The Israeli Experience In Lebanon, 1982-1985 CSC 1987 SUBJECT AREA History THE ISRAELI EXPERIENCE IN LEBANON, 1982-1985 Major George C. Solley Marine Corps Command and Staff College Marine Corps Development and Education Command Quantico, Virginia 10 May 1987 ABSTRACT Author: Solley, George C., Major, USMC Title: Israel's Lebanon War, 1982-1985 Date: 16 February 1987 On 6 June 1982, the armed forces of Israel invaded Lebanon in a campaign which, although initially perceived as limited in purpose, scope, and duration, would become the longest and most controversial military action in Israel's history. Operation Peace for Galilee was launched to meet five national strategy goals: (1) eliminate the PLO threat to Israel's northern border; (2) destroy the PLO infrastructure in Lebanon; (3) remove Syrian military presence in the Bekaa Valley and reduce its influence in Lebanon; (4) create a stable Lebanese government; and (5) therefore strengthen Israel's position in the West Bank. This study examines Israel's experience in Lebanon from the growth of a significant PLO threat during the 1970's to the present, concentrating on the events from the initial Israeli invasion in June 1982 to the completion of the withdrawal in June 1985. In doing so, the study pays particular attention to three aspects of the war: military operations, strategic goals, and overall results. The examination of the Lebanon War lends itself to division into three parts. Part One recounts the background necessary for an understanding of the war's context -- the growth of PLO power in Lebanon, the internal power struggle in Lebanon during the long and continuing civil war, and Israeli involvement in Lebanon prior to 1982. The second part deals with the four distinct phases of Israeli military operations in Lebanon: (1) the eight-day offensive which shattered the PLO and seriously damaged Syrian occupation forces; (2) the consolidation of gains and seige of West Beirut; (3) the occupation of territory pending political settlement; and (4) the phased withdrawal from Lebanon. Part Three examines the results of the war in terms of military lessons learned, degree of success of war goals, and overall effects of the war on Israel, Lebanon, and the Palestinian movement. In brief, the Israeli Defense Force conducted a successful combined arms offensive which achieved every military objective assigned it, but which revealed certain weakness in force structure and tactics. Strategic goals were initially met with the evacuation of much of the PLO from Beirut and the defeat of Syrian forces in the Bekaa; however,long term results have been a renewed PLO presence in Lebanon, the rise of militant Shi'a fundamentalist militias in the south, the almost total collapse of any semblance of a Lebanese government, restored Syrian presence and influence, deep domestic divisions in Israel concerning the war, and increased political violence in the West Bank. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Chapter I. Introduction 1 Chapter II. Background 4 Chapter III. Plans and Preparations 40 Chapter IV. Invasion 58 Chapter V. Seige 97 Chapter VI. Occupation and Withdrawal 106 Chapter VII. IDF Lessons Learned 126 Chapter VIII. Conclusions 142 Bibliography 150 FIGURES Figure 1. IDF Expansion, 1973-1982 16 Figure 2. IDF Organization 18 Figure 3. PLO Organization 23 Figure 4. Palestinian Factions 25 Figure 5. Lebanese Factions 29 Figure 6. IDF Order of Battle 48 Figure 7. PLO Order of Battle 50 Figure 8. Syrian Order of Battle 55 MAPS Map 1. Religious Communities in Lebanon 27 Map 2. Areas of Control in Lebanon 35 Map 3. Topography of Lebanon 43 Map 4. PLO Dispositions 51 Map 5. Syrian Dispositions 53 (Vp6w6n?p 6. Israeli Advances -- 6 June 65 Map 7. Israeli Advances -- 7 June 68 Map 8. Israeli Advances -- 8 June 73 Map 9. Israeli Advances -- 9 June 78 Map 10. Israeli Advances -- 10 June 82 Map 11. Israeli Advances -- 11-12 June 85 Map 12. Beirut-Damascus Highway -- 22-25 June 91 Map 13. Beirut 96 Map 14. Beirut -- 1-4 August 102 Map 15. Israeli Dispositions -- Sept 82-Sept 83 113 Map 16. Israeli Dispositions -- Sept 83-Jan 85 115 Map 17. Israeli Dispositions -- Jan 85-June 85 123 CHAPTER I -- INTRODUCTION Any attempt to examine one segment in the continuing Arab- Israeli conflict runs into an immediate and unavoidable dilemma, and this study of the Israeli invasion and occupation of southern Lebanon from 1982 to 1985 is no exception. The dilemma is this: the threads that must be woven together to produce a tapestry which accurately and thoroughly depicts a particular conflict are long and convoluted; the Lebanon conflict especially cannot be understood without a knowledge of the greater Arab-Israeli conflict, its roots and history -- both military and political. Even that knowledge must be reinforced by further understanding of both Arab and Jewish-Israeli history, culture, and society. Obviously, a study which attempted such an encyclopedic approach could not be confined to one volume -- much less to a research paper. The approach of this study, therefore, is to rely on the reader to bring with him an overall awareness of the greater conflict and to provide only a brief account of the broader struggle in order to concentrate on background events which directly influenced the events and conduct of the Lebanon War. