Find a Security Clearance Job!

Military

Foundations Of Excellence:  Moshe Dayan And Israel's 
Military Tradition (1880 To 1950)
AUTHOR Major Allan A. Katzberg, USMC
CSC 1988
SUBJECT AREA History
                         TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter    Title						Page
           Introduction					2
   1.      Setting the Stage: 1880-1929			9
   2.      The Haganah and the Emergence of Moshe
               Dayan: 1930-1941				48
   3.      Recovery and Revolt: 1942-1947			87
   4.      War, Politics, and Independence:  1948-1949	118
   5.      Epilogue						154
           Appendix A: Glossary				162
           Appendix B: The Evolution of the Israel
                     Defense Force:  1907-Present	167
           Maps and Charts
               1)  The Middle East				8
               2)  Northern Israel				10
               3)  Partition Plans for Palestine			56
               4)  United Nations Partition Plan			117
               5)  Arab Invasion of 15 May 1948			132
               6)  Israel's Borders: 1949-1967			133
               7)  Operation Dani				144
               8)  Chart of the Evolution of the IDF		167
         Endnotes						176
         Bibliography					207
                          INTRODUCTION
     No man is an island, especially in the turbulent stream of
history.  To fully appreciate the validity of this concept and to
grasp the essence of any historic figure, the serious person must
accomplish four interrelated tasks.
           1)  He or she must understand the history - the social
movements, cultural values, ideas, events, and personalities -
that nourished the environment in which the man developed.
           2)  From this flood of information, the scholar must
identify those specific factors that molded the man.  This
identification process must examine how the man's values,
thoughts, and perceptions were influenced, bounded, fashioned, or
otherwise tainted by the cultural, social, economic, and
political components of his environment.
           3)  The historian must examine the relationship between
the man's subsequent actions and the carefully analyzed tapestry
of his past.
           4)  This examination can then explain how that man
influenced both his environment and his fellow man.
     While this interpretive or indirect process disputes the
"big men of history" theory, a flawed concept whose singular
tenet purports that a few key personalities power history's
mighty engines, it does not argue that mankind is the virtual
prisoner of his past.  Rather, this methodology provides a
vehicle for the rational examination of the relationship between
the people who "make" history and the historical circumstances
that provided those individuals with the opportunity to do so.
Using this methodology, this paper examines Moshe Dayan
against the backdrop of Israel's history and identifies the
social, military, and political foundations of his career.  In
simpler terms, the paper attempts to identify and explain the
varied forces that made Moshe Dayan who and what he was.  While
concentrating on the development and application of his military
thoughts, the paper does not ignore those non-military factors
that influenced his world view - an examination that provides
the reader with a more complete portrait of the "whole man."
     How can an examination of Moshe Dayan, or any other public
figure, benefit the professional soldier?  The old adage "know
your enemy" is only half complete.  The second half of that axiom
is "know your ally."  If knowing what makes an enemy "tick"
better enables a soldier to defeat his foe, then understanding
the motivations of an ally will better enable the professional to
work with that ally in defeating a common enemy.  This is
particularly important with regard to Moshe Dayan since he played
a major role in developing the military forces capable of
implementing Israeli military doctrine.
     This paper is divided into five chapters.  The first chapter
covers the 50 years from the late 19th century to 1929 when, at
the age of 14, Moshe Dayan joined the Haganah.  While little of
this chapter is devoted directly to Moshe Dayan, it provides
background information concerning the socio-political environment
in which he was raised.  The history of Palestinian Jews and
Moshe Dayan are so inexorably linked that it is impossible to
understand Dayan without digesting a sizable portion of the
Jewish struggle in Palestine.  The chapter specifically discusses
Zionism, the British Mandate in Palestine, the rise of Arab and
Jewish nationalism, and the tentative beginnings of Israel's
military tradition.
     Chapter two spans the period 1930 to 1941 and examines those
personalities, ideas, political decisions, and events that played
critical roles in both Moshe Dayan's military development and in
the development of Jewish military forces.  Included here are
analyses of the evolution of Jewish military doctrine during the
Arab Revolt of 1936 through 1939, the splintering of Jewish
reactions to the British Mandate, and the increasing tensions
between Arabs, Jews, and the British.
     Chapter three focuses on the years 1942 through 1947 and
discusses the political, social, and military events that led to
the demise of the British Mandate, Israel's War of Independence,
and the creation of the Israel Defense force.  Althoush Dayan
played only a minor role in this five-year slice of history, the
issues raised, problems resolved, and dilemmas left unanswered
significantly influenced his political development - especially
with regard to the close relationship he eventually shared with
his future political mentor, David Ben-Gurion.  Of particular
importance in this chapter are the discussions centering on
military-civilian relationships, the Haganah's active support of
Ben-Gurion's strategy of nation-building, the use of Jewish
forces to support Britain's war against Hitler, and the
subsequent employment of those forces against the British Mandate
in Palestine.
     Chapter four spans two short but eventful years, 1948 and
1949.  While focusing on Israel's War of Independence, this
chapter uses Moshe Dayan participation in that conflict as a
mechanism to examine how the Israel is fought that war.  Particular
attention is paid to Dayan's style of combat leadership and his
remarkable ability to apply the military concepts he learned in
the small unit, guerrilla, and counter-guerrilla environment of
the Arab Revolt, to the conventional battlefield of 1948.  This
chapter concludes with an analysis of how Dayan's political
relationship with Ben-Gurion was solidified - a relationship that
played an important role in his eventual rise to Chief of Staff of
the Israel Defense Force.
     Chapter five is an epilogue that briefly summarizes Dayan's
social, political, and military foundations.  It also provides a
brief glimpse at the remaining 32-years of his life.
     As is evidenced by the preceding paragraphs, this-paper is
more than a biographical sketch of Israel's most famous soldier.
Using Dayan as a common thread running through Israel's social,
political, and military history, the paper provides an examination
of the development of the Israel Defense force, Israel's military
doctrine, and Israel's military tradition.
     Initially, the paper was to have examined what made Moshe
Dayan and how Dayan influenced the development of Israel's
military forces.  However, the author found it impossible to
first divorce Dayah from Israel's early military tradition and to
then separate that tradition from Israel's social, political, and
diplomatic history.  This expansion of purpose proved to be too
massive for the time allocated which, when combined with a near
terminal case of writer's block, almost resulted in disaster.
Consequently, the final product only discusses the Dayan's
formative years and makes no attempt to adequately examine his
military and political career after Israel's War of Independence.
I leave that task to a future student who, possessing greater
stamina and talent than I, can finish what I failed to
accomplish.  That student, as well as all readers, are encouraged
to make frequent use of the endnotes as they provide additional
information that may be of assistance in grasping the essence of
both Dayan and the modern Israeli military tradition.
     In addition to the aforementioned deficiencies, this paper
does not contain a detailed examination of two key subjects
Although forged in the heat of battle, the Israel Defense Force
(IDF) was constructed upon two different military foundations -
the partisan tradition embodied in the Palmach and the "purist" or
British tradition symbolized in the Jewish Brigade of World War
II.  The precise mechanics of how that fusion was engineered on an
IDF-wide basis are not discussed.  Instead, the paper examines how
Moshe Dayan combined those foundations when he organized and led
the 89th Commando Battalion in 1948.  Second, the paper briefly
mentions Moshe Dayan's controversial "Open Bridges Policy" - a
remarkably novel approach to solving Arab-Israeli coexistence
problems in the West Bank.  Once again, time constraints prevented
a detailed examination of how Dayan's West Bank policies not only
meshed with his concept of national defense, but how his ideas
could have provided a framework for Jewish-Palestinian peace.
Both of these subjects are offered as Potential topics for future
research.
     I wish to thank several people for their direct and indirect
assistance in this project.  First, I would like to thank Major
General Amnon Shahak of the Israel Defense Force, who took time
from his busy schedule and provided me with answers to several
questions regarding Dayan.  His insights were particularly
helpful.  Second, I would like to thank my wife, Suzy.  Without
her patience and understanding, this lengthy project would never
have been completed.  Third, I would like to thank Lieutenant
Colonel Bittner who patiently prodded me along and fully
understood my anxieties as I battled a particularly pernicious
disease - writer's block.  Finally, I wish to thank my father who
instilled in me a deep and abiding interest in and appreciation
of history.
Click here to view image
                            CHAPTER I
                  SETTING THE STAGE: 1880-1929
     On May 4, 1915, in the small Jewish settlement of Deganiah,
a son was born to Shmuel and Dvorah Dayan.  This was a
bittersweet moment for these newly-wed, Russian-born emigres.
Not only was he their first-born, he was also the first child
born in the struggling village situated near the Sea of Galilee's
southern shore.  As such, he was Deganiah's first sabra.*  But the
festivity surrounding this event was laced with sadness.  The
boy's proud parents named him Moshe, after Moshe Barsky, a close
friend who, at the age of nineteen, had been killed by Arab
bandits some eighteen months earlier. (1)  As his biographer,
Shabtai Teveth, records:
     Moshe inherited with his very name a direct association
     with the struggle between Jews and Arabs that would
     characterize the rest of his life. (2)
     Moshe was born in troubled times.  With World War I raging
in Europe, the Ottoman Empire, rulers of Palestine, looked with
increasing suspicion on the small but growing cluster of Jewish
settlements on the Mediterranean's eastern shore.  As a member of
the Central Powers, Turkey viewed these 80,000, mostly Russian-
born, Jews as potential Allied sympathizers.  Fearful of British
attack from Egypt and concerned about pro-British sentiment
* SABRA:  A Jewish term of affection referring to Jews born in
Palestine.  The term comes from a word describing a small but
resilient cactus that grew throughout Palestine.
Please note that more complete definitions of Jewish terms and
phrases may be found in the glossary.
Click here to view image
within the Jewish settlements, the Turks pursued an active policy
of harassment toward the Jews in Palestine - a policy that
threatened Jews with deportation, restricted Jewish immigration,
and banned Jewish self-defense organizations.  These actions were
designed to eliminate Jewish nationalism within the Ottoman
Empire.  This policy split the Yishuv*  as some Jews, fearful of
losing all they had worked for, urged their neighbors to not only
seek Turkish citizenship but to also join the Turkish army.
Other Jews actively supported the Allied cause. (3)
     But Jews were not the only group to feel the sting of
Turkish policy.  Portions of the restless Arab community, a
community splintered by inter-family feuds yet bonded by a
growing spirit of nationalism, openly warred against Turkish
domination.  Although nationalistic in nature, their war was
openly supported by the British who viewed the Arabs as allies in
their war against Turkey and the Central Powers.
     Eventually the British, with Arab and Jewish assistance,
removed the Turks from Palestine and, in the ensuing peace,
settled down to what they considered would be the mundane
business of governing their new territorial mandate.  But the
war's violence and the peace that accompanied it's sudden end
masked a set of complex, powerful, and opposing forces in
Palestine.  There, nascent Arab nationalism began to grind
against rising Jewish nationalism and the collision of those
movements would eventually rock the world with their fury.
* YISHUV:  A term referring to the entire Jewish population of
Palestine.
     As a youngster, Moshe seemed ill-prepared to survive the
harsh environment of his native land. (4)  At the age of one, he
contracted trachoma in his left eye.  At age two, pneumonia
nearly killed him and by the age of five he had already survived
his first bout with malaria.  Moshe's mother suffered similar
illnesses.  In addition to contracting trachoma from her young
son, she fell victim to liver disease, an abscessed breast that
required surgery on two separate occasions, and repeated bouts
with malaria.  Since such illnesses were common in Palestine, it
is not surprising that so many of these young pioneers left the
region shortly after their arrival. (5)  Despite these medical
hardships, the Dayan's remained in Palestine.  In 1922, Moshe's
sister Aviva was born in the port of Haifa and four years later
his brother Zohar was born in the same city.
     As a boy, Moshe was not a physically gifted lad and, much to
his father's dismay, did not enjoy the rigors of farming.  At
that time, every Jewish youngster was expected to work willingly
and cheerfully in the fields; however, Moshe's somewhat lazy
attitude toward farming embarrassed his father.  Having learned
to read at age four, Moshe was an exceptionally articulate child
whose precocious nature and spirit of daring adventurism earned
him the reputation of a quarrelsome, somewhat aloof boy.  His
peers neither appreciated nor fully understood these traits.
     Moshe's home life was not exceptionally stable.  Throughout
the war, his mother moved him from village to village in search
of medical assistance or an environment more conducive to
physical recuperation.  His father was a rising star in the
Zionist movement and after the war, he frequently left his
struggling family on urgent Zionist matters as he traveled to
other Jewish settlements in Palestine, to Zionist meetings in
Jerusalem, and to Europe and the United States on fund raising
missions.
     While Moshe wrote very little about his childhood, two
passages concerning those early years leap from the pages of his
autobiography:
     But I grew up in an independent Jewish society that
     spoke Hebrew and fostered the values of Israeli Jews
     who had struck roots and were living in their ancient
     homeland.  My parents had helped create that society.
     They had been privileged to be among the first of the
     redeemed - and the redeemers.
And later:
     The atmosphere in which I was born was that of a Jew
     in his homeland.  My children and their children have
     known no other state or mood.  My parents, however,
     had been forced with the choice and the spiritual
     struggle.  They had made it and had reached the
     correct decision. (6)
     This atmosphere of a "Jew living in his homeland" was the
primal influence on Moshe Dayan.  As a sabra, Moshe was one of
the first tangible products of Zionism* and, as such, that
movement provided the social and political foundations to his
military career.  One cannot fully appreciate either Moshe Dayan
or the development and later application of his military thought
* ZIONISM:  A Jewish movement whose expressed goal was the
settlement of and eventual creation in Palestine of a national
Jewish state.  In many respects, Zionism was the socio-political
(nationalistic) outgrowth of the ancient religious attachment of
Jews to Palestine, especially Jerusalem.  Within a European
context, Zionism was quite similar to other ethnic nationalistic
movements of the 19th century.  Those separate ethnic movements
had created the German state, unified Italy, and had
unsuccessfully pressured the European powers for an independent
Poland. Without first understanding Zionism and then recognizing how that
movement shaped Moshe Dayan's environment.
     While Theodor Herzl is recognized as the founder of the
Zionist Movement, he was neither the first Zionist nor the first
proponent of Jewish nationalism. (7)  Herzl was, however, the
first western European Jew to publicly call for the creation of
a separate and distinct Jewish state.  An Austrian Jewish
journalist, Herzl initially advocated Jewish assimilation into
European culture and society.  But in view of rising anti -
semitism following the Dreyfus Affair in France, he regarded that
goal as unrealistic.  In The Jewish State, published in 1896,
Herzl articulated the concept of political Zionism, the basic
premise of which stated that if external pressures forced Jews to
form a nation, then Jews could only live a normal existence
through concentration in one territory.  Herzl's book was not
well-received in western Europe where the political and economic
freedoms resulting from liberalism and enlightenment enabled most
Jews to assimilate into the national societies and cultures in
which they lived.  Non-Jewish western Europeans resented the book
since its philosophical premise ran counter to existing
nationalistic undercurrents.
     By the late 19th century, however, political Zionism was one
of several related philosophies that appealed to oppressed
Russian Jews. (8)  In Russia, where reactionary Tsarist
governments viewed liberalism and enlightenment as threats to
their autocratic regimes, a growing number of Jews eagerly
accepted Herzl's doctrine of a national Jewish homeland.  Unlike
western European Jews, Russian Jews had not been accepted by or
assimilated into Russian society and, classified as aliens, were
forced to live segregated lives within the "Russian Pale of
Settlement."*
     Within the Pale, most Jews lived in tightly knit, yet
impoverished communities.  While there were exceptions, Russian
Jews spoke their own language (Yiddish),**   were usually educated
in Jewish schools, practiced their distinct religion, and quietly
lived within their own economic structures.  They did not enjoy
political or legal equality with Russian peasants and merchants
living within the Pale and, from time-to-time, endured the
violence of state-sanctioned, anti-Jewish pograms.
     Before the publication of Herzl's book, Russian Jews were
divided over the proper reaction to the influences of western
European liberalism and the anti-semitic practices of Tsarist
Russia.  While generalizations are often as dangerous to make as
they are incorrect, Russian Jews in the latter half of the 19th
century can be categorized into one of three broad groups: the
secular assimi lationists, the orthodox, and the Zionists.  Each
of these groups reacted differently to liberalism and Tsarist
practices.
* RUSSIAN PALE OF SETTLEMENT:  Usually referred to as the Pale,
this was a stretch of land on the western fringe of the vast
Russian Empire where the majority of Russia's five million Jews
lived.  This area ran from the Baltic Sea in the north to the
Black Sea in the south and covered portions of the Ukraine and
what is now known as Poland.  After World War I, some of these
territories became independent nations - Poland, Lithuania,
Estonia, Latvia, etc.
** YIDDISH:  A specific dialect formed by a combination of Middle
High German, Hebrews Polish, and Russian.  Its roots can be traced
to the 13th century when Jews moved east from the Rhineland.
     Secular assimilationists did not place an inordinate amount
of faith in traditional orthodox values and hoped that the twin
spirits of liberalism and enlightenment would eventually allow
them to fully integrate into Russian society.  While the modest
reforms of Tsar Alexander II encouraged this belief, some secular
Jews viewed emigration to the west as the only means to escape
the bloom and uncertainty of life in Russia.
     Most orthodox Jews ignored state policies, endured Tsarist
practices, and rejected as religiously dangerous the secular
humanism inherent in liberalism and enlightenment.  While some
orthodox families were transitioning to either secularism or
Zionism, most religious traditionalists opposed Zionism and
condemned it as "the great Jewish heresy of the nineteenth
century." (9)  It should be noted that after the publication of
The Jewish State, most western European Jews denounced the book's
anti-assimilationist arguments and, in time, became powerful
opponents of Zionism. (10)
     But a small and increasingly vocal Jewish minority, inspired
by various messianic writings and growing nationalism, looked to
Palestine as a place where Jews might live in peace and dignity.
Although Herzl had not yet written The Jewish State, these Jews
were among the first advocates of what became political Zionism.
While their activities did not influence many of their peers,
they prepared the way for Herzl's message.
     In 1881, anarchists, three of whom bore Jewish names,
assassinated Alexander II.  This act was a turning point in both
Jewish and Russian history for it brought Alexander III to the
throne and effectively ended the meager reforms of his
predecessor.  The new Tsar's reactionary tendencies found ardent
support in his chief advisor, Konstantin Pobedonostev, a vicious
anti-semite who considered democracy a leprous disease and
autocratic theocracy the only rational foundation for government.
     Under Alexander III, the state enacted restrictive anti-
Jewish laws and officially sanctioned, or at least officially
ignored, a series of anti-Jewish pograms, the violence of which
had not been seen since the 17th century.  By the end of 1881,
these riots had mauled 225 Jewish communities and it was
estimated that mob violence left 20,000 Jews homeless,
economically ruined another 100,000, and destroyed $80 million of
Jewish property. By 1903, anti-semitic violence had swept through
most Jewish communities from Warsaw to Odessa. (11)
     Widely condemned in western Europe, this surge of anti-
semitic violence shattered Jewish hopes of assimilation and gave
impetus to two dissimilar reactions - Marxist revolution in
Russia and emigration from Russia.  As Tsarist repression also
moved against non-Jewish elements, revolutionary movements
sprang-up throughout the country.  The Tsar's policy of denying
Jews a Russian education inadvertently assisted these movements.
Those Jewish students fortunate enough to study abroad, were
exposed to liberal thought, the spirit of enlightenment, and
Marxist ideology.  Some of those students returned to Russia and,
filled with revolutionary zeal, joined the revolution.
     Most Russian Jews favored emigration from Russia over
revolution in Russia.  From 1880 to 1914, one-third of all
eastern European Jews, to include nearly two million of Russia's
five million Jews, departed for the United States. (12)  From
1882 to 1903, approximately 25,000 Russian Jews emigrated to
Palestine.  Although less than 10,000 of these early pioneers
stayed there, they comprised the first of five separate mass
Jewish migrations or Aliyah's* to Palestine.
     These immigrants had little in common with the Jewish
community that had lived for centuries in Palestine - a highly
religious community that numbered some 25,000.  First Aliyah Jews
were rebels against the conservative and anti-semitic environment
in which they were born and their departure from Russia was a
direct response to the resurgence of anti-semitic persecution.
Politically oriented and inspired with nationalistic zeal and
messianic self-fulfillment, these Jews were convinced that
regeneration was possible with a return to free and productive
labor on the soil. (13)
     Finding Palestine anything but "the promised land of milk
and honey", these struggling pioneers established agricultural
settlements.  Without organic Zionist support, these communities
were not notably successful and had it not been for Baron Edmond
de Rothschild's financial support, one wonders how many of those
settlements would have survived. (14)
     Using Rothschild's money, these Jews purchased land from
absentee Turkish landlords.  To the Arab tenant farmers, the
transfer of land from Turkish to Jewish ownership was of little
consequence since the Jews rehired them as agricultural workers.
This was due in part to Rothschild's insistence that the Jewish
* ALIYAH:  Literally meaning ascension, this term describes the
various mass migrations of Jews to Palestine.
settlers establish "european-style colonial plantations", an
arrangement that worked out nicely since the Jews, serving as
overseers, did not deprive the Arab farmers of employment.
     Despite Rothschild's assistance, life in Palestine was not
easy.  The climate was hot and muggy, disease was rampant, and
much of the land was poor.  Over time, the struggle to merely
survive exacted a physical and spiritual toll on the settlers.
By 1900, the colonists had fully integrated into the economy and,
concerned with their own needs, no longer "exclusively thought of
a national Jewish revival in Palestine." (15)  Despite this
failure, these early pioneers made an important contribution to
the eventual creation of Israel - they built a small but
permanent Jewish bridgehead in Palestine.
     As the fervor of the first Aliyah succumbed to the daily
pressures of survival, two separate yet interrelated movements
captured the imaginations of an ever-increasing number of Russian
Jews - Herzl's concept of political Zionism and Marxist
socialism. These related yet divergent movements, Jewish
nationalism and international revolution, provided the foundation
for the second mass Jewish migration to Palestine. (16)
     Following the publication of The Jewish State, Herzl
organized the World Zionist Organization which, after his death
in 1904, unified the various strands of Jewish nationalism into a
coherent movement.  While Zionism appealed to only a small
minority of Russian Jews, it provided them a viable means of
escape from autocratic Russian rule.
     At the same time, reactionary Tsarist policies alienated an
increasing number of Jewish and non-Jewish Russians.  Imbued with
Marxist idealism and revolutionary zeal, these Russians agitated
with increasing vehemence against Tsarist theocratic autocracy.
A disproportionate number of these revolutionaries were Jewish.
Comprising only four percent of Russia's population, by the early
1900's, 31 percent of all political exiles under surveillance in
Siberia were Jews.  Lenin later wrote that "Russians were too
easy going, too readily tired of the revolutionary struggle.
Jews on the other hand, with their stubbornness and fanaticism,
made excellent revolutionaries." (17)
     This agitation resulted in the Revolution of 1905.  The wave
of pograms and repressions that followed that ill-fated revolt
forced many disillusioned Jewish Marxists and Zionists to leave
Russia for Palestine.
     The differences between the First and Second Aliyahs are as
striking as they are important.  Whereas first Aliyah Jews grew
up under the rather benign rule of Alexander II and left Russia
as a result of the pograms following his assassination, Second
Aliyah Jews were raised under the harsh regimes of Alexander III
and Nicholas II.  Consequently, the Zionist and Marxist
components of the second migration were more ardent in both the
affirmation and application of their beliefs than were the
pioneers of the first Aliyah.  Their heightened sense of purpose
and the tenacity of their approach to life, society, and nation-
building, altered the relationship between Arab and Jew, and
forever changed the course of Palestine's history.  The most
pronounced impacts of the Second Aliyah were in employment and
defense.
     These Jews did not equate farming only with the production
of food.  Instead, they viewed agriculture in nationalistic
terms.  The spread of Jewish settlements would constitute a
national land reclamation program through which the future
borders of a Jewish state would be determined.
     Entering Palestine needing jobs and money, these emigres
viewed the First Aliyah's accomplishments with skepticism.
Instead of finding settlements where Jews personally worked the
soil, they found Rothschild's colonial plantations where Jews,
acting as overseers, employed Arab laborers.  Without fully
understanding the rigors faced by the earlier pioneers, Second
Aliyah Jews wondered where the idealism of the First Aliyah had
gone and, rejecting the concept of a planter society, denounced
Rothschild for removing the burden of survival from his
colonists.
     Israel Shochat was one of these newcomers and he described
his disillusionment with the way of life he found in the small
settlement of Petach Tikvah:
     Even the young people gave no hint of being involved in
     any sort of national enterprise.  They seemed like the
     children of farmers everywhere else: except that their
     main job was seeing to it that the Arabs worked
     properly.  After a week or two, my wonderment at being
     in a Jewish village in Palestine began to fade and
     blur.  The magic evaporated. ... Before dawn, hundreds
     of Arab laborers daily streamed into Petach Tikvah to
     look for work, and mostly found it.  Then there was the
     matter of language: the villagers all spoke Yiddish.
     To speak Hebrew was regarded as absurd, as a Zionist
     affectation.  And the most serious thing was that Jews
     were considered unemployable. (18)
Like other newcomers, Shochat was encouraged to go to America,
Canada, or Australia to earn enough money so that he could return
to Palestine and purchase his own orange grove.
     These Zionist-Socialists viewed personal and physical labor
as "the magic key to true perception of the self" and hence, to
self-redemption. (19)  The concept of a Jewish "planter-elite"
was anathema to their socialist ideals and they vehemently
opposed what they considered to be the exploitation of Arab
labor.  Firmly committed to creating an economically and socially
just society, Second Aliyah pioneers were determined that Jewish
self-sufficiency, not the class exploitation of native labor, was
the only rational mechanism through which a Jewish state could be
built.  If Arab labor was not exploited, they naively reasoned,
then the Arabs would not object to Zionism. (20)
     Supplied with funds from the World Zionist Organization, the
new immigrants purchased additional lands from Turkish landlords
and wealthy Arab families.  Refusing to employ native labor for
fear of perpetuating the class struggle, they established
collective settlements known as kibbutzim.*   Eventually, some of
these new pioneers became dissatisfied with the collective
regimen of kibbutzim life and formed less restrictive agrarian
settlements called moshavim.**
     However, these land purchases stripped Arab tenant farmers
and nomadic herders of their livelihood.  Understanding this
problem, Jews often paid more for the land than what the owner
* KIBBUTZ (plural kibbutzim):  A collective farming settlement
that eliminated private property, personal wealth, and, stressing
a communal life-style, observed the principles of social equality,
mutual responsibility, and direct democracy.  The first kibbutz
was established in 1909 at Deganiah, Moshe Dayan's birthplace.
** MOSHAV (plural moshavim):  Another form of pioneering
cooperative settlement that allowed settlers to own and work their
own land while sharing community resources (water and scarce farm
equipment) and services (marketing of produce).
demanded with the excess monies to be given to the displaced
peasants in compensation for the loss of "their" land.  Yet
hostilities frequently erupted between Jewish settlers and
dislocated Arabs. (21)  Thus, the creation of a class of
impoverished, landless Arabs and the naive lack of foresight on
the part of Jewish settlers contributed to the developing rift
between Arab and Jew.
     Though fostering their own nationalistic dreams, the Jews
largely ignored similar tendencies developing among the Arabs.
In 1905, Naguib Azuri, a Christian Arab, made a chilling
prediction in a book that went largely unnoticed among both the
Jewish settlers in Palestine and the leaders of the World Zionist
Organization in Europe.  Azuri wrote in Le Reveil de la Nation
Arab:
     Two important phenomenon of a singular nature and yet
     opposed, at present manifest themselves in Asian
     Turkey.  These are the awakening of the Arab nation and
     the latent effort of the Jews to reconstitute on a very
     large scale the ancient kingdom of Israel.  The two
     movements are destined to combat one another until one
     is beaten by the other. (22)
     Having taken Arab acquiescence for granted and overlooking
the possibility of native opposition, few Jews appreciated the
growing force of Arab nationalism and fewer still viewed the Arab
response to Zionism in its true perspective.  As early as 1891,
three years before the publication of Herzl's The Jewish State
and ten years after the beginning of the First Aliyah, some Arabs
had protested both the immigration to and the acquisition of land
by Jews in Palestine.  This was not a violent protest as the Arab
complaints were sent to Turkish officials in a telegram. (23)
     During the first decade of the 20th century, tensions
heightened as Jewish settlers moved inland from their coastal
conclaves.  This movement, especially to the Sea of Galilee area,
resulted in minor violence, most of which concerned grazing
rights.  Blood feuds between Arab families and confrontations
between Jewish farmers and semi-nomadic Arab herders were quite
common and, in many respects, were similar to the disputes
between cattlemen and "sod-busting" farmers in the American west.
     In 1908, the first major anti-Jewish riot occurred in the
port city of Jaffa.  In that year, a new Turkish government
abolished press censorship and almost immediately several Arab
newspapers launched editorial attacks against the Jewish
settlers.  Jews viewed both events in terms of an anti-Jewish
pogram and not as the collision of two different cultures each of
which supported separate nationalistic movements.  As Amos Elon
crisply states:
     In the first stages of their open struggle with the
     Arab nationalists, Zionists could not tear themselves
     away from European stereotypes. (24)
     Anti-Jewish violence in Palestine, when combined with bitter
memories of Russian pograms, produced the second distinguishing
characteristic of the Second Aliyah - the formation of Jewish
self-defense organizations.  However, this phenomenon had its
historical roots in Russia.
     In 1903, a group of Jews in the small Ukranian town of Gomel
organized self-defense units and defeated a mob bent on
destroying that Jewish community.  But in the aftermath of
victory, the Tsar's forces moved in and, abandoning any semblance
of neutrality, crushed the Jewish resistance.
     Four years later, one of those defenders helped organize the
first Jewish self-defense unit in Palestine.  Israel Shochat left
Russia soon after his experience in Gomel and, upon arriving in
Palestine, was impressed with the warrior spirit of the
Circassians.*   Shochat believed that Jews could learn a great
deal from the Circassian example:
     Here they were, a tiny minority in the sea of Arabs,
     and none-the-less, they had managed to earn an
     honorable position for themselves.  They had rooted
     themselves in the land, they had set up their own
     villages; perhaps all was not lost for us yet.  It was
     possible, after all, I thought, to strengthen
     ourselves, to settle and to hold on to the land, to
     force our Arab neighbors to respect us.  But for this
     we ourselves needed to be brave, and to persevere. (25)
     In September 1907, Israel Shochat and nine other men met in a
candle-lit, upper-story room of an old house in Jaffa and formed
the Bar-Giora.**  These men recognized that the creation of a
Jewish state was dependent upon two separate, yet interrelated
tasks.  First, the "conquest of Jewish labor" was of the utmost
importance, for without Jewish workers there could be no Jewish
homeland.  Given the rise of anti-Jewish sentiments in the
surrounding Arab community, they also believed that it was both
the right and the duty of Jewish settlers to defend themselves.
These men drafted a program that favored Jewish self-defense,
* CIRCASSIANS:  A people originally brought to Palestine from the
northeast coast of the Black Sea by Abdul Hamid in the second half
of the 19th century.  However, the Circassians defended themselves
so well against attacks from Bedouin bandits, that their fighting
skills won them the reputation of fierce warriors.  Arabs and Jews
were so impressed with their martial talents that they frequently
hired Circassians as guards and watchmen.
** BAR-GIORA:  The first of several Jewish self-defense forces
established prior to Israel's War for Independence.  This
organization was named after Simon Bar-Giora, leader of the
Jewish revolt against Rome from 66 to 70 A.D.
especially with regard to a Jewish militia, and advocated active
participation in Socialist-Zionist education through which
workers would be unified in a common purpose. (26)  Following the
meeting, the ten men swore "By blood and fire, Judea fell;
through blood and fire, Judea shall rise again."  Yitshaq Ben-
Zvi, a future president of Israel, later wrote of that night:
     We felt we were standing before Mount Sinai at the
     Giving of the Law, and all of us were ready to
     sacrifice ourselves.  We knew that words would not
     rebuild the nation, only our deeds. (27)
     Moving to Galilee, the Bar-Giora offered contracted security
services to Jewish settlements in the area.  However, only those
villages that relied on Jewish labor could hire the Bar-Giora.
following several encounters with Bedouin bandits, outlaws that
raided Jewish and Arab villages, Shochat petitioned Zionist
leaders for money and weapons. (28)  While proving the validity
of its concept of self-defense, the Bar-Giora never expanded its
protective role beyond a few villages in upper Palestine.
     In April 1909, the Bar-Giora decided that their secret
society was neither sufficiently strong nor politically active
enough to become a force of national significance.  Consequently,
they reorganized and called themselves the Hashomer.*  Despite its
small size and limited abilities, the Hashomer represented the
first melding of Jewish para-military force to a set of vaguely
defined national objectives. (29)  Clarifying the relationship
between self-defense and the creation of new social and national
values, the Hashomer is military mission was "to make the entire
* HASHOMER:  In English, Hashomer means "watchmen". This was the
second Jewish self-defense force established in Palestine.
Jewish population conscious of the needs, and implications, of
self-defense." (30)
     In addition to establishing and defending kibbutzim in
Palestine, the Hashomer actively linked the spread of Jewish
settlements with the principles of nation-building and national
defense.  A leading Marxist force, the Hashomer's political
mission "was the establishment of the dictatorship of an agrarian
proletariat based in fortified collectives (which were) to serve
as the vanguard of the Socialist-Zionist movement." (31)
     However, the Hashomer's increasingly militant leftist
tendencies alienated a growing number of Jewish leaders.  David
Ben-Gurion was one of those leaders who had renounced his earlier
faith in radical Marxist-Socialism and had grown increasingly
distrustful of the para-military organization.  This, when
combined with Turkey's outlawing of the Hashomer during the war
and the organization's inability to effectively protect Jewish
interests in Palestine during the Arab Riots of 1920, culminated
in a split between the Yishuv and the Hashomer and led to that
organization's ultimate demise. (32)
     Before discussing Jewish participation in World War I and
the establishment of the British Mandate in Palestine, it is
necessary to reintroduce Moshe Dayan into this stream of history.
While Moshe was born after the Second Aliyah had ended, both of
his parents were among the 40,000 Jews that entered Palestine
during that migration.  Shmuel and Dvorah came from divergent
family backgrounds and each arrived in Palestine with different
expectations.  Together, Moshe's parents embodied the two driving
forces behind the Second Aliyah - Zionism and Marxist-Socialism.
	Born in 1890, Shmuel Dayan came from an impoverished family
of orthodox Jews living in Zaskow, a small Ukrainian town near
Kiev.  At one time, Shmuel's family had been quite prominent in
religious circles.  His great grandfather had been a dayan - a
religious or rabbinical judge - and it was that man who gave the
family its name.  Despite his family's poverty, Shmuel learned to
read and write Russian, Hebrew, and, of course, Yiddish.
     In keeping with tradition, Shmuel's father maintained a
strict, religious home.  However, this struggling merchant was
one of a growing number of orthodox Jews who viewed Zionism with
lessening skepticism.  Among the sacred writings in the family
library, young Shmuel found Zionist pamphlets and copies of ihe
Zionist Worker, a Labor-Zionist newspaper describing the Jewish
struggle in Palestine.  During the dark days of pograms and
repressions following the 1905 Revolution, Shmuel read a
particularly inspirational appeal from Palestine.  Reflecting on
life in Russia, Shmuel later wrote that the pamphlet's message
was "a consolation to an aching soul." (33)  In 1908, against the
wishes of their father, Shmuel and his older brother Eliyahu left
for Palestine as ardent Zionists.
     But each brother expressed his Zionist fervor differently.
Eliyahu "resolutely turned his beliefs into practice" and refused
"to engage in political activities", establishing a farm before
sending for his wife and children. (34)  Shmuel was more
interested in politics and public affairs than he was in farming.
After arriving in Jaffa, he wrote for a Hebrew Labor Movement
newspaper and became an active member of that that political
party.  Within a year, he purchased an old Turkish pistol and
left the coastal plains for Galilee where he hired himself out as
a guard for a Jewish farm. (35)
     In 1911, Shmuel joined a group of young pioneers who had
recently established the kibbutz at Deganiah.  While living at
Deganiah, Shmuel participated in an endless series of political
debates that alienated many of his peers.  This alienation was
caused by his debating style and by his expressed dissatisfaction
with rigid collectivism.  After the war, Shmuel helped found the
first moshav at Nahalal.  Additionally, Shmuel worked in the
fields by day, guarded the settlement by night, and, in response
to a Hashomer request, protected neighboring villages where he
helped drive "away the local Arabs who tried to harvest wheat in
the settlement fields." (36)
     Moshe's mother, Dvorah Zatulovsky, was born in 1890 in the
Ukranian village of Prochorovka.  Unlike her future husband,
Dvorah came from a wealthy secular family and had been given a
Russian education. (37)  Although her father had pro-Zionist
tendencies, Dvorah did not share his interests in either that
movement or in Hebrew culture.  Instead, she was caught up in the
revolutionary fervor of the times and, devoting "herself to the
movement for the emancipation of the proletariat", she joined the
student faction of Lenin's Social Democratic Party. (38)
     After serving as a volunteer nurse in the Balkan War of
1911-1912, she grew dissatisfied with the progress of the
revolutionary struggle in Russia while becoming increasingly
aware of her Jewish heritage.  After reading several letters
written to her father by Zionists, she decided that Palestine "is
where the workers of my people are.  I shall join them." (39)
Like Shmuel's father, Dvorah's parents were dismayed with her
decision.
     After initially meeting in 1913, Shmuel and Dvorah, the
Zionist and the fading Marxist, were married in the autumn of
1914.  In May of the following year, Moshe was born.
     While World War I halted Zionist work in Palestine, the
conflagration provided the movement with a golden opportunity.
Since most Zionists believed that the Ottoman Empire would not
survive the war and since, as a member of the Central Powers,
Turkey was at war with England, the World Zionist Organization
moved its headquarters from Berlin to Copenhagen and later to
London.  Influential Jewish leaders like Dr. Chaim Weizmann, an
English chemist and future leader of the World Zionist
Organization, believed that the only Zionists who would have any
influence by the time of the peace settlement would be Zionists
who had taken a side: the one that proved to be a winner." (40)
     Dr. Welzmann and the British government developed a
symbiotic relationship as each party possessed something the
other desperately needed.  Weizmann, the Anglophile, recognized
that Britain was the only major European power with territorial
holdings and vital strategic interests in the Middle East.  He
correctly reasoned that Britain might support the establishment
of a friendly Jewish community in Palestine and might, therefore,
support Zionist goals.  The British increasingly viewed the Arabs
and the Jews as potential allies in a post-war struggle to stymie
french ambitions in the Middle East.  Possessing solid
connections in the British government and fully understanding
British Middle-Eastern concerns, Dr. Weizmann urged Lloyd
George's government to establish a national Jewish homeland in
Palestine. (41)
     In 1916, Britain and France concluded a secret agreement
outlining their intentions regarding the post-war disposition of
the Ottoman Empire.  Known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the
document initially called for the internationalization of
Palestine, the creation of French protectorates in Lebanon and
Syria, and British control of Mesopotamia (modern Iraq).  Growing
increasingly concerned about post-war French intentions in the
region, the British began exploring ways in which they could
thwart French aims while protecting their own strategic
interests.  Of vital concern to them was the post-war disposition
of Palestine. (42)
     In pursuing this objective, the British had already engaged
the Arabs in a revolt against the Turks.  In return, they
indicated that the Empire might support the creation of an
independent Arab kingdom in Palestine.  The Arabs interpreted
this "indication" as a direct British promise. (43)
     The British also enlisted Jewish assistance in both the war
against the Central Powers and in their gambit against the
French.  However, British Middle-Eastern policies did not
completely coincide with Zionist intentions.  Joseph Trumpeldor
and Vladimir Jabotinsky offered to raise all-Jewish units to
fight for the British in Palestine. (44)  These Russian-born Jews
believed that the establishment of a Jewish homeland was the
first step toward the eventual creation of an independent Jewish
state.  They argued that the Yishuv must abandon its passive
posture since "only if the Jews fought for Palestine .. . would
they be able to stake a claim to it come peace." (45)  Sensing
potential problems, the British rejected the offer and instead
formed the Zion Mule Corps.  Serving with distinction at Galipoli
in 1915, this 650-man unit was disbanded in 1916 when it refused
to quell anti-British riots in Ireland.
     With help from Dr. Weizmann, Trumpeldor and Jabotinsky
convinced Lloyd George's cabinet to form the Jewish Legion.
Eventually, three Jewish battalions were raised, two of which
fought in Palestine under British command.  While fewer than 5000
Jews served in the Legion, the formation of that unit was an
important accomplishment since it "signaled the official
emergence of the Jewish people from their traditional state of
neutrality" and, to Zionists, it was the first  expression of the
British commitment to the Zionist cause." (46)  On a more
practical level, members of the Jewish Legion received valuable
military training and combat experience, and some of those
veterans eventually joined Jewish para-military units in
Palestine.
