Military

Che Guevara:  Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare
CSC 1988
SUBJECT AREA History
                           ABSTRACT
Author : Clark, Major Jackie K, U.S. Marine Corps
Title:   Che Guevara: Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare
Short Title: Guevara
     The combat strength and expeditionary nature of the Marine Air
Ground Task Force make it one of the most responsive elements of
U.S. power projection abroad, and the best military force suited
for rapid insertion into a low-intensity conflict.  In fact, many
notable military and civilian authorities see this traditional
role of the Corps developing into its primary mission as we
approach the twenty-first century.  As General A. M. Gray, the
Corps' Commandant, commented in his October 1987 Marine Corps
Gazette article "The Art of Command", the Corps must be ready and
able to conduct low-intensity warfare.  He wrote:
          We need to be able to conduct revoluntionary
     warfare and to defeat it.   Sure we need to be prepared
     for NATO contingencies, but we must not lose sight of
     the kind of conflict that's most apt to confront us.
     The ability of Marines to defeat insurgent and paramilitary
forces in a low-intensity guerrilla warfare scenario will depend
largely on  their  full  understanding the nature of such conficts
and  their  familiarity with the battlefield strategies and  tactics
characteristically employed by guerrilla fighters.  As the noted
Chinese General Sun Tzu stated in his treatise The Art Of War, 
a leader who does not understand his enemy should never be confi-
dent in predicting victory before battle since hsi chances for win-
ning can be no better than his chances for losing.
     
     The purpose of this paper is to review the writings  of  Ernesto
Che Guevara  (1928-1967)  on the subject of revolutionary guerrilla
warfare.  A veteran of the l968 Cuban Revolution and one of the
first Cuban advisors in the Congo, Guevara spent the last  decade
of his life participating in revolutionary struggles throughout
the Third World.   His book Guerrilla Warfare is consided by many
to be a "cookbook"  for insurgent fighters.  The military tactics
and strategies he presents therein are based on his extensive
battlefield and political experiences as a guerrilla leader.   As
such, his writings provide an excellent foundation upon which con-
temporary military leaders can develop a sound understanding of
insurgent warfare.
     This paper explores the underlying circumstances which stimu-
late populaions to engage in revolutionary guerrilla warfare,  and
presents a brief biographical sketch of Guevara's development into
a revolutionary leader.
                         CONTENTS
I.     Introduction                                     1    
II.    The Making of A Revolutionary                    5
III.   Insurgent Guerrilla Warfare:  A Strategy         19
IV.    The Nature of Guerrilla Warfare                  23
V.     Conclusion                                       32
                        Chapter I.  INTRODUCTION
     Sigmund Freud in his book Civilization and Its Discontents
asserts that the first requisite of civilization is justice:   that
is, assurance that laws designed to eliminate strife and competition
from human activity once made will not be broken in order to give
one individual an advantage over another.  If this fundamental
principle is violated, the desire for freedom, self-realization and
happiness will cause the disadvantaged members of society to rebel
and direct their agressiveness against the institutions which seek
to regulate their conduct.1  Although speaking from an economic
vice psychoanalytical perspective, Karl Marx, Friedrick  Engels and
V.I. Lenin utter a similar sentiment throughout their writings.
They argue that societies characterized by human exploitation, cor-
ruption, economic inequality and social injustice cannot survive and
are doomed to be overthrown by the masses they seek to oppress. 2
Indeed, this innate need for fairness and justice in regulating hu-
man interaction within the social context is also expressed in our
own Declaration of Independence which contains the supposition that
when a government fails to secure for its citizens their unalienable
right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, or fails to
observe the principle that all men are created equal and are to be
treated justly, "it is the right of the people to alter or abolish
it."
     When a significant segment within a society desires to reform or
replace its government inorder to institute political, social,
economic or ideological changes which are perceived as necessary to
perserve or strengthen the body politic, it does so through either
peaceful or violent means.   In democratic societies such changes are
routinely achieved through acts of non-violent disobedience, the
electorial process or other peaceful methods used to pressure govern-
ments to adopt policies reflective of the public will and promotive
of its welfare.   In non-democratic societies where autocratic rulers
and tyrannical oligarchies frequently flourish, and compassionate
benevolent leaders are rare, massive violence is normally the only
course of action available for altering the status quo.   In many of
the world's developing nations, the most prevalent form of violence
used to alter or replace political regimes and the institutions of
their perpetuation is revolutionary guerrilla warfare.
     As a mechanism for reform and a principal tool of insurrection-
ist, guerrilla warfare has been with us throughout history.   It has
taken on its greatest significance, however, since World War II as
disenchanted segments within developing nations have struggled to
free their societies from the dominating influence of the former
colonial powers and the aristocratic elites  that  have succeeded
them.  Through guerrilla warfare numerous insurgent groups have
sought to displace repressive regimes inorder to establish the
economic, political and social environments they profess are needed
to achieve social progress, economic development, internal peace and
national solidarity.3
Guerrilla Warfare, like all forms of war,  is governed by a set
of principles which must be adhered to if it is to be successfully
waged4.   The purpose of this paper is to examine some of the common
aspects  of guerrilla warfare and its causes.   The importance of this
examination lies in the fact that for the forseeable future, the
most probable scenario in which U.S. Marines are likely to partici-
pate is that of the Low-Intensity Conflict where the opposition will
consist of a militarily weak but well armed and tenacious insurgent
force employing guerrilla and terrorist tactics in a war of no
fronts, and be led by a disciplined ideologically committed cadre.5
This supposition is predicated on the fact that unlike nuclear and
conventional warfare which require enormous resources to prepare for
and wage, guerrilla warfare can produce dramatic results at compara-
tively low costs and is the warfare form of choice for most insur-
gent movements existing throughout the world today since it allows
them to transform their major weakness --an inferiority in numbers--
into a significant strength.6  To effectively engage and defeat
these insurgent forces, Marines must be thoroughly familiar with
their warfighting strategies and battlefield tactics, as well as,
develop an appreciation for the conditions which give rise to insur-
gent movements and perpetuate their existence.   As the noted Chinese
General Sun Tzu  pointed out, if you do not know your enemy, you can
never be confident of victory until the battle has been won.
     To accomplish my objective,  I have relied heavily on the writ-
ings of Ernesto `Che' Guevara:   A noted Latin American revolutionary
and guerrilla leader.  His work Guerrilla Warfare is considered a
classic on the subject and has served as a primer for numerous guer-
rilla and terrorist leaders.   Central to understanding  Guevara's
impact on contemporary insurgent movements, particularly those in
Latin America, one must possess an appreciation of him as an indivi-
dual inorder to get a sense of the the magnitude of his charisma and
egalitarian spirit, as well as, the alluring eloquence of his
thoughts on revolutionary warfare.   I have therefore devoted a
significant portion of this paper to his development as a guerrilla
leader.