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 and the ensuing three-year occupation are themselves multi-faceted. There is the purely military struggle between Israel, on the one hand, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Syria, and Lebanese militias on the other. There is a political struggle on several levels -- within the Israeli government, within Israeli society, between Israel and both its friends and adversaries, between Syria and Lebanon, and within Lebanon. There is the effect of the war on the pre-existing confessional conflict in Lebanon. And there is the effect on the Palestinian problem as a whole, including not only the PLO but also the Palestinian communities in Lebanon, Israel, and elsewhere. Again, a relatively brief examination of the war cannot hope to deal adequately with its many facets in any detail, so this study will focus on its military aspects. But to concentrate solely on the military aspects of this war in particular would be to remove it from its context and to mislead the reader, so the attempt has been made to include enough related information that the reader may gain an understanding of military events in their political context. An additional problem in writing of the Lebanon War concerns the matter of sources. One might expect to find only contemporary press accounts supplemented by a few journal articles, but in fact a number of full-length works concerning the war (or at least the invasion through the siege of Beirut) have appeared in the last few years. In dealing with these works, and in particular when dealing with press reports, care must be exercised to maintain a balanced viewpoint. This conflict, like the Arab-Israeli conflict in general, brings forth an emotionally charged reaction from anyone who subscribes to the views of one side or the other, and in this case the deep division within Israel over the war has led to substantially different accounts even among Israeli writers. The sources, then, can be divided into four points of view, each represented by writers whose approach varies from balanced, factual, and reasoned to biased, unreliable, and emotional: anti-Israeli and pro-Palestinian, anti-Israeli and anti-Palestinian but pro- Lebanese, pro-Israeli and anti-Palestinian, and pro-Israeli and reasonably balanced concerning the Palestinians. In dealing with these sources the researcher must recognize any inherent biases on the parts of the authors and accept as legitimate only that information which can be verified. In addition, all Israel Defense Force reports are kept secret for thirty years, and American reports resulting from liaison with the Israelis also remain classified. Nevertheless, one can build an accurate and fairly complete picture of the war by comparing information from a number of sources. This study represents an attempt to build such a picture by examining the events which led to the war, the characteristics of its participants, the way in which it was fought, and its overall results. CHAPTER II -- BACKGROUND It is difficult to define the amount of background information the reader may need for an understanding of the Lebanon War, but there is no doubt that some knowledge of the roots of the war is necessary. In order to dig out those roots without trying to cover the entire history of the Middle East, it is possible to examine the influences on the conflict in four areas: the military aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict; the development of the Israel Defense Force; the history of the Palestinians and the PLO in Lebanon; and the growing role of Israel in Lebanese affairs. THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT The historical roots of Arab-Israeli hostility can be traced as far back as one wishes to go, and some Arabs and Israelis argue the issue from a Biblical starting point, anchoring their key points in events of 3,000 years ago. Be that as it may, the modern conflict has its genesis in the Zionist movement of the late 19th century, when the Jewish population in Palestine increased from some 25,0002 in 1881 to more than 80,0002 in 1914. Unlike the Palestinian