority over the Palmach. While the Palmach voluntarily agreed to submit to the Agency's and not Ben-Gurion's authority during the revolt against England, given its close ties with Mapam, it is not surprising that Ben-Gurion accepted Dayan's support and, in later years, rewarded him for both his loyalty and his demonstrated abilities. (57) But in politically tense situations, loyalty is often earned through action, not words. On 21 June 1948, during the first * MAPAM: Israel's Communist Party. United Nations truce, Dayan physically demonstrated his loyalty to Ben-Gurion during the "Altalena Affair". (58) For several years, Ben-Gurion had regarded the Irgun "as a dangerous source of dissidence and was determined to destroy it as a military organization." (59) Although he had tried to rid the Yishuv of Begin's Revisionist para-military group during the "saison", his efforts had failed. When Israel declared its independence in May, Dayan, like Ben-Gurion, "assumed that the Irgun would submit to the jurisdiction of the Israeli government." (60) However, in mid- June 1948, Ben-Gurion and the IDF learned of a covert Irgun weapons smuggling operation - an operation whose purpose was to arm only Begin's forces. Echoing Ben-Gurion's angry sentiments, Dayan wrote: This act could only be viewed as an irresponsible and wanton act of defiance of governmental authority, and it had to be vigorously and speedily dealt with. (61) While other units had been ordered to intercept the weapons as soon as the Irgun began transferring them from the ship to the beaches north of Tel Aviv, those units refused to take action against their fellow Jews. In what Teveth describes as "the government's search for loyal units", the IDF turned to Sadeh who then tasked Dayan with the mission. Deciding not to involve those troops in his battalion who were former members of LEHI, Dayan is force surrounded the Irgun position on the night of 21 June. Informing the Irgunists that they were surrounded and ordering them to surrender, the Irgun opened fire. Following a deadly exchange of gurifire and mortars that killed two of Dayan's men and wounded six others, the ship weighed anchor and steamed to Tel Aviv where it was promptly seized. All of the weapons captured on the beach were promptly returned to IDF armories This event so impressed Ben-Gurion that he immediately pressed Dayan to take command of the more prestigious Jerusalem Sector. Although not particularly anxious to leave his battalion, Dayan ultimately accepted the honor and at Ben- Gurion's request, conducted numerous negotiations with ranking members of the Jordanian military, with diplomats representing the Jordanian government, and even with King Abdullah himself. Performing these duties with brilliance and with tact, Dayan's public image changed from that of a "partisan fighter" to that of a "soldier statesman". Of even greater importance, Ben- Gurion viewed Dayan as a capable and valuable political ally. Rewarding his loyalty and his demonstrated military and diplomatic abilities, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion promoted Dayan to Major General on 21 November 1949. On 25 November 1949, Minister of Defense Ben-Gurion replaced Yigal Allon, the Commander of the Southern front, with Dayan - an appointment made while Allon was touring french Algeria. Although Allon and the other Mapam members of the IDF had made no public statements nor taken any actions that could be interpreted as a prelude to a left-wing coup, Ben-Gurion made sure that all radicals or suspected radicals were eventually removed from the IDF. Thus by 1950, having proven himself on the battlefield and at the negotiating table, Dayan was fully prepared to assume greater political and military responsibilities. In the years to come, he would lead Israeli forces in three separate wars and would eventually be recognized as Israel's greatest soldier. CHAPTER V EPILOGUE With its independence secured, Israel turned its attention to the task of creating a self-sufficient Jewish state. The war, however, had destroyed much of its economic capacity and, coupled with the massive influx of Jewish immigrants, Israel's economy nearly collapsed. With the national budget producing unacceptable deficits, Ben-Gurion, Israel's Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, had no alternative but to slash the nation's defense budget. This action seriously strained the relationship between Ben-Gurion and Yigal Yadin, the IDF Chief-of-Staff, and in 1952, led to Yadin's resignation. His replacement was the British-trained Mordechai Maklef who, faced with similar problems, eventually resigned in 1953. But financial constraints were not the only problem facing the IDF. Many of the Palmach heroes of Israel's War of Independence, men like Yigal Allon and Yitzhak Sadeh, had been forced out of the military due to their membership in Mapam, Israel's Communist Party. This blood less purge had a deleterious impact on the IDF's capabilities as a large number of exceptional veterans left the military for more profitable civilian careers. Although national law required all able-bodied young men and women to serve in the IDF, many of these new recruits were sephardic Jews whose limited education and their inability to speak Hebrew hindered their military training. This, when combined with low pay and harsh working conditions, severely limited the IDF's career appeal. This decline in military preparedness could not have come at a worse time as a wave of nationalism swept through Israel's defeated Arab neighbors. Arab reaction to their recent defeat dashed any hopes for peace between Arab and Jew as three Arab governments were toppled between 1950 and 1952. In 1950, the Syrian government was overthrown in the first of a series of coups that would destabilize that nation for several years to come. In 1951, King Abdullah of Jordan, perhaps the most moderate of Arab leaders, was gunned-down by Haj Amin's henchmen. Abdullah's grandson now sits on the Jordanian throne and, like his grandfather, he too holds moderate attitudes toward Israel. In 1952, Nassar overthrew King Farouk of Egypt and for the next 20 years, tried to strengthen and embellish his position by taking a very hard-line toward Israel. Nassar and other militant Arab nationalists used the Palestinian refugee problem to its fullest potential, recruiting and training them for commando actions. As early as 1950, Arab guerrillas had already begun penetrating Israel is borders and by 1952, it was apparent that Israel's neighbors were either actively supporting those attacks or providing passive support by ignoring them. From 1950 through 1953, the IDF was incapable of dealing with those raids and despite several attempts, was unable to effectively strike Arab terrorist bases. With troop morale low, it appeared that Israeli forces had not only lost their ability to fight, but also their will to win. Political changes in Israel coincided with both the decline if Israel's military capabilities and Arab reaction to their recent defeat. Growing increasingly tired of the political infighting within his government, Ben-Gurion decided to retire in 1954. In a move often cited as an attempt to ensure that his political views were represented in both the government and in the military, Ben-Gurion appointed Moshe Dayan, then IDF Chief- of-Operations, as IDF Chief-of-Staff in December 1953. Given a mandate to improve the IDF's readiness and combat performance, Dayan made sweeping changes. Replacing many of the younger, British-trained officers with older officers with whom he had served, Dayan transformed the IDF from an organization that emphasized a "spit-and-polish" appearance, to a lean, alert, prepared, and confident force honed on his personality and shaped in his image. Faced with an inadequate budget, Dayan improved the army's "tooth-to-tail" ratio by shifting the responsibility for supporting what he considered non-combat essential operations - laundry, disbursing, and some transportation services, to name but a few - to government agencies or to contracted civilian firms Using unannounced inspections and appearing unexpectedly at individual commands during exercises, Dayan emphasized realistic combat training, small unit assault techniques, and aggressive, dynamic leadership at all levels of command. Ignoring criticism that these practices circumvented established chains of command, Dayan removed officers who, through their performance or attitudes, did not measure up to his ideal - the traditions of Sadeh arid of Wingate Distressed over what he considered to be the IDF's lackluster performance, Dayan used Ariel Sharon's "Unit 101" in an attempt to reinstill aggressive partisan values and traditions within the military. An elite commando outfit specifically organized and trained for retaliation operations against Arab terrorist base camps, Dayan had initially opposed the formation of this unit. Once he became Chief-of-Staff, however, Dayan reformed the unit into the 202nd Paratroop Brigade and used that force to set an example of excellence he expected all other IDF units to emulate. Within months, the paratroops became Israel's premier fighting force and during the next two years, participated in an increasing number of highly successful retaliation raids into Egypt and Jordan. Although heavily criticized for displaying excessive favoritism to "his paratroops", Dayan ignored those complaints and by 1956, his technique had transformed the IDF into a finely tuned, confident, and aggressive machine capable of fighting using the "structured partisan" doctrine of "maintenance of aim." In that year, President Nassar of Egypt received a $50 million arms shipment from the Soviet Union and, having previously barred Israeli shipping from the Suez Canal and having closed the Strait of Tiran to vessels bound for Israel is southern port of Eliat, tensions increased between Egypt and Israel. Nassar, however, committed a serious error when he seized and nationalized the Suez Canal, a move that angered the British. With Nassar already supporting anti-french Algerian rebels, France and England prepared for war against Egypt. Ben-Gurion, who had recently returned to power as both the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense following the politically disastrous "Lavon Affair" , encouraged Dayan to open direct talks with the French regarding Egypt. In return for French weapons, Ben-Gurion and Dayan pledged to support the joint Anglo-French invasion of Egypt. After lengthy discussion involving the British who were not particularly overjoyed at the prospect of attacking an Arab state with Israeli assistance, it was decided that all three allies would launch their assaults simultaneously. Israel's "Operation Kadesh" began on 29 October and despite pledges from both the British and the French, those nations did not invade Egypt until 6 November, by which time the Egyptians had been routed. Militarily, the campaign was a sparkling Israeli success and within six days, Israeli forces were sitting on the banks of the Suez and, more importantly, had occupied the Egyptian fortifications at Shark el-Sheik - the fortifications used to close the Strait if Tiran. Diplomatically, the invasion was less than satisfactory. Pressured by the Soviet Union and the United States, Britain and France withdrew from Egypt and Israel returned the Sinai to Egyptian control. Despite assurances from the United Nations and the United States that Egypt would not be allowed to close the Strait of Tiran, in 1967 Egypt closed the Strait, removed the United Nations peacekeeping force from the Gaza Strip, and prepared for war. Widely acclaimed as Israel's hero, Dayan retired from the IDF in 1958. After completing his civilian education, he reentered politics in 1959 and served on Ben-Gurion' s cabinet as the Minister of Agriculture. In 1964, willingly Dayan vacated that post when Ben-Gurion broke with the Mapai Party and created his own political organization, the RAFI Party. Out of office, Dayan worked briefly for the Washington Post as a war correspondent in Vietnam. In 1967, as Egypt again prepared for war against Israel and as Syria and Jordan prepared to support Nassar militarily, Israel's government seemed paralyzed. As the situation grew progressively grim, popular outcry demanded that Dayan be brought back as Minister of Defense. Although Levi Eshkol , Israel's Prime Minister and a political foe of Dayan's, objected to this move, a National Unity Government was formed - a government that included Moshe Dayan as the Minister of Defense. Assuming office less than two weeks before the outbreak of hostilities, Dayan is largely credited with refining Israel's war plans. On 6 June, Israel launched a pre-emptive strike against Egypt and within six days, Israeli forces occupied the Sinai, the West Bank, and portions of Syria's Golan Heights. Immediately after the war, Dayan established one of the most remarkable policies yet seen in the annals of Arab-Israel relations. Known as the "Open Bridges Policy", Dayan opened Israel's borders to all Arabs, especially those Arabs who had fled their homes on the West Bank. Central to this controversial policy was Dayan's belief that economic ties between Israel (to include Israel's occupied territories) and Israel's Arab neighbors, especially Jordan, would eventually result in both a lessening of tensions between the two nations. Dayan ignored a criticisms of his novel approach to diplomacy and over time, he withdrew most of the IDF forces from centers of Arab population on the West Bank. The Yom Kippur War of 1973 caught Israel by surprise and despite its eventual victory over Egyptian and Syrian forces, the war's tremendous casualties shocked the nation. The public demanded the mass resignation of Golda Meir's government and called for an investigation to determine the causes of Israel's unpreparedness. Although Dayan was eventually cleared of any wrong doing, he resigned as Minister of Defense in 1974 and turned his attentions to writing his memoirs, farming, and the pursuit of his most engrossing hobby, archaeology. In 1977, he answered the political call once again and joined Menachem Begin's, right-wing, Likud Coalition government. Serving as Israel's foreign Minister, Dayan participated in the now-famous Camp David Accord - an agreement between Egypt and Israel in which Israel returned the Sinai to her former enemy in return for a non-aggression pact. In l979, Dayan broke with Begin's Likud government over a series of long-standing disputes regarding the government's West Bank Policies. To Dayan, Begin's settlement policies did not encourage peaceful relations between West Bank Arabs and Jews. Never agreeing that Israel should return the West Bank to Jordan, Dayan believed that the control of local government and all related municipal functions should be transferred to the inhabitants of the territories, especially on the West Bank. This, he maintained, would demonstrate Israel's willingness to to allow the Arab's to govern themselves within the overall jurisdiction of Israel' s national control. He also advocated strengthening the local Arab economy and urged that medical and educational assistance be provided to Arabs in occupied territories. He even went so far as to argue that in time, West Bank Arabs should be permitted to vote in Jordanian national elections while they simultaneously participated in local elections in the Israeli occupied West Bank. Thus, West Bank Arabs would, in effect, be aligned nationally with Jordan, while on a more important level, they would be aligned economically and politically with Israel. This unique concept of "dual autonomy" was never realized. Although forming his own political party in early 1981, Dayan's health was declining rapidly. A few months before his death, Dayan agreed to help narrate a film about Israel and walking through his boyhood home of Nahalal , Dayan led the camera crew to the Shimron Hill Cemetery - a cemetery containing members of his family, many of his friends, and some of his fellow soldiers. Reflecting on his life and what he had accomplished, Dayan carefully said: I don't want any speeches at my funeral, I don't want any decoration, or any place to be called after me. To be buried here, with these people, is the highest decoration. (1) On 16 October 1981, Dayan quietly passed away from heart failure at the age of 66. APPENDIX A GLOSSARY Please Note: The number following the term indicates the page where the term is first used. ALIYAH (p. 18): Literally meaning ascension, the term describes the various mass migrations of Jews to Palestine. As used by Zionists, this term had both religious and nationalistic connotations. Religiously, the