              Chapter II.  The Making of A Revolutionary
     Ernesto "Che" Guevara was born June 14, 1928, in Rosario Argen-
tina. The oldest of five children,  he could trace his family lin-
eage  back to the aristocratic Spanish viceroys of the River
Plate:  the  Argentine  equivalent of having  an  ancestor  that
landed  at   Plymouth  Rock.1  His father, Ernesto  Rafael   Guevara
Lynch (maternal  Irish extraction) , was an enthusiastic entrepre-
neur  who frequently shifted from one enterprise to another--final-
ly  settling  in the building construction trade.    Che's   mother,
Celia  de la Serna Guevara, was an avid activist in Latin American
leftist movements and a strong influence on Che's political orien-
tation.2  Both of Che's parents were staunch anti-fascist liber-
tarians and held strong egalitarian sentiments which they incul
cated in  their  son.3   Their home contained a  library  of  over
3000  books  and  Che, who suffered from  severe  asthma  attacks,
frequently  spent his recuperation periods reading Latin  American
history  and  discussing  the  social and  political   problems  of
Argentina  with  his father.   In 1930, the Guevaras moved  to  the
small  university  town of Cordoba after living for several  years
in  Buenos Aires where the elder Guevara had been unsuccessful   at
establishing  a  profitable shipbuilding business.   Cardoba was  a
city full   of  students, soldiers, priests and nuns, and a  center
of  seething  but quiet discontent with the Bolivian  government.4
As  a consequence  of the strong leftist  associations  Che made
there during his early youth, his revolutionary path was all but
predestined
     In high school,  Che joined the "Partido Union Democratica"
and the "Comando Civico Revolucionario Monteagudo" nationalist
youth groups.  His membership in these organizations frequently
obligated him to fight street battles against the teenage support-
ers of President Juan Peron.5
    Under Peron's rule, the economic and social divisions
within Argentine society were exacerbated by its faltering econo-
my   and  intense  political polarization into pro  and  anti-Peron
camps.     Although he alienated many of Argentina's  business  and
religious leaders  by  imposing heavy taxes,   instituting   import
controls,   legalizing  divorce and allowing wholesale  immigration
by  former German Nazi leaders, Peron maintained power through his
skillful use of patronage to control the Argentine labor move-
ment,    and  masterfully  manipulated the Argentinean  populace  by
appealing   to   the  popular sentiments  of  justice,  sovereignty,
harmony  and  progress. However, for many of his vocal critics  in
the  country's business, labor and religious communities  Peronism
meant  economic  hardship, imprisonment, exile and torture.     His
opposition  and much of the international community denounced  him
as  an  opportunistic  dictator  who   governed  by  fraud,   false
propaganda,   indoctrination  and  persecution.    In  1955  he  was
forced to resign and cede power to a military junta headed by
Eduardo  Lonardi,   a retired military general who led the  Cordoba
Army  Garrison in a revolt against Peron's leadership.6    Although
Che  had  departed  Cordoba some years earlier, the  active  anti-
fascist  libertarian  sentiments existing there undoubtedly had  a
qreat impact on his political development.
Che was nineteen when he left Cordoba to pursue premedical
studies  at the University of Buenos Aires.   He helped finance his
way through school by working as a night watchman, a reporter
for the nationalist newspaper Accion Argentina, and as a
student  employee  at  the    Argentinian    Institute  for  Allergy
Research.7     During  his summer vacations, he also  worked  as  a
nurse  on  commercial coastal ships.   While attending  university,
Che's  parents  separated  and  his    mother  became  his   primary
custodian.     Partially  as a result of his parents  divorce,  his
sense of independence and restlessness heightened.
     In 1952, Che left school for several months to tour Latin
America  on  a  motorbike  with    his  childhood  friend,   Alberto
Granados.     Granados was a trained pharmacist and biochemist   who
worked at a leprosarium near Cordoba.   A youthful lefist acti-
vist,   Che  had  met  Granados while  attending  high  school   and
frequently  visted  him at the leprosarium.   During their tour   of
Latin  American,  the  two  visted the countries  of  Chile,   Peru,
Ecuador,   Columbia and Venezuela.   They were struck by the massive
proverty  and social unrest present throughout the region and made
many acquaintances among the many student dissidents they met.
In  Bogota the pair was briefly detained by the police as suspect-
 ed foreign subversives because of their open leftist associa-
tions.8  Eventually  the  pair  managed to  make  their  way  to
Venezuela  where  they  parted   company.    Che  continued  on  to
Argentina  by hitchhiking on a cargo plane transporting horses  to
the  United  States.     The aircraft made a brief  stop  in  Miami
Flordia  where  Che visted with a childhood friend  attending  the
University  of  Miami.    Unfortunately, Che  missed  the  flight `s
continuation   a  couple of days later and was eventually  deported
to  Argentina  where  he  resumed  his  medical  studies.9     Upon
graduating  from  medical school in 1953 as an allergist,  Guevara
made  plans to return to Venezuela where he intended to work  with
his friend Granados at the Cabo Blanco Leper Hospital.10
     In route to Venezuela, Che met Ricardo Rojo, a friend of
Granados,   in  La  Paz, Bolivia.  Rojo was a  young  Buenos  Aires
lawyer  active in Bolivian socialist circles.  He had eariler fled
Argentina because of his anti-Peronist activities.  Rojo con-
vinced  Che to cancel his plans to work in Venezuela and accompany
him to Guatemala in order to participate in that country's height-
ening social revolution.11
     Upon his arrival in Guatemala in January of 1954 , Guevara
quickly  aligned  himself with the communist supported  regime  of
Jacobo  Arbenz  Guzman.    Arbenz had come to power in  1951  as  a
social  reformer.12     Although he was a  staunch  anti-communist,
Arbeniz's socialist philosophy and incorporation of the communist
led  Guatemalan Labor Party into his government in 1952 earned him
the  nickname  of "The Red Colonel". 13  Some of Che's  biographers
state  that  he was employed by the Guzman regime as an  inspector
in its national land reform office; others that he held no offi-
cial   government  position.14     Regardless,  the  Guzman   regime,
feared  by  its  Latin American neighbors and  the  major    Western
powers,   was  overthrown  in  June of   1954  by  the  conservative
Colonel  Carlos  Castillo  Armas who quickly  purged  labor   party
members  from the government.   Among those purged was Hilda  Gadea
Acosta, a minor government offical who was also Guevara's para-
mour and future wife.15
         Hilda Gadea Acosta married Guevara in Mexico after fleeing
from   Guatemala.   She introduced Che to Raul Castro, who served as
the  best  man at their wedding.16  While living in Mexico,  Hilda
served  as a conduit between the Soviet military attache and  pro-
communist  revolutionaries  of the American Popular  Revolutionary
Alliance Rebelda in Peru.   As for Che, without gainful employ-
ment  and  disgusted  by  the repeated  failure  of  revolutionary
movements  in  Latin  America (which he believed resulted  from  a