Jews, the Zionist immigrants came to till the soil and were determined to defend themselves in a land where Bedouin and other Arab bandits regularly plundered villages and robbed travelers; these Zionists established barricaded villages guarded by the first Jewish defense organizations, Hashomer ("the Watchman").4 World War I was a watershed for both Jews and Arabs. Palestinian Jews served initially at Gallipoli in the Zion Mule Corps; later, after the Balfour Declaration gave British approval for "establishment in Palestine of a national homeland for the Jewis people," the Jewish Legion participated in Allenby's campaign to drive the Ottoman Turks from Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria. Also serving under Allenby was the Arab Legion, commanded by the Arabian Sheik Faisal--great-uncle of Jordan's King Hussein--and advised by the T. E. Lawrence.5 At war's end, Britain received the Palestinian mandate, but in order to conquer the region, she had encouraged both Zionist aspirations and Arab nationalism in Arabia, Trasnsjordan, and Palestine. These conflicting aspirations resulted in bloody clashes during the period of the British Mandate in Palestine. The increasing number of authorized Jewish immigrants spurred Arab anti-Jewish riots in the 1920's, which in turn led to the creation of the country-wide militia that was father of the Israel Defense Force--the Haganah.6 By the outbreak of World War II, the Jewish population had reached 445,000; thousands of Jews had received paramilitary training as part of the Jewish Settlement Police; and the best of these underwent special training under Orde Wingate in the counterguerilla Special Night Squads. In addition, the Zionist radical right had formed its own militia, the Irgun Zvai Leumi.On the Arab side, banditry and riots had begun to be supplemented by trained guerillas under the command of a former Ottoman army officer named Fawzi al-Kawukji. World War II again brought military training to the Palestinian Jews, as some 32,000 joined the British forces. Meanwhile, the Haganah organized a full-time military force, the Palmach, which participated as scouts and commandos in the British operations against Vichy Lebanon and Syria. After the war, the Haganah concentrated on building an army-in-waiting and on facilitating illegal immigration from Europe, while the Irgun and its offshoot Lohamei Herut Yisrael ("Fighters for Israel's Freedom", LEHI to Israelis and the Stern Gang abroad), indulged in a terrorist campaign against the British. Arab guerilla groups -- many of whom had also received British training -- fought both British and Jews.7 The first Arab-Israel war actually began in November 1947, when the United Nations commenced its plan to partition Palestine and the British agreed to withdraw within six months. The war unfolded in several phases, the first two of which consisted of an offensive by mostly Palestinian elements and a Jewish counteroffensive. The Palestinians had formed a number of units manned by armed Palestinians and Arab volunteers. One of these units was commanded by the same Fawzi al-Kawukji; another by the talented Abdul Kader Husseini -- a kinsman of Yasser Arafat. During these phases, the Palestinians attacked Jewish villages throughout Palestine, until the Jewish forces mustered the strength to strike back. In April 1948, the Irgun seized the Arab village of Deir Yassin, near Jerusalem, and massacred some 250 men, women, and children in an action which more than any other stimulated Palestinian flight into neighboring countries. By May, the Palestinian offensive reached its apex when Arabs captured the Jewish kibbutz of Kfar Etzion and committed their own, retaliatory, massacre. However, soon after the Palestinians were spent. The final phases of the war began on 14 May 1948: the day the British evacuation was completed, Israel declared her independence, and forces from five Arab countries, including Lebanon, invaded Palestine. On 26 May, the Israeli Army was officially established by combining the various militias into the Zva Haganah LeyIsrael (literally "Defense Army for Israel", and officially Israel Defense Forces, or IDF, but known in Israel by its popular acronym--Zahal). In a campaign which lasted until June of 1949 (although the fighting was mostly over by December 1948), the Israeli Army defeated each invading force in detail.8 The signing of armistice agreements with Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon in 1949 did not end the Arab-Israeli conflict. Rather, the conflict became institutionalized. In the years following the War for Independence, Israel continued to build her army and to define a defense doctrine, while at the same time strengthening her population