term described as ascension unto heaven, in this case Palestine, the ancient home of the Jews. In nationalistic terms, Aliyah implied personal participation in rebuilding the Jewish homeland and in constructing a national Jewish state in Palestine. Historians generally list five separate Aliyahs: First Aliyah: 1882 - 1903 Second Aliyah: 1904 - 1914 Third Allyah: 1919 - 1923 Fourth Aliyah: 1924 - 1928 Fifth Aliyah: 1929 - 1939 Each of these Aliyah's brought different groups of Jews to Palestine and each group made a distinct contribution to the formation of the Jewish state. ASHKENAZI (p. 92): A term referring to European Jews who, because of their exposure to the western concepts of liberalism and enlightenment, generally take a less hawkish stance on Arab-Israeli relations than do their sephardic or "oriental" counterparts. BAR-GIORA (p. 25): The first of several Jewish self-defense groups established prior to Israel's War for Independence. Formed in 1907, the Bar-Giora was reorganized into the Hashomer in 1909. The organization was named after Simon Bar-Giora, leader of the Jewish revolt against the Romans from 66 to 70 A.D. CIRCASSIANS (p. 25): A people originally brought to Palestine from the northeast coast of the Black Sea by Abdul Hamid in the second half of the 19th century. However, the Circassians defended themselves so well against attacks from Bedouin bandits, that their fighting skills won them the reputation of fierce warriors. Arabs and Jews were so impressed with their martial talents that they frequently hired Circassians as guards and watchmen. FOSH (p. 65): Known as the Plugot Sadeh, these "field companies" were formed in 1937 and represented the first Jewish units organized for offensive operations. Although disbanded in 1939, the FOSH served as the foundation upon which the Palmach - the Haganah's "shock troops" of the 1940's - were formed. HAGANAH (p. 38) : In Hebrew, Haganah means defense. The Haganah was the third, most famous, and most successful of Israel's pre-independence defense organizations. Like the Hashomer the Haganah participated in establishing and defending Jewish settlements in Palestine. Unlike the Hashomer, the Haganah was subordinate to civilian authority and despite attempts to turn it into a political militia, the Haganah remained remarkably apolitical. HASHOMER (p. 26): In English, "Hashomer" means "watchmen". This was the second Jewish self-defense force established in Palestine and operated from 1909 until the mid-1920's when it was replaced by the Haganah. According to Yigal Allon (see Yigal Allon, Shield of David, page 30), not every applicant was accepted as a watchman and not every watchman became a member of the society. Following field training, weapons familiarization, and rigorous stamina tests, those determined as qualified, were placed on a one-to-two year period of probationary service. Those who successfully completed that "internship" were sworn into the Hashomer in special nocturnal and highly ritualistic ceremonies. Like the Bar- Giora, many of the "watchmen" tried to emulate the Arabs in both dress and horsemanship. HAVLAGAH (p. 58): The Yishuv's policy of self-restraint first adopted during the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939. The policy specifically forbade any form of military counter-strike that might kill or injure Arab non-combatants. Following World War Two, the policy was modified to allow sabotage attacks against British installations provided that British personnel were not the target of the attack. HISH (p. 81): An acronym formed from the Hebrew term Chail Sadeh, which roughly translates into "field corps or "field force" formed in 1940, the HISH was controlled by the Haganah and, composed of unpaid, part-time militia, served primarily as a "territorial home guard". HISTADRUT (p. 39): Formed in 1920, the General Federation of Jewish Labor was designed to promote the formation of the Jewish state through the consolidation and unification of all Jewish workers. Politically, the Histadrut represented merging of various political groups within the Yishuv whose purpose was to provide a political and economic base for the eventual creation of the Jewish state. IRGUN ZVAI LEUMI (p. 51): Commonly referred to as the Irgun, in Hebrew the phrase is translated "National Military Organization". A direct product of Jabotinsky' s Revisionist philosophy, the Irgun did not gain much recognition until the post-World War Two struggle with England. This organization refused to accept Ben-Gurion's policies and directly violated the Yishuv's policy of self-restraint through its terrorist attacks against both the Arabs and the British. JEWISH AGENCY (p. 39): Formerly known as the Zionist Commission or the Zionist Executive, this organization was responsible to the World Zionist Organization for all Jewish matters in Palestine. Officially recognized under the Mandate Charter (Article 4), the British allowed the organization to govern Jewish Palestine. KIBBUTZ (p. 22): A voluntary collective farming settlement that, through the complete elimination of private property and private wealth, stressed a communal life-style. In theory, it observed the principles of complete social equality, mutual responsibility, and direct democracy. The first kibbutz was established in 1909 at Deganiah, Moshe Dayan's birthplace. The plural form of kibbutz is kibbutzim. LABOR AND DEFENSE BATTALIONS (p. 38): Established by Joseph Trumpeldor, the Gdud Ha'Avoda were designed to promote the development of the Jewish state through civil construction projects - roads, housing, etc. As envisioned by Trumpeldor, these units would be composed of soldier-pioneers who would serve as a pioneer militia in both defending and constructing the Jewish state. Disbanded in the early 1920's, these units were ineffective in defending Jewish interests and, to most Jewish leaders, were politically too "left wing". LEHI (p. 95): An acronym formed from the Hebrew phrase Lohamel Herut Israel - "Fighters for the Freedom of Israel". Better known as either the LEHI or the Stern Gang, this group of terrorists split from the Irgun in 1941 over the issue of cooperation with the British. Never numbering more than 500 strong, the Yishuv repudiated both this group and its destructive, anti-British terrorist activities. MAPAI (p. 99): Founded in 1930 as Israel's Labor Party, Mapai advocated slightly "left-of-center" social-democratic policies. Until the late 1960's Mapai was Israel's strongest political party and was the party to which Ben- Gurion belonged. MAPAM (p. 148): Israel's Communist Party. MOSHAV (p. 22): Another form of pioneering cooperative movement that differed from the kibbutzim approach in that it allowed settlers to own and work their own land while the community shared common resources (water) and pooled common services (marketing of produce) NOTRIM (p. 61): A collective term referring to any of the three Jewish organizations supported or otherwise authorized by the British during the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939. These organizations were staffed with Haganah personnel and included the Jewish Settlement Police (the largest and most important of the groups), the ghafirs (Jewish "militia- police"), and guides for British army patrols. PALMACH (p. 8.2): From the Hebrew Plugot Mahatz, the term is best translated as either "striking companies" or "shock troops". formed in 1941, the Palmach was Haganah controlled and was the first, permanently manned, Jewish controlled combat force capable of executing sustained offensive operations. This organization formed the basis upon which the Israel Defense force was established in 1948. PALMACHNIK (p. 101): A slang Jewish expression describing a member of the Palmach. REVISIONIST PARTY (p. 41): A political party formed by Vladimir Jabotinsky in 1925. Unlike its Social-Zionist counterparts, this political organization did not envision the creation of a Socialist Jewish commonwealth based on a cooperative economic structure. Rather, it campaigned for the creation of a political democracy with a strong capitalist economy. Revisionists also preached a vigorous form of nationalism and believed that the borders of the eventual Jewish state must coincide with the borders of ancient Israel - a territory that included much of modern Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. RUSSIAN PALE OF SETTLEMENT (p. 15): Usually referred to as the Pale, this was a stretch of land on the western fringe of the vast Russian Empire where the majority of Russia's five million Jews lived. This area ran from the Baltic Sea in the north to the Black Sea in the South and covered portions of the Ukraine and what is now known as Poland. Special dispensation was occasionally granted to more fortunate Jews, generally academicians or wealthy merchants, to reside temporarily outside of the Pale. After World War I, some of this territory became independent nations - Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, etc. SABRA (p. 9): A Jewish term of affection referring to Jews born in Palestine. The term comes from a word describing a small but resilient cactus that grew throughout Palestine. SEPHARDIC (p. 92): A term describing those Jews who lived in moslem countries running from Pakistan in the east to Morocco in the west. Having experienced life in increasingly hostile Arab countries, sephardic or "oriental" Jews often took (and still do) a much harder stand on issues relating to Arabs than do Ashkenazi Jews - European Jews. YIDDISH (p. 15): A specific dialect formed by a combination of Middle High German, Hebrew, Polish, and Russian. Its roots can be traced to the 13th century when Jews moved east from the Rhineland. YISHUV (p. 11): A term referring to the entire Jewish population of Palestine. The term originally applied to only the collection of Jewish settlements in Palestine. It is important to note that over time, this word changed from a description of a collection of vial lages to the description of an entire people. ZAHAL (p. 119): An abbreviation of "Zva-Ha-Haganah Le-Israel", more commonly referred to in English as the Israel Defense force (IDF) ZIONISM (p. 13): A Jewish national movement whose expressed goal was the settlement of and eventual creation in Palestine of a national Jewish state. In many respects, Zionism was the political and social (nationalistic) outgrowth of the ancient religious attachment of Jews to Palestine, especially Jerusalem. Click here to view image APPENDIX B EVOLUTION OF THE ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCE: 1907 - PRESENT NAME: Bar-Giora YEARS OF OPERATION: 1907-1909 PURPOSE: Provided contracted self-defense security services to Jewish farms and settlements in the Galilee area of upper Palestine. SIZE: Undetermined. Given its small area of operations, the Bar-Giora was probably substantially smaller than the Hashomer. COMMENTS: Providing contracted self-defense services only to those farms and settlements that relied on Jewish labor, the Bar-Giora never expanded its services beyond an few villages in upper Palestine. In 1909, it was reorganized and became the Hashomer. PRINCIPLE CONTRIBUTION: The Bar-Giora was the first Jewish self- defense force organized in Palestine. NAME: Hashomer - "Society of Watchmen" YEARS OF OPERATION: 1909-c.1924 SIZE: Never more than 100 men. PURPOSE: Provided self-defense services for all Jewish communities and settlements in Palestine and assisted in the establishment and subsequent defense of new Jewish settlements in Palestine. COMMENTS: Formed when the Bar-Giora reorganized in 1909, this organization became a leading proponent of radical Marxist- Socialism. Its radical political views, when combined with its inability to effectively protect Jews during the Arab Riots of 1920-1921, led Jewish leaders to abolish the organization in 1920. Although officially replaced with the Haganah in 1921, some Hashomer units continued to operate for the next few years. PRINCIPLE CONTRIBUTION: The the Hashomer was the first Jewish para-military organization that attempted to defend Jewish interests throughout Palestine. NAME: Zion Mule Corps YEARS OF OPERATION: 1915-1916 SIZE: 650 men PURPOSE: This unit served two purposes. Militarily, the corps was a non-combatant, all-Jewish logistics unit that served under British command during World War I. Politically, she unit was formed to demonstrate Jewish support for the British war effort and it was hoped that this demonstration would persuade London to support a Jewish homeland in Palestine. COMMENTS: Organized after Vladimir Jabotinsky and Joseph Trumpeldor urged the British government to form an all- Jewish combat unit to help remove Turkish forces from Palestine. After serving at Galipoli, the British disbanded the unit when its men refused to quell anti-British riots in Ireland. PRINCIPLE CONTRIBUTION: Although not an independent, all-Jewish combat unit, the Zion Mule Corps' success led to the creation of the Jewish Legion. NAME: Jewish Legion YEARS OF OPERATION: 1917-1919 SIZE: 5,000 men PURPOSE: Like its predecessor, the Jewish Legion served two purposes. Although commanded by the British, the Legion was organized to demonstrate Jewish military capabilties and support Britain's campaign against Turkey. Politically, Zionists hoped that the Legion's military contributions might persuade London to formally support a Jewish home land. COMMENTS: Formed by the British after negotiations with Dr. Chaim Weizmann, Vladimir Jabotinsky, and Joseph Trumpeldor, the Jewish Legion eventually contained three all-Jewish battalions. After participating in the British conquest and subsequent occupation of Palestine, the unit was disbanded in 1919. PRINCIPLE CONTRIBUTION: As the first all-Jewish combat unit since the 1st century A.D., the Jewish Legion not only proved that Jews could fight, the unit's successful participation in the Palestine campaign provided Zionist leaders with political and diplomatic clout in their discussions with London concerning the formation of a Jewish homeland. NAME: Labor and Defense Battalions YEARS OF OPERATION: 1920-1922 SIZE: Unknown PURPOSE: To promote the development of the Jewish state through civil construction projects and to protect Jewish settlements in Palestine. COMMENTS: As envisioned by their founder, Joseph Trumpeldor, the Labor and Defense Battalions would be composed of soldier- pioneers who would serve as a "people's militia" in self- defense matters while simultaneously serving as a "civilian construction corps" in projects designed to build the physical necessities of a Jewish state - roads, housing, etc. Like the Hashomer, these units advocated Marxist- Socialism and, more interested in political indoctrination than they were in self-defense matters, enjoyed little support from Jewish political leaders. PRINCIPLE CONTRIBUTION: While attempting to link Marxist political ideology with the military force required to inculcate that philosophy in the Jewish population, the Labor and Defense Battalion's only contribution was that its failure to adequately defend Jewish interests in Palestine led to the creation of the Haganah. NAME: Haganah YEARS OF OPERATION: 1921-1948 SIZE: In 1947, the Haganah contained roughly 45,000 man and women serving in various Haganah-controlled organizations: the HISH, the Palmach, and "home-guard" units. PURPOSE: Initially created as a self-defense organization, over time it became an instrument of "nation-building" through participation in military affairs, the establishment and subsequent defense of Jewish settlements, illegal weapons purchases, and illegal immigration operations. COMMENTS: The third, largest, and most successful of the pre- Israel Defense Force organizations, the Haganah replaced the Hashomer and the Labor and Defense Battalions as the official Jewish self-defense organization. From 1921 through 1936, the Haganah's self-defense strategies were based on static, position-oriented concepts advocated by the Yishuv's political leaders. During the Arab Revolt of 1936- 1939, individual's within the Haganah helped transform that doctrine to one based on aggressive, offensive-minded, and mobile tactics. In 1948, the Haganah and its various components were reorganized into the Israel Defense Force. PRINCIPLE CONTRIBUTION: The Haganah was tie first Jewish self defense organization that willingly subordinated itself to Jewish civilian authority and supported the "national" policies developed by those authorities (i.e., the Jewish Agency) . Without this underground army, Israel would not exist today. NAME: The "Flying Squad" YEARS OF OPERATION: 1937 SIZE: Unknown but presumed to be substantially less than 100. PURPOSE: Formed to test the validity of