lace   of   competent  leadership and popular support),  he  eagerly
joined Fidel Castro's revolutionaries because of their strong ide-
ological beliefs, dedication to revolutionary action and willing-
ness to use the force-of-arms to achieve their aims.17
     On 26 July 1953, Fidel Castro led an attack on the Moncada
Military  Barracks at Santiago du Cuba in an attempt to topple the
regime  of  President Fulgencio Batista.   Overwhelmed and  quickly
defeated  by government forces, who had advanced knowledge of  his
plans,  Castro  was sentenced to fifteen years  imprisonment,   but
miraculously  freed  under  a  provision of  general  amnesty  for
political  prisoners  during   1955.18  After his  release,  Castro
moved  to Mexico where  he plotted his return to Havana with  Cuban
opposition  leaders  and  expatriates.   During November  1956,   he
left  Mexico  by ship with a band of approximately 82 men for  the
Cuban  province  of  Orienta where he had been born.     Among  his
companions  was his trusted friend Ernesto Guevara, who served  as
one  of  the  group's doctors. 19  When the band arrived  in  Cuban
waters near  Cape Cruz on 2 December, it had to abandon  much  of
its heavy equipment because its ship became stuck in the coastal
marsh.     Betrayed  by  one  of  its  guides,   Castro's  band  was
intercepted  by government troops two days later and  decimated.20
Only  twelve  men managed to escape:   Among these were Fidel,  his
brother  Raul   and  Che Guevara who was slightly  wounded  in  the
chest   and throat.   With this small group, Castro established  his
base of operation in the Sierra Maestra Mountains.21
     From its sanctuary in the Sierra Maestra, Castro's force con-
ducted  limited  skirmishes against Batista's army.    It  achieved
its  first major victory on 17 January,  1957, when it captured  an
army  post  at the mouth of the Plate River.   Numbering  about   17
men,   the rebels began their attack on the post of 15 soldiers  at
2:40 AM.  Within an hour the battle was over. Without suffering
any  losses,   the  rebels  had  killed  two  government  soldiers,
wounded  five  and  taken three prisoners, as well   as  a  healthy
cache  of weapons, ammunition and supplies.22  The success of  the
battle  provided the rebels with a great psychological boost.    As
Guevara later recalled:  "The effect of our victory was electri-
fyiny.    It was like a clarion call, proving the Rebel Army really
existed  and  was  ready  to fight. "23  As  word  of  its  victory
spread, Castro's force began to grow with new recruits.  Employ-
ing classic guerrilla hit-and-run tactics, the insurgents haras-
sed  and  defeated  Batista's Army  throughout  Oriente  Province;
while   in  cities throughout the country an extensive  underground
carried out acts of terrorism and sabotage to derail the govern-
ment.     Sensing  Castro's eventual victory, in July of  1958, the
leaders  of  Cuba's  major  opposition   parties  met  in  Caracas
Venezuela  and  signed a declaration in support of   the  rebels. 24
Castro  also received widespread support from the Cuban  peasantry
and  urban  middle-class,  as well as substantial  covert  support
from  many  in the Cuban Army, who resented Batista's  dictatorial
rule and corrupt administration.25
     Much of the success enjoyed by Fidel's guerrillas has been
attributed  to  Che Guevara, who was to become the groups  primary
media  spokesman ideologist.   Because of his courage, boldness and
proven  battlefield  leadership, Castro appointed Che to the  rank
of  Major  and gave him command of a column of  approximately  one
hundred  and fifty men in March of 1957.   As Richard Harris points
out:          
          Che  had  that  quality of  personal  magnetism  that
     attracts   and  inspires the  loyalty   and   devotion  of
     others. In  the  Sierra    Maestra,   his   boldness   and
     determination   invoked  the enthusiasm of  his  comrades,
     and  it soon became clear to Fidel that Che was a natural
     leader     Once having elevated him to a position of lead-
     ership,   Fidel  found that Che was an  extremely  capable
     and resourceful military commander.   He gave Che increas-
     inqly  greater responsibilities, and in the end entrusted
     him  with she most important and crucial campaign of  the
     Cuban  revolutionary war. Fidel knew that he could  count
     on Che's  loyalty and unquestioning devotion to the goals
     of  the  revolution.      Their  relationship  was  close,
     largely     because  of  the   similarity    of     their
     thinking. 26
     In August of 1958, Fidel directed Che's column to leave the
sanctuary  of the Sierra Maestra and seize the central province of
Las  Villas.   Traveling through over 350 miles of government  held
territory,   Che's  column  won several battles, the  decisive  one
being  fought   in  the provincial capital of  Santa  Clara  during
December.2    Undaunted  by  limited  government  air  and  armor
attacks, Che's force --reinforced by a second column led by
Camilo  Cienfuegos-- took the city and decimated Batista's  forces
in  the  area.   Hearing of the defeat, President Batista fled  the
country  on  1  January  1959.   On  3 January  Che's  and  Camilo's
columns  entered  Havana  and  assumed control of  the  city  with
little  government resistance.   As Castro consolidated his  power,
Guevara  was  soon elevated to several powerful positions  in  the
new revolutionary government.
     On 2 January 1959, Fidel Castro appointed Buevara as command-
er  of the La Cabana Fortress overlooking Havana harbor.   It was a
purely  military  position  which Che held for eight months.     In
November, after a rash of resignations by several key cabinet min-
isters,  who  were disenchanted with Castro's leftist  orientation
and  communist  ideology, Castro appointed Che as director of  the
Industrial Department of the National Institute of Agrarian Re-
form.    Shortly thereafter Che was also appointed president of the
National Bank of Cuba.   In charge of Cuba's industrialization and
agrarian  reform  programs,  Che exercised enormous  power  within
Castro's regime.   He was responsible for overseeing the disman-
tling of Cuba's large land estates, establishing peasant collec-
tives  and  formulating the country's economic policies.   In  1960
he  signed major trade agreements with the Soviet Union, China and
a  number  of  Eastern-Bloc countries.  Cuba's economy   was  being
greatly  strained  by  an economic boycott imposed by  the  United
States  in  retaliation  for   Castro's  expropriation  of  Anglo-
American agricultural, manufacturing and petroleum refinery
assets.    Although Che was able to work with both the Soviets  and
the  Chineese, he considered the Soviet Union to be  imperialistic
and  lacking  in  revolutionary  spirit.   However,  he  had  great
respect   for  China  which  spawned  his  ideological  mentor  and
actively  supported  revolutionary movements throughout the  Third
World.   Unfortunately, Che's relationship with China caused major
problems  for   Castro,  who was relying upon the Soviet  Union  to
supply  most    of  the economic aid needed to keep  Cuba's  economy
afloat  and  train the country's militaty.   The Soviet  Union  and
the  legion  of   pro-Moscow communists who  dominated  the  Castro
regime  saw Che as a radical Maoist who sought to stir revolutions
throughout   the  world  without benefit of party leadership.