base by the encouragement of unlimited Jewish immigration. On the other side, the Arabs were struggling to come to grips with the disaster of 1947-48, both in Arab capitals and in the many Palestinian refugee camps scattered throughout the Middle East. In the main, the early 1950's was a time when both sides tested each other -- and themselves -- in small raids, both by regular forces and armed Palestinian Fedayeen (Arab for "self-sacrificers") guerillas from Gaza and Jordan's West Bank. By October 1956, Egypt had regained sufficient strength and confidence to close both the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping, prompting Israel to act in concert with Britain and France and launch an offensive against Egyptian forces in the Sinai. That fast-moving operation resulted in a swift Israeli victory: IDF mechanized and armored columns reached the Suez Canal in less than four days, and in another four days they seized the entire Sinai Peninsula, destroying the equivalent of two Egyptian divisions in the process.9 Again, a period of relative peace followed the Egyptian defeat; but again, Egypt rebuilt its strength in preparation for another clash with Israel. In May 1967, Egypt began to mass its forces in the Sinai, concentrating some 95,000 men and nearly a thousand tanks; President Nasser made increasingly bellicose announcements and declared the closing of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, while at the same time Jordan and Syria mobilized their forces. To counter what it considered increasingly dangerous preparations by the Arabs, Israel launched a pre-emptive attack on 5 June. Begun with Israeli Air Force (IAF) attacks on the airfields of all three countries, the Israeli attack routed all three Arab forces in a mere six days, with relatively low losses to the IDF.10 The Six Day War was an unparalleled success for Israel and an unmitigated disaster for the Arabs. Egypt had suffered some 10,000 dead and lost the Sinai Peninsula for the second time in 11 years. Jordan had 1,000 killed and lost its remaining foothold in Palestine on the West Bank, but more important to Arabs and Israelis alike, it had lost the city of Jerusalem; Syria lost over 2,000 killed and most of the Golan Heights, the strategic hills overlooking northern Galilee. Moreover, the Israeli success brought about an entirely new equation in the Arab- Israeli conflict. Although the territorial gains greatly enhanced the security of Israel proper by distancing her from her enemies, the gains also brought hundreds of thousands of Arabs under Israeli control, caused a new wave of Palestinian refugees, and stimulated the fortunes of the Palestinian Liberation Organization as Palestinians lost faith in the ability of Arab governments. As the Arabs despaired, Israelis rejoiced in the belief that they had so thoroughly destroyed any threat to their survival that lasting peace would now follow. However, the war did not bring peace, but a three-year period of non-stop conflict known in Israel as the War of Attrition. This war was most intense along the Suez Canal, but was also fought on the Syrian and Jordanian fronts; artillery exchanges, ground raids, and air strikes exacted a steady toll on both sides, and terrorist and guerilla attacks against Israeli civilian targets became frequent. Although Israel fortified its front lines, particularly along the Suez Canal and in the Golan Heights, it also conducted long-range air strikes and armor raids. It was Israeli air power, which struck deep into Arab countries and destroyed over 60 MiG-21's (with the loss of only two Mirages), which caused the Arabs to agree to a ceasefire in August 1970. Israelis counted this non-war a victory, but -- although it cost nearly 600 Israeli lives -- the fighting did not seriously test Israeli defenses in the occupied territories.11 That test came in October 1973. On the afternoon of 6 October, on the Jewish Day of Atonement (Yom Kippur), Egyptian and Syrian Forces launched a well-coordinated surprise attack in in the Sinai and on the Golan Heights. On both fronts, Israeli defenses were overrun and the small IDF forces were reduced to fighting desperate holding actions while mobilization was slowly taking place. In the Golan, the threat to Israel was more immediate, since a short Syrian advance would put them among the towns and settlements of northern Galilee. In the Sinai, the IDF did not stem the Egyptian advance until 14 October, when IDF armor defeated that of Egypt in a tremendous tank battle involving nearly 2,000 tanks. The Israelis quickly seized the offensive and crossed the Suez Canal, and by 24 October had completely encircled the 45,000 men of the Egyptian 3rd Army. Therefore the IDF conducted simultaneous