     In the diplomatic arena, the British, following heated
negotiations with Dr. Weizmann, issued the Balfour Declaration on
2 November 1917.  The British hoped to use this document for
propaganda purposes. (47)  First, they hoped that the declaration
would rally Jewish opinion, especially in the United States, to
the side of the allies.  After the capture of Jerusalem in
December 1917, the British covertly distributed leaflets among
Jewish soldiers in Central European countries that stated the
Allies were giving "the land of Israel back to the children of
Israel."  finally, given their strategic concerns in the region,
the British hoped that the declaration would lead to the
settlement in Palestine of a Jewish population attached to
Britain through ties of sentiment and common interests.
     The Balfour Declaration was a masterpiece of carefully
worded ambiguity, and hence could and was misinterpreted by Arabs
and Jews alike.  The second of its three paragraphs stated:
     His Majesty's Government views with favour the
     establishment in Palestine of a national home for the
     Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to
     facilitate the achievement of this object, it being
     clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may
     prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing
     non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and
     political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.
     While most Jews overestimated the importance of the Balfour
Declaration, the Arabs interpreted its vague phrases in the most
extreme context possible. (48)  However, after receiving Allied
endorsement at the San Remo Conference of 1920, the document
became an instrument of British and international policy.
Influenced by the altruistic concepts embodied in the
declaration, in 1922 the League of Nations officially granted
Britain a mandate over Palestine. (49)
     But this official action ignored the powerful nationalistic
undercurrents in Palestine.  Arab nationalists wanted immediate
independence and viewed the Balfour Declaration and the Sykes-
Picot Agreement as British attempts to nullify their pledge to
support an independent Arab-Palestinian state. (50)  Zionist
leaders in Palestine wanted to cultivate conditions conducive to
the development of a Jewish state and, holding "no illusions
about British intentions" decided to "use the Balfour Declaration
for their own needs." (51)
     The British, and to some extent the French, sought to
strengthen their respective strategic and economic positions in
the Middle East largely at the expense of Arab interests.  Thus,
as early as 1919, the stage was set and the principle players,
each having established their mutually exclusive objectives,
began a 30 year drama that eventually resulted in the ousting of
European power from Palestine, the creation of a Jewish state,
and the tragic deepening of Arab-Jewish hostilities.
     Many European Jews viewed the Balfour Declaration as a
godsend and it was that document, the dislocations caused by war,
and the disastrous Russian Revolution and the ensuing civil war
that provided the basis for the Third Aliyah.  Lasting until
1924, this migration brought over 35,000 Jews to Palestine and
breathed renewed life into the Zionist movement there. (52)
     Increased Jewish immigration, when combined with what Arab
nationalists viewed as British duplicity regarding the formation
of an independent Arab state, resulted in the Arab Riots of 1920-
1921.  This rioting was partly fueled by the pro-Arab stance of
the British military government in Palestine - a position rooted
in traditional, yet benign, English anti-semitism.  Following an
inflammatory speech by the British Governor of Jerusalem, Arabs
attacked the Jewish quarter in the Old City of Jerusalem. (53)
Arab police sided with the rioters and had to be disarmed and
withdrawn.  In direct violation of British regulations, Vladimir
Jabotinsky organized Jewish self-defense units and he and his
principle supporters were disarmed, arrested, and jailed. (54)
     Rioting spread to other areas of Palestine, to include
Jaffa, the principle port through which Jews entered the region.
Anxious to remove European influence from northern Palestine,
Arabs attacked Jewish settlements in the Sea of Galilee area and
in so doing, they inadvertently provided the Yishuv with its
first national folk hero.  Joseph Trumpeldor, hero and co-founder
of the Jewish Legion, led Jewish settlers in a determined but
futile defense of Tel Hai.  Killed after a valiant stand,
Trumpeldor's dying words were alleged to have been "It is good to
die for our country." (55)  His death and the popular mythology
surrounding the destruction of Tel Hai fired the resolve of
future Jewish defenders.
     Zionists viewed these riots as an anti-semitic pogram and
accused the British of not doing enough to halt them.  Although
largely directed against Jews, these attacks were part of a
larger movement choreographed by Arab nationalists opposed to
European domination.  During the summer of 1920, 90,000 British
troops crushed a revolt in Iraq and by 1925, the French used an
even larger force to quell a similar rebellion in Syria. (56)
     The Arab Riots profoundly affected Palestine and seriously
damaged the already sensitive relationships between Arabs, Jews,
and the British. (57)  In the summer of 1920, British military
rule was replaced with Sir Herbert Samuel's civilian
administration.  A British Jew, Samuel believed that Arab
aspirations and Zionist aims were not mutually exclusive and that
both movements could be satisfied within the framework of the
British Mandate.
     After legalizing Jewish immigration and approving further
land sales to Zionists, Samuel pardoned Jabotinsky and the Arab
leaders of the recent riots.  His administration also established
a Palestinian Constitution that authorized the formation of an
elected assembly.  While comprising less than 15% of Palestine's
population, the Yishuv accepted the concept of representative
government and viewed increased immigration as the key to future
political survival.  The Arabs, distrusting British intentions
and committed to a policy of non-cooperation as long as the
Balfour Declaration was not revoked, rejected the proposal.
Although the Arab community was divided by factional and inter-
family political strife, Haj Amin al-Husseini, the Grand Mufti of
Jerusalem, served as that community's principal political and
religious spokesman.
     Unable to establish a cooperative Palestinian state, Samuel
authorized Arabs and Jews to form separate governing agencies
through which each community could manage its own affairs.  While
this political partition led to nearly a decade of peace, the
formation of parallel governments increased Arab and Jewish
alienation as each community pursued its nationalistic goals
largely at the expense of each other.
     These separatist tendencies gained additional momentum
through Samuel's unwillingness to show favoritism to either side.
Refusing to placate either community by acquiescing to their
major, and usually unreasonable demands, the British sought to
defuse tensions by granting minor concessions to both sides.  As
would be expected, these concessions never violated British
strategic interests and security concerns in the region.
     In 1922, the British Colonial Office issued the first of
several White Papers regarding Palestine.  A document that sought
to placate both communities, it suffered a fate typical of most
compromise policies.  Refusing to repudiate the Balfour
Declaration, the paper did separate the Trans-Jordan from
Palestine.  While this angered the Jews, it did not satisfy Arab
demands that England honor its promise to support an independent
Arab state.  Although the paper officially limited Jewish
immigration based upon the "absorptive capacity" of the region, a
move that dismayed the Yishuv, the document failed to meet Arab
demands that all Jewish immigration be halted.
     In January 1922, the Arabs formed the Supreme Muslim council
led by Haj Amin al-Husseini , the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem.  Soft-
spoken, blue-eyed, well-groomed, and resembling "Alec Guinness
dressed as an Arab", the British granted Haj Amin political,
financial, and legal powers over Palestinian Muslim affairs.
Samuel's administration granted Haj Amin these powers for two
reasons.  Not only did the Mandate want to develop a more
cooperative working relationship with the Arab community, the
authorities also hoped that this move would soften Haj Amin's
militant political views.  However, this gambit failed backfired.
Now possessing formidable political and religious influence, Haj
Amin became the most powerful and important Arab in Palestine - a
position he used to further his nationalist agenda. (58)
     The Yishuv was concerned over this turn of events.  Fearing
his militant tendencies, Jews believed Haj Amin to have been the
instigator of the riots and blamed the British for his rise to
power.
     The Arab Riots also produced far-reaching changes within the
Yishuv.  Given Britain's inability to protect Jewish interests
during the riots and the Hashomer's meager performance, the
Yishuv reevaluated its self-defense policies.  Inexorably linked
to self-defense was the strategy of nation-building.  One
particularly candid Jewish activist argued:
     We cannot claim what we cannot defend.  There are no
     borders.  There is no problem here of local defense.
     If we fall in Galilee, we shall also fall in the
     (Negev) desert.  If we leave Tel Hai ... history will
     record that this was our first retreat. (59)
     Trumpeldor's death, the loss of Tel Hai, and the destruction
of other farming settlements, to include Moshe Dayan's new home
at Deganiah B, underscored the need for a national defense
organization. (60)  However, the successful defense of other
communities reemphasized the advantages of a cooperative self-
defense strategy based on an available, mobile, armed, and fully-
trained militia capable of protecting Jewish lives and property
throughout Palestine.  In 1920, Jewish leaders abolished the
politically radical and militarily ineffective Hashomer,
expressed their dissatisfaction with the Labor and Defense
Battalions*, and called for the creation of a nation-wide Jewish
self-defense force.  The following year, the Haganah**  was
organized.
     In addition to reevaluating the tactics of self-defense and
the strategy of nation-building, the Yishuv addressed political
and economic affairs.  British policy regarding the formation of
* LABOR AND DEFENSE BATTALIONS:  Established by Trumpeldor, the
Gdud Ha'Avoda were designed to promote the development of the
Jewish state through civil construction projects and, as
envisioned by Trumpeldor, these units were to serve as a "people's
militia".
** HAGANAH:  Literally meaning "defense" in Hebrew, the Haganah
was the third, most famous, and most successful of Israel is pre-
independence defense organizations.
Arab and Jewish governments within the Mandate legitimized both
the existence and functions of the Jewish Agency.*  Formerly
known as the Zionist Executive, the Jewish Agency had already
begun to coordinate the actions of Weizmann's World Zionist
Organization with those of the Yishuv.  During the next 25 years,
the Agency formed a shadow government within Palestine and
established national policies regarding fund raising,
immigration, weapons procurement, and the use of military force.
     The Yishuv also founded the Histadrut**.  Embracing all
aspects of Jewish labor to include trade unions and agrarian
collectives, the Histadrut's function was "to consolidate and
politically centralize the work of the pioneers." (61)
     Frequently hailed as Israel's founding fathers, Second and
Third Aliyah Jews were directly responsible for establishing the
Jewish Agency, the Histadrut, and the Haganah.  These
institutions provided the lasting political, economic, and
military foundations upon which both a national character and a
national state were constructed.  Although later migrations
augmented Jewish ranks, those immigrants conformed to the
patterns of social and political life established during the
years 1904 to 1924. (62)  By the mid-1920's, the organizational
* JEWISH AGENCY:  Formerly known as the Zionist Commission or the
Zionist Executive, this organization was responsible to the World
Zionist Organization for all Jewish matters in Palestine.
Officially recognized under the Mandate Charter (Article 4), the
British allowed the organization to govern Jewish Palestinians.
** HISTADRUT:  The General federation of Jewish Labor was an
economic and political organization designed to promote the
formation of the Jewish state through the consolidation and
unification of all Jewish workers, political parties, and interest
groups.
embryo of a Jewish state had been formed.
     But Zionists were not as politically or as philosophically
united as one might imagine. (63)  The Arab Riots, the lackluster
British response to chose disturbances, and the Yishuv's distrust
of British objectives, split the movement into three camps.  As
President of the World Zionist Organization, Dr. Weizmann was
primarily concerned with the political processes leading to the
eventual formation of a Jewish state.  Headquartered in London,
Weizmann was a confirmed gradualist who maintained that a Jewish
state could be developed only within the framework of British
guidance and support.
     While endorsing Weizmann's gradualism, David Ben-Gurion was
a political pragmatist who was convinced that Jews must rely on
their own abilities and resources in constructing a nation.  As
the future leader of the Jewish Agency, he viewed nation-building
in tactical terms and argued that the Yishuv must not depend
exclusively on external, and frequently restrictive, British
support.  Through his hard work and grass-roots activism, Ben-
Gurion obtained the political experience necessary to eventually
assume the mantle of Jewish leadership from Dr. Weizmann.
     While both men agreed on the ultimate goal, their different
perspectives led to disagreements concerning the specific means
required to achieve that end.  Those differences, however, were
insignificant when compared to Vladimir Jabotinsky's tactical
approach to achieve his strategic goals.  Having already run
afoul of British authority, Jabotinsky rejected the concept of a
geographic partition of Palestine, recoiled at the thought of
cooperating with the British, and believed that the Jewish state
must encompass all of pre-1922 Palestine to include the Trans-
Jordan.  He advocated a policy of mass migration as a means to
create a Jewish majority in Palestine.  Somewhat of a cultural
supremacist, Jabotinsky, in response to moderates who feared that
his policies would lead all-out war with the Arabs, rhetorically
asked "whether during the colonization of America or Australia
anyone had bothered to beg the native's for permission." (64)
     Forming the Revisionist Party* in 1925, Jabotinsky's
extreme, nationalistic sabre-rattlings produced few die-hard
converts.  While his political influence waned during the uneasy
peace of 1922 through 1928, his radical pronouncements concerned
both the Arabs and Jewish moderates.  Ultimately losing control
of his movement to younger and more aggressive Jewish
nationalists in the late 1930's, his brand of militant
nationalism captured the imaginations of less restrained
individuals and led to the formation of two terrorist gangs - the
Irgun and the Stern Gang - that openly warred against British
rule and defied Ben-Gurion's policies of structured nation-
building.
     From 1922 through 1928, Palestine enjoyed relative peace as
Arabs and Jews managed an uneasy coexistence.  But in August
1929, anti-Jewish violence broke out once again.  Primarily an
* REVISIONIST PARTY:  Unlike its Social-Zionist counterparts,
this political organization did not envision the creation of a
Socialist Jewish commonwealth based on a cooperative economic
structure.  Rather, it campaigned for the creation of a political
democracy with a strong capitalist economy.  Revisionists also
preached a vigorous form of nationalism and believed that the
borders of the eventual Jewish state must coincide with the
borders of ancient Israel - a territory that would include much
of modern Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan.
expression of Arab nationalism, this renewed violence was
preceded by a vigorous propaganda campaign that alleged the Jews
were a threat to Moslem Holy Places.  Carefully orchestrating
this religious campaign in mosques and the Arab press, Haj Amin,
the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, united Arab factions under his
spiritual and political leadership.  Following a series of
religious disputes in Jerusalem, Arab mobs attacked Jews in that
city.  These riots soon spilled into the surrounding countryside
and, eventually engulfing most of Palestine, produced a level of
violence that surpassed the riots of 1920 and 1921. (65)
     Lacking sufficient troops to effectively control the
situation, the British were unable to protect every Jewish
community   The Jews also lacked sufficient self-defense
resources and, recognizing that their best chance for survival
"lay in banding together in exclusively Jewish settlements and
neighborhoods," the Yishuv abandoned communities located in
predominantly Arab towns.  Since many Jews no longer trusted
British intentions in Palestine, England's inability to protect
every Jewish settlement provided the basis for the Yishuv's
perception that the British military had been unwilling to halt
the riots. (66)
     While popular history explains the 1929 riots as an Arab
react ion against Jewish immigration, there were other more
fundamental, yet subtle, causal factors.  Ironically, Arabs and
Jews agreed on one key point.  British attempts to placate Arab
opinion, especially with regard to the Trans-Jordan, led some
Arab nationalists and many Jewish leaders to assume that London
was retreating from its pro-Zionist policies.  This belief, when
combined with British troop reductions in Palestine, created an
attitude among competing Arab nationalists that Britain might be
unwilling to use military force to protect the Jews. (67)
     Although badly battered, the Yishuv survived the ordeal of
1929, primarily because British troops intervened and
reestablished order.  However, because the British were unable to
promptly react to every Arab attack, the Jews resolved to
strengthen their own defensive arrangements and practices.
     In the autumn of 1929, the Haganah began operating out of
Moshe's village of Nahalal and, at the age of 14, Moshe joined
that organization.  An early photograph shows a lean, dark-haired
boy standing in a jaunty pose, his characteristic smile drooping
sarcastically across his face.  Spending most of the remaining 52
years of his life learning and practicing the art of war, by the
time of his death in 1981 Moshe Dayan was hailed as Israel's most
brilliant warrior.
     Unfortunately, all too many military buffs dismiss as
unimportant the socio-political foundations upon which military
careers are based.  By refusing to examine these non-military
influences and forgetting that military concepts are neither
created nor applied in a vacuum, these individuals fail to
understand the essential link between a society's perception of
its environment and its use of military force.
     This is especially important with respect to Moshe Dayan.
To him, the history of Palestine from 1915 through 1929 was not
history at all.  Rather, it was part of his life and it was
difficult for him to view those years with scholarly detachment.
Although based on fact, his perceptions of those eventful years
were influenced by the environment in which he was raised - an
environment that emphasized the teachings and historical
justification of Zionism.
     While the roots of that environment predated his birth by at
least 40 years, Moshe's parents established the quality and
structure of his early life.  Energetic members of the Second
Aliyah, Shmuel and Dvorah Dayan were living examples of Zionism
in action.  A political activist, Shmuel worked in Jaffa and
Jerusalem for the World Zionist Organization, served on the
Zionist Agricultural Committee, briefly worked in the Labor
Battalions, was offered a position in the Agricultural Center of
the Histadrut, and was a founding member of the moshav settlement
at Nahalal .  While the responsibilities of motherhood curtailed
her political activities, Dvorah was a delegate to the Woman's
Labor Council and worked for the Bureau for the Location of
Relatives. (68)
     Shmuel's letters to his wife and son reinforced the twin
concepts of Zionism and a Jewish nation.  In 1919 he wrote:
     Let us live in the great hope that lights the path of
     our nation and find strength together ... in this our
     country that our hands shall conquer.
In 1921, Shmuel wrote his son:
     And when was this land plowed by Jews?  A great many
     years ago ... two thousand years ago, the Jews were
     driven out of this land and went into exile.  Since
     then they have not dared to return to our country ... I
     yearned for this land, to conquer it once again. (69)
     Having been born in Palestine and raised by active Zionists
who spoke of "our land", "our country", and "our nation", Moshe's
perception of himself was more than merely a "Jew living in his
homeland."  When he joined the Haganah in 1929, Moshe Dayan, like
his predecessors in the Bar-Giora and the Hashomer, began serving
his people and protecting his land and took his first step toward
becoming a defender of his nation.
     Like other Jews, Moshe followed with great interest the
progress of the British Royal Commission sent to Palestine to
investigate the disturbances.  The hearings were widely covered
in the local press and guests visiting the Dayans remembered that
Moshe could:
     quote everything that had been said at the Royal
     Commission, adding his own comments on who testified
     well, which testimony might cause harm to Jewish
     interests and which might benefit them.  He lived the
     entire affair. (TO)
     The Riots of 1929, the White Paper of 1930, the widespread
Jewish belief that the British had not done enough to protect
their lives and property during the violence, and the perception
that Britain was changing its policies concerning a Jewish
homeland, taught Moshe that the Yishuv must become self-
sufficient and that future Jewish survival could not be based
entirely on external, British protection. (71)  This belief in
self-sufficiency eventually evolved into a strong distrust of
foreign governments and a skeptical view of their ultimate
reliability.
     Although he was the product of an environment already
engaged in nationalistic competition with the Arabs, Moshe Dayan
broke from the prejudicial confines of that environment.  Viewing
Arabs through the eyes of a Russian Jew, Shmuel Dayan believed
and tried to raise young Moshe to believe "that the Arabs were by
nature men of violence, marauders, and a source of disturbances."
As a youngster, Moshe mingled and became friends with Arabs from
surrounding villages and encampments and sharply disputed his
father's opinion.  From his boyhood days, he found it easy to get
along with Arabs and while he defended his village's land against
individual Arab trespassers, his attitude toward the Arabs as a
people:
     was always positive and friendly.  I liked their
     way of life and I respected them as hard workers,
     devoted to the land and to our common natural
     environment.  I had no doubt that it was possible
     to live at peace with them.  (72)
     This unusually liberal and enlightened attitude was
demonstrated on repeated occasions.  In 1935, Moshe was involved
in a dispute with neighboring Arabs concerning grazing rights.
The dispute turned violent and Moshe was injured by a boyhood
Arab friend.  Six months later, Moshe not only invited the Arab
and his family to his wedding, but made the unprecedented move of
inviting the entire Arab vilage. (73)
     Moshe's ability to understand, feel compassion for, and
negotiate with Arabs, set him apart from many of his peers and
provided Israel with a valuable asset during times of war and
times of peace.  It is interesting to note that Moshe Dayan was
one of the few important Jewish military and political leaders
who bothered to learn Arabic.  While defending his nation's
right to exist, he refused to ignore the plight of Arabs caught
in the crossfire of war and eventually formulated a most
controversial peace initiative now known as the "Open Bridges
Policy." (74)  As his biographer Shabtai Teveth records:
     it was only the quirks of history and the bitter
     destiny of the Jewish people that placed him at the
     head of troops who recurrently fought the Arabs. (75)
     Thus, the initial foundations of Moshe Dayan's military
career were laid during the first fourteen years of his life, a
period in which he saw no military service.
                            CHAPTER II
     THE HAGANAH AND THE EMERGENCE Of MOSHE DAYAN: 1930-1941
     If the years prior to 1929 were characterized by the
development of the economic and political foundations required to
create the Jewish state, then the years through 1948 were
characterized by the development of the military forces needed to
secure and defend that state.  To Moshe Dayan, those years were
crucial to his development as a professional soldier and formed
the environment in which he developed the standards of excellence
by which he judged himself and measured others.
     Creating a natiohal military force was an arduous task that
evoked considerable debate and forced Jewish leaders to make
several controversial decisions.  Debates centered on three
separate, yet interrelated issues: establishing and clarifying
the relationship between civilian authority and the military,
changing military doctrine, and the proper use of military force
to secure national objectives.  As always, political realities
greatly influenced these decisions which, in turn, produced
actions that modified political behavior.
     The Riots of 1929 had an even more profound affect on
Palestine than did the violence of 1920-1921.  The bloodshed
widened the chasm between Arabs and Jews, hardened each group's
attitude, increased their suspicions concerning British Mandate
policies and the Empire's regional intentions, and gave rise to
militant elements within both communities.
     Having incorrectly assumed that Britain would not intervene
on behalf of the Jews, Arab nationalists were angered by what
they viewed as the use of external military force to rescue
Zionism in Palestine.  While the British blamed Haj Amin for not
having exerted his influence to halt the riots, they refused to
accuse him of instigating the violence.  This refusal
strengthened the Mufti's position as the most powerful political,
religious, and nationalist Arab leader in Palestine. (1)
     The British formed two Royal Commissions to investigate the
violence and then published the White Paper of 1930.  Blaming the
riots on Jewish immigration and Jewish land purchases, the
Passfield Paper recommended that the Mandate restrict both
activities.  Never mentioning the Balfour Declaration, the paper
proposed forming a Palestinian legislative council - an elected
assembly - with Jewish and Arab  representation based on their
population strengths.  Since the White Paper recommended
restricting Jewish immigration, Zionists rejected the proposed
council.  Arab nationalists aso rejected the concept for two
reasons; they did not trust British intentions and, they did not
want to be viewed as cooperating with the British in the
construction of a non-Arab Palestinian state.  More important,
the document suggested that Britain had conflicting obligations
regarding the Arab and Jewish communities and hinted that the
Empire had already discharged its responsibilities concerning a
Jewish homeland. (2)
     Vacillating British policy, when combined with Jewish
suspicions regarding London's resolve to forcefully suppress the
riots, worried and infuriated the Yishuv.  This reaction produced
additional casualties.  Although angered over the White Paper,
Dr. Weizmann still encouraged continued reliance on Britain.  As
a result, his popularity and political influence within the
Yishuv declined and these reversals led to David Ben-Gurion's
emergence as the leader of Jewish Palestine.  Additionally,
Jewish groups advocating reconciliation with the Arabs found the
political environment too hostile to support their tentative
efforts. (3)
     Although formed in the early 1920's, the Haganah was ill-
equipped and too poorly organized to effectively protect the
Yishuv during the Riots of 1929.  The relative calm of the late
1920's had lulled the Jewish community into a sense of false
security and, complacent about self-defense, Jews provided the
Haganah with minimal financial support. (4)  This lack of
preparedness and the renewal of anti-Jewish violence resulted in
a reorganization of and an eventual split within the Haganah.
Relinquishing control of the Haganah, the Histadrut made the
Jewish Agency responsible for the defense organization.  With
emotions running high and not wanting the Haganah to be
controlled by factional interest groups, the Haganah was placed
under the direct control of a 5-man bi-partisan committee
composed of 2 representatives from socialist parties, 2 men from
non-socialist groups, and a neutral chairman.
     But even this act of consensus did not prevent the formation
of separate para-military organizations that pursued national
objectives defined by their political masters.  Rational military
actions are not executed in a vacuum.  Instead, they are the
physical manifestations of political necessity and national
policy.  Since there was no nation and hence, no binding
consensus regarding "national" policies and objectives, the
growing rift between the Ben-Gurion/Weizmann moderates and
Jabotinsky's ultra-nationalistic Revisionists split the Yishuv.
This crack in the political structure produced a similar split
within the Haganah which, in turn, led to the formation of a
rival, para-military organization, the Irgun Zvai Leumi*,  in
1931.  (5)  Never attracting a sizable following, the Irgun
created problems for Ben-Gurion and the Jewish Agency from the
instant of its creation until its demise in 1948.
     Despite the Irgun and although it was still in its infancy,
the Haganah now had the popular support, the political backing,
and the funding necessary to strengthen its organization, expand
its scope of operations, and emerge as the national instrument of
self-defense.  Working clandestinely under the direct supervision
of the Jewish Agency, the Haganah participated in illegal
immigration operations, weapons purchases, and recruitment
activities.  These operations were essential elements of an
overall policy designed to enhance Jewish self-defense
capabilities and strengthen the foundations upon which a future
Jewish state could be constructed.
     While the British did not implement the recommendations
contained in the White Paper of 1930, a failure that convinced
Arab nationalists that favorable concessions made to them could
always be annulled by Zionist pressure in London, the British did
* IRGUN ZVAI LEUMI:  Referred to as the IRGUN, in Hebrew the
phrase is translated "National Military Organization."  While not
gaining much recognition until the post-World War II struggle with
Britain, this organization refused to accept Ben-Gurion's policies
and directly violated the Yishuv's policy of self-restraint
through its attacks on non-combatant Arabs.
attempt to limit Jewish immigration.  These restrictions came at
a time when Jews, in ever-increasing numbers, were fleeing Nazi
Germany and her neighboring Central European countries.  Early
on, the Nazi regime "worked" with the Jewish Agency on
immigration issues and between 1933 and 1939, nearly 50,000 Jews
fled the Reich and sought refuge in Palestine. (6)
     While not baring wealthy Jews from entering Palestine, the
Mandate strictly regulated the number of impoverished Jews
a lowed to enter the region.  This was accomplished through Labor
Certificates without which poor Jews were denied entry into
Palestine.  From 1933 through 1939, the Jewish Agency applied for
over 170,000 certificates, of which the British granted less than
60,000.  Thus, the Jewish Agency, with assistance from the
Haganah, began to smuggle Jews into Palestine.  While the
Haganah's pre-World War II smuggling operations were neither as
bold nor as large as its post-war efforts, with Haganah
assistance the Jewish population in Palestine increased from
160,000 in 1931 to nearly 450,000 in 1939. (7)
     Since the Mandate declared it illegal for Arabs or Jews to
possess rifles or pistols, the Haganah purchased weapons and
munitions from overseas sources.  When possible, they attempted
to augment those supplies with locally produced explosives. (8)
     Finally, the Haganah began extensive recruiting efforts
among Jewish communities and provided its new recruits with
minimal military trainigs.  In 1930 and 1931, Moshe's initial
training consisted of small arms familiarization, instruction in
hand-to-hand combat, and sentry duty. (9)  However, as the
Haganah expanded its influence and its operational capabilities,
it still lacked the means to aggressively accomplish its mission.
As Moshe later wrote, "My Haganah duties at this time did not
take up much of my energies, so I was comparatively free." (10)
     It was during the years 1929 to 1935 that Moshe's
exceptional leadership qualities emerged.  As a member of a small
horse-mounted unit, Moshe helped protect his village and drove
away Bedouin herders who allowed their sheep to graze on the
wheatfields of Nahalal.  Practicing wild Cossack-style cavalry
charges and demonstrating personal courage, Moshe alertly led the
troop with innovative daring and consistently displayed a
personal trait that would be one of the hallmarks of his
subsequent military career - that of leadership by example.  One
boyhood friend later recalled:
     It was always good to go out to fight with Moshe.  He
     was very daring.  He never looked twice; he simply ran
     forward.  We all noticed that nothing seemed to
     frighten him, nor did he care a whit what might happen
     to him.  And in fights he knew no mercy. (11)
As the fame of this mounted patrol spread, neighboring
settlements increasingly requested its assistance.
     At the same time, Moshe openly displayed a personal aversion
to politics and participation in organized political activities.
Highly critical of Jewish political parties and their associated
youth movements, Moshe was reluctant to participate in those
organizations and bluntly stated, "I was not attracted to party
work."  In fact, Moshe "became involved in party affairs only
after the loss of his eye, when he believed his military career
was at an end."  Throughout his life, Moshe was impatient with
politicians and party functionaries and frequently displayed a
preference for decisive action to the painfully slow process of
political decision-making.  Shabtai Teveth suggests that this
trait was rooted in his childhood when his father frequently
"abandoned" his family and went on lengthy political trips. (12)
     But as Moshe guarded Nahalal and as the Haganah slowly
adjusted to its role as the national Jewish defense force, events
in Europe captured British attention and, to a considerable
extent, disrupted the delicate balance in Palestine.  Hitler's
rise to power constituted a continental threat to Britain and
provided the Arabs with a potential ally in their struggle for
self-rule.  Although the Nazis never successfully exploited Arab
nationalism, the British were keenly aware of German threats to
Middle Eastern stability.  Some authors have argued that British
attempts to placate the Arabs during and after the Arab Revolt of
1936-1939 were predicated on London's desire to thwart German
encroachment into the region. (13)
     Arab nationalists were also aware of Britain's concerns
regarding the Axis Powers and viewed Italian successes in Lybia
and Ethiopia as signs of British vulnerability.  This perception,
when combined with Britain's failure to halt Jewish immigration
and land purchases, heightened Arab resentment of western rule,
especially non-Arab Christian rule over Arab Muslims. (14)
     In April 1936, following anti-Jewish violence and the
Irgun's unauthorized retaliatory murder of two Arabs, Haj Amin
declared a general strike.  As both the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem
and the recently selected leader of the Higher Arab Committee, a
"political action group" designed to unite Palestinian Arabs in
common cause, Haj Amin declared that until the British suspended
Jewish immigration and land purchases, no Arab would work in
Palestine.  While the strike lasted until the fall harvest, it
created little economic disruption as Jewish workers quickly
filled vacated Arab jobs.  However, the strike was the first
round in an escalating cycle of violence referred to as the Arab
Revolt of 1936-1939. (15)
     By early summer, strike related violence subsided and
although attacks against Jewish communities continued, Arab
guerrillas began focusing their efforts on the British.  Angered
over attacks against their installations and the repeated
sabotage of the Iraq Petroleum Pipeline, British patience finally
broke and London poured troops into Palestine.  While the
fighting did not spread to neighboring territories under British
rule, Egypt and the Tran's-Jordan, a significant number of Arab
volunteers joined the Arab Palestinians in their fight against
the British and the Jews.  Despite these volunteers, "there was
no attempt, throughout the period of the revolt, at any kind of
concerted action by the Arab governments against Britain." (16)
     British troops neutralized the rebels by October and in
November, another royal commission, headed by Lord Peel, arrived
to study the situation.  Although the Arabs largely boycotted the
hearings, the British preferred a negotiated settlement to a
military victory and in July 1937 the commission published its
sensational findings.  Attributing the revolt to Arab desires for
independence and their fears concerning a national Jewish
homeland, the Peel Report declared the Mandate unworkable and
stated that ultimate peace lay in geographic partition.  In a
White Paper issued simultaneously with the report, the British
proposed establishing two independent states within Palestine -
Click here to view image
one Arab and one Jewish.  Holy places sacred to Christians, Jews,
and Muslims would be placed in an international conclave under
British control.  Arabs denounced the plan, but most Jews, with
the notable exception of Jabotinsky's Revisionists, accepted the
proposal. (17)
     While scattered violence continued during and after the Peel
Commission's deliberations, massive violence erupted in September
1937 when Lewis Andrews, Acting District Commissioner of Galilee,
was assassinated in Nazareth by unknown Arab assailants.  Viewing
his murder as a declaration of rebellion, the British responded
with force.  Removing Haj Amin as leader of the Supreme Muslim
Council, the British outlawed the Higher Arab Committee and
issued arrest warrants for members of that organization.  Fearing
arrest, Haj Amin fled to Beirut where the French granted him
political asylum.  Never returning to Palestine, Haj Amin fled to
Germany following his participation in an abortive pro-Nazi
revolt in Iraq in 1941. (18)
     Arab nationalists met force with force and attacked British
installations and Jewish settlements with renewed vigor.  Once
again, Arab volunteers augmented local guerrilla forces.  Arab
irregulars in northern Palestine posed a particularly troublesome
problem.  Led by Fawzi el-Kaukji, a former officer in the Turkish
army, these guerrillas infiltrated Palestine from Syria and
Lebanon and, operating at night, repeatedly sabotaged the Iraq
Petroleum Pipeline.  Despite heavy patrolling, the British were
unable to capture el-Kaukji or destroy his force. (19)
     British attempts to quell the revolt were massive but
largely ineffective.  Eventually bringing two divisions into
Palestine, the British relied on traditional tactics.  Seldom
operating at night, the British conducted search and destroy
operations, fined villages suspected of harboring terrorists, and
destroyed homes in which illegal weapons were found.  Martial
law, night-long curfews, and massive detentions failed to end the
revolt.  Even the Teggart Forts, a series of fortified police
stations a long the frontier with Lebanon, Syria, and the Trans-
Jordan, failed to halt guerrilla infiltration. (20)
     Although Jewish leaders "regarded the riots as a series of
preliminary skirmishes in the battle for the establishment of the
Jewish State," the Yishuv's response to the Arab Revolt was one
of self-restraint and static, position-oriented defense. (21)
During the tense summer of 1936, the Yishuv reached a collective
and highly controversial decision regarding the proper Jewish
response to Arab attacks.  Officially known as Havlagah,* the
policy ordered the Haganah to limit its actions to direct self-
defense measures and strictly forbade any offensive counter-
strike against the Arabs.  There were military and political
reasons to support this decision.
     Militarily, the Haganah was not yet sufficiently strong to
execute offensive operations.  Still viewed by the British as an
illegal organization, the Haganah operated clandestinely and
lacked sufficient weapons to launch vigorous counterattacks.  A
second problem involved the overall quality of the Haganah's
* HAVLAGAH:  The Yishuv's policy of self-restraint adopted during
the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939.  The policy specifically forbade any
form of counter-strike that might injure or kill Arab non-
combatants and was implemented again in post-World War II
Palestine when when Jews battled the British for independence.
forces.  Although centrally controlled and directed, its training
standards, overall military skills, and the quality of its small
unit leadership varied markedly among the various Haganah cells.
Finally, the selection of local commanders was often based on
political considerations rather than on tactical skills, a factor
that greatly reduced the Haganah's ability to operate effectively
throughout Palestine. (22)
     The policy of Havlagah was also dictated by political
necessity.  Not wanting to attack innocent Arabs in retaliatory
raids, Dr. Weizmann persuaded the Yishuv that it was in their
best political interests to refrain from offensive action.
Passive resistance, he maintained, would serve the Yishuv's long-
term interests better than offensive operations against Arab
guerrillas.  Anxious to dissuade British beliefs that the revolt
was a war between Arabs and Jews, even Ben-Gurion reasoned that
self-restraint might deter the British from suspending further
Jewish immigration and might even persuade them to provide aid in
Jewish self-defense efforts.  While most Jews embraced the
policy, the Irgun openly opposed Havlagah and actively pursued an
aggressive policy of retaliation and counter-attack against the
Arabs.  Some of these strikes were clearly terrorist in nature
and were widely condemned by the Yishuv and the British. (23)
     Despite Havlagah, the Yishuv realized that the construction
of new settlements could influence the future borders of that
state.  Using their own land, the Yishuv launched a vigorous
settlement campaign known as Operation Stockade and Tower.  New
settlement sites were selected for their strategic and political
value and were frequently located near guerrilla infiltration
routes on the Syrian and Lebanese borders.  The Haganah,
supplemented by engineer units and farmers, would construct a
prefabricated watchtower with searchlight, homes, and fortified
outer wall, all of which was then encircled with barbed wire and,
when available, primitive minefields.  Frequently completed in
one day, these farming settlements often became para-military
bases for Haganah training exercises and self-defense operations.
Augmented with Haganah units, the settlers farmed by day and
defended their settlements by night.  Depending on the situation,
Arab assaults lasted from a few nights to several months.  From
1936 through 1938, during the height of the Arab Revolt, 36
settlements were established on some 21,000 acres of land and,
despite Arab attacks, no farming settlements were abandoned. (24)
     As the revolt intensified, the Yishuv's policy of self-
restraint impressed the British.  Viewing the Jews as potential,
short-term allies in their struggle against Arab guerrillas, in
1936 the British reluctantly accepted the Jewish Agency's offer
to augment local police forces.  The British understood that most
if not all of these augmentees would be Haganah members.  But
since the Arabs held the initiative, the British could not reject
the offer.  During the next decade, British-Jewish cooperation
was tenuous at best and was evident only when British interests
in the Middle East were threatened. (25)
     However, British support was essential for Jewish survival
since it provided the Haganah with time to strengthen its
organization and expand its operations without risking major
British reprisals. (26)  Operational cooperation between the
Haganah and the Mandate also provided Moshe Dayan with his first
real military experiences.
     Since British troops could not be everywhere at once, the
Mandate agreed to arm, train, and pay Jews for a variety of
military and para-military services.  Although Haganah members,
these Jews were under the direct operational control of the
Mandate authorities and, as such, they served as guides for
British patrols, filled the ranks of the Supernumary Police or
Jewish Settlement Police, and worked as ghafirs or lightly armed
police militia.  Providing a direct physical link between the
Haganah and the British military, these organizations,
collectively known as the notrim*, allowed the Jewish underground
to acquire legal cover for their illegal operations.  Even more
important, notrim members received British military training.  By
the autumn of 1936, nearly 750 notrim were on the British
payrolls while an additional 1,800 were subsidized by the Jewish
community.  By July 1938, the most important of these notrim
organizations, the Jewish Settlement Police, had grown to an
astounding 22,000 members.  As one Jewish historian has written:
     The notrim were a substitute for a real militia, a
     surrogate for a Jewish army ... (and) ... widened the
     mainstream of Jewish self-defense. (27)
     In the spring of 1937, Moshe Dayan was issued a legal
pistol, a ghafir's uniform, paid a monthly salary of 8
Palestinian pounds, and served as a guide to units of the King's
Own Scottish Regiment and the Yorkshire Fusiliers.  The specific
* NOTRIM:  A collective term referring to any of three Jewish
organizations supported or authorized by the British during the
Arab Revolt of 1936-1939: the Jewish Settlement Police, the
ghafirs, and guides for British army patrols.
missions given these units were to seal the Lebanese and Syrian
borders to guerrilla infiltrators and to protect that portion of
the Iraq Petroleum Pipeline running across northern Palestine.
     Moshe served as a guide for eight months and was highly
critical of both the tactics employed by and the overall combat
proficiency of those units.  Although the British troops had
little or no reconnaissance training, Moshe criticized their lack
of initiative and their inability to improvise when the situation
demanded.  Recognizing these deficiencies, he fully understood:
     the ineffectiveness of regular troops, using routine
     methods with fixed times and routes of patrol, against
     saboteurs who knew the terrain, moved stealthily on
     foot, could lose themselves in the local population,
     and could choose the convenient time and place for
     their operations.
He also subjected British officers to a scathing indictment over
their lack of mission-oriented purpose and later wrote that these
officers "assumed that they had fulfilled their task if they
simply showed their presence by patrolling the area." (28)  Moshe
maintained that these deficiencies resulted from inadequate
training in fieldcraft, uniforms and equipment not suited for the
mission, and a lazy attitude that led to slipshod patrols and
inadequately prepared ambushes. (29)
     Despite these critical observations, Moshe's performance did
not go unnoticed by either the British or the Haganah.  Following
his service as a guide, Moshe returned to his new home at Shimron
and, as a member of the Jewish Settlement Police, was promoted to
sergeant and appointed commander of a mobile squad composed of
six ghafirs and a truck.  Clearly violating the spirit of
Havlagah but working within the legal constraints imposed by
British authorities, Moshe actively patrol led the Nahalal
District and helped ambush Arab terrorists.  Although these
actions defied the policy of self-restraint, they were the first
manifestations of another character trait - that of seizing the
initiative whenever possible.  Years later, he justified his
actions within the context of military tactics:
     It became clear to me that the only way to fight them
     (Arab guerrillas) was to seize the initiative, attack
     them in their bases, and surprise them when they were
     on the move. (30)
     Yet Moshe was not the first Jew to express dissatisfaction
with the doctrine of a static and position-oriented defense.
While condemning the Irgun's irresponsible application of
indiscriminate military force against both combatant and innocent
Arabs, other military leaders openly questioned the policy of
Havlagah and demanded that the Haganah be allowed to launch
counter-strikes against Arab guerrillas.
