Marine Airborne Opertions As Part Of The Amphibious Assault AUTHOR Major Jeffrey R. Earley, USA CSC 1988 SUBJECT AREA Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Marine Airborne Operations as part of the Amphibious Assault I.Purpose:To establish the validity of introducing U.S.Marines into the amphibious operation area utilizing the technique of airborne assault. II.Problem:Although the employment of airborne insertion of Marines into the object area is not a new concept, the Marine Corps has failed to realize the potential advantage the airborne assault would compliment and support the overall mission. III.Data:The employment of Marine airborne units into the amphibious operation area would add a new dimension to the commander to secure designated task force objectives.Marines must plan to go ashore from both airborne and amphibious transportation assets.Commanders should not find it difficult to incorporate airborne operational planning in the over all scheme of manuever.The beach landing and airborne assault can be independent or mutually supporting operations.By employing airborne forces, the commander can expect to exploit such tactical advantages as surprise, shock, and the enemy's inability to predict probable direction and location of attack. IV.Conclusion:Due to the similarity between capabilities and problems that are common to amphibious and airborne operations, the Marine Corps can readily adapt itself to a combined method of employment role.This role will allow commanders additional flexibility in planning and executing operations against enemy shores.The Marine Corps already has the assets available to it and would not require any additional physical or financial resources. V.Recommendation:The U. S. Marine Corps must train its force in individual and unit airborne techniques and operations. Headquarters, Marine Corps should certainly be able to arrange an agreement with the U.S. Army for additional training quotas for individual parachute proficiency and with the U.S.Airforce for the allocation of aircraft to enhance and retain acquired skills.The doctrine for such operations currently exists, it would be relatively simple to incorporate this doctrine into Marine Corps practice. Marine Airborne Forces in the Amphibious Assault. OUTLINE Thesis Statement.The employment of Marine airborne units into the amphibious operations area would add a new dimension to the Commander,Landing Force's options of securing the designated amphibious task force objectives. I. Marine Corps mission A.Historical Perspective B.National Security Act of 1947 C.Amphibious Doctrine D.Airborne Doctrine II. Strategic and Tactical implications A.securing the objective B.Airhead C.Beachhead D.Problem areas E.Coordination III. Capabilities A.Airborne B.Employment capability options. IV. Conclusion Marine Airborne Operations as Part of the Amphibious Assault Amphibious operations have been employed many times throughout history out never with the degree of success attained during World War II .This type of operation was used by the United States throughout the war in order to carry out offensive missions against thie Axis powers and the Japanese.The technique utilized was that which was employed by the U. S. Marine Corps in conjunction with the U. S. Navy during peace time.This concept was tested on Guadalcanal in 1942 in which many hard lessons were learned.From that point on the technique was improved at a rapid and continuous pace.The success of the technique was proven time and again by the Allies. Landing of combat troops from the air was forecast by numerous visionaries throughout history. This prophecy was not realized until 1939 when the Soviet Union dropped paratroopers in combat against the Finns during the Russo - Finnish War.Regardless of the degree of success obtained, the act was the spark that made all other nations intensify their search for the proper means of employing airborne troops in combat. The first successful large scale combined use of airborne and amphibious operations was made against the Axis powers in Sicily in 1943.Just as Guadalcanal was the birthplace of amphibious warfare, so Sicily became the birthplace of United States airborne 0perations.This operation was the forerunner of the greatest airborne / amphibious assault in history made in 1944 by the allied forces against the Axis Powers at Normandy.1 The employment of Marine airborne units into the amphibious operations area would add a new dimension to the commander, landing force's options of securing the designated amphibious task force objectives.United States airborne forces and amphibious forces together form a strong portion of the nation's strategic policy which is the projection of power.The inherent capabilities of each method of employment make them ideally suited for this mission. Strategicly. and tactically airborne forces move with great speed and amphibious forces move with great strength. If the Marine Corps is to fully accomplish its mission as assigned by the National Security Act of 1947, it must exploit all of the tools available to it."The United States Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall include land combat aid service forces and such aviation as may be organic there