offense and defense, holding on by a thread in one sector while counterattacking in another. By 11 October, the Syrian attack had been broken, and IDF units had advanced to within artillery range of Damascus by the next day. After a near superpower confrontation; a ceasefire was imposed in 22 October. The Yom Kippur War shook the Israelis out of their complacent sense of military superiority -- for it had been a near thing. On the other hand, the war increased Arab self- respect and demonstrated that when supplied with sophisticated weaponry and equipment, they became more formidable opponents. The war also led to a number of developments in the continuing conflict: Egypt signed the first peace treaty between Israel and an Arab country; Jordan, which had stayed out of the war and ceased providing a haven for PLO guerillas, became more determined to shift attention from military to political action; and attacks by the PLO, both within Israel and abroad, increased in frequency. Now, however, these attacks did not emanate from Egypt or Jordan, but from the growing PLO base in Lebanon. And it was toward Lebanon that Israel turned her attention during the l970's. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDF Much of the doctrine and fighting characteristics of the IDF stem from the pre-state era and the War for Independence. The Haganah, which formed the core of the new IDF, emerged from a strong pacifist background and at first strongly opposed the use of force except in self-defense. This principle of self- restraint, known to the Haganah as "to keep your weapon clean," later developed into the IDF concept of tohar haneshek, or purity .of arms -- a concept which can loosely be described as morality in war. Not all members of the Haganah agreed with what some considered such a naive approach, and the establishment of the Irgun and LEHI reflected that counter-policy, whose chief characteristics were lack of restraint and a tendency to identify as enemies all who stood between them and their goals. It was in the Haganah that the first operational doctrine was formulated -- based particularly on the main principles espoused by Orde Wingate. These principles included leadership by personal example, purposeful discipline based on operational requirements, careful planning down to the lowest levels, delegation of authority to subordinates, encouragement of improvisation, concentration on the main objective, exploitation of surprise and mobility, use of night operations, and emphasis on ideological motivation. In matters of training, the chief influence on the IDF was the Palmach, both because it served as the training ground for many of the future leaders and because the training methods were unconventional. Palmach training emphasized individual responsbility, stressed the need for independence of action even to the squad leader level, and instilled as military answers to the Jewish lack of a conventional military force the concepts of cohesion, group morale, inventive tactics, and daring leadership.13 The War for Independence molded the different elements of the Jewish defenses into a single military organization based on these principles and practices. The doctrinal concepts of the Haganah and the Palmach were proven valid in that war, and the young members of those organizations became the heroes of the war and the leaders of the post-war IDF. After the War for Independence, the new IDF began to attain its shape as a national military force. Confronted immediately with the problem of how to provide a ready defense without the draining burden of a large standing army, the IDF adopted a modified Swiss model of reserve service. The IDF would be made up of three components: Keva, the relatively small permanent service of career officers and NCOs; Hova, conscripts undergoing compulsory service; and Meluimm, the large standby reserve of those whose compulsory service was completed. The IDF was organized into an army, air force, and small navy -- all subordinate to a Chief of Staff who reported directly to the Minister of Defense. Within the IDF, three regional commands and a General Staff reported to the Chief of Staff. Also during these early years, the main strategic and tactical doctrines of the IDF were defined. Stemming from certain built-in constraints (lack of geographical depth, numerical inferiority, and limited economic resources), the IDF developed doctrinal concepts which still form the basis for Israeli defense: 1) deterrence of Israel's larger enemies is only possible through an effective and highly aggressive military force; 2) effective intelligence is required to deny surprise to the enemy; 3) pre-emptive attack is necessary to prevent enemy penetration of