     The most prominent of these constructive dissidents was
Yitzhak Sadeh.  A Polish Jew, Sadeh was a highly decorated
veteran of the Tsar's army.  Active in the Russian Revolution,
Sadeh served as an officer in Lenin's army and it was there that
he met Joseph Trumpeldor.  Trumpeldor persuaded Sadeh to emigrate
to Palestine and Yitzhak, short of funds, entered wrestling
tournaments to earn money for his passage.  Participating in the
defense of Jerusalem during the 1920-1921 riots, Sadeh's leftist
predilections led him to join Trumpeldor is Labor and Defense
Battalions.  Once those units were disbanded, Sadeh retired from
public life and did not resurface until 1936 when he offered his
services to the Haganah. (31)
     Although Haganah leaders officially supported Havlagah,
Sadeh vehemently opposed total reliance on static, position-
oriented defensive tactics and forcefully argued in favor of an
active, aggressive, mobile defense.  Convincing his superiors
that a solid defense must be offensive in nature, Sadeh received
reluctant permission to test his theory.  He quickly formed and
trained a mobile patrol whose mission was to seek-out, close-
with, and destroy Arab guerrillas operating near Jerusalem. (32)
     Later known as "The Flying Squad", this small, foot-mobile
unit was much more than an ambush and patrol force.  Instead, it
was the first officially sanctioned Jewish force capable of
independent offensive operations and it represented the first
tangible break with the doctrine of static defense.
     Using deception and moving at night, the all-volunteer force
employed what Sadeh called "the hammer and anvil technique." (33)
Upon learning of a possible Arab night assault against a Jewish
village, the squad would deploy to a staging area near the
settlement.  Once the Arabs attacked, the squad would vigorously
strike the enemy from the flank or rear and drive the
disorganized unit into the village's static defense.  Later
permutations involved two patrols - one mobile and one lying in
ambush.  The roving patrol would locate an enemy unit and, using
fire and maneuver, either lure or drive the Arabs toward the
ambush site.  Once in range, the ambush unit would launch a
violent aisault against the confused Arab band.  Since "The
Flying Squad" was rather small and mostly comprised of teenagers,
Sadeh carefully selected both the enemy to be engaged and the
terrain on which the night action would take place.  Sadeh
believed that psycho logical preparation was another key to
success and, by continually preaching that the "fellowship of
fighters is the foundation of life, the inner-most heart and soul
of comradship", he ensured that his hand-picked men developed a
strong sense of unit cohesion. (34)
     In 1937, Sadeh was authorized to expand this concept and,
drawing from notrim forces, he organized the FOSH.*   In July
1937, the FOSH was placed under the direct control of the Haganah
High Command, and by March 1938 these field companies boasted a
trained strength of 1,000 men organized into thirteen regional
groups.  Containing organic, yet primitive, combat service
support units to include quartermaster, topographic, education,
and intelligence teams, the FOSH was a well-trained and
aggressively mobile force that the Haganah High Command could
employ throughout Palestine without "having to rely on the
resources and goodwill of the local branches of the Haganah, with
their parochial concerns and uneven leadership." (35)
     But Jewish political leaders never fully accepted the FOSH
and feared the organization represented a growing military elite
that would eventually reject civilian authority.  Equally damning
were the accusations of political moderates who feared the FOSH's
aggressive nature would encourage Arab reprisals, jeopardize
British-Jewish cooperation, and undermine any chance of a
peaceful coexistence with the Arabs.  Despite its own
* FOSH:  Known as the Plugot Sadeh, these field companies were the
first Jewish units developed for offensive operations and provided
the foundation upon which the Palmach - the Haganah's elite "shock
troops" of the 1940's - were constructed.
reservations regarding the political reliability of the FOSH, the
Haganah High Command supported the field companies until they
were abolished in 1939. (36)
     However, the importance of Sadeh is unconventional approach
and revolutionary ideas in the transformation of existing Jewish
military doctrine must not be underestimated.  Yigal Allon
provides the best description of Sadeh the man and Sadeh the
military thinker:
     Possessed of limitless personal courage and endowed
     with a rare quality of leadership, Sadeh was one of the
     few high-ranking members of the Haganah able, at all
     times, to project his own unconventional insights into
     the real meaning of self-defense ... It was Sadeh -
     that bespectacled, warm, crumpled, ordinary-looking
     bon-vivant-cum-poet, that great lover of country, of
     women, and of the implacable logic of history who
     symbolized most vividly the fighting spirit of the
     underground, and who discovered and taught war to a
     group of teenagers destined, within only a few years,
     to lead the army of Israel. (37)
One of those young men was Moshe Dayan.
     Elements of Sadeh's old "Flying Squad" were incorporated
into the largest notrim organization, the Jewish Settlement
Police and, with British approval, they evolved into mobile guard
units.  While the mobile guards were legally constituted units
under British control, they were also Haganah units reporting
directly to the Jewish underground.  Their legal mission was to
prevent Arab attacks against Jewish settlements and, in the case
of attack, serve as aggressive counter-attack forces.  Their
illegal mission was to provide on-the-job training for new
Haganah recruits.  By the spring of 1939, there were 62 mobile
guard units with nearly 600 men, supplied with British vehicles
and British weapons. (44)
     As a mobile guard unit leader, Moshe was selected to attend
a Haganah Platoon Commander's Course in December 1937.  His
instructor was Yitzhak Sadeh.  Although 25 years younger  than his,
teacher, Moshe instantly recognized that Sadeh:
     was a man after my own heart.  Bursting with original
     ideas, he grasped the essence of a problem and demanded
     of us great daring, bordering at times on recklessness.  (39)
While neither Moshe nor his biographer discuss the course in any
detail, one can only conclude that Sadeh reinforced Moshe's
belief that victory depended on the seizure of the initiative
through prompt, aggressive action and personal leadership.
     Upon completing Sadeh's course with its "realistic battle
exercises", the British ordered Moshe to attend a school for
Jewish Settlement Police sergeants.  Held at a British military
camp, Moshe described the training with humorous contempt:
     I did not care for the highly disciplined inspection
     parades with the strict adhernce on shiny boots and
     smartness of dress.  And the content of the military
     instruction served no use whatsoever for ensuring the
     safety of the Nahalal region and the rest of the
     Jezreel Valley.  Yet I found it interesting, and I
     realized that in order to run an empire, there may have
     been some virtue in the spit and polish of British
     army tradition. (40)
     Even though Moshe had little use for non-mission oriented
military training, he led by example and demanded perfection from
his men.  One of his peers recalled that Moshe:
     took drill very seriously.  He would take his men out
     to the main road with clean rifles and polished shoes
     and drill them until they excelled at it, even though
     he hated all of it. (41)
     In 1938, Moshe was appointed a Haganah instructor in the
Nahalal district and, reflecting what he had learned from the
British, from Sadeh, arid from his personal experiences, he wrote
a training manual titled "Fieldcraft".   While largely critical  of
the "external mannerisms that were an integral part of the
British Army", the manual outlined detailed training methods that
went far beyorid weapons familiarization and drill formations.
Stressing the importance of terrain analysis and emphasizing
methods designed to exploit the tactical features of any piece of
land, the booklet also discussed infiltration and ambush
techniques.   After reading the manual, Ya' akov Dori , the Haganah
commander of northern Palestine, personally commended Moshe for
his work.  (42)
     As an instructor, Moshe implemented his ideas in the field.
Emphasizing infiltration and stressing the importance of
surprise, innovative thinking, and personal leadership, Moshe led
his class on unauthorized night raids against Jewish settlements.
Without  informing his Haganah superiors or village leaders, Moshe
and his pupils would approach a settlement, cut through fences,
slip past armed guards, and make their way to the center of the
community.   While commending him for his unorthodox teaching
methods, his superiors reminded him of the consequences if a
settlement guard mistook the class for Arab guerrillas.  When
ordered to stop these raids, Moshe reluctantly agreed even
though:
     I knew in my heart that as long as I was crawling at
     the head of my men to break through a guarded fence,
     we would not fail.  (43)
     His innovative, daring, and aggressive approach to combat
training made a lasting impression on his students and one of
them later recalled:
     He began giving us lessons in fieldcraft in Nahalal
     It was a great turning point in the Haganah.  Before
     that we had only learned how to handle weapons or
     routine drill ... Did we love him?  Yes and no.
     Actually we respected him.  We were always ready to
     follow him as a leader, but I couldn't possibly define
     our feelings for him as love.  He was never aloof from
     us, and we could always go up and talk to him; yet
     somehow he remained distant. (44)
     While the art of small unit, mobile, aggressive warfare was
being learned in the field, Jewish leaders still thought in terms
of a static, national defense.  Against the objections of the
Mandatory, Ben-Gurion authorized the establishment of several new
settlements along the Lebanese border in western Galilee.
Politically, the Yishuv believed that partition was imminent and
that the borders of the future Jewish state would be determined
through diplomatic negotiations.  Since western Galilee had no
Jewish settlements, Jewish leaders feared the area would not be
included in the Jewish state.  Militarily, the settlements would
help seal infiltration routes and, once the state was
established, would form a first line of defense against organized
Arab invasion from the north.  As part of Operation Stockade and
Tower, the Haganah ordered Sadeh to select a group of volunteers
to help construct and defend these settlements.  Sadeh named two
of his star pupils as deputy commanders - Yigal Allon and Moshe
Dayan.
     On 21 March 1938, in the largest operation of its kind, 400
men began constructing the settlement of Hanita.  That night and
for several weeks thereafter, Arab guerrillas attacked Hanita
and, despite Sadeh's request that Allon and Dayan be allowed to
lead a counterattack, the regional Haganah commander, Ya' akov
Dori, rejected the proposal as irresponsible and dangerous.
Consequently, Sadeh's forces assumed static defensive positions
and the Arabs retained the initiative. (45)
     Despite his inspiring leadership, proven tactical abilities,
and innovative ideas, Sadeh could not overcome the Haganah's
defensive orientation.  Thinking in terms of a static defense
built around heavily fortified settlements, Haganah leaders could
not fully accept the concept of a mobile and aggressive defense.
In an ironic twist of fate, it was an English officer who not
only proved the validity of Sadeh's approach but forever changed
the military thinking of an entire people.
     Posted to Palestine as an intelligence officer, Orde Charles
Wingate arrived in Haifa in September 1936.  A captain in the
British army, Wingate was an unusual and highly eccentric
individual whose strange habits included a diet of onions,
nudity, and a bizarre personal grooming regimen that included
massaging his entire body with an old toothbrush.  His boyishly
handsome face was framed by a thick crop of black hair and his
eyes, dark and piercing, had the gleam of either a dreamer or a
fanatic. (46)
     Born in India in 1903, his father was an army officer who
be longed to an unusual religious sect - the Plymouth Brethern.
Wingate's Scottish grandfather had worked as a missionary to
convert "God is chosen people" - the Jews - to Christianity.
Although he was not Jewish, Wingate held the rather peculiar
belief "that the inhabitants of Great Britain (were) descendants
of the ten lost tribes of Israel who did not return to the land
of Canaan from the Babylonian captivity." (47)
     Prior to his departure for Palestine, Wingate held pro-Arab
sympathies.  While there is some question as to when he became a
convinced Zionist, his pro-Jewish beliefs alienated him from most
of his fellow officers serving in Palestine. (48)  Within a few
months of his arrival, Wingate met notable Jewish leaders to
include Dr. Weizmann, David Ben-Gurion, the Haganah's chief
intelligence officer, and the Haganah Chief of Staff.
     Wingate's forceful and frequently aggressive pro-Jewish
outbursts both impressed and confused these Jewish leaders.
Concerning the Zionist Movement in Palestine, Wingate said:
     I believe that the very existence of mankind is
     justified when it is based on the moral foundation of
     the Bible.  Whoever dares lift a hand against you -the
     Jews) and your enterprise here should be fought
     against. (49)
And later:
     God give it to us to slay the enemies of the Jews, for
     the enemies of the Jews are the enemies of all mankind. (50)
Such statements, coming as they did from an English intelligence
officer, led many Jews to consider Wingate a spy.  Over time, the
Yishuv and the Haganah accepted Wingate and in honor of his
unusual stance, called him "Hayedid" - the Friend. (51)
     Displeased with Britain's diplomatic and military efforts to
end the Arab revolt, Wingate wrote a letter to his cousin, Sir
Reginald Wingate, the former British High Commissioner of Egypt.
In this remarkable letter, Wingate outlined his plan for
safeguarding British interests in Palestine while simultaneously
assisting the Zionist cause.  In Wingate's mind, British and
Jewish interests were inseparable:
     The Arabs of Palestine are making a great song and
     dance about what they will do if the findings of the
     [Peel] Commission are not 90% in their favour.
     Supposing they do all they threaten, i.e., rise en
     masse, we need only (a) arm the Jews, (b) proclaim
     martial law and arrest and exile every Arab notable; to
     find ourselves able to master the revolt with no more
     than the eight battalions already here ... The military
     strength, past, present, and future of the whole Arab
     group is quite negligible ... The potential military
     strength of the Jews, especially if we adopt my
     recommendations, is equivalent to at least two British
     Army Corps when trained and organized ... Palestine is
     essential to our Empire - our Empire is essential to
     England - England is essential to world peace . .. Islam
     is out of it.  [We have] the chance to plant here in
     Palestine and Transjordan a loyal, rich and intelligent
     nation, with which we can make an everlasting treaty,
     and which will hold for us the key to world dominion
     without expense or effort on our part.
In addition to arming the Jews, Wingate recommended that the
British-supported Arab government in the Trans-Jordan be
overthrown and that the High Commissioner of Palestine, Sir
Arthur Wauchope, be removed.  Highly opinionated, disputatious,
and occasionally disrespectful, Wingate "never appreciated the
dangers of extremism or the values of moderation." (52)
     Wingate carefully studied Jewish and British military
responses to Arab attacks.  Dismayed over the Jewish penchant for
static, position defense, Wingate told Haganah leaders:
     So long as you sit in your settlements and wait to
     fight and die, you will die before you have a chance
     to fight. (53)
     Wingate was equally appalled with Britain's mech-heavy,
road-bound, and inadequately coordinated combined arms approach
to waging counter-guerrilla warfare.  He specifically objected to
the tactics employed in engagements with Arab guerrillas.  After
allowing themselves to be ambushed, the British would dismount,
seek cover, return fire, and call for air support.  Seldom
seizing the initiative, British patrols were reluctant to engage
the guerrillas in close combat.  He was equally critical of
manpower intensive search and destroy operations, and was
dismayed at the lack of regular night operations. (54)  These
deficiencies were amplified when the revolt exploded with renewed
ferocity in the fall of 1937.
     In the spring of 1938, Captain Wingate received permission
from Sir Archibald Wavel, the new British Military Commander in
Palestine, to establish a military intelligence network among the
Jewish settlements in northern Palestine.  This network would
help identify infiltration routes used by terrorists and
irregular Arab forces to enter Palestine from Lebanon, Syria, and
the Trans-Jordan.  The British were specifically concerned with
Fawzi el-Kaukji's renewed attacks against British installations
and the Iraq Petroleum Pipeline. (55)
     Upon completing his mission, Wingate returned to Haifa and
requested permission to organize special units composed of the
Jewish Settlement Police with a "proper stiffening" of British
troops.  Wingate argued that these units would operate at night
and, through aggressive offensive action, end guerrilla attacks
against the pipeline and clear northern Palestine of rebel bases.
After considerable debate among his superiors and separate
discussions among Jewish leaders, Wingate's proposal was accepted
and the Special Night Squads were formed. (56)
     Unknown to British authorities at that time, Wingate had
already tested his concept during his reconnaissance of northern
Palestine during the spring.  Visiting Hanita in April, Wingate
and Dayan met for the first time and shortly thereafter Wingate
led Dayan and a small Jewish contingent on an ambush patrol.
Wingate demanded that the ambush be set on the outskirts of an
Arab village.  While the concept of limited offensive actions
against Arab guerrillas had already been advanced by Sadeh,
Wingate's concept of carrying the fight to the enemy and
attacking him in his own villages and bases was an approach of
revolutionary magnitude.  Moshe later wrote:
     This concept was new to us, for we had always set our
     ambushes near the approaches to the Jewish settlement
     to be defended and not near the exit from an Arab
     village serving as a terrorist base. (57)
     After gaining Sadeh's support, Wingate formally established
the Special Night Squads in May 1938.  Composed of 80 Haganah
representatives, 30 British troops, and a large contingent of
Jewish Settlement Police, Wingate formed and trained nine
individual squads capable of independent and combined operations.
By early June, the squads were deployed. (58)
     Demanding excellence from his troops and perfection from his
NCOs and junior officers, Wingate was a strict disciplinarian
who, at times, resembled a merciless tyrant.  Known to strike
subordinates for bad map-reading, he once butt-stroked an man for
making too much noise while on patrol and beat an NCO who drank
water from a pool before allowing his men to quench their
thirsts.  But in garrison, he ran his unit as a democracy. (59)
     Emphasizing the importance of secrecy, surprise, mobility,
deception, and the proper exploitation of the tactics of terrain,
Wingate carefully trained his men in night-fighting skills and
constantly told them:
     The Arabs think the night is theirs, that only they
     can fight us in the dark.  The British lock
     themselves up in their barracks at night.  But we,
     the Jews, will teach them to fear the night more
     than the day. (60)
     A meticulous planner who regarded his men as partners in
thought and action, Wingate stressed that each soldier,
regardless of rank, must fully understand a plan before
implementing it.  At the same time, he delegated leadership
responsibilities to his subordinates and taught them how to
improvise when a plan collapsed during execution.
     Wingate also served as a role model for Dayan's evolving
view of combat leadership.  Reinforcing Moshe's belief that a
good leader lead his men from the front of a column, Wingate
frequently walked point on night patrols.  From Wingate, Dayan
and others learned that independent action within the context of
an operational plan was the key to seizing and maintaining the
initiative and was essential for successfully carrying the fight
to the enemy.  Although crudely implemented when compared with
Israel Defense force operations in the 1950's and 1960's, this
concept provided the basis for Dayan's strong belief in a
structure of command and control known as "maintenance of the
objective" or optional control.  Finally, Wingate taught Dayan
the value of instant retaliation as a means to break the enemy's
will while simultaneously maintaining the initiative. (61)
     Dayan accompanied Wingate on numerous patrols together, and
Moshe, a quick learner, viewed Wingate as "a genius, an
innovator, and non-conformist". (62)  Moshe was also impressed
with Wingate's "iron will" and his desire to "carry the fight to
the enemy."
     After several months of vigorous operations, Wingate's
Special Night Squads fought their most important engagement at
Dabburiyah and, in a 14 hour battle, defeated a large guerrilla
force.  Critically wounded, Wingate refused medical attention
until enemy resistance collapsed.  The battle marked the end of
major guerrilla operations in northern Palestine.  Although minor
assaults continued against Jewish settlements, British
installations, and the pipeline, they did not pose a serious
threat to Jewish survival or British interests. (63)
     Awarded a D.S.O. and promoted to major, Wingate's days in
Palestine were numbered.  British opposition to his pro-Zionist
favoritism peaked in late 1938 as Wingate opened two NCO schools
for the Haganah. (64)  In May 1939, Wingate was ordered to leave
Palestine and his commanding officer wrote the following in his
official record:
     Orde Charles Wingate, D.S.O., is a good soldier, but,
     so far as Palestine is concerned, he is a security
     risk.  He cannot be trusted.  He puts the interests of
     the Jews before those of his own country.  He should
     not be allowed in Palestine again. (65)
     After leading guerrilla operations against the Italians in
Ethiopia, he eventually rose to the rank of general and led the
"Chindit" guerrillas against the Japenese in Burma.  He died in a
plane crash in 1944.
     Wingate's most important contribution was not in the tactics
of small unit combat, but rather in the correct application of
the right tactics to secure strategic objectives and national
goals.   In this, he accomplished something that Sadeh had tried
in vain to achieve.  Wingate convinced Jewish leaders that a
strategy of static, position-oriented, self-defense and could not
succeed and that the survival of a future Jewish state would
depend on an aggressive, active defense that, at the right time,
could be unleashed in decisive, offensive action.
     While Sadeh's aggressive approach paralleled Wingate's
beliefs, even Yitzhak gave credit to Wingate's accomplishments:
     Eventually, we would have done by ourselves what
     Wingate did, but we would have done it on a smaller
     scale, and without his talent.  We were following
     parallel paths until he became our leader. (66)
Even though Wingate's efforts were essential to the
transformation of Jewish doctrine during the 1930's, one should
not forget Sadeh's contributions in that area.  Moshe Dayan
wrote:
     The seeds of Wingate's novel ideas and tactics had
     already been implanted in us by Yitzhak Sadeh, the
     pioneer of the "emerge-from-the-fence" school.
Yet there was something different about Wingate that appealed to
Dayan:
     But there was a professionalism about Wingate, a
     positiveness, a stubborn lack of compromise.  A
     dominating personality, he infected us all with his
     fanaticism and faith. (67)
     Always favoring a diplomatic solution to the Palestine
problem, the British attempted to resolve the dispute in direct
negotiations with Arab and Jewish diplomats.  That attempt failed
miserably, and with the Arab Revolt over and the possibility of
war with Germany looming on the dark horizon, the British could
not afford to further damage Anglo-Arab relations. (68)
     Just prior to Wingate's departure, the British issued the
White Paper of 1939 - a document that completely reversed
existing policy.  Rejecting both the Peel and Woodhead
Commissions' recommendations for partition, the document
contained other startling provisions.  The paper called for the
creation of an independent Palestinian state within 10 years and
directed that Jewish immigration be limited to only 75,000
through 1945, after which there would be no further Jewish
immigration unless a majority of the people in Palestine (the
Arabs) approved.  Future Jewish land purchases were virtually
eliminated.  Even though the document stipulated that there would
be no independent Palestinian state unless the rights of
minorities were protected, the Yishuv viewed this shocking
reversal of British policy as a repudiation of the Balfour
Declaration and as the death of both a Jewish homeland and a
Jewish state.  Ironically, the Arabs also rejected the plan,
although for totally different reasons. (69)
     Although the Haganah had cooperated with the British in
their struggle against Arab guerrillas, the British still viewed
that organization as an illegal army.  Searching for weapons,
training camps, and Haganah leaders, the British dissolved the
Special Night Squads, curtailed their support for the notrim, and
drove the Haganah deep underground.
     In August 1939, Moshe was ordered to teach field tactics in
a Haganah Platoon Commanders Course.  Although the course was
conducted in secrecy, on 4 October 1939 Moshe Dayan and 42 other
Haganah members were arrested for the illegal possession of
firearms.  Tried and convicted, Moshe was sentenced to 10 years
in prison. (70)
     While Moshe and his fellow inmates served their sentences in
the prison-fortress at Acre, World War II raged in Europe.
Slowly spreading to North Africa and threatening the Suez Canal,
the war temporarily altered British-Jewish relations which, in
turn, profoundly affected Moshe Dayan.
     Still bitter over the White Paper of 1939, most Palestinian
Jews viewed Nazi Germany as an immediate and far more dangerous
threat to Jewish survival than fickle British Middle-Eastern
policies.  As Chairman of the Jewish Agency, Ben-Gurion
succinctly defined the Yishuv's position regarding both the hated
White Paper and the war against Germany:
     We shall fight the war as if there is no White Paper,
     and we shall fight the White Paper as if there is no
     war. (71)
Following the shocking German victories in April and May
1940, Ben-Gurion shifted the emphasis of the policy to fighting
the war:
     the participation of the maximum Jewish force in the
     defense of Palestine and in bringing about Hitler's
     defeat - that, to my way of thinking, has to be our
     whole program of activity until the victory. (72)
Politically and diplomatically sound, Ben-Gurion's policy was the
only rational course of action available to the Jews.  That
policy, however, strongly implied not only Jewish cooperation
with the British, but also active Jewish support of Britain's war
effort.  Implementing that policy - a policy demanding resistance
to the White Paper and war against Hitler - proved to be a
difficult and politically treacherous task.
     The Jewish struggle against both the Nazis and British
policies also affected the Yishuv and the Haganah militarily.
Although driven underground, the Haganah was not idle and,
building on previous organizational changes, secretly improved
its command structure and strengthened its operational
capabilities.  Emerging from its cocoon as a loosely-knit, self-
defense force in 1937, by 1941 the Haganah was an efficient,
centrally controlled, underground militia army complete with a
general   headquarters and a general staff that included
logistics, planning, operations, training, education, and
manpower branches. (73)
     These improvements were due in large part to the Jewish
Agency.  Having been officially sanctioned by the British in the
early 1920's and made responsible for the Haganah by the Yishuv
in the early 1930's, the Agency carefully protected the national
defense organization during the dark months following the
publication of the White Paper of 1939.  In return, the Haganah
assisted the Jewish Agency in illegal immigration and weapons
procurement operations and, despite British opposition, helped
establish new Jewish farming settlements through a revived
Operation Stockade and Tower.  (74)
     However, the British still viewed the Haganah as an illegal
organization and despite the war against Germany, sought to
destroy both its capabilities and command structure through
arrests, raids, and weapons seizures.  The elimination of the
FOSH and the Special Night Squads and the substantial curtailment
of British support for the notrim, especially the Jewish
Settlement Police, severely restricted the Haganah's ability to
protect the Yishuv. (75)  This situation was further aggravated
by a dwindling supply of manpower as roughly 30,000 Jews, many of
them Haganah members, joined the British army. (76)
     Faced with manpower shortages, British hostility, British
control of remaining notrim forces, and the emerging Axis threat
to Palestine, Haganah leaders urged the Yishuv to create an
independent military force under direct Haganah control.
Initially opposed to the idea, political leaders argued that
service in the British army would not only provide a free
military education, but might even persuade the British to
nullify the White Paper of 1939.  Already negotiating with the
British for the creation of a Jewish Brigade, Jewish leaders
believed that active participation in the war against Hitler
might even influence the British to reaffirm its obligations
spelled-out in the Balfour Declaration of 1917.  The Haganah High
Command "questioned the wisdom of putting all of the Yishuv's
military resources in one basket, a basket held by provenly
hostile hands" and vigorously argued that without trained forces
to augment its ranks, the Haganah would be unable to defend the
Jews against either the Germans or the Arabs in the case of a
British defeat in North Africa. (77)
     In 1940, the Jewish Agency authorized the Haganah to
organize and train permanent reserve forces drawn primarily from
Jewish agrarian settlements.  Known as the HISH,* these light
infantry units augmented local Haganah branches, assisted in
self-defense activities, and served as a part-time militia of
unpaid volunteers capable of rapid mobilization in times of
"national" emergency.  Unlike the FOSH, the HISH was not a full-
time force and, given the limited military training it received,
operated much like a "territorial home guard."  However, the HISH
expanded the Haganah's military capabilities, broadened its base
of support, and served as a capable fighting force during the
initial stages of Israel's War for Independence. (79)
* HISH:  An acronym formed from the Hebrew term Chail Sadeh, which
roughly translates into "field corps" or field force".
     But a part-time militia was not what the Haganah wanted or
the Yishuv needed.  In May 1941, Rommel's first North African
campaign reached the Lybian-Egyptian border and both the British
and the Palestinian Jews feared a Nazi invasion of the Middle
East.  On 15 May 1941, a new Haganah National Command was formed
to integrate the existing self-defense efforts of the HISH and
the regional Haganah command with a new, full-time military
organization known as the Palmach.*  Organized and led by Yitzhak
Sadeh, Palmach ranks were filled with former members of the FOSH
and the Special Night Squads.  By mid-summer, nine Palmach
companies were ready for active service and their missions were
to defend the Yishuv against Arab attacks, to cooperate with
British forces in defending Palestine, and, in the event of
British defeat, defend Palestine against the Axis and Arab
invaders.  When possible, this defense was to be conducted
through limited offensive action. (79)
     It was at this point the Moshe Dayan reentered the stream of
history.  After serving only 16 months of a sentence that had
been reduced from ten years to five, Moshe and his 42 fellow
inmates were released from prison on 16 February 1941.
     Although Dr. Weizmann and Jewish Agency officials had
negotiated with the British government for their release, those
discussions, in and of themselves, did not secure Moshe's
* PALMACH:  From the Hebrew "Plugot Mahatz", the term is best
translated as either "striking companies" or "shock troops".  The
Palmach was the first, permanently manned, and Jewish controlled
combat element capable of executing offensive operations.  This
organization provided the basis upon which the Israel Defense
Force was constructed in 1948.
freedom.   With Rommel's Afrika Korps to the west and Vichy French
forces occupying Syria and Lebanon to the north, the prisoner
release was a calculated British action designed to solicit
Jewish support in defending British Middle-Eastern interests from
Nazi attack. (80)  After all, a friendly Jewish population in
Palestine would provide a "safety-buffer" between Nazi-
collaborationist forces to the north and the vital Suez Canal to
the west.
     The Palmach's creation coincided with Rommel's first
offensive lunge toward Egypt.  With their own forces stretched
dangerously thin, the British recognized the Palmach's military
potential and initiated negotiations with the Jewish Agency
regarding joint operations between the Palmach and British
forces.  While neither side was totally comfortable with the
idea, a marriage of convenience was unofficially arranged whereby
the Palmach would assist the British army without becoming an
official component of that army.  Since Palmach light infantry
companies would have little impact against Rommel's forces, the
British decided to use those combat units in support of an Allied
invasion of Syria and Lebanon.  Specifically, the Palmach would
support the attack through pre-invasion reconnaissance patrols
and special operations missions. (81)
     As Palmach leader, Sadeh had already selected his company
commanders and had based his personal choices on those
individuals' previously demonstrated aggressiveness, combat
experiences, and leadership abilities.  Among those selected were
two of Sadeh's former pupils, Yigal Allon and Moshe Dayan.  Since
time was of the essence and demonstrating complete trust in his
subordinates, Sadeh allowed his company commanders to recruit
their own men. (82)
     In late May, Sadeh informed his company officers that the
Allied invasion of Lebanon and Syria would begin on 8 June and
provided each commander with his unit's missions.  Moshe's unit
was given the following missions: conduct pre-invasion patrols to
determine enemy troop strengths and dispositions; gather
information regarding off-road routes of advance able to support
motorized assaults; on D-1, lead an advance force approximately
six miles into Lebanon to seize and hold two vital bridges on the
coastal highway leading to Beirut. (83)
     Few of the 30 men Moshe had selected were familiar with the
southern-Lebanon countryside and this, when combined with his
plan to divide the force into small reconnaissance teams,
presented Moshe with a potentially disastrous problem.  Undaunted
and eager for action, Moshe quickly solved the problem in a most
unconventional manner - he hired trustworthy Arabs who, being
familiar with Lebanon, would guide his Palmach patrols.
     Dressed as Arabs, operating only at night, and under strict
orders to avoid clashes with enemy troops, Moshe and his men
successfully conducted several intelligence-gathering forays into
Lebanon during the first week of June.  After each night's
patrols, Moshe personally reviewed each of his team leaders'
after action reports before forwarding those documents to the
British.
     On Saturday evening, 7 June, Moshe's commando force
assembled near his home at Hanita.  Consisting of ten
Australians, five Jews, and one Arab, the group waited until
night before crossing into Lebanon.  By 0100, the Australian-led
force reached its objective and, finding the two bridges neither
guarded nor rigged for demolition, secured both structures within
an hour.  After deploying to defensive positions, the group
waited for the British forces that were expected to arrive by
0400.
      At sunrise, however, there was no sign of the invasion
force.  Realizing that their position was exposed, Moshe
immediately suggested that the group seize a nearby police
station that would provide a solid defensive position while
allowing the commando force to control both bridges by fire.  The
Australians agreed.
     Unfortunately, no one knew that Vichy French forces held the
station and, while approaching the building, the 16 man commando
team was taken under heavy fire and pinned down.  With ammunition
running low, Moshe characteristically suggested that the best form
of defense would be a rapid assault on the enemy's position.
After a brief firefight, several French defenders were killed and
the remainder quickly routed. (84)
     The men quickly consolidated their position and, augmenting
their meager ammunition supplies with captured French weapons,
prepared to defend themselves against a counterattack.  Since the
police station served as a regional Vichy command post, French
reinforcements surrounded the building and brought it under heavy
fire.  What happened next is best described in Moshe's own words:
     I took up my field glasses to try to locate the
     source of the shooting.  I had hardly got them into
     focus when a rifle bullet smashed into them,
     splintering the lens and the metal casing, which became
     embedded in the socket of my left eye.  I immediately
     lost consciousness. (85)
     Wounded shortly after 0700, Moshe remained on his back,  in
considerable pain, drifting in and out of consciousness, until
1300 when the first elements of the British invasion force
finally reached the station's beleaguered defenders.  Eventually
medivaced to a hospital in Haifa, surgeons could do little except
carefully remove the metal and glass fragments and close the now-
empty eye socket.  Since the bones surrounding the socket had
been shattered beyond repair, later attempts to outfit Moshe with
a glass eye failed. (86)
     Thus, at the age of 26, Moshe Dayan adopted his now-famous
trademark - a black eye-patch.  For the next 40 years, that
leather patch reminded him of war's human costs and eventually
provided his fellow Israelis and the world with a permanent
physical symbol of military excellence.
                         CHAPTER III
                RECOVERY AND REVOLT: 1941-1947
     To Dayan, the loss of his left eye was more than a physical
wound - it represented the probable end of his military career.
Relieved of command, Moshe's personal anguish intensified as he
watched his Haganah and Palmach contemporaries advance.  A highly
competitive man, the thought of losing ground to his peers,
especially to Yigal Allon, tore at Moshe's soul and his personal
descent into depression is best captured in his own words:
     I almost gave up hope of ever recovering my fitness to
     fight, and I reflected with considerable misgivings on
     my future as a cripple without a skill, trade, or
     profession to provide for my family. (1)
The wound also caused him extreme embarrassment.  Six years after
losing his eye, Moshe was:
     ready to make any effort and stand any suffering if
     only I could get rid of my black eye patch.  The
     attention it drew was intolerable to me.  I preferred
     to shut myself up at home, doing anything, rather than
     encounter the reactions of people wherever I went. (2)
     Late in the summer of 1941, Dayan accepted a position with
the Political Department, special Services Branch, of the Jewish
Agency.  Later calling this his "entrance into the political
field", Dayan's duties were primarily military.  As a junior
action officer, however, his performance of those duties and his
crystallizing political convictions, eventually brought him to the
attention of his future political mentor - David Ben-Gurion.
Although Dayan's exceptionally strong political bond with Ben-
Gurion did not mature until 1948, the seeds of that relationship
were sown during the years 1941 through 1947.  While Wingate and
Sadeh provided Dayan with his military foundations,  it was Ben-
Gurion who nurtured Moshe's political foundations, a process that
ultimately provided Dayan with an avenue to greatness.  Thus,
while the period 1941 through 1947 has little to do with Dayan
directly, those years are crucial to an understanding of Dayan
the soldier and Dayan the politician.
     Although the pro-Nazi threat in Syria and Lebanon had been
neutralized, the Afrika Korps still threatened both the British
8th Army and the Suez Canal.  Consequently, the British asked the
Jewish Agency to establish an intelligence network in Palestine
which, in the event the region was lost to German forces, could
provide information to the Allies.  Moshe's first task as an
action officer in the Special Services Branch was to organize and
implement that network.
     Plunging into the project with characteristic vigor, by mid-
August Moshe presented his superiors with a detailed plan that
proposed creating a series of intelligence-gathering and
transmission cells located in key areas of Palestine.  In late
September, the British approved the plan and provided radio
training to the Jews operating those cells.  Although under
British operational control and officially named the "Palestine
Scheme", the espionage ring worked closely with the Haganah and
was usually referred to as "Moshe's Network". (3)
     In October, Dayan suggested that the Palmach expand its
special operations capabilities by organizing two unique platoons
- one fluent in German and the other fluent in Arabic.  Moshe
envisioned using these forces behind enemy lines in Europe and,
if the British evacuated North Africa, as partisan units in
Palestine.  After considerable debate, the British accepted the
proposal in July 1942 and eventually parachuted some 33 out of
the 150  Palmach commandos into the Balkans.  While agreeing with
the British that these commandos were tools of war, the Haganah
and the Jewish Agency also viewed them as a means to both contact
the persecuted Jewish communities of Europe and strengthen Jewish
resistance efforts.  Historians have estimated that these
commandos helped 10,000 Jews escape from Europe. (4)
     Ostensibly organized to assist the British war effort,
Dayan's intelligence network and the special Palmach platoons
were integral parts of an overall Jewish plan to defend the
Yishuv against both the Arabs and the Germans in the event the
British evacuated Palestine.  Known as the Carmel Plan, Haganah
strategists planned to create a large Jewish conclave located in
and around the Carmel mountains and their adjoining foothills.
This region, running east from Haifa to the valleys of western
Galilee, was easily defendable, open to naval resupply, and
sufficiently large and fertile to provide enough arable land to
temporarily support the nearly half-million Palestinian Jews.
The authors of the plan - Yohanan Rattner of the Haganah High
Command and the "old night fighter" Yitzhak Sadeh - viewed the
enclave as:
     a giant emplacement from which the enemy could be
     attacked . . . from which night raids could be carried
     out, and from which enemy lines of communication and
     resupply could be disrupted and destroyed ... [and)
     ...that the Carmel fortress could be used as a
     bridgehead for an Allied landing, were a counter-
     invasion take place.  (5)
     While modern strategists may scoff at the overly optimistic
nature of the Carmel Plan, that plan demonstrated the Haganah's
ability to carefully develop a detailed and potentially
executable "national defense" plan.  Even more important, it
showed that the lessons learned during the Arab Revolt were being
correctly applied and that the concept of an active and
aggressive defense had replaced the predominantly passive,
static, position-oriented mindset of the 1930's.  Having already
developed their own evacuation plan, the British immediately
concurred with the Carmel Plan.
     As Rommel steadily advanced toward Cairo during the spring
of 1942, Anglo-Jewish cooperation intensified.  With the Haganah
already training Palmach platoons in kibbutzim base camps in
northern Palestine, the British offered to officially support
sabotage, demolition, and partisan warfare training for an
additional 300 Palmach members.  The British offer was not
totally altruistic and was based on their desire to create an
effective partisan force which, in the event Rommel seized the
Suez Canal and Palestine, could wage guerrilla war against the
Germans.  Short of funds, the Jewish Agency immediately accepted
the offer and in June 1942, a British-sponsored training facility
was established in the Jezreel Valley.
     Although British officers served as instructors "in some of
the more esoteric para-military arts", their duties were largely
confined to liaison activities.  Most of the active instructors
were seasoned Haganah veterans whose experiences dated back to
the days of the FOSH and the Special Night Squads.  As Palmach
commander, Sadeh placed his characteristic stamp on both the
nature and tempo of the training, insisting that the students
receive intensive instruction in topography, small unit
leadership, mobile guerrilla tactics, tracking, scouting, and
related partisan skills.  Since future Palmach operations would
probably be conducted with an inadequate supply of weapons, Sadeh
required his men to familiarize themselves with a wide variety of
weapons.  This was in keeping with his axiom - "We must learn to
fight with whatever is available rather than with what is
theoretically desirable." (6)
     Although the Afrika Korps was not defeated until November
1942, in August of that year, field Marshal Montgomery's 8th Army
halted Rommel at the first Battle of El Alamein.  That initial
victory eased London's anxieties concerning the Suez Canal and
the Empire's Middle-Eastern interests which, following
Montgomery's final victory in November, resulted in the
termination of direct cooperation between British forces and
independent Jewish military units.  London reasoned that with the
German threat neutralized, it was neither in their best interest
nor in the best interest of future Palestinian stability to
continue training independent Jewish military units.  (7)
     Shortly after halting Rommel's offensive in August, the
British abandoned the "Palestine Scheme".  Although "Moshe's
Network" reverted to secret Haganah control, Dayan no longer had
any official duties with the Special Operations Branch.  In late
summer, he returned with his family to Nahalal. (8)
     Before returning to civil ian life, Moshe volunteered for a
clandestine Haganah mission to Iraq.  Its purpose was to smuggle
weapons to the local Haganah cell in Baghdad and reestablish a
link between Jewish leaders in Palestine and the persecuted
Jewish community in Iraq.  Like other sephardic*  communities in
Arab lands, Iraqi Jews had been the victims of recent Arab
discontent. (9)
     In April 1941, prior to the Allied invasion of Syria and
Lebanon, the pro-British Iraqi government was overthrown by the
pro-Nazi, Rashid Ali Beg Gailani .  In response to British
landings at Basra, Iraq's Persian Gulf port, Rashid appeaied to
Hitler for assistance.  The fuhrer, busy preparing for Germany's
invasion of Russia, dispatched some Luftwaffe elements which
using Syrian bases, provided meager air support to Rashid's
embattled forces.  In May, Haj Amin, the deposed Grand Mufti of
Jerusalem now living in Baghdad, sided with the Germans and
declared a jihad or holy war against England.  Shortly before
British forces recaptured Baghdad, Haj Amin's militant followers
slaughtered some 400 Jewish residents of the city.  Haj Amin then
fled to Iran before eventually making his way to Berlin. (10)
     Although British forces controlled Iraq in 1942, they were
unable to protect Iraqi Jews against attacks by militant  Arabs.
Consequently, the transfer of weapons to the Haganah cell was
part of a larger mission whose purpose was to help:
* SEPHARDIC: A term describing those Jews who lived in moslem
countries running from Pakistan in the east to Morocco in the
west.  Having experienced life in increasingly hostile Arab
countries, Sephardic or "Oriental", Jews often took (and still do)
a much harder stand on issues relating to Arabs than do Ashkenazi
Jews.