in.The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide to fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure and defense of advance naval bases and for the c onduct of such land operations as may be essential in the prosecution of a naval campaign. It shall be the duty of the Marine Corps to develop, in coordination with the Army and the Airforce , those phases of amphibious operations which pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment employed by landing forces....." .The mission assigned is restrictive in nature ,but the tools for accomplishing the mission on the other hand are not restictive. The Marine Corps/must equip and utilize its air component to the maximum and capitalize on its capability to employ the tatic of vertical assault .This employment must occur with the ability of both aircraft and Marines being able to land directly on the designated objective.The age old principles of war are unchanging , however the application of these principles in strategy and tatics must chance as the means to wage war are ever changing. The employment of air transportation as a means of delivering armed forces into battle has been one of those changes and improvements that have now and will continue to exert considerable influence on strategical and tactical concepts.Under this concept, the Marine Corps in any future conflict, probably will be called upon to make amphibious landings.Marines will be going ashore not only in boats but also in helicopters and airplanes.The Marine Corps should not find it to difficult to adapt itself to the airborne technique because of its similarity to amphibious operations. Airborne and amphibious operations are compared to one another because of the similarity in both the planning and execution phases.Primarily, their stated missions are quite similar.Simply stated, the airborne operation is to secure an airhead and the amphibious operation is to secure a beachhead from which follow - on troops and equipment can operate successfully for the fulfillment of a specified mission.Any airborne or amphibious force with an offensive mission must land in hostile territory where it must establish itself firmly and secure itself against enemy surprise and fire.It must reinforce and resupply itself and it must move in a planned direction to accomplish a specified mission.These steps constitute the establishment of an airhead just as an amphibious assault means in a similar manner the establishment of a beachhead. The only difference between an airhead and a beachhead is that an airhead covers 360 degrees and a beachhead usually covers 180 degrees.An airhead is two beachheads back to back with reinforcements and resupply comming from the sea.2 The force beachhead line is not a closed circle however it must also be protected from possible attack from any direction, including enemy airborne and airmobile vertical envelopment.The only significant difference betwten airborne and amphibious operations is by the means in which troops are delivered to the target. In order to execute each mission, troops must be specially trained and they must be specially equipped to accomplish their respective mission.Troop training must stress small unit tactics and the development of leadership from the small unit leader up through the highest levels of command.Detailed planning that is necessary for one type of operation is necessary for the other type as well.This transition from one type of operation to the other or a combination of both should pose no particular problem on the leadership ability of leader at any level.The problem areas that operational and logistic planners are required to solve for each or simultaneous employment of airborne and amphibious operations are essentially the same. Briefly outlined, some of the common problem areas are:1.) selection of embarkation or marshalling area sites 2.) Staging, tactical loading, and cross decking 3.) selection of landing zones, drop zones, and landing beaches 4.) Supply and resupply 5.)command and control relationships 6.) communications 7.) supporting arms 8.) rehearsals 9.) protection of troop carriers into the objective 10.) timing and 11.) evacuation. When airborne troops are used in conjuction with an amphibious operation, the highest degree of cooperation will be required with naval and other ground forces.The most favorable characteristic of any airborne force is their ability to move to any objective over a large area with the speed inherent to their mode of transportation.This speed and mobility should enable the force to exploit one of the most important principles of offensive operations, surprise!The airborne force can overcome many of the geographic or man - made barriers that may hinder a traditional amphibious force ashore.The ability of airborne forces to conduct a vertical envelopment permits it to strike directly at the vital assets of an enemy defense by seizing key terrain and objectives, desroying or rendering ineffective installations and facilities, attacking enemy defenses from the rear, paralizing communications, and blocking the movement of enemy reserves that may attempt to reinforce, and to create confusion and disorder among enemy forces. The ability of airborne troops to