Foundations Of Excellence: Moshe Dayan And Israel's Military Tradition (1880 To 1950) AUTHOR Major Allan A. Katzberg, USMC CSC 1988 SUBJECT AREA History TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Title Page Introduction 2 1. Setting the Stage: 1880-1929 9 2. The Haganah and the Emergence of Moshe Dayan: 1930-1941 48 3. Recovery and Revolt: 1942-1947 87 4. War, Politics, and Independence: 1948-1949 118 5. Epilogue 154 Appendix A: Glossary 162 Appendix B: The Evolution of the Israel Defense Force: 1907-Present 167 Maps and Charts 1) The Middle East 8 2) Northern Israel 10 3) Partition Plans for Palestine 56 4) United Nations Partition Plan 117 5) Arab Invasion of 15 May 1948 132 6) Israel's Borders: 1949-1967 133 7) Operation Dani 144 8) Chart of the Evolution of the IDF 167 Endnotes 176 Bibliography 207 INTRODUCTION No man is an island, especially in the turbulent stream of history. To fully appreciate the validity of this concept and to grasp the essence of any historic figure, the serious person must accomplish four interrelated tasks. 1) He or she must understand the history - the social movements, cultural values, ideas, events, and personalities - that nourished the environment in which the man developed. 2) From this flood of information, the scholar must identify those specific factors that molded the man. This identification process must examine how the man's values, thoughts, and perceptions were influenced, bounded, fashioned, or otherwise tainted by the cultural, social, economic, and political components of his environment. 3) The historian must examine the relationship between the man's subsequent actions and the carefully analyzed tapestry of his past. 4) This examination can then explain how that man influenced both his environment and his fellow man. While this interpretive or indirect process disputes the "big men of history" theory, a flawed concept whose singular tenet purports that a few key personalities power history's mighty engines, it does not argue that mankind is the virtual prisoner of his past. Rather, this methodology provides a vehicle for the rational examination of the relationship between the people who "make" history and the historical circumstances that provided those individuals with the opportunity to do so. Using this methodology, this paper examines Moshe Dayan against the backdrop of Israel's history and identifies the social, military, and political foundations of his career. In simpler terms, the paper attempts to identify and explain the varied forces that made Moshe Dayan who and what he was. While concentrating on the development and application of his military thoughts, the paper does not ignore those non-military factors that influenced his world view - an examination that provides the reader with a more complete portrait of the "whole man." How can an examination of Moshe Dayan, or any other public figure, benefit the professional soldier? The old adage "know your enemy" is only half complete. The second half of that axiom is "know your ally." If knowing what makes an enemy "tick" better enables a soldier to defeat his foe, then understanding the motivations of an ally will better enable the professional to work with that ally in defeating a common enemy. This is particularly important with regard to Moshe Dayan since he played a major role in developing the military forces capable of implementing Israeli military doctrine. This paper is divided into five chapters. The first chapter covers the 50 years from the late 19th century to 1929 when, at the age of 14, Moshe Dayan joined the Haganah. While little of this chapter is devoted directly to Moshe Dayan, it provides background information concerning the socio-political environment in which he was raised. The history of Palestinian Jews and Moshe Dayan are so inexorably linked that it is impossible to understand Dayan without digesting a sizable portion of the Jewish struggle in Palestine. The chapter specifically discusses Zionism, the British Mandate in Palestine, the rise of Arab and Jewish nationalism, and the tentative beginnings of Israel's military tradition. Chapter two spans the period 1930 to 1941 and examines those personalities, ideas, political decisions, and events that played critical roles in both Moshe Dayan's military development and in the development of Jewish military forces. Included here are analyses of the evolution of Jewish military doctrine during the Arab Revolt of 1936 through 1939, the splintering of Jewish reactions to the British Mandate, and the increasing tensions between Arabs, Jews, and the British. Chapter three focuses on the years 1942 through 1947 and discusses the political, social, and military events that led to the demise of the British Mandate, Israel's War of Independence, and the creation of the Israel Defense force. Althoush Dayan played only a minor role in this five-year slice of history, the issues raised, problems resolved, and dilemmas left unanswered significantly influenced his political development - especially with regard to the close relationship he eventually shared with his future political mentor, David Ben-Gurion. Of particular importance in this chapter are the discussions centering on military-civilian relationships, the Haganah's active support of Ben-Gurion's strategy of nation-building, the use of Jewish forces to support Britain's war against Hitler, and the subsequent employment of those forces against the British Mandate in Palestine. Chapter four spans two short but eventful years, 1948 and 1949. While focusing on Israel's War of Independence, this chapter uses Moshe Dayan participation in that conflict as a mechanism to examine how the Israel is fought that war. Particular attention is paid to Dayan's style of combat leadership and his remarkable ability to apply the military concepts he learned in the small unit, guerrilla, and counter-guerrilla environment of the Arab Revolt, to the conventional battlefield of 1948. This chapter concludes with an analysis of how Dayan's political relationship with Ben-Gurion was solidified - a relationship that played an important role in his eventual rise to Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Force. Chapter five is an epilogue that briefly summarizes Dayan's social, political, and military foundations. It also provides a brief glimpse at the remaining 32-years of his life. As is evidenced by the preceding paragraphs, this-paper is more than a biographical sketch of Israel's most famous soldier. Using Dayan as a common thread running through Israel's social, political, and military history, the paper provides an examination of the development of the Israel Defense force, Israel's military doctrine, and Israel's military tradition. Initially, the paper was to have examined what made Moshe Dayan and how Dayan influenced the development of Israel's military forces. However, the author found it impossible to first divorce Dayah from Israel's early military tradition and to then separate that tradition from Israel's social, political, and diplomatic history. This expansion of purpose proved to be too massive for the time allocated which, when combined with a near terminal case of writer's block, almost resulted in disaster. Consequently, the final product only discusses the Dayan's formative years and makes no attempt to adequately examine his military and political career after Israel's War of Independence. I leave that task to a future student who, possessing greater stamina and talent than I, can finish what I failed to accomplish. That student, as well as all readers, are encouraged to make frequent use of the endnotes as they provide additional information that may be of assistance in grasping the essence of both Dayan and the modern Israeli military tradition. In addition to the aforementioned deficiencies, this paper does not contain a detailed examination of two key subjects Although forged in the heat of battle, the Israel Defense Force (IDF) was constructed upon two different military foundations - the partisan tradition embodied in the Palmach and the "purist" or British tradition symbolized in the Jewish Brigade of World War II. The precise mechanics of how that fusion was engineered on an IDF-wide basis are not discussed. Instead, the paper examines how Moshe Dayan combined those foundations when he organized and led the 89th Commando Battalion in 1948. Second, the paper briefly mentions Moshe Dayan's controversial "Open Bridges Policy" - a remarkably novel approach to solving Arab-Israeli coexistence problems in the West Bank. Once again, time constraints prevented a detailed examination of how Dayan's West Bank policies not only meshed with his concept of national defense, but how his ideas could have provided a framework for Jewish-Palestinian peace. Both of these subjects are offered as Potential topics for future research. I wish to thank several people for their direct and indirect assistance in this project. First, I would like to thank Major General Amnon Shahak of the Israel Defense Force, who took time from his busy schedule and provided me with answers to several questions regarding Dayan. His insights were particularly helpful. Second, I would like to thank my wife, Suzy. Without her patience and understanding, this lengthy project would never have been completed. Third, I would like to thank Lieutenant Colonel Bittner who patiently prodded me along and fully understood my anxieties as I battled a particularly pernicious disease - writer's block. Finally, I wish to thank my father who instilled in me a deep and abiding interest in and appreciation of history. Click here to view image CHAPTER I SETTING THE STAGE: 1880-1929 On May 4, 1915, in the small Jewish settlement of Deganiah, a son was born to Shmuel and Dvorah Dayan. This was a bittersweet moment for these newly-wed, Russian-born emigres. Not only was he their first-born, he was also the first child born in the struggling village situated near the Sea of Galilee's southern shore. As such, he was Deganiah's first sabra.* But the festivity surrounding this event was laced with sadness. The boy's proud parents named him Moshe, after Moshe Barsky, a close friend who, at the age of nineteen, had been killed by Arab bandits some eighteen months earlier. (1) As his biographer, Shabtai Teveth, records: Moshe inherited with his very name a direct association with the struggle between Jews and Arabs that would characterize the rest of his life. (2) Moshe was born in troubled times. With World War I raging in Europe, the Ottoman Empire, rulers of Palestine, looked with increasing suspicion on the small but growing cluster of Jewish settlements on the Mediterranean's eastern shore. As a member of the Central Powers, Turkey viewed these 80,000, mostly Russian- born, Jews as potential Allied sympathizers. Fearful of British attack from Egypt and concerned about pro-British sentiment * SABRA: A Jewish term of affection referring to Jews born in Palestine. The term comes from a word describing a small but resilient cactus that grew throughout Palestine. Please note that more complete definitions of Jewish terms and phrases may be found in the glossary. Click here to view image within the Jewish settlements, the Turks pursued an active policy of harassment toward the Jews in Palestine - a policy that threatened Jews with deportation, restricted Jewish immigration, and banned Jewish self-defense organizations. These actions were designed to eliminate Jewish nationalism within the Ottoman Empire. This policy split the Yishuv* as some Jews, fearful of losing all they had worked for, urged their neighbors to not only seek Turkish citizenship but to also join the Turkish army. Other Jews actively supported the Allied cause. (3) But Jews were not the only group to feel the sting of Turkish policy. Portions of the restless Arab community, a community splintered by inter-family feuds yet bonded by a growing spirit of nationalism, openly warred against Turkish domination. Although nationalistic in nature, their war was openly supported by the British who viewed the Arabs as allies in their war against Turkey and the Central Powers. Eventually the British, with Arab and Jewish assistance, removed the Turks from Palestine and, in the ensuing peace, settled down to what they considered would be the mundane business of governing their new territorial mandate. But the war's violence and the peace that accompanied it's sudden end masked a set of complex, powerful, and opposing forces in Palestine. There, nascent Arab nationalism began to grind against rising Jewish nationalism and the collision of those movements would eventually rock the world with their fury. * YISHUV: A term referring to the entire Jewish population of Palestine. As a youngster, Moshe seemed ill-prepared to survive the harsh environment of his native land. (4) At the age of one, he contracted trachoma in his left eye. At age two, pneumonia nearly killed him and by the age of five he had already survived his first bout with malaria. Moshe's mother suffered similar illnesses. In addition to contracting trachoma from her young son, she fell victim to liver disease, an abscessed breast that required surgery on two separate occasions, and repeated bouts with malaria. Since such illnesses were common in Palestine, it is not surprising that so many of these young pioneers left the region shortly after their arrival. (5) Despite these medical hardships, the Dayan's remained in Palestine. In 1922, Moshe's sister Aviva was born in the port of Haifa and four years later his brother Zohar was born in the same city. As a boy, Moshe was not a physically gifted lad and, much to his father's dismay, did not enjoy the rigors of farming. At that time, every Jewish youngster was expected to work willingly and cheerfully in the fields; however, Moshe's somewhat lazy attitude toward farming embarrassed his father. Having learned to read at age four, Moshe was an exceptionally articulate child whose precocious nature and spirit of daring adventurism earned him the reputation of a quarrelsome, somewhat aloof boy. His peers neither appreciated nor fully understood these traits. Moshe's home life was not exceptionally stable. Throughout the war, his mother moved him from village to village in search of medical assistance or an environment more conducive to physical recuperation. His father was a rising star in the Zionist movement and after the war, he frequently left his struggling family on urgent Zionist matters as he traveled to other Jewish settlements in Palestine, to Zionist meetings in Jerusalem, and to Europe and the United States on fund raising missions. While Moshe wrote very little about his childhood, two passages concerning those