** ASHKENAZI:  A term referring to European Jews who, because of
their exposure to the western concepts of liberalism and
enlightenment, generally take a less hawkish stance on Arab-
Jewish relations than do their "Oriental" or Sephardic
counterparts.
     organize [Jewish) self-defense against future attacks
     and to overcome Iraqi impediments to the departure of
     Jews from Iraq and the British ban on their entry into
     Palestine by establishing clandestine routes. (11)
After delivering the weapons, Moshe returned to Nahalal and spent
the next two years farming.
     Following Rommel's retreat toward Tunisia in December 1942,
London reevaluated its military arrangements with the Yishuv and,
except for the "German" platoon, terminated all support of the
Palmach.  By early 1943, the British disbanded their Palmach
training facility, tried to determine the real identities of
those Haganah members who had received British-sponsored
training, and confiscated weapons previously issued to the
Haganah and the Palmach.  Quickly responding to what it
considered the illegal seizure of Jewish weapons, the Haganah
broke into British armories and recaptured the weapons. (12)
     The end of the British-Jewish partnership, London's
steadfast refusal to rescind the hated White Paper of 1939, and
Britain's apparent insensitivity toward European Jews trapped
within Hitler's Third Reich, polarized relations between the
Yishuv and London.  This polarization intensified the internal
debates between various Jewish political groups over the issues
of support for London's war effort and the struggle against the
White Paper.  These debates divided the Yishuv, significantly
altered Jewish attitudes concerning the use of Jewish military
force, and gave rise to extremist elements within the Jewish
community.  Since each of these factors - political, diplomatic,
and military - are inexorably linked in a complex cause-and-
effect relationship, each must be briefly discussed.  This
discussion is all the more important since those forces shaped
Dayan's environment and provided him with the opportunity to
reenter military service.
     The official end of Anglo-Jewish cooperation had been
preceded by a fierce debate within the Irgun - a debate that
centered on London's enforcement of the Mandate's anti-Jewish
immigration provisions.  By early 1940, that paper stood as a
wall between the rescue and the annihilation of European Jewry.
In November 1940, the first of several unseaworthy craft limped
into Palestinian waters carrying Jewish refugees fleeing Europe.
The British promptly intercepted the ship, transferred its
passengers to the S.S. Patria, and announced that these illegal
aliens would be exiled on Mauritius - an island in the Indian
Ocean.  While attempting to scuttle the vessel in Haifa harbor,
the Haganah inadvertently destroyed the ship, killing 257
refugees.  Similar, although less deadly fates awaited other Jews
entering Palestine by sea as most were immediately quarantined
before being sent into exile.  However, in February 1942, the
S.S. Struma was refused docking privileges in Turkey and Lord
Moyne of the British Colonial Office refused to grant its Jewish
passengers entry visas into Palestine.  Once out at sea, the
vessel sank, drowning 767 refugees.  This tragedy further
alienated the Yishuv from London. (13)
     Obeying Ben-Gurion's policy regarding the war against
Germany and the struggle to overturn the White Paper, the Irgun
had temporarily halted its anti-British terrorist campaign.
However, a small dissident group within the Irgun found the idea
of cooperating with the British so unpalatable that in 1941, they
formed the Lohamei Herut Israel (LEHI)*  - better known to the
British as the Stern Gang.  Led by Avraham Stern, a firey, 35
year-old intellectual who viewed Britain and not Germany as the
real enemy, LEHI "declared war" on the British.  Although British
police killed Stern in 1942, his gang survived and, completely
rejecting the policies and authority of Ben-Gurion and the Jewish
Agency, conducted an unrestrained terrorist campaign against the
British. (14)
     The debate that had fractured the Irgun and had spawned the
Stern Gang also widened the chasm between Ben-Gurion and
Weizmann.  Although both men staunchly supported England's war
effort, Weizmann still hoped that the differences separating the
Yishuv and Britain could be reconciled and that the Jewish
homeland could gradually acquire its independence within a
political framework established by London.  While appreciating
the necessity of British support, Ben-Gurion grew increasingly
impatient with London's immigration policies and in this matter
he was more attuned to the Yishuv's attitudes than was Weizmann.
Departing from Weizmann's penchant for moderation, Ben-Gurion
became convinced that diplomatic overtures directed toward the
United States and its sizable Jewish community might induce that
nation to pressure London into rescinding the White Paper and its
anti-Jewish immigration policies. (15)
     The personal battle between the two men boiled into heated
* LEHI: Lohamei Herut Israel is translated "fighters for the
freedom of Israel."  Better known as either LEHI or the Stern
Gang, the Yishuv repudiated the small but extremely militant group
and deplored its violent, destructive, anti-British terrorist
activities.
public debate in May 1942 during an American Zionist conference
held at New York City's Biltmore Hotel.  Despite Weizmann's
eloquent protests, the conference endorsed the Biltmore
Resolution that called for the immediate opening of Palestine to
two million Jewish immigrants, the transfer of all authority over
immigration and Jewish Palestinian affairs to the Jewish Agency,
and the establishment of a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine under
the auspices of the recently proposed United Nations.  As one
historian has described this remarkable turn of events, "the
entire program represented a complete [Ben-Gurion] triumph over
Weizmann's gradualist, pro-British approach."  Defeated and
disappointed, Weizmann returned to England while Ben-Gurion
returned victorious to Palestine.  Although the split raised
considerable controversy within the Jewish community, it was Ben-
Gurion, not Weizmann, who emerged as Yishuv's political spokesman
and as the "de facto Prime Minister of his country."  London,
however, viewed Ben-Gurion's ascendancy with concern since it
"classified the Zionists into moderates, headed by Weizmann, and
extremists, headed by Ben-Gurion." (16)
     The Irgun-LEHI split, Ben-Gurion's victory over Weizmann,
and the end of direct Anglo-Jewish military cooperation were
quickly followed by shocking revelations coming from Europe.  In
November 1942, a group of Polish Jews brought news of Hitler's
"Final Solution" and in December, Allied governments corroborated
that information. (17)
     News of the Holocaust, when combined with London's refusal
to open Palestine to Jewish immigration, increased the Yishuv's
resentment of England, breathed renewed life into LEHI, and
convinced a number of Revisionists and a larger number of
sephardic Jews to join the Irgun.  Among these recruits was
Menachem Begin, a young Polish Jew stationed in Palestine as a
member of the Andres free Polish Army.   Released from his
military duties  in 1943, Begin was appointed the Irgun's
Commander-in-Chief in May 1944.  (18)
     A small, bespectacled man, Begin had previously led Betar -
a militant Revisionist youth movement in Poland during the 1920's
and 1930's.   Upon meeting Jabotinsky, the spiritual master of the
Revisionist Party, Begin found both his  leader and his political
mentor.  (19)   There was, however, a significant philosophic
difference between the two men.   Despite his bold and even
inflammatory rhetoric, Jabotinsky never abandoned his "dedication
to  legal military action and Zionist diplomacy."  Begin, on the
other hand, viewed terrorism as a viable,  if not legal means to
secure valid political objectives.  (20)
     Under Begin's charismatic  leadership, the Irgun grew in both
size and strength.   Demonstrating superb organizational  skills,
Begin reshaped the Irgun into what he hoped would become the
"militarily active successor to Revisionism."   This dream
contained political and military components, each of which
supported his ultimate objective - the establishment in Palestine
of an  independent Jewish state whose border would include all  of
the territories once held by the ancient Kingdom of Israel.
Politically, Begin hoped to unite the Irgun, LEHI, the Haganah,
and the political groups supporting those military elements into
a unified organization capable of implementing his military
objective - the complete removal of the British from Palestine.
But as long as war raged in Europe, Begin's Irgun received no
political support from Ben-Gurion and no military assistance from
the Haganah.  Consequently, he formed a coalition with LEHI and
launched his own anti-British terrorist campaign. (21)
     This campaign produced disastrous results and was largely
responsible for the deterioration of Winston Churchill
relationship with responsible Jewish leaders.  In late 1943,
Churchill, the conservative Prime Minister of Britain and a
verbal ally of Zionism, recommended that partition based upon the
19:37 Peel Report was the only practical solution to the
Palestinian problem.  However, increasing levels of anti-British
violence in Palestine eventually culminated in Lord Moyne's
assassination by LEHI gunmen in Cairo on 6 November 1944.  Moyne,
the British Minister Resident in Cairo, was a close personal
friend of Churchills' and his murder dampened the Prime
Minister's pro-Zionist stance.  In a speech before the House of
Commons, Churchill condemned the atrocity:
     If our dreams for Zionism should be dissolved in the
     smoke of the revolvers of assassins and if our efforts
     for its future should provoke a new wave of banditry
     worthy of the Nazi Germans, many persons like myself
     will have to reconsider the position that we have
     taken so firmly for such a long-time. (22)
Later Irgun attacks totally alienated Churchill who, in August
1946, endorsed the new Labor government's party doctrine "which
divorced Palestine from the Jewish refugee problem." (23)
     Appalled at this act of terror and fearing British
reprisals, Ben-Gurion immediately ordered the Haganah to
cooperate with Mandate authorities in their search for the
terrorists.  Later dubbed the "saison" - a French term referring
to the "hunting season " -  the Haganah identifed suspected
terrorists and turned over non Haganah arms caches to Mandate
authorities.   Although LEHI had committed the atrocity,  it was
Begin's Irgun that suffered the most. By early 1945, British
constabulary and military forces had arrested 403 out of 531
identified suspects.   Drawing a riot altogether fanciful
comparison between the "saison" and a political purge, one
historian has written:
     For Ben-Gurion, it [the "saison"] was yet another
     example of squashing incipient rival forces, a matter
     of preserving the unity of the Yishuv and keeping its
     political  and military structures under one umbrella,
     the umbrella of Socialist-Zionism, Labor, and Mapai.* (24)
     Throughout this period of political infighting and
deteriorating relations with London, the seeds of the future
Israel Defense Force, planted during the Arab Revolt and
carefully nurtured by the Jewish Agency, slowly matured.
However, this development was complicated by Ben-Gurion's policy
requiring direct Jewish support of Britain's war against Germany
and the Yishuv's simultaneous support of the Jewish Agency's
struggle against London's Palestinian policies.  While Ben-Gurion
viewed the struggle against the White Paper primarily  in non-
violent, political terms, other individuals believed that the
issue might only be resolved militarily.   These activists also
were concerned that if Jewish support of the war against Hitler
did not produce "a new Balfour Declaration with a cleaner and
* MAPAI:   Founded in 1930 as Israel's Labor Party, Mapai
advocated slightly "left-of-center" social-democratic policies.
Until the late-1960's, Mapai was Israel's strongest political
party and was the party to which Ben-Gurion belonged.
firmer British commitment to Jewish statehood", then a total
commitment of Jewish forces to England could leave the Yishuv
defenseless in the post-war period. (25)  In a thinly veiled
threat, Yitzhak Sadeh concurred with these sentiments:
     The Allied victory will be our victory, the victory
     over the most terrible of all our enemies, but it will
     not be the ultimate victory.  That will come only when
     we have won our war of national liberation - a war
     which may very well start when this World War is over. (26)
Despite the Yishuv's limited financial and manpower resources and
its heated debates over military priorities, Palestinian Jews
managed to physically support England's war effort while
simultaneously developing their own independent military forces.
     Since 1940, Weizmann, and to a certain extent Ben-Gurion,
had urged Palestinian Jews to join the British army.  (27)  These
men believed that active Jewish participation in the war as
British soldiers would produce several benefits - the formation
of an all-Jewish combat unit under British command, the provision
of free military training to Jewish volunteers, and the possible
rededication of British support for an independent Jewish state.
By war's end, approximately 30,000 Palestinian Jews had entered
the British army.  Even more important, on 20 September 1944,
London formed the 5,000-man Jewish Brigade.  While this all-
Jewish unit was organized too late to play a significant role in
the war, the Jewish Brigade was a fully trained and:
     independent fighting force, equipped with its own
     staff, services, and supporting arms, that became a
     a training ground where hundreds of Palestinian
     officers and NCO's, for the first time, learned
     logistics, organization, and tactics on a brigade
     level. (28)
Seeing little combat, the Brigade's officers and NCO's were well-
trained in and familiar with the technical, administrative, and
combat service support requirements needed to sustain offensive
operations and in 1948, these veterans played an important role
in Israel's War of Independence.  (29)
     After the Anglo-Jewish partnership collapsed, the Jewish
Agency lacked sufficient funds to support the Palmach's training,
logistics, and operational needs and considered dissolving the
Haganah's elite "shock companies" - an option previously debated
during the summer of 1941. (30)  Consequently, Sadeh and the
Haganah High Command eagerly accepted an innovative solution
proposed by Yitzhak Tabenkin.  An ardent admirer of Lenin,
Tabenki  was the leader of one of the largest agrarian
federations in Palestine - the United Kibbutzim Movement. (31)
Tabenkin proposed attaching Palmach platoons to individual
kibbutzim associated with his federated movement where, in
exchange for food and shelter, the soldiers would devote two
weeks each month to farming.  The remainder of the month could
then be devoted to military training. (32)
     Not overjoyed with this arrangement, some disgruntled
Palmachniks*  immediately joined the British army.  However, most
accepted the offer and thereby formalized the direct link between
agrarian settlements and the standing Jewish army.  Thus, the
tradition of the farmer-soldier and the citizen-warrior was born
- a tradition that provided one of the foundations upon which the
Israel Defense force's reserve system was constructed.
* PALMACHNIK:  A slang Jewish expression describing a member of
the Palmach.
     Although some Palmach leaders viewed this relationship as
the basis for transforming their organization into a "true
people's army", this marriage of convenience provided the Haganah
with a means to protect the Yishuv while simultaneously training
its forces without overly arousing British suspicions.  In
describing this relationship, one Palmach commander wrote:
     Just as ... Tito's Partisans ... hid out in the woods
     and thickets, so the Palmach used the kibbutz movement
     as its forest. (33)
As would be expected, Sadeh - the "old guerrilla fighter" - was
elated with this turn of events since:
     he was determined to return the Palmach to underground
     conditions, to remind it collectively that it was a
     Jewish force, and to wean it away from what he thought
     might be the weakening effect of cooperative action
     with regular army forces. (34)
     By mid-1943, the Palmach numbered some 1,000 active duty
members with another 400 in reserve.  With these forces attached
by platoon to some 28 separate kibbutzim, mobilization and
training exercises were difficult to organize and manage.  Taking
advantage of what others would have considered an insurmountable
obstacle, Sadeh and the Haganah staff developed effective
training and mobilization plans whereby platoons in adjoining
kibbutzim would form companies and adjacent companies would form
battalions.  This arrangement relied heavily on the ability of
separate platoons to rapidly merge and form a company-sized
"strike task force." (35)
     Expanding upon the lessons learned during the Arab Revolt,
Sadeh insisted that his men be trained in the tradition of the
flying Squad, the FOSH, and Wingate's Special Night Squads.
Emphasizing unit cohesion and combat leadership at all levels,
Sadeh's physically demanding training program placed a premium on
both the skill of the individual soldier and high unit morale as
a means to compensate for the Palmach's lack of heavy weapons.
All members, regardless of rank:
     were educated to think and function in terms of the
     utmost flexibility and to accommodate themselves to
     the needs of the hour. (36)
     Despite its previous association with the British army, the
Palmach's approach to combat owed little to that earlier contact.
Echoing Dayan's disparaging comments concerning the training he
had received from the British in the 1930's, commanders argued
that Palmach training must not mimic the British approach.  One
commander succinctly explained not only the differences between
the two approaches to training and combat, but also the
underlying reason for that divergence:
     Infantry training in the British Army was orderly
     and schematic, while the Palmach stressed individual
     ability and collective flexibility.  Where British
     instructors taught their men that enemy positions
     could be softened by heavy artillery barrages or from
     the air, the Palmach, lacking either possibility,
     emphasized the use of darkness and explosives.  Where
     British army tacticians thought in terms of formal and
     inflexible arrangements such as infantry, artillery,
     and engineers, etc., the Palmach regarded itself as a
     single, multi-purpose force. (37)
     Perhaps the most striking difference between the British
army, with its heavy reliance on traditional tactics and clearly
defined chains of command, and the Palmach, with its informal
approach to both tactics and personal relations between the
ranks, was in the area of NCO training.  In the Palmach:
     section commanders were not trained as NCO's but as
     officers; they were taught to make decisions alone -
     each soldier and his weapon was considered as the
     basic unit of the force.  Unconventional tactics
     were advocated and the Palmach (NCO) was drilled to
     anticipate unconventionality from the enemy. (38)
Even if  no command billet was available, every promising soldier
attended the Palmach Squad Commander's Course.  This course
emphasized developing a potential commander is ability to react
quickly and to think logically in any situation.  Candidates were
expected to use terrain, darkness, and even the weather to the
maximum and most favorable extent possible.  Perhaps the most
revealing aspect of this rigorous training regimen was that of
the 493 training-hours available, 79 were dedicated to "The
Independent Commander" while only 25 were spent studying "The NCO
and the Platoon."  This environment helped codify the doctrinal
link between seizure of the initiative and independent decision-
making - a vital relationship still taught and practiced in
today's Israel Defense force.  As would be expected in any Sadeh-
developed course, 121 hours were devoted to social, political,
and cultural indoctrination. (39)
     Although best categorized as light infantry, by the end of
World War II, 4 Palmach battalions were ready for action.  In
early 1948, Yigal Allon, who succeeded Yitzhak Sadeh as Palmach
Commander in 1945, had 6 fully-trained battalions at his disposal
each of which contained 4 companies.  By the early summer of that
year, the Palmach contained 9 battalions and was capable of
sustained, brigade-level offensive operations.  The Palmach also
helped support the Haganah's small air force and fledgling
navy. (40)
     When the war in Europe ended on 8 May 1945, the Yishuv was
confident that its support of Britain's war effort, when combined
with the ghastly details of the Holocaust, would result in the
cancellation of the White Paper of 1939.   When Churchill's
government made no effort to either lift the anti-Jewish
immigration restrictions or renew London's nearly 30 year-old
commitment to a Jewish homeland, the Yishuv withdrew its support
of the "saiso."
     In July, Clement Attlee's Labor Party replaced Churchill's
conservative government and once again, the Yishuv looked
hopefully to London.   Despite its previous condemnations of the
White Paper, once  in office the Labor Party made no attempt to
alter existing Mandate policies.   Even mild diplomatic pressure
from President Truman, who urged Attlee to allow 100,000 Jewish
refugees enter Palestine, had no effect.  (41)
     In August, his patience wearing thin, Ben-Gurion warned
London that:
     If for some reason or another, it [the Labor Party]
     maintains the White Paper for an unlimited period ...
     we  in Palestine will not draw back  in the face of
     England's great power and we shall fight against her.  (42)
In September, London agreed to admit 1,500 Jewish refugees to
Palestine each month.   But with nearly a million Holocaust
survivors crowding Displaced Persons camps  in Europe, even
Weizmann criticized this gesture.   Noticing that a sizable
number of non-Jews were also detained in these camps, Ernest
Bevin, Britain's new foreign Minister, responded to this
criticism:
     If the Jews, with all  their sufferings, want to get
     too much at the head of the queue, you have the danger
     of another anti-Semitic reaction through it all.
Weizmann, the moderate, angrily retorted:
     Is it getting too much to the head of the queue if,
     after the slaughter of six million Jews,  the remnant ...
     implore the shelter of the Jewish Homeland? (43)
By early autumn, Zionist policy, with  its linked demands for an
independent Jewish state and a rapid resolution of the Jewish
refugee problem, was clearly at odds with Britain's official
Mandate policies.
     However, London's post-war Palestinian policies had not been
created in a diplomatic vacuum.  Harold Beeley, Britain's
secretary to the Anglo-American Committee on Palestine,
emphasized this point in 1947 when he stated:
     The Zionists believe that Palestine itself is of first
     class strategic  importance to us.   What is  important,
     I think,  is the effect upon our Middle Eastern
     position generally of our policy in Palestine. (44)
London' s Mandate policies were indeed rooted in a larger Middle
Eastern strategy designed to protect England's interests while
thwarting Soviet ambitions in the region.  With both Turkey and
Persia  (Iran) under Russian pressure and with moslems demanding
that an independent, non-Hindu state (Pakistan) be carved out of
the western provinces  of the soon-to-be-created Indian state:
     It seemed to any reasonable British minister or service
     chief as vital as ever it had been to appease anxieties
     in the world of Islam, and to maintain the British
     garrisons stationed, or rather left there in force by
     the accident of war,  in Egypt, and the Arab lands to the
     East.  (45)
To a certain extent, Britan's Middle Eastern policies were also
founded upon what London viewed as potential rivalry with the
United States.   Prior to the end of the war, Anthony Eden
remirided Churchill's cabinet of England's dependency on Middle
Eastern oil when he said:
     If we  lose Arab goodwill , the Americans and the
     Russians will be on hand to profit from our mistakes. (46)
     To Ben-Gurion and the Yishuv, however, London's regional
interests paled to insignificance when compared to the plight of
Jewish refugees and the Zionist goal of an independent Jewish
state.  Recognizing that diplomacy would neither resolve the
refugee issue nor obtain Jewish independence, in October 1945
Ben-Gurion authorized the Haganah to establish a para-military
coalition with both the Irgun and LEHI and further directed the
Haganah to initiate a revolt against British domination.  This
was a controversial decision as members of the Haganah. and
particularly the Palmach objected on the grounds that a:
     proliferation of underground movements was undesirable
     (since) a multiplicity of military forces would be fatal
     to the concept of one nation, one authority, one army. (47)
Yet despite their deep philosophic differences and the Irgun's
disregard of the Jewish Agency's political authority, the
Haganah, the Irgun, and LEHI formed a loosely-coordinated, but
highly effective, and frequently tempestuous partnership.
     Realizing that brute force alone would not secure national
objectives, the Yishuv launched a multi-faceted campaign using
social, diplomatic, and military means.  Together, these distinct
yet mutually supporting campaigns formed the framework of a
national resistance movement which, just 32 months later, saw
Ben-Gurion announce the format ion of the independent Jewish state
of Israel.   From 1945 through May 1948, the Jewish Agency
skillfully directed this movement, to include the coordination of
most military strikes, and it is not unreasonable to state that
it functioned as a provisional Israeli government. (48)
     Jewish para-military forces played an important role in this
resistance movement.  Not only did they fight a successful
partisan campaign, the Haganah-Irgun coalition served in other
non-traditional capacities and in so doing, helped create the
nation of Israel.
     The social or "nation-building" campaign involved illegal
immigration and the construction of new agrarian settlements -
two operations in which the Haganah played a key role.   Between
August 1945 and the end of 1947, nearly 70,000 European Jews
attempted to enter Palestine by sea.   As the Jewish Agency's
military arm, the Haganah was largely responsible for staging
the refugees in Europe, transporting them to Palestine, and once
there, helping them "disappear"  into the population.  Despite
these efforts, the British navy intercepted most of the vessels
and interred nearly 50,000 Holocaust victims in detention camps
in northern Palestine and in Cyprus or,  in the case of the
Exodus, returned the refugees to German soil.   With assistance
from both the Haganah and Jewish soldiers in the British army
still  stationed in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Lebanon,
sephardic  Jews from neighboring Arab lands also poured into
Palestine.   Since this overland migration received no publicity,
precise figures regarding the number of sephardic  immigrants are
not known. (49)
     In direct defiance of Mandate regulations, the Haganah
revived Operation Stockade and Tower and helped construct new
Jewish farming communities.   This campaign was a continuation of
Jewish policy established in the 1920's, a policy that viewed
land reclamation  in both economic and diplomatic terms.
Economically, the settlements provided Jewish refugees with the
means to become contributing members of society.   Diplomatically,
the settlements defined the borders of the future Jewish state.
Although Mandate police and British military units occasionally
leveled these communities, Jewish workers and Haganah guards,
quickly rebuilt them. (50)
     The Jewish Agency effectively linked its immigration
operation to its diplomatic campaign - a strategy designed to
elicit sympathy for the Jewish cause while depicting the British
as insensitive to the plight of Jewish refugees.  The American
public, still shocked over Holocaust atrocities, were not
favorably impressed with British Mandate policies especially
after news reports, photographs, and film footage described
British forces intercepting and interring Jewish refugees.  As one
historian has described this campaign:
     Where the passengers [refugees] got through, it was
     a gain for the Yishuv in people.  When they were
     apprehended, it was a gain for the Zionist cause, in
     propaganda terms. (51)
     Aware of growing, pro-Jewish sentiments in the United
States, London was eager to gain American assistance in resolving
the troublesome Palestine question.  In late 1945, a joint Anglo-
American Committee of Inquiry was organized to seek solutions to
both the Jewish refugee problem and the Palestine problem.  After
interviewing refugees in Europe's Displaced Persons camps and
touring Palestine, the commission reported its findings in May
1946. (52)
     Repudiating existing Mandate policies, the committee
recommended that 100,000 Jews be immediately admitted to
Palestine, that regulations restricting land sales to Jewish
Palestinians be terminated, and that a bi-national Palestinian
state be established under a United Nation's trusteeship.
Although Truman endorsed the proposal, Attlee made it quite clear
that "unless the United States would be prepared to share in the
additional military and financial responsibilities", Britain
could not accept the recommendations.  Attlee also indicated that
London would not change existing policies until the Yishuv
disbanded its underground forces.  Since the report contained no
reference to a Jewish state, Jewish leaders withheld their
approval, a position the Arabs supported. (53)
     Arab disapproval was based on similar attitudes.  Since the
commission had not recommended the creation of an Arab state
encompassing all of Palestine, Haj Amin, now living in Egypt, and
other Arab leaders rejected the proposal.  Continued Arab
intransigence further complicated the already delicate situation.
In September 1946, Arab diplomats attending negotiations in
London not only rejected the concept of an independent Jewish
state, they demanded the formation of an Arab state in Palestine
riot later than 31 December 1948.  Their implacable opposition to
a Jewish state was based on their belief that:
     the creation of an autonomous Jewish province, with
     substantial control over its own immigration, would
     give the Zionists an irreversible demographic,
     economic, and political advantage [and that] an
     independent Jewish state in Palestine would become
     the bridgehead for Jewish political and economic
     penetration, first into the rest of Palestine and
     thereafter into Transjordan, Syria, and the whole
     Arab world. (54)
Following Truman's tentative endorsement of a Palestinian Jewish
state, Iraq and Syria even tried imposing economic sanctions
against the United States in October 1946. (55)
     Militarily, the Haganah and the Palmach were uniquely
qualified to lead the anti-British rebellion.  With their
guerrilla training having been frequently enriched with British
combat training, these underground forces not only understood
Britsh tactics and organizational practices, they also
appreciated London's political weaknesses.  Fully prepared to
conduct a guerrilla campaign against British, the Haganah and its
shock companies accepted the Jewish Agency's control of its
partisan operations.  Although the Irgun and LEHI cooperated with
the Haganah militarily, their political goals did not coincide
with those of the Jewish Agency.  Unlike Ben-Gurion, Begin the
Revisionist believed that all of Palestine, plus additional
territories in Lebanon, Syria, and the Transjordan - territories
formerly belonging to ancient Israel - must be included in any
new Jewish state.  Consequently, the Irgun and LEHI conducted
their own independent guerrilla war - a partisan campaign the
frequently ignored Ben-Gurion's policy of Havlagah. (56)
     Havlagah was still a potent policy within the Yishuv and
Ben-Gurion was adamant that this tradition carried over from the
Arab Revolt would not be violated.  Although the Haganah was
authorized to engage in sabotage and reprisal activities, they
were to avoid personal terror.  Furthermore, each partisan strike
was to be carefully planned and executed so as to create the
maximum damage possible while simultaneously avoiding human
casualties. (57)
     Accepting these rule of engagement as guidance and not as
limitations, the Haganah launched its campaign.  On 10 October
1945, 250 Haganah commandos overpowered the guards at the Atlit
detention camp and freed hundreds of Jewish refugees previously
captured by the British navy.  Just 21 days later, the Haganah,
the Irgun, and LEHI attacked the Palestine railway system,
destroying track in over 150 places.  Later called "The Night of
the Railways", rolling stock and locomotives were also destroyed
as were three police launches anchored in Haifa harbor.  In June
1946, a similar attack destroyed 10 out of the 11 bridges
connecting Palestine with her neighboring Arab states.  On
occasions, these coordinated attacks were launched  in direct
support of other facets of the Jewish resistance campaign.  In
June 1947, two British radar installations used to track ships
bringing refugees to Palestine were attacked and destroyed.
Carefully planned, each attack was conducted at night and was
fully described in a detailed after action report.  These reports
outlined the operational plan, discussed how that plan was
implemented, noted the strengths and weaknesses of the plan's
execution, and provided tactical tips to assist future assaults.
for example, after attacking the Allenby Bridge linking Palestine
with the Transjordan, the after action report noted: "The
enemy used tracer bullets.  This helped us."  (58)
       London's response was predictable.  In May 1945, some 50,000
British troops were stationed in Palestine, a number that climbed
to nearly 80,000 by December.  By 1947, over 100,000 British
soldiers patrolled Palestine while a sizable naval flotilla
blockaded its shores. (59)  On 29 June, the British launched
Operation Agatha and for the next two weeks, some 17,000 British
troops conducted a massive search-and-arrest operation.  Although
catching the Yishuv by surprise and arresting over 2,700 Jews to
include high ranking members of the Jewish Agency, the operation
failed to either break the Haganah militarily or silence activist
Jewish leaders.  Instead, it intensified Jewish resolve and
helped pave the way for the Irgun-LEHI counteroffensive. (60)
     Shortly thereafter, the Irgun struck the first of several
deadly blows designed to embarrass Mandate authorities and weaken
British morale.  With key Mandate administrators, elements of the
British military command, and British intelligence offices housed
in Jerusalem's King David Hotel, the Irgun attacked this lucrative
target on 22 July and destroyed that building's south wing.  The
explosion killed 92 and wounded dozens more.  Although the Haganah
had sanctioned the attack, Begin's forces either failed to warn
the British as had been agreed upon or the British had not taken
the bomb threat seriously. (61)  Instead of breaking British
morale, the assault solidified British opinion and shocked Jewish
moderates.
     Later Irgun attacks were directed against the British
embassy in Rome, the central income tax office in Jerusalem, and
the oil refineries in Haifa.  These attacks not only violated the
very essence of Havlagah, they clearly demonstrated tat the
political contradictions in the Haganah-Irgun alliance were
beginning to split the joint resistance movement.  Although the
Haganah restricted its own actions and took great care to avoid,
when practicable, inflicting casualties on British forces, it
could not restrain the activities of the Irgun - activities that
soon disintegrated into a "personal" war between the British and
the dissidents.  After two Irgun youths were given 18 lashes for
their participation in a bank robbery, the Irgun kidnaped a
British major and 3 sergeants and before releasing them,
administered punishment in kind.  On 29 July 1947, Mandate
authorities hanged 2 Irgun gunmen for having killed British
soldiers during a raid on a prison.  The next day, the bodies of
2 British sergeahts were found dangling in an orchard.
Unfortunately, the British troops recovering the bodies set off a
booby trap and the resulting explosion seriously injured a British
captain. (62)
     Incidents like these infuriated London.  Citing the deaths
of 99 British soldiers and policemen between 1 October and 18
November 1946, field Marshal Montgomery urged the British
government to use whatever military force was required to
apprehend the terrorists and crush their base of popular support.
Clement Attlee, the British Prime Minister, reminding Montgomery
that Operation Agatha had not broken the Yishuv militarily, took
no action on the general in impassioned plea.  In Palestine,
however, British troops reacted to these outrages and, in some
instances, acted as vigilantes - beating civilians, destroying
shops, and in one instance, murdering a detainee.
     By May 1947, Ben-Gurion had had enough of the Irgun and
ordered the Haganah to begin operations against the dissidents.
Unlike the "saison", the Haganah did not actively cooperate with
the British.  Instead, they acted independently, almost as
policemen.  Fearing a return to the "saison" and not particularly
pleased with the thought of attacking fellow Jews, Yigal Allon,
the Palmach Commander, did not allow his troops to participate in
this internal affair.  For the next several months, the Haganah
thwarted an Irgunist attempt to blow-up the British Military
Headquarters in Jaffa, prevented an attack on the British army
camp at Rehovet, and foiled an assassination attempt on General
MacMillan, the military governor of Palestine.  For the next 5
months, the Haganah continued to work against Begin's Irgun and,
on occasions, won the praise of the British.  However, its actions
could not and did not break the Irgun.  Ben-Gurion, furious with
Begin, could only wait for a more propitious moment to silence his
opponent. (63)
     Still suffering economically after World War II, faced with
increasing levels of anti-British violence in Palestine,
disappointed with continued Arab non-cooperation regarding a
settlement of the Palestine debate, and not wanting to alienate
Arab opinion by taking any action that might be construed to be
anti-Arab, on 18 February 1947, the British government announced:
     His Majesty's Government have of themselves no power
     under the terms of the Mandate to award the country
     to the Arabs or the Jews, or even to partition it
     between them ... We have therefore reached the
     conclusion that the only course open to us is to
     submit the problem to the judgment of the United
     Nations. (64)
Although the Irgun's attacks against the British and British
retaliatory strikes against the dissidents continued, the wheels
of diplomacy were set in motion.
     On 29 November 1947, following several months of debate,
negotiations, and diplomatic maneuverings, the United Nations
voted to terminate the British Mandate and to partition Palestine
into three areas - one for the Jews, one for the Arabs, and an
international conclave encompassing the various religious sites in
and around Jerusalem.  Of the 56 nations voting, 33 voted in
favor, 13 voted against (to include all 11 Arab states), and 10
nations, to include Great Britain, abstained. (65)
     Designed to guarantee independence to two separate national
and religious groups, the decision instead provided the spark that
ignited the 14-month long war known as Israel's War of
Independence.  That spark also provided Moshe Dayan with the
opportunity to reenter full-time military service.
Click here to view image
                             CHAPTER IV
            WAR, POLITICIS, AND INDEPENDENCE: 1948-1949
     Beginning  in late November 1947 and lasting until early
1949, Israel's War of Independence was one of the most
remarkable, unique, and complicated of this century's numerous
conflicts.  Initially confined to Palestine, the war started with
sporadic outbreaks of scattered violence.  Within a few months,
however, the frequency and ferocity of that violence increased.
Riots, bombings, and snipings gave way to guerrilla raids and
vicious skirmishes which, in turn, led to a conventional war
involving not only Arab and Jewish Palestinians, but also several
Middle Eastern Arab states.
     Just as the war did not begin everywhere at the same time,
neither did it end for everyone on the same date.  In February
1949, Egypt was the first Arab state to sign an armistice
agreement.  Iraq merely withdrew its troops and never negotiated
a settlement.  Given the events of the last 40 years, it is not
unreasonable to argue that Israel is still fighting its war of
independence or, at a minimum, the consequences of that war.
     Despite its relatively short duration, its gradual
escalation, and the lack of sophisticated weaponry used in its
execution, the war was an exceptionally bloody affair.  While
precise Arab casualty totals are not known, it has been estimated
that 15,000 Arabs from Palestine.and its neighboring states were
killed.  Over 6,O00 of the 650,000 Palestinian Jews died during
the 14-months of war.  This equates to nearly 1% of the total
Jewish pupulation or, put in more graphic terms, the United
States  would have to sustain over 25 million war dead  to
proportionately approximate Jewish losses!  (1)
     Of lasting importance was the affect the war had as a
stimulus for mass migration.  By the end of 1948, 700,000 Arabs,
including a majority of the community's political and regilious
leaders and a large segment of its commercial and social elite,
had fled Palestine and taken up frequently unwelcome residence in
neighboring Arab states. (2)  The departure of Palestinian Arabs
was matched by an equally sizable number of Jews emigrating  to
Israel.  Between 1948 and 1951, nearly 730,000 Jews arrived in
Israel, a large number of which were sephardic Jews who had fled
their homes in Arab countries in search of economic, social
religious, and political freedoms in Israel.  In 1951, 400,000 of
Israel's 1.4 million Jewish residents had been born in moslem
countries. (3)
     Perhaps the most singularly unique aspect of the war
involved Jewish military forces.  Beginning the war as light
infantry units and as partisan saboteurs, Jewish forces belonged
to three separate groups (the Haganah, the Irgun, and LEHI) and
generally were capable of conducting only company-sized
operations.  In May 1948, all of these forces were combined  to
form ZAHAL,* the Israel Defense Force (IDF).  By war's end, the
IDF was a mobile, partially mechanized, unified army capable of
conducting conventional, multi-brigade, combined arms operations.
This transformation was all the more remarkable considering that
* ZAHAL:  An abbreviation of "Zva Ha-Haganah Le-Israel", more
commonly referred to in English as the Israel Defense Force
(IDF)
it occurred during Israel's fight for survival.
     Since the war ultimately involved more than Arab and Jewish
Palestinians, any discussion of either side's advantages and
disadvantages must include the strengths and weaknesses of the
five Arab nations - Egypt, Lebanon, Syria,  Iraq, and Jordan -
that  invaded Israel  in May.  (4)
     In 1947, Arab Palestinians outnumbered their Jewish rivals
by a nearly 2-to-1 margin (1.2 million Arabs to 650,000 Jews).
With its population concentrated in Jerusalem, in coastal cities,
and in some 300 settlements clustered  in western Galilee, the
Jezreel Valley, and along the coastal  plain from Haifa in the
north to south of Tel Aviv, the Yishuv's geographic position was
tenuous at best.  Portions of the area allotted to the Jews were
either predominantly Arab or,  in the case of both western Galilee
and the Negev, were isolated from other areas of Jewish
demographic strength.   Of critical importance to the Yishuv was
the fact that Jerusalem, a religiously significant city
containing  15% of the total Jewish population of Palestine, was
in the International Area, an enclave completely surrounded by
Arab territory.   Furthermore, a large number of Jewish
settlements  (the Etzion Block)  near Jerusalem were located in
territory granted to the Arabs. (5)
     The Yishuv's geographic disadvantages were exacerbated by
several additional factors.   Even predominantly Jewish areas
contained sizable Arab populations.   While kibbutzim in those
areas occupied the fertile valleys, Arab villages were frequently
located in the hills.   Tactically, this situation not only
provided local Arabs with easily defendable terrain, those hills
often overlooked the roads linking Jewish settlements.
Additionally, the roads connecting both western Galilee and the
Negev with the coastal plains passed through territory
partitioned to the Arabs.  Consequently, these vital Jewish lines
of communication, resupply, and reinforcement were susceptible to
ambush and interdiction.  Finally, unlike Arab Palestine, the
Jewish state did not share a common border with any friendly
nation and its most secure frontier was its shoreline along the
Mediterranean.
     Despite its traditions of self-defense and partisan tactics
and its recently acquired expertise in conventional warfare, the
Yishuv's overall military posture was not particularly strong.
Although considerably better prepared than their Palestinian Arab
counterparts, on paper the Jews did not possess sufficient
military strength to oppose the military forces of Egypt, Syria,
Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan.  Theoretically, the Yishuv could
muster some 85,000 males of fighting age (18 to 32).  In reality,
the effective Jewish fighting strength as of November 1947 was a
mere 15,000.  Although the Haganah boasted a membership of
45,000, its full-time strike force, the Palmach, consisted of 4
battalions with a total force structure of only 3,000 men.  The
Haganah's remaining forces consisted of the 9,500 men and women
of the HISH and various homeguard units containing some 30,000
poorly trained and ill-equipped men, women, and teenagers who were
of little value in offensive operations.  The Haganah's military
partners did not significantly improve this bleak picture.  With
a strength of roughly 3,000 urban guerrillas, the Irgun could
barely equip and field half of its street fighters and saboteurs.
LEHI strength was estimated to be 500. (6.)
     Inadequate supplies of weapons further reduced the Yishuv's
military capabilities.  While estimates vary, the Haganah
possessed between 10-16,000 rifles of various makes and calibers
(many of which were antiquated relics dating back to before the
Arab Revolt), less than 1,000 light and medium machine guns, and
a variety of two-inch and three-inch mortars.  Many of these
weapons had been either produced locally or smuggled into the
country by Rekhesh - the Haganah's arms procurement branch.
Other weapons and related war materiel had been stolen from
British armories or hijacked from trains.  Unlike the Arab armies
that invaded Israel in May, the Haganah possessed no artillery,
no tanks, and only a meager air force consisting mainly of Piper
Cubs. (7)
     The continued British presence in Palestine adversely
affected Jewish military preparedness.  Despite its best efforts,
the Haganah was not always able to evade British arms raids -
raids that were conducted primarily against Jewish, not Arab,
arms caches. (8)  Britain's naval cordon further restricted the
Yishuv's arms procurement operations as the Royal Navy was almost
as successful in seizing illegal arms shipments as it was in
intercepting Jewish refugees.  London maintained this embargo
until the Mandate expired in May - a policy that seriously
hampered the Yishuv's ability to not only prepare for war, but to
defend itself against Arab irregular forces infiltrating
Palestine from Syria and Lebanon.  The British naval blockade had
no affect on the Arabs as most of their weapons were safely
stored in nieghboring Arab states. (9)
     Supporting the nearly 50,000 Palestinan Arab irregulars
were the "modern" armies of five Arab states whose combined
forces used in the May invasion numbered over 30,000.  These
forces included armor, artillery, and, in some instances,
aircraft.  Of particular importance was Jordan's Arab Legion.