move relatively great distances in a short time make them available as reinforcements who otherwise could not be counted on for assistance if required if they were configureod in another fashion.This situation is particularly applicable if forward or expeditionary airfields are not secure for the reception of follow - on forces and equipment.A primary concern that must also be taken into account as to the absolute necessity for a secure airhead.A secure airhead is necessary for evacuation and retrograde operations to commence as soon as the combat situation will permit. The U.S Army and U. S. Airforce recognize parachute operations as "providing rapid, nearly simultaneous delivery of a force under most weather conditions on any terrtin that is relatively free of obstacles.Airdropped troops must land on or as close as possible to their objectives.Such forces are best employed where few fixed defenses or enemy combat are known to be located.During landing and reorganization , and until combat equipment is recovered from airdropped loads, airdropped troops are particularly vulnerable.Airborne forces and accompanying equipment should be loaded in a manner that will expedite employment on the ground after arrival in the objective area."3 The outlined concept of employment states that airborne forces are transported by air for employment to areas within the delivery capability of the airlifted force.Once delivered, forces are employed as a combat or deterrent force.Units delivered by air execute parachute or airlanded assaults to seize, and hold objectives until grouud linkup , reinforcement , or, withdrawal can be accomplished.Airborne, light infantry, and air assault units can conduct sustained combat operations when reinforced with appropriate combat, combat support, and combat service support elements.The previously stated missions and concept of employment are not unique to airborne troops and units alone.They are missions that have been carried out by successful military units throughout history By utilizing airborne troops, these missions can be carried out more rapidly, with greater degrue of security and surprise and in a direction that is most favorable to the attacker.Again these functions can be exploited to the maximum if employed in conjunction with a simultaneous amphibious assault. Marines must plan to go ashore from both airborne platforms as well as from amphibious ships.U.S Marine Corps commanders should not find it to difficult to incorporate airborne operational planning because of its cycle requirements being essentially the same.The airborne / amphibious movement ashore will allow commanders greater latitude and flexibility in the selection of key objectives.Immediate capture or isolation of key terrain features as initial objectives concurrently with the seizure of the beach area would facilitate the securing of the forced beachhead area.The landing on the beach and the insertion of airborne troops can be independent or mutually supporting operations. In the conventional amphibious assault, a certain amount of surprise is possible to attain.However, prior to D - Day operations, the concentration of ships, preparation fires on beach landing sites and objectives, and obstacle removal may reduce the opportunity for tactical surprise.By considering the employment of airborne forces during the planning phase of an operation, the landing force commander can expect to exploit such tactical advantages as shock, surprise , and most importantly the enemy's inability to predict probable direction of attack or probable landing area. Amphibious warfare integrates virtually all types of ships, aircraft, weapons, and landing forces in a concerted military effort against a hostile shore.The essential usefulness of the amphibious operation stems from mobility and flexibility.The amphibious operation exploits the element of surprise and capitalizes upon enemy weaknesses through the application of the required type and degree of force at the most advatageous locations at the most opportune times.The mere threat imposed by the existence of powerful amphibious forces may induce the enemy to disperse his forces which may result in his making expensive and wasteful efforts in defense of his coast line.The most important requirement in the amphibious assault is the necessity of building up combat power ashore.4 A quick definition of an amphibious assault from Landing Force Manual 01 states tliat "an amphibious operation is an attack launched from the sea by naval and landing forces embarked in ships or craft involving landing on a hostile shore.It normally requires extensive air participation and is characterized by closely integrated efforts of forces trained, organized, and equipped for different combat functions". Similarity between airborne and amphibious operational planning and execution has intentionally been stressed.The same degree of emphasis must be applied to the problem areas that may arise.The commonality that exists between the advantages of each type of employment are the same for many of the limitations as well.The limiting factors for both methods are :1.) movement-forces are particularly vulnerable during air movement.Therefore, air superiority is essential during the