Harris points out:
          (Che) firmly believed that the Cuban experience
     demonstrated that socialist revolutions in the under-
     developed  world  could be successfully launched  without
     the  direction   and  control  of  an  orthodox  Communist
     party,   and  it was "heretical" views such as this  which
     earned him the disfavor of the pro-Moscow Commu-
     unist. 28
     Caught in the midst of an ideological struggle between Moscow
and  Peking  as  to  how the cause of World Socialism  was  to  be
advanced, distrustful of the Soviets, held in comtempt by the
Chinese because of Cuba'a intense courthip of Moscow, and
disenchanted by the slow pace of Cuba's new bureaucracy to effect
revolutionary changes, Guevara wrote his mother in the Spring of
1965 and informed her of his plans to leave the government and
work in the sugar cane fields and factories of Cuba.  His mother
responded that if he did so he would not be a good servant of 
world socialism.  After reaffirming her social-democratic convic-
tions ,she wrote:
          If for some reason there are paths no longer open     
     to you in Cuba, in Algeria there's a Mr. Ben Bella who
     would be grateful for your organizing the economy there
     and endorsing him, or a Mr. Nkrumah in Ghana who would
     feel the same way.29
     By the time he responed to his mother's letter, Che had 
convinced Fidel to permit him and a group of about 125 Cubans to
go the Congo and train leftist rebels fighting to overthrow the
pro-Western regime of President Moise Tshombe. 30   Shortly
before departing for the Congo in July of 1965 he wrote his
mother:
       Once again I feel below my heels the ribs of
Rosinante.  I return to the road with my shield on my
arm.
     Nothing in essence has changed, except that I am
more  conscious, and my Marxism has taken root and become
pure.   I  believe  in the armed struggle  as  the  only
solution   for those peoples who fight to free themselves,
and  I am consistent with my beliefs.   Many will call  me
an  adventurer,   and that I am; only one of  a  different
kind  --  one  of those who risks his skin to  prove  his
beliefs.31
      Guevara`s stay in the Congo lasted until March 1966 when he
was forced to return to Cuba by Castro in response to the  Soviet
Union's  displeasure with Che's adventurism and China's threat  to
withdraw  its support from the Congolese rebels if they  continued
their  Cuban  association.    The incessant  ideological   bickering
between  Peking  and Moscow had divided Communists throughout  the
world.      When Castro opted to maintain his association  with  the
Soviet  camp  in  order to protect his primary source  of  foreign
aid,  Cuba's  military assistance to the Congolese rebels had to be
terminated.
     After his exploits in the Congo, Guevara returned to Cuba and
lived  largely in seclusion.   He had resigned his government posts
and  Cuban  citizenship during the Spring of 1965  in  preparation
for his Congo involvement.   By October 1966, however, he found
himself  in Bolivia creating a guerrilla nucleus to carry out  his
dream of a transcontinental socialist revolution in Latin
America.  In  Bolivia  a year later, that dream would  end for
Guevara: his body riddled by a hail of automatic weapons fire.
Che's  defeat was the result of a combination of factors: too  few
men (his  force never exceeded 42 men and averaged only 22);  too
little  time to adequately prepare his force for combat (the force
was assembled in December and saw its first combat during March).
Too  many  spies  among  the few local recruits  he  was  able  to
attract;  the  extreme  isolation of his base camp which  hampered
his  logistics;   his  failing health; his underestimation  of  the
quality of the Bolivian army which had received extensive counter-
guerrilla  training  from U.S. Special Forces in Panama;   and  his
gross  failure  to  appreciate  the history  of  Bolivia  and   the
laissez-faire  attitude  of  the Bolivian natives, who  were  more
concerned  with  eking  out their daily  existence  than  pursuing
revolutionary  ideologies  and  riskng  their  lives.     However,
although  Gevara's ideas did not stimulate the Bolivian people to
revolutionary  action,  they  did  find a  significant  number  of
sympathizers  in  the United States where a youthful  culture  was
questioning  its  national values and searching for  something  to
bulieve in.
     Although Guevara's participation in leftist liberation
struggles  did  much to cement his revolutionary convictions,  his
basic  political  orientation  had been inculcated in him  by  his
family  during  his  early  childhood.  His  parents  planted  the
dream:   Hilda Gadea by exposing him to the writings of men such as
Marx and Lenin helped him to understand it:   and Fidel Castro
showed him how to make it a reality.
         Chapter III.  lnsurgent Guerrilla Warfare:  A Strategy
     Carl Von Clausewitz characterizes war as a violent activity
which  serves  as an instrument of policy.1  Mao  Tse-Tung  echoes
that  belief  when he states, " war itself is a political  action,
since  ancient times there has never been a war that did not  have
a  political  character."2     Guerrilla  warfare  therefore, like
nuclear  and conventional war, must be conducted in furtherance of
a political objective.
     Throughout the Third World, guerrilla warfare has been employ-
ed by insurgent movements to achieve economic, political and cul-
tural   changes  by  militarily creating the conditions  needed  to
obtain their objectives which frequently include the displace-
ment  of  corrupt, tyrannical and repressive neo-colonial  regimes
and  aristocratic elites.   The economic exploitation and  cultural
repression  practiced by many post-colonial governments entrenched
and  in  many cases created abnormal social and economic  divisions
within Third World nations which have resulted in institution-
ailzed  inequities in the distribution of wealth and  opportunity,
and imposed alien value systems and beliefs on native popula-
tions.   In almost all cases, the end result has been a  situation
in  which  the richer have become richer and the poor poorer,  and
native  cultures have been violently repressed or eliminated.  The
majority of the population in these countries has also been deni-
ed any mechanism by which to exercise the right of self-deter-
mination.  As  a result, popular movements have sprung up  in  a
number  of   developing  countries,   just as  they  did  throughout
European  history,   to redress perceived inequities  within  their
societies.   Devoid  of economic and political   power,   the  only
strategy   these   movements  have been able to effectively  use to
challenge   and   depose  the institutions of their  oppression  has
been  that  of   guerrilla   warfare.   As the  former  President  of
Argentina, Juan  Peron, has  been quoted  as  saying,   guerrilla
warfare  "is  the  natural escape of oppressed persons. "3    It  is
the basis of a people's struggle to redeem and liberate them-
selves.  It is a war of the people and draws its greatest  force
from  the mass of the people themselves.  It can only be won  when
the  institutions  that shelter the existing regime and  maintains
its position of power have been abolished.4
     The root cause of insurgent guerrilla warfare is the exist-
ence  of  real or perceived inequities within a society  which  a
significant segment of the population believes negates the esta-
blished  order's  legitimate  right to govern.  As  Bard  O~Neill
points  out in his work  "The Analysis of Insurgency",   insurgency
is  essentially  a  question of political legitimacy: that  is,
whether or not there is a perception within the general popula-
tion  that  the ruling regime has lost its moral right  to  govern
under the existing conditions.5
     The first objective of an insurgency is the undermining of
the  established regime's legitimacy:  the notion that it can rule
and should rule.6   Insurgent movements, however, must be very
careful  not  to  lose  their own legitimacy by a premature  and
indiscriminate  use  of  violence to  accomplish  their  political
agenda.   As Che Guevara pointed out, the employment of   vioience
should  only  be  resorted  to    in    those  instances  where  the
illegitimacy  of   the  government  is   clearly  evident  and  the
population  believes  that  the  injustices  existing  within  the
society cannot be redressed by civil means.7    Guevara cautioned:
          Where a government has come into power through
     some  form  of  popular vote, fraudulent or  not,  and
     maintains  at  least an appearance  of  constitutional
     legality,  the  guerrilla outbreak cannot be  promoted
     since  the possibilities of peaceful struggle have not
     yet been exhausted.7
     Whether its aim is the liberation of its society from control
by a foreign powers the deposition of a corrupt  and  tyrannical
government  or the protection of existing institution  and  values
against forces advocating their transformation or demise  an in-
surgent  movement pursuing revolutionary goals must first  exhaust
all   peaceful   remedies to redress the inequities existing within
its  society  before resorting to violence.   Otherwise,  it  risks
the danger  of negating its own legitimacy:   without which it car-
not claim  the moral ascendancy of its cause nor  generate substan-
tial  support within the general population.   As  history
has  shown,  popular support for war is essential for its  success.