early years leap from the pages of his autobiography: But I grew up in an independent Jewish society that spoke Hebrew and fostered the values of Israeli Jews who had struck roots and were living in their ancient homeland. My parents had helped create that society. They had been privileged to be among the first of the redeemed - and the redeemers. And later: The atmosphere in which I was born was that of a Jew in his homeland. My children and their children have known no other state or mood. My parents, however, had been forced with the choice and the spiritual struggle. They had made it and had reached the correct decision. (6) This atmosphere of a "Jew living in his homeland" was the primal influence on Moshe Dayan. As a sabra, Moshe was one of the first tangible products of Zionism* and, as such, that movement provided the social and political foundations to his military career. One cannot fully appreciate either Moshe Dayan or the development and later application of his military thought * ZIONISM: A Jewish movement whose expressed goal was the settlement of and eventual creation in Palestine of a national Jewish state. In many respects, Zionism was the socio-political (nationalistic) outgrowth of the ancient religious attachment of Jews to Palestine, especially Jerusalem. Within a European context, Zionism was quite similar to other ethnic nationalistic movements of the 19th century. Those separate ethnic movements had created the German state, unified Italy, and had unsuccessfully pressured the European powers for an independent Poland. Without first understanding Zionism and then recognizing how that movement shaped Moshe Dayan's environment. While Theodor Herzl is recognized as the founder of the Zionist Movement, he was neither the first Zionist nor the first proponent of Jewish nationalism. (7) Herzl was, however, the first western European Jew to publicly call for the creation of a separate and distinct Jewish state. An Austrian Jewish journalist, Herzl initially advocated Jewish assimilation into European culture and society. But in view of rising anti - semitism following the Dreyfus Affair in France, he regarded that goal as unrealistic. In The Jewish State, published in 1896, Herzl articulated the concept of political Zionism, the basic premise of which stated that if external pressures forced Jews to form a nation, then Jews could only live a normal existence through concentration in one territory. Herzl's book was not well-received in western Europe where the political and economic freedoms resulting from liberalism and enlightenment enabled most Jews to assimilate into the national societies and cultures in which they lived. Non-Jewish western Europeans resented the book since its philosophical premise ran counter to existing nationalistic undercurrents. By the late 19th century, however, political Zionism was one of several related philosophies that appealed to oppressed Russian Jews. (8) In Russia, where reactionary Tsarist governments viewed liberalism and enlightenment as threats to their autocratic regimes, a growing number of Jews eagerly accepted Herzl's doctrine of a national Jewish homeland. Unlike western European Jews, Russian Jews had not been accepted by or assimilated into Russian society and, classified as aliens, were forced to live segregated lives within the "Russian Pale of Settlement."* Within the Pale, most Jews lived in tightly knit, yet impoverished communities. While there were exceptions, Russian Jews spoke their own language (Yiddish),** were usually educated in Jewish schools, practiced their distinct religion, and quietly lived within their own economic structures. They did not enjoy political or legal equality with Russian peasants and merchants living within the Pale and, from time-to-time, endured the violence of state-sanctioned, anti-Jewish pograms. Before the publication of Herzl's book, Russian Jews were divided over the proper reaction to the influences of western European liberalism and the anti-semitic practices of Tsarist Russia. While generalizations are often as dangerous to make as they are incorrect, Russian Jews in the latter half of the 19th century can be categorized into one of three broad groups: the secular assimi lationists, the orthodox, and the Zionists. Each of these groups reacted differently to liberalism and Tsarist practices. * RUSSIAN PALE OF SETTLEMENT: Usually referred to as the Pale, this was a stretch of land on the western fringe of the vast Russian Empire where the majority of Russia's five million Jews lived. This area ran from the Baltic Sea in the north to the Black Sea in the south and covered portions of the Ukraine and what is now known as Poland. After World War I, some of these territories became independent nations - Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, etc. ** YIDDISH: A specific dialect formed by a combination of Middle High German, Hebrews Polish, and Russian. Its roots can be traced to the 13th century when Jews moved east from the Rhineland. Secular assimilationists did not place an inordinate amount of faith in traditional orthodox values and hoped that the twin spirits of liberalism and enlightenment would eventually allow them to fully integrate into Russian society. While the modest reforms of Tsar Alexander II encouraged this belief, some secular Jews viewed emigration to the west as the only means to escape the bloom and uncertainty of life in Russia. Most orthodox Jews ignored state policies, endured Tsarist practices, and rejected as religiously dangerous the secular humanism inherent in liberalism and enlightenment. While some orthodox families were transitioning to either secularism or Zionism, most religious traditionalists opposed Zionism and condemned it as "the great Jewish heresy of the nineteenth century." (9) It should be noted that after the publication of The Jewish State, most western European Jews denounced the book's anti-assimilationist arguments and, in time, became powerful opponents of Zionism. (10) But a small and increasingly vocal Jewish minority, inspired by various messianic writings and growing nationalism, looked to Palestine as a place where Jews might live in peace and dignity. Although Herzl had not yet written The Jewish State, these Jews were among the first advocates of what became political Zionism. While their activities did not influence many of their peers, they prepared the way for Herzl's message. In 1881, anarchists, three of whom bore Jewish names, assassinated Alexander II. This act was a turning point in both Jewish and Russian history for it brought Alexander III to the throne and effectively ended the meager reforms of his predecessor. The new Tsar's reactionary tendencies found ardent support in his chief advisor, Konstantin Pobedonostev, a vicious anti-semite who considered democracy a leprous disease and autocratic theocracy the only rational foundation for government. Under Alexander III, the state enacted restrictive anti- Jewish laws and officially sanctioned, or at least officially ignored, a series of anti-Jewish pograms, the violence of which had not been seen since the 17th century. By the end of 1881, these riots had mauled 225 Jewish communities and it was estimated that mob violence left 20,000 Jews homeless, economically ruined another 100,000, and destroyed $80 million of Jewish property. By 1903, anti-semitic violence had swept through most Jewish communities from Warsaw to Odessa. (11) Widely condemned in western Europe, this surge of anti- semitic violence shattered Jewish hopes of assimilation and gave impetus to two dissimilar reactions - Marxist revolution in Russia and emigration from Russia. As Tsarist repression also moved against non-Jewish elements, revolutionary movements sprang-up throughout the country. The Tsar's policy of denying Jews a Russian education inadvertently assisted these movements. Those Jewish students fortunate enough to study abroad, were exposed to liberal thought, the spirit of enlightenment, and Marxist ideology. Some of those students returned to Russia and, filled with revolutionary zeal, joined the revolution. Most Russian Jews favored emigration from Russia over revolution in Russia. From 1880 to 1914, one-third of all eastern European Jews, to include nearly two million of Russia's five million Jews, departed for the United States. (12) From 1882 to 1903, approximately 25,000 Russian Jews emigrated to Palestine. Although less than 10,000 of these early pioneers stayed there, they comprised the first of five separate mass Jewish migrations or Aliyah's* to Palestine. These immigrants had little in common with the Jewish community that had lived for centuries in Palestine - a highly religious community that numbered some 25,000. First Aliyah Jews were rebels against the conservative and anti-semitic environment in which they were born and their departure from Russia was a direct response to the resurgence of anti-semitic persecution. Politically oriented and inspired with nationalistic zeal and messianic self-fulfillment, these Jews were convinced that regeneration was possible with a return to free and productive labor on the soil. (13) Finding Palestine anything but "the promised land of milk and honey", these struggling pioneers established agricultural settlements. Without organic Zionist support, these communities were not notably successful and had it not been for Baron Edmond de Rothschild's financial support, one wonders how many of those settlements would have survived. (14) Using Rothschild's money, these Jews purchased land from absentee Turkish landlords. To the Arab tenant farmers, the transfer of land from Turkish to Jewish ownership was of little consequence since the Jews rehired them as agricultural workers. This was due in part to Rothschild's insistence that the Jewish * ALIYAH: Literally meaning ascension, this term describes the various mass migrations of Jews to Palestine. settlers establish "european-style colonial plantations", an arrangement that worked out nicely since the Jews, serving as overseers, did not deprive the Arab farmers of employment. Despite Rothschild's assistance, life in Palestine was not easy. The climate was hot and muggy, disease was rampant, and much of the land was poor. Over time, the struggle to merely survive exacted a physical and spiritual toll on the settlers. By 1900, the colonists had fully integrated into the economy and, concerned with their own needs, no longer "exclusively thought of a national Jewish revival in Palestine." (15) Despite this failure, these early pioneers made an important contribution to the eventual creation of Israel - they built a small but permanent Jewish bridgehead in Palestine. As the fervor of the first Aliyah succumbed to the daily pressures of survival, two separate yet interrelated movements captured the imaginations of an ever-increasing number of Russian Jews - Herzl's concept of political Zionism and Marxist socialism. These related yet divergent movements, Jewish nationalism and international revolution, provided the foundation for the second mass Jewish migration to Palestine. (16) Following the publication of The Jewish State, Herzl organized the World Zionist Organization which, after his death in 1904, unified the various strands of Jewish nationalism into a coherent movement. While Zionism appealed to only a small minority of Russian Jews, it provided them a viable means of escape from autocratic Russian rule. At the same time, reactionary Tsarist policies alienated an increasing number of Jewish and non-Jewish Russians. Imbued with Marxist idealism and revolutionary zeal, these Russians agitated with increasing vehemence against Tsarist theocratic autocracy. A disproportionate number of these revolutionaries were Jewish. Comprising only four percent of Russia's population, by the early 1900's, 31 percent of all political exiles under surveillance in Siberia were Jews. Lenin later wrote that "Russians were too easy going, too readily tired of the revolutionary struggle. Jews on the other hand, with their stubbornness and fanaticism, made excellent revolutionaries." (17) This agitation resulted in the Revolution of 1905. The wave of pograms and repressions that followed that ill-fated revolt forced many disillusioned Jewish Marxists and Zionists to leave Russia for Palestine. The differences between the First and Second Aliyahs are as striking as they are important. Whereas first Aliyah Jews grew up under the rather benign rule of Alexander II and left Russia as a result of the pograms following his assassination, Second Aliyah Jews were raised under the harsh regimes of Alexander III and Nicholas II. Consequently, the Zionist and Marxist components of the second migration were more ardent in both the affirmation and application of their beliefs than were the pioneers of the first Aliyah. Their heightened sense of purpose and the tenacity of their approach to life, society, and nation- building, altered the relationship between Arab and Jew, and forever changed the course of Palestine's history. The most pronounced impacts of the Second Aliyah were in employment and defense. These Jews did not equate farming only with the production of food. Instead, they viewed agriculture in nationalistic terms. The spread of Jewish settlements would constitute a national land reclamation program through which the future borders of a Jewish state would be determined. Entering Palestine needing jobs and money, these emigres viewed the First Aliyah's accomplishments with skepticism. Instead of finding settlements where Jews personally worked the soil, they found Rothschild's colonial plantations where Jews, acting as overseers, employed Arab laborers. Without fully understanding the rigors faced by the earlier pioneers, Second Aliyah Jews wondered where the idealism of the First Aliyah had gone and, rejecting the concept of a planter society, denounced Rothschild for removing the burden of survival from his colonists. Israel Shochat was one of these newcomers and he described his disillusionment with the way of life he found in the small settlement of Petach Tikvah: Even the young people gave no hint of being involved in any sort of national enterprise. They seemed like the children of farmers everywhere else: except that their main job was seeing to it that the Arabs worked properly. After a week or two, my wonderment at being in a Jewish village in Palestine began to fade and blur. The magic evaporated. ... Before dawn, hundreds of Arab laborers daily streamed into Petach Tikvah to look for work, and mostly found it. Then there was the matter of language: the villagers all spoke Yiddish. To speak Hebrew was regarded as absurd, as a Zionist affectation. And the most serious thing was that Jews were considered unemployable. (18) Like other newcomers, Shochat was encouraged to go to America, Canada, or Australia to earn enough money so that he could return to Palestine and purchase his own orange grove. These Zionist-Socialists viewed personal and physical labor as "the magic key to true perception of the self" and hence, to self-redemption. (19) The concept of a Jewish "planter-elite" was anathema to their socialist ideals and they vehemently opposed what they considered to be the exploitation of Arab labor. Firmly committed to creating an economically and socially just society, Second Aliyah pioneers were determined that Jewish self-sufficiency, not the class exploitation of native labor, was the only rational mechanism through which a Jewish state could be built. If Arab labor was not exploited, they naively reasoned, then the Arabs would not object to Zionism. (20) Supplied with funds from the World Zionist Organization, the new immigrants purchased additional lands from Turkish landlords and wealthy Arab families. Refusing to employ native labor for fear of perpetuating the class struggle, they established collective settlements known as kibbutzim.