Perhaps the best military unit in the region, this British-
trained and British-equipped force of 7,000 men was led by a
British officer, Lieutenant General Sir John Bagot Glubb -
affectionately known to his men as "Glubb Pashall.  In addition to
these conventional forces were Haj Amin's Army of Salvation,
numbering some 5,000 militants bent on conducting a jihad, and
Fawzi al-Kaukji's 5,500-man Arab Liberation Army. (10)
     Despite their superiority in men and materiel, Arab forces
lacked the organizational cohesion and tactical flexibility that
had been bred into Jewish partisan units.  Trained as colonial
European armies, their inability to either deveop or implement
innovative tactical solutions to fit the immediate situation
frequently worked against them.  Leading the successful defense
of Deganiah against invading and numerically superior Syrian
forces, Moshe Dayan took advantage of these deficiencies and
later wrote "the Syrians advanced according to the book." (11) As
Commander of the Palmach, Yigal Allon later attributed Arab
military failures to a number of related problems:
     The Arab commanders tended to be unreliable and had no
     echelon of experienced junior officers under them.  The
     various Commands were made up of often brilliant and
     brave individuals who were incapable of, and unused to
     teamwork.  Noteworthy as "hit and run" snipers, the
     Arabs did poorly whenever well-planned operations,
     requiring group effort, were called for. (12)
     Despite their demographic and geographic advantages and
their quantitative superiority in men and materiel, the Arabs
were unable to implement a coordinated plan for the conquest of
Jewish Palestine.  This failure contributed greatly to the Arab's
ultimate defeat and was rooted in the intense political rivalries
between the "allied" Arab states - each of which feared the
territorial and political ambitions of the other.  Appointed in
April as the Arab commander of all invading forces, King Abdullah
of Jordan, later wrote:
     Unity of command existed in name only and the Commander
     in Chief (Abdullah) was not permitted to inspect the
     forces which were supposed to be under him.  The Arab
     troops entered Palestine and their lack of progress,
     their confusion and absence of preparation, were
     complete. ... History will record the consequences (of
     this invasion) with pain and regret, the grandsons of
     these men will blush with shame at the deeds of their
     grandsires. (13)
     Central in these disputes were Haj Amin, now living in
Lebanon, and King Abdullah.  As members of the Arab League, an
organization formed in 1944 to promote Arab unity and to ensure
that "the rights of the Arabs in Palestine could not be infringed
upon without danger to the peace and stability of the Arab
world", both men sought the League's approval of their individual
designs on Palestine. (14)  Haj Amin demanded that the League
transfer complete control of Arab Palestine's political affairs
to his Higher Arab Committee and that one of his deputies be
appointed to the League's general staff.  Not particularly
anxious to establish a Palestinian state under the Muft is
political and religious control, the League rejected his demands
in February 1948. (15)
     King Abdullah, on the other hand, had visions of annexing
Arab Palestine, an ambition Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Haj
Amin adamantly opposed.  Since one of Abdullah's goals was the
creation of a Jordanian-Syrian federation under his control, the
Syrian, quite naturally, took a dim view of Abdullah's
Palestinian aspirations.  Saudi Arabia and Egypt opposed
Abdullah's territorial ambitions - the former for fear that
Jordanian control of the Negev Desert would threaten Saudi
interests on the Red Sea and the later for fear that such
territorial gains would provide Jordan with direct access to both
the Sinai and the Mediterranean Sea.  For obvious political
reasons, Haj Amin opposed Abdullah's grand territorial
aspirations. (16)
     While discouraging Abdullah's Syrian designs, London quietly
supported his plans to annex Arab Palestine.  Already enjoying
relatively close ties with the Jordanian monarch, the British
were initially quite confident that:
     in the long run the Jews would not be able to cope
     with the Arabs and would be thrown out of Palestine
     unless they came to terms with them. (17)
Preferring not to deal with the radical and unreliable Haj Amin,
London believed that Abdullah's annexation of Arab Palestine
would ultimately lead to his control of all of Palestine and
would, therefore, help safeguard regional British interests.
Whitehall also concluded that British support of the King would
help maintain its solid relationship with a future Arab power. (18)
However, as the Arab military position in Palestine slowly
decayed during the spring of 1948, Abdullah's neighbors, highly
suspicious of his plans to annex only Arab Palestine, pressured
him to join the combined invasion.
     Unlike the Arabs, the Yishuv was united in purpose and
viewed the coming hostilities as a war of survival.  Having
survived the Holocaust, Jewish resolve was best epitomized in the
words of Enzo Sereni .  A Palmach commando parachuted into Italy
and later executed at Dachau, Sereni wrote:
     If we want to live, we must be ready to die, and to
     kill, to go out towards the looming dangers ... even
     in death, there are the seeds of life. (19)
     Given the war's diplomatic, political, and military
complexities, the best way to examine the conflict is to divide
it into four periods:
           - Phase One - 29 November 1947 through late March 1948;
           - Phase Two - early April to 15 May;
           - Phase Three - 16 May to 11 June; and
           - Phase four - 11 June 1948 through January 1949.
While it is not possible to examine these phases in detail, the
following paragraphs provide a brief discussion of the
significant events that took place during each phase.  This
discussion will then be used to briefly analyze the evolution of
the Israel Defense force and to examine Moshe Dayan' s
participation in that war. (20)
     The dominant characteristics of Phase One were the chaos
created by the British withdrawal and the Yishuv's inability to
seize the military initiative.  Throughout this period, London
was concerned with the safe evacuation of its forces, a
withdrawal designed to protect British lives.  On 11 December,
the British Foreign Office announced that the Mandate's civil
administration would end on 15 May and that British military
units would be withdrawn in a phased operation commencing in
February and ending by 31 July.  The Foreign Office also
announced that while Britain would not obstruct the United
Nations partition plan, it would neither assist in implementing
that plan nor permit its troops to maintain law and order in
evacuated areas. (21)
     This policy, London's continued enforcement of Mandate
regulations in those areas from which British authority had not
yet been withdrawn, and the sequence of the British withdrawal -
first from Arab-held territories, then from mixed territories,
and lastly from predominantly Jewish territories - prompted Yigal
Allon to later charge that the British withdrawal was phased:
     in accordance not only with the organizational
     requirements of the British Army, but with those of
     the Arabs. ... The British planned their evacuation
     in such a manner that it would be easy for the Arabs
     to take over from them. (22)
     But as the tempo of fighting between Arabs and Jews
increased, London accelerated its withdrawal.  Since the precise
withdrawal schedule was not announced to either side, however,
unexpected British evacuations created a political and military
vacuum - a vacuum that produced chaos.  As the British withdrew
from major cities like Jerusalem, Haifa, Safed, and Jaffa, street
fighting erupted.  Sometimes lasting for days, these bloody
encounters killed hundreds.
     Militarily, British withdrawal policies forced the Haganah
High Command to employ tactics that complimented Arab strategy.
Realizing the simplest way to defeat the Jews was to isolate
their settlements, the Arabs quickly blocked key road networks
running through their territories thereby force the Haganah to
resupply and reinforce those settlements using convoys. Acting in
accordance with existing policy, British troops usually refused
to allow either side to occupy territory not ceded to them under
the partition plan.  Prevented from securing terrain overlooking
roads that ran through Arab territory or that connected Jewish
settlements within Arab territory, the Haganah was forced to
defend individual convoys - a costly and manpower intensive
tactic that could not break the Arab's strangle hold.  Arab forces
quickly laid siege to the Jewish quarter of Jerusalem and to the
Etzion Block settlements.  Repeated Jewish attempts to relieve
those beleaguered communities were largely ineffective and
ultimately led to the loss of both Jerusalem and the Etzion
settlements.
     With the Arabs possessing the initiative and with elements
of al-Kaukji's Arab Liberation Army infiltrating Palestine, the
Jewish situation deteriorated rapidly during the first three
months of 1948.  With casualties sustained in the defense of
individual settlements and in running Arab ambushes and blockades
reaching unacceptable levels (during the last week of March 100
Jews were killed trying to keep the roads open), some members of
the Haganah High Command suggested abandoning isolated or
outlying communities.  This move, they argued, would conserve
limited military resources while a lowing Jewish forces to
concentrate in vital areas.  Ben-Gurion, the acting Minister of
Defense, emphatically rejected this proposal as did Yigal Yadin,
the army's Chief of Operations. (23)
     Remembering the lessons of the Arab Revolt, Yadin advocated
launching quick strikes against Arab bases and supply depots and
even suggested that the bridges linking Palestine with Syria and
the Transjordan be destroyed to stem the influx of Arab
"volunteers" pouring into Palestine.  While the Haganah was not
yet capable of implementing this bold suggestion, Yadin's proposal
resulted in the development of "Plan D" whose strategic goals
were:
      To gain control of all the area allotted to the Jewish
      State and defend its borders, and those of the blocks
      of Jewish settlements and such Jewish population as
      were outside those borders, against a regular or para-
      regular enemy operating from bases outside or inside
      the area of the Jewish state. (24)
Calling for the permanent seizure of Arab villages as well as
Arab territory containing Jewish settlements, "Plan D" and the
various operations conducted in its implementation have often
been cited as one of the principle reasons for the mass migration
of Arabs out of Palestine. (25)
      The implementation of "Plan D" marked the end of Phase One.
On 3 April, the Haganah, with Palmach support, launched
"Operation Nachshon", the first of 39 offensive operations Jewish
forces conducted during the war.  The operation's objective was
to open a supply corridor running from the coastal plains to both
Jerusalem and the Etzion Block settlements.  To accomplish this,
Jewish forces were required to seize and hold key terrain along
the winding road leading to Jerusalem.  Although Jewish forces
had previously operated only in company-sized formations, a
mobile brigade was quickly formed and for two weeks it fought to
clear the road.  While relief columns did reach Jerusalem, Arab
forces launched a series counterattacks and resealed the road.
Despite this failure and the significant logistics problems
encountered during the operation, "Nashchon" marked a significant
turning point in the war.  It not only demonstrated that Jewish
forces could conduct offensive operations at the brigade level
"Operation Nashchon" signaled the end of the defensive mindset
that had paralyzed the Jewish war effort. (26)
     Unfortunately, the first of many of atrocities were
committed during the operation.  On 9 April, Begin's Irgun,
supported with LEHI elements, attacked Deir Yassin, a small Arab
village located on the outskirts of Jerusalem.  During the
fighting, over 200 Arab villagers were slaughtered.  Claiming the
villagers fired first, Begin argued that the capture of Deir
Yassin was vital to operation.  Ben-Gurion was outraged and
condemned both massacre and its perpetrators.  On 13 April, the
Arabs retaliated.  Attacking a medical convoy headed for
Jerusalem, Arabs butchered some 80 doctors and nurses.  Although
British troops were stationed less than one mile away, they took
no action. (27)
     With "Operation Nashchon" striking at Jerusalem, Yigal
Allon's Palmach launched attacks in northern Palestine and
cleared Arab forces from Safed and western Galilee. (26.)  By
early May, "Plan D's" objectives had been largely accomplished.
With the exception of Jerusalem and the hilly regions of central
Palestine running south from Galilee to Samaria and Judea, Jewish
forces held most of the territory allocated to the Yishuv under
the United Nations partition plan as well as some Arab territory
containing Jewish farming communities.
     With the formal termination of the British Mandate on 14
May, Ben-Gurion promptly announced the formation of the State of
Israel.  The Arabs, having already met in April to develop
invasion plans, quickly launched their offensive - an invasion
designed to rescue Palestinan Arabs and to protect each invading
nation's regional interests.  The invasion marked the end of
Phase Two as the Arabs regained the initiative.
     Attacking from Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt, the Arab
invasion lacked crisp coordination and sound execution.  Instead
of bypassing outlying Jewish settlements, Syrian and Egyptian
forces usually engaged those communities in time consuming
attacks.  Although the Egyptian forces fought their way to within
20 miles of Tel Aviv, their refusal to skirt fortified kibbutzim
seriously retarded their offensive thrust and allowed Jewish
forces to form 501 id defensive positions on key terrain
protecting the southern approaches to Tel Aviv.  Syrian attacks
made even less progress and Lebanese forces were quickly
expelled.  The Arab Legion, perhaps in the best position to cut
Israel in half with a quick thrust to the coast, generally
confined its activities to consolidating Jordanian control over
what is now referred to as the West Bank.  This prompted Haj Amin
to vehemently condemn King Abdullah and brand him a traitor to
the Arab cause.  The combined Arab attacks continued until 11
June when the first United Nations truce went into affect.
     While this brief summary might suggest that the Jewish
forces handled the invading Arab armies with relative ease,
nothing could be further from the truth.  Although Jewish
settlements had effectively delayed many of the Arab advances
thereby permitting Jewish forces to shift their 12, newly-formed
mobile brigades to stop all major attacks, Israel's position was
desperate.  During the truce, its position was precarious at best.
Click here to view images
Like the Arabs, Israel took advantage of the 30-day truce to
rest and rearm its forces.  However, the new state also used the
ceasefire to complete several other vital tasks.  Israel used the
respite to complete the reorganization of its military forces
begun on 26 May with the creation of the Israel Defense force
(IDF) - a consolidation that combined all Jewish military and
para-military organizations under a single, national command.  No
longer under British restrictions, Israel also intensified its
efforts to acquire additional weapons as well as to absorb the
arms and immigrants that had begun to pour into it sports
following the British withdrawal.  Finally, the new IDF general
staff carefully studied the experiences of the previous six
months and developed plans for resuming the war once the truce
expired.  Taking advantage of Israel's interior lines and the
Arabs inability to prosecute a coordinated military campaign, the
IDF decided to regain the initiative and keep the Arabs off-
balance by launching a series of operations requiring rapid
shifting of concentrated combat power from one sector to another.
Each shift would result in a concentrated assault designed to
regain lost territory, relieve threatened settlements, and defeat
their numerically superior opponents.
     These preparations resulted in "Operation Dani", Israel's
first counter-offensive since the 15 May Arab invasion.  Since
that offensive helped to permanently regain the initiative for
Israeli forces, it is not unreasonable to infer that Phase four
began 11 June 1948 and ended in January 1949 when the Egyptians
were outmaneuvered and defeated in the eastern Sinai .  During the
next 7 months of bitter fighting, the IDF successfully defeated
each Arab army and neutralized the guerrilla forces operating
within Israel's borders.  Building on its experiences and
learning from its mistakes, the IDF launched operation after
operation, each more finely tuned and more crisply executed than
the last.  As its expertise grew, so did the size of its
operations and by the end of the war, the IDF was capable of
planning and executing highly mobile, partially mechanized,
combined arms, multi-brigade attacks.
     This evolutionary transformation of Jewish military
capabilities was the result of a complex melding process begun
with the creation of the IDF in late May 1948.  Containing every
Jewish military organization from the Haganah and the Palmach to
the Irgun, and from LEHI to the veterans of the Jewish Brigade
and the British army, the IDF was the product of the fusion of
two distinct, yet complimentary military traditions.
     The Jewish Brigade and the other Jewish veterans of the
British army represented one of these military traditions.
British military training, organization, and combat techniques
had been inculcated into the Jewish Brigade, thereby forming the
IDF's traditional or "military purist" foundation.  Knowledgeable
in brigade level tactics and combat service support requirements
for large scale offensive operations, these veterans of
conventional war used their technical talents and staff planning
skills to correct the logistical and coordination problems that
had plagued many of the earlier Jewish operations.  By
harnessing, but not constraining, the aggressive spirit and
collective abilities of the Jewish underground, these forgotten
heroes enhanced the IDF's ability to wage conventional war in a
doctrinally unconventional manner.   (29)
     This foundation was complimented by the Haganah's partisan
approach to war.  Emphasizing individual  and small unit combat
skills, the Haganah and its elite shock companies, the Palmach,
had fostered the development of non-traditional military tactics
that were neither based upon nor hampered by a stable rear-area
with its dependence on secure routes of communication, resupply,
and transportation.   While the fusion of the "purist" and the
partisan approaches to combat was not an easy process, the
melding of those foundations provided the Israel Defense force
with its unique and highly effective approach to combat.  (30)
     As the size and complexity of Israeli operations increased
and as the number of Jewish soldiers rose from 15,000 regulars  in
November 1947 to nearly 80,000 in October 1948, the army's
command structure underwent a series of modifications.  Each of
these evolutionary changes attempted to provide better
coordination and greater flexibility in both offensive and
defensive operations.   In February 1948, Ben-Gurion, the acting
Minister of Defense, divided Palestine into nine military
districts with each district sitting astride probable  invasion
routes.   These districts contained a "mix-master" of various
Haganah units from Palmach and HISH battalions to local self-
defense units, all of which reported to the district commander
who,  in turn, received his orders from the Haganah High Command.
While this arrangement was adequate during the defensive battles
of February and March, it proved too inflexible when Jewish
forces launched their offensives in April  and May.   During those
operations, the High Command found it difficult to coordinate
actions between districts, to effectively control mult-brigade
operations within a district, to solve debilitating combat
service support problems, and to settle command relationship
disputes between Palmach commanders and district commanders.
     Following the creation of the IDF, Ya'akov Dori , the IDF
Chief-of-Staff, and his Chief-of-Operations, Yigal Yadin, took
advantage of the first United Nations truce and established a
layer of intermediate commands between the districts and the IDF
headquarters.  Those commands were responsible for coordinating
multi-unit operations within a district and for efficiently
controlling military actions involving two or more districts.
While increasing operational flexibility and reducing confusion,
even this command and control arrangement proved too cumbersome.
In the fall, shortly after Ben-Gurion disbanded the Palmach, IDF
units were divided between four commands - the Northern, Central,
Southern, and the Jerusalem fronts - each of which contained a
staff of sufficient quality and size to efficiently direct
military campaigns within their areas of geographic
responsibility. (31)
     Despite this imposition of a formal command and control
structure rooted in the traditional or "military purist"
foundation, commanders within those fronts were expected to lead
their units in the partisan tradition.  Once given a mission (or
aim), each unit was expected to push and to fight on in one
continuous battle (maintain) until the assigned objective was
gained.  While front commanders developed the overall concept of
operations and provided subordinate commanders with their  aim
maximum discretion was given to unit commanders who were held
responsible for the "maintenance" (attacks) required to secure
that aim.  Commonly referred to as "maintenance of aim" or
"maintenance of the objective", this loosely-structured
battlefield command and control system relied heavily on the
small unit leader's daring, resourcefulness, fighting spirit, and
sound judgment.  During the Sinai Campaign of 1956, Moshe Dayan,
a great proponent of this "structured-partisan" approach to war,
provided the following description of its use:
     Our units must stick to "maintenance of aim", and
     continue to advance until their objective is gained.
     They must therefore be self-contained, carrying with
     them all they will need to reach their final target,
     and not be dependent on outside supplies.  Once the
     roads are clear, they must press forward and not stop
     to clean up isolated enemy positions.  We should avoid
     analogies whereby Egyptian units would be expected to
     behave as European armies would in similar
     circumstances. (32)
     Although he eventually became the IDF Chief-of-Staff, Moshe
Dayan best epitomizes the IDF is partisan traditions.  While
recognizing the importance of the "purist" military tradition,
Dayan believed that the values and spirit of the IDF's "partisan"
tradition were of the utmost importance and throughout his
career, he fostered and nurtured that tradition.  When asked what
Dayan's greatest strengths and weaknesses were, one Israeli
general replied:
     Dayan's greatest contribution was in the field of
     developing the IDF's fighting spirit and self-
     sacrifice, initiative, inventiveness and original
     thinking. .. . Dayan's main weakness was perhaps a
     certain disregard for the subjects of logistics, order
     and discipline; the rights and obligations of regular
     and reserve soldiers, and his tendency to ignore
     orderly staff procedures. (33)
These remarks underscore the importance Dayan placed on reviving
and maintaining the IDF's partisan heritage within the confines
of conventional, "traditional" war.
     Although Dayan fought in three separate actions - the
defense of Deganiah against the Syrians in May 1948, "Operation
Dani" against the Arab Legion in July, and later in that month
against the Egyptians in the Negev desert - "Operation Dani"
provides the best example of his tactical skills and aggressive
style of combat leadership, traits that he demanded his officers
and NCO's adopt during his tenure as IDF Chief-of-Staff. (34)
     Dayan began the war as the Haganah's Staff Officer for Arab
Affairs, a post he had held since early 1947.  Since his earliest
childhood, Dayan had developed a special interest in and felt
deep compass ion for Palestinian Arabs and, as an adult, was one
of the few Israeli leaders who bothered to learn Arabic.  While
not completely understanding Dayan's special relationship with
his Arab neighbors, the Haganah asked him to gather intelligence
information regarding various Arab families and how those clans
would react when war came to Palestine.  While little is written
concerning the effectiveness of his operation, in March 1948 he
provided a great service to his nation.
     In that month, his younger brother was killed while
defending a settlement in northern Palestine against Druze
militia operating under Fawzi al-Kaukji is command.  After the
battle, Dayan met with the Druze leader and not only persuaded
him to withdraw his units from al-Kaukji's control, but to also
enter the war on Israel's side!  After Israel's War of
Independence, the Druze living in northern Israel demanded that
they be allowed to-serve in the IDF, a request that was
immediately granted. (35)
     In May, Yitzhak Sadeh invited Dayan to form an independent
raiding battalion that would operate as part of his 8th Armored
Brigade.  Dayan eagerly accepted the challenge but before he
could organize his battalion, the Haganah High Command sent him
to Galilee to coordinate the district's defense against the
invading Syrians.  Although he had been instructed that the
troops in the Jordan Valley did not come under his command, after
meeting with the district commander and fully appreciating the
gravity of the Jewish position, Dayan:
     ceased to be bothered by who was subordinate to whom.
     The situation appeared to be so desperate that the
     problem was not who was to give orders but what was to
     be done. (36)
     Displaying a characteristic disregard for formal chains of
command, Dayan personally led the defense of Deganiah - the first
kibbutz founded in Israel and also his birthplace - against a
numerically superior Syrian force equipped with tanks, artillery,
and aircraft.  In a 9-hour battle on 20 May, Dayan's tiny force
not only held Deganiah, but forced the Syrians to retreat.  This
epic stand brought Dayan instant fame and national acclaim at a
time when Israel's prospects of survival appeared to be non-
existent.
     Following the stunning victory at Deganiah, Dayan began
organizing the 89th Commando Battalion.  Equipped with half-
tracks and Jeeps, the 89th Commando Battalion's primary function
was, in Dayan's words: "to penetrate deep into enerny territory
and operate behind enemy lines." (37)  This mission suited Dayan
perfectly for it allowed him to operate in an environment that
demanded independent action - an environment that suited both his
partisan training and his partisan talents.
     With Israel short of equipment and with its trained
personnel already assigned to combat units, Dayan formed his
battalion in a most unorthodox, yet at that time accepted manner.
Although selected brigades had been ordered to provide his unit
with a quota of 40 prospective recruits each, Dayan frequently
persuaded men from other units to join his battalion - a practice
that infuriated commander's whose units had already been depleted
in combat.  During the first United Nations truce, the IDF
general staff ended this practice by strictly regulating the
formation of new units and by establishing a mobilization system
that funneled new troops into existing units.  Dayan's approach
to gathering equipment was equally novel.  He authorized and
occasionally led his growing band in the theft of civilian and
military jeeps. (38)
     Dayan is reliance on the partisan approach to war was also
evidenced in the different priorities he established while
forming his battalion.  Dayan carefully screened each prospective
recruit since he was primarily concerned with finding men full
of:
     confidence and fighting spirit, the will to get into
     action and strike the enemy.  This was the very
     quality I was looking for and I did everything to
     encourage it. (39)
When it came to administrative, logistical, and combat service
support matters, Dayan took a different approach:
     I left them (those matters) to my deputy, Yohanan
     Peltz, an experienced officer who had served in the
     Jewish Brigade of the British army in the world war
     and who was more of an "organization man," more
     familiar with administration and logistics. (40)
By late June, his battalion of 350 hand-picked men was organized
and ready for action.  Consisting of five companies - one jeep,
two mechanized infantry, one support/reconnaissance, and one
command - Dayan later wrote that some of these companies were
"hardly larger than a platoon." (41)
     Shortly thereafter, Ben-Gurion asked Dayan to represent
Israel at the funeral of Colonel David "Mickey" Marcus.  A West
Point graduate who had volunteered his services in Israel's
battle for survival, Marcus had been accidentally killed by his
own troops near Jerusalem.  Dayan did not return to Israel from
the United States until 9 July, a few hours before the truce was
to expire.  While in New York, Dayan met with Abraham J. Baum who
had served in the 4th Armored Division under Colonel Creighton
Abrams.  Since Dayan had no experience in mechanized warfare, the
two men discussed various theories on the subject and to Dayan's
amazement:
     Baum's words fitted my own ideas, and I still remember
     our conversation.  He preached the supreme importance
     of speed and mobility in battle.  According to him, it
     was best not to undertake preliminary reconnaissance
     patrols to the projected target of attack, for the
     information thus received was usually meager, and by
     tipping off the enemy, the element of surprise was
     lost.  It was best to go straight to the assault
     positions, with the reconnaissance unit moving ahead,
     observing, sensing, feeling out the situation,
     reporting back, and guiding the main force.  Baum's
     experience was born of a different kind of war, but
     several of his points seemed to me to be applicable
     to us, too.  One was the need to maintain continuous
     movement.  Another was to have the commander direct
     the action from the front line so that he could see
     what was happening with his own eyes, rather than rely
     on second hand-reports. (42)
Baum also urged Dayan to concentrate his force in narrow
penetration formations and to use his unit's fire power more as
"a psychological factor than as a weapon of death." (43)
     Baum's idea of directing the battle from the front line also
coincided with Dayan's concept of a commander's proper role in
combat.  Having always advocated and practiced this belief from
his early days as a Haganah instructor through his active
participation in the defense of Deganiah, Dayan was dismayed with
other IDF commanders who "stayed at the rear base and `directed'
the battle from there."  He privately wondered:
     how it was possible to "control the operation" without
     being on the spot with one's own battalion.  It was
     possible to receive reports and transmit orders by
     radio, but a commander could lead a unit into battle
     only by fighting with them, not by remote control, and
     not by sitting safely in the rear ordering one's men
     to storm the enemy. (44)
     Returning to Israel on 9 July, just a few hours before the
start of "Operation Dani", Dayan was quickly briefed on the
overall operation and the 89th Commando Battalion's specific
mission.  Led by Yigal Allon and directed against the Arab
Legion, the two-phased, multi-brigade operation was planned to
accomplish the following tasks - relieve Jerusalem, push the Arab
Legion back from its positions near Tel Aviv, secure the Lod
airport, and provide the IDF with better defensive positions from
which future attacks would be launched.  During phase one, the
towns of Lod (Lydda) and Ramle were to be seized in a pincer
movement with one arm moving from the north and linking up with
the southern thrust near the besieged Jewish settlement of Ben
Shemen.  During the second phase, Arab fortifications at Latrun
and Ramallah were to be captured thereby opening a portion of the
road leading to Jerusalem.  Dayan's 89th Commando Battalion was
to strike from the north and seize the Arab villages of Kula
Click here to view image
(Kule), Tira, and Deir Tarif, all of which were opposite the
defensive positions occupied by Glubb Pasha's Arab Legion. (45)
     Linking up with his unit on the evening of the 9th, Dayan
quickly changed the battalion's operational plan developed in his
absence by Yohanan Peltz, his executive officer and a former
officer on the Jewish Brigade.  According to Dayan, Peltz's
scheme was a "good plan for fighting against a European Regular
Army.  But we were fighting Arabs, not Germans. "  Additionally,
Dayan did not particularly care for the "long softening up
preparation by our 81mm mortars.  I favored the quick dash." (46)
     Dividing his battalion so that it could strike Kula and Tira
simultaneously on the 10th, Dayan was dissatisfied with the
battalion's excessive reliance on indirect weapons.
     Instead of diving full expression to its fighting
     capacity, flinging its entire weight against the
     target, using all of its firepower, and storming the
     enemy's positions, the battalion merely fired off half
     a dozen mortars.  This was not the real thing.
     Something had to be done.  So I went over to Akiva
     Sa'ar [the company commander leading the assault on
     Kula] and told him to stop using kid gloves.  He
     should break into Kula without delay, and I would
     take the second company and storm the neighboring
     village or Tira. (47)
Both villages fell and before dark, the Arab strong point at Deir
Tarif some two miles south of Tira was also in Moshe's hands.
     During the evening, Dayan was summoned to Tel Aviv and in a
meeting with Ben-Gurion, was offered command of the Jerusalem
Sector.  Dayan refused the request since:
     Under no circumstances would I wish to leave it [the
     89th], relinquishing command of a combat unit with the
     responsibility of personally leading it into action.
     In the Jerusalem Command I would be ordering others to
     fight.  Here I would be fighting together with my men. (48)
     Returning to his unit the next morning,  11 July, Dayan found
that the battalion had been dispersed between Tira and Deir Tarif
with portions of his unit assigned to positions previously held
by the 82nd Tank Battalion.  Dayan was furious!
     I failed to understand why the 82nd Tank Battalion had
     retired and how a jeep unit was expected to fight armor
     without any armor of its own. ... What angered me most
     was that instead of using our battalion as a concentrated
     iron fist, spitting fire and storming the enemy, it had
     been broken up and used piecemeal, some detachments
     being assigned to guard Arab villages that had already
     been captured. (49)
     Reassembling his command, Dayan surveyed the situation.
Looking south from a vantage point atop a hill, Dayan could see
the Arab Legion's positions to the east and "Operation Dani's
phase one objective (the town of Lod) three-and-one-half miles to
the south.  With no enemy forces between his position and the
eastern approaches to Lod, Dayan quickly developed a plan for an
assault on that key village.  Leaving half of the battalion at
Deir Tarif to tie down the Arab Legion, Dayan planned to lead  150
men in a quick strike against Lod.   (50)
     At that moment, however, fate intervened, not once, but
twice.  First, the commander of the Yiftak Brigade, the unit
previously designated to capture Lod with an attack from the
southwest, radioed Dayan and mistaking the 89th Commandos for a
tank battalion, asked Dayan if he could support the attack?
Never informing the brigade commander of his mistake, Dayan's
immediate response was an unqualified "Yes."  Second, Dayan's men
retrieved a disabled Jordanian armored car mounting a 2-pound
cannon.  Renamed "The Terrible Tiger", the vehicle led Dayan's
column in its assault.
     The rest is history.  Ordering his men that if the column's
lead elements were stopped, the rest of the column would "deploy
promptly to the flanks and storm the enemy position from a
sides", Dayan successfully led an attack against both Lod and
Ramle.  Mounted on only half-tracks and jeeps and with "The
Terrible Tiger" in the lead, Dayan's men stormed through strong
Arab positions on the northern outskirts of Lod, raced through
the town firing in all directions, and exited Lod to the south.
After streaking through Ramle, Dayan reassembled his unit, turned
the column around, and retraced its path back through both towns,
again firing in all directions.  The speed, ferocity, and
unexpected nature of the attack so demoralized the Arab defenders
that many of them hastily retreated to the east and to safety -
enabling the Yiftak Brigade to capture Lod as originally planned.
Although this daring attack had been conducted in full daylight,
the 89th Commando Battalion's casualties were only 9 killed and
17 wounded.
     Once again, Dayan was acclaimed as a national hero and once
again Ben-Gurion asked him to take command of the Jerusalem
Sector.  Dayan declined the offer.  Briefly describing his
private meeting with Ben-Gurion, Dayan wrote:
     He [Ben-Gurion] did not agree with my implied thesis
     that the best way to get past the first line of enemy
     positions was through the fast and daring dash.  To
     him, an attack should be planned and carried out
     methodically and steadily like the movement of a
     steamroller.  We ended our brief exchange with him
     regarding me as a bold enough commander but somewhat
     of a partisan, and my regarding him a wise and
     inspiring political leader who had learned and heard
     much of the Arabs and of war, but who had no close,
     personal, first-hand knowledge of either.  He knew
     about them, but he did not know them.   (51)
     Despite these differences, Ben-Gurion continued to pressure
Dayan to take command of the Jerusalem Sector.  In August 1948,
after leading the 89th in action against the Egyptians in the
Negev Desert and after being promoted to Lieutenant Colonel,
Dayan accepted Ben-Gurion's offer.  This marked an important
turning point in Dayan's career.  Spending the rest of the war
negotiating with the Jordanians over ceasefire lines, Joint
peacekeeping operations, truces, and prisoner exchanges, the post
provided Dayan with his first real taste of politics and
diplomacy and forever cemented his relationship with Ben-Gurion,
Israel's first Prime Minister.  (52)
     Dayan's political association with Ben-Gurion began during
the during the dark days of the "saison".  In 1944, Dayan
rejoined the Haganah and taking part in the "saison", described
it as "a very unhappy season."  While neither Dayan nor his
biographer, Shabtai Teveth, describe his precise role in the
affair, Dayan did hold discussions with Begin and his
subordinates.  Although understanding their motivations and
respecting their spirit of self-sacrifice, Dayan wrote:
     I remained a "Haganah" man in the eyes of these men of
     the dissident underground.  I was completely at one in
     my way of thinking and my actions with the path marked
     out by Ben-Gurion who was firmly opposed to the
     dissidents and called for an end to their terror
     activities. (53)
It is not known whether or not Dayan's firm stance brought him to
Ben-Gurion's attention.  What is known is that by 1945, Dayan had
made an important politcal decision in choosing to actively
support Ben-Gurion and his policies.
     In 1946, Dayan officially joined Ben-Gurion's Mapai Party
and in December, he attended the 22nd World Zionist Congress held
in Basle.  During that conference, Ben-Gurion and Weizmann
clashed one last time over whether the Yishuv should actively
pursue its national goals independent of London or whether Jews
should adopt Weizmann's policies of moderation and cooperation
with London.  As in 1942 at the Biltmore Conference, Ben-Guirion
won.  Describing himself as an "enthusiastic `Ben-Gurionst'",
Dayan fully supported:
     the activist line urged by Ben-Gurion, in contrast to
     Chaim Weizmann's policy of moderation toward the
     British administration.  The World War had ended,
     Hitler had been defeated, and there was no point in
     continuing to cooperate with the British, who harshly
     restricted Jewish immigration into Palestine and
     Jewish settlement and development in the country.  In
     my view, this (Ben-Gurion's) approach included not
     all defense matters but all Zionist aims, particularly
     land settlement and immigration. (54)
At the conference, Dayan addressed an internal meeting of the
Mapai Party delegation and expressed his complete support of Ben-
Gurion's activist approach.  Apparently pleased with these
comments, Ben-Gurion publicly endorsed Dayan's "wide definition
of `activism'".
     While Ben-Gurion later claimed that he did not know Dayan
until May 1948, both Ya'akov Dori and Yigal Yadin state
otherwise.  During 1947 and 1948, these future Israel Defense
force Chief's-of-Staff were ranking member of the Haganah High
Command and Dayan worked for them as the Haganah Officer for Arab
Affairs.  Both men recall that Dayan not only had free access to
Ben-Gurion through these years, but that he frequently exercised
that privilege without their prior knowledge or approval.  Even
as a junior staff officer, Moshe Dayan displayed his
characteristic disregard for formal chains of command and proper
command relationships - traits he carried with him as he rose
through the ranks to become IDf Chief-of-Staff. (55)
     The important thing to remember about Dayan's formal entry
into politics - joining the Mapai Party, publicly praising Ben
Gurion's "activist" approach, and his free access to the Head of
the Jewish Agency while only a junior staff officer - is that
Ben-Gurion and Dayan formed an exceptionally strong political
relationship before Israel's War of Independence.  This
relationship later provided Dayan with an "inside edge" over his
Haganah contemporaries, an edge that in 1953 resulted in Ben-
Gurion's appointment of Dayan as IDF Chief-of-Staff.
     This does not argue that Dayan was unqualified for that
position or that his selection was made at the expense of other,
more qualified professionals.  Instead, the unbreakable political
bond between Dayan and Ben-Gurion complimented and strengthened
Dayan's growing military reputation to such an extent that prior
to his first retirement as Israel's Prime Minister in January
1954, Ben-Gurion selected Dayan as Chief-of-Staff - an
appointment frequently interpreted as Ben-Gurion's way of
perpetuatirig his national policies. (56)
     This political bond had been formed and later tested during
a particularly sensitive era.  While Ben-Gurion recognized that
Israel's external security rested on the strength of its military
forces, he demanded that those forces fully support Israel's
elected government.  To Ben-Gurion, the last problem Israel
needed to face was that of a highly political military force (or
forces) committed to political, not national goals.
Consequently, many of the actions he took against the Irgun and
later against the Palmach were the direct result of his beliefs
regarding military-civilian relations.  The "saison" had not
endeared Ben-Gurion with Begin's right-wing Irgun.  Ben-Gurion's
concerns over the Palmach's leftist tendencies also made him
suspicious of that organization's political intentions and would,
in October 1948, influence his controversial decision to disband
that elite force.
     The Palmach's founding father, Yitzhak Sadeh, had the
reputation of a social revolutionary and Tabenkin, the individual
whose proposal rescued the Palmach in late 1942, was an avowed
Marxist.  To further complicate matters, Yigal Allon, appointed
Palmach Commander in 1945, had broken away from Mapai in 1942 and
in 1944, had helped form a separate labor party which, in 1948,
became Mapam*  - Israel's communist party.  Furthermore, nearly
40% of the Palmach's rank and file either belonged to or were
associated with Tabenkin's leftist kibbutzim federation.
Although a member of Mapai, Ben-Gurion was also Head of the
Jewish Agency and neither of these organizations had political
authority over the Palmach.  While the Palmach voluntarily agreed
to submit to the Agency's and not Ben-Gurion's authority during
the revolt against England, given its close ties with Mapam, it is
not surprising that Ben-Gurion accepted Dayan's support and, in
later years, rewarded him for both his loyalty and his
demonstrated abilities. (57)
     But in politically tense situations, loyalty is often earned
through action, not words.  On 21 June 1948, during the first
* MAPAM:  Israel's Communist Party.
United Nations truce, Dayan physically demonstrated his loyalty
to Ben-Gurion during the "Altalena Affair". (58)
     For several years, Ben-Gurion had regarded the Irgun "as a
dangerous source of dissidence and was determined to destroy it
as a military organization." (59)  Although he had tried to rid
the Yishuv of Begin's Revisionist para-military group during the
"saison", his efforts had failed.
     When Israel declared its independence in May, Dayan, like
Ben-Gurion, "assumed that the Irgun would submit to the
jurisdiction of the Israeli government." (60)  However, in mid-
June 1948, Ben-Gurion and the IDF learned of a covert Irgun
weapons smuggling operation - an operation whose purpose was to
arm only Begin's forces.  Echoing Ben-Gurion's angry sentiments,
Dayan wrote:
     This act could only be viewed as an irresponsible and
     wanton act of defiance of governmental authority, and
     it had to be vigorously and speedily dealt with. (61)
     While other units had been ordered to intercept the weapons
as soon as the Irgun began transferring them from the ship to the
beaches north of Tel Aviv, those units refused to take action
against their fellow Jews.  In what Teveth describes as "the
government's search for loyal units", the IDF turned to Sadeh who
then tasked Dayan with the mission.  Deciding not to involve
those troops in his battalion who were former members of LEHI,
Dayan is force surrounded the Irgun position on the night of 21
June.  Informing the Irgunists that they were surrounded and
ordering them to surrender, the Irgun opened fire.  Following a
deadly exchange of gurifire and mortars that killed two of Dayan's
men and wounded six others, the ship weighed anchor and steamed
to Tel Aviv where it was promptly seized.  All of the weapons
captured on the beach were promptly returned to IDF armories
     This event so impressed Ben-Gurion that he immediately
pressed Dayan to take command of the more prestigious Jerusalem
Sector.  Although not particularly anxious to leave his
battalion, Dayan ultimately accepted the honor and at Ben-
Gurion's request, conducted numerous negotiations with ranking
members of the Jordanian military, with diplomats representing
the Jordanian government, and even with King Abdullah himself.
     Performing these duties with brilliance and with tact,
Dayan's public image changed from that of a "partisan fighter" to
that of a "soldier statesman".  Of even greater importance, Ben-
Gurion viewed Dayan as a capable and valuable political ally.
Rewarding his loyalty and his demonstrated military and
diplomatic abilities, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion promoted Dayan to
Major General on 21 November 1949.  On 25 November 1949, Minister
of Defense Ben-Gurion replaced Yigal Allon, the Commander of the
Southern front, with Dayan - an appointment made while Allon was
touring french Algeria.  Although Allon and the other Mapam
members of the IDF had made no public statements nor taken any
actions that could be interpreted as a prelude to a left-wing
coup, Ben-Gurion made sure that all radicals or suspected
radicals were eventually removed from the IDF.
     Thus by 1950, having proven himself on the battlefield and
at the negotiating table, Dayan was fully prepared to assume
greater political and military responsibilities.  In the years to
come, he would lead Israeli forces in three separate wars and
would eventually be recognized as Israel's greatest soldier.
                           CHAPTER V
                           EPILOGUE
        With its independence secured, Israel turned its
attention to the task of creating a self-sufficient Jewish state.
The war, however, had destroyed much of its economic capacity
and, coupled with the massive influx of Jewish immigrants,
Israel's economy nearly collapsed.
        With the national budget producing unacceptable deficits,
Ben-Gurion, Israel's Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, had
no alternative but to slash the nation's defense budget.  This
action seriously strained the relationship between Ben-Gurion and
Yigal Yadin, the IDF Chief-of-Staff, and in 1952, led to Yadin's
resignation.  His replacement was the British-trained Mordechai
Maklef who, faced with similar problems, eventually resigned in
1953.