Yitzhak Sadeh's concept of a mobile, aggressive, Jewish self-defense unit organized to protect Jewish villages and settlements through active patrolling and the ambushing of Arab guerrilla forces. COMMENTS: Formed by Sadeh and controlled by the Haganah, this was the first officially sanctioned, Jewish self-defense unit capable of small, but independent offensive operations. PRINCIPLE CONTRIBUTION: Representing the first politically sanctioned break with the prevailing doctrine of static, position-oriented defense, the "flying Squad" provided the conceptual foundation upon which the FOSH and the Palmach were formed. NAME: FOSH - from the Hebrew "Plugot Sadeh" YEARS OF OPERATION: 1937-1939 SIZE: 1,000 PURPOSE: To provide the Haganah with military units capable of sustained offensive operations. COMMENTS: Organized, trained, and led by Yitzhak Sadeh, these Haganah controlled field companies provided the foundation upon which the Palmach - the Haganah's elite shock troops - were constructed. As part of the Haganah, the FOSH followed civilian directed policies, to include Havlagah (the policy of self-restraint). Operating in company size units, the FOSH was disbanded in 1939 following the collapse of the Arab Revolt and the subsequent termination of British-Jewish cooperation. PRINCIPLE CONTRIBUTION: Validated Sadeh's concept of an "offensive defense" the relied on the tactics of aggressive mobility and surprise. NAME: Notrim YEARS OF OPERATION: 1937-1939 SIZE: 22,000 in 1938 PURPOSE: To actively support British efforts in quelling the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939 by replacing British military police and Mandate constabulary units with Jewish volunteers. This enabled British elements to concentrate their efforts on halting Arab gluerrilla operations in Palestine. COMMENTS: A collective term referring to any of three Jewish para-military organizations supported or otherwise authorized by the British during the Arab Revolt of 1936- 1939. These notrim elements were the Jewish Settlement Police (the largest of the three sub-units), the ghafirs or police militia, and guides for British army patrols. While operationally directed by the British, these units were staffed with Haganah members. PRINCIPLE CONTRIBUTION: The notrim provided the first military link between the British and the Haganah since its members belonged to the Haganah. This arrangement enabled the Haganah to expand its operational capabilities, protect the Yishuv during the Arab Revolt, and receive free military training without fear of British reprisals. NAME: Special Night Squads YEARS OF OPERATION: 1938-1939 SIZE: Given the clandestine relationship between Captain Wingate and the Haganah, the size of the Special Night Squads (S.N.S.)is unknown. However, Christopher Sykes, Crossroads too Israel, p. 183, states that "at no time did Wingate command more than 200 men in Palestine." PURPOSE: From the British perspective, the S.N.S. was formed to end Arab guerrilla attacks against the Iraq Petroleum Pipeline and to clear northern Palestine of Arab guerrilla bases. From Wingate's and the Haganah's perspective, the S.N.S. was formed to strengthen Jewish military capabilities. COMMENTS: Authorized and supported by British authorities, the S.N.S. served as "legal cover" for the covert training of the Haganah in small unit offensive tactics. Primarily staffed with members of the notrim, the S.N.S. was organized, trained, and led by Captain Orde Charles Wingate, a British officer serving in Palestine. The S.N.S. succeeded in its legally authorized mission (ending Arab terrorist attacks in northern Palestine), and in its covert mission (providing training for the Haganah). The S.N.S. was disbanded in 1939 when she British severely curtailed their support of the notrim and transferred Wingate out of Palestine. PRINCIPLE CONTRIBUTION: Through the S.N.S., Wingate convinced Jewish leaders that a doctrine of static, position-oriented, self-defense would not succeed and that the survival of a future Jewish state would depend of an aggressive, active defense that, at the right time, could be unleashed in decisive, offensive action. NAME: Irgun - from the Hebrew "Irgun Zvai Leumi" which translated means "National Military Organization". YEARS OF OPERATION: 1931-1948 SIZE: 2,000 - 3,000 in 1947 PURPOSE: To secure Jewish independence through attacks against British installations, military personnel, and Mandate police. COMMENTS: Formed in 1931 as a para-military group supporting Vladimir Jabotinsky's Revisionist Party, the Irgun frequently ignored "national" policies established by responsible Jewish political leaders - specifically the Jewish Agency. During and after World War II, the Irgun was generally viewed as a terrorist organization and was led by Menachem Begin - a future Prime Minister of Israel. Merged with the Haganah, Palmach, and HISH in 1948 to form the Israel Defense force. PRINCIPLE CONTRIBUTION: Zealously pursuing its nationalistic goals through terrorism, it can be argued that the Irgun was one of the first modern "national liberation movements". As such, its acts of violence helped convince London that the use of conventional and restrained military force could not impose British will on Palestine. NAME: LEHI - from the Hebrew "Lohamei Herut Israel which translated means "fighters for the freedom of Israel" - it is best known as The Stern Gang. YEARS OF OPERATION: 1940-1948 SIZE: 500 - 800 in 1947 PURPOSE: To secure an independent Jewish State through any means possible - terrorist attacks, kidnappings, murder, etc. COMMENTS: Formed by Avraham Stern who, in 1941, broke with the Irgun over the issue of cooperation with the British during World War II. Although British police killed Stern in 1942, his band of militant extremists survived and launched a terrorist campaign against the British from 1942 - 1947. PRINCIPLE CONTRIBUTION: Vehemently condemned by most Palestinian Jews, the Stern Gang made no positive contribution in either the creation of Israel or in the development of Israeli military tradition. NAME: HISH - from the Hebrew "Chail Sadeh" which translated means "field corps" or "field force". YEARS OF OPERATION: 1940-1948 SIZE: 9,500 in 1947 PURPOSE: Provided the Haganah with a part-time militia or home guard reserve force capable of mobile, local-area, self- defense actions. COMMENTS: Formed in response to concerns regarding the 1055 of trained Haganah members entering the British army to fight against Nazi Germany, the HISH provided the Haganah with a cadre of semi-trained personnel capable of mobilization in times of "national" emergency. Merged with regular Haganah units, the Palmach, and elements of the Irgun to form the Israel Defense force in 1948. PRINCIPLE CONTRIBUTION: The HISH served as one of several models upon which the Israel Defense force reserve system was established in the early 1950's. NAME: Palmach - from the Hebrew "Plugot Mahatz" which is translated "striking companies" or "shock troops". YEARS OF OPERATION: 1941-1948 SIZE: 3,100 full-time and 1,000 reservists in 1947 PURPOSE: To provide the Haganah with a- fully-trained, full-time, professional military force which, under Haganah control, would be capable of sustained, large-scale, offensive operations. COMMENTS: Organized, trained, and initially led by Yitzhak Sadeh in 1941, the Palmach formed the backbone of what would eventually become the Israel Defense force in May 1948. The Palmach provided one of the two military foundations upon which the Israel Defense force was later constructed - the partisan traditon. PRINCIPLE CONTRIBUTION: The importance of the Palmach cannot be overemphasized. In addition to providing the doctrinal and leadership foundations upon which the Israel Defense Force was both patterned after and based upon, three of the twelve general staff officers during the Israel is War of Independence - Dayan, Allon, and Sadeh - camel from the Palmach. Roughly 20 of the 40 Israel Defense force colonels serving during that war were Palmach officers. Dayan, Rabin, Bar-Lev, and Elazar were Palmach officers who eventually became Chiefs of Staff for the Israel Defense force. Dayan later served as Minister of Defense (1967- 1974) and foreign Minister (1977-1979). Rabin eventually became Prime Minister of Israel. NAME: The Jewish Brigade YEARS OF OPERATION: 1944-1946 PURPOSE: Formed to demonstrate the Yishuv's support of Britain's war against Nazi Germany. SIZE: 5,000 COMMENTS: Although formed too late in the war to play a significant role in defeating Germany, this all-Jewish unit not only demonstrated the Yishuv's support of London it also provided a significant number of Jews with modern military training. Even though this unit was part of the British army, immediately after the war, the Jewish Brigade helped the Haganah in its efforts to illegally transport Holocaust survivors to Palestine. PRINCIPLE CONTRIBUTION: The Jewish Brigade represented the second of the two military foundations upon which the Israel Defense force was later constructed - the "purist" or British military tradition. As a brigade within the British army, this unit not only received modern training in combined/supporting arms, its members learned logistics, staff organization, and tactics on a brigade level. Consequently, its traditions complimented the Palmach's partisan approach to waging war and the fusion of those foundations provided the Israel Defense force with its unique and highly effective military practices and doctrine. ENDNOTES CHAPTER I SETTING THE STAGE: 1880-1929 1. Moshe Barsky set out one night to purchase medicine for Shmuel Dayan. Barsky never returned. Evidently killed by roaming bandits, his body was found the next day. For a complete description of this event see Moshe Dayan, Moshe Dayan: Story of My Life (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1976) , pp. 21-22; Shabtai Teveth, Moshe Dayan: The Soldier, the Man, The Legend (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973), pp. 3-4. 2. Teveth, Dayan, p. 1. While Teveth is an eloquent writer, there is no indication that Moshe Dayan ever made this association part of himself. 3. Yigal Allon, Shield of David: The Story of Israel's Armed Forces (New York: Random House, 1970) , p. 31, states that by 1914, there were over 85,000 Jews living in Palestine. These Jews lived on 43 agricultural settlements as well as in major cities like Haifa and Jerusalem. By the outbreak of World War I, over half of Jerusalem's population was Jewish. The split within the Jewish community caused by World War I is easily documented. Moshe Sharett, a future Israeli prime minister, was an officer in the Turkish army during World War One. The Hashomer, a small Jewish self-defense organization, urged Jews to accept Turkish citizenship as a means to avoid mass deportations and even offered their services to the Ottoman Empire - an offer the Turkish government refused. Other Jews had Allied sympathies. Until their capture, the Aaronson family spied for the British. Vladimir Jabotinsky and Joseph Trumpeldor raised Jewish combat units which, under British command, participated in the liberation of Palestine. 4. For a detailed account of Moshe's boyhood, see Teveth, Dayan, chapters two through five. Although containing less personal information, see Dayan, My Life, chapter one. 5. While specific data was not kept, a large number of Jewish immigrants eventually left Palestine for more hospitable climates. Amos Elon, The Israelis: Founders and Sons (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Wilson, 1971), pp. 101-102, briefly examines this phenomenon. On page 108, Elon provides David Ben-Gurion's inflated estimate that up to 90% of all Jews arriving in Palestine between 1881 and 1924 eventually emigrated from Palestine. Information collected after World War One indicates that approximately one-third of the 35,000 Jews arriving in Palestine between 1919 and 1924 soon left Palestine. Borrowing from Darwinian theory, Elon (p. 136) argues that the Jews who left Palestine were the physically and philosophically weak - those who could not endure the hardships associated with life in that land. Those who remained possessed the physical stamina, the emotional courage, and the dedication required to build a life and forge a nation in Palestine. 6. Dayan, My Life, pp.22-23. 7. For a balanced view of Zionism from its pre-Herzl beginnings to the creation of the British Mandate in Palestine see Conner Cruise O'Brien, The Siege, The Saga of Israel and Zionism (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), pp. 25-131; Amos Elon, The Israelis, pp. 3-186. 8. At the turn of the century, the Russian Empire included territories contained within the current borders of the Soviet Union, as well as territories which, after World War I, became independent nations - Poland, for example. 9. See Elon, The Israel is, p. 38. Generally speaking, orthodox Jews viewed the movement as a direct challenge to God Who, at His will, would allow all Jews to return to Palestine under His divine guidance and the strict application of religious laws. 10. O'Brien, The Siege, p. 25. 11. Ibid., pp. 35-37, discusses these pograms and provides three explanations for them. First, the new Tsar and his political advisor were anti-semites. Second, both men feared iberalism and viewed Jews as the principal proponents or carriers of liberal thought. Third, given the anti-semitic traditions of Tsarist Russia, "of all the people whom the (Russian) peasants had a grudge against, or fancied robbing, the Jews were the only ones they could attack and rob and get away with it." Elon, The Israelis, p. 51, provides additional insight into the causes of the pograms under Alexander III, an insight the supports O'Brien's final explanation - the government condoned anti-Jewish riots as "a popular diversion from the miseries of daily life." One must also consider Tsarist fears of ethnic nationalism as another contributing factor. During the latter-half of the 19th century, Tsarist forces were frequently used to crush Polish nationalism. 12. Elon, The Israelis, p. 58 and O'Brien, Ihe Siege, p. 40. 13. See Elon, The Israelis, pp. 60 through 81, for a thoughtful discussion concerning the rise and subsequent blending of Jewish nationalism and pre-Herzl Zionism. O'Brien, The Siege, p. 31, states that in 1880 nearly two-thirds of the Jewish population of Palestine lived in Jerusalem. 14. Ibid., p. 99, states that Rothschild's contribution to these early settlements was approximately 10 million pounds sterling. 19. Ibid, p. 100. 16. Elon, Tbe Israelis, points out that Marxism and Zionism frequently overlapped. While discussing Zalman Shazar, one of Israel's presidents, Elon states that Shazar's family was like many other Russian families in transition from orthodox Judaism to European culture. On page 15 he stated that families like these "were producing in almost equal numbers leading Zionist pioneers and Socialist revolutionaries." Prior to emigrating to Palestine, Shazar spent time in a Russian prison for his underground activities. On page 118, Elon briefly discusses David Ben-Gurion's conversion from Marxism to Zionism. 17. See Elon, The Israelis, p. 59, for Lenin's statement. O'Brien, The Siege, p. 99, discusses the size of the Jewish Marxist movement in Russia. 18. Allon, David, p. 18. The passage concerning the use of Hebrew is important. Many Sucond Aliyah pioneers actively worked to establish Hebrew as the official Jewish language. For a discussion of the "Hebraists", see Elon, The Israelis, pp. 96-98 and pp. 110-111. 19. Elon, The Israelis, p. 113. 20. Ibid., p. 168. 