* Eventually, some of these new pioneers became dissatisfied with the collective regimen of kibbutzim life and formed less restrictive agrarian settlements called moshavim.** However, these land purchases stripped Arab tenant farmers and nomadic herders of their livelihood. Understanding this problem, Jews often paid more for the land than what the owner * KIBBUTZ (plural kibbutzim): A collective farming settlement that eliminated private property, personal wealth, and, stressing a communal life-style, observed the principles of social equality, mutual responsibility, and direct democracy. The first kibbutz was established in 1909 at Deganiah, Moshe Dayan's birthplace. ** MOSHAV (plural moshavim): Another form of pioneering cooperative settlement that allowed settlers to own and work their own land while sharing community resources (water and scarce farm equipment) and services (marketing of produce). demanded with the excess monies to be given to the displaced peasants in compensation for the loss of "their" land. Yet hostilities frequently erupted between Jewish settlers and dislocated Arabs. (21) Thus, the creation of a class of impoverished, landless Arabs and the naive lack of foresight on the part of Jewish settlers contributed to the developing rift between Arab and Jew. Though fostering their own nationalistic dreams, the Jews largely ignored similar tendencies developing among the Arabs. In 1905, Naguib Azuri, a Christian Arab, made a chilling prediction in a book that went largely unnoticed among both the Jewish settlers in Palestine and the leaders of the World Zionist Organization in Europe. Azuri wrote in Le Reveil de la Nation Arab: Two important phenomenon of a singular nature and yet opposed, at present manifest themselves in Asian Turkey. These are the awakening of the Arab nation and the latent effort of the Jews to reconstitute on a very large scale the ancient kingdom of Israel. The two movements are destined to combat one another until one is beaten by the other. (22) Having taken Arab acquiescence for granted and overlooking the possibility of native opposition, few Jews appreciated the growing force of Arab nationalism and fewer still viewed the Arab response to Zionism in its true perspective. As early as 1891, three years before the publication of Herzl's The Jewish State and ten years after the beginning of the First Aliyah, some Arabs had protested both the immigration to and the acquisition of land by Jews in Palestine. This was not a violent protest as the Arab complaints were sent to Turkish officials in a telegram. (23) During the first decade of the 20th century, tensions heightened as Jewish settlers moved inland from their coastal conclaves. This movement, especially to the Sea of Galilee area, resulted in minor violence, most of which concerned grazing rights. Blood feuds between Arab families and confrontations between Jewish farmers and semi-nomadic Arab herders were quite common and, in many respects, were similar to the disputes between cattlemen and "sod-busting" farmers in the American west. In 1908, the first major anti-Jewish riot occurred in the port city of Jaffa. In that year, a new Turkish government abolished press censorship and almost immediately several Arab newspapers launched editorial attacks against the Jewish settlers. Jews viewed both events in terms of an anti-Jewish pogram and not as the collision of two different cultures each of which supported separate nationalistic movements. As Amos Elon crisply states: In the first stages of their open struggle with the Arab nationalists, Zionists could not tear themselves away from European stereotypes. (24) Anti-Jewish violence in Palestine, when combined with bitter memories of Russian pograms, produced the second distinguishing characteristic of the Second Aliyah - the formation of Jewish self-defense organizations. However, this phenomenon had its historical roots in Russia. In 1903, a group of Jews in the small Ukranian town of Gomel organized self-defense units and defeated a mob bent on destroying that Jewish community. But in the aftermath of victory, the Tsar's forces moved in and, abandoning any semblance of neutrality, crushed the Jewish resistance. Four years later, one of those defenders helped organize the first Jewish self-defense unit in Palestine. Israel Shochat left Russia soon after his experience in Gomel and, upon arriving in Palestine, was impressed with the warrior spirit of the Circassians.* Shochat believed that Jews could learn a great deal from the Circassian example: Here they were, a tiny minority in the sea of Arabs, and none-the-less, they had managed to earn an honorable position for themselves. They had rooted themselves in the land, they had set up their own villages; perhaps all was not lost for us yet. It was possible, after all, I thought, to strengthen ourselves, to settle and to hold on to the land, to force our Arab neighbors to respect us. But for this we ourselves needed to be brave, and to persevere. (25) In September 1907, Israel Shochat and nine other men met in a candle-lit, upper-story room of an old house in Jaffa and formed the Bar-Giora.** These men recognized that the creation of a Jewish state was dependent upon two separate, yet interrelated tasks. First, the "conquest of Jewish labor" was of the utmost importance, for without Jewish workers there could be no Jewish homeland. Given the rise of anti-Jewish sentiments in the surrounding Arab community, they also believed that it was both the right and the duty of Jewish settlers to defend themselves. These men drafted a program that favored Jewish self-defense, * CIRCASSIANS: A people originally brought to Palestine from the northeast coast of the Black Sea by Abdul Hamid in the second half of the 19th century. However, the Circassians defended themselves so well against attacks from Bedouin bandits, that their fighting skills won them the reputation of fierce warriors. Arabs and Jews were so impressed with their martial talents that they frequently hired Circassians as guards and watchmen. ** BAR-GIORA: The first of several Jewish self-defense forces established prior to Israel's War for Independence. This organization was named after Simon Bar-Giora, leader of the Jewish revolt against Rome from 66 to 70 A.D. especially with regard to a Jewish militia, and advocated active participation in Socialist-Zionist education through which workers would be unified in a common purpose. (26) Following the meeting, the ten men swore "By blood and fire, Judea fell; through blood and fire, Judea shall rise again." Yitshaq Ben- Zvi, a future president of Israel, later wrote of that night: We felt we were standing before Mount Sinai at the Giving of the Law, and all of us were ready to sacrifice ourselves. We knew that words would not rebuild the nation, only our deeds. (27) Moving to Galilee, the Bar-Giora offered contracted security services to Jewish settlements in the area. However, only those villages that relied on Jewish labor could hire the Bar-Giora. following several encounters with Bedouin bandits, outlaws that raided Jewish and Arab villages, Shochat petitioned Zionist leaders for money and weapons. (28) While proving the validity of its concept of self-defense, the Bar-Giora never expanded its protective role beyond a few villages in upper Palestine. In April 1909, the Bar-Giora decided that their secret society was neither sufficiently strong nor politically active enough to become a force of national significance. Consequently, they reorganized and called themselves the Hashomer.* Despite its small size and limited abilities, the Hashomer represented the first melding of Jewish para-military force to a set of vaguely defined national objectives. (29) Clarifying the relationship between self-defense and the creation of new social and national values, the Hashomer is military mission was "to make the entire * HASHOMER: In English, Hashomer means "watchmen". This was the second Jewish self-defense force established in Palestine. Jewish population conscious of the needs, and implications, of self-defense." (30) In addition to establishing and defending kibbutzim in Palestine, the Hashomer actively linked the spread of Jewish settlements with the principles of nation-building and national defense. A leading Marxist force, the Hashomer's political mission "was the establishment of the dictatorship of an agrarian proletariat based in fortified collectives (which were) to serve as the vanguard of the Socialist-Zionist movement." (31) However, the Hashomer's increasingly militant leftist tendencies alienated a growing number of Jewish leaders. David Ben-Gurion was one of those leaders who had renounced his earlier faith in radical Marxist-Socialism and had grown increasingly distrustful of the para-military organization. This, when combined with Turkey's outlawing of the Hashomer during the war and the organization's inability to effectively protect Jewish interests in Palestine during the Arab Riots of 1920, culminated in a split between the Yishuv and the Hashomer and led to that organization's ultimate demise. (32) Before discussing Jewish participation in World War I and the establishment of the British Mandate in Palestine, it is necessary to reintroduce Moshe Dayan into this stream of history. While Moshe was born after the Second Aliyah had ended, both of his parents were among the 40,000 Jews that entered Palestine during that migration. Shmuel and Dvorah came from divergent family backgrounds and each arrived in Palestine with different expectations. Together, Moshe's parents embodied the two driving forces behind the Second Aliyah - Zionism and Marxist-Socialism. Born in 1890, Shmuel Dayan came from an impoverished family of orthodox Jews living in Zaskow, a small Ukrainian town near Kiev. At one time, Shmuel's family had been quite prominent in religious circles. His great grandfather had been a dayan - a religious or rabbinical judge - and it was that man who gave the family its name. Despite his family's poverty, Shmuel learned to read and write Russian, Hebrew, and, of course, Yiddish. In keeping with tradition, Shmuel's father maintained a strict, religious home. However, this struggling merchant was one of a growing number of orthodox Jews who viewed Zionism with lessening skepticism. Among the sacred writings in the family library, young Shmuel found Zionist pamphlets and copies of ihe Zionist Worker, a Labor-Zionist newspaper describing the Jewish struggle in Palestine. During the dark days of pograms and repressions following the 1905 Revolution, Shmuel read a particularly inspirational appeal from Palestine. Reflecting on life in Russia, Shmuel later wrote that the pamphlet's message was "a consolation to an aching soul." (33) In 1908, against the wishes of their father, Shmuel and his older brother Eliyahu left for Palestine as ardent Zionists. But each brother expressed his Zionist fervor differently. Eliyahu "resolutely turned his beliefs into practice" and refused "to engage in political activities", establishing a farm before sending for his wife and children. (34) Shmuel was more interested in politics and public affairs than he was in farming. After arriving in Jaffa, he wrote for a Hebrew Labor Movement newspaper and became an active member of that that political party. Within a year, he purchased an old Turkish pistol and left the coastal plains for Galilee where he hired himself out as a guard for a Jewish farm. (35) In 1911, Shmuel joined a group of young pioneers who had recently established the kibbutz at Deganiah. While living at Deganiah, Shmuel participated in an endless series of political debates that alienated many of his peers. This alienation was caused by his debating style and by his expressed dissatisfaction with rigid collectivism. After the war, Shmuel helped found the first moshav at Nahalal. Additionally, Shmuel worked in the fields by day, guarded the settlement by night, and, in response to a Hashomer request, protected neighboring villages where he helped drive "away the local Arabs who tried to harvest wheat in the settlement fields." (36) Moshe's mother, Dvorah Zatulovsky, was born in 1890 in the Ukranian village of Prochorovka. Unlike her future husband, Dvorah came from a wealthy secular family and had been given a Russian education. (37) Although her father had pro-Zionist tendencies, Dvorah did not share his interests in either that movement or in Hebrew culture. Instead, she was caught up in the revolutionary fervor of the times and, devoting "herself to the movement for the emancipation of the proletariat", she joined the student faction of Lenin's Social Democratic Party. (38) After serving as a volunteer nurse in the Balkan War of 1911-1912, she grew dissatisfied with the progress of the revolutionary struggle in Russia while becoming increasingly aware of her Jewish heritage. After reading several letters written to her father by Zionists, she decided that Palestine "is where the workers of my people are. I shall join them." (39) Like Shmuel's father, Dvorah's parents were dismayed with her decision. After initially meeting in 1913, Shmuel and Dvorah, the Zionist and the fading Marxist, were married in the autumn of 1914. In May of the following year, Moshe was born. While World War I halted Zionist work in Palestine, the conflagration provided the movement with a golden opportunity. Since most Zionists believed that the Ottoman Empire would not survive the war and since, as a member of the Central Powers, Turkey was at war with England, the