        But financial constraints were not the only problem
facing the IDF.  Many of the Palmach heroes of Israel's War of
Independence, men like Yigal Allon and Yitzhak Sadeh, had been
forced out of the military due to their membership in Mapam,
Israel's Communist Party.  This blood less purge had a deleterious
impact on the IDF's capabilities as a large number of exceptional
veterans left the military for more profitable civilian careers.
        Although national law required all able-bodied young men
and women to serve in the IDF, many of these new recruits were
sephardic Jews whose limited education and their inability to
speak Hebrew hindered their military training.  This, when
combined with low pay and harsh working conditions, severely
limited the IDF's career appeal.
       This decline in military preparedness could not have come
at a worse time as a wave of nationalism swept through Israel's
defeated Arab neighbors.  Arab reaction to their recent defeat
dashed any hopes for peace between Arab and Jew as three Arab
governments were toppled between 1950 and 1952.  In 1950, the
Syrian government was overthrown in the first of a series of
coups that would destabilize that nation for several years to
come.  In 1951, King Abdullah of Jordan, perhaps the most
moderate of Arab leaders, was gunned-down by Haj Amin's henchmen.
Abdullah's grandson now sits on the Jordanian throne and, like
his grandfather, he too holds moderate attitudes toward Israel.
In 1952, Nassar overthrew King Farouk of Egypt and for the next
20 years, tried to strengthen and embellish his position by
taking a very hard-line toward Israel.
       Nassar and other militant Arab nationalists used the
Palestinian refugee problem to its fullest potential, recruiting
and training them for commando actions.  As early as 1950, Arab
guerrillas had already begun penetrating Israel is borders and by
1952, it was apparent that Israel's neighbors were either
actively supporting those attacks or providing passive support by
ignoring them.
     From 1950 through 1953, the IDF was incapable of dealing
with those raids and despite several attempts, was unable to
effectively strike Arab terrorist bases.  With troop morale low,
it appeared that Israeli forces had not only lost their ability
to fight, but also their will to win.
     Political changes in Israel coincided with both the decline
if Israel's military capabilities and Arab reaction to their
recent defeat.  Growing increasingly tired of the political
infighting within his government, Ben-Gurion decided to retire in
1954.  In a move often cited as an attempt to ensure that his
political views were represented in both the government and in
the military, Ben-Gurion appointed Moshe Dayan, then IDF Chief-
of-Operations, as IDF Chief-of-Staff in December 1953.
     Given a mandate to improve the IDF's readiness and combat
performance, Dayan made sweeping changes.  Replacing many of the
younger, British-trained officers with older officers with whom
he had served, Dayan transformed the IDF from an organization
that emphasized a "spit-and-polish" appearance, to a lean, alert,
prepared, and confident force honed on his personality and shaped
in his image.  Faced with an inadequate budget, Dayan improved
the army's "tooth-to-tail" ratio by shifting the responsibility
for supporting what he considered non-combat essential operations
- laundry, disbursing, and some transportation services, to name
but a few - to government agencies or to contracted civilian
firms
     Using unannounced inspections and appearing unexpectedly at
individual commands during exercises, Dayan emphasized realistic
combat training, small unit assault techniques, and aggressive,
dynamic leadership at all levels of command.  Ignoring criticism
that these practices circumvented established chains of command,
Dayan removed officers who, through their performance or
attitudes, did not measure up to his ideal - the traditions of
Sadeh arid of Wingate
     Distressed over what he considered to be the IDF's
lackluster performance, Dayan used Ariel Sharon's "Unit 101" in
an attempt to reinstill aggressive partisan values and traditions
within the military.  An elite commando outfit specifically
organized and trained for retaliation operations against Arab
terrorist base camps, Dayan had initially opposed the formation
of this unit.  Once he became Chief-of-Staff, however, Dayan
reformed the unit into the 202nd Paratroop Brigade and used that
force to set an example of excellence he expected all other IDF
units to emulate.  Within months, the paratroops became Israel's
premier fighting force and during the next two years,
participated in an increasing number of highly successful
retaliation raids into Egypt and Jordan.  Although heavily
criticized for displaying excessive favoritism to "his
paratroops", Dayan ignored those complaints and by 1956, his
technique had transformed the IDF into a finely tuned, confident,
and aggressive machine capable of fighting using the "structured
partisan" doctrine of "maintenance of aim."
     In that year, President Nassar of Egypt received a $50
million arms shipment from the Soviet Union and, having
previously barred Israeli shipping from the Suez Canal and having
closed the Strait of Tiran to vessels bound for Israel is southern
port of Eliat, tensions increased between Egypt and Israel.
Nassar, however, committed a serious error when he seized and
nationalized the Suez Canal, a move that angered the British.
With Nassar already supporting anti-french Algerian rebels,
France and England prepared for war against Egypt.
     Ben-Gurion, who had recently returned to power as both the
Prime Minister and Minister of Defense following the politically
disastrous "Lavon Affair" , encouraged Dayan to open direct talks
with the French regarding Egypt.  In return for French weapons,
Ben-Gurion and Dayan pledged to support the joint Anglo-French
invasion of Egypt.  After lengthy discussion involving the
British who were not particularly overjoyed at the prospect of
attacking an Arab state with Israeli assistance, it was decided
that all three allies would launch their assaults simultaneously.
     Israel's "Operation Kadesh" began on 29 October and despite
pledges from both the British and the French, those nations did
not invade Egypt until 6 November, by which time the Egyptians
had been routed.  Militarily, the campaign was a sparkling
Israeli success and within six days, Israeli forces were sitting
on the banks of the Suez and, more importantly, had occupied the
Egyptian fortifications at Shark el-Sheik - the fortifications
used to close the Strait if Tiran.  Diplomatically, the invasion
was less than satisfactory.  Pressured by the Soviet Union and
the United States, Britain and France withdrew from Egypt and
Israel returned the Sinai to Egyptian control.  Despite
assurances from the United Nations and the United States that
Egypt would not be allowed to close the Strait of Tiran, in 1967
Egypt closed the Strait, removed the United Nations peacekeeping
force from the Gaza Strip, and prepared for war.
     Widely acclaimed as Israel's hero, Dayan retired from the
IDF in 1958.  After completing his civilian education, he
reentered politics in 1959 and served on Ben-Gurion' s cabinet as
the Minister of Agriculture.  In 1964, willingly Dayan vacated
that post when Ben-Gurion broke with the Mapai Party and created
his own political organization, the RAFI Party.  Out of office,
Dayan worked briefly for the Washington Post as a war
correspondent in Vietnam.
     In 1967, as Egypt again prepared for war against Israel and
as Syria and Jordan prepared to support Nassar militarily,
Israel's government seemed paralyzed.  As the situation grew
progressively grim, popular outcry demanded that Dayan be brought
back as Minister of Defense.  Although Levi Eshkol , Israel's
Prime Minister and a political foe of Dayan's, objected to this
move, a National Unity Government was formed - a government that
included Moshe Dayan as the Minister of Defense.  Assuming office
less than two weeks before the outbreak of hostilities, Dayan is
largely credited with refining Israel's war plans.  On 6 June,
Israel launched a pre-emptive strike against Egypt and within six
days, Israeli forces occupied the Sinai, the West Bank, and
portions of Syria's Golan Heights.
     Immediately after the war, Dayan established one of the most
remarkable policies yet seen in the annals of Arab-Israel
relations.  Known as the "Open Bridges Policy", Dayan opened
Israel's borders to all Arabs, especially those Arabs who had
fled their homes on the West Bank.  Central to this controversial
policy was Dayan's belief that economic ties between Israel (to
include Israel's occupied territories) and Israel's Arab
neighbors, especially Jordan, would eventually result in both a
lessening of tensions between the two nations.  Dayan ignored a
criticisms of his novel approach to diplomacy and over time, he
withdrew most of the IDF forces from centers of Arab population
on the West Bank.
     The Yom Kippur War of 1973 caught Israel by surprise and
despite its eventual victory over Egyptian and Syrian forces, the
war's tremendous casualties shocked the nation.  The public
demanded the mass resignation of Golda Meir's government and
called for an investigation to determine the causes of Israel's
unpreparedness.  Although Dayan was eventually cleared of any
wrong doing, he resigned as Minister of Defense in 1974 and
turned his attentions to writing his memoirs, farming, and the
pursuit of his most engrossing hobby, archaeology.
     In 1977, he answered the political call once again and
joined Menachem Begin's, right-wing, Likud Coalition government.
Serving as Israel's foreign Minister, Dayan participated in the
now-famous Camp David Accord - an agreement between Egypt and
Israel in which Israel returned the Sinai to her former enemy in
return for a non-aggression pact.
     In l979, Dayan broke with Begin's Likud government over a
series of long-standing disputes regarding the government's West
Bank Policies.  To Dayan, Begin's settlement policies did not
encourage peaceful relations between West Bank Arabs and Jews.
Never agreeing that Israel should return the West Bank to Jordan,
Dayan believed that the control of local government and all
related municipal functions should be transferred to the
inhabitants of the territories, especially on the West Bank.
This, he maintained, would demonstrate Israel's willingness to to
allow the Arab's to govern themselves within the overall
jurisdiction of Israel' s national control.  He also advocated
strengthening the local Arab economy and urged that medical and
educational assistance be provided to Arabs in occupied
territories.  He even went so far as to argue that in time, West
Bank Arabs should be permitted to vote in Jordanian national
elections while they simultaneously participated in local
elections in the Israeli occupied West Bank.  Thus, West Bank
Arabs would, in effect, be aligned nationally with Jordan, while
on a more important level, they would be aligned economically and
politically with Israel.
     This unique concept of "dual autonomy" was never realized.
Although forming his own political party in early 1981, Dayan's
health was declining rapidly.  A few months before his death,
Dayan agreed to help narrate a film about Israel and walking
through his boyhood home of Nahalal , Dayan led the camera crew to
the Shimron Hill Cemetery - a cemetery containing members of his
family, many of his friends, and some of his fellow soldiers.
Reflecting on his life and what he had accomplished, Dayan
carefully said:
     I don't want any speeches at my funeral, I don't want
     any decoration, or any place to be called after me.  To
     be buried here, with these people, is the highest
     decoration. (1)
On 16 October 1981, Dayan quietly passed away from heart failure
at the age of 66.
                            APPENDIX A
                             GLOSSARY
Please Note:  The number following the term indicates the page
               where the term is first used.
ALIYAH (p. 18):   Literally meaning ascension, the term describes
     the various mass migrations of Jews to Palestine.  As used
     by Zionists, this term had both religious and nationalistic
     connotations.  Religiously, the term described as ascension
     unto heaven, in this case Palestine, the ancient home of the
     Jews.  In nationalistic terms, Aliyah implied personal
     participation in rebuilding the Jewish homeland and in
     constructing a national Jewish state in Palestine.
     Historians generally list five separate Aliyahs:
                    First  Aliyah:  1882  - 1903
                    Second Aliyah:  1904  - 1914
                    Third  Allyah:  1919  - 1923
                    Fourth Aliyah:  1924  - 1928
                    Fifth  Aliyah:  1929  - 1939
     Each of these Aliyah's brought different groups of Jews to
     Palestine and each group made a distinct contribution to the
     formation of the Jewish state.
ASHKENAZI (p. 92):  A term referring to European Jews who,
     because of their exposure to the western concepts of
     liberalism and enlightenment, generally take a less hawkish
     stance on Arab-Israeli relations than do their sephardic or
     "oriental" counterparts.
BAR-GIORA (p. 25):  The first of several Jewish self-defense
     groups established prior to Israel's War for Independence.
     Formed in 1907, the Bar-Giora was reorganized into the
     Hashomer in 1909.  The organization was named after Simon
     Bar-Giora, leader of the Jewish revolt against the Romans
     from 66 to 70 A.D.
CIRCASSIANS (p. 25):  A people originally brought to Palestine
     from the northeast coast of the Black Sea by Abdul Hamid in
     the second half of the 19th century.  However, the
     Circassians defended themselves so well against attacks from
     Bedouin bandits, that their fighting skills won them the
     reputation of fierce warriors.  Arabs and Jews were so
     impressed with their martial talents that they frequently
     hired Circassians as guards and watchmen.
FOSH (p. 65):  Known as the Plugot Sadeh, these "field companies"
     were formed in 1937 and represented the first Jewish units
     organized for offensive operations.  Although disbanded in
     1939, the FOSH served as the foundation upon which the
     Palmach - the Haganah's "shock troops" of the 1940's - were
     formed.
HAGANAH (p. 38) : In Hebrew, Haganah means defense.  The Haganah
     was the third, most famous, and most successful of Israel's
     pre-independence defense organizations.  Like the Hashomer
     the Haganah participated in establishing and defending Jewish
     settlements in Palestine.  Unlike the Hashomer, the Haganah
     was subordinate to civilian authority and despite attempts to
     turn it into a political militia, the Haganah remained
     remarkably apolitical.
HASHOMER (p. 26):   In English, "Hashomer" means "watchmen".  This
     was the second Jewish self-defense force established in
     Palestine and operated from 1909 until the mid-1920's when it
     was replaced by the Haganah.  According to Yigal Allon (see
     Yigal Allon, Shield of David, page 30), not every applicant
     was accepted as a watchman and not every watchman became a
     member of the society.  Following field training, weapons
     familiarization, and rigorous stamina tests, those determined
     as qualified, were placed on a one-to-two year period of
     probationary service.  Those who successfully completed that
     "internship" were sworn into the Hashomer in special
     nocturnal and highly ritualistic ceremonies.  Like the Bar-
     Giora, many of the "watchmen" tried to emulate the Arabs in
     both dress and horsemanship.
HAVLAGAH (p. 58):   The Yishuv's policy of self-restraint first
     adopted during the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939.  The policy
     specifically forbade any form of military counter-strike that
     might kill or injure Arab non-combatants.  Following World
     War Two, the policy was modified to allow sabotage attacks
     against British installations provided that British personnel
     were not the target of the attack.
HISH (p. 81):  An acronym formed from the Hebrew term Chail Sadeh,
     which roughly translates into "field corps  or "field force"
     formed in 1940, the HISH was controlled by the Haganah and,
     composed of unpaid, part-time militia, served primarily as a
     "territorial home guard".
HISTADRUT (p. 39):  Formed in 1920, the General Federation of
     Jewish Labor was designed to promote the formation of the
     Jewish state through the consolidation and unification of all
     Jewish workers.  Politically, the Histadrut represented
     merging of various political groups within the Yishuv whose
     purpose was to provide a political and economic base for the
     eventual creation of the Jewish state.
IRGUN ZVAI LEUMI (p. 51):  Commonly referred to as the Irgun, in
     Hebrew the phrase is translated "National Military
     Organization".  A direct product of Jabotinsky' s Revisionist
     philosophy, the Irgun did not gain much recognition until the
     post-World War Two struggle with England.  This organization
     refused to accept Ben-Gurion's policies and directly violated
     the Yishuv's policy of self-restraint through its terrorist
     attacks against both the Arabs and the British.
JEWISH AGENCY (p. 39):   Formerly known as the Zionist Commission
     or the Zionist Executive, this organization was responsible
     to the World Zionist Organization for all Jewish matters in
     Palestine.  Officially recognized under the Mandate Charter
     (Article 4), the British allowed the organization to govern
     Jewish Palestine.
KIBBUTZ (p. 22):  A voluntary collective farming settlement that,
     through the complete elimination of private property and
     private wealth, stressed a communal life-style.  In theory,
     it observed the principles of complete social equality,
     mutual responsibility, and direct democracy.  The first
     kibbutz was established in 1909 at Deganiah, Moshe Dayan's
     birthplace.  The plural form of kibbutz is kibbutzim.
LABOR AND DEFENSE BATTALIONS (p. 38):  Established by Joseph
     Trumpeldor, the Gdud Ha'Avoda were designed to promote the
     development of the Jewish state through civil construction
     projects - roads, housing, etc.  As envisioned by Trumpeldor,
     these units would be composed of soldier-pioneers who would
     serve as a pioneer militia in both defending and constructing
     the Jewish state.  Disbanded in the early 1920's, these units
     were ineffective in defending Jewish interests and, to most
     Jewish leaders, were politically too "left wing".
LEHI (p. 95):  An acronym formed from the Hebrew phrase Lohamel
     Herut Israel - "Fighters for the Freedom of Israel".  Better
     known as either the LEHI or the Stern Gang, this group of
     terrorists split from the Irgun in 1941 over the issue of
     cooperation with the British.  Never numbering more than 500
     strong, the Yishuv repudiated both this group and its
     destructive, anti-British terrorist activities.
MAPAI (p. 99):   Founded in 1930 as Israel's Labor Party, Mapai
     advocated  slightly "left-of-center" social-democratic
     policies.  Until the late 1960's Mapai was Israel's
     strongest political party and was the party to which Ben-
     Gurion belonged.
MAPAM (p. 148):  Israel's Communist Party.
MOSHAV (p. 22):  Another form of pioneering cooperative movement
     that differed from the kibbutzim approach in that it allowed
     settlers to own and work their own land while the community
     shared common resources (water) and pooled common services
     (marketing of produce)
NOTRIM (p. 61):  A collective term referring to any of the three
     Jewish organizations supported or otherwise authorized by the
     British during the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939.  These
     organizations were staffed with Haganah personnel and
     included the Jewish Settlement Police (the largest and most
     important of the groups), the ghafirs (Jewish "militia-
     police"), and guides for British army patrols.
PALMACH (p. 8.2): From the Hebrew Plugot Mahatz, the term is best
     translated as either "striking companies" or "shock troops".
     formed in 1941, the Palmach was Haganah controlled and was
     the first, permanently manned, Jewish controlled combat force
     capable of executing sustained offensive operations.  This
     organization formed the basis upon which the Israel Defense
     force was established in 1948.
PALMACHNIK (p. 101): A slang Jewish expression describing a
     member of the Palmach.
REVISIONIST PARTY (p. 41): A political party formed by Vladimir
     Jabotinsky in 1925.  Unlike its Social-Zionist counterparts,
     this political organization did not envision the creation of
     a Socialist Jewish commonwealth based on a cooperative
     economic structure.  Rather, it campaigned for the creation
     of a political democracy with a strong capitalist economy.
     Revisionists also preached a vigorous form of nationalism
     and believed that the borders of the eventual Jewish state
     must coincide with the borders of ancient Israel - a
     territory that included much of modern Lebanon, Syria, and
     Jordan.
RUSSIAN PALE OF SETTLEMENT (p. 15):  Usually referred to as the
     Pale, this was a stretch of land on the western fringe of
     the vast Russian Empire where the majority of Russia's five
     million Jews lived.  This area ran from the Baltic Sea in
     the north to the Black Sea in the South and covered portions
     of the Ukraine and what is now known as Poland.  Special
     dispensation was occasionally granted to more fortunate Jews,
     generally academicians or wealthy merchants, to reside
     temporarily outside of the Pale.  After World War I, some of
     this territory became independent nations - Poland,
     Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, etc.
SABRA (p. 9):  A Jewish term of affection referring to Jews born
     in Palestine.  The term comes from a word describing a small
     but resilient cactus that grew throughout Palestine.
SEPHARDIC (p. 92):  A term describing those Jews who lived in
     moslem countries running from Pakistan in the east to
     Morocco in the west.  Having experienced life in
     increasingly hostile Arab countries, sephardic or "oriental"
     Jews often took (and still do) a much harder stand on issues
     relating to Arabs than do Ashkenazi Jews - European Jews.
YIDDISH (p. 15):  A specific dialect formed by a combination of
     Middle High German, Hebrew, Polish, and Russian.  Its roots
     can be traced to the 13th century when Jews moved east from
     the Rhineland.
YISHUV (p. 11):  A term referring to the entire Jewish population
     of Palestine.  The term originally applied to only the
     collection of Jewish settlements in Palestine.  It is
     important to note that over time, this word changed from a
     description of a collection of  vial lages to the description
     of an entire people.
ZAHAL (p. 119):  An abbreviation of "Zva-Ha-Haganah Le-Israel",
     more commonly referred to in English as the Israel Defense
     force (IDF)
ZIONISM (p. 13):  A Jewish national movement whose expressed goal
     was the settlement of and eventual creation in Palestine of a
     national Jewish state.  In many respects, Zionism was the
     political and social (nationalistic) outgrowth of the ancient
     religious attachment of Jews to Palestine, especially
     Jerusalem.
Click here to view image
                            APPENDIX B
      EVOLUTION OF THE ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCE: 1907 - PRESENT
NAME:  Bar-Giora
YEARS OF OPERATION:  1907-1909
PURPOSE:  Provided contracted self-defense security services to
     Jewish farms and settlements in the Galilee area of upper
     Palestine.
SIZE:  Undetermined.  Given its small area of operations, the
     Bar-Giora was probably substantially smaller than the
     Hashomer.
COMMENTS:  Providing contracted self-defense services only to
     those farms and settlements that relied on Jewish labor, the
     Bar-Giora never expanded its services beyond an few villages
     in upper Palestine.  In 1909, it was reorganized and became
     the Hashomer.
PRINCIPLE CONTRIBUTION:  The Bar-Giora was the first Jewish self-
     defense force organized in Palestine.
NAME:  Hashomer - "Society of Watchmen"
YEARS OF OPERATION:  1909-c.1924
SIZE: Never more than 100 men.
PURPOSE:  Provided self-defense services for all Jewish
     communities and settlements in Palestine and assisted in the
     establishment and subsequent defense of new Jewish
     settlements in Palestine.
COMMENTS:  Formed when the Bar-Giora reorganized in 1909, this
     organization became a leading proponent of radical Marxist-
     Socialism.  Its radical political views, when combined with
     its inability to effectively protect Jews during the Arab
     Riots of 1920-1921, led Jewish leaders to abolish the
     organization in 1920.  Although officially replaced with the
     Haganah in 1921, some Hashomer units continued to operate
     for the next few years.
PRINCIPLE CONTRIBUTION:  The the Hashomer was the first Jewish
     para-military organization that attempted to defend Jewish
     interests throughout Palestine.
NAME: Zion Mule Corps
YEARS OF OPERATION:  1915-1916
SIZE:  650 men
PURPOSE:   This unit served two purposes.  Militarily, the corps
     was a non-combatant, all-Jewish logistics unit that served
     under British command during World War I.  Politically, she
     unit was formed to demonstrate Jewish support for the
     British war effort and it was hoped that this demonstration
     would persuade London to support a Jewish homeland in
     Palestine.
COMMENTS:  Organized after Vladimir Jabotinsky and Joseph
     Trumpeldor urged the British government to form an all-
     Jewish combat unit to help remove Turkish forces from
     Palestine.  After serving at Galipoli, the British disbanded
     the unit when its men refused to quell anti-British riots in
     Ireland.
PRINCIPLE CONTRIBUTION:  Although not an independent, all-Jewish
     combat unit, the Zion Mule Corps' success led to the
     creation of the Jewish Legion.
NAME:  Jewish Legion
YEARS OF OPERATION:  1917-1919
SIZE:  5,000 men
PURPOSE:   Like its predecessor, the Jewish Legion served two
     purposes.  Although commanded by the British, the Legion was
     organized to demonstrate Jewish military capabilties and
     support Britain's campaign against Turkey.  Politically,
     Zionists hoped that the Legion's military contributions
     might persuade London to formally support a Jewish home land.
COMMENTS: Formed by the British after negotiations with Dr.
     Chaim Weizmann, Vladimir Jabotinsky, and Joseph Trumpeldor,
     the Jewish Legion eventually contained three all-Jewish
     battalions.  After participating in the British conquest and
     subsequent occupation of Palestine, the unit was disbanded
     in 1919.
PRINCIPLE CONTRIBUTION:  As the first all-Jewish combat unit
     since the 1st century A.D., the Jewish Legion not only
     proved that Jews could fight, the unit's successful
     participation in the Palestine campaign provided Zionist
     leaders with political and diplomatic clout in their
     discussions with London concerning the formation of a Jewish
     homeland.
NAME:  Labor and Defense Battalions
YEARS OF OPERATION:  1920-1922
SIZE:  Unknown
PURPOSE: To promote the development of the Jewish state through
     civil construction projects and to protect Jewish
     settlements in Palestine.
COMMENTS:  As envisioned by their founder, Joseph Trumpeldor, the
     Labor and Defense Battalions would be composed of soldier-
     pioneers who would serve as a "people's militia" in self-
     defense matters while simultaneously serving as a "civilian
     construction corps" in projects designed to build the
     physical necessities of a Jewish state - roads, housing,
     etc.  Like the Hashomer, these units advocated Marxist-
     Socialism and, more interested in political indoctrination
     than they were in self-defense matters, enjoyed little
     support from Jewish political leaders.
PRINCIPLE CONTRIBUTION:  While attempting to link Marxist
     political ideology with the military force required to
     inculcate that philosophy in the Jewish population, the
     Labor and Defense Battalion's only contribution was that its
     failure to adequately defend Jewish interests in Palestine
     led to the creation of the Haganah.
NAME:  Haganah
YEARS OF OPERATION:  1921-1948
SIZE: In 1947, the Haganah contained roughly 45,000 man and
     women serving in various Haganah-controlled organizations:
     the HISH, the Palmach, and "home-guard" units.
PURPOSE: Initially created as a self-defense organization, over
     time it became an instrument of "nation-building" through
     participation in military affairs, the establishment and
     subsequent defense of Jewish settlements, illegal weapons
     purchases, and illegal immigration operations.
COMMENTS:  The third, largest, and most successful of the pre-
     Israel Defense Force organizations, the Haganah replaced the
     Hashomer and the Labor and Defense Battalions as the
     official Jewish self-defense organization.  From 1921
     through 1936, the Haganah's self-defense strategies were
     based on static, position-oriented concepts advocated by the
     Yishuv's political leaders.  During the Arab Revolt of 1936-
     1939, individual's within the Haganah helped transform that
     doctrine to one based on aggressive, offensive-minded, and
     mobile tactics.  In 1948, the Haganah and its various
     components were reorganized into the Israel Defense Force.
PRINCIPLE CONTRIBUTION: The Haganah was tie first Jewish self
     defense organization that willingly subordinated itself to
     Jewish civilian authority and supported the "national"
     policies developed by those authorities (i.e., the Jewish
     Agency) .  Without this underground army, Israel would not
     exist today.
NAME: The "Flying Squad"
YEARS OF OPERATION:	1937
SIZE:  Unknown but presumed to be substantially less than 100.
PURPOSE:   Formed to test the validity of Yitzhak Sadeh's concept
     of a mobile, aggressive, Jewish self-defense unit organized
     to protect Jewish villages and settlements through active
     patrolling and the ambushing of Arab guerrilla forces.
COMMENTS:  Formed by Sadeh and controlled by the Haganah, this
     was the first officially sanctioned, Jewish self-defense
     unit capable of small, but independent offensive operations.
PRINCIPLE CONTRIBUTION:  Representing the first politically
     sanctioned break with the prevailing doctrine of static,
     position-oriented defense, the "flying Squad" provided the
     conceptual foundation upon which the FOSH and the Palmach
     were formed.
NAME: FOSH - from the Hebrew "Plugot Sadeh"
YEARS OF OPERATION: 1937-1939
SIZE:  1,000
PURPOSE:   To provide the Haganah with military units capable of
     sustained offensive operations.
COMMENTS:  Organized, trained, and led by Yitzhak Sadeh, these
     Haganah controlled field companies provided the foundation
     upon which the Palmach - the Haganah's elite shock troops -
     were constructed.  As part of the Haganah, the FOSH followed
     civilian directed policies, to include Havlagah (the policy
     of self-restraint).  Operating in company size units, the
     FOSH was disbanded in 1939 following the collapse of the
     Arab Revolt and the subsequent termination of British-Jewish
     cooperation.
PRINCIPLE CONTRIBUTION:  Validated Sadeh's concept of an
     "offensive defense" the relied on the tactics of aggressive
     mobility and surprise.
NAME: Notrim
YEARS OF OPERATION: 1937-1939
SIZE:  22,000 in 1938
PURPOSE:  To actively support British efforts in quelling the
     Arab Revolt of 1936-1939 by replacing British military
     police and Mandate constabulary units with Jewish
     volunteers.  This enabled British elements to concentrate
     their efforts on halting Arab gluerrilla operations in
     Palestine.
COMMENTS:  A collective term referring to any of three Jewish
     para-military organizations supported or otherwise
     authorized by the British during the Arab Revolt of 1936-
     1939.  These notrim elements were the Jewish Settlement
     Police (the largest of the three sub-units), the ghafirs or
     police militia, and guides for British army patrols.  While
     operationally directed by the British, these units were
     staffed with Haganah members.
PRINCIPLE CONTRIBUTION:  The notrim provided the first military
     link between the British and the Haganah since its members
     belonged to the Haganah.  This arrangement enabled the
     Haganah to expand its operational capabilities, protect the
     Yishuv during the Arab Revolt, and receive free military
     training without fear of British reprisals.
NAME:  Special Night Squads
YEARS OF OPERATION:  1938-1939
SIZE: Given the clandestine relationship between Captain Wingate
     and the Haganah, the size of the Special Night Squads
     (S.N.S.)is unknown. However, Christopher Sykes, Crossroads
     too Israel, p. 183, states that "at no time did Wingate
     command more than 200 men in Palestine."
PURPOSE:   From the British perspective, the S.N.S. was formed to
     end Arab guerrilla attacks against the Iraq Petroleum
     Pipeline and to clear northern Palestine of Arab guerrilla
     bases.  From Wingate's and the Haganah's perspective, the
     S.N.S. was formed to strengthen Jewish military
     capabilities.
COMMENTS:  Authorized and supported by British authorities, the
     S.N.S. served as "legal cover" for the covert training of
     the Haganah in small unit offensive tactics.  Primarily
     staffed with members of the notrim, the S.N.S. was
     organized, trained, and led by Captain Orde Charles Wingate,
     a British officer serving in Palestine.  The S.N.S.
     succeeded  in its legally authorized mission (ending Arab
     terrorist attacks in northern Palestine), and in its covert
     mission (providing training for the Haganah).  The S.N.S.
     was disbanded in 1939 when she British severely curtailed
     their support of the notrim and transferred Wingate out of
     Palestine.
PRINCIPLE CONTRIBUTION:  Through the S.N.S., Wingate convinced
     Jewish leaders that a doctrine of static, position-oriented,
     self-defense would not succeed and that the survival of a
     future Jewish state would depend of an aggressive, active
     defense that, at the right time, could be unleashed in
     decisive, offensive action.
NAME: Irgun - from the Hebrew "Irgun Zvai Leumi" which
     translated means "National Military Organization".
YEARS OF OPERATION:  1931-1948
SIZE: 2,000 - 3,000 in 1947
PURPOSE:   To secure Jewish independence through attacks against
     British installations, military personnel, and Mandate
     police.
COMMENTS:  Formed in 1931 as a para-military group supporting
     Vladimir Jabotinsky's Revisionist Party, the Irgun
     frequently ignored "national" policies established by
     responsible Jewish political leaders - specifically the
     Jewish Agency.  During and after World War II, the Irgun was
     generally viewed as a terrorist organization and was led by
     Menachem Begin - a future Prime Minister of Israel.  Merged
     with the Haganah, Palmach, and HISH in 1948 to form the
     Israel Defense force.
PRINCIPLE CONTRIBUTION:  Zealously pursuing its nationalistic
     goals through terrorism, it can be argued that the Irgun was
     one of the first modern "national liberation movements".  As
     such, its acts of violence helped convince London that the
     use of conventional and restrained military force could not
     impose British will on Palestine.
NAME:  LEHI - from the Hebrew "Lohamei Herut Israel which
     translated means "fighters for the freedom of Israel" - it
     is best known as The Stern Gang.
YEARS OF OPERATION: 1940-1948
SIZE:  500 - 800 in 1947
PURPOSE:   To secure an independent Jewish State through any means
     possible - terrorist attacks, kidnappings, murder, etc.
COMMENTS:  Formed by Avraham Stern who, in 1941, broke with the
     Irgun over the issue of cooperation with the British during
     World War II.  Although British police killed Stern in 1942,
     his band of militant extremists survived and launched a
     terrorist campaign against the British from 1942 - 1947.
PRINCIPLE CONTRIBUTION:  Vehemently condemned by most Palestinian
     Jews, the Stern Gang made no positive contribution in either
     the creation of Israel or in the development of Israeli
     military tradition.
NAME:  HISH - from the Hebrew "Chail Sadeh" which translated
     means "field corps" or "field force".
YEARS OF OPERATION: 1940-1948
SIZE:  9,500 in 1947
PURPOSE: Provided the Haganah with a part-time militia or home
     guard reserve force capable of mobile, local-area, self-
     defense actions.
COMMENTS:  Formed in response to concerns regarding the 1055 of
     trained Haganah members entering the British army to fight
     against Nazi Germany, the HISH provided the Haganah with a
     cadre of semi-trained personnel capable of mobilization in
     times of "national" emergency.  Merged with regular Haganah
     units, the Palmach, and elements of the Irgun to form the
     Israel Defense force in 1948.
PRINCIPLE CONTRIBUTION:  The HISH served as one of several models
     upon which the Israel Defense force reserve system was
     established in the early 1950's.
NAME:  Palmach - from the Hebrew "Plugot Mahatz" which is
     translated "striking companies" or "shock troops".
YEARS OF OPERATION: 1941-1948
SIZE:  3,100 full-time and 1,000 reservists in 1947
PURPOSE:  To provide the Haganah with a- fully-trained, full-time,
     professional military force which, under Haganah control,
     would be capable of sustained, large-scale, offensive
     operations.
COMMENTS:  Organized, trained, and initially led by Yitzhak Sadeh
     in 1941, the Palmach formed the backbone of what would
     eventually become the Israel Defense force in May 1948.  The
     Palmach provided one of the two military foundations upon
     which the Israel Defense force was later constructed - the
     partisan traditon.
PRINCIPLE CONTRIBUTION:  The importance of the Palmach cannot be
     overemphasized.  In addition to providing the doctrinal and
     leadership foundations upon which the Israel Defense Force
     was both patterned after and based upon, three of the twelve
     general staff officers during the Israel is War of
     Independence - Dayan, Allon, and Sadeh - camel from the
     Palmach.  Roughly 20 of the 40 Israel Defense force colonels
     serving during that war were Palmach officers.  Dayan,
     Rabin, Bar-Lev, and Elazar were Palmach officers who
     eventually became Chiefs of Staff for the Israel Defense
     force.  Dayan later served as Minister of Defense (1967-
     1974) and foreign Minister (1977-1979).  Rabin eventually
     became Prime Minister of Israel.
NAME:  The Jewish Brigade
YEARS OF OPERATION:  1944-1946
PURPOSE:   Formed to demonstrate the Yishuv's support of Britain's
     war against Nazi Germany.
SIZE:  5,000
COMMENTS:  Although formed too late in the war to play a
     significant role in defeating Germany, this all-Jewish unit
     not only demonstrated the Yishuv's support of London it also
     provided a significant number of Jews with modern military
     training.  Even though this unit was part of the British
     army, immediately after the war, the Jewish Brigade helped
     the Haganah in its efforts to illegally transport Holocaust
     survivors to Palestine.
PRINCIPLE CONTRIBUTION:  The Jewish Brigade represented the
     second of the two military foundations upon which the Israel
     Defense force was later constructed - the "purist" or
     British military tradition.  As a brigade within the British
     army, this unit not only received modern training in
     combined/supporting arms, its members learned logistics,
     staff organization, and tactics on a brigade level.
     Consequently, its traditions complimented the Palmach's
     partisan approach to waging war and the fusion of those
     foundations provided the Israel Defense force with its
     unique and highly effective military practices and doctrine.
                          ENDNOTES
                          CHAPTER I
                 SETTING THE STAGE: 1880-1929
  1. Moshe Barsky set out one night to purchase medicine for
Shmuel Dayan.  Barsky never returned.  Evidently killed by
roaming bandits, his body was found the next day.  For a complete
description of this event see Moshe Dayan, Moshe Dayan: Story of
My Life (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1976) , pp. 21-22;
Shabtai Teveth, Moshe Dayan: The Soldier, the Man, The Legend
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973), pp. 3-4.
  2. Teveth, Dayan, p. 1.  While Teveth is an eloquent writer,
there is no indication that Moshe Dayan ever made this
association part of himself.
  3. Yigal Allon, Shield of David: The Story of Israel's Armed
Forces (New York: Random House, 1970) , p. 31, states that by
1914, there were over 85,000 Jews living in Palestine.  These
Jews lived on 43 agricultural settlements as well as in major
cities like Haifa and Jerusalem.  By the outbreak of World War I,
over half of Jerusalem's population was Jewish.  The split within
the Jewish community caused by World War I is easily documented.
Moshe Sharett, a future Israeli prime minister, was an officer in
the Turkish army during World War One.  The Hashomer, a small
Jewish self-defense organization, urged Jews to accept Turkish
citizenship as a means to avoid mass deportations and even
offered their services to the Ottoman Empire - an offer the
Turkish government refused.  Other Jews had Allied sympathies.
Until their capture, the Aaronson family spied for the British.
Vladimir Jabotinsky and Joseph Trumpeldor raised Jewish combat
units which, under British command, participated in the
liberation of Palestine.
  4. For a detailed account of Moshe's boyhood, see Teveth,
Dayan, chapters two through five.  Although containing less
personal information, see Dayan, My Life, chapter one.
  5. While specific data was not kept, a large number of Jewish
immigrants eventually left Palestine for more hospitable
climates.  Amos Elon, The Israelis: Founders and Sons (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Wilson, 1971), pp. 101-102, briefly examines
this phenomenon.  On page 108, Elon provides David Ben-Gurion's
inflated estimate that up to 90% of all Jews arriving in
Palestine between 1881 and 1924 eventually emigrated from
Palestine.  Information collected after World War One indicates
that approximately one-third of the 35,000 Jews arriving in
Palestine between 1919 and 1924 soon left Palestine.  Borrowing
from Darwinian theory, Elon (p. 136) argues that the Jews who
left Palestine were the physically and philosophically weak -
those who could not endure the hardships associated with life in
that land.  Those who remained possessed the physical stamina,
the emotional courage, and the dedication required to build a
life and forge a nation in Palestine.
  6.   Dayan, My Life, pp.22-23.
  7.   For a balanced view of Zionism from its pre-Herzl
beginnings to the creation of the British Mandate in Palestine
see Conner Cruise O'Brien, The Siege, The Saga of Israel and
Zionism (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), pp. 25-131; Amos
Elon, The Israelis, pp. 3-186.
  8.   At the turn of the century, the Russian Empire included
territories contained within the current borders of the Soviet
Union, as well as territories which, after World War I, became
independent nations - Poland, for example.
  9. See Elon, The Israel is, p. 38.  Generally speaking,
orthodox Jews viewed the movement as a direct challenge to God
Who, at His will, would allow all Jews to return to Palestine
under His divine guidance and the strict application of religious
laws.
  10.  O'Brien, The Siege, p. 25.
  11.  Ibid., pp. 35-37, discusses these pograms and provides
three explanations for them.  First, the new Tsar and his
political advisor were anti-semites.  Second, both men feared
iberalism and viewed Jews as the principal proponents or
carriers of liberal thought.  Third, given the anti-semitic
traditions of Tsarist Russia, "of all the people whom the
(Russian) peasants had a grudge against, or fancied robbing, the
Jews were the only ones they could attack and rob and get away
with it."  Elon, The Israelis, p. 51, provides additional insight
into the causes of the pograms under Alexander III, an insight
the supports O'Brien's final explanation - the government
condoned anti-Jewish riots as "a popular diversion from the
miseries of daily life."  One must also consider Tsarist fears of
ethnic nationalism as another contributing factor.  During the
latter-half of the 19th century, Tsarist forces were frequently
used to crush Polish nationalism.
  12.  Elon, The Israelis, p. 58 and O'Brien, Ihe Siege, p. 40.
  13.  See Elon, The Israelis, pp. 60 through 81, for a
thoughtful discussion concerning the rise and subsequent blending
of Jewish nationalism and pre-Herzl Zionism.  O'Brien, The Siege,
p. 31, states that in 1880 nearly two-thirds of the Jewish
population of Palestine lived in Jerusalem.
  14.  Ibid., p. 99, states that Rothschild's contribution to
these early settlements was approximately 10 million pounds
sterling.
  19.  Ibid, p. 100.
  16.  Elon, Tbe Israelis, points out that Marxism and Zionism
frequently overlapped.  While discussing Zalman Shazar, one of
Israel's presidents, Elon states that Shazar's family was like
many other Russian families in transition from orthodox Judaism
to European culture.  On page 15 he stated that families like
these "were producing in almost equal numbers leading Zionist
pioneers and Socialist revolutionaries."  Prior to emigrating to
Palestine, Shazar spent time in a Russian prison for his
underground activities.  On page 118, Elon briefly discusses
David Ben-Gurion's conversion from Marxism to Zionism.
  17.  See Elon, The Israelis, p. 59, for Lenin's statement.
O'Brien, The Siege, p. 99, discusses the size of the Jewish
Marxist movement in Russia.
  18.  Allon, David, p. 18.  The passage concerning the use of
Hebrew is important.  Many Sucond Aliyah pioneers actively worked
to establish Hebrew as the official Jewish language.  For a
discussion of the "Hebraists", see Elon, The Israelis, pp. 96-98
and pp. 110-111.