According  to  Mao-Tse-Tung, "the richest source of power to wage
war  lies   in  the  masses of people. "  Men will  fight  wars  for
causes they believe in but oppose those which they find  morally
repugnant.8
       Insurgents  must also be cautious of the fact that their
association with  a foreign power can also weaken their claim  of
ligitimacy   by  projecting an impression that they  are  dominated
and   manipulated  by  that power, especially when the  values  and
beliefs  of that power are antithetical to those prevalent  within
the insurgent's own society.
     Guerrilla warfare is the preferred warfare strategy of insur-
gent movemerts because it offers "quick, dramatic results at lit-
tle  cost."9    It is the strategy of the weak who  uses  surprise,
maneuver,  quickness and geography as force multipliers to counter
the  superior combat strength of the ruling regime's armed forces.
Through  numerous  small military victories,  insurgent  movements
establish  that the ruling regime is not omnipotent but vulnerable
and  capable  of being defeated.   Their armed struggle gives  hope
to  the  people that victory is possible, reinforces the  morality
of their cause, and strengthens the general population's deter-
mination  to  rid itself of of the forces causing its  misery  and
despair.
               Chapter IV.   The Nature of Guerrilla Warfare
     Like  Machiavelli's  The Prince and Sun Tzu's The Art of  War,
Che  Guevarra's  book La Guerra de Guerrilla   (Guerrilla  Warfare)
serves as a practical outline for carrying out the complex activi-
ties  associated  with war.   It is a primer that seeks to  impress
upon its reader the need for common sense in planning and exe-
cuting  the  violent activities of that particular form  of  armed
conflict we call  "Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare.
     In it purest form, revolutionary guerrilla warfare is waged
primarily  by  popular paramilitary forces to bring about a  rapid
redistribution of power within society from the haves to the have-
nots  by  deposing established ruling elites and instituting  some
form  of  populistic  government through which the "voice  of  the
people"  can be heard and their will implemented.   Although it was
once  almost  exclusively  associated with movements  seeking  the
democratization  of their societies, it has come to represent  the
principal   strategy pursued by communist in their pursuit of world
domination.   As stated in Chapter III, it arises out of a ques-
ton  of political legitimacy and seeks to empower those  elements
perceived  by the population as having the moral right to  govern.
For  Che Guevarra, only a regime which enjoys the popular  support
of its people can claim the legitimacy it needs to govern.
     The first prerequisite for waging an insurgent guerrilla war-
fare campaign, therefore, is the existence of a significant level
of dissatisfaction with the status quo being perpetuated by the
ruling regime.  Concomitant with that requirement is a need for
insurgent movements to have popular support.  Through propaganda
and indoctrination, insurgents attempt to point out the excesses
and immoral acts of the ruling regime and convince the population
that armed rebellion is the only way it can be removed from
power.  The insurgent movement further seeks to gain popular sup-
port by taking up the general causes o disenchantment existing
within the general populace and serving as the armed vanguard of
the people in their struggle to improve their daily existance.1
     Popular support for an isurgent guerrilla movement is of
utmost importance because it is from the general population that
the movement obtains its recruits and much of its material sup-
port.  Initially, conceived insecrecy and consisting of a very
small homogeneous group with little or no monetary support, the
movement must rely upon the citizenry for food, shelter, manpower
and military intelligence.  To obtain this assistance it must not
only openly embrace the cause of the people, but also treat the
population with dignity and respect.  As Guevara pointed out:
          Conduct toward the civil population ought to be
     regulated by a large respect for all the rules and tradi-
     tions of the people in order to demonstrate effectively,
     with  deeds,  the  moral  superiority  of  the  guerrilla
     fighter over the oppressing soldier.2
The insurgent fighter "must have a moral conduct that shows him
to  he a true priest of the reform to which he aspires."  He  must
"be  a  sort  of guiding angel who has fallen into  the  zone   (of
operations)   helping  the poor always..."   Indiscriminate acts  of
terrorism  and  assaults  should not be employed.    Supplies  that
cannot  be immediately paid for with cash should be paid for   with
"bonds of hope" that should be redeemed at the first opportuni-
ty. 3
     One of the most important activities pursued by insurgent
guerrilla  movements in their attempt to engender popular  support
is   the  establishment of civil action programs.   By  establishing
medical clinics, schools, judicial courts, civilian self-protec-
tion cadres, and local government councils, the guerrillas pro-
ject  a capacity to govern, demonstrate their solidarity with  the
plight of the average citizen and affirm their professed commit-
ment to fairness and  equality.
     In regions that have few or no government services, the civil
action programs instituted by guerrilla movements serve as a
strong  recruitment  and propaganda tool, and develop  within  the
local population a feeling of obligation and kinship.  This
"intimacy  with the people" provides the guerrillas with a  source
of general supplies, information on enemy movements and disposi-
tions, temporary hiding places among the local citizens and emer-
gency  manpower  that can be used to expand the guerrilla  numbers
then needed to conduct decisive military engagements of opportu-
nity.4  To establish the elaborate infrastructure needed to
carry  out such programs, however, guerrilla movements need secure
bases from which to operate.
     Unlike orthodox Marxist-Leninist who believe revolutionary
insurgents should base their movement in urban centers with their
concentrations of people, industry, and governmental institu-
tions,  Guevara  was an avid proponent of the Maoist  belief  that
guerrilla  movements  should establish themselves in secure  rural
enclaves.   He stated:
         The struggles of the city masses of organized
    workers  should  not  be  underrated;  but  their  real
    possibilities  of  engaging in armed struggle  must  be
    carefully    analyzed   where   the   guarantees   which
    customarily  adorn  our constitutions are suspended  or
    ignored.     In  these conditions the  illegal  worker's
    movements  face  enormous dangers.  They must  function
    secretly  without  arms.    The situation  in  the  open
    country  is not so difficult.  There, in places  beyond
    the  reach  of the repressive forces,  the  inhabitants
    can be supported by the armed guerrillas.5
Becase of their inaccessibility and isolation, rural areas offer
guerrilla  movements the security they need to mature and  expand.
The rough terrain and frequently canopied vegetation of the hin-
terland shield guerrilla forces from direct government observa-
tion and diminishes the effectiveness of the regime's heavy indi-
rect  fire  weapons; e.g., attack airplanes, artillery and  tanks.