World Zionist Organization moved its headquarters from Berlin to Copenhagen and later to London. Influential Jewish leaders like Dr. Chaim Weizmann, an English chemist and future leader of the World Zionist Organization, believed that the only Zionists who would have any influence by the time of the peace settlement would be Zionists who had taken a side: the one that proved to be a winner." (40) Dr. Welzmann and the British government developed a symbiotic relationship as each party possessed something the other desperately needed. Weizmann, the Anglophile, recognized that Britain was the only major European power with territorial holdings and vital strategic interests in the Middle East. He correctly reasoned that Britain might support the establishment of a friendly Jewish community in Palestine and might, therefore, support Zionist goals. The British increasingly viewed the Arabs and the Jews as potential allies in a post-war struggle to stymie french ambitions in the Middle East. Possessing solid connections in the British government and fully understanding British Middle-Eastern concerns, Dr. Weizmann urged Lloyd George's government to establish a national Jewish homeland in Palestine. (41) In 1916, Britain and France concluded a secret agreement outlining their intentions regarding the post-war disposition of the Ottoman Empire. Known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the document initially called for the internationalization of Palestine, the creation of French protectorates in Lebanon and Syria, and British control of Mesopotamia (modern Iraq). Growing increasingly concerned about post-war French intentions in the region, the British began exploring ways in which they could thwart French aims while protecting their own strategic interests. Of vital concern to them was the post-war disposition of Palestine. (42) In pursuing this objective, the British had already engaged the Arabs in a revolt against the Turks. In return, they indicated that the Empire might support the creation of an independent Arab kingdom in Palestine. The Arabs interpreted this "indication" as a direct British promise. (43) The British also enlisted Jewish assistance in both the war against the Central Powers and in their gambit against the French. However, British Middle-Eastern policies did not completely coincide with Zionist intentions. Joseph Trumpeldor and Vladimir Jabotinsky offered to raise all-Jewish units to fight for the British in Palestine. (44) These Russian-born Jews believed that the establishment of a Jewish homeland was the first step toward the eventual creation of an independent Jewish state. They argued that the Yishuv must abandon its passive posture since "only if the Jews fought for Palestine .. . would they be able to stake a claim to it come peace." (45) Sensing potential problems, the British rejected the offer and instead formed the Zion Mule Corps. Serving with distinction at Galipoli in 1915, this 650-man unit was disbanded in 1916 when it refused to quell anti-British riots in Ireland. With help from Dr. Weizmann, Trumpeldor and Jabotinsky convinced Lloyd George's cabinet to form the Jewish Legion. Eventually, three Jewish battalions were raised, two of which fought in Palestine under British command. While fewer than 5000 Jews served in the Legion, the formation of that unit was an important accomplishment since it "signaled the official emergence of the Jewish people from their traditional state of neutrality" and, to Zionists, it was the first expression of the British commitment to the Zionist cause." (46) On a more practical level, members of the Jewish Legion received valuable military training and combat experience, and some of those veterans eventually joined Jewish para-military units in Palestine. In the diplomatic arena, the British, following heated negotiations with Dr. Weizmann, issued the Balfour Declaration on 2 November 1917. The British hoped to use this document for propaganda purposes. (47) First, they hoped that the declaration would rally Jewish opinion, especially in the United States, to the side of the allies. After the capture of Jerusalem in December 1917, the British covertly distributed leaflets among Jewish soldiers in Central European countries that stated the Allies were giving "the land of Israel back to the children of Israel." finally, given their strategic concerns in the region, the British hoped that the declaration would lead to the settlement in Palestine of a Jewish population attached to Britain through ties of sentiment and common interests. The Balfour Declaration was a masterpiece of carefully worded ambiguity, and hence could and was misinterpreted by Arabs and Jews alike. The second of its three paragraphs stated: His Majesty's Government views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country. While most Jews overestimated the importance of the Balfour Declaration, the Arabs interpreted its vague phrases in the most extreme context possible. (48) However, after receiving Allied endorsement at the San Remo Conference of 1920, the document became an instrument of British and international policy. Influenced by the altruistic concepts embodied in the declaration, in 1922 the League of Nations officially granted Britain a mandate over Palestine. (49) But this official action ignored the powerful nationalistic undercurrents in Palestine. Arab nationalists wanted immediate independence and viewed the Balfour Declaration and the Sykes- Picot Agreement as British attempts to nullify their pledge to support an independent Arab-Palestinian state. (50) Zionist leaders in Palestine wanted to cultivate conditions conducive to the development of a Jewish state and, holding "no illusions about British intentions" decided to "use the Balfour Declaration for their own needs." (51) The British, and to some extent the French, sought to strengthen their respective strategic and economic positions in the Middle East largely at the expense of Arab interests. Thus, as early as 1919, the stage was set and the principle players, each having established their mutually exclusive objectives, began a 30 year drama that eventually resulted in the ousting of European power from Palestine, the creation of a Jewish state, and the tragic deepening of Arab-Jewish hostilities. Many European Jews viewed the Balfour Declaration as a godsend and it was that document, the dislocations caused by war, and the disastrous Russian Revolution and the ensuing civil war that provided the basis for the Third Aliyah. Lasting until 1924, this migration brought over 35,000 Jews to Palestine and breathed renewed life into the Zionist movement there. (52) Increased Jewish immigration, when combined with what Arab nationalists viewed as British duplicity regarding the formation of an independent Arab state, resulted in the Arab Riots of 1920- 1921. This rioting was partly fueled by the pro-Arab stance of the British military government in Palestine - a position rooted in traditional, yet benign, English anti-semitism. Following an inflammatory speech by the British Governor of Jerusalem, Arabs attacked the Jewish quarter in the Old City of Jerusalem. (53) Arab police sided with the rioters and had to be disarmed and withdrawn. In direct violation of British regulations, Vladimir Jabotinsky organized Jewish self-defense units and he and his principle supporters were disarmed, arrested, and jailed. (54) Rioting spread to other areas of Palestine, to include Jaffa, the principle port through which Jews entered the region. Anxious to remove European influence from northern Palestine, Arabs attacked Jewish settlements in the Sea of Galilee area and in so doing, they inadvertently provided the Yishuv with its first national folk hero. Joseph Trumpeldor, hero and co-founder of the Jewish Legion, led Jewish settlers in a determined but futile defense of Tel Hai. Killed after a valiant stand, Trumpeldor's dying words were alleged to have been "It is good to die for our country." (55) His death and the popular mythology surrounding the destruction of Tel Hai fired the resolve of future Jewish defenders. Zionists viewed these riots as an anti-semitic pogram and accused the British of not doing enough to halt them. Although largely directed against Jews, these attacks were part of a larger movement choreographed by Arab nationalists opposed to European domination. During the summer of 1920, 90,000 British troops crushed a revolt in Iraq and by 1925, the French used an even larger force to quell a similar rebellion in Syria. (56) The Arab Riots profoundly affected Palestine and seriously damaged the already sensitive relationships between Arabs, Jews, and the British. (57) In the summer of 1920, British military rule was replaced with Sir Herbert Samuel's civilian administration. A British Jew, Samuel believed that Arab aspirations and Zionist aims were not mutually exclusive and that both movements could be satisfied within the framework of the British Mandate. After legalizing Jewish immigration and approving further land sales to Zionists, Samuel pardoned Jabotinsky and the Arab leaders of the recent riots. His administration also established a Palestinian Constitution that authorized the formation of an elected assembly. While comprising less than 15% of Palestine's population, the Yishuv accepted the concept of representative government and viewed increased immigration as the key to future political survival. The Arabs, distrusting British intentions and committed to a policy of non-cooperation as long as the Balfour Declaration was not revoked, rejected the proposal. Although the Arab community was divided by factional and inter- family political strife, Haj Amin al-Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, served as that community's principal political and religious spokesman. Unable to establish a cooperative Palestinian state, Samuel authorized Arabs and Jews to form separate governing agencies through which each community could manage its own affairs. While this political partition led to nearly a decade of peace, the formation of parallel governments increased Arab and Jewish alienation as each community pursued its nationalistic goals largely at the expense of each other. These separatist tendencies gained additional momentum through Samuel's unwillingness to show favoritism to either side. Refusing to placate either community by acquiescing to their major, and usually unreasonable demands, the British sought to defuse tensions by granting minor concessions to both sides. As would be expected, these concessions never violated British strategic interests and security concerns in the region. In 1922, the British Colonial Office issued the first of several White Papers regarding Palestine. A document that sought to placate both communities, it suffered a fate typical of most compromise policies. Refusing to repudiate the Balfour Declaration, the paper did separate the Trans-Jordan from Palestine. While this angered the Jews, it did not satisfy Arab demands that England honor its promise to support an independent Arab state. Although the paper officially limited Jewish immigration based upon the "absorptive capacity" of the region, a move that dismayed the Yishuv, the document failed to meet Arab demands that all Jewish immigration be halted. In January 1922, the Arabs formed the Supreme Muslim council led by Haj Amin al-Husseini , the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. Soft- spoken, blue-eyed, well-groomed, and resembling "Alec Guinness dressed as an Arab", the British granted Haj Amin political, financial, and legal powers over Palestinian Muslim affairs. Samuel's administration granted Haj Amin these powers for two reasons. Not only did the Mandate want to develop a more cooperative working relationship with the Arab community, the authorities also hoped that this move would soften Haj Amin's militant political views. However, this gambit failed backfired. Now possessing formidable political and religious influence, Haj Amin became the most powerful and important Arab in Palestine - a position he used to further his nationalist agenda. (58) The Yishuv was concerned over this turn of events. Fearing his militant tendencies, Jews believed Haj Amin to have been the instigator of the riots and blamed the British for his rise to power. The Arab Riots also produced far-reaching changes within the Yishuv. Given Britain's inability to protect Jewish interests during the riots and the Hashomer's meager performance, the Yishuv reevaluated its self-defense policies. Inexorably linked to self-defense was the strategy of nation-building. One particularly candid Jewish activist argued: We cannot claim what we cannot defend. There are no borders. There is no problem here of local defense. If we fall in Galilee, we shall also fall in the (Negev) desert. If we leave Tel Hai ... history will record that this was our first retreat. (59) Trumpeldor's death, the loss of Tel Hai, and the destruction of other farming settlements, to include Moshe Dayan's new home at Deganiah B, underscored the need for a national defense organization. (60) However, the successful defense of other communities reemphasized the advantages of a cooperative self- defense strategy based on an available, mobile, armed, and fully- trained militia capable of protecting Jewish lives and property throughout Palestine. In 1920, Jewish leaders abolished the politically radical and militarily ineffective Hashomer, expressed their dissatisfaction with the Labor and Defense Battalions*, and called for the creation of a nation-wide Jewish self-defense force. The following year, the Haganah** was organized. In addition to reevaluating the tactics of self-defense and the strategy of nation-building, the Yishuv addressed political and economic affairs. British policy regarding the formation of * LABOR AND DEFENSE BATTALIONS: Established by Trumpeldor, the Gdud Ha'Avoda were designed to promote the development of the Jewish state through civil construction projects and, as envisioned by Trumpeldor, these units were to serve as a "people's militia". ** HAGANAH: Literally meaning "defense" in Hebrew, the Haganah was the third, most famous, and most successful of Israel is pre- independence defense organizations. Arab and Jewish governments within the Mandate legitimized both the existence and functions of the Jewish Agency.