  19.  Elon, The Israelis, p. 113.
  20.  Ibid., p. 168.
  21.  Ibid., pp. 151-152, describes a typical clash that
occurred in 1909 in Galilee.  Dayan, My Life, pp. 39-40,
describes a similar, although less deadly fight, that occurred in
1934.   While understanding Arab feelings, Dayan writes "They
(the Bedouin) had been pasturing their flocks on other people's
land, and watering them at other people's springs, for
generations.  But the land then had been untilled, untended
it was ours now."  A comparison can be made between these
cultural and economic clashes and the hostilities that erupted
in the American west - between the white settlers and the
American Indian and between ranchers and farmers.  On a cultural
level, white settlers viewed the western plains as vast tracts of
"empty", unused land that could be used for farming and/or
ranching.  The Indians, of course, resented this intrusion onto
lands that they used for hunting.  White ranchers occasionally
fought with white farmers and these clashes were based on
economics.  Ranchers needed vast amounts of grazing land to
support their cattle while farmers plowed these lands under for
crops
  22.  Elon, The Israelis, p. 154. The fact that Azuri's book
went unnoticed among most Zionists is not too surprising,
especially when one considers that most Zionists ignored the
presence of Arabs in Palestine.  On pp. 148-150, Elon discusses
this phenomenon and on pp. 159-160, he states that even Herzl
ignored the Arab presence in Palestine.  Perhaps this was due to
the "stereotypical" European view of third world territories and
the people who inhabited those lands.  While Jewish settlers in
Palestine realized that Arabs lived in Palestine, they also knew
that the territory was sparsely populated.  Since Arab
nationalism had not yet visibly surfaced, those settlers seldom
"contemplated the possibility that Arabs and Jews would one day
clash in bloody battle over the same stretch of soil."
  23.  O'Brien, The Siege, pp. 109-110, writes that the "protests
of 1891 were probably initiated by the Muslims, but a
disproportionately large part of the Arab agitation against
Jewish settlements - and later against Zionism - were carried out
by Christian Arabs."  Since Jewish persecution had usually been
conducted in the name of religion, Jews were quite sensitive
about the origins of any anti-semitic outburst.  Since Christian
Arabs were largely responsible for these verbal attacks, many
Jews assumed that European Christians had orchestrated the
protest.  O'Brien gives no indication as to what actions, if any,
Turkish officials took in response to the telegram.
  24.  See Elon, The Israel is, p. 173 for the quotation.
O'Brien, The Siege, pp. 117-120, provides portions of these
editorial attacks, attacks that succinctly outlined Arab concerns
over Zionist encroachments.  These concerns included inequitable
taxation, unfair labor practices, low interest bank loans,
growing Jewish nationalism, and a fear of losing Palestine to the
Jews.
  25.  Allon, David, pp. 20-21.
  26.  Ibid., p. 23.  It is interesting to note that the Bar-
Giora also opposed the Hallukah, a form of financial support
gathered from Jewish congregations for the exclusive support of
orthodox Jews and religious scholars living in Palestine.  These
charitable donations were separate and distinct from the monies
raised to fund the Zionist enterprise in Palestine.  Since the
use of this money did nothing to further the Zionist cause and
given the adversarial relationship between ardent Zionists and
orthodox Jews, it is not surprising that many Second Aliyah Jews
were opposed to the Hallukah.
  27.  Ibid., pp. 23 and 25.
  28.  Ibid., p. 27.  This is the first recorded instance the
author could find regarding an arms shipment into Palestine.
  29.  Edward N. Luttwak and Daniel Horowitz, The Israeli
1948-1973 (Cambridge: Abt Books, 1983). p. 6, state that at its
peak, the Hashomer numbered less than 100 men.
  30.  Allon, David, p. 29.
  31.  For an expanded discussion of the Hashomer's military and
political objectives, see Amos Perlmutter, Military and Politics
in Israel: Nation-Building and Role Expansion, (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), pp. 4-6 and Allon, David, pp. 30-33.
for an official statement concerning the Hashomer's objectives -
a statement written in 1912 by one of its founders - see Israel
Shochat, "A Proposal for the Defense of the Jewish Community in
the land of Israel" in Yigal Allon, The Making of Israel's Army
(New York: Universe Books, 1970) , pp. 113-116.
  32.  For information regarding the split between the Yishuv and
the Hashomer, see Perlmutter, Military and Politics, pp. 6, 12-
14, and 34; Amos Perlmutter, Israel the Partitioned State: A
Political History Since 1900, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1985), pp. 82-83.  For additional information regarding the
Yishuv and the Ottoman Empire during World War One, see Allon,
David, pp. 34-40.
  33.  Elon, The Israelis, p. 80.
  34.  Teveth, Dayan, p. 6.
  35.  In describing Shmuel's employment as a guard, both Dayan
and Teveth imply that he was a member of the Hashomer.  However,
neither of them actually state that he was a member of that
organization.  Given Allon's discussion of the Hashomer's
selection, testing, and induction practices (see Allon, David, p.
30), it is doubtful that Shmuel had enough time to become a full-
fledged member of that group prior to his departure for Galilee.
Also, the Marxist bent of the Hashomer's pro-kibbutzim philosophy
might not have been compatible with Shmuel's preference for the
less restrictive moshavim approach.
  36.  Teveth,  Dayan, p. 12.
  37.  Dvorah's family was the only Jewish family in Prochorovka
and, given her father's wealth and secular attitudes, it is not
surprising that she was afforded a Russian education.  Shmuel's
family was part of a large Jewish community in Zaskow, a Jewish
community that provided its own social services and social
structure.  This, when combined with his family's poverty and
deep ties to Jewish traditions, denied Shmuel the opportunity to
receive a secular education.
  38.  See Dayan, My Life, p. 26; Teveth, Dayan, p. 10.  Neither
author indicates to which branch of that party Dvorah belonged.
In 1903, the Social Democratic Party had divided into two wings,
the revolutionary Bolsheviks (the minority wing led by Lenin) and
the evolutionary Mensheviks.
  39.  Teveth, Dayan, p. 11.
  40.  O'Brien, The Siege, p. 121.
  41.  Ibid., pp. 121-131, provides interesting reading
concerning Weizmann's efforts in this regard and highlights the
growing international interest in the potentials of the Zionist
Movement.
  42.  Christopher Sykes, Crossroads to Israel, (New York: World
Publishing Company, 1965). p.8, discusses the strategic value of
Palestine to British Middle-Eastern interests: "to many people in
under secretarial and lesser but influential ranks of state
service in England, Zionism in Palestine seemed a marvelous
opportunity for countering any sort of French establishment in
Syria ... many British political and military thinkers at the
time of the First World War and after considered that an increase
in French authority in Syri a, especially in the form of a
protectorate or a similar system would gravely imperil the
communications with India."  Such threats could be countered by
supplying "advisors to governments" and by obtaining maximum
concessions from those governments, thereby establishing
"protectorates over the whole Arabic-speaking world, as a
safeguard against the rapacity of France!"  Sykes also states
that the British sought to protect the Suez Canal by establishing
a "friendly zone" east of Egypt, "a country in which their
position was threatened internally."
  43.  For a discussion of the Hussein-McMahon correspondence of
1915, see O'Brien, The Siege, p. 144.
  44.  For a somewhat simplistic yet informative examination of
Joseph Trumpeldor, see P. Lipovetsky, "Joseph Trumpeldor" , in
Harold U. Ribalow, ed. Fighting Heroes of Israel (New York:
Signet Books, 1967).  A devout Zionist, Trumpeldor had been
awarded four St. George Crosses while serving in the Tsar's army.
During the Russo-Japanese War, Trumpeldor lost an arm and
according to Allon (see Allon, David, p. 44), was the only Jewish
officer in the Russian army.  Vladimir Jabotinsky and his
unfortunate legacy will be discussed later in this paper.  For
now, Jabotinsky can best be described as a right-wing extremist
who actively preached the Jewish conquest of Palestine, to
include the Trans-Jordan.
  45.  Allon, David, p. 44.
  46.  Ibid., p. 43.
  47.  O'Brien, The Siege, p. 124-125, discusses the feelings of
American Jews toward the Russians.  Having recently left Russia,
many American Jews were not particularly enamored with the idea
of Tsarist Russia as an ally.  Sensing this, the British wanted
to change those attitudes toward a pro-allied, and especially a
pro-British stance.  On page 135, O'Brien outlines the British
use of the Balfour Declaration for propaganda purposes,
especially with regard to Jewish soldiers fighting for the
Central Powers.  He also states that the British refused to
publish the document in Palestine for fear of extremist reactions
from the Jews and, more importantly, from the Arabs.
  48.  For discussion concerning the interpretations given the
Balfour Declaration by Arabs and Jews, see O'Brien, The Siege, p.
134; Perlmutter, The Partitioned State, pp. 32-34 and pp. 41-42.
  49.  See Sykes, Crossroads, for an informative and entertaining
examination of the British Mandate in Palestine.
  50.  O'Brien, The Siege, p. 144, neatly summarizes Arab
suspicions concerning what they believed to be British duplicity
regarding the format ion of an Arab state in Palestine:  "The last
months of 1919 saw a great increase in Arab nationalist activity,
not only in Palestine, but also in neighboring Syria.  Much of
this was due to the consequences of the areas of conflict between
Britain's promises of the period 1915-1919.  The Hashemites
the men who had raised, at British instigation, the standard of
the Arab revolt against Ottoman rule - believed themselves to
have been promised, through the Hussein-McMahon correspondence of
1915, a throne in Syria, then generally assumed to include
Palestine.  But the Sykes-Picot secret agreement (1916) awarded
Syria to France, while by modified Sykes-Picot (1917), Britain
awarded Palestine to itself, and then, by the Balfour Declaration
of the same year, awarded a National Home in Palestine to the
Jews.
  51.  Perlmutter, The Partitioned State, p. 26.
  52.  Elon, ihe Israelis, pp. 135-136, discusses the reasons for
the Third Aliyah and outlines the fate of Jews in Russia during
and after the 1917 revolution.  O'Brien, The Siege, p. 131,
states that World War One reduced Palestine's population from
approximately 800,000 in 1914 to roughly 640,000 in 1918.  Of the
1918 population, 512,000 were Muslin, 61,000 were Christian, and
66,000 were Jewish.  The Jewish pre-war population in Palestine
exceeded 85,000.
  53.  See O'Brien, The Siegi, p. 139-147, for a discussion of
the growing anti-Zionist stance taken by the British military
authorities in Palestine.  In his speech given to a large Arab
audience, the British. Governor of Jerusalem, Sir Robert Storrs,
stated that Palestine "refuses to be a National Home for the
people who did evil unto the Messiah and to the whole world."  On
pages 26-32, O'Brien neatly summarizes British anti-semitism
through an examination of Balfour's "Aliens Bill" of 1904.  This
legislation attempted to strictly limit the number of eastern
European Jews trying to enter Britain during the first decade of
the 20th century.
  54.  Allon, David, p. 68.  Jabotinsky had already raised the
ire of British military authorities when, as a member of the
Jewish Legion, he had bypassed the established chain of command
and had gone directly to General Allenby concerning the anti-
semitic views of a large number of British officers.  This breech
of conduct so infuriated the British that Jabotinsky was removed
from the ranks of the Legion.
  55.  Ze'ev Schiff, A History of the Israeli Army: 1874 to the
Present, (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1985), p. 5;
Lipovetsky, "Trumpeldor", in Ribalow, Fighting Heroes.
  56.  See O'Brien, The Siege, page 204, concerning the scope of
the Arab revolt against European domination in Iraq, Syria, and
Lebanon.  O'Brien, page 146, contains a transcript of the
conversation in which Jewish leaders referred to the riots as a
pogram.  Readers should remember that Arab nationalism continued
to grow throughout the period 1920-1950 and its power forced
London to concede territory to various national groups - Egypt,
Jordan, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, etc.
  57.  Ibid. , pp. 155-170, for a discussion of the problems Sir
Herbert Samuel, the British Governor of Palestine,  faced and
actions his administration took to resolve those issues
  58.  Ibid., p. 183.
  59.  David, p. 66.
  60.  Teveth, Dayan, p. 25.
  61.  Perlmutter, The Partitioned State, p.  134.
  62.  Elon, Ih e Israelis, p. 145, lists the following examples:
the political party system, strong beliefs in equality, agrarian
collectives, dedication to volunteerism, and the notion of an
official state ideology (Zionism).
  63.  For discussions concerning Weizmann, Beri-Gurion, and
Jabotinsky, see Perlmutter, The Partitioned State, pp. 14-17; pp.
22-32; and pp. 62-63.
  64.  Elon, The Israelis, p. 174.  While Jabotinsky's comment
may not sound particularly logical or valid today, one must
remember that European colonialism and territorial imperialism
was still a potent, although dying force.  This is underscored
when Perlmutter, Military and Politics, p. 43, states that
Jabotinsky largely ignored the Arab population in Palestine.
Perlmutter does not indicate what Jabotinsky would have done with
the Arabs had he been Israel's founding father.
  6S.  See O'Brien, The Siege, pp. 180-183 and p. 186 for a
discussion of the riots which killed 133 Jews, wounded another
339, killed 110 Arabs, and wounded 232 more.  According to Sykes,
Cr0ss roads, p. 110, all but 6 of the Arab casualties were
inflicted by British troops.
  66.  See Allon, David, p. 70; Schiff, Israel's Army, p. 8;
Dayan, My Life, p. 32.
  67.  O'Brien The Siege, pp. 178-179, disputes the explanation
that Jewish immigration caused the riots.  While semi-peaceful
relations between Arabs and Jews existed from 1924 through 1928,
62,000 Jews entered Palestine from 1924 through 1926.  Between
1927 and 1929, less than 12,000 Jews entered Palestine.  O'Brien
states "clearly there is no simple correlation between the volume
of Jewish immigration and the intensity of Arab reaction."  This
argument is somewhat simplistic since it can be argued that the
Arab reaction was not tied to an increase in Jewish immigration
but was rather a response to the cumulative effect of a decade of
Jewish immigration.  Michael J. Cohen, Palestine and the Great
Powers: 1945-1948, (Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 6,
states that in 1929, Jews comprised approximately 17% of
Palestine's total population.  See also O'Brien, pp. 179-188 and
Allon, David, p. 76, for a discussion of other causal factors.
  68.  See Teveth, Dayan, pp. 23-39; Dayan, My Life, p. 31
concerning Shmuel's and Dvorahis political activities.
  69.  Teveth, Dayan, pp. 20 and 31.
  70.  Ibid. , p. 57.
  71.  See Dayan, My Life, p. 32.  Dayan writes: "The British
Mandatory authority, through its police force and troops,
maintained order in the country.  They were supposed to protect
the citizens, but they were comparatively small forces and were
unable - and often unwilling - to rush to the defense of Jewish
communities in danger.  And when they did come, they frequently
arrived too late."
  72.  Ibid., p. 34.
  73.  Ibid., pp. 37-38.
  74.  Readers interested in a visual presentation of, among
other things, Dayan's view of the Arabs are encouraged to watch
Arnon Zuckerman, Dayan's Israel, (A Rimon Communications, Ltd.
production in association with the BBC, 1981).   In 1948, Moshe's
brother was killed by Druze militia while defending his home.  But
Moshe's successfully negotiated with Druze leaders and persuaded
them to withdraw from the Arab war against Israeli independence;
see Dayan, My Life, pp. 81-82.  During and after the War for
Independence, Moshe successfully negotiated with the Jordanians on
a variety of issues, to include ceasefire lines, peacekeeping
operations, and truces, see Dayan, My Life, chapters 9 and 10.
For a discussion of his participation in the Egyptian-Israeli
negotiations that resulted in the Camp David Accord, see Moshe
Dayan, Breakthrough:  A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace
Negotations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981).
  75.  Teveth, Dayan, p. 80.
                         CHAPTER II
       IHE HAGANAH AND THE EMERGENCE Of DAYAN: 1930-1941
  1. See O'Brien, The Siege, p. 188.
  2. Ibid., pp. 189-190.
  3. For a discussion of Jewish reconcilliationsists, see
O'Brien, The Siege, pp. 172-174.  See also Sykes, Crossroads, p.
156, regarding Dr. Judah Manges who, as President of the Hebrew
University, advocated an Arab-Jewish, bi-national state.  For
information regarding Weizmann's relationship with the British
and the Yishuv following the 1929 riots, see O'Brien, The Siege,
p. 188 and pp. 193-195.  Regarding Ben-Gurion's rise, see
O'Brien, Ihe Siege, pp. 223-225.  While those pages discuss Ben-
Gurion during the initial stages of the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939,
it is both easy and not incorrect to "back-fit" that passage to
the immediate post-1929 Riots timeframe.  Although he was a
moderate, his approach differed from Weizmann's pro-British
stance and his public statements certainly endeared him to Jewish
Palestinians.  For example, in formal testimony given before the
Peel Commission in January 1937, Ben-Gurion stated: "I say on
behalf of the Jews that the Bible is our Mandate which was
written by us, in our own language, in Hebrew in this very
country.  That is our mandate.  It was only the recognition of
this right which was expressed in the Balfour Declaration."
(O'Brien, p. 225).
  4. During the 1920's, the Histadrut had allocated less than
2,000 pounds sterling for the Haganah's annual budget, Luttwak
and Horowitz, Israeli Army, p. 9.  See also Perlmutter, The
Partitioned State, pp. 82-83.
  5. For a discussion of the rift between Ben-Gurion and
Jabotinsky's Revisionists and how that dispute led to the
formation of a rival para-military organization in the early
1930's, see O'Brien, The Siege,pp. 187-188; Perlmutter, The
Partitioned State, pp. 84-85; Luttwak and Horowitz, Israeli Army,
pp. 9-10, p. 12; and Schiff, Israel's Army, p. 9.
  6. For a discussion of Nazi-Jewish cooperation, see O'Brien,
The Siege, pp. 196-201.  Ben-Gurion and the moderates believed
that Jabotinsky's Revisionists were responsible for the murder of
Chaim Arlosoroff who, as a representative of the Jewish Agency,
had negotiated with the Nazis and secured an agreement allowing
some Jews to leave Germany.  See also Luttwak and Horowitz,
Israeli Army, p. 10.
  7. O'Brien, The Siege, pp. 202-203.  This increased population
resulted in increased Jewish land purchases.  Between 1922 and
1939, Jewish landholdings increased from 148,500 acres to nearly
384,000 acres.
  8. See Allon, David, p. 73, concerning early Jewish weapons
procurement and munitions production efforts.  See Allon, David,
p. 83 and Dayan, My Life, pp. 32-33 on British regulations
regarding weapons possession.
  9. For discussions concerning Moshe Dayan's early experiences
in and training received from the Haganah, see Teveth, Dayan, pp.
64-68; Dayan, My Life, pp. 32-38.
  10.  Dayan, My Life, p. 32.
  11.  Teveth, Dayan, p. 67.
  12.  See Dayan, My Life, p. 33; Teveth, Dayan, pp. 61, 68, 69,
and 74.
  13.  See Schiff, Israel's Army, p. 10; Allon, David, p. 75.
Sykes, Crossroads, p. 198, writes: "The concern of the Arabic-
speaking world with Palestine was not a chimera imagined by
orientalists and Arabophiles.  It was a real fact and a dangerous
one.  It tended to make the Arab world friendly-disposed to Nazi
Germany, and a large part of the oil resources of Britain were
located in the Arab world.  To have opened a major quarrel with
the Arab states when Europe was moving toward war would have been
an act of folly by Britain without precedent."
  14.  For a discussions concerning the causes of the Arab Revolt
of 1936-1939, see O'Brien, The Siege, pp. 204-210.  Of particular
importance are the religious aspects of the revolt.  In November
1935, Sheikh al-Qassam and his guerrilla band were killed to the
last man in a fierce engagement.  Each dead Arab was found to
have a copy of the Koran strapped to his body and al-Qassam
quickly became a martyred hero to Muslim youth.  In June 1936,
Haj Amin and other Muslim nationalists called on Arabs in the
name of Islam to join the growing rebellion.  During the British
hearings in December 1936, Haj Amin testified that Jews
constituted a threat to the sanctity of Arab Holy places (Ibid.,
p. 226).  For a Jewish and occasionally biased perspective
concerning the revolt see Allon, David, pp. 75-77.  It is
interesting that Allon states that Arab militants fomented
rebellion despite the fact that the influx of European Jews
raised the standard of living for everyone in Palestine, to
include the Arabs.  While true, the statement overlooks that fact
that increased economic standing does not defuse nationalistic
sentiments.
  15.  For discussions concerning Arab violence directed against
Arab strike-breakers, see Allon, David, p. 80; Michael J. Cohen,
Palestine and the Great Powers 1945-1948, (Princeton University
Press, 1982), p. 6; Luttwak and Horowitz, Israeli Army, p. 11.
Both Cohen and Luttwak suggest that Arab vs. Arab violence
represented a political power struggle within the Arab community
over which family or clan would assume the mantle of Arab
leadership.  As the revolt wore one the struggle against the
British occasionally took second seat behind this political
infighting.  Allon, David, p. 76, states that the revolt killed
2287 Arabs, 520 Jews, and 140 Brits.
  16.  See O'Brien, The Siege, pp. 215-217, for a discussion of
the political factors motivating various Arab leaders -
especially King Saud of Saudi Arabia, King Ghazi of Iraq, and
Abdullah of the Trans-Jordan.  Each leader wanted to rid
Palestine of both the Jews and their British protectors.
However, each wanted to ensure that the others did not benefit
from a British evacuation of Palestine.  This is especially
important when studying the relationship between Haj Amin and
Abdullah.  In discussing the subject of Arab volunteers, it is
interesting to note that Allon, David, p. 77, refers to them as
"illegal Arab immigrants."
  17.  For discussions concerning the Peel Report and the
recommendations contained in the White Paper of 1937, see Allon,
David, pp. 94-96; O'Brien, The Siege, pp  226-230.
  18.  For additional information on Haj Amin, see O'Brien, The
Siege, pp. 231 and 250-252; Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars,
(New York: Random House, 1982) , p. 21.  For Hitler is comments
after meeting Haj Amin in 1942, see Adolf Hitler, H. R. Trevor-
Roper, ed.,  Hitler's Table Talk: 1941-1944, (London: WeidenfeId
and Nicolson, 1953), p. 547.
  19.  Allon, David, p. 80, states that el-Kaukji boasted that
10,000 men were under his command.
  20.  For discussions concerning British tactics employed during
the revolt, see Allon, David, pp. 83-90; Schiff, Israel's Army,
p. 11.  Luttwak and Horowitz, Israeli Army, p. 13, sites British
strength at two divisions.  Israeli attempts to halt Arab
Palestinian disturbances in the West Bank during the first half
of 1988 are quite similar to the tactics the British employed to
quell the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939.  Using military units as
policemen and subjecting an angry population to curfews,
detentions, and martial law, did not work in the 1930's and does
not appear to be overly successful today.
  21.  Teveth, Dayan, p. 93.
  22.  See Luttwak and Horowitz, Israeli  Army, p. 11, concerning
the Haganah's operational problems during 1936.  Teveth, Dayan,
p. 91, provides an excellent example of the political selection
process within the Haganah.  Although he was the most militarily
and tactically proficient Haganah member in Shimron, Moshe Dayan
was not selected as the village's Haganah leader for political
reasons.  See also Schiff, Israel's Army, p. 11, concerning the
Haganah's underestimation of Arab strengths and fighting
abilities.
  23.  For a discussion concerning the military and political
roots of Havlagah, see Allon, David, p. 81; Perlmutter, Military
and Politics, pp. 24-26; Schiff, Israel's Army, p. 11.
Perlmutter's comments also provide insight into the split between
the Haganah and its leaders with the Irgun over Havlagah.
O'Brien. The Siege, pp. 232-234, also discusses this rift, its
effect on the Yishuv, and an Irgun terrorist attack in a Haifa
fruit market that left 74 dead and 129 wounded.  Allon, David, p.
80 also discusses the Irgun's terrorist attacks.
  24.  For a well-written description of Operation Stockade and
Tower, see Allon, Making Israel's Army, pp. 12-13.  For
additional information regarding the strategic implications of
this strategy, see Allon, David, pp. 92-93.
  25.  The best examples of this cooperation was during the Arab
Revolt of 1936-1939 and during Rommel is North African Campaign of
1941-1942.
  26.  Amos Perlmutter, Military band Politics, pp. 30-31, states
"The Arab rebellion could have turned into a Jewish massacre but
for the mufti's fatal mistake of directing the action primarily
against the Mandatory instead of against the Jews.  This forced
the Mandatory to rely on armed Jewish force in addition to its
own troops and police to crush the revolt.  Without initial
British support and protection, the Yishuv would have been at the
mercy of the Arab terrorists and there probably would have been
no contest in 1948."
  27.  Allon, David, pp. 84-85.  See also Teveth, Dayan, p. 94;
and Al ln, Making Israel's Army, p. 8, on the expansion and
growing importance of the Jewish Settlement Police.
  28.  Dayan, My Life, p. 41.
  29.  Teveth, Dayan, p. 94.
  30.  Dayan lists his duties and discusses his ideas concerning
initiative and surprise in Dayan, My Life, pp. 41-42.   The issue
of the precise date Dayan became the leader of the mobile patrol
is somewhat muddled as both Dayan and Teveth list different dates
for the event.  Dayan, My Life, pp. 41-42, discusses his eight
month tenure as a guide and states that he was appointed by
written order as a ghafir in March 1937.  He clearly states that
he was promoted to sergeant after terminating his association
with the British units.  Yet Teveth, Dayan, p. 94, states that
Moshe joined the Jewish Settlement Police in the spring of 1937
after relinquishing his post as guide.
  31.  Schiff, Israel's Army, p. 17.
  32.  Allon, David, pp. 86-87.
  33.  For a discussion of "hammer and anvil" tactics, see
Yitzhak Sadeh, "The Flying Squad", in Allon, Making Israel's
Army, pp. 120-122.
  34.  See Yitzhak Sadeh, "The fellowship of Fighters", in Allon,
Making Israel's Army, pp. 131-132.  As part of his psychological
preparations, Sadeh obviously believed it was important to
prepare his men with the corrects political motivation.  As a
former member of Lenin's army, Sadeh taught his men the history
and traditions of the Hashomer and the Labor and Defense
Battalions, both of which had strong Marxist leanings.  Sadeh
also made sure that his troops were properly infused with the
pro-Marxist spirit of his mentor, Joseph Trumpeldor, Allon,
David, pp. 87-88.
  35.  Luttwak and Horowitz, Israeli Army, pp. 13-14; Allon,
David, pp. 98-100.
  36.  See Allon, David, p. 100; Schiff, Israel's Army, p. 17,
for a brief discussion of these political concerns.  While no
author links the FOSH's demise with Sadeh's left-wing political
views, Schiff, Israeli Arm, p. 18, states that "when the IDF
(Israel Defense Force) was founded, he (Sadeh) was moved out of a
senior position because of political rivalries within the Labor
Movement - his views were considered too 'left-wing' for those in
power."
  37.  Allon, David, p. 86.
  38.  Teveth, David, p. 95; Allon, Making Israeli's Army, p. 8.
  39.  Dayan, My Life, p. 42.
  40.  Ibid., p. 42.
  41.  Teveth, Dayan, p. 95.
  42.  Dayan, My Life, pp. 42-43; Teveth, Dayan, p. 96.
  43.  Dayan, My Life, p. 43.
  44.  Teveth, Dayan, p. 96.
  45.  Dayan, My Life, pp. 43-45; Teveth, Dayan, pp. 98-99;
Allon, David, p. 103.
  46.  For an examination of Wingate's experiences in Palestine,
see Christopher Sykes, Orde Wingate: A Biography, (New York:
World Publishing Company, 1959), pp. 103-178; Leonard Mosley,
Gideon Goes to War, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955),
pp. 34-96.
  47.  Sykes, Wingateo, p. 117.
  48.  Mosley, Gideon, p. 34 claims that Wingate became a Zionist
during his transit to Palestine; Sykes, Wingate, p. 109 argues
that Wingate became a convert within four months after having
arrived in Palestine.
  49.  Sykes,Wingate, p. 112.
  50.  Ibid., p. 167.  Although made in 1938, this quote is
typical of the statements Wingate made during his tour in
Palestine.
  51.  Since Wingate was related to Lawrence of Arabia and was a
cousin of the pro-Arab and former British High Commissioner of
Egypt, Sir Reginald Wingate, the Haganah did riot automatically
embrace him as "The Friend" until after it completed a thorough
security check.  See Mosley, Gideon, pp. 41-43.
  52.  Sykes, Wingate, pp. 121-126.
  53.  Mosely, Gideon, p. 47.
  54.  Sykes, Wingate, pp. 136-137.  Sykes points out that
Wingate's assessment is not entirely fair since it ignores the
innovative and aggressive counter-guerrilla actions taken by some
British units.  However, it appears that those actions were the
exception rather than the rule, see Allon, David, p. 83 and p.
90.
  55.  Sykes, Wingate, p. 136 and p. 148.
  56.  British opposition stemmed from the plan's contradiction
of a primary tenet of England's Palestinian Policy, that of "the
avoidance of any line of action that would bring the Jews and
Arabs into armed conflict", Sykes, Wingate, p. 142.  While
Jewish-British cooperation had led to the formation of the
notrim, those were essentially defensive units.  Wingate' s
proposal required that Britain officially support and sanction
the use of Jewish units in offensive action.  Some Jews also
opposed the plan for fear that it would undermine the national
policy of self-restraint, increase Arab-Jewish hostilities,
result in the inadvertent death of non-combatant Arabs, and
provide a lucrative recruiting ground for the British army,
Ibid., p. 143; Allon, David, p. 102.
  57.  While Sadeh's "Flying Squad" concept eventually involved
assaulting guerrillas on the outskirts of their villages, Sadeh
is not clear as to when this tactics was first employed against
Arab villages, see Sadeh, "The Flying Squad", in Allon, Making
Israel's Army, p. 122.  Even if Arab villages had been targeted
before Wingate's arrival in northern Palestine, the Yishuv would
have condemned it as a violation of Havlagah.  See also Dayan, My
Life, pp. 45-46.
  58.  Sykes, Wingate, pp. 149-150; Allon, David, p. 104.
  59.  Sykes, Wingate, pp. 152-154; Mosley, Gideon, p. 64.
  60.  Allon, David, p. 104.
  61.  For specific examples of these generalizations, see Sykes,
Wingate, pp. 150-178; Mosley, Gideon, pp. 55-69.  for Dayan's
comments on the value of retaliatory strikes against Arab
guerrilla bases, see Mosley, Gideon, p. 63.
  62.  For a description of one of the SNS patrols in which Dayan
took part, see Teveth, Dayan, pp. 101-102.
  63.  See Sykes, Wingate, pp. 156-159; Mosley, Gideon, pp. 69-
70.  After the battle, Arab guerrillas placed a sizable reward on
Wingate's head and tried to assassinate him, see Mosley, Gideon,
pp. 70 and 73.
  64.  Training at these schools was conducted in 11 day cycles
and covered such topics as the nature of war, the infantry
platoon in battle, infantry  in the defense, infantry in the
attack, leadership and military vices, field artillery in support
of the infantry, and the tasks of engineers and cavalry. See
Sykes, Wingate, p. 174; Allon, David, p. 105.
  65.  Mosley, Gideon, p. 78.
  66.  Allon, David, p. 106.
  67.  Dayan, My Life, p. 47.  While Wingate's contributions to
Jewish military thinking and his influence on Moshe Dayan's
development were considerable, some authors tend to ignore
Sadeh's major contributions in this area.  See Mosley, Gideon, p.
252, where he "quotes" then Chief of Staff Dayan as saying
Wingate "taught me and many another Israeli soldier everything we
know."  It is doubtful that this is a precise quote given Dayan's
own statement regarding the parallel influences of both Sadeh and
Wingate and is probably an attempt by Mosley to enhance the
reputation of his book's central figure, i .e. , Wingate.
  68.  The meetings were held in England and were attended by
representatives of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Yemen, Trans-
Jordan, and Palestine (a split delegation of Arab factional
leaders and the Jews).  The Arabs refused to meet in the same
room as the Jews and the meetings soon collapsed.  See O'Bri en,
The Siege, pp. 237-238; Allon, David, pp. 106-107.
  69.  See O'Brien, The Siege, pp. 237-243; Allon, David, p. 107;
Perlmutter, The Partitioned State, pp. 75-81.  The Woodhead
Commission issued its report in 1938 and had recommended
partition as a solution to the Arab-Jewish dispute.  Under that
plan, the Jewish portion of Palestine would have been a conclave
of less than 500 square miles on the coastal plain.  Both the
Arabs and the Jews objected to this plan: the Jews because it was
unfair; the Arabs on principle.
  70.  On Dayan's arrest, trial, and stay in prison, see Dayan,
My Life, pp. 48-61; Teveth, Dayan, pp. 104-115.
  71.  O'Brien, The Siege, p. 243.
  72.  Ibid., p. 247.
  73.  This evolutionary process began in 1937 with the creation
of the Haganah National Command which, in 1938, was directed by
Yohanan Rattner - a man more interested in exploiting the
Haganah's military capabilities than he was in politically
controlling that organization.  Rattner and others succeeded in
dividing Palestine into military districts and allocating Haganah
forces to each of those four regions.  These forces were led by
regional commanders each of whom reported directly to the Haganah
National Command.  Although ultimately responsible to civilian
authority, by 1941 the Haganah was no longer the object of
destructive political infighting between right-wing and left-wing
groups seeking political control of the national defense
organization.  See Allon, David, pp. 91-92and pp. 96-98; Luttwak
and Horowitz, Israeli Army, p. 14 and p. 17; Schiff, Israel's
Army, p. 11.
  74.  For a discussion of the Haganah-Jewish Agency relationship
from 1940-1941, see Allon, David, pp. 109-111.  Please note that
Operation Stockade and Tower was exactly the same as its earlier
version except in one key area.  During the Arab Revolt, new
Jewish settlements were constructed during daylight hours so that
they could be defended against the inevitable Arab night assault.
During the 1940's, these new settlements were constructed at
night to avoid British interference.
  75.  While the notrim was not completely dissolved, the British
still controlled those militia and police forces and that control
eliminated the Haganah's ability to command notrim elements as
"independent Jewish fighting formations."  Ibid., p. 113.
  76.  Luttwak and Horowitz, Israeli Army, p. 19, states that
27,000 Palestinian Jews served in the British army.  Allon,
David, p. 140, puts that figure at 32,000.  The precise number is
irrelevant.  The importance of these figures lies in the fact
that approximately 6% of the total Jewish population in Palestine
served in the British army.  This represented a serious manpower
dilemma for the Haganah.
  77.  For a discussion of the debate surrounding the formation
of the HISH and later the Palmach, see Allon, David, pp. 112-116.
  78.  See Ibid., p. 106 and p. 141; Luttwak and Horowitz,
Israeli Army, p. 19.
  79.  Allon, David, pp. 116-118; Luttwak and Horowitz, Isreali
Army, pp. 19-20.
  80.  Teveth, Dayan, p. 115; Dayan, My Life, p. 60.  Shmuel kept
a diary during his son's incarceration and the passages reprinted
in Shmuel Dayan, "Moshe My Son", in Ribalow, ed., Fighting Heroes
of Israel, provide interesting glimpses into the negotiations
undertaken to obtain Moshe' s release, growing Jewish and British
fears concerning a possible Nazi invasion of Palestine, and
Shmuel's relationship with his son.
  81.  Haganah leaders were quite concerned that the Palmach
would eventually become part of the British army, thereby
eliminating the Haganah's ability to operationally control those
forces in the "national interests" of the nascent Jewish state.
See Allon, David, p. 118.  On page 114, Allon summarizes British
concerns over the arming and training of Jewish military forces.
On pp. 118-119, Allon briefly examines one of those special
operation missions - an amphibious raid that not only failed, but
cost the lives of all 23 participants.
  82.  Ibid., p. 117.
  83.  For discussions of Moshe's participation in the Allied
invasion of Lebanon, see Dayan, My Life, pp. 62-71 ; Teveth,
Dayan, pp. 116-124.  While Dayan states that the Allied invasion
began on 7 June, the actual invasion began in the early morning
hours of 8 June.  Moshe's commando unit was sent across the
border on 7 June to conduct pre-D-Day operations.
  84.  Accounts of the engagement vary markedly.  Teveth cites
official, but slanted, Australian reports that give scant
recognition to Moshe's participation in the battle.  Teveth
refutes those reports with archival Haganah documents that
portray the Australians as confused and timid.  Teveth, quite
naturally, describes Moshe as the hero.  The best compromise
description is Moshe's matter-of-fact account - an account that
neither builds him up nor minimizes the Australians' efforts.
  85.  Dayan, My Life, p. 70.
  86.  The last attempt to implant a glass eye was made in 1957,
Teveth, Dayan, p. 126.
                         CHAPTER III
               RECOVERY AND REVOLT: 1941-1947
  1. For Dayan's quotation, see Dayan, My Life, p. 72.  While
Yigal Allon and Moshe Dayan were comrades in arms, a rift
developed between the two men that would last until Moshe's death
in 1981.  Teveth, Dayan, p. 126, suggests that this rift was a
result of the private "competitive race" for military prowess the
two men ran against each other.  While the rift may have been
rooted in competition, it does not fully explain the distant
relationship that developed between the two men in later years.
This "distancing of personal relations" may best be explained in
political terms.  While Yigal Allon was a devout military
disciple of Yitzhak Sadeh, there was a sense of political
affinity between the two men.  Dayan shared a deep political
relationship with David Ben-Gurion, not Yitzhak Sadeh, and it was
Ben-Gurion, not Sadeh, who provided political leadership and
political philosophy for Israel before, during, and after
Israel's War of Independence.  During that war, Sadeh was not
immediately given a military command and, after the war, he was
excluded from the Israel Defense force for his leftist political
beliefs (see Schiff, Israel's Army, p. 18).  Readers should also
remember that before emigrating to Israel, Sadeh was an officer
in Lenin's Red Army.  While Allon served his country well during
what he termed "Israel's War of Liberation", he was not afforded
the same opportunities for military advancement as was Dayan and
after the war, he, like his mentor Sadeh, was excluded from any
position of responsibility within the Israel Defense force.
Perlmutter, The Partitioned State, p. 72, discusses Allon's break
with the Mapai Party in 1942.  The Mapai Party, also known as the
Labor Party, was the single most powerful political organization
within Israel through the mid-1960's.  After breaking with Mapai,
Allon helped establish a new Labor Party in 1944. In January
1949, the first national elections were held in Israel.  Ben-
Gurion's Mapai party emerged the victor, winning 46 out of the
120 seats in the knesset - Israel's Parliament.  The Mapam Party,
Israel's communist party, won 19 seats, the second largest total
won by any party in the elections.  Yigal Allon was a member of
the Mapam Party, see Luttwak and Horowitz, Israeli Army, p. 72.
Following the War of Independence, Ben-Gurion replaced Al Ion
with Dayan as Commander of the Southern front.  This replacement
occurred while Allon was out of the country touring French
Algeria.  See Schiff, Israel's Army, p. 48.    Although Allon was
being considered for the position of Minister of Defense in May
1967, it was Moshe Dayan who ultimately filled that position and
"led" Israel to its military victory in the 1967 Six-Day War.
Perhaps the most visible indication of the Allon-Dayan rift lies
in Allon's book, Shield of David: The Story of Israel's Armed
Forces, which seldom mentions Dayan by name.
  2. Dayan, My Life, p. 79.
  3    Ibid., pp. 73-74; Teveth, Dayan, pp. 126-127.
  4. While this idea did not originate with Dayan, he did expand
the concept and played a major role in its implementation.
O'Brien, The Siege, p. 256, indicates that these "specially
trained Haganah volunteers" helped some 10,000 Jews escape to
Palestine.  For the favorable views of the British military on
the "German platoon", see Perlmutter, The Partitioned State, p.
90.  For a discussion of the employment of the Palmach "German
Platoon", see Allon, David, pp  122 and 130-138; Dayan, My Life,
pp. 74-75; and Teveth, Dayan, p. 127.
  5. For a discussion of the Carmel Plan, see Allon, David, pp.
122-124.   It should be noted that this was not the first "nation-
wide" defense plan developed by the Haganah.  In 1938, during the
Arab Revolt, there was considerable Jewish concern that the
British would abandon Palestine if and when war came to Europe.
Accordingly, Yohanan Rattner and the Haganah developed several
contingency plans that would have been implemented if the British
had withdrawn.  Collectively known as Avner, these plans called
for the defense of all of "Jewish" Palestine.  Plan Avner
differed from the Carmel Plan in two key areas.  First, Avner was
an extremely audacious plan that was clearly beyond the Haganah's
capabilities to successfully execute.  Second, Avner was
basically a position-oriented, static defense-in-depth plan that
lacked any meaningful offensive characteristics.  See Allon,
David, pp. 96-97.
  6.  Allon, David, pp. 121-122; O'Brien, The Siege, p. 249.
  7. Once again, British self-interests, concerns over future
relations with the Arabs, and the official Palestine policy
codified in the White Paper of 1939, led London to curtail its
support of Jewish military efforts in Palestine.  No doubt, the
British also remembered the problems created after World War I
when, during that war, they had armed and trained independent
Jewish units.