In its secure position, the guerrilla movement establishes defen-
sive  positions in depth; develops para-military training centers;
constructs logistics facilities, small hospitals, schools and pro-
paganda  organs such as radio stations and printing shops; and  if
needed,  endeavors to set up small industries to build and  repair
weapons, and produce other military related items.6
     From its secure bases in the countryside, the guerrilla move-
ment strikes out at government forces operating in the surround-
ing  area.     Moving into attack positions during  the  night,   it
systematically conducts incessant attacks against small govern-
ment   army  outposts and convoys to seize munitions  and  supplies
with  with  which it can sustain itself and outfit  new   recruits.
These  attacks  are designed to weaken the morale and strength  of
the  government  soldiers,   as well as supply the  guerrilla  band
with  the  bulk  of its armaments.   They are  supported  by  small
ancillary  guerrilla  cadres operating in urban areas  who  employ
sabotage to disrupt and destroy the enemy's  communication, lo-
gistics,  and command facilities.   With each victory, the guerril-
la movement weakens the power and control of the central govern-
ment  and incites the general population to ever expanding acts of
civil disobedience.   This process is accelerated by the move-
ment's propaganda organs which makes radio broadcasts and distri-
butes  pamphlets  detailing the "just" aims of the  movement,  its
military  successes,  the corruption and repression of the  ruling
regime,  and the right of the people to seek redress through armed
struggle for  their grievances.   Guevara cautioned that such propa-
ganda,  however,  must be truthful if a guerrilla movement  is  to
gain the trust and confidence of the general population.7
     Once the guerrilla group begins to grow with new recruits,
training  becomes a major organizational activity.   The new  rural
and  urban  volunteers  are assembled at secluded  training  sites
where they receive basic commando training and political indoc-
trination.   They are subjected to a rigorous  physical  training
regimen  to  build their endurance and agility, and improve  their
marksmanship  skills.  Guevara notes, however, that the  guerrilla
band  does  not  have the time to conduct  a  methodical  training
program.   A school for recruits should be established only  when
the  bands  base area is secure and sufficient personnel  are  on
hand  to  supervise  the  training without  degrading  the  combat
force.   During the early stages of the guerrilla movement, there-
fore,  the fundamental training received by the guerrilla fighters
will be the experience they receive in battle and the informal in-
formation they receive from their seasoned cohorts.   When a for-
mal training school is established, it must be capable of provid-
ing for its own support and dedicate a major portion of its cur-
riculum  to imbuing the recruits with a clear understanding of the
aims  of  the insurgent movement, an elementary  understanding  of
the  history  of  their country, and the facts that  motivate  the
movement's historic acts.8
     According to Guevara, as the guerrilla force expands numeri-
cally,  it  eventually establishes new bases and zones of  action
Employing classic guerrilla tactics, it seeks to engage govern-
ment troops on the most favorable of terms.  No attack is conduct-
ed  unless victory is assured.9  With small squads of 8 to 12  men
headed  by a Lieutenant, the guerrillas whittle away at the army's
stretched  out formations attacking the vanguard units of  patrols
and  transport  columns.  Guerrilla platoons consisting mainly  of
30  to  40  men  led by a Captain, concentrate  their  efforts  on
destroying  army  outposts and defeating enemy troops  within  the
area  surrounding the guerrilla base camp.   The largest  guerrilla
formation,   the column which consists of 100 to 150 men  commanded
by  a Major, has the task of establishing new base camps and zones
of   operations,   along with attacking the enemy's  main  garrisons
and  destroying his communications and logistics  infrastructures.
As  the  guerrilla force grows, new columns are formed and  branch
out to bring more and more of the country under guerrilla con-
trol.  The  hit-and-run mobile warfare tactics employed  by  the
guerrilla  forces  make  them appear as "biting  fleas"  attacking
here  then  there;   engaging  the enemy at  its  weak  points  and
avoiding his force concentrations; fighting incessantly where
victory is possible but rapidly disengaging when the enemy has  a
clear  force  superiority; feinting an attack on the enemy's  left
flank before striking on his right.10
      With the creation of new columns, the guerrilla movement even-
tually  begins to pursue a more conventional warfare strategy.   It
engages the enemy's army along defined fronts and employs encir-
clement techniques to capture army strongholds in built-up subur-
ban  areas.   With each victory, the movement captures  more  and
more  enemy  munitions  that include small  crew  served  weapons,
heavy artillery pieces and even tanks.   At some point, the con-
frontation  becomes equal and the small isolated victories of  the
guerrilla movement are transformed into decisive large-scale bat-
ties  as  the government force "is brought to accept battle  under
conditions  imposed  by  the guerrilla band. "11   Eventually  the
government, lacking public support and saddled with a demoralized
and ineffective army, is forced to capitulate and relinquish con-
trol of the country to the leaders of the insurgent movement.
The task of the insurgents then becomes one of consolidating
their  power,   dismantling the institutions which perpetuated  the
old   regime in power and establishing a new government  responsive
to tee needs of the general society.
     Although guerrilla leaders often profess that their aim is to
improve  the conditions under which their people live, history has
shown  that  more of ten than not these individuals are  frequently
more repressive and tyrannical than the regimes they depose.   In
most  cases  their idealistic rhetoric was simply a camouflage  to
wan popular support in their struggle for power
                       Chapter V.   Conclusion
     Since Che Guevara's death in 1967,  the nature of guerrilla
warfare  has changed little.   Whether one is a student of Sun-Tuz,
Clausewitz,  Nepoleon, Mao-Tse-Tung or Che Guevara, it is  obvious
that  the  activity of war is  conducted  in accordance with a  set
of  fundamental  precepts which have remained constant  throughout
history.    The only thing that has changed and which continues  to
evolve  is how these principles are applied to meet the challenges
posed  by  the different physical environments and  situations  in
which wars are fought.
     Marines deployed to conduct counter-guerrilla operations can
expect  to face a crafty well trained opponent equipped with  many
of  the  same  lethal and sophisticated weapons available  in  the
Corps'  own  inventory.    Operating from secure  bases  in  remote
rural   areas and hidden urban enclaves, the guerrilla fighter will
have  the distinct advantages of knowing the terrain upon which he
operates, a total commitment to the cause for which he is fight-
ing  and  the moral support from his fellow citizens.   In  such  a
situation,  Marine Corps forces must be willing to fight a war  of
repeated  limited  engagements where manuever, mass  and  security
will  be  paramount.    They must also be prepared  to  suffer  the
manpower attrition associated with this kind of warfare.
     It is important to note at this point that unlike Guevara,
many  contemporary   insurgent  leaders in Third World  nations  have
adopted  a  primary  strategy  of  urban  revolutionary  guerrilla
warfare  to  depose  ruling regimes.   This  is  particularly  true
among  opposition leftist leaders in Latin America where Guevara's
Bolivian  defeat is considered proof of the fallacy of rural based
insurgent  movements. Urban based guerrilla movements, however,
have  faired  no better than their rural counterparts.  As  James
Khol and John Litt point out:
          Urban guerrilla warfare can contribute to the
       fall  of a government (e.g., Levingston or, in a more
       subtle  way,   Lanusse, both in Argentina) and it  can
       transform  a  conjuncture  from  crisis  to  breaking
       point  (e.g.,   the Tupamaros in Uruguay),  but  urban
       guerrilla  warfare has yet to win.  Moreover, serious
       doubts have been expressed as to whether it can con-
       summate the seizure of revolutionary power.