* Formerly known as the Zionist Executive, the Jewish Agency had already begun to coordinate the actions of Weizmann's World Zionist Organization with those of the Yishuv. During the next 25 years, the Agency formed a shadow government within Palestine and established national policies regarding fund raising, immigration, weapons procurement, and the use of military force. The Yishuv also founded the Histadrut**. Embracing all aspects of Jewish labor to include trade unions and agrarian collectives, the Histadrut's function was "to consolidate and politically centralize the work of the pioneers." (61) Frequently hailed as Israel's founding fathers, Second and Third Aliyah Jews were directly responsible for establishing the Jewish Agency, the Histadrut, and the Haganah. These institutions provided the lasting political, economic, and military foundations upon which both a national character and a national state were constructed. Although later migrations augmented Jewish ranks, those immigrants conformed to the patterns of social and political life established during the years 1904 to 1924. (62) By the mid-1920's, the organizational * JEWISH AGENCY: Formerly known as the Zionist Commission or the Zionist Executive, this organization was responsible to the World Zionist Organization for all Jewish matters in Palestine. Officially recognized under the Mandate Charter (Article 4), the British allowed the organization to govern Jewish Palestinians. ** HISTADRUT: The General federation of Jewish Labor was an economic and political organization designed to promote the formation of the Jewish state through the consolidation and unification of all Jewish workers, political parties, and interest groups. embryo of a Jewish state had been formed. But Zionists were not as politically or as philosophically united as one might imagine. (63) The Arab Riots, the lackluster British response to chose disturbances, and the Yishuv's distrust of British objectives, split the movement into three camps. As President of the World Zionist Organization, Dr. Weizmann was primarily concerned with the political processes leading to the eventual formation of a Jewish state. Headquartered in London, Weizmann was a confirmed gradualist who maintained that a Jewish state could be developed only within the framework of British guidance and support. While endorsing Weizmann's gradualism, David Ben-Gurion was a political pragmatist who was convinced that Jews must rely on their own abilities and resources in constructing a nation. As the future leader of the Jewish Agency, he viewed nation-building in tactical terms and argued that the Yishuv must not depend exclusively on external, and frequently restrictive, British support. Through his hard work and grass-roots activism, Ben- Gurion obtained the political experience necessary to eventually assume the mantle of Jewish leadership from Dr. Weizmann. While both men agreed on the ultimate goal, their different perspectives led to disagreements concerning the specific means required to achieve that end. Those differences, however, were insignificant when compared to Vladimir Jabotinsky's tactical approach to achieve his strategic goals. Having already run afoul of British authority, Jabotinsky rejected the concept of a geographic partition of Palestine, recoiled at the thought of cooperating with the British, and believed that the Jewish state must encompass all of pre-1922 Palestine to include the Trans- Jordan. He advocated a policy of mass migration as a means to create a Jewish majority in Palestine. Somewhat of a cultural supremacist, Jabotinsky, in response to moderates who feared that his policies would lead all-out war with the Arabs, rhetorically asked "whether during the colonization of America or Australia anyone had bothered to beg the native's for permission." (64) Forming the Revisionist Party* in 1925, Jabotinsky's extreme, nationalistic sabre-rattlings produced few die-hard converts. While his political influence waned during the uneasy peace of 1922 through 1928, his radical pronouncements concerned both the Arabs and Jewish moderates. Ultimately losing control of his movement to younger and more aggressive Jewish nationalists in the late 1930's, his brand of militant nationalism captured the imaginations of less restrained individuals and led to the formation of two terrorist gangs - the Irgun and the Stern Gang - that openly warred against British rule and defied Ben-Gurion's policies of structured nation- building. From 1922 through 1928, Palestine enjoyed relative peace as Arabs and Jews managed an uneasy coexistence. But in August 1929, anti-Jewish violence broke out once again. Primarily an * REVISIONIST PARTY: Unlike its Social-Zionist counterparts, this political organization did not envision the creation of a Socialist Jewish commonwealth based on a cooperative economic structure. Rather, it campaigned for the creation of a political democracy with a strong capitalist economy. Revisionists also preached a vigorous form of nationalism and believed that the borders of the eventual Jewish state must coincide with the borders of ancient Israel - a territory that would include much of modern Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. expression of Arab nationalism, this renewed violence was preceded by a vigorous propaganda campaign that alleged the Jews were a threat to Moslem Holy Places. Carefully orchestrating this religious campaign in mosques and the Arab press, Haj Amin, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, united Arab factions under his spiritual and political leadership. Following a series of religious disputes in Jerusalem, Arab mobs attacked Jews in that city. These riots soon spilled into the surrounding countryside and, eventually engulfing most of Palestine, produced a level of violence that surpassed the riots of 1920 and 1921. (65) Lacking sufficient troops to effectively control the situation, the British were unable to protect every Jewish community The Jews also lacked sufficient self-defense resources and, recognizing that their best chance for survival "lay in banding together in exclusively Jewish settlements and neighborhoods," the Yishuv abandoned communities located in predominantly Arab towns. Since many Jews no longer trusted British intentions in Palestine, England's inability to protect every Jewish settlement provided the basis for the Yishuv's perception that the British military had been unwilling to halt the riots. (66) While popular history explains the 1929 riots as an Arab react ion against Jewish immigration, there were other more fundamental, yet subtle, causal factors. Ironically, Arabs and Jews agreed on one key point. British attempts to placate Arab opinion, especially with regard to the Trans-Jordan, led some Arab nationalists and many Jewish leaders to assume that London was retreating from its pro-Zionist policies. This belief, when combined with British troop reductions in Palestine, created an attitude among competing Arab nationalists that Britain might be unwilling to use military force to protect the Jews. (67) Although badly battered, the Yishuv survived the ordeal of 1929, primarily because British troops intervened and reestablished order. However, because the British were unable to promptly react to every Arab attack, the Jews resolved to strengthen their own defensive arrangements and practices. In the autumn of 1929, the Haganah began operating out of Moshe's village of Nahalal and, at the age of 14, Moshe joined that organization. An early photograph shows a lean, dark-haired boy standing in a jaunty pose, his characteristic smile drooping sarcastically across his face. Spending most of the remaining 52 years of his life learning and practicing the art of war, by the time of his death in 1981 Moshe Dayan was hailed as Israel's most brilliant warrior. Unfortunately, all too many military buffs dismiss as unimportant the socio-political foundations upon which military careers are based. By refusing to examine these non-military influences and forgetting that military concepts are neither created nor applied in a vacuum, these individuals fail to understand the essential link between a society's perception of its environment and its use of military force. This is especially important with respect to Moshe Dayan. To him, the history of Palestine from 1915 through 1929 was not history at all. Rather, it was part of his life and it was difficult for him to view those years with scholarly detachment. Although based on fact, his perceptions of those eventful years were influenced by the environment in which he was raised - an environment that emphasized the teachings and historical justification of Zionism. While the roots of that environment predated his birth by at least 40 years, Moshe's parents established the quality and structure of his early life. Energetic members of the Second Aliyah, Shmuel and Dvorah Dayan were living examples of Zionism in action. A political activist, Shmuel worked in Jaffa and Jerusalem for the World Zionist Organization, served on the Zionist Agricultural Committee, briefly worked in the Labor Battalions, was offered a position in the Agricultural Center of the Histadrut, and was a founding member of the moshav settlement at Nahalal . While the responsibilities of motherhood curtailed her political activities, Dvorah was a delegate to the Woman's Labor Council and worked for the Bureau for the Location of Relatives. (68) Shmuel's letters to his wife and son reinforced the twin concepts of Zionism and a Jewish nation. In 1919 he wrote: Let us live in the great hope that lights the path of our nation and find strength together ... in this our country that our hands shall conquer. In 1921, Shmuel wrote his son: And when was this land plowed by Jews? A great many years ago ... two thousand years ago, the Jews were driven out of this land and went into exile. Since then they have not dared to return to our country ... I yearned for this land, to conquer it once again. (69) Having been born in Palestine and raised by active Zionists who spoke of "our land", "our country", and "our nation", Moshe's perception of himself was more than merely a "Jew living in his homeland." When he joined the Haganah in 1929, Moshe Dayan, like his predecessors in the Bar-Giora and the Hashomer, began serving his people and protecting his land and took his first step toward becoming a defender of his nation. Like other Jews, Moshe followed with great interest the progress of the British Royal Commission sent to Palestine to investigate the disturbances. The hearings were widely covered in the local press and guests visiting the Dayans remembered that Moshe could: quote everything that had been said at the Royal Commission, adding his own comments on who testified well, which testimony might cause harm to Jewish interests and which might benefit them. He lived the entire affair. (TO) The Riots of 1929, the White Paper of 1930, the widespread Jewish belief that the British had not done enough to protect their lives and property during the violence, and the perception that Britain was changing its policies concerning a Jewish homeland, taught Moshe that the Yishuv must become self- sufficient and that future Jewish survival could not be based entirely on external, British protection. (71) This belief in self-sufficiency eventually evolved into a strong distrust of foreign governments and a skeptical view of their ultimate reliability. Although he was the product of an environment already engaged in nationalistic competition with the Arabs, Moshe Dayan broke from the prejudicial confines of that environment. Viewing Arabs through the eyes of a Russian Jew, Shmuel Dayan believed and tried to raise young Moshe to believe "that the Arabs were by nature men of violence, marauders, and a source of disturbances." As a youngster, Moshe mingled and became friends with Arabs from surrounding villages and encampments and sharply disputed his father's opinion. From his boyhood days, he found it easy to get along with Arabs and while he defended his village's land against individual Arab trespassers, his attitude toward the Arabs as a people: was always positive and friendly. I liked their way of life and I respected them as hard workers, devoted to the land and to our common natural environment. I had no doubt that it was possible to live at peace with them. (72) This unusually liberal and enlightened attitude was demonstrated on repeated occasions. In 1935, Moshe was involved in a dispute with neighboring Arabs concerning grazing rights. The dispute turned violent and Moshe was injured by a boyhood Arab friend. Six months later, Moshe not only invited the Arab and his family to his wedding, but made the unprecedented move of inviting the entire Arab vilage. (73) Moshe's ability to understand, feel compassion for, and negotiate with Arabs, set him apart from many of his peers and provided Israel with a valuable asset during times of war and times of peace. It is interesting to note that Moshe Dayan was one of the few important Jewish military and political leaders who bothered to learn Arabic. While defending his nation's right to exist, he refused to ignore the plight of Arabs caught in the crossfire of war and eventually formulated a most controversial peace initiative now known as the "Open Bridges Policy." (74) As his biographer Shabtai Teveth records: it was only the quirks of history and the bitter destiny of the Jewish people that placed him at the head of troops who recurrently fought the Arabs. (75) Thus, the initial foundations of Moshe Dayan's military career were laid during the first fourteen years of his life, a period in which he saw no military service. CHAPTER II THE HAGANAH AND THE EMERGENCE Of MOSHE DAYAN: 1930-1941 If the years prior to 1929 were characterized by the development of the economic and political foundations required to create the Jewish state, then the years through 1948 were characterized by the development of the military forces needed to secure and defend that state. To Moshe Dayan, those years were crucial to his development as a professional soldier and formed the environment in which he developed the standards of excellence by which he judged himself and measured others. Creating a natiohal military force was an arduous task that evoked considerable debate and forced Jewish leaders to make several controversial decisions. Debates centered on three separate, yet interrelated issues: establishing and clarifying the relationship between civilian authority and the military, changing military doctrine, and the proper use of military force to secure national objectives. As always, political realities greatly influenced these decisions which, in turn, produced actions that modified political behavior. The Riots of 1929 had an even more profound affect on Palestine than did the violence of 1920-1921. The bloodshed widened the chasm between Arabs and Jews, hardened each group's attitude, increased their suspicions concerning British Mandate policies and the Empire's regional intentions, and