21. Ibid., pp. 151-152, describes a typical clash that occurred in 1909 in Galilee. Dayan, My Life, pp. 39-40, describes a similar, although less deadly fight, that occurred in 1934. While understanding Arab feelings, Dayan writes "They (the Bedouin) had been pasturing their flocks on other people's land, and watering them at other people's springs, for generations. But the land then had been untilled, untended it was ours now." A comparison can be made between these cultural and economic clashes and the hostilities that erupted in the American west - between the white settlers and the American Indian and between ranchers and farmers. On a cultural level, white settlers viewed the western plains as vast tracts of "empty", unused land that could be used for farming and/or ranching. The Indians, of course, resented this intrusion onto lands that they used for hunting. White ranchers occasionally fought with white farmers and these clashes were based on economics. Ranchers needed vast amounts of grazing land to support their cattle while farmers plowed these lands under for crops 22. Elon, The Israelis, p. 154. The fact that Azuri's book went unnoticed among most Zionists is not too surprising, especially when one considers that most Zionists ignored the presence of Arabs in Palestine. On pp. 148-150, Elon discusses this phenomenon and on pp. 159-160, he states that even Herzl ignored the Arab presence in Palestine. Perhaps this was due to the "stereotypical" European view of third world territories and the people who inhabited those lands. While Jewish settlers in Palestine realized that Arabs lived in Palestine, they also knew that the territory was sparsely populated. Since Arab nationalism had not yet visibly surfaced, those settlers seldom "contemplated the possibility that Arabs and Jews would one day clash in bloody battle over the same stretch of soil." 23. O'Brien, The Siege, pp. 109-110, writes that the "protests of 1891 were probably initiated by the Muslims, but a disproportionately large part of the Arab agitation against Jewish settlements - and later against Zionism - were carried out by Christian Arabs." Since Jewish persecution had usually been conducted in the name of religion, Jews were quite sensitive about the origins of any anti-semitic outburst. Since Christian Arabs were largely responsible for these verbal attacks, many Jews assumed that European Christians had orchestrated the protest. O'Brien gives no indication as to what actions, if any, Turkish officials took in response to the telegram. 24. See Elon, The Israel is, p. 173 for the quotation. O'Brien, The Siege, pp. 117-120, provides portions of these editorial attacks, attacks that succinctly outlined Arab concerns over Zionist encroachments. These concerns included inequitable taxation, unfair labor practices, low interest bank loans, growing Jewish nationalism, and a fear of losing Palestine to the Jews. 25. Allon, David, pp. 20-21. 26. Ibid., p. 23. It is interesting to note that the Bar- Giora also opposed the Hallukah, a form of financial support gathered from Jewish congregations for the exclusive support of orthodox Jews and religious scholars living in Palestine. These charitable donations were separate and distinct from the monies raised to fund the Zionist enterprise in Palestine. Since the use of this money did nothing to further the Zionist cause and given the adversarial relationship between ardent Zionists and orthodox Jews, it is not surprising that many Second Aliyah Jews were opposed to the Hallukah. 27. Ibid., pp. 23 and 25. 28. Ibid., p. 27. This is the first recorded instance the author could find regarding an arms shipment into Palestine. 29. Edward N. Luttwak and Daniel Horowitz, The Israeli 1948-1973 (Cambridge: Abt Books, 1983). p. 6, state that at its peak, the Hashomer numbered less than 100 men. 30. Allon, David, p. 29. 31. For an expanded discussion of the Hashomer's military and political objectives, see Amos Perlmutter, Military and Politics in Israel: Nation-Building and Role Expansion, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), pp. 4-6 and Allon, David, pp. 30-33. for an official statement concerning the Hashomer's objectives - a statement written in 1912 by one of its founders - see Israel Shochat, "A Proposal for the Defense of the Jewish Community in the land of Israel" in Yigal Allon, The Making of Israel's Army (New York: Universe Books, 1970) , pp. 113-116. 32. For information regarding the split between the Yishuv and the Hashomer, see Perlmutter, Military and Politics, pp. 6, 12- 14, and 34; Amos Perlmutter, Israel the Partitioned State: A Political History Since 1900, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1985), pp. 82-83. For additional information regarding the Yishuv and the Ottoman Empire during World War One, see Allon, David, pp. 34-40. 33. Elon, The Israelis, p. 80. 34. Teveth, Dayan, p. 6. 35. In describing Shmuel's employment as a guard, both Dayan and Teveth imply that he was a member of the Hashomer. However, neither of them actually state that he was a member of that organization. Given Allon's discussion of the Hashomer's selection, testing, and induction practices (see Allon, David, p. 30), it is doubtful that Shmuel had enough time to become a full- fledged member of that group prior to his departure for Galilee. Also, the Marxist bent of the Hashomer's pro-kibbutzim philosophy might not have been compatible with Shmuel's preference for the less restrictive moshavim approach. 36. Teveth, Dayan, p. 12. 37. Dvorah's family was the only Jewish family in Prochorovka and, given her father's wealth and secular attitudes, it is not surprising that she was afforded a Russian education. Shmuel's family was part of a large Jewish community in Zaskow, a Jewish community that provided its own social services and social structure. This, when combined with his family's poverty and deep ties to Jewish traditions, denied Shmuel the opportunity to receive a secular education. 38. See Dayan, My Life, p. 26; Teveth, Dayan, p. 10. Neither author indicates to which branch of that party Dvorah belonged. In 1903, the Social Democratic Party had divided into two wings, the revolutionary Bolsheviks (the minority wing led by Lenin) and the evolutionary Mensheviks. 39. Teveth, Dayan, p. 11. 40. O'Brien, The Siege, p. 121. 41. Ibid., pp. 121-131, provides interesting reading concerning Weizmann's efforts in this regard and highlights the growing international interest in the potentials of the Zionist Movement. 42. Christopher Sykes, Crossroads to Israel, (New York: World Publishing Company, 1965). p.8, discusses the strategic value of Palestine to British Middle-Eastern interests: "to many people in under secretarial and lesser but influential ranks of state service in England, Zionism in Palestine seemed a marvelous opportunity for countering any sort of French establishment in Syria ... many British political and military thinkers at the time of the First World War and after considered that an increase in French authority in Syri a, especially in the form of a protectorate or a similar system would gravely imperil the communications with India." Such threats could be countered by supplying "advisors to governments" and by obtaining maximum concessions from those governments, thereby establishing "protectorates over the whole Arabic-speaking world, as a safeguard against the rapacity of France!" Sykes also states that the British sought to protect the Suez Canal by establishing a "friendly zone" east of Egypt, "a country in which their position was threatened internally." 43. For a discussion of the Hussein-McMahon correspondence of 1915, see O'Brien, The Siege, p. 144. 44. For a somewhat simplistic yet informative examination of Joseph Trumpeldor, see P. Lipovetsky, "Joseph Trumpeldor" , in Harold U. Ribalow, ed. Fighting Heroes of Israel (New York: Signet Books, 1967). A devout Zionist, Trumpeldor had been awarded four St. George Crosses while serving in the Tsar's army. During the Russo-Japanese War, Trumpeldor lost an arm and according to Allon (see Allon, David, p. 44), was the only Jewish officer in the Russian army. Vladimir Jabotinsky and his unfortunate legacy will be discussed later in this paper. For now, Jabotinsky can best be described as a right-wing extremist who actively preached the Jewish conquest of Palestine, to include the Trans-Jordan. 45. Allon, David, p. 44. 46. Ibid., p. 43. 47. O'Brien, The Siege, p. 124-125, discusses the feelings of American Jews toward the Russians. Having recently left Russia, many American Jews were not particularly enamored with the idea of Tsarist Russia as an ally. Sensing this, the British wanted to change those attitudes toward a pro-allied, and especially a pro-British stance. On page 135, O'Brien outlines the British use of the Balfour Declaration for propaganda purposes, especially with regard to Jewish soldiers fighting for the Central Powers. He also states that the British refused to publish the document in Palestine for fear of extremist reactions from the Jews and, more importantly, from the Arabs. 48. For discussion concerning the interpretations given the Balfour Declaration by Arabs and Jews, see O'Brien, The Siege, p. 134; Perlmutter, The Partitioned State, pp. 32-34 and pp. 41-42. 49. See Sykes, Crossroads, for an informative and entertaining examination of the British Mandate in Palestine. 50. O'Brien, The Siege, p. 144, neatly summarizes Arab suspicions concerning what they believed to be British duplicity regarding the format ion of an Arab state in Palestine: "The last months of 1919 saw a great increase in Arab nationalist activity, not only in Palestine, but also in neighboring Syria. Much of this was due to the consequences of the areas of conflict between Britain's promises of the period 1915-1919. The Hashemites the men who had raised, at British instigation, the standard of the Arab revolt against Ottoman rule - believed themselves to have been promised, through the Hussein-McMahon correspondence of 1915, a throne in Syria, then generally assumed to include Palestine. But the Sykes-Picot secret agreement (1916) awarded Syria to France, while by modified Sykes-Picot (1917), Britain awarded Palestine to itself, and then, by the Balfour Declaration of the same year, awarded a National Home in Palestine to the Jews. 51. Perlmutter, The Partitioned State, p. 26. 52. Elon, ihe Israelis, pp. 135-136, discusses the reasons for the Third Aliyah and outlines the fate of Jews in Russia during and after the 1917 revolution. O'Brien, The Siege, p. 131, states that World War One reduced Palestine's population from approximately 800,000 in 1914 to roughly 640,000 in 1918. Of the 1918 population, 512,000 were Muslin, 61,000 were Christian, and 66,000 were Jewish. The Jewish pre-war population in Palestine exceeded 85,000. 53. See O'Brien, The Siegi, p. 139-147, for a discussion of the growing anti-Zionist stance taken by the British military authorities in Palestine. In his speech given to a large Arab audience, the British. Governor of Jerusalem, Sir Robert Storrs, stated that Palestine "refuses to be a National Home for the people who did evil unto the Messiah and to the whole world." On pages 26-32, O'Brien neatly summarizes British anti-semitism through an examination of Balfour's "Aliens Bill" of 1904. This legislation attempted to strictly limit the number of eastern European Jews trying to enter Britain during the first decade of the 20th century. 54. Allon, David, p. 68. Jabotinsky had already raised the ire of British military authorities when, as a member of the Jewish Legion, he had bypassed the established chain of command and had gone directly to General Allenby concerning the anti- semitic views of a large number of British officers. This breech of conduct so infuriated the British that Jabotinsky was removed from the ranks of the Legion. 55. Ze'ev Schiff, A History of the Israeli Army: 1874 to the Present, (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1985), p. 5; Lipovetsky, "Trumpeldor", in Ribalow, Fighting Heroes. 56. See O'Brien, The Siege, page 204, concerning the scope of the Arab revolt against European domination in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. O'Brien, page 146, contains a transcript of the conversation in which Jewish leaders referred to the riots as a pogram. Readers should remember that Arab nationalism continued to grow throughout the period 1920-1950 and its power forced London to concede territory to various national groups - Egypt, Jordan, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, etc. 57. Ibid. , pp. 155-170, for a discussion of the problems Sir Herbert Samuel, the British Governor of Palestine, faced and actions his administration took to resolve those issues 58. Ibid., p. 183. 59. David, p. 66. 60. Teveth, Dayan, p. 25. 61. Perlmutter, The Partitioned State, p. 134. 62. Elon, Ih e Israelis, p. 145, lists the following examples: the political party system, strong beliefs in equality, agrarian collectives, dedication to volunteerism, and the notion of an official state ideology (Zionism). 63. For discussions concerning Weizmann, Beri-Gurion, and Jabotinsky, see Perlmutter, The Partitioned State, pp. 14-17; pp. 22-32; and pp. 62-63. 64. Elon, The Israelis, p. 174. While Jabotinsky's comment may not sound particularly logical or valid today, one must remember that European colonialism and territorial imperialism was still a potent, although dying force. This is underscored when Perlmutter, Military and Politics, p. 43, states that Jabotinsky largely ignored the Arab population in Palestine. Perlmutter does not indicate what Jabotinsky would have done with the Arabs had he been Israel's founding father. 6S. See O'Brien, The Siege, pp. 180-183 and p. 186 for a discussion of the riots which killed 133 Jews, wounded another 339, killed 110 Arabs, and wounded 232 more. According to Sykes, Cr0ss roads, p. 110, all but 6 of the Arab casualties were inflicted by British troops. 66. See Allon, David, p. 70; Schiff, Israel's Army, p. 8; Dayan, My Life, p. 32. 67. O'Brien The Siege, pp. 178-179, disputes the explanation that Jewish immigration caused the riots. While semi-peaceful relations between Arabs and Jews existed from 1924 through 1928, 62,000 Jews entered Palestine from 1924 through 1926. Between 1927 and 1929, less than 12,000 Jews entered Palestine. O'Brien states "clearly there is no simple correlation between the volume of Jewish immigration and the intensity of Arab reaction." This argument is somewhat simplistic since it can be argued that the Arab reaction was not tied to an increase in Jewish immigration but was rather a response to the cumulative effect of a decade of Jewish immigration. Michael J. Cohen, Palestine and the Great Powers: 1945-1948, (Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 6, states that in 1929, Jews comprised approximately 17% of Palestine's total population. See also O'Brien, pp. 179-188 and Allon, David, p. 76, for a discussion of other causal factors. 68. See Teveth, Dayan, pp. 23-39; Dayan, My Life, p. 31 concerning Shmuel's and Dvorahis political activities. 69. Teveth, Dayan, pp. 20 and 31. 70. Ibid. , p. 57. 71. See Dayan, My Life, p. 32. Dayan writes: "The British Mandatory authority, through its police force and troops, maintained order in the country. They were supposed to protect the citizens, but they were comparatively small forces and were unable - and often unwilling - to rush to the defense of Jewish communities in danger. And when they did come, they frequently arrived too late." 72. Ibid., p. 34. 73. Ibid., pp. 37-38. 74. Readers interested in a visual presentation of, among other things, Dayan's view of the Arabs are encouraged to watch Arnon Zuckerman, Dayan's Israel, (A Rimon Communications, Ltd. production in association with the BBC, 1981). In 1948, Moshe's brother was killed by Druze militia while defending his home. But Moshe's successfully negotiated with Druze leaders and persuaded them to withdraw from the Arab war against Israeli independence; see Dayan, My Life, pp. 81-82. During and after the War for Independence, Moshe successfully negotiated with the Jordanians on a variety of issues, to include ceasefire lines, peacekeeping operations, and truces, see Dayan, My Life, chapters 9 and 10. For a discussion of his participation in the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations that resulted in the Camp David Accord, see Moshe Dayan, Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981). 75. Teveth, Dayan, p. 80. CHAPTER II IHE HAGANAH AND THE EMERGENCE Of DAYAN: 1930-1941 1. See O'Brien, The Siege, p. 188. 2. Ibid., pp. 189-190. 3. For a discussion of Jewish reconcilliationsists, see O'Brien, The Siege, pp. 172-174. See also Sykes, Crossroads, p. 156, regarding Dr. Judah Manges who, as President of the Hebrew University, advocated an Arab-Jewish, bi-national state. For information regarding Weizmann's relationship with the British and the Yishuv following the 1929 riots, see O'Brien, The Siege, p. 188 and pp. 193-195. Regarding Ben-Gurion's rise, see O'Brien, Ihe Siege, pp. 223-225. While those pages discuss Ben- Gurion during the initial stages of the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939, it is both easy and not incorrect to "back-fit" that passage to the immediate post-1929 Riots timeframe. Although he was a moderate, his approach differed from Weizmann's pro-British stance and his public statements certainly endeared him to Jewish Palestinians. For example, in formal testimony given before the Peel Commission in January 1937, Ben-Gurion stated: "I say on behalf of the Jews that the Bible is our Mandate which was written by us, in our own language, in Hebrew in this very country. That is our mandate. It was only the recognition of this right which was expressed in the Balfour Declaration." (O'Brien, p. 225). 