entire operation, and enemy air defense systems must be surpressed or avoided.Selection of the type of delivery system must be made after considering the ground force mission, threat and the locations and quality of landing zones, drop zones, and other landing sites.The capability and availability of airlift or sealift and fixed - winged assets may also limit the scope of the operation 2.) ground tactical vulnerabilities-airborne and amphibious forces are vulnerable to armor, mechanized infantry, nuclear and chemical threats during the initial assault phase of the operation.With this threat in mind, planners must plan to deliver a force of sufficient size and capability to avoid undue risk.Commanders must anticipate to augment the airhead or beachhead with additional forces and plan for a continuing commitment to subsequent operatioal phases 3.) weather-low visibility, low ceiling, high seas, and high winds restrict any type of military operation.Prolonged periods of adverse weather may threaten the mission as a whole.One point that must be' mentioned is that low visibility and low ceilings could be an advantage to a force which is looking to avoid enemy air defenses and increase the measure of tactical surprise in staging and movement to the objective area 4.) mobility-the mobility of forces depends on the number and type of ground and air vehicles that can be delivered to and supported in the objective area.The mobility of forces will be restricted until substantial build up of combat service support units are introduced into the amphibious operation area. The Marine corps visualized, studied, and solved these problems as they apply to amphibious operations, it should also seek for the establishment and development of the airborne technique of troop delivery.Due to all the similarities between the capabilities and problem areas of both amphibious and airborne assault , the Marine Corps can readily adapt itself to a combined method of employment role.The adoption of this role will increase the flexibility of operations against enemy shores. Employment of airborne Marines into battle will provide the commander yet another option , relying only on organic assets, as to how shock troops will be delivered to the assault area during the amphibious operation. "The Nation that in the future has the best trained and equipped airborne forces has the best chance of survival.Indeed, more than this, only by having such security forces can any nation survive.For as long as the means of waging modern war are available to us they are available to aggressor nations.A modern airborne force of aggressor nations cannot be fought successfully with the weapons that fought past wars.Not if they are to be engaged at parity and beaten. Airborne troops are our best national security and the world' s most promising hope for international security.The knowledge of the existence of a well trained airborne force, moving anywhere on the globe on short notice, is our best guarantee of lasting peace.The nation or nations that control the air will control the peace."5 It is not the intention to strip or alter in any way the missions or capabilities of the U. S. Marine Corps as they now exist.It should be extremely clear that the Marine Corps should not become the airborne / amphibious arm of the U. S. Army. The Marine Corps has the available air assets with C-130, helicopter, and especially with the introduction of the MV-22, Osprey, to utilize an airborne method of introducing Marines into the amphibious operation area.Considering the pro's and con's of the Marine Corps and its mission, the United States Marine Corps is well qualified to accept and would benifit from adopting the technique of vertical assault as an aid or compliment to Marine airborne operations as part of the amphibious assault. FOOTNOTES 1 Davis, William J. To Determine How Simultaneous Employment of Amphibious and Airborne Forces Should be Coordinated.Marine Corps Command and Staff College research paper, 1965,pg.1 and 2. 2 Gavin, James M. Airborne Warfare.Infantry Journal Press, 1947, pg.10. 3 U.S.Army, Army / Airforce Doctrine For Joint Airborne and Tactical Airlift Operations.FM 100-27 Jan .85,pg.5. 4 U.S. Marine Corps, Doctrine for Amiphibious Operations.LFM 01 w/change 4,Nov.86,pg.1-3. 5 Gavin, James M. Airborne Warfare. Infantry Journal Press, 1947,pg.155. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Davis, William J. To Deteriine How Simultaneous. Employment of Amphibious And Airborne Forces Should be Coordinated.Marine Corps Command and Staff College research paper, 1965. 2. Gallagher, Burnette R. Employment of Troop Carriers and Airborne Forces.Amphibious Warfare School Junior Course, 1949. 3. Gavin, James M. Airborne Warfare.Infantry Journal Press 1947. 4. Seeds, Elmore W. Airborne Operations as an Adjunct of Amphibious Operations.Senior Course, Project study 1949. 5. U.S. Army, Army Airborne Doctrine.FM 57-1, Jan.85. 6. U.S.Army, Army / Airforce Doctrine for Joint Airborne and Tactical Airlift Operation.FM 100-27, Jan.85. 7. U.S.Marine Corp. Doctrine for Amphibious. Operations. LFM-01 w/change 4, Nov.86. 8. Wallace, Elmore W. Airborne Operations as an Adjunct of Amphibious Operations Senior Course,Project Study 1950. -END-