gave rise to militant elements within both communities. Having incorrectly assumed that Britain would not intervene on behalf of the Jews, Arab nationalists were angered by what they viewed as the use of external military force to rescue Zionism in Palestine. While the British blamed Haj Amin for not having exerted his influence to halt the riots, they refused to accuse him of instigating the violence. This refusal strengthened the Mufti's position as the most powerful political, religious, and nationalist Arab leader in Palestine. (1) The British formed two Royal Commissions to investigate the violence and then published the White Paper of 1930. Blaming the riots on Jewish immigration and Jewish land purchases, the Passfield Paper recommended that the Mandate restrict both activities. Never mentioning the Balfour Declaration, the paper proposed forming a Palestinian legislative council - an elected assembly - with Jewish and Arab representation based on their population strengths. Since the White Paper recommended restricting Jewish immigration, Zionists rejected the proposed council. Arab nationalists aso rejected the concept for two reasons; they did not trust British intentions and, they did not want to be viewed as cooperating with the British in the construction of a non-Arab Palestinian state. More important, the document suggested that Britain had conflicting obligations regarding the Arab and Jewish communities and hinted that the Empire had already discharged its responsibilities concerning a Jewish homeland. (2) Vacillating British policy, when combined with Jewish suspicions regarding London's resolve to forcefully suppress the riots, worried and infuriated the Yishuv. This reaction produced additional casualties. Although angered over the White Paper, Dr. Weizmann still encouraged continued reliance on Britain. As a result, his popularity and political influence within the Yishuv declined and these reversals led to David Ben-Gurion's emergence as the leader of Jewish Palestine. Additionally, Jewish groups advocating reconciliation with the Arabs found the political environment too hostile to support their tentative efforts. (3) Although formed in the early 1920's, the Haganah was ill- equipped and too poorly organized to effectively protect the Yishuv during the Riots of 1929. The relative calm of the late 1920's had lulled the Jewish community into a sense of false security and, complacent about self-defense, Jews provided the Haganah with minimal financial support. (4) This lack of preparedness and the renewal of anti-Jewish violence resulted in a reorganization of and an eventual split within the Haganah. Relinquishing control of the Haganah, the Histadrut made the Jewish Agency responsible for the defense organization. With emotions running high and not wanting the Haganah to be controlled by factional interest groups, the Haganah was placed under the direct control of a 5-man bi-partisan committee composed of 2 representatives from socialist parties, 2 men from non-socialist groups, and a neutral chairman. But even this act of consensus did not prevent the formation of separate para-military organizations that pursued national objectives defined by their political masters. Rational military actions are not executed in a vacuum. Instead, they are the physical manifestations of political necessity and national policy. Since there was no nation and hence, no binding consensus regarding "national" policies and objectives, the growing rift between the Ben-Gurion/Weizmann moderates and Jabotinsky's ultra-nationalistic Revisionists split the Yishuv. This crack in the political structure produced a similar split within the Haganah which, in turn, led to the formation of a rival, para-military organization, the Irgun Zvai Leumi*, in 1931. (5) Never attracting a sizable following, the Irgun created problems for Ben-Gurion and the Jewish Agency from the instant of its creation until its demise in 1948. Despite the Irgun and although it was still in its infancy, the Haganah now had the popular support, the political backing, and the funding necessary to strengthen its organization, expand its scope of operations, and emerge as the national instrument of self-defense. Working clandestinely under the direct supervision of the Jewish Agency, the Haganah participated in illegal immigration operations, weapons purchases, and recruitment activities. These operations were essential elements of an overall policy designed to enhance Jewish self-defense capabilities and strengthen the foundations upon which a future Jewish state could be constructed. While the British did not implement the recommendations contained in the White Paper of 1930, a failure that convinced Arab nationalists that favorable concessions made to them could always be annulled by Zionist pressure in London, the British did * IRGUN ZVAI LEUMI: Referred to as the IRGUN, in Hebrew the phrase is translated "National Military Organization." While not gaining much recognition until the post-World War II struggle with Britain, this organization refused to accept Ben-Gurion's policies and directly violated the Yishuv's policy of self-restraint through its attacks on non-combatant Arabs. attempt to limit Jewish immigration. These restrictions came at a time when Jews, in ever-increasing numbers, were fleeing Nazi Germany and her neighboring Central European countries. Early on, the Nazi regime "worked" with the Jewish Agency on immigration issues and between 1933 and 1939, nearly 50,000 Jews fled the Reich and sought refuge in Palestine. (6) While not baring wealthy Jews from entering Palestine, the Mandate strictly regulated the number of impoverished Jews a lowed to enter the region. This was accomplished through Labor Certificates without which poor Jews were denied entry into Palestine. From 1933 through 1939, the Jewish Agency applied for over 170,000 certificates, of which the British granted less than 60,000. Thus, the Jewish Agency, with assistance from the Haganah, began to smuggle Jews into Palestine. While the Haganah's pre-World War II smuggling operations were neither as bold nor as large as its post-war efforts, with Haganah assistance the Jewish population in Palestine increased from 160,000 in 1931 to nearly 450,000 in 1939. (7) Since the Mandate declared it illegal for Arabs or Jews to possess rifles or pistols, the Haganah purchased weapons and munitions from overseas sources. When possible, they attempted to augment those supplies with locally produced explosives. (8) Finally, the Haganah began extensive recruiting efforts among Jewish communities and provided its new recruits with minimal military trainigs. In 1930 and 1931, Moshe's initial training consisted of small arms familiarization, instruction in hand-to-hand combat, and sentry duty. (9) However, as the Haganah expanded its influence and its operational capabilities, it still lacked the means to aggressively accomplish its mission. As Moshe later wrote, "My Haganah duties at this time did not take up much of my energies, so I was comparatively free." (10) It was during the years 1929 to 1935 that Moshe's exceptional leadership qualities emerged. As a member of a small horse-mounted unit, Moshe helped protect his village and drove away Bedouin herders who allowed their sheep to graze on the wheatfields of Nahalal. Practicing wild Cossack-style cavalry charges and demonstrating personal courage, Moshe alertly led the troop with innovative daring and consistently displayed a personal trait that would be one of the hallmarks of his subsequent military career - that of leadership by example. One boyhood friend later recalled: It was always good to go out to fight with Moshe. He was very daring. He never looked twice; he simply ran forward. We all noticed that nothing seemed to frighten him, nor did he care a whit what might happen to him. And in fights he knew no mercy. (11) As the fame of this mounted patrol spread, neighboring settlements increasingly requested its assistance. At the same time, Moshe openly displayed a personal aversion to politics and participation in organized political activities. Highly critical of Jewish political parties and their associated youth movements, Moshe was reluctant to participate in those organizations and bluntly stated, "I was not attracted to party work." In fact, Moshe "became involved in party affairs only after the loss of his eye, when he believed his military career was at an end." Throughout his life, Moshe was impatient with politicians and party functionaries and frequently displayed a preference for decisive action to the painfully slow process of political decision-making. Shabtai Teveth suggests that this trait was rooted in his childhood when his father frequently "abandoned" his family and went on lengthy political trips. (12) But as Moshe guarded Nahalal and as the Haganah slowly adjusted to its role as the national Jewish defense force, events in Europe captured British attention and, to a considerable extent, disrupted the delicate balance in Palestine. Hitler's rise to power constituted a continental threat to Britain and provided the Arabs with a potential ally in their struggle for self-rule. Although the Nazis never successfully exploited Arab nationalism, the British were keenly aware of German threats to Middle Eastern stability. Some authors have argued that British attempts to placate the Arabs during and after the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939 were predicated on London's desire to thwart German encroachment into the region. (13) Arab nationalists were also aware of Britain's concerns regarding the Axis Powers and viewed Italian successes in Lybia and Ethiopia as signs of British vulnerability. This perception, when combined with Britain's failure to halt Jewish immigration and land purchases, heightened Arab resentment of western rule, especially non-Arab Christian rule over Arab Muslims. (14) In April 1936, following anti-Jewish violence and the Irgun's unauthorized retaliatory murder of two Arabs, Haj Amin declared a general strike. As both the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and the recently selected leader of the Higher Arab Committee, a "political action group" designed to unite Palestinian Arabs in common cause, Haj Amin declared that until the British suspended Jewish immigration and land purchases, no Arab would work in Palestine. While the strike lasted until the fall harvest, it created little economic disruption as Jewish workers quickly filled vacated Arab jobs. However, the strike was the first round in an escalating cycle of violence referred to as the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939. (15) By early summer, strike related violence subsided and although attacks against Jewish communities continued, Arab guerrillas began focusing their efforts on the British. Angered over attacks against their installations and the repeated sabotage of the Iraq Petroleum Pipeline, British patience finally broke and London poured troops into Palestine. While the fighting did not spread to neighboring territories under British rule, Egypt and the Tran's-Jordan, a significant number of Arab volunteers joined the Arab Palestinians in their fight against the British and the Jews. Despite these volunteers, "there was no attempt, throughout the period of the revolt, at any kind of concerted action by the Arab governments against Britain." (16) British troops neutralized the rebels by October and in November, another royal commission, headed by Lord Peel, arrived to study the situation. Although the Arabs largely boycotted the hearings, the British preferred a negotiated settlement to a military victory and in July 1937 the commission published its sensational findings. Attributing the revolt to Arab desires for independence and their fears concerning a national Jewish homeland, the Peel Report declared the Mandate unworkable and stated that ultimate peace lay in geographic partition. In a White Paper issued simultaneously with the report, the British proposed establishing two independent states within Palestine - Click here to view image one Arab and one Jewish. Holy places sacred to Christians, Jews, and Muslims would be placed in an international conclave under British control. Arabs denounced the plan, but most Jews, with the notable exception of Jabotinsky's Revisionists, accepted the proposal. (17) While scattered violence continued during and after the Peel Commission's deliberations, massive violence erupted in September 1937 when Lewis Andrews, Acting District Commissioner of Galilee, was assassinated in Nazareth by unknown Arab assailants. Viewing his murder as a declaration of rebellion, the British responded with force. Removing Haj Amin as leader of the Supreme Muslim Council, the British outlawed the Higher Arab Committee and issued arrest warrants for members of that organization. Fearing arrest, Haj Amin fled to Beirut where the French granted him political asylum. Never returning to Palestine, Haj Amin fled to Germany following his participation in an abortive pro-Nazi revolt in Iraq in 1941. (18) Arab nationalists met force with force and attacked British installations and Jewish settlements with renewed vigor. Once again, Arab volunteers augmented local guerrilla forces. Arab irregulars in northern Palestine posed a particularly troublesome problem. Led by Fawzi el-Kaukji, a former officer in the Turkish army, these guerrillas infiltrated Palestine from Syria and Lebanon and, operating at night, repeatedly sabotaged the Iraq Petroleum Pipeline. Despite heavy patrolling, the British were unable to capture el-Kaukji or destroy his force. (19) British attempts to quell the revolt were massive but largely ineffective. Eventually bringing two divisions into Palestine, the British relied on traditional tactics. Seldom operating at night, the British conducted search and destroy operations, fined villages suspected of harboring terrorists, and destroyed homes in which illegal weapons were found. Martial law, night-long curfews, and massive detentions failed to end the revolt. Even the Teggart Forts, a series of fortified police stations a long the frontier with Lebanon, Syria, and the Trans- Jordan, failed to halt guerrilla infiltration. (20) Although Jewish leaders "regarded the riots as a series of preliminary skirmishes in the battle for the establishment of the Jewish State," the Yishuv's response to the Arab Revolt was one of self-restraint and static, position-oriented defense. (21) During the tense summer of 1936, the Yishuv reached a collective and highly controversial decision regarding the proper Jewish response to Arab attacks. Officially known as Havlagah,* the policy ordered the Haganah