4. During the 1920's, the Histadrut had allocated less than 2,000 pounds sterling for the Haganah's annual budget, Luttwak and Horowitz, Israeli Army, p. 9. See also Perlmutter, The Partitioned State, pp. 82-83. 5. For a discussion of the rift between Ben-Gurion and Jabotinsky's Revisionists and how that dispute led to the formation of a rival para-military organization in the early 1930's, see O'Brien, The Siege,pp. 187-188; Perlmutter, The Partitioned State, pp. 84-85; Luttwak and Horowitz, Israeli Army, pp. 9-10, p. 12; and Schiff, Israel's Army, p. 9. 6. For a discussion of Nazi-Jewish cooperation, see O'Brien, The Siege, pp. 196-201. Ben-Gurion and the moderates believed that Jabotinsky's Revisionists were responsible for the murder of Chaim Arlosoroff who, as a representative of the Jewish Agency, had negotiated with the Nazis and secured an agreement allowing some Jews to leave Germany. See also Luttwak and Horowitz, Israeli Army, p. 10. 7. O'Brien, The Siege, pp. 202-203. This increased population resulted in increased Jewish land purchases. Between 1922 and 1939, Jewish landholdings increased from 148,500 acres to nearly 384,000 acres. 8. See Allon, David, p. 73, concerning early Jewish weapons procurement and munitions production efforts. See Allon, David, p. 83 and Dayan, My Life, pp. 32-33 on British regulations regarding weapons possession. 9. For discussions concerning Moshe Dayan's early experiences in and training received from the Haganah, see Teveth, Dayan, pp. 64-68; Dayan, My Life, pp. 32-38. 10. Dayan, My Life, p. 32. 11. Teveth, Dayan, p. 67. 12. See Dayan, My Life, p. 33; Teveth, Dayan, pp. 61, 68, 69, and 74. 13. See Schiff, Israel's Army, p. 10; Allon, David, p. 75. Sykes, Crossroads, p. 198, writes: "The concern of the Arabic- speaking world with Palestine was not a chimera imagined by orientalists and Arabophiles. It was a real fact and a dangerous one. It tended to make the Arab world friendly-disposed to Nazi Germany, and a large part of the oil resources of Britain were located in the Arab world. To have opened a major quarrel with the Arab states when Europe was moving toward war would have been an act of folly by Britain without precedent." 14. For a discussions concerning the causes of the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939, see O'Brien, The Siege, pp. 204-210. Of particular importance are the religious aspects of the revolt. In November 1935, Sheikh al-Qassam and his guerrilla band were killed to the last man in a fierce engagement. Each dead Arab was found to have a copy of the Koran strapped to his body and al-Qassam quickly became a martyred hero to Muslim youth. In June 1936, Haj Amin and other Muslim nationalists called on Arabs in the name of Islam to join the growing rebellion. During the British hearings in December 1936, Haj Amin testified that Jews constituted a threat to the sanctity of Arab Holy places (Ibid., p. 226). For a Jewish and occasionally biased perspective concerning the revolt see Allon, David, pp. 75-77. It is interesting that Allon states that Arab militants fomented rebellion despite the fact that the influx of European Jews raised the standard of living for everyone in Palestine, to include the Arabs. While true, the statement overlooks that fact that increased economic standing does not defuse nationalistic sentiments. 15. For discussions concerning Arab violence directed against Arab strike-breakers, see Allon, David, p. 80; Michael J. Cohen, Palestine and the Great Powers 1945-1948, (Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 6; Luttwak and Horowitz, Israeli Army, p. 11. Both Cohen and Luttwak suggest that Arab vs. Arab violence represented a political power struggle within the Arab community over which family or clan would assume the mantle of Arab leadership. As the revolt wore one the struggle against the British occasionally took second seat behind this political infighting. Allon, David, p. 76, states that the revolt killed 2287 Arabs, 520 Jews, and 140 Brits. 16. See O'Brien, The Siege, pp. 215-217, for a discussion of the political factors motivating various Arab leaders - especially King Saud of Saudi Arabia, King Ghazi of Iraq, and Abdullah of the Trans-Jordan. Each leader wanted to rid Palestine of both the Jews and their British protectors. However, each wanted to ensure that the others did not benefit from a British evacuation of Palestine. This is especially important when studying the relationship between Haj Amin and Abdullah. In discussing the subject of Arab volunteers, it is interesting to note that Allon, David, p. 77, refers to them as "illegal Arab immigrants." 17. For discussions concerning the Peel Report and the recommendations contained in the White Paper of 1937, see Allon, David, pp. 94-96; O'Brien, The Siege, pp 226-230. 18. For additional information on Haj Amin, see O'Brien, The Siege, pp. 231 and 250-252; Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars, (New York: Random House, 1982) , p. 21. For Hitler is comments after meeting Haj Amin in 1942, see Adolf Hitler, H. R. Trevor- Roper, ed., Hitler's Table Talk: 1941-1944, (London: WeidenfeId and Nicolson, 1953), p. 547. 19. Allon, David, p. 80, states that el-Kaukji boasted that 10,000 men were under his command. 20. For discussions concerning British tactics employed during the revolt, see Allon, David, pp. 83-90; Schiff, Israel's Army, p. 11. Luttwak and Horowitz, Israeli Army, p. 13, sites British strength at two divisions. Israeli attempts to halt Arab Palestinian disturbances in the West Bank during the first half of 1988 are quite similar to the tactics the British employed to quell the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939. Using military units as policemen and subjecting an angry population to curfews, detentions, and martial law, did not work in the 1930's and does not appear to be overly successful today. 21. Teveth, Dayan, p. 93. 22. See Luttwak and Horowitz, Israeli Army, p. 11, concerning the Haganah's operational problems during 1936. Teveth, Dayan, p. 91, provides an excellent example of the political selection process within the Haganah. Although he was the most militarily and tactically proficient Haganah member in Shimron, Moshe Dayan was not selected as the village's Haganah leader for political reasons. See also Schiff, Israel's Army, p. 11, concerning the Haganah's underestimation of Arab strengths and fighting abilities. 23. For a discussion concerning the military and political roots of Havlagah, see Allon, David, p. 81; Perlmutter, Military and Politics, pp. 24-26; Schiff, Israel's Army, p. 11. Perlmutter's comments also provide insight into the split between the Haganah and its leaders with the Irgun over Havlagah. O'Brien. The Siege, pp. 232-234, also discusses this rift, its effect on the Yishuv, and an Irgun terrorist attack in a Haifa fruit market that left 74 dead and 129 wounded. Allon, David, p. 80 also discusses the Irgun's terrorist attacks. 24. For a well-written description of Operation Stockade and Tower, see Allon, Making Israel's Army, pp. 12-13. For additional information regarding the strategic implications of this strategy, see Allon, David, pp. 92-93. 25. The best examples of this cooperation was during the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939 and during Rommel is North African Campaign of 1941-1942. 26. Amos Perlmutter, Military band Politics, pp. 30-31, states "The Arab rebellion could have turned into a Jewish massacre but for the mufti's fatal mistake of directing the action primarily against the Mandatory instead of against the Jews. This forced the Mandatory to rely on armed Jewish force in addition to its own troops and police to crush the revolt. Without initial British support and protection, the Yishuv would have been at the mercy of the Arab terrorists and there probably would have been no contest in 1948." 27. Allon, David, pp. 84-85. See also Teveth, Dayan, p. 94; and Al ln, Making Israel's Army, p. 8, on the expansion and growing importance of the Jewish Settlement Police. 28. Dayan, My Life, p. 41. 29. Teveth, Dayan, p. 94. 30. Dayan lists his duties and discusses his ideas concerning initiative and surprise in Dayan, My Life, pp. 41-42. The issue of the precise date Dayan became the leader of the mobile patrol is somewhat muddled as both Dayan and Teveth list different dates for the event. Dayan, My Life, pp. 41-42, discusses his eight month tenure as a guide and states that he was appointed by written order as a ghafir in March 1937. He clearly states that he was promoted to sergeant after terminating his association with the British units. Yet Teveth, Dayan, p. 94, states that Moshe joined the Jewish Settlement Police in the spring of 1937 after relinquishing his post as guide. 31. Schiff, Israel's Army, p. 17. 32. Allon, David, pp. 86-87. 33. For a discussion of "hammer and anvil" tactics, see Yitzhak Sadeh, "The Flying Squad", in Allon, Making Israel's Army, pp. 120-122. 34. See Yitzhak Sadeh, "The fellowship of Fighters", in Allon, Making Israel's Army, pp. 131-132. As part of his psychological preparations, Sadeh obviously believed it was important to prepare his men with the corrects political motivation. As a former member of Lenin's army, Sadeh taught his men the history and traditions of the Hashomer and the Labor and Defense Battalions, both of which had strong Marxist leanings. Sadeh also made sure that his troops were properly infused with the pro-Marxist spirit of his mentor, Joseph Trumpeldor, Allon, David, pp. 87-88. 35. Luttwak and Horowitz, Israeli Army, pp. 13-14; Allon, David, pp. 98-100. 36. See Allon, David, p. 100; Schiff, Israel's Army, p. 17, for a brief discussion of these political concerns. While no author links the FOSH's demise with Sadeh's left-wing political views, Schiff, Israeli Arm, p. 18, states that "when the IDF (Israel Defense Force) was founded, he (Sadeh) was moved out of a senior position because of political rivalries within the Labor Movement - his views were considered too 'left-wing' for those in power." 37. Allon, David, p. 86. 38. Teveth, David, p. 95; Allon, Making Israeli's Army, p. 8. 39. Dayan, My Life, p. 42. 40. Ibid., p. 42. 41. Teveth, Dayan, p. 95. 42. Dayan, My Life, pp. 42-43; Teveth, Dayan, p. 96. 43. Dayan, My Life, p. 43. 44. Teveth, Dayan, p. 96. 45. Dayan, My Life, pp. 43-45; Teveth, Dayan, pp. 98-99; Allon, David, p. 103. 46. For an examination of Wingate's experiences in Palestine, see Christopher Sykes, Orde Wingate: A Biography, (New York: World Publishing Company, 1959), pp. 103-178; Leonard Mosley, Gideon Goes to War, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), pp. 34-96. 47. Sykes, Wingateo, p. 117. 48. Mosley, Gideon, p. 34 claims that Wingate became a Zionist during his transit to Palestine; Sykes, Wingate, p. 109 argues that Wingate became a convert within four months after having arrived in Palestine. 49. Sykes,Wingate, p. 112. 50. Ibid., p. 167. Although made in 1938, this quote is typical of the statements Wingate made during his tour in Palestine. 51. Since Wingate was related to Lawrence of Arabia and was a cousin of the pro-Arab and former British High Commissioner of Egypt, Sir Reginald Wingate, the Haganah did riot automatically embrace him as "The Friend" until after it completed a thorough security check. See Mosley, Gideon, pp. 41-43. 52. Sykes, Wingate, pp. 121-126. 53. Mosely, Gideon, p. 47. 54. Sykes, Wingate, pp. 136-137. Sykes points out that Wingate's assessment is not entirely fair since it ignores the innovative and aggressive counter-guerrilla actions taken by some British units. However, it appears that those actions were the exception rather than the rule, see Allon, David, p. 83 and p. 90. 55. Sykes, Wingate, p. 136 and p. 148. 56. British opposition stemmed from the plan's contradiction of a primary tenet of England's Palestinian Policy, that of "the avoidance of any line of action that would bring the Jews and Arabs into armed conflict", Sykes, Wingate, p. 142. While Jewish-British cooperation had led to the formation of the notrim, those were essentially defensive units. Wingate' s proposal required that Britain officially support and sanction the use of Jewish units in offensive action. Some Jews also opposed the plan for fear that it would undermine the national policy of self-restraint, increase Arab-Jewish hostilities, result in the inadvertent death of non-combatant Arabs, and provide a lucrative recruiting ground for the British army, Ibid., p. 143; Allon, David, p. 102. 57. While Sadeh's "Flying Squad" concept eventually involved assaulting guerrillas on the outskirts of their villages, Sadeh is not clear as to when this tactics was first employed against Arab villages, see Sadeh, "The Flying Squad", in Allon, Making Israel's Army, p. 122. Even if Arab villages had been targeted before Wingate's arrival in northern Palestine, the Yishuv would have condemned it as a violation of Havlagah. See also Dayan, My Life, pp. 45-46. 58. Sykes, Wingate, pp. 149-150; Allon, David, p. 104. 59. Sykes, Wingate, pp. 152-154; Mosley, Gideon, p. 64. 60. Allon, David, p. 104. 61. For specific examples of these generalizations, see Sykes, Wingate, pp. 150-178; Mosley, Gideon, pp. 55-69. for Dayan's comments on the value of retaliatory strikes against Arab guerrilla bases, see Mosley, Gideon, p. 63. 62. For a description of one of the SNS patrols in which Dayan took part, see Teveth, Dayan, pp. 101-102. 63. See Sykes, Wingate, pp. 156-159; Mosley, Gideon, pp. 69- 70. After the battle, Arab guerrillas placed a sizable reward on Wingate's head and tried to assassinate him, see Mosley, Gideon, pp. 70 and 73. 64. Training at these schools was conducted in 11 day cycles and covered such topics as the nature of war, the infantry platoon in battle, infantry in the defense, infantry in the attack, leadership and military vices, field artillery in support of the infantry, and the tasks of engineers and cavalry. See Sykes, Wingate, p. 174; Allon, David, p. 105. 65. Mosley, Gideon, p. 78. 66. Allon, David, p. 106. 67. Dayan, My Life, p. 47. While Wingate's contributions to Jewish military thinking and his influence on Moshe Dayan's development were considerable, some authors tend to ignore Sadeh's major contributions in this area. See Mosley, Gideon, p. 252, where he "quotes" then Chief of Staff Dayan as saying Wingate "taught me and many another Israeli soldier everything we know." It is doubtful that this is a precise quote given Dayan's own statement regarding the parallel influences of both Sadeh and Wingate and is probably an attempt by Mosley to enhance the reputation of his book's central figure, i .e. , Wingate. 68. The meetings were held in England and were attended by representatives of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Yemen, Trans- Jordan, and Palestine (a split delegation of Arab factional leaders and the Jews). The Arabs refused to meet in the same room as the Jews and the meetings soon collapsed. See O'Bri en, The Siege, pp. 237-238; Allon, David, pp. 106-107. 69. See O'Brien, The Siege, pp. 237-243; Allon, David, p. 107; Perlmutter, The Partitioned State, pp. 75-81. The Woodhead Commission issued its report in 1938 and had recommended partition as a solution to the Arab-Jewish dispute. Under that plan, the Jewish portion of Palestine would have been a conclave of less than 500 square miles on the coastal plain. Both the Arabs and the Jews objected to this plan: the Jews because it was unfair; the Arabs on principle. 70. On Dayan's arrest, trial, and stay in prison, see Dayan, My Life, pp. 48-61; Teveth, Dayan, pp. 104-115. 71. O'Brien, The Siege, p. 243. 72. Ibid., p. 247. 73. This evolutionary process began in 1937 with the creation of the Haganah National Command which, in 1938, was directed by Yohanan Rattner - a man more interested in exploiting the Haganah's military capabilities than he was in politically controlling that organization. Rattner and others succeeded in dividing Palestine into military districts and allocating Haganah forces to each of those four regions. These forces were led by regional commanders each of whom reported directly to the Haganah National Command. Although ultimately responsible to civilian authority, by 1941 the Haganah was no longer the object of destructive political infighting between right-wing and left-wing groups seeking political control of the national defense organization. See Allon, David, pp. 91-92and pp. 96-98; Luttwak and Horowitz, Israeli Army, p. 14 and p. 17; Schiff, Israel's Army, p. 11. 