  8.  Teveth and Dayan disagree as to when Moshe ended his
service with the Special Operations Branch.  Dayan, My Life, p.
75, indicates that he returned to Nahalal in August 1942 while
Teveth, Dayan, states that Moshe returned in September of that
year.
  9.   For an excellent examination of the history of sephardic
Jews, their plight in moslem countries, and the reasons for their
generally hard-line approach to Arab-Israeli relations, see
O'Brien, The Siege, pp. 333-361.   Commonly referred to as
sephardic Jews, these Jews had experienced life under hostile Arab
rule and, after World War II, a great number of them quickly
emigrated to Israel.  Sephardic immigrants to Israel have had a
tremendous impact on Israel's social composition and politcal
views.  According to one author, sephardic Jewish beliefs are
"based on Revisionist, neo-Revisionist and religious strands of
Zionism which are characterized by a hard-line towards the Arabs
and the Arab-Israeli conflict ..." views that have replaced
"Socialist Zionism as the country's dominant belief system."  See
Ofira Seliktar, "Ethnic Stratification and Foreign Policy in
Israel: The Attitudes of Oriental Jews Towards the Arabs and the
Arab-Israeli Conflict", The Middle East Journal, volume 38, number
1, Winter 1984, pp. 34-50.
  10.  O'Brien, The Siege, pp. 250-252; Perlmutter, The
Partitioned State, pp. 89-91; Allon, David, p. 149, discuss Haj
Amin's role in the pro-Nazi revolt in Iraq in 1941.  On p. 235,
O'Brien briefly discusses the fate of Jews living in Iraq, Syria,
and Lebanon during the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939.
  11.  For a discussion of Moshe's mission to Baghdad, see
Teveth, Dayan, pp. 130-131; Dayan My Life, pp. 75-77.
  12.  Allon, David, p. 126.  When the British began cooperating
with the Haganah in 1941, British authorities agreed not to
request the true names of those Palmach members who received
military training from the British.  Once Rommel had been
defeated, the British immediately revoked that pledge and
actively sought their real identities.
  13.  For the fate of the S.S. Patria and other vessels
attempting to smuggle Jewish refugees out of Europe and into
Palestine during World War II, see Allon, David, pp. 109-111;
O'Brien, The Siege, p. 248; Perlmutter, The Partitioned State, p.
94.  Allon provides the Haganah's explanation regarding the
Patria.  No one knew how unseaworthy the ship was and
consequently, the Haganah used too much explosives while
attempting to scuttle the vessel.  Both O'Brien and Perlmutter lay
much of the blame for the deaths of the 767 Jews aboard the
Struma, which sank in February 1942, on Lord Moyne of the British
Colonial Office who refused to issue the Jewish refuges entry
visas into Palestine.  While the precise cause of the sinking is
not known, Allon states that after being refused docking rights in
Turkey, the Struma struck a mine near the Straits of Bosphorus.
In 1944, the Stern Gang assassinated Lord Moyne in Cairo.
  14.  Stern's campaign included bombings, assassinations, and
bank robberies.  See Perlmutter, The Partitioned State, pp. 84-87
and pp. 91-94, for a discussion of the Irgun-LEHI split.  On
Stern's attempt to work with the Nazis against the British, see
O'Brien, The Siege, pp. 246-247.  According to Sykes, Crossroads,
p. 243, "Stern hated Jews who disagreed with him more than he did
Gentiles" ... and ... "in January 1942, the Sternists murdered two
officials of (the) Histadrut."  It is interesting to note that
Yitzhak Shamir, Israel's current Prime Minister, was a former
operations officer for LEHI, see Perlmutter, The Partitioned
State, p. 202.
  15.  For a brief discussion of the divergent views of Weizmann
and Ben-Gurion, see Perlmutter, The Partitioned State, p. 71.
Also review Chapter I, pp. 30-31, of this paper.
  16.  For a succinct discussion of the Biltmore Conference and
the final split between Weizmann and Ben-Gurion, see O'Brien, The
Siege, pp. 252-256; Perlmutter, The Partitioned State, pp. 71-73.
See also Cohen, Great Powers, pp. 177-183.  The referenced quote
is on p. 182.
  17.  O'Brien, The Siege, p. 256.
  18.  During 1942-1943, portions of the Polish Free Army were
stationed in Palestine.  According to Perlmutter, The Partitioned
State, p. 97, elements within the Irgun tried to persuade Begin
to desert the army.  After Begin refused, Revisionists negotiated
with the Polish Army and eventually obtained Begin's premature
release from military duty.  O'Brien, The Siege, p. 357, states
that "Oriental (sephardic) Jews had made up a large portion of the
membership of the Irgun.
  19.  Jabotinsky died in 1940 and his body was eventually moved
from the United States to Israel.  Immediately prior to the 1967
Six-Day War, Begin joined the National Unity government and soon
afterward he stood beside Jabotinsky's grave on Mount Herzl and,
snapping to attention, is reported to have said "Sir, Head of
Betar, we have come to inform you that one of your followers is
now serving as a minister in the government of Israel."
Perlmutter, The Partitioned State, p. 334.
  20.  For a comparison of Jabotinsky and Begin and for a brief
examination of Begin's life through 1944, see Ibid., pp. 273-276
and pp. 333-336; O'Brien, The Siege, p. 248.
  21.  Although Begin's dreams of a unification of military and
political forces bonded in common cause against the British did
not take place precisely when and how he envisioned it would, by
1946 the Irgun and the Haganah, to include the Palmach, were
actively engaged in semi-coordinated assaults against the
British.  This accomplishment has prompted one historian to
describe Begin as a leader "of a modern national liberation
force, turning a group of so-called gangsters (LEHI and Irgun)
into an efficient political and military organization."  See
Perlmutter, The Partitioned State, p. 98.
  22.  O'Brien, The Siege, p. 258.  While Churchill was pro-
Zionist until Moyne' s assassination, as Prime Minister of Britain
and leader of the Allied war effort, he placed greater emphasis
on defeating Hitler than he did on the formation of a Jewish
state.
  23.  Cohen, Great Powers, p. 12.  No doubt the Irgun's bombing
of the King David Hotel in July 1946 played a key role in both
the Labor Party's drafting of this statement and Churchill's
endorsement of that policy.
  24.  There are several reasons why the "saison" did not
degenerate into civil war between rival Jewish factions.  First,
British tactics were not selective as their use of cordon and
search operations, arms raids, mass arrests, and detentions
tended to affect the entire Jewish population.  Second, after
Hitler was defeated, London's refusal to allow Jewish refugees
to enter Palestine so angered the Yishuv that the "saison"
quickly lost momentum.  Third, the Irgun-LEHI coalition enjoyed a
much smaller babe of popular support than did the Haganah, a fact
that probably influenced their decision not to retaliate against
their Jewish opponents.  Finally, despite his pro-terrorist
preferences, Begin refused to attack his fellow Jews.  for
additional discussions of the "saison" see Perlmutter, The
Partitioned State, pp. 93-94 and pp. 98-101; Allon, Making
Israel's Army, p. 29; O'Brien The Siege, p. 258.  This was not
the only instance of Ben-Gurion's political and military "house-
cleaning".  In 1946, he took military action against the right-
wing Irgun in the "Altalena Incident" and following the formation
of the Israel Defense Force, he disbanded the left-wing Palmach
(see Chapter IV for a description of these events).  In 1949,
acting as both Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, he made
sure that officers with extreme left-wing or right-wing political
views were not allowed to remain in the Israel Defense Force.
  25.  Allon, Making Israel's Army, p. 15.
  26.  Allon, David, p. 126..
  27.  Ibid., pp. 112-113.
  28.  Ibid.,  pp.  138-141,  briefly  discusses  both  the  Jewish
Brigade  and  Jewish  service  in  the British  Army.   Allon  provides
the  following  breakdown  of  Jewish  personnel  by  branch  or  type  of
service   4,800  infantrymen,  3,300 Royal  Engineers,  4,400  in
transportation,  1,250  in  the Royal  Ordnance  Corps, 1,100 in the
Service Corps, 650 artillerymen, 2,000 in the Royal Air force,
1,100 in the Royal Navy, 200 doctors, 450 officers, and 4,000
women attached to various support units,  Additionally, some 3,400
Jewish boys served in the British Army's Pioneer Corps - primarily
in Palestine as laborers.  See also Abraham Tanier and David
Karmon, "The Legacy of the Jewish Brigade", in Allon, Making
IsaAel's Army, pp. 225-231, provides a well-written discussion of
the Jewish Brigade, its organization, its strengths, and its
contributions in both World War II and in Israel's War of
Independence.
  29.  The author was unable to locate any study describing how
the technical expertise of the Jewish Brigade and the other
veterans of the British army were successfully combined with the
Haganah's and Palmach's tactical expertise.  Chapter IV provides
a brief discuss ion of how Moshe Dayan integrated veterans of the
British army with his Palmach volunteers when he organized and
led the 89th Commando Battalion.
  30.  After the successful Allied invasion of Syria and Lebanon
in June 1941, the Jewish Agency seriously considered eliminating
the Palmach as a means to further stimulate Jewish enlistments in
the British Army.  This inducement was not necessary since by
early 1940, over 130,000 Jews had volunteered for service.
However, British regulations initially stipulated that Jewish
volunteers would be accepted on a one-for-one basis with Arab
volunteers.  Given Arab sentiments toward London, Arab
enlistments were "snail-like".  See Allon, David, pp. 114 and
120.
  31.  See Perlmutter, The Partitioned State, p. 64, for
Tabenkin's political philosophy and aspirations.
  32.   See Allon, David, pp. 126-127; Schiff, Israel's Army, p.
19; and Luttwak and Horowitz, Israeli Army, pp. 20-21.  While
Allon and Schiff state that this offer was made in 1943, Luttwak
claims the offer was made in November 1942.
  33.  Allon, David, p. 127.  Sadeh and his disciples, Yigal
Allon in particular, continued to work for the creation of a
people's militia, a force capable of defending the Yishuv and a
force imbued with neo-Marxist philosophy.  In discussing the
integration of women into the Palmach, Allon, pp. 128-129, makes
repeated references to "a true people's army" based on the
"spirit of a new society. "  See also Yisreal Galili , "Foundations
of the Haganah (May. 1941)', in Allon, Making Israel's Army, pp.
117-118.   In his preface to Galili's article, Allon describes the
Haganah as "a movement of social and national liberation."
  34.  Allon, David, p. 20.
  35. Perlmutter, Military and Politics, p. 39, states that 17
of these 28 platoons were attached to agrarian settlements
associated with Tabenkin's United Kibbutzim Federation.  See
Allon, Making Israel's Army, p. 19, for a discussion of the
Palmach's mobilization scheme.
  36.  Allon, David, p. 125.
  37.  Ibid., p.  124.
  38.  Ibid.,  pp.  124-125.
  39.  See  Chaim Bar-Lev, "Training of Palmach N.C.O.'s  at  Daliya
(Report)",  in Allon, Making Israel's  Army,  pp. 127-130.  This is
a most fascinating report as it lists each block of instruction
taught - to include specific courses within each block.  The list
of "guest lecturers" is most impressive as it includes such
notables as Yigal Allon, Chaim Bar-Lev, Ya'akov Dori , Golda Meir,
and Yitzhak Rabin.  Although this report covers the period 23
July 1947 - 10 September 1947, it provides a glimpse of the
Palmach training offered from 1943 on.  See also "Palmach Field-
Training Programme", in Allon, Making Israel's Army, pp. 124-126,
which provides an equally informative examination of the standard
Palmach training regimen of 1946.  See also Perlmutter, Military
and Politics, p. 38, which discusses the Palmach's view of the
small unit leader.
  40.  Allon, Making Israel's Army, p. 21; Perlmutter, Military
and Politics, p. 39.  Allon, David, pp. 129-130, provides a brief
discussion of the formation of Israel's air force and navy during
World War II.
  41.  O'Brien, The Siege, p. 259.
  42.  Ibid., p. 261.
  43.  Cohen, Great Powers, pp. 66-67.  Allon, David, p. 169
states that initially the British linked Arab approval to the
monthly immigration quota, a position London quickly changed.
  44.  Cohen, Great Powers, p. 40.  Cohen, p. 39, contains a
lengthy quote from the British Chief's of Staff which underscore
their concern over maintaining good relations with Arab states.
  45.  Sykes, Crossroads, pp. 268 and 307.
  46.  O'Brien, The Siege, p. 259.  While primarily discussing
the differences between the Washington and London regarding
Proposed solutions to the Palestinian question, Perlmutter, The
Partitioned State, pp. 107-120, also hints at a growing sense of
Anglo-American rivalry in the Middle East.  See also Cohen, Great
Powers, pp. 96-115, which provides an excellent discussion on the
sensitive relations between the two powers regarding Palestine.
  47.  Allon, David, p. 172.  One must wonder to what extent the
Palmach' political stance influenced their objection to
cooperation with the Irgun and LEHI.  After all, many prominent
Palmach leaders had openly expressed their leftist sentiments and
would eventually join Mapam - Israel's communist party.  The
Irgun, on the other hand, was the para-military offspring of the
Yishuv's political right-wing organization - the Revisionist
Party.  See also O'Brien, The Siege, p. 261, and Cohen, Great
Powers, pp. 69-70.
  48.  For an excellent description of the Jewish resistance
movement, see Cohen, Great Powers, pp. 68-96; Allon, Making
Israel's Army, pp. 23-30; Allon, David, pp. 143-183.
  49.  Allon, David, pp. 143-156 and pp. 172-174, provides a
riveting discussion of the Haganah's illegal immigration
operations.
  50.  See Ibid., pp. 174-176.  It is interesting to note that
these settlements were constructed at night to avoid British
interference.  The settlements constructed during the Arab
Revolt, were built during the day so that they could be defended
against Arab night assaults.
  51.  O'Brien, The Siege, p. 276.
  52.  Cohen, Great Powers, pp. 96-115; Sykes, Crossroads, pp.
264-314, both discuss the Anglo-American Committee and the role
the Jewish Agency and other Zionist organizations had in shaping
public opinion.
  53.  O'Brien, The Siege, p. 267.  One reason for London's
stated requirement that the United States must help in defraying
the financial costs associated with implementing the committee's
recommendations was that Britain's economy was still suffering
the effects of World War II.  It is also interesting to note that
London tried to accommodate Washington's foreign policy views
since the United States had, and still was, supporting England
with massive economic loans.
  54.  For a good examination of Arab policy in 1946, see Cohen,
Great Powers, pp. 184-202, the quotation is found on page 201.
for Haj Amin's role in shaping Palestinian Arab opinion see
O'Brien, Thee Siege, p. 269.  The British, it should be noted, made
no attempt to prevent Haj Amin from entering Egypt following his
release by french officials in late 1945.  Their primary concern
was that they did not want to make a martyr out of the Mufti and
thereby inflame Arab opinion.
  55.  O'Brien, The Siege, p. 269.
  56.  Ibid., p. 273.  As Jabotinsky's spiritual heir, Begin used
the Irgun (originally formed by Jabotinsky's Revisionist Party) in
an attempt to secure Jabotinsky's political and territorial
objectives.
  57.  Cohen, Great Powers, p. 66.
  58.  For an overall examination of these military actions, see
Allon, David, pp. 143-183.  Readers interested in viewing several
of the after action reports or reading accounts of the actions by
Jewish participants should see Allon, Making Israel's Army, pp.
146-150, "The Attack on the Bridges"; pp. 151-157, "Sabotage
Action Report No. 9 (Report) - The Allenby Bridge"; pp. 158-161,
Famous Allenby Bridge"; pp. 162-154, "The Night of the Radar";
and pp. 165-172, "The Radar Action".
  59.  Cohen, Great Powers, p. 75.
  60.  For a good discussion of Operation Agatha, see Cohen,
Great Powers, pp. 81-90.  See also Allon, David, p. 178.
  61.  For varied opinions regarding who was ultimately
responsible for the King David Hotel tragedy, see Sykes,
Crossroads, p. 300; Cohen, Great Powers, pp. 90-93; Perlmutter,
The Partitioned State, pp. 103-105; Allon, David, pp. 178-179.
  62.  For a discussion of the unrestrained Irgun-LEHI war
against the British and the consequences of that campaign, see
Cohen, Great Powers, pp. 229-259.
  63.  Ibid., p. 243, the British attended the funeral of a
Haganah man killed defusing a warning charge in an Irgun tunnel
that ran beneath the British Headquarters buildins in Jaffa.
  64.  O'Brien, The Siege, p. 272.  for a discussion of the
British decision to refer the Palestine matter to the United
Nations, see, Cohen, Great Powers, pp. 203-228.
  65.  For discussion of the United Nations debates regarding the
decision to partition Palestine, see Ibid., pp. 260-300; O'Brien,
The Siege, pp. 271-279.
                              CHAPTER IV
           WAR, POLITICS, AND INDEPENDENCE: 1948-1949
  1. Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars,
1947-1914 (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), p. 124.  During its
212 year history, the United States has sustained slightly more
than 1 million battlefield deaths.
  2. O'Brien, The Siege, p. 428.  Chapter 9 of that book, "The
Shirt of Uthman", pp. 419-488, provides an excellent discussion of
both the ongoing refugee problem as well as Israel is attempts to
come to terms with its Arab inhabitants.
  3. Luttwak and Horowitz, Israeli Army, p. 81.
  4. Herzog, Arab-Israeli Wars, pp. 17-24, provides a succinct
examination of Arab and Jewish strengths and weaknesses.
  5. Allon, David, p. 190, indicates that there were slightly
more than 300 Jewish settlements in Palestine.  He does not
indicate how many of those were in territory granted to the
Arabs.
  6.   Ibid., p. 186.
  7.   Ibid., pp. 152-165, contains a succinct history of the
Yishuv's arms manufacturing and procurement operations.  For
estimates on the number and types of weapons held by the Haganah,
see Luttwak and Horowitz, Israeli Army, p. 25; Herzog, Arab-
Israeli Wars, p. 19.
  8.   Many of the arms raids frequently referred to in various
books were conducted before the United Nations Partition
Resolution.  Those conducted after that vote were in keeping with
existing Mandate policies.  However, it is easy to conclude that
some of those later raids were British attempts to retaliate for
the Jewish revolt against London's authority.
  9.   Luttwak and Horowitz, Israeli Army, p. 29.
  10.  Dupuy, Elusive Victory, p. 123, provides the following
information regarding the size of the Arab invasion force:
Lebanon, 2,000; Syria, 5,000; Jordan, 7,500; Egypt, 7,000; and
Iraq, 10,000.  for a limited discussion of the Arab Legion, see
Herzog, Arab-Israeli War s, p. 23.  While that page also contains
slightly different figures regarding the various strengths of the
Arab forces, those figures do not differ markedly from Dupuy's.
  11.  Dayan, My Life, p. 91.
  12.  Allon, David, p. 188.
  13.  Cohen, Great Powers, pp. 324-325.
  14.  Ibid., p. 187.
  15.  Ibid., pp. 306 and 321.
  16.  For a discussion of inter-Arab affairs, see Ibid., pp.
184-202.  For a discussion of the Arab League, see Ibid., pp.
317-325.  For a discussion of Abdullah's regional goals and his
somewhat friendly relations with the Jews, see Ibid., pp. 325-
334.  The rivalry between Jordan and Syria became so intense that
during 1947, each nation closed their embassy in the others
country.  Syrian-Jordanian relations continue to be less than
hospitable as is evidenced by the Syrian link with the Palestine
Liberation Organization, a link that helped spur Jordan to remove
the PLO from its territories in 1971 - "Black September".
  17.  Cohen, Great Powers, p. 311.
  18.  As late as 1956, Jordan and England maintained a close
diplomatic and military relationship.  In 1956, when England,
France, and Israel were preparing to invade Egypt, an Israeli
retaliation strike into Jordan against an Arab guerrilla camp
created tremendous diplomatic tensions between London and Tel
Aviv.  The British actually threatened to intervene militarily on
behalf of Jordan!
  19.  Allon, David, p. 13:3.
  20.  Those interested in the specifics of Israel's War of
Independence are encouraged to read, Chaim Herzog, The Arab-
Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East (New York: Random
House, 1982), pp. 17-108; which provides an unbiased appraisal of
that conflict.  For those interested in the evolution of the
Israel Defense force during that conflict, see Luttwak and
Horowitz, Israeli Army, pp. 27-70.  For a strictly Israeli
perspective, see Allon, David, pp. 185-227.  for those only
interested in a brief, yet nicely written overview, see Schiff,
Israel's Army, pp. 21-45.  Unless otherwise noted, the
discussions about the war were constructed from information drawn
from these volumes.  General  speaking, no additional footnotes
regarding the overall conduct of the war will be provided
unless either another work is cited or a quotation is used.
  21.  Cohen, Great Powers, pp. 301-344 provides an excellent
discussion of the political, diplomatic, and military events of
the November 1947 to May 1948 timeframe.
  22.  Allon, David, p. 200.  Throughout his discussion of
Israel's War of Independence, Allon goes to great lengths to cite
occasions when the British assisted, or appeared to assist, the
Arabs.  In many respects, Allon's case appears to be quite
justified and his contention that the British withdrawal favored
the Arabs is substantiated in part by the withdrawal sequence
described by Cohen, Great Powers, p. 312.  Cohen, who honestly
attempts to portray the British as neutral, does not cite one
instance in which the British assisted the Jews when that
assistance was not in their own best interests.  While Cohen
states that British forces forcefully expelling a sizable element
of the Arab Liberation Army from upper Galilee in January 1948,
thereby rescuing several beleaguered Jewish settlements, Herzog,
Arab-Israeli Wars, p. 24, states that this was in keeping with
existing British policy since that portion of Palestine had not
yet been evacuated.  Perhaps the most charitable were comment regarding
the British withdrawal is found in Luttwak and Horowitz, The
Israeli Armny, p. 28, "Right up to the last phases of the
evacuation, even quite small British contingents could decide the
outcome of local struggles by what they did or failed to do.  Much
was left to the discretion of junior officers; some were strictly
neutral, a few were pro-Jewish, but the vast majority tended to be
pro-Arab.
  23.  When this suggestion was made, Ya'akov Dori was the Haganah
Chief of Staff.  Dori, it should be recalled, refused to grant
Sadeh and Dayan permission in 1938 to launch counter-attacks
against the Arab forces besieging the settlement of Hanita.  It is
not entirely unreasonable to argue that Dori's lack of offensive
spirit in 1938 was reflected in the defense oriented proposal of
early 1948.  Luttwak and Horowitz, Israeli Army, p. 75, suggest
that Dori's poor health contributed to his "indifferent
leadership."
  24.   Luttwak and Horowitz, Israeli  Army, p. 31.
  25.  For discussion of how Israeli military operations
encouraged Palestinian Arabs to flee their homes, see Benny
Morris, "The Operation Dani and the Palestinian Exodus from Lydda
and Ramle in 1948" in The Middle East Journal, volume 40, number
1, Winter 1986; Denny Morris, "The Harvest of 1948 and the
Creation of the Palestinian Refugee Problem", in The Middle East
Journal, volume 40, number 4, Autumn 1986.  While emphasizing the
more controversial aspects of Israeli military operations, in
both of the articles Morris either plays down or ignores the fact
that Arab guerrilla groups hid amongst the local Arab population.
Consequently, the IDF often encouraged Arabs to flee their homes
since their departure would strip the Arab guerrillas of both
their cover and their base of popular support.
  26.  For additional information regarding "Operation Nashchon"
and Yigal Yadin's role in its preparation and execution, see
Sachar "Yigal Yadin", in Harold U. Ribalow, ed. Fighting Heroes
of Israeli, pp. 154-183.
  27.  For discussions of both tragedies, see O'Brien, The Siege,
pp. 281-282; Herzog, Arab-Israeli Wars, pp. 30 and 38.  See also
Cohen, Great Powers, pp. 337-338.
  28.  For Yigal Allon's Palmach offensives in northern Palestine,
see Sachar, "Yigal Allon", in Harold U. Ribalow, ed. , Fighting
Heroes of Isreali, pp. 65-87.
  29.  See Abraham Tanier and David Karmon, "The Legacy of the
Jewish Brigade", in Allon, Making Isreali's Army, pp. 225-2.31.
  30.  Often been described as the "training ground of the Israel
Defense Force" (IDF) , the importance of the Palmach must not be
underestimated.  In May 1948, the Palmach, the HISH, elements of
the Irgun and LEHI, and seasoned veterans of both the Jewish
Brigade and the British army were merged to form the IDF.
Despite the Palmach's small size, 4 of its officers - Moshe
Dayan, Yitzhak Rabin, Chaim Bar-Lev, and David Elazar -
eventually served as IDF Chief's-of-Staff.  After Israel's War of
Independence, 40 additional Palmach officers attained the rank of
brigadier-general. See Perlmutter, Military and Politics, p. 39.
  31.  See Luttwak and Horowitz, Israel Army, pp. 39-43, for a
succinct discussion of the evolution of the IDF's command
structure.
  32.  Moshe Dayan, Diary of the Sinai Campaign (New York.
Schocken Books, 1965) , p. 39.
  33.  Personal letter from Major General Amnon Shahak, Israel
Defense Force, dated 28 February 1988.
  34.  See Teveth, Dayan, pp. 138-143 and 159-162; Dayan, My
Life, pp. 87-92 and 112-121.
  35.  See Dayan, My Life, pp. 78-82.
  36.  See Dayan, My Life, pp. 87-92; Teveth, Dayan, pp. 138-14:3.
  37.  Dayan, My Life, p. 93.
  38.  Teveth, Dayan, pp. 144-147.  In July, this practice of
"raiding" other units for personnel was abolished as the IDF
headquarters decreed that no new units would be formed.  Instead,
a mobilization and assignment system was installed whereby new
recruits were funneled into already existing units.  See Luttwak
and Horowitz, Israeli Army, p. 43.
  39.  Dayan, My Life, p. 95.
  40.  Ibid., p. 94.
  41.  Ibid., p. 92; Teveth, Dayan, p. 155.
  42.  Dayan, My Life, pp. 96-98
  43.  Teveth, Dayan, pp. 149-151.
  44.  Dayan, My Life, pp. 115 and 117.
  45.  Teveth, Dayan, p. 151; Dayan, My Life, p. 98-99.
  46.  Dayan, My Life, p. 98; Teveth, Dayan, p. 151.  Dayan's
remark concerning "fighting Arabs, not Germans", is quite
interesting since it is indicative of his beliefs concerning Arab
military doctrine - a belief that to a large extent influenced
his approach to both the 1956 Sinai Campaign and, to a certain
extent in the 1967 Six Day War.  As Major General Amnon Shahak
put it, personal letter from Major General Amnon Shahak, dated 28
February 1988, "Dayan claimed that [since] the Arabs had not
studied the the German and British combat doctrine, [there was]
no reason to expect that they would act in accordance with this
doctrine."  This statement does not imply that Dayan believed the
Arabs were incompetent soldiers and tacticians.  Rather, it
underscores Dayan's lifelong belief that since Arab armies did
not fight using European methods, there was no need for the IDF
to devote an excessive amount of time and talent studying
European military history and doctrine.  While other IDF
commanders did study European military doctrine especially as it
related to the employment of armor, throughout his career Dayan
fostered the development of a combat doctrine largely based on
"young Israeli talents, their originality, inventiveness, and
pluck."  While some authors have attempted to describe Dayan's
approach to war as an offshoot of Sir Liddel Hart's "Indirect
Approach", especially with respect to his 1956 Sinai Campaign,
Dayan never studied nor did he meet Hart.  Other Israeli military
leaders were devout disciples of Hart's approach.  For a brief
examination of how Hart's "Indirect Approach" was modified to
suit IDF doctrinal needs, see Jac Weller, "Sir Basil Liddel
Hart's Disciples in Israel", Military Review, volume 54, number
2, January 1974.
  47.  Dayan, My Life, p. 99.
  48.  Ibid., p. 99.
  49.  Ibid., p. 100.
  50.  for an overview of the assaults on Lod (Lydda) and Ramle,
see Dayan, My Life, pp. 102-111; Teveth, Dayan, pp  153-158.
  51.  Dayan, My Life, pp. 113-114.
  52.  For a discussion of his duties, responsibilities, and
close working relationship with his Jordanian counterparts, see
Ibid., Chapter 8; Teveth, Dayan, pp. 163-179.
  53.  Dayan, My Life, p. 78.
  54.  Ibid., pp. 78-79.
  55.  Teveth, Dayan, pp. 135-136.
  56.  O'Brien, The Siege, p. 367.
  57.  Luttwak and Horowitz, Israeli Army, pp, 25-27 and p. 72,
discuss the Palmach's leftist links and Allon's membership in
Mapam.  Perlmutter, The Partitioned State, pp. 64 and 72, outline
Tabenkin's pro-Leninist predilections and Allon's split with
Mapai in 1942.  See also Perlmutter, Military and Politics, pp.
38-40.
  58.  For Dayan's participation in the "Altalena Affair", see
Dayan, My Life, pp. 95-96; Teveth, Dayan, pp. 147-149.
  59.  Luttwak and Horowitz, Israeli Army, p. 38.
  60.  Dayan, My Life, p. 95.
  61.  Ibid, p. 95.
                            CHAPTER V
                            EPILOGUE
  1.   This quotation was taken from Arnon Zuckerman, Dayan's
Israeli.  A review of the bibliography should provide the
interested reader with a starting point for further investigation
of the information presented in this chapter.
                             BIBLIOGRAPHY
Allon, Yigal . The Making of Israel's Army. New York: Universe
     Books, 1970.  Written by the former Commander of the Palmach
     and acting Israel Defense Force Chief of Staff, the book is
     divided into two parts.  Part One, "Defending the Land",
     presents a brief overview of Israel's armed forces from the
     turn of the century through the 1967 Six-Day War.  Part Two,
     "Voices and Documents", contains a series of articles, after-
     action reports, and training schedules written by various
     Jewish military leaders dating back to 1909.  While
     containing little information on Moshe Dayan, this section
     was exceptionally valuable in that it provided descriptions
     of the formation and training of, as well as the problems
     faced by the Haganah and the Palmach during their struggle
     with Britain following World War Two.
Allon, Yigal. Shield of David: The Story of Israel's Armed Forces.
     New York: Random House, 1970.  A companion volume to his book
     The Making of Israel's Army, this work provides a careful
     examination of the Israel Defense Force from its earliest
     predecessors through the 1967 Six-Day War.  Concentrating on
     the years 1929 through 1949, this book was useful in
     understanding how the development of the various Jewish
     defense organizations affected Moshe Dayan.  Readers are
     warned that Allon's treatment of the Arabs is somewhat one-
     sided.
Burns, Lt. General E. L. M. Between Arab and Israeli. New York
     1962.  General Burns was the head of the United Nations
     Special Committee on Palestine during the early 1950's.  His
     book provides an excellent discussion of the gradual
     increase of Israel's use of retaliation during that period.
     Of particular interest is Chapter Eight which specifically
     discusses Dayan's relationship with Beri-Gurion and his role
     in Israeli retaliation attacks.
Cohen, Michael J. Pajestine and the Great Powers: 1945-1948.
     Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1982.  This book does
     not provide any information regarding Moshe Dayan.  However,
     since it analyzes the diplomatic efforts of Britain, the
     United States, the Arabs, and the Jews to impose their own
     solution to the "Palestine Problem".  Following World War
     Two, the book provides valuable information concerning the
     political relationships that existed within Israel and
     between Israel and the western world and how those
     relationships were translated into military action.  Of
     particular importance was its unbiased discussion of the
     crumbling relationship between the Jews and the British in
     Palestine during the final months of the Mandate.
Dayan, Moshe. "A Soldier Reflects on Peace Hopes", ed. Walter
     Laquer and Barry Rubin, The Arab-Israeli Reader: A
     Documetary History of the Middle East Conflict, 4th edition,
     New York, 1985.  This article is a reprint of a speech Dayan
     made to a 1969 graduation ceremony for new Israel Defense
     Force officers and was useful intracing the development of
     his philosophy concerning peaceful relations between Israel
     and her neighboring Arab states.
Dayan, Moshe. Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the
     Israel Peace Negoiations. New York, 1981.  Written in the
     months before his death, Dayan lays out his remarkable
     account of the negotiations that led to the Camp David
     Accord.  Also included are discussions of his break with
     Begin and in 1979 and his beliefs regarding Arabs within
     occupied territories.
Dayan, Moshe. Diary of the Sinai Campaign. New York, 1967.  Based
     on his personal recollections and on a diary he kept during
     the 1956 Sinai War, the book contains Dayan's perspective of
     the war, its causes, and its execution.  In addition to its
     value as an historical record of that campaign, the volume
     provides the reader with a view of Dayan's personal beliefs
     concerning combat command and control procedures, combat
     leadership, etc.
Dayan, Moshe. "Israel's Border and Security Problems", Foreign
     Affairs, volume 33, number 2, January 1955.  This article was
     useful in understanding Dayan's frustration over the
     continued Arab raids and terrorist activities conducted
     against Israel during his tenure as Chief of Staff.
Dayan, Moshe. Moshe Dayan: Story of My Life. New York: William
     Morrow and Company, 1976.  To understand Moshe Dayan,
     students must read this thoughtful, well-written, and honest
     appraisal of his life, his ideas, his thbughts, and his
     actions.  Although he devotes half of the book to the years
     1967 through 1976, he provides an insightful glimpse into his
     "inner-self".  The book's major weakness is that it assumes
     the reader is well-versed in the political, social, and
     diplomatic history of Israel.
Dayan, Moshe. "Why Israel Strikes Back", Under Fire: Israel's 20-
     Year Struggle for Survival, ed. Donald Robinson, New York,
     1968.  Written in 195?, the piece provides Moshe Dayan's
     explanation for Israel's retaliation policy of the 1950's.
Elon, Amos. The Israelis: Founders and Sons. New York: Holt,
     Rinehart, and Winston, 1971.  Exceptionally thought
     provoking, the volume traces Israelis history from its pre-
     Herzl Zionist roots to the early 1970's.  The book is divided
     into two parts and part one, "Father's", was especially
     useful in identifying the varied social, political, and
     philosophical forces that molded Moshe Dayan's environment.
Herzog, Chaim. The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle
     East. New York, 1982.  This book is good military history and
     provided an excellent examination of each of Israel's wars
     from 1948 through 1973.
Khouri, Fred. "The Policy of Retaliation in Arab-Israeli
     Relations", The Middle East Journal, volume 20, number 4,
     Autumn 1966.  While primarily concentrating on Israeli
     retaliation raids since 1967, the article provides minimal
     information on pre-1956 strikes.
Luttwak, Edward N. and Daniel Horowitz.  The Israeli Army: 1948-
     1973.  Lanham, Maryland: Abt Books, 1983.  While covering the
     same information as Herzog's volume, this book provides less
     detail on how Israel fought her wars and concentrates on
     analyzing why Israel fought those war the way she did.
Morris, Benny. "Operation Dani and the Palestinian Exodus from
     Lydda and Ramle in 1948", The Middle East Journal, volume 40,
     number 1, Winter 1986.  While Moshe Dayan's exploits during
     Operation Dani are legendary, that operation has been cited
     as one of the causes of the Palestinian refugee problem.
Morris, Benny. "The Harvest of 1946 and the Creation of the
     Palestinian Refugee Problem", The Middle East Journal, volume
     40, number 4, Autumn 1986.  A useful piece in that it
     examines how food was used as a weapon in Israel's War for
     Independence and the military and political reasons for
     adopting that policy.
Mosley, Leonard. Gideon Goes to War. New York: Charles Scribner's
     Sons, 1955.  This biography of Orde Charles Wingate contains
     much of the same information as does Christopher Sykes'
     biography but it is neither as well-written nor as detailed
     as Sykes' work.  The volume does provide a more personal
     description of Wingate and is filled with numerous
     antecdotes of his experiences in Palestine.
O'Brien, Conor Cruise. The Siege: The Saga of Israel and Zionism.
     New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986.  While highly critical
     of the British, this volume traces the history of Israel
     from the mid-nineteenth century through 1982.  The book is
     well-documented and carefully researched and was of great
     value in examining the various social and political forces
     that shaped Moshe Dayan and his environment.
Perlmutter, Amos. Israel the Partitioned State: A Political
     History Since 1900. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1985.
     A political history of Israel since the earliest days of the
     British Madate, the volume describes the relationship
     between politics and the military and provides interesting
     reading when discussing the moderate vs. Revisionist split.
     Some information is given regarding Dayan's relationships
     with the various political leaders of Israel and his "Open
     Bridges Policy".
Perlmutter, Amos.  Military and Politics in Israel: Nation-
     Building an Role Expansion. New Vork: Frederick A. Praeger,
     1969.  Although this is a very small volume, it is an
     exceptionally complex work that requires the reader to have
     more than a passing knowlegde of Israel's political history.
     Despite this drawback, the book proved invaluable.
Perlmutter, Amos.  "The Institutionalization of Civil-Military
     Relations in Israel: The Ben-Gurion Legacy and Its
     Challengers (1953-1967)", The Middle East Journal, volume
     22, number 4, Autumn 1968.  This article uses the Lavon
     Affair as a start-point in discussing Israel's military-
     civilian relations.  It was of limited value in this study.
Raphaeli, Nimrod.  "Military Government in the Occupied
     Territories: An Israeli View", The Middle East Journal,
     volume 23, number 2, Spring 1969.  An early description of
     Dayan's "Open Bridges Policy".
Ribalow, Harold U. ed.  Fighting Heroes of Israel.  New York:
     Signet Books, 1967.  While this volume contains biographical
     sketches of various Israeli heroes, it was obviously written
     to capitalize on Israel7's 1967 Six-Day War.  The book was
     of limited value to this study.  However, it did provide
     light reading and is offered to those students who seek a
     pedestrian history of Israel's political and military
     heroes.
Samuel, Edwin.  "The Government of Israel and Its Problems", The
     Middle East Journal, volume 3, number 1, January 1949.
     Provides one of thme first examinations of the newly created
     Israeli state and its current and potential problems.  It
     was of limited value in this study.
Schiff, Ze'ev.  A History of The Israeli Army: 1874 to the
     Present.  New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1985.  Of
     limited historical use in this study, the book did provide
     useful discussions of the military doctrine of the Israel
     Defense force and how that doctrine support's Israel's
     national goals.
Seliktar, Ofira.  "Ethnic Stratification and Foreign Policy in
     Israel: The Attitudes of Oriental Jews Toward the Arabs and
     the Arab-Israeli Conflict", The Middle East Journal, volume
     38, number 1, Winter 1984.  An excellent discussion of the
     "hard-line" attitudes of "Oriental" (Sephardic) Jews and how
     their beliefs differ from "Western" (Ashkanhazi) Jews.
Shlaim, Avi.  "Conflicting Approaches to Israel's Relations with
     the Arabs: Ben-Gurion and Sharett, 1953-1956", The Middle
     East Journal, volume 37, number 3, Spring 1983.  A critical
     examination of the different foreign policy views held by
     two Israeli Prime Ministers in the 1950's, the article is as
     thought provoking as it is harsh in its judgement of Dayan's
     role in Israel's policy of retaliation.
Soffer, Arnon.  "The Wars of Israel in Sinai: Topography
     Conquered", Military Review, volume 62, number 4, April
     1982.  This article is crisply-written and provides a solid
     discussion of how the Israel Defense force utilized the
     Sinai's terrain in its confrontations with the Egyptian
     army.  Clearly demonstrating that Israel, not Egypt,
     understood how to use terrain in a mobile war of speed and
     disruption, the maps and terrain analyses show the striking
     similarity of Israel's campaigns of 1956 and 1967.
Sykes, Christopher.  Crossroads to Israel.  Cleveland: World
     Publishing Company, 1965.  Often quoted in later works, this
     volume provides an exceptional history of the British
     Mandate in Palestine.  Although Sykes does not discuss
     Dayan, the volume is critical to understanding the social
     and political forces that shaped and eventually led to
     Israel.
Sykes, Christopher.  Orde Wingate  A Biography.  Cleveland, World
     Publishing Company, 1959.  Well-written and carefully
     researched, this volume provided valuable information
     concerning Wingate's impact on the Haganah and the
     prevailing military doctrine of static, position-oriented
     defense.
Teveth, Shabtai.  Moshe Dayan: The Soldier, The Man, The Legend.
     Boston, 1973.  This work was invaluable in this study as it
     filled in many of the gaps Dayan either intentionally or
     unintentionally left in his autobiography.  While Dayan
     often assumes the reader is familiar with Israeli history,
     Teveth takes the time to provide a suitable explanation to
     many of the topics Dayan glosses over.
Weller, Jac.  "Sir Basil Liddell Hart's Disciples in Israel",
     Military Review, volume 54, number 2, January 1974.
     Although Dayan never met Hart, other Israel Defense Force
     (IDF) leaders met with Hart and studied his concept of the
     "Indirect Approach".  This piece discussed Hart's influence
     on the IDF.
                        MISCELLANEOUS
Personal letter from Major General Amnon Shahak to Major Allan
     Katzberg, dated 28 February 1988.  This letter was written
     in response to several questions I forwarded to formar IDF
     graduates of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College.
     The letter was most informative.
Zuckerman, Arnon.  Dayan's Israel, 1981.  This Rimon
     Communications, Ltd. production was produced in cooperation
     with the BBC and was most helpful in understanding Dayan's
     appreciation of and compassion for the Arabs.



NEWSLETTER
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list