to limit its actions to direct self- defense measures and strictly forbade any offensive counter- strike against the Arabs. There were military and political reasons to support this decision. Militarily, the Haganah was not yet sufficiently strong to execute offensive operations. Still viewed by the British as an illegal organization, the Haganah operated clandestinely and lacked sufficient weapons to launch vigorous counterattacks. A second problem involved the overall quality of the Haganah's * HAVLAGAH: The Yishuv's policy of self-restraint adopted during the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939. The policy specifically forbade any form of counter-strike that might injure or kill Arab non- combatants and was implemented again in post-World War II Palestine when when Jews battled the British for independence. forces. Although centrally controlled and directed, its training standards, overall military skills, and the quality of its small unit leadership varied markedly among the various Haganah cells. Finally, the selection of local commanders was often based on political considerations rather than on tactical skills, a factor that greatly reduced the Haganah's ability to operate effectively throughout Palestine. (22) The policy of Havlagah was also dictated by political necessity. Not wanting to attack innocent Arabs in retaliatory raids, Dr. Weizmann persuaded the Yishuv that it was in their best political interests to refrain from offensive action. Passive resistance, he maintained, would serve the Yishuv's long- term interests better than offensive operations against Arab guerrillas. Anxious to dissuade British beliefs that the revolt was a war between Arabs and Jews, even Ben-Gurion reasoned that self-restraint might deter the British from suspending further Jewish immigration and might even persuade them to provide aid in Jewish self-defense efforts. While most Jews embraced the policy, the Irgun openly opposed Havlagah and actively pursued an aggressive policy of retaliation and counter-attack against the Arabs. Some of these strikes were clearly terrorist in nature and were widely condemned by the Yishuv and the British. (23) Despite Havlagah, the Yishuv realized that the construction of new settlements could influence the future borders of that state. Using their own land, the Yishuv launched a vigorous settlement campaign known as Operation Stockade and Tower. New settlement sites were selected for their strategic and political value and were frequently located near guerrilla infiltration routes on the Syrian and Lebanese borders. The Haganah, supplemented by engineer units and farmers, would construct a prefabricated watchtower with searchlight, homes, and fortified outer wall, all of which was then encircled with barbed wire and, when available, primitive minefields. Frequently completed in one day, these farming settlements often became para-military bases for Haganah training exercises and self-defense operations. Augmented with Haganah units, the settlers farmed by day and defended their settlements by night. Depending on the situation, Arab assaults lasted from a few nights to several months. From 1936 through 1938, during the height of the Arab Revolt, 36 settlements were established on some 21,000 acres of land and, despite Arab attacks, no farming settlements were abandoned. (24) As the revolt intensified, the Yishuv's policy of self- restraint impressed the British. Viewing the Jews as potential, short-term allies in their struggle against Arab guerrillas, in 1936 the British reluctantly accepted the Jewish Agency's offer to augment local police forces. The British understood that most if not all of these augmentees would be Haganah members. But since the Arabs held the initiative, the British could not reject the offer. During the next decade, British-Jewish cooperation was tenuous at best and was evident only when British interests in the Middle East were threatened. (25) However, British support was essential for Jewish survival since it provided the Haganah with time to strengthen its organization and expand its operations without risking major British reprisals. (26) Operational cooperation between the Haganah and the Mandate also provided Moshe Dayan with his first real military experiences. Since British troops could not be everywhere at once, the Mandate agreed to arm, train, and pay Jews for a variety of military and para-military services. Although Haganah members, these Jews were under the direct operational control of the Mandate authorities and, as such, they served as guides for British patrols, filled the ranks of the Supernumary Police or Jewish Settlement Police, and worked as ghafirs or lightly armed police militia. Providing a direct physical link between the Haganah and the British military, these organizations, collectively known as the notrim*, allowed the Jewish underground to acquire legal cover for their illegal operations. Even more important, notrim members received British military training. By the autumn of 1936, nearly 750 notrim were on the British payrolls while an additional 1,800 were subsidized by the Jewish community. By July 1938, the most important of these notrim organizations, the Jewish Settlement Police, had grown to an astounding 22,000 members. As one Jewish historian has written: The notrim were a substitute for a real militia, a surrogate for a Jewish army ... (and) ... widened the mainstream of Jewish self-defense. (27) In the spring of 1937, Moshe Dayan was issued a legal pistol, a ghafir's uniform, paid a monthly salary of 8 Palestinian pounds, and served as a guide to units of the King's Own Scottish Regiment and the Yorkshire Fusiliers. The specific * NOTRIM: A collective term referring to any of three Jewish organizations supported or authorized by the British during the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939: the Jewish Settlement Police, the ghafirs, and guides for British army patrols. missions given these units were to seal the Lebanese and Syrian borders to guerrilla infiltrators and to protect that portion of the Iraq Petroleum Pipeline running across northern Palestine. Moshe served as a guide for eight months and was highly critical of both the tactics employed by and the overall combat proficiency of those units. Although the British troops had little or no reconnaissance training, Moshe criticized their lack of initiative and their inability to improvise when the situation demanded. Recognizing these deficiencies, he fully understood: the ineffectiveness of regular troops, using routine methods with fixed times and routes of patrol, against saboteurs who knew the terrain, moved stealthily on foot, could lose themselves in the local population, and could choose the convenient time and place for their operations. He also subjected British officers to a scathing indictment over their lack of mission-oriented purpose and later wrote that these officers "assumed that they had fulfilled their task if they simply showed their presence by patrolling the area." (28) Moshe maintained that these deficiencies resulted from inadequate training in fieldcraft, uniforms and equipment not suited for the mission, and a lazy attitude that led to slipshod patrols and inadequately prepared ambushes. (29) Despite these critical observations, Moshe's performance did not go unnoticed by either the British or the Haganah. Following his service as a guide, Moshe returned to his new home at Shimron and, as a member of the Jewish Settlement Police, was promoted to sergeant and appointed commander of a mobile squad composed of six ghafirs and a truck. Clearly violating the spirit of Havlagah but working within the legal constraints imposed by British authorities, Moshe actively patrol led the Nahalal District and helped ambush Arab terrorists. Although these actions defied the policy of self-restraint, they were the first manifestations of another character trait - that of seizing the initiative whenever possible. Years later, he justified his actions within the context of military tactics: It became clear to me that the only way to fight them (Arab guerrillas) was to seize the initiative, attack them in their bases, and surprise them when they were on the move. (30) Yet Moshe was not the first Jew to express dissatisfaction with the doctrine of a static and position-oriented defense. While condemning the Irgun's irresponsible application of indiscriminate military force against both combatant and innocent Arabs, other military leaders openly questioned the policy of Havlagah and demanded that the Haganah be allowed to launch counter-strikes against Arab guerrillas. The most prominent of these constructive dissidents was Yitzhak Sadeh. A Polish Jew, Sadeh was a highly decorated veteran of the Tsar's army. Active in the Russian Revolution, Sadeh served as an officer in Lenin's army and it was there that he met Joseph Trumpeldor. Trumpeldor persuaded Sadeh to emigrate to Palestine and Yitzhak, short of funds, entered wrestling tournaments to earn money for his passage. Participating in the defense of Jerusalem during the 1920-1921 riots, Sadeh's leftist predilections led him to join Trumpeldor is Labor and Defense Battalions. Once those units were disbanded, Sadeh retired from public life and did not resurface until 1936 when he offered his services to the Haganah. (31) Although Haganah leaders officially supported Havlagah, Sadeh vehemently opposed total reliance on static, position- oriented defensive tactics and forcefully argued in favor of an active, aggressive, mobile defense. Convincing his superiors that a solid defense must be offensive in nature, Sadeh received reluctant permission to test his theory. He quickly formed and trained a mobile patrol whose mission was to seek-out, close- with, and destroy Arab guerrillas operating near Jerusalem. (32) Later known as "The Flying Squad", this small, foot-mobile unit was much more than an ambush and patrol force. Instead, it was the first officially sanctioned Jewish force capable of independent offensive operations and it represented the first tangible break with the doctrine of static defense. Using deception and moving at night, the all-volunteer force employed what Sadeh called "the hammer and anvil technique." (33) Upon learning of a possible Arab night assault against a Jewish village, the squad would deploy to a staging area near the settlement. Once the Arabs attacked, the squad would vigorously strike the enemy from the flank or rear and drive the disorganized unit into the village's static defense. Later permutations involved two patrols - one mobile and one lying in ambush. The roving patrol would locate an enemy unit and, using fire and maneuver, either lure or drive the Arabs toward the ambush site. Once in range, the ambush unit would launch a violent aisault against the confused Arab band. Since "The Flying Squad" was rather small and mostly comprised of teenagers, Sadeh carefully selected both the enemy to be engaged and the terrain on which the night action would take place. Sadeh believed that psycho logical preparation was another key to success and, by continually preaching that the "fellowship of fighters is the foundation of life, the inner-most heart and soul of comradship", he ensured that his hand-picked men developed a strong sense of unit cohesion. (34) In 1937, Sadeh was authorized to expand this concept and, drawing from notrim forces, he organized the FOSH.* In July 1937, the FOSH was placed under the direct control of the Haganah High Command, and by March 1938 these field companies boasted a trained strength of 1,000 men organized into thirteen regional groups. Containing organic, yet primitive, combat service support units to include quartermaster, topographic, education, and intelligence teams, the FOSH was a well-trained and aggressively mobile force that the Haganah High Command could employ throughout Palestine without "having to rely on the resources and goodwill of the local branches of the Haganah, with their parochial concerns and uneven leadership." (35) But Jewish political leaders never fully accepted the FOSH and feared the organization represented a growing military elite that would eventually reject civilian authority. Equally damning were the accusations of political moderates who feared the FOSH's aggressive nature would encourage Arab reprisals, jeopardize British-Jewish cooperation, and undermine any chance of a peaceful coexistence with the Arabs. Despite its own * FOSH: Known as the Plugot Sadeh, these field companies were the first Jewish units developed for offensive operations and provided the foundation upon which the Palmach - the Haganah's elite "shock troops" of the 1940's - were constructed. reservations regarding the political reliability of the FOSH, the Haganah High Command supported the field companies until they were abolished in 1939. (36) However, the importance of Sadeh is unconventional approach and revolutionary ideas in the transformation of existing Jewish military doctrine must not be underestimated. Yigal Allon provides the best description of Sadeh the man and Sadeh the military thinker: Possessed of limitless personal courage and endowed with a rare quality of leadership, Sadeh was one of the few high-ranking members of the Haganah able, at all times, to project his own unconventional insights into the real meaning of self-defense ... It was Sadeh - that bespectacled, warm, crumpled, ordinary-looking bon-vivant-cum-poet, that great lover of country, of women, and of the implacable logic of history who symbolized most vividly the fighting spirit of the underground, and who discovered and taught war to a group of teenagers destined, within only a few years, to lead the army of Israel. (37) One of those young men was Moshe Dayan. Elements of Sadeh's old "Flying Squad" were incorporated into the largest notrim organization, the Jewish Settlement Police and, with British approval, they evolved into mobile guard units. While the mobile guards were legally constituted units under British control, they were also Haganah units reporting directly to the Jewish underground. Their legal mission was to prevent Arab attacks against Jewish settlements and, in the case of attack, serve as aggressive counter-attack forces. Their illegal mission was to provide on-the-job training for new Haganah recruits. By the spring of 1939, there were 62 mobile guard units with nearly 600 men, supplied with British vehicles and British weapons. (44) As a mobile guard unit leader, Moshe was selected to attend a Haganah Platoon Commander's Course in December 1937. His instructor was Yitzhak Sadeh. Although 25 years younger than his, teacher, Moshe instantly recognized that Sadeh: was a