74. For a discussion of the Haganah-Jewish Agency relationship from 1940-1941, see Allon, David, pp. 109-111. Please note that Operation Stockade and Tower was exactly the same as its earlier version except in one key area. During the Arab Revolt, new Jewish settlements were constructed during daylight hours so that they could be defended against the inevitable Arab night assault. During the 1940's, these new settlements were constructed at night to avoid British interference. 75. While the notrim was not completely dissolved, the British still controlled those militia and police forces and that control eliminated the Haganah's ability to command notrim elements as "independent Jewish fighting formations." Ibid., p. 113. 76. Luttwak and Horowitz, Israeli Army, p. 19, states that 27,000 Palestinian Jews served in the British army. Allon, David, p. 140, puts that figure at 32,000. The precise number is irrelevant. The importance of these figures lies in the fact that approximately 6% of the total Jewish population in Palestine served in the British army. This represented a serious manpower dilemma for the Haganah. 77. For a discussion of the debate surrounding the formation of the HISH and later the Palmach, see Allon, David, pp. 112-116. 78. See Ibid., p. 106 and p. 141; Luttwak and Horowitz, Israeli Army, p. 19. 79. Allon, David, pp. 116-118; Luttwak and Horowitz, Isreali Army, pp. 19-20. 80. Teveth, Dayan, p. 115; Dayan, My Life, p. 60. Shmuel kept a diary during his son's incarceration and the passages reprinted in Shmuel Dayan, "Moshe My Son", in Ribalow, ed., Fighting Heroes of Israel, provide interesting glimpses into the negotiations undertaken to obtain Moshe' s release, growing Jewish and British fears concerning a possible Nazi invasion of Palestine, and Shmuel's relationship with his son. 81. Haganah leaders were quite concerned that the Palmach would eventually become part of the British army, thereby eliminating the Haganah's ability to operationally control those forces in the "national interests" of the nascent Jewish state. See Allon, David, p. 118. On page 114, Allon summarizes British concerns over the arming and training of Jewish military forces. On pp. 118-119, Allon briefly examines one of those special operation missions - an amphibious raid that not only failed, but cost the lives of all 23 participants. 82. Ibid., p. 117. 83. For discussions of Moshe's participation in the Allied invasion of Lebanon, see Dayan, My Life, pp. 62-71 ; Teveth, Dayan, pp. 116-124. While Dayan states that the Allied invasion began on 7 June, the actual invasion began in the early morning hours of 8 June. Moshe's commando unit was sent across the border on 7 June to conduct pre-D-Day operations. 84. Accounts of the engagement vary markedly. Teveth cites official, but slanted, Australian reports that give scant recognition to Moshe's participation in the battle. Teveth refutes those reports with archival Haganah documents that portray the Australians as confused and timid. Teveth, quite naturally, describes Moshe as the hero. The best compromise description is Moshe's matter-of-fact account - an account that neither builds him up nor minimizes the Australians' efforts. 85. Dayan, My Life, p. 70. 86. The last attempt to implant a glass eye was made in 1957, Teveth, Dayan, p. 126. CHAPTER III RECOVERY AND REVOLT: 1941-1947 1. For Dayan's quotation, see Dayan, My Life, p. 72. While Yigal Allon and Moshe Dayan were comrades in arms, a rift developed between the two men that would last until Moshe's death in 1981. Teveth, Dayan, p. 126, suggests that this rift was a result of the private "competitive race" for military prowess the two men ran against each other. While the rift may have been rooted in competition, it does not fully explain the distant relationship that developed between the two men in later years. This "distancing of personal relations" may best be explained in political terms. While Yigal Allon was a devout military disciple of Yitzhak Sadeh, there was a sense of political affinity between the two men. Dayan shared a deep political relationship with David Ben-Gurion, not Yitzhak Sadeh, and it was Ben-Gurion, not Sadeh, who provided political leadership and political philosophy for Israel before, during, and after Israel's War of Independence. During that war, Sadeh was not immediately given a military command and, after the war, he was excluded from the Israel Defense force for his leftist political beliefs (see Schiff, Israel's Army, p. 18). Readers should also remember that before emigrating to Israel, Sadeh was an officer in Lenin's Red Army. While Allon served his country well during what he termed "Israel's War of Liberation", he was not afforded the same opportunities for military advancement as was Dayan and after the war, he, like his mentor Sadeh, was excluded from any position of responsibility within the Israel Defense force. Perlmutter, The Partitioned State, p. 72, discusses Allon's break with the Mapai Party in 1942. The Mapai Party, also known as the Labor Party, was the single most powerful political organization within Israel through the mid-1960's. After breaking with Mapai, Allon helped establish a new Labor Party in 1944. In January 1949, the first national elections were held in Israel. Ben- Gurion's Mapai party emerged the victor, winning 46 out of the 120 seats in the knesset - Israel's Parliament. The Mapam Party, Israel's communist party, won 19 seats, the second largest total won by any party in the elections. Yigal Allon was a member of the Mapam Party, see Luttwak and Horowitz, Israeli Army, p. 72. Following the War of Independence, Ben-Gurion replaced Al Ion with Dayan as Commander of the Southern front. This replacement occurred while Allon was out of the country touring French Algeria. See Schiff, Israel's Army, p. 48. Although Allon was being considered for the position of Minister of Defense in May 1967, it was Moshe Dayan who ultimately filled that position and "led" Israel to its military victory in the 1967 Six-Day War. Perhaps the most visible indication of the Allon-Dayan rift lies in Allon's book, Shield of David: The Story of Israel's Armed Forces, which seldom mentions Dayan by name. 2. Dayan, My Life, p. 79. 3 Ibid., pp. 73-74; Teveth, Dayan, pp. 126-127. 4. While this idea did not originate with Dayan, he did expand the concept and played a major role in its implementation. O'Brien, The Siege, p. 256, indicates that these "specially trained Haganah volunteers" helped some 10,000 Jews escape to Palestine. For the favorable views of the British military on the "German platoon", see Perlmutter, The Partitioned State, p. 90. For a discussion of the employment of the Palmach "German Platoon", see Allon, David, pp 122 and 130-138; Dayan, My Life, pp. 74-75; and Teveth, Dayan, p. 127. 5. For a discussion of the Carmel Plan, see Allon, David, pp. 122-124. It should be noted that this was not the first "nation- wide" defense plan developed by the Haganah. In 1938, during the Arab Revolt, there was considerable Jewish concern that the British would abandon Palestine if and when war came to Europe. Accordingly, Yohanan Rattner and the Haganah developed several contingency plans that would have been implemented if the British had withdrawn. Collectively known as Avner, these plans called for the defense of all of "Jewish" Palestine. Plan Avner differed from the Carmel Plan in two key areas. First, Avner was an extremely audacious plan that was clearly beyond the Haganah's capabilities to successfully execute. Second, Avner was basically a position-oriented, static defense-in-depth plan that lacked any meaningful offensive characteristics. See Allon, David, pp. 96-97. 6. Allon, David, pp. 121-122; O'Brien, The Siege, p. 249. 7. Once again, British self-interests, concerns over future relations with the Arabs, and the official Palestine policy codified in the White Paper of 1939, led London to curtail its support of Jewish military efforts in Palestine. No doubt, the British also remembered the problems created after World War I when, during that war, they had armed and trained independent Jewish units. 8. Teveth and Dayan disagree as to when Moshe ended his service with the Special Operations Branch. Dayan, My Life, p. 75, indicates that he returned to Nahalal in August 1942 while Teveth, Dayan, states that Moshe returned in September of that year. 9. For an excellent examination of the history of sephardic Jews, their plight in moslem countries, and the reasons for their generally hard-line approach to Arab-Israeli relations, see O'Brien, The Siege, pp. 333-361. Commonly referred to as sephardic Jews, these Jews had experienced life under hostile Arab rule and, after World War II, a great number of them quickly emigrated to Israel. Sephardic immigrants to Israel have had a tremendous impact on Israel's social composition and politcal views. According to one author, sephardic Jewish beliefs are "based on Revisionist, neo-Revisionist and religious strands of Zionism which are characterized by a hard-line towards the Arabs and the Arab-Israeli conflict ..." views that have replaced "Socialist Zionism as the country's dominant belief system." See Ofira Seliktar, "Ethnic Stratification and Foreign Policy in Israel: The Attitudes of Oriental Jews Towards the Arabs and the Arab-Israeli Conflict", The Middle East Journal, volume 38, number 1, Winter 1984, pp. 34-50. 10. O'Brien, The Siege, pp. 250-252; Perlmutter, The Partitioned State, pp. 89-91; Allon, David, p. 149, discuss Haj Amin's role in the pro-Nazi revolt in Iraq in 1941. On p. 235, O'Brien briefly discusses the fate of Jews living in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon during the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939. 11. For a discussion of Moshe's mission to Baghdad, see Teveth, Dayan, pp. 130-131; Dayan My Life, pp. 75-77. 12. Allon, David, p. 126. When the British began cooperating with the Haganah in 1941, British authorities agreed not to request the true names of those Palmach members who received military training from the British. Once Rommel had been defeated, the British immediately revoked that pledge and actively sought their real identities. 13. For the fate of the S.S. Patria and other vessels attempting to smuggle Jewish refugees out of Europe and into Palestine during World War II, see Allon, David, pp. 109-111; O'Brien, The Siege, p. 248; Perlmutter, The Partitioned State, p. 94. Allon provides the Haganah's explanation regarding the Patria. No one knew how unseaworthy the ship was and consequently, the Haganah used too much explosives while attempting to scuttle the vessel. Both O'Brien and Perlmutter lay much of the blame for the deaths of the 767 Jews aboard the Struma, which sank in February 1942, on Lord Moyne of the British Colonial Office who refused to issue the Jewish refuges entry visas into Palestine. While the precise cause of the sinking is not known, Allon states that after being refused docking rights in Turkey, the Struma struck a mine near the Straits of Bosphorus. In 1944, the Stern Gang assassinated Lord Moyne in Cairo. 14. Stern's campaign included bombings, assassinations, and bank robberies. See Perlmutter, The Partitioned State, pp. 84-87 and pp. 91-94, for a discussion of the Irgun-LEHI split. On Stern's attempt to work with the Nazis against the British, see O'Brien, The Siege, pp. 246-247. According to Sykes, Crossroads, p. 243, "Stern hated Jews who disagreed with him more than he did Gentiles" ... and ... "in January 1942, the Sternists murdered two officials of (the) Histadrut." It is interesting to note that Yitzhak Shamir, Israel's current Prime Minister, was a former operations officer for LEHI, see Perlmutter, The Partitioned State, p. 202. 15. For a brief discussion of the divergent views of Weizmann and Ben-Gurion, see Perlmutter, The Partitioned State, p. 71. Also review Chapter I, pp. 30-31, of this paper. 16. For a succinct discussion of the Biltmore Conference and the final split between Weizmann and Ben-Gurion, see O'Brien, The Siege, pp. 252-256; Perlmutter, The Partitioned State, pp. 71-73. See also Cohen, Great Powers, pp. 177-183. The referenced quote is on p. 182. 17. O'Brien, The Siege, p. 256. 18. During 1942-1943, portions of the Polish Free Army were stationed in Palestine. According to Perlmutter, The Partitioned State, p. 97, elements within the Irgun tried to persuade Begin to desert the army. After Begin refused, Revisionists negotiated with the Polish Army and eventually obtained Begin's premature release from military duty. O'Brien, The Siege, p. 357, states that "Oriental (sephardic) Jews had made up a large portion of the membership of the Irgun. 19. Jabotinsky died in 1940 and his body was eventually moved from the United States to Israel. Immediately prior to the 1967 Six-Day War, Begin joined the National Unity government and soon afterward he stood beside Jabotinsky's grave on Mount Herzl and, snapping to attention, is reported to have said "Sir, Head of Betar, we have come to inform you that one of your followers is now serving as a minister in the government of Israel." Perlmutter, The Partitioned State, p. 334. 20. For a comparison of Jabotinsky and Begin and for a brief examination of Begin's life through 1944, see Ibid., pp. 273-276 and pp. 333-336; O'Brien, The Siege, p. 248. 21. Although Begin's dreams of a unification of military and political forces bonded in common cause against the British did not take place precisely when and how he envisioned it would, by 1946 the Irgun and the Haganah, to include the Palmach, were actively engaged in semi-coordinated assaults against the British. This accomplishment has prompted one historian to describe Begin as a leader "of a modern national liberation force, turning a group of so-called gangsters (LEHI and Irgun) into an efficient political and military organization." See Perlmutter, The Partitioned State, p. 98. 22. O'Brien, The Siege, p. 258. While Churchill was pro- Zionist until Moyne' s assassination, as Prime Minister of Britain and leader of the Allied war effort, he placed greater emphasis on defeating Hitler than he did on the formation of a Jewish state. 23. Cohen, Great Powers, p. 12. No doubt the Irgun's bombing of the King David Hotel in July 1946 played a key role in both the Labor Party's drafting of this statement and Churchill's endorsement of that policy. 24. There are several reasons why the "saison" did not degenerate into civil war between rival Jewish factions. First, British tactics were not selective as their use of cordon and search operations, arms raids, mass arrests, and detentions tended to affect the entire Jewish population. Second, after Hitler was defeated, London's refusal to allow Jewish refugees to enter Palestine so angered the Yishuv that the "saison" quickly lost momentum. Third, the Irgun-LEHI coalition enjoyed a much smaller babe of popular support than did the Haganah, a fact that probably influenced their decision not to retaliate against their Jewish opponents. Finally, despite his pro-terrorist preferences, Begin refused to attack his fellow Jews. for additional discussions of the "saison" see Perlmutter, The Partitioned State, pp. 93-94 and pp. 98-101; Allon, Making Israel's Army, p. 29; O'Brien The Siege, p. 258. This was not the only instance of Ben-Gurion's political and military "house- cleaning". In 1946, he took military action against the right- wing Irgun in the "Altalena Incident" and following the formation of the Israel Defense Force, he disbanded the left-wing Palmach (see Chapter IV for a description of these events). In 1949, acting as both Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, he made sure that officers with extreme left-wing or right-wing political views were not allowed to remain in the Israel Defense Force. 25. Allon, Making Israel's Army, p. 15. 26. Allon, David, p. 126.. 27. Ibid., pp. 112-113. 28. Ibid., pp. 138-141, briefly discusses both the Jewish Brigade and Jewish service in the British Army. Allon provides the following breakdown of Jewish personnel by branch or type of service 4,800 infantrymen, 3,300 Royal Engineers, 4,400 in transportation, 1,250 in the Royal Ordnance Corps, 1,100 in the Service Corps, 650 artillerymen, 2,000 in the Royal Air force, 1,100 in the Royal Navy, 200 doctors, 450 officers, and 4,000 women attached to various support units, Additionally, some 3,400 Jewish boys served in the British Army's Pioneer Corps - primarily in Palestine as laborers. See also Abraham Tanier and David Karmon, "The Legacy of the Jewish Brigade", in Allon, Making IsaAel's Army, pp. 225-231, provides a well-written discussion of the Jewish Brigade, its organization, its strengths, and its contributions in both World War II and in Israel's War of Independence. 