          In the city, mass militance can be expressed
      through factory seizures, demonstrations,  neighbor-
       hood  organizations,  and the  revolutionary  general
       strike.     Characteristic of each of these,  however,
       is  the inability to deliver the crushing blow to the
       state.1
With neither rural nor urban movements enjoying much success,
guerrilla leaders have realized that they must strike a balance
between war in the hinterland and war in the cities.   As a con-
sequence,  most insurgent movements now conduct operations on both
fronts.  In  the cities reside the political  organs  which  form
shadow   governments  and  control the strategic acts  of  sabotage
carried  out by small bands of militant supporters.   In the  rural
areas  operates  the  movements main military arm which  seeks  to
galvanize support among the peasantry and destroy the govern-
ment's  armed forces through incessant small engagements.   It is a
classic  merging  of  the strategies of Marx and Mao to  meet  the
changing environment in which insurgents operate.   The sophisti-
cated  weapons,   excellent  counter-insurgency tactics  and  heavy
handed repressive measures employed by governments to quash insur-
gent  movements  in  their infancy, however, makes the  future  of
revolutionary  guerrilla  movements appear bleak unless  they  can
enlist the total  support of their societies.
                              ENDNOTES
                              Chapter I
1.   Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, Translated
by James Strachey (New York: Norton, 1962), pp. 42-43.
2.   Emile Burns, The Marxist Reader (New York: Avenel Books,
1982), pp. 21-51; 196-234; 565-603.
3.  Gerard Chaliand, Guerrilla Strategies (Berkley: University of
California Press, 1982), pp  1-32. In those few cases since WWII
where revolutionary insurgent movements have been victorious
(e.g., Angola, Cuba and Nicaragua), it is clear that the stated
aims of a movement are not always translated into reality once
power is achieved. It should also be noted that prior to the end
of the war, most guerrilla campaigns were waged by partisans
seeking to eject a foreign power from their homeland vice over-
throw their indiginous leaders.
4.   Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, Translated by J.P. Morray
(New York: Vantage Books, 1961), p. 3.
5.   Brian Jenkins, New Modes of Conflict (Santa Monica Calif: The
Rand Corporation, 1983).
6.   Harries-Clinchy Peterson, Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare
(New York: Frederick A. Prager publisher, 1961), pp. vii-viii;
Jenkins, p.  17.
                             Chapter II
1.   Martin Ebon, Che: The Making of A Legend (New York: Universe
Books, 1969), pp.  11,13.
2.   Current Biography Yearbook (New York: H.W. Wilson Company,
1963), p.  166.
3.   Luis J. Gonzalez and Gustavo A. Sanchez Salazar, The Great
Rebel  (New York: Grove Press, 1969), p. 31; Richard Harris, Death
of A Revolutionary (New York: Norton, 1970), pp.  19-20; Ebon, pp.
11-15.
4.   Ebon, pp.12-13; Current Biography 1963, p  166.
5.   Ebon, p.14; Current Biography 1963, pp.  166-167.
6.   David Rock, Argentina, 1516-1982 (Berkeley: University of
California Press- 1985), pp. 262-319.
7.    Ebon, pp.    15-17.
8.    Ibid., pp.   20-21; Harris, pp.21-22.
9.    Harris, p.   22.
10.   Ebon, pp.   21-23.
11.   Ibid.
12.   Current Biography 1953, pp. 26-28.
13.   Current Biography 1971, p. 459; Ebon, pp. 29-30.
14.   Current Biography 1963, p.  167; Ebon, p. 32.; Harris, p. 25
(Only Ebon states that Che was not employed by the regime).
15.   Ebon, pp. 30-31.
16.   Ebon, p. 33.
17.   Harris, pp. 27-28; Ebon, p. 32.
18.   Andrew Wheatcroft, The World Atlas of Revolutions (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1983), p.  154.
19.   John Gerassi, Venceremos!  (New York: MacMillan), p.33.  (The
group's other physican was Pati Fajardo.)
20.   Ibid., pp. 29-30. One of the band's local guides had informed
the army of the group's landing after being granted leave by
Castro to visit his family.
21.   Harris, pp. 29-30.
22.   Gerassi, p. 32.
23.   Ibid., p. 30.
24.   Harris, p. 31.
25.   Wheatcroft, p.  156.; H.P. Willmott, "Castro's Revolution", in
War in Peace, eds. Sir Robert Thompson et al.  (New York: Harmony
Books, 1981), p.  147.
26.   Harris, p. 33.
27.   Ibid., p. 31.
28.   Harris, p. 36.
29.   Gonzalez, pp. 38-39
30.   Harris, p. 57;  Ebon, p. 74
31.   Harris, p. 37.
32.   Ebon, pp. 74-77.
                             Chapter III
1.   Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Anatol Rapoport (New York:
Penguin Books,  1983), pp. 109,119,401-414.
2.   Mao Tse-Tung, The Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung (Peking:
Foreign Languages Press, 1967), p. 226.
3.  James Kohl and John Litt, Urban Guerrilla Warfare in Latin
America (Cambridge Mass: MIT Press, 1974), p. 313.
4.  Guevara, p. 2.
5.   Bard E. O'Neill, "The Analysis of Insurgency," in The Art and
Practice of Military Strategy, ed. George Edward Thibault
(Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1984), p. 779.
6.   Kohl, p. 18.
7.   Guevara, p. 2.
8.   Mao Tse-Tung, pp. 66,81,260.
9.   Peterson, p. viii. Although combat engagements are normally
frequent and quick producing dramatic results, insurgencies
routinely last for several years before their outcome is decided.
                                  Chapter IV
1.    Guevara, pp. 4,33.
2.    Ibid., p. 19.
3.    Ibid., pp. 33,75,85.
4.    Ibid., p. 18.
5.    Ibid.  pp  2-3.
6.    Ibid., pp. 20,72.
7.    Ibid.,  pp.  98-102.
8.    Ibid., pp.  38,102-105.
9.    Ibid., p. 6.
10.   Ibid., pp. 57-71.
11.   Ibid., p. 73.
                                   Chapter V
1.   Kohl, pp. 25-26.
                       ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Burns, Emile, ed.   The Marxist Reader.  New York:   Avenel
     Books, 1982.   Shows the historical development of Marxism
     as a political ideology with its emphasis on the party as
     the vanguard of revolutionary struggles.   Presents various
     monographs by Marx, Engles, Lenin and Stalin.
Chaliand, Gerard, ed.   Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical
     Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan.   Berkeley:
     University of Calif. Press, 1982.  Presents a survey and
     analysis of contemporary guerrilla struggles.  Focuses on 
     their underlying strategies and how they are used to
     political change.   Excellent introductory comments on the
     mature and typology of guerrilla movements, and the pre-
     requisites for their success.
Current Biography.  New York: H.W. Wilson Company.   A multi-
     volume annual yearbook containing biographical data on
     prominent  international personages.