man after my own heart. Bursting with original ideas, he grasped the essence of a problem and demanded of us great daring, bordering at times on recklessness. (39) While neither Moshe nor his biographer discuss the course in any detail, one can only conclude that Sadeh reinforced Moshe's belief that victory depended on the seizure of the initiative through prompt, aggressive action and personal leadership. Upon completing Sadeh's course with its "realistic battle exercises", the British ordered Moshe to attend a school for Jewish Settlement Police sergeants. Held at a British military camp, Moshe described the training with humorous contempt: I did not care for the highly disciplined inspection parades with the strict adhernce on shiny boots and smartness of dress. And the content of the military instruction served no use whatsoever for ensuring the safety of the Nahalal region and the rest of the Jezreel Valley. Yet I found it interesting, and I realized that in order to run an empire, there may have been some virtue in the spit and polish of British army tradition. (40) Even though Moshe had little use for non-mission oriented military training, he led by example and demanded perfection from his men. One of his peers recalled that Moshe: took drill very seriously. He would take his men out to the main road with clean rifles and polished shoes and drill them until they excelled at it, even though he hated all of it. (41) In 1938, Moshe was appointed a Haganah instructor in the Nahalal district and, reflecting what he had learned from the British, from Sadeh, arid from his personal experiences, he wrote a training manual titled "Fieldcraft". While largely critical of the "external mannerisms that were an integral part of the British Army", the manual outlined detailed training methods that went far beyorid weapons familiarization and drill formations. Stressing the importance of terrain analysis and emphasizing methods designed to exploit the tactical features of any piece of land, the booklet also discussed infiltration and ambush techniques. After reading the manual, Ya' akov Dori , the Haganah commander of northern Palestine, personally commended Moshe for his work. (42) As an instructor, Moshe implemented his ideas in the field. Emphasizing infiltration and stressing the importance of surprise, innovative thinking, and personal leadership, Moshe led his class on unauthorized night raids against Jewish settlements. Without informing his Haganah superiors or village leaders, Moshe and his pupils would approach a settlement, cut through fences, slip past armed guards, and make their way to the center of the community. While commending him for his unorthodox teaching methods, his superiors reminded him of the consequences if a settlement guard mistook the class for Arab guerrillas. When ordered to stop these raids, Moshe reluctantly agreed even though: I knew in my heart that as long as I was crawling at the head of my men to break through a guarded fence, we would not fail. (43) His innovative, daring, and aggressive approach to combat training made a lasting impression on his students and one of them later recalled: He began giving us lessons in fieldcraft in Nahalal It was a great turning point in the Haganah. Before that we had only learned how to handle weapons or routine drill ... Did we love him? Yes and no. Actually we respected him. We were always ready to follow him as a leader, but I couldn't possibly define our feelings for him as love. He was never aloof from us, and we could always go up and talk to him; yet somehow he remained distant. (44) While the art of small unit, mobile, aggressive warfare was being learned in the field, Jewish leaders still thought in terms of a static, national defense. Against the objections of the Mandatory, Ben-Gurion authorized the establishment of several new settlements along the Lebanese border in western Galilee. Politically, the Yishuv believed that partition was imminent and that the borders of the future Jewish state would be determined through diplomatic negotiations. Since western Galilee had no Jewish settlements, Jewish leaders feared the area would not be included in the Jewish state. Militarily, the settlements would help seal infiltration routes and, once the state was established, would form a first line of defense against organized Arab invasion from the north. As part of Operation Stockade and Tower, the Haganah ordered Sadeh to select a group of volunteers to help construct and defend these settlements. Sadeh named two of his star pupils as deputy commanders - Yigal Allon and Moshe Dayan. On 21 March 1938, in the largest operation of its kind, 400 men began constructing the settlement of Hanita. That night and for several weeks thereafter, Arab guerrillas attacked Hanita and, despite Sadeh's request that Allon and Dayan be allowed to lead a counterattack, the regional Haganah commander, Ya' akov Dori, rejected the proposal as irresponsible and dangerous. Consequently, Sadeh's forces assumed static defensive positions and the Arabs retained the initiative. (45) Despite his inspiring leadership, proven tactical abilities, and innovative ideas, Sadeh could not overcome the Haganah's defensive orientation. Thinking in terms of a static defense built around heavily fortified settlements, Haganah leaders could not fully accept the concept of a mobile and aggressive defense. In an ironic twist of fate, it was an English officer who not only proved the validity of Sadeh's approach but forever changed the military thinking of an entire people. Posted to Palestine as an intelligence officer, Orde Charles Wingate arrived in Haifa in September 1936. A captain in the British army, Wingate was an unusual and highly eccentric individual whose strange habits included a diet of onions, nudity, and a bizarre personal grooming regimen that included massaging his entire body with an old toothbrush. His boyishly handsome face was framed by a thick crop of black hair and his eyes, dark and piercing, had the gleam of either a dreamer or a fanatic. (46) Born in India in 1903, his father was an army officer who be longed to an unusual religious sect - the Plymouth Brethern. Wingate's Scottish grandfather had worked as a missionary to convert "God is chosen people" - the Jews - to Christianity. Although he was not Jewish, Wingate held the rather peculiar belief "that the inhabitants of Great Britain (were) descendants of the ten lost tribes of Israel who did not return to the land of Canaan from the Babylonian captivity." (47) Prior to his departure for Palestine, Wingate held pro-Arab sympathies. While there is some question as to when he became a convinced Zionist, his pro-Jewish beliefs alienated him from most of his fellow officers serving in Palestine. (48) Within a few months of his arrival, Wingate met notable Jewish leaders to include Dr. Weizmann, David Ben-Gurion, the Haganah's chief intelligence officer, and the Haganah Chief of Staff. Wingate's forceful and frequently aggressive pro-Jewish outbursts both impressed and confused these Jewish leaders. Concerning the Zionist Movement in Palestine, Wingate said: I believe that the very existence of mankind is justified when it is based on the moral foundation of the Bible. Whoever dares lift a hand against you -the Jews) and your enterprise here should be fought against. (49) And later: God give it to us to slay the enemies of the Jews, for the enemies of the Jews are the enemies of all mankind. (50) Such statements, coming as they did from an English intelligence officer, led many Jews to consider Wingate a spy. Over time, the Yishuv and the Haganah accepted Wingate and in honor of his unusual stance, called him "Hayedid" - the Friend. (51) Displeased with Britain's diplomatic and military efforts to end the Arab revolt, Wingate wrote a letter to his cousin, Sir Reginald Wingate, the former British High Commissioner of Egypt. In this remarkable letter, Wingate outlined his plan for safeguarding British interests in Palestine while simultaneously assisting the Zionist cause. In Wingate's mind, British and Jewish interests were inseparable: The Arabs of Palestine are making a great song and dance about what they will do if the findings of the [Peel] Commission are not 90% in their favour. Supposing they do all they threaten, i.e., rise en masse, we need only (a) arm the Jews, (b) proclaim martial law and arrest and exile every Arab notable; to find ourselves able to master the revolt with no more than the eight battalions already here ... The military strength, past, present, and future of the whole Arab group is quite negligible ... The potential military strength of the Jews, especially if we adopt my recommendations, is equivalent to at least two British Army Corps when trained and organized ... Palestine is essential to our Empire - our Empire is essential to England - England is essential to world peace . .. Islam is out of it. [We have] the chance to plant here in Palestine and Transjordan a loyal, rich and intelligent nation, with which we can make an everlasting treaty, and which will hold for us the key to world dominion without expense or effort on our part. In addition to arming the Jews, Wingate recommended that the British-supported Arab government in the Trans-Jordan be overthrown and that the High Commissioner of Palestine, Sir Arthur Wauchope, be removed. Highly opinionated, disputatious, and occasionally disrespectful, Wingate "never appreciated the dangers of extremism or the values of moderation." (52) Wingate carefully studied Jewish and British military responses to Arab attacks. Dismayed over the Jewish penchant for static, position defense, Wingate told Haganah leaders: So long as you sit in your settlements and wait to fight and die, you will die before you have a chance to fight. (53) Wingate was equally appalled with Britain's mech-heavy, road-bound, and inadequately coordinated combined arms approach to waging counter-guerrilla warfare. He specifically objected to the tactics employed in engagements with Arab guerrillas. After allowing themselves to be ambushed, the British would dismount, seek cover, return fire, and call for air support. Seldom seizing the initiative, British patrols were reluctant to engage the guerrillas in close combat. He was equally critical of manpower intensive search and destroy operations, and was dismayed at the lack of regular night operations. (54) These deficiencies were amplified when the revolt exploded with renewed ferocity in the fall of 1937. In the spring of 1938, Captain Wingate received permission from Sir Archibald Wavel, the new British Military Commander in Palestine, to establish a military intelligence network among the Jewish settlements in northern Palestine. This network would help identify infiltration routes used by terrorists and irregular Arab forces to enter Palestine from Lebanon, Syria, and the Trans-Jordan. The British were specifically concerned with Fawzi el-Kaukji's renewed attacks against British installations and the Iraq Petroleum Pipeline. (55) Upon completing his mission, Wingate returned to Haifa and requested permission to organize special units composed of the Jewish Settlement Police with a "proper stiffening" of British troops. Wingate argued that these units would operate at night and, through aggressive offensive action, end guerrilla attacks against the pipeline and clear northern Palestine of rebel bases. After considerable debate among his superiors and separate discussions among Jewish leaders, Wingate's proposal was accepted and the Special Night Squads were formed. (56) Unknown to British authorities at that time, Wingate had already tested his concept during his reconnaissance of northern Palestine during the spring. Visiting Hanita in April, Wingate and Dayan met for the first time and shortly thereafter Wingate led Dayan and a small Jewish contingent on an ambush patrol. Wingate demanded that the ambush be set on the outskirts of an Arab village. While the concept of limited offensive actions against Arab guerrillas had already been advanced by Sadeh, Wingate's concept of carrying the fight to the enemy and attacking him in his own villages and bases was an approach of revolutionary magnitude. Moshe later wrote: This concept was new to us, for we had always set our ambushes near the approaches to the Jewish settlement to be defended and not near the exit from an Arab village serving as a terrorist base. (57) After gaining Sadeh's support, Wingate formally established the Special Night Squads in May 1938. Composed of 80 Haganah representatives, 30 British troops, and a large contingent of Jewish Settlement Police, Wingate formed and trained nine individual squads capable of independent and combined operations. By early June, the squads were deployed. (58) Demanding excellence from his troops and perfection from his NCOs and junior officers, Wingate was a strict disciplinarian who, at times, resembled a merciless tyrant. Known to strike subordinates for bad map-reading, he once butt-stroked an man for making too much noise while on patrol and beat an NCO who drank water from a pool before allowing his men to quench their thirsts. But in garrison, he ran his unit as a democracy. (59) Emphasizing the importance of secrecy, surprise, mobility, deception, and the proper exploitation of the tactics of terrain, Wingate carefully trained his men in night-fighting skills and constantly told them: The Arabs think the night is theirs, that only they can fight us in the dark. The British lock themselves up in their barracks at night. But we, the Jews, will teach them to fear the night more than the day. (60) A meticulous planner who regarded his men as partners in thought and action, Wingate stressed that each soldier, regardless of rank, must fully understand a plan before implementing it. At the same time, he delegated leadership responsibilities to his subordinates and taught them how to improvise when a plan collapsed during execution. Wingate also served as a role model for Dayan's evolving view of combat leadership. Reinforcing Moshe's belief that a good leader lead his men from the front of a column, Wingate frequently walked point on night patrols. From Wingate, Dayan and others learned that independent action within the context of an operational plan was the key to seizing and maintaining the initiative and was essential for successfully carrying the fight to the enemy. Although crudely implemented when compared with Israel Defense force operations in the 1950's and 1960's, this concept provided the basis for Dayan's strong belief in a structure of command and control known as "maintenance of the objective" or optional control. Finally, Wingate taught Dayan the value of ins