29. The author was unable to locate any study describing how the technical expertise of the Jewish Brigade and the other veterans of the British army were successfully combined with the Haganah's and Palmach's tactical expertise. Chapter IV provides a brief discuss ion of how Moshe Dayan integrated veterans of the British army with his Palmach volunteers when he organized and led the 89th Commando Battalion. 30. After the successful Allied invasion of Syria and Lebanon in June 1941, the Jewish Agency seriously considered eliminating the Palmach as a means to further stimulate Jewish enlistments in the British Army. This inducement was not necessary since by early 1940, over 130,000 Jews had volunteered for service. However, British regulations initially stipulated that Jewish volunteers would be accepted on a one-for-one basis with Arab volunteers. Given Arab sentiments toward London, Arab enlistments were "snail-like". See Allon, David, pp. 114 and 120. 31. See Perlmutter, The Partitioned State, p. 64, for Tabenkin's political philosophy and aspirations. 32. See Allon, David, pp. 126-127; Schiff, Israel's Army, p. 19; and Luttwak and Horowitz, Israeli Army, pp. 20-21. While Allon and Schiff state that this offer was made in 1943, Luttwak claims the offer was made in November 1942. 33. Allon, David, p. 127. Sadeh and his disciples, Yigal Allon in particular, continued to work for the creation of a people's militia, a force capable of defending the Yishuv and a force imbued with neo-Marxist philosophy. In discussing the integration of women into the Palmach, Allon, pp. 128-129, makes repeated references to "a true people's army" based on the "spirit of a new society. " See also Yisreal Galili , "Foundations of the Haganah (May. 1941)', in Allon, Making Israel's Army, pp. 117-118. In his preface to Galili's article, Allon describes the Haganah as "a movement of social and national liberation." 34. Allon, David, p. 20. 35. Perlmutter, Military and Politics, p. 39, states that 17 of these 28 platoons were attached to agrarian settlements associated with Tabenkin's United Kibbutzim Federation. See Allon, Making Israel's Army, p. 19, for a discussion of the Palmach's mobilization scheme. 36. Allon, David, p. 125. 37. Ibid., p. 124. 38. Ibid., pp. 124-125. 39. See Chaim Bar-Lev, "Training of Palmach N.C.O.'s at Daliya (Report)", in Allon, Making Israel's Army, pp. 127-130. This is a most fascinating report as it lists each block of instruction taught - to include specific courses within each block. The list of "guest lecturers" is most impressive as it includes such notables as Yigal Allon, Chaim Bar-Lev, Ya'akov Dori , Golda Meir, and Yitzhak Rabin. Although this report covers the period 23 July 1947 - 10 September 1947, it provides a glimpse of the Palmach training offered from 1943 on. See also "Palmach Field- Training Programme", in Allon, Making Israel's Army, pp. 124-126, which provides an equally informative examination of the standard Palmach training regimen of 1946. See also Perlmutter, Military and Politics, p. 38, which discusses the Palmach's view of the small unit leader. 40. Allon, Making Israel's Army, p. 21; Perlmutter, Military and Politics, p. 39. Allon, David, pp. 129-130, provides a brief discussion of the formation of Israel's air force and navy during World War II. 41. O'Brien, The Siege, p. 259. 42. Ibid., p. 261. 43. Cohen, Great Powers, pp. 66-67. Allon, David, p. 169 states that initially the British linked Arab approval to the monthly immigration quota, a position London quickly changed. 44. Cohen, Great Powers, p. 40. Cohen, p. 39, contains a lengthy quote from the British Chief's of Staff which underscore their concern over maintaining good relations with Arab states. 45. Sykes, Crossroads, pp. 268 and 307. 46. O'Brien, The Siege, p. 259. While primarily discussing the differences between the Washington and London regarding Proposed solutions to the Palestinian question, Perlmutter, The Partitioned State, pp. 107-120, also hints at a growing sense of Anglo-American rivalry in the Middle East. See also Cohen, Great Powers, pp. 96-115, which provides an excellent discussion on the sensitive relations between the two powers regarding Palestine. 47. Allon, David, p. 172. One must wonder to what extent the Palmach' political stance influenced their objection to cooperation with the Irgun and LEHI. After all, many prominent Palmach leaders had openly expressed their leftist sentiments and would eventually join Mapam - Israel's communist party. The Irgun, on the other hand, was the para-military offspring of the Yishuv's political right-wing organization - the Revisionist Party. See also O'Brien, The Siege, p. 261, and Cohen, Great Powers, pp. 69-70. 48. For an excellent description of the Jewish resistance movement, see Cohen, Great Powers, pp. 68-96; Allon, Making Israel's Army, pp. 23-30; Allon, David, pp. 143-183. 49. Allon, David, pp. 143-156 and pp. 172-174, provides a riveting discussion of the Haganah's illegal immigration operations. 50. See Ibid., pp. 174-176. It is interesting to note that these settlements were constructed at night to avoid British interference. The settlements constructed during the Arab Revolt, were built during the day so that they could be defended against Arab night assaults. 51. O'Brien, The Siege, p. 276. 52. Cohen, Great Powers, pp. 96-115; Sykes, Crossroads, pp. 264-314, both discuss the Anglo-American Committee and the role the Jewish Agency and other Zionist organizations had in shaping public opinion. 53. O'Brien, The Siege, p. 267. One reason for London's stated requirement that the United States must help in defraying the financial costs associated with implementing the committee's recommendations was that Britain's economy was still suffering the effects of World War II. It is also interesting to note that London tried to accommodate Washington's foreign policy views since the United States had, and still was, supporting England with massive economic loans. 54. For a good examination of Arab policy in 1946, see Cohen, Great Powers, pp. 184-202, the quotation is found on page 201. for Haj Amin's role in shaping Palestinian Arab opinion see O'Brien, Thee Siege, p. 269. The British, it should be noted, made no attempt to prevent Haj Amin from entering Egypt following his release by french officials in late 1945. Their primary concern was that they did not want to make a martyr out of the Mufti and thereby inflame Arab opinion. 55. O'Brien, The Siege, p. 269. 56. Ibid., p. 273. As Jabotinsky's spiritual heir, Begin used the Irgun (originally formed by Jabotinsky's Revisionist Party) in an attempt to secure Jabotinsky's political and territorial objectives. 57. Cohen, Great Powers, p. 66. 58. For an overall examination of these military actions, see Allon, David, pp. 143-183. Readers interested in viewing several of the after action reports or reading accounts of the actions by Jewish participants should see Allon, Making Israel's Army, pp. 146-150, "The Attack on the Bridges"; pp. 151-157, "Sabotage Action Report No. 9 (Report) - The Allenby Bridge"; pp. 158-161, Famous Allenby Bridge"; pp. 162-154, "The Night of the Radar"; and pp. 165-172, "The Radar Action". 59. Cohen, Great Powers, p. 75. 60. For a good discussion of Operation Agatha, see Cohen, Great Powers, pp. 81-90. See also Allon, David, p. 178. 61. For varied opinions regarding who was ultimately responsible for the King David Hotel tragedy, see Sykes, Crossroads, p. 300; Cohen, Great Powers, pp. 90-93; Perlmutter, The Partitioned State, pp. 103-105; Allon, David, pp. 178-179. 62. For a discussion of the unrestrained Irgun-LEHI war against the British and the consequences of that campaign, see Cohen, Great Powers, pp. 229-259. 63. Ibid., p. 243, the British attended the funeral of a Haganah man killed defusing a warning charge in an Irgun tunnel that ran beneath the British Headquarters buildins in Jaffa. 64. O'Brien, The Siege, p. 272. for a discussion of the British decision to refer the Palestine matter to the United Nations, see, Cohen, Great Powers, pp. 203-228. 65. For discussion of the United Nations debates regarding the decision to partition Palestine, see Ibid., pp. 260-300; O'Brien, The Siege, pp. 271-279. CHAPTER IV WAR, POLITICS, AND INDEPENDENCE: 1948-1949 1. Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947-1914 (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), p. 124. During its 212 year history, the United States has sustained slightly more than 1 million battlefield deaths. 2. O'Brien, The Siege, p. 428. Chapter 9 of that book, "The Shirt of Uthman", pp. 419-488, provides an excellent discussion of both the ongoing refugee problem as well as Israel is attempts to come to terms with its Arab inhabitants. 3. Luttwak and Horowitz, Israeli Army, p. 81. 4. Herzog, Arab-Israeli Wars, pp. 17-24, provides a succinct examination of Arab and Jewish strengths and weaknesses. 5. Allon, David, p. 190, indicates that there were slightly more than 300 Jewish settlements in Palestine. He does not indicate how many of those were in territory granted to the Arabs. 6. Ibid., p. 186. 7. Ibid., pp. 152-165, contains a succinct history of the Yishuv's arms manufacturing and procurement operations. For estimates on the number and types of weapons held by the Haganah, see Luttwak and Horowitz, Israeli Army, p. 25; Herzog, Arab- Israeli Wars, p. 19. 8. Many of the arms raids frequently referred to in various books were conducted before the United Nations Partition Resolution. Those conducted after that vote were in keeping with existing Mandate policies. However, it is easy to conclude that some of those later raids were British attempts to retaliate for the Jewish revolt against London's authority. 9. Luttwak and Horowitz, Israeli Army, p. 29. 10. Dupuy, Elusive Victory, p. 123, provides the following information regarding the size of the Arab invasion force: Lebanon, 2,000; Syria, 5,000; Jordan, 7,500; Egypt, 7,000; and Iraq, 10,000. for a limited discussion of the Arab Legion, see Herzog, Arab-Israeli War s, p. 23. While that page also contains slightly different figures regarding the various strengths of the Arab forces, those figures do not differ markedly from Dupuy's. 11. Dayan, My Life, p. 91. 12. Allon, David, p. 188. 13. Cohen, Great Powers, pp. 324-325. 14. Ibid., p. 187. 15. Ibid., pp. 306 and 321. 16. For a discussion of inter-Arab affairs, see Ibid., pp. 184-202. For a discussion of the Arab League, see Ibid., pp. 317-325. For a discussion of Abdullah's regional goals and his somewhat friendly relations with the Jews, see Ibid., pp. 325- 334. The rivalry between Jordan and Syria became so intense that during 1947, each nation closed their embassy in the others country. Syrian-Jordanian relations continue to be less than hospitable as is evidenced by the Syrian link with the Palestine Liberation Organization, a link that helped spur Jordan to remove the PLO from its territories in 1971 - "Black September". 17. Cohen, Great Powers, p. 311. 18. As late as 1956, Jordan and England maintained a close diplomatic and military relationship. In 1956, when England, France, and Israel were preparing to invade Egypt, an Israeli retaliation strike into Jordan against an Arab guerrilla camp created tremendous diplomatic tensions between London and Tel Aviv. The British actually threatened to intervene militarily on behalf of Jordan! 19. Allon, David, p. 13:3. 20. Those interested in the specifics of Israel's War of Independence are encouraged to read, Chaim Herzog, The Arab- Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East (New York: Random House, 1982), pp. 17-108; which provides an unbiased appraisal of that conflict. For those interested in the evolution of the Israel Defense force during that conflict, see Luttwak and Horowitz, Israeli Army, pp. 27-70. For a strictly Israeli perspective, see Allon, David, pp. 185-227. for those only interested in a brief, yet nicely written overview, see Schiff, Israel's Army, pp. 21-45. Unless otherwise noted, the discussions about the war were constructed from information drawn from these volumes. General speaking, no additional footnotes regarding the overall conduct of the war will be provided unless either another work is cited or a quotation is used. 21. Cohen, Great Powers, pp. 301-344 provides an excellent discussion of the political, diplomatic, and military events of the November 1947 to May 1948 timeframe. 22. Allon, David, p. 200. Throughout his discussion of Israel's War of Independence, Allon goes to great lengths to cite occasions when the British assisted, or appeared to assist, the Arabs. In many respects, Allon's case appears to be quite justified and his contention that the British withdrawal favored the Arabs is substantiated in part by the withdrawal sequence described by Cohen, Great Powers, p. 312. Cohen, who honestly attempts to portray the British as neutral, does not cite one instance in which the British assisted the Jews when that assistance was not in their own best interests. While Cohen states that British forces forcefully expelling a sizable element of the Arab Liberation Army from upper Galilee in January 1948, thereby rescuing several beleaguered Jewish settlements, Herzog, Arab-Israeli Wars, p. 24, states that this was in keeping with existing British policy since that portion of Palestine had not yet been evacuated. Perhaps the most charitable were comment regarding the British withdrawal is found in Luttwak and Horowitz, The Israeli Armny, p. 28, "Right up to the last phases of the evacuation, even quite small British contingents could decide the outcome of local struggles by what they did or failed to do. Much was left to the discretion of junior officers; some were strictly neutral, a few were pro-Jewish, but the vast majority tended to be pro-Arab. 23. When this suggestion was made, Ya'akov Dori was the Haganah Chief of Staff. Dori, it should be recalled, refused to grant Sadeh and Dayan permission in 1938 to launch counter-attacks against the Arab forces besieging the settlement of Hanita. It is not entirely unreasonable to argue that Dori's lack of offensive spirit in 1938 was reflected in the defense oriented proposal of early 1948. Luttwak and Horowitz, Israeli Army, p. 75, suggest that Dori's poor health contributed to his "indifferent leadership." 24. Luttwak and Horowitz, Israeli Army, p. 31. 25. For discussion of how Israeli military operations encouraged Palestinian Arabs to flee their homes, see Benny Morris, "The Operation Dani and the Palestinian Exodus from Lydda and Ramle in 1948" in The Middle East Journal, volume 40, number 1, Winter 1986; Denny Morris, "The Harvest of 1948 and the Creation of the Palestinian Refugee Problem", in The Middle East Journal, volume 40, number 4, Autumn 1986. While emphasizing the more controversial aspects of Israeli military operations, in both of the articles Morris either plays down or ignores the fact that Arab guerrilla groups hid amongst the local Arab population. Consequently, the IDF often encouraged Arabs to flee their homes since their departure would strip the Arab guerrillas of both their cover and their base of popular support. 26. For additional information regarding "Operation Nashchon" and Yigal Yadin's role in its preparation and execution, see Sachar "Yigal Yadin", in Harold U. Ribalow, ed. Fighting Heroes of Israeli, pp. 154-183. 27. For discussions of both tragedies, see O'Brien, The Siege, pp. 281-282; Herzog, Arab-Israeli Wars, pp. 30 and 38. See also Cohen, Great Powers, pp. 337-338. 28. For Yigal Allon's Palmach offensives in northern Palestine, see Sachar, "Yigal Allon", in Harold U. Ribalow, ed. , Fighting Heroes of Isreali, pp. 65-87. 29. See Abraham Tanier and David Karmon, "The Legacy of the Jewish Brigade", in Allon, Making Isreali's Army, pp. 225-2.31. 30. Often been described as the "training ground of the Israel Defense Force" (IDF) , the importance of the Palmach must not be underestimated. In May 1948, the Palmach, the HISH, elements of the Irgun and LEHI, and seasoned veterans of both the Jewish Brigade and the British army were merged to form the IDF. Despite the Palmach's small size, 4 of its officers - Moshe Dayan, Yitzhak Rabin, Chaim Bar-Lev, and David Elazar - eventually served as IDF Chief's-of-Staff. After Israel's War of Independence, 40 additional Palmach officers attained the rank of brigadier-general. See Perlmutter, Military and Politics, p. 39. 31. See Luttwak and Horowitz, Israel Army, pp. 39-43, for a succinct discussion of the evolution of the IDF's command structure. 32. Moshe Dayan, Diary of the Sinai Campaign (New York. Schocken Books, 1965) , p. 39. 33. Personal letter from Major General Amnon Shahak, Israel Defense Force, dated 28 February 1988. 