Ebon, Martin.  Che: The Making of A Legend.   New York:
     Universe Books, 1969.   A biography of Guevara.  Focuses on
     the revolutionary personalities with whom Guevara associ-
     ated.
Freud, Sigmund.   Civilization and Its Discontents.   Tr.  James
     Strachey.   W.W, Norton and Co., 1961.   A classic work on
     man's inate drive to fulfill his individual aspiration;  his
     instinct of aggression and self-destruction; and his antago-
     nistic relationship with society.  Presents a counterview to
     the Marxist argument that man will resort to a democratic
     and equalitarianistic existence with the demise of the state
     and abolition of private property.
Gerassi, John, ed.   Venceremos!: The Speeches and Writings of
     Ernesto Che Guevara.  New York:  Macmillan, 1968.  A compre-
     hensive collection of Guevara's thoughts on a broad range of
     subjects.   It reveals Guevara's revolutionary philosophies,
     idealism and Marxist inclinations.
Gonzales, Luis and Gustavo A. Sanchez Salazar.   The Great Rebel:
     Che Guevara in Bolivia.   Tr. Helen R. Lane.   New York:
     Grove Press, 1969.   Traces Guevara's activities in Bolivia
     as reconstructed from Bolivian government documents, eyewit-
     ness accounts and personal letters.
Guevara, Che.   Guerrilla Warfare.   Tr. J.P. Murray.   New York:
     Vantage Books, 1961. An unabridged translation of Guevara's
     book complete with drawings depicting guerrilla weapons and
     tactics.   In it Guevara presents various principles of
     guerrilla warfare that are based on his experiences during
     the Cuban revolutionary struggle of 1956-58.
Hagan, Robert P.   Major USMC.   Che Guevara: An Epilogue.
     Newport, R.I.:   Naval War College, 1969.   An excellent
     thesis detailing the influence and involvement of Che
     Guevara in the Cuban and other revolutionary struggles of
     the Third World from 1956 until his death in 1967.  The
     author brings to light the deep ideological schism which
     developed between Fidel Castro and Guevara in post revo-
     tionary Cuba and details the reasons why Cuba has been un-
     able to successfully export its revolutionary zeal to other
     Latin American countries.
Harris, Richard L.   Death of a Revolutionary: Che Guevara's
     Last Mission.   New York:   W.W. Norton and Company, 1970. A
     chronicle of Guevara's Bolivian operation.   Contai.ns a corn-
     prehensive discussion of the ideological rifts which existed
     among Bolivia's communist groups and their lack of support
     for Guevara's guerrilla cadre.   Assesses the reasons for Gue-
     vara's failure in Bolivia.
James, Daniel, ed.   The Complete Bolivian Diaries of Che
     Guevara: and other Captured Documents.  New York:  Stein and
     Day, 1968.   A chronicle of Guevara's Bolivian Campaign as
     recorded in his personal diary and those of three members of
     his group.   It vividly portrays the band's stark existence
     and declining morale, as well as Che's gross underestimation
     of the Bolivian army and his inability to generate support
     among the Bolivian peasants.
Jenkins, Brian   New Modes of Conflict.   Santa Monica, Cali-
     fornia:   The Rand Corporation, 1983.   A brief explanation of
     the future of armed conflict in an environment where conven-
     tional war, guerrilla warfare and terrorism coexist; and the
     implications this has for U.S. strategic planners.
Kohl, James and John Litt. Urban Guerrilla Warfare in Latin
     America.   Cambridge, Massachusetts:   The MIT Press, 1974.
     An anthology and analysis of works by several contemporary
     leftist leaders in Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina.   It covers
     revolutionary strategies, tactics and organization, and
     points out the pros and cons of rural and urban guerrilla
     warfare.
Laquer, Walter.   Guerilla.   Boston:  Little, Brown and Company,
     1976.   Presents a critical examination of guerrilla theories
     and practices from 15 Century B.C. to the present.  Contains
     a brief analysis of Latin American guerrilla movements con-
     centrating on leadership philosophies and strategies.
Mao Tse-Tung. Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung,  2nd
     ed.   Peking:   Foreign Languages Press, 1967.   Establishes
     the ideological basis upon which Guevara sought to export
     revolution throughout Latin America.  Emphasizes the guerril-
     la as both the political and military head of the revolution-
     ary struggle as opposed to control by a political party.
     argues that the guerrilla through armed struggle can create
     the conditions needed to spark the masses to revolutionary
     acts without having to wait for the people to act of their
     own volition.
Peterson, Harries. Clinchy, Major USMCR.  Che Guevara on Guer-
      rilla Warfare.   New York:   Frederick A. Prager, Publisher,
      1961.   An abridged translation of Guevara's book `Guerrilla
      Warfare'.   It is based on an official U.S. army Intelligence
      translation, as edited by the author.  The introduction pro-
      vides an insightful discussion on the tactics of Communist
      inspired revolutionary guerrilla movements.
Pomeroy, William J. , ed.   Guerrilla Warfare and Marxism.   New
      York:   International Publishers, 1968.   A collection of writ-
      ings on worldwide armed struggles for "liberation and social-
      ism"  during the Twentieth Century.   Includes monographs by
      Marx, Lenin, Minz, Tito, Mao Tse-Tung, Le Duan, Nkrumah,  and
      Debray, among others.   Pomeroy attempts to clearly validate
      the need for movements to establish political organs to care-
      fully prepare themselves and their national populations for
      armed struggle, as well as, the need for revolutionary move-
      ments to conform to the situational peculiarities of their
      environments.
Rapoport, Anatol, ed.   Carl Von Clausewitz on War.   New York:
     Penguin Books, 1983.   A classic treatise on the subject of
     warfare.   It presents the general principles of war which
     have come to be associated with Western military thought.
     Emphasizes the importance of popular support when conducting
     bar.
Rock, David.   Argentina:  1516-1982.   Berkeley:   University of
     California Press, 1985.   Traces the political and economic
     history of Argentina from its colonization by the Spanish to
     the 1982 Falkland War.   Presents substantial insight into
     the social and political environment existing in Argentina
     during the Peron era in which Guevara grew up.
Sun Tzu.   The Art of War.  Tr. BGen Samuel B. Griffith, USMC.
     Ned York:   Oxford University Press, 1971.   Presents general
     principles of war and proposes that military leaders should
     not tolerate or be subjected to interference from the
     sovereign when prosecuting campaigns.
Thibault, George, ed.  The Art and Practice of Military Strat-
     egy.     Washington, D.C.:   National Defense University, 1984.
     Contains several monographs useful in developing an under-
     standing of insurgent warfare and provides a practical frame-
     work with which to analyze insurgent movements.
Thompson, Robert Sir, et al. , eds.  War In Peace: Conventional
     and Guerilla Warfare Since 1945    New York:  Harmony Books,
     1982.   An examination of armed conflicts around the world
     from 1946 to 1980.
Wheatcroft, Andrew.  The World Atlas  of Revolution.  New York:
     Simon and Schuster, 1983.   An analytical anthology of world
     revolutionary struggles from 1765 to 1980.



NEWSLETTER
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list