34. See Teveth, Dayan, pp. 138-143 and 159-162; Dayan, My Life, pp. 87-92 and 112-121. 35. See Dayan, My Life, pp. 78-82. 36. See Dayan, My Life, pp. 87-92; Teveth, Dayan, pp. 138-14:3. 37. Dayan, My Life, p. 93. 38. Teveth, Dayan, pp. 144-147. In July, this practice of "raiding" other units for personnel was abolished as the IDF headquarters decreed that no new units would be formed. Instead, a mobilization and assignment system was installed whereby new recruits were funneled into already existing units. See Luttwak and Horowitz, Israeli Army, p. 43. 39. Dayan, My Life, p. 95. 40. Ibid., p. 94. 41. Ibid., p. 92; Teveth, Dayan, p. 155. 42. Dayan, My Life, pp. 96-98 43. Teveth, Dayan, pp. 149-151. 44. Dayan, My Life, pp. 115 and 117. 45. Teveth, Dayan, p. 151; Dayan, My Life, p. 98-99. 46. Dayan, My Life, p. 98; Teveth, Dayan, p. 151. Dayan's remark concerning "fighting Arabs, not Germans", is quite interesting since it is indicative of his beliefs concerning Arab military doctrine - a belief that to a large extent influenced his approach to both the 1956 Sinai Campaign and, to a certain extent in the 1967 Six Day War. As Major General Amnon Shahak put it, personal letter from Major General Amnon Shahak, dated 28 February 1988, "Dayan claimed that [since] the Arabs had not studied the the German and British combat doctrine, [there was] no reason to expect that they would act in accordance with this doctrine." This statement does not imply that Dayan believed the Arabs were incompetent soldiers and tacticians. Rather, it underscores Dayan's lifelong belief that since Arab armies did not fight using European methods, there was no need for the IDF to devote an excessive amount of time and talent studying European military history and doctrine. While other IDF commanders did study European military doctrine especially as it related to the employment of armor, throughout his career Dayan fostered the development of a combat doctrine largely based on "young Israeli talents, their originality, inventiveness, and pluck." While some authors have attempted to describe Dayan's approach to war as an offshoot of Sir Liddel Hart's "Indirect Approach", especially with respect to his 1956 Sinai Campaign, Dayan never studied nor did he meet Hart. Other Israeli military leaders were devout disciples of Hart's approach. For a brief examination of how Hart's "Indirect Approach" was modified to suit IDF doctrinal needs, see Jac Weller, "Sir Basil Liddel Hart's Disciples in Israel", Military Review, volume 54, number 2, January 1974. 47. Dayan, My Life, p. 99. 48. Ibid., p. 99. 49. Ibid., p. 100. 50. for an overview of the assaults on Lod (Lydda) and Ramle, see Dayan, My Life, pp. 102-111; Teveth, Dayan, pp 153-158. 51. Dayan, My Life, pp. 113-114. 52. For a discussion of his duties, responsibilities, and close working relationship with his Jordanian counterparts, see Ibid., Chapter 8; Teveth, Dayan, pp. 163-179. 53. Dayan, My Life, p. 78. 54. Ibid., pp. 78-79. 55. Teveth, Dayan, pp. 135-136. 56. O'Brien, The Siege, p. 367. 57. Luttwak and Horowitz, Israeli Army, pp, 25-27 and p. 72, discuss the Palmach's leftist links and Allon's membership in Mapam. Perlmutter, The Partitioned State, pp. 64 and 72, outline Tabenkin's pro-Leninist predilections and Allon's split with Mapai in 1942. See also Perlmutter, Military and Politics, pp. 38-40. 58. For Dayan's participation in the "Altalena Affair", see Dayan, My Life, pp. 95-96; Teveth, Dayan, pp. 147-149. 59. Luttwak and Horowitz, Israeli Army, p. 38. 60. Dayan, My Life, p. 95. 61. Ibid, p. 95. CHAPTER V EPILOGUE 1. This quotation was taken from Arnon Zuckerman, Dayan's Israeli. A review of the bibliography should provide the interested reader with a starting point for further investigation of the information presented in this chapter. BIBLIOGRAPHY Allon, Yigal . The Making of Israel's Army. New York: Universe Books, 1970. Written by the former Commander of the Palmach and acting Israel Defense Force Chief of Staff, the book is divided into two parts. Part One, "Defending the Land", presents a brief overview of Israel's armed forces from the turn of the century through the 1967 Six-Day War. Part Two, "Voices and Documents", contains a series of articles, after- action reports, and training schedules written by various Jewish military leaders dating back to 1909. While containing little information on Moshe Dayan, this section was exceptionally valuable in that it provided descriptions of the formation and training of, as well as the problems faced by the Haganah and the Palmach during their struggle with Britain following World War Two. Allon, Yigal. Shield of David: The Story of Israel's Armed Forces. New York: Random House, 1970. A companion volume to his book The Making of Israel's Army, this work provides a careful examination of the Israel Defense Force from its earliest predecessors through the 1967 Six-Day War. Concentrating on the years 1929 through 1949, this book was useful in understanding how the development of the various Jewish defense organizations affected Moshe Dayan. Readers are warned that Allon's treatment of the Arabs is somewhat one- sided. Burns, Lt. General E. L. M. Between Arab and Israeli. New York 1962. General Burns was the head of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine during the early 1950's. His book provides an excellent discussion of the gradual increase of Israel's use of retaliation during that period. Of particular interest is Chapter Eight which specifically discusses Dayan's relationship with Beri-Gurion and his role in Israeli retaliation attacks. Cohen, Michael J. Pajestine and the Great Powers: 1945-1948. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982. This book does not provide any information regarding Moshe Dayan. However, since it analyzes the diplomatic efforts of Britain, the United States, the Arabs, and the Jews to impose their own solution to the "Palestine Problem". Following World War Two, the book provides valuable information concerning the political relationships that existed within Israel and between Israel and the western world and how those relationships were translated into military action. Of particular importance was its unbiased discussion of the crumbling relationship between the Jews and the British in Palestine during the final months of the Mandate. Dayan, Moshe. "A Soldier Reflects on Peace Hopes", ed. Walter Laquer and Barry Rubin, The Arab-Israeli Reader: A Documetary History of the Middle East Conflict, 4th edition, New York, 1985. This article is a reprint of a speech Dayan made to a 1969 graduation ceremony for new Israel Defense Force officers and was useful intracing the development of his philosophy concerning peaceful relations between Israel and her neighboring Arab states. Dayan, Moshe. Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the Israel Peace Negoiations. New York, 1981. Written in the months before his death, Dayan lays out his remarkable account of the negotiations that led to the Camp David Accord. Also included are discussions of his break with Begin and in 1979 and his beliefs regarding Arabs within occupied territories. Dayan, Moshe. Diary of the Sinai Campaign. New York, 1967. Based on his personal recollections and on a diary he kept during the 1956 Sinai War, the book contains Dayan's perspective of the war, its causes, and its execution. In addition to its value as an historical record of that campaign, the volume provides the reader with a view of Dayan's personal beliefs concerning combat command and control procedures, combat leadership, etc. Dayan, Moshe. "Israel's Border and Security Problems", Foreign Affairs, volume 33, number 2, January 1955. This article was useful in understanding Dayan's frustration over the continued Arab raids and terrorist activities conducted against Israel during his tenure as Chief of Staff. Dayan, Moshe. Moshe Dayan: Story of My Life. New York: William Morrow and Company, 1976. To understand Moshe Dayan, students must read this thoughtful, well-written, and honest appraisal of his life, his ideas, his thbughts, and his actions. Although he devotes half of the book to the years 1967 through 1976, he provides an insightful glimpse into his "inner-self". The book's major weakness is that it assumes the reader is well-versed in the political, social, and diplomatic history of Israel. Dayan, Moshe. "Why Israel Strikes Back", Under Fire: Israel's 20- Year Struggle for Survival, ed. Donald Robinson, New York, 1968. Written in 195?, the piece provides Moshe Dayan's explanation for Israel's retaliation policy of the 1950's. Elon, Amos. The Israelis: Founders and Sons. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971. Exceptionally thought provoking, the volume traces Israelis history from its pre- Herzl Zionist roots to the early 1970's. The book is divided into two parts and part one, "Father's", was especially useful in identifying the varied social, political, and philosophical forces that molded Moshe Dayan's environment. Herzog, Chaim. The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East. New York, 1982. This book is good military history and provided an excellent examination of each of Israel's wars from 1948 through 1973. Khouri, Fred. "The Policy of Retaliation in Arab-Israeli Relations", The Middle East Journal, volume 20, number 4, Autumn 1966. While primarily concentrating on Israeli retaliation raids since 1967, the article provides minimal information on pre-1956 strikes. Luttwak, Edward N. and Daniel Horowitz. The Israeli Army: 1948- 1973. Lanham, Maryland: Abt Books, 1983. While covering the same information as Herzog's volume, this book provides less detail on how Israel fought her wars and concentrates on analyzing why Israel fought those war the way she did. Morris, Benny. "Operation Dani and the Palestinian Exodus from Lydda and Ramle in 1948", The Middle East Journal, volume 40, number 1, Winter 1986. While Moshe Dayan's exploits during Operation Dani are legendary, that operation has been cited as one of the causes of the Palestinian refugee problem. Morris, Benny. "The Harvest of 1946 and the Creation of the Palestinian Refugee Problem", The Middle East Journal, volume 40, number 4, Autumn 1986. A useful piece in that it examines how food was used as a weapon in Israel's War for Independence and the military and political reasons for adopting that policy. Mosley, Leonard. Gideon Goes to War. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955. This biography of Orde Charles Wingate contains much of the same information as does Christopher Sykes' biography but it is neither as well-written nor as detailed as Sykes' work. The volume does provide a more personal description of Wingate and is filled with numerous antecdotes of his experiences in Palestine. O'Brien, Conor Cruise. The Siege: The Saga of Israel and Zionism. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986. While highly critical of the British, this volume traces the history of Israel from the mid-nineteenth century through 1982. The book is well-documented and carefully researched and was of great value in examining the various social and political forces that shaped Moshe Dayan and his environment. Perlmutter, Amos. Israel the Partitioned State: A Political History Since 1900. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1985. A political history of Israel since the earliest days of the British Madate, the volume describes the relationship between politics and the military and provides interesting reading when discussing the moderate vs. Revisionist split. Some information is given regarding Dayan's relationships with the various political leaders of Israel and his "Open Bridges Policy". Perlmutter, Amos. Military and Politics in Israel: Nation- Building an Role Expansion. New Vork: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969. Although this is a very small volume, it is an exceptionally complex work that requires the reader to have more than a passing knowlegde of Israel's political history. Despite this drawback, the book proved invaluable. Perlmutter, Amos. "The Institutionalization of Civil-Military Relations in Israel: The Ben-Gurion Legacy and Its Challengers (1953-1967)", The Middle East Journal, volume 22, number 4, Autumn 1968. This article uses the Lavon Affair as a start-point in discussing Israel's military- civilian relations. It was of limited value in this study. Raphaeli, Nimrod. "Military Government in the Occupied Territories: An Israeli View", The Middle East Journal, volume 23, number 2, Spring 1969. An early description of Dayan's "Open Bridges Policy". Ribalow, Harold U. ed. Fighting Heroes of Israel. New York: Signet Books, 1967. While this volume contains biographical sketches of various Israeli heroes, it was obviously written to capitalize on Israel7's 1967 Six-Day War. The book was of limited value to this study. However, it did provide light reading and is offered to those students who seek a pedestrian history of Israel's political and military heroes. Samuel, Edwin. "The Government of Israel and Its Problems", The Middle East Journal, volume 3, number 1, January 1949. Provides one of thme first examinations of the newly created Israeli state and its current and potential problems. It was of limited value in this study. Schiff, Ze'ev. A History of The Israeli Army: 1874 to the Present. New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1985. Of limited historical use in this study, the book did provide useful discussions of the military doctrine of the Israel Defense force and how that doctrine support's Israel's national goals. Seliktar, Ofira. "Ethnic Stratification and Foreign Policy in Israel: The Attitudes of Oriental Jews Toward the Arabs and the Arab-Israeli Conflict", The Middle East Journal, volume 38, number 1, Winter 1984. An excellent discussion of the "hard-line" attitudes of "Oriental" (Sephardic) Jews and how their beliefs differ from "Western" (Ashkanhazi) Jews. Shlaim, Avi. "Conflicting Approaches to Israel's Relations with the Arabs: Ben-Gurion and Sharett, 1953-1956", The Middle East Journal, volume 37, number 3, Spring 1983. A critical examination of the different foreign policy views held by two Israeli Prime Ministers in the 1950's, the article is as thought provoking as it is harsh in its judgement of Dayan's role in Israel's policy of retaliation. Soffer, Arnon. "The Wars of Israel in Sinai: Topography Conquered", Military Review, volume 62, number 4, April 1982. This article is crisply-written and provides a solid discussion of how the Israel Defense force utilized the Sinai's terrain in its confrontations with the Egyptian army. Clearly demonstrating that Israel, not Egypt, understood how to use terrain in a mobile war of speed and disruption, the maps and terrain analyses show the striking similarity of Israel's campaigns of 1956 and 1967. Sykes, Christopher. Crossroads to Israel. Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1965. Often quoted in later works, this volume provides an exceptional history of the British Mandate in Palestine. Although Sykes does not discuss Dayan, the volume is critical to understanding the social and political forces that shaped and eventually led to Israel. Sykes, Christopher. Orde Wingate A Biography. Cleveland, World Publishing Company, 1959. Well-written and carefully researched, this volume provided valuable information concerning Wingate's impact on the Haganah and the prevailing military doctrine of static, position-oriented defense. Teveth, Shabtai. Moshe Dayan: The Soldier, The Man, The Legend. Boston, 1973. This work was invaluable in this study as it filled in many of the gaps Dayan either intentionally or unintentionally left in his autobiography. While Dayan often assumes the reader is familiar with Israeli history, Teveth takes the time to provide a suitable explanation to many of the topics Dayan glosses over. Weller, Jac. "Sir Basil Liddell Hart's Disciples in Israel", Military Review, volume 54, number 2, January 1974. Although Dayan never met Hart, other Israel Defense Force (IDF) leaders met with Hart and studied his concept of the "Indirect Approach". This piece discussed Hart's influence on the IDF. MISCELLANEOUS Personal letter from Major General Amnon Shahak to Major Allan Katzberg, dated 28 February 1988. This letter was written in response to several questions I forwarded to formar IDF graduates of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. The letter was most informative. Zuckerman, Arnon. Dayan's Israel, 1981. This Rimon Communications, Ltd. production was produced in cooperation with the BBC and was most helpful in understanding Dayan's appreciation of and compassion for the Arabs.
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