Israeli territory; 4) reserve forces, the main strength of the IDF, must be kept in a high state of proficiency, equipment, and readiness; 5) a "fast-war doctrine" is necessary to avert economic and human attrition. Despite these developments, and partially because of the IDF's role in assimilating immigrants from a myriad of backgrounds into Israeli society, the IDF suffered a lapse of effectiveness until Moshe Dayan became Chief of Staff in 1953. Dayan, who had been a favored disciple of Orde Wingate, set about to reinstill the Haganah/Palmach characteristics into an IDF made up largely of immigrants. This he did while at the same time developing the IDF's infantry capability in response to Fedayeen attacks. The Sinai campaign affirmed the overall Israeli approach, although it revealed weaknesses in logistics, coordination, and armor. As a result, the armored corps was greatly increased in number and quality, and air operations received greater emphasis. The IDF's characteristics and doctrinal concepts, however, remained the same.14 The June 1967 war further validated IDF doctrine and character, and seemed also to demonstrate an Israeli edge in the adaptation of modern, sophisticated weapons and equipment to the battlefield. However, it was in this area of equipment that the Israelis noticed problems, for its forces were equipped with a wide variety of machines -- from modern Centurians to surplus World War II Shermans. Troops followed the tanks in civilian buses, and the navy could boast no craft built since 1945. Only the air force contained quality equipment, and it was outnumbered by almost three to one. The combination of poor equipment, good leadership, and swift victory led to overconfidence on the part of the IDF, especially as the outdated items were replaced by first rate tanks, personnel carriers, missile boats, and aircraft. More serious, the IDF combined arms doctrine was supplanted by the belief (seemingly confirmed in the war) that successful operations in the Middle East could be conducted with tanks fighting virtually alone, without supporting infantry. From an infantry-based force in the early 1950's, the IDF had become an overwhelmingly armor-heavy force by the 1970's.15 Both the overconfidence and reliance on armored formations received severe blows in the Yom Kippur War of 1973, which brought with it the realization that courage and initiative might not in themselves prove sufficient for Israel's defense. In addition to maintaining a qualitative edge, the IDF must obtain quantitative comparability as well. In addition, the IDF had encountered technological innovations for which it was unprepared, particularly the surface-to-air (SAM) and anti-tank missiles. Israeli human and equipment losses were high, but the IDF immediately began to replace these losses and to begin an enormous expansion in manpower, equipment, and complexity. Figure 1 details that expansion, but the overall trends were a great increase in the number of armor and artillery brigades, the mechanization of infantry and artillery, and the tripling of the number of tactical aircraft.16 This growth did bring with it certain problems. The increase in manpower resulted from the acceptance of lower quality conscripts, which in turn decreased the average quality of the IDF soldier. Officer selection and promotion became more Click here to view image lax, because of both force expansion and the need to replace the nearly 1,300 officers killed and wounded in the Yom Kippur War. As the IDF grew, so did its complexity, command and control difficulties, centralization, and bureaucracy.17 Finally, the expansion had a severe economic effect: the money spent on upgrading equipment was significant, and when added to that spent dismantling IDF bases in the Sinai following the Camp David Accords with Egypt and rebuilding them in Israel, caused defense spending to jump from around 21 per cent of the GNP prior to thewar to a high of 35 per cent in the mid-1970's; the store of arms and ammunition, which was nearly exhausted early in the war, was enlarged sufficiently to sustain 28 days of combat; and the costs of equipment acquisition and force growth led to a cutback in training time, live-fire exercises, flight time, and other key training. However, a corresponding effect was the hastened development of an arms industry in Israel which would reduce dependence on overseas suppliers.18 Operationally, the IDF learned several lessons from the Yom Kippur War. First, Israel underestimated the enemy. Second, the IDF suffered an imbalance in the composition of its forces: the lack of APC's inhibited mobility; artillery had been neglected due to emphasis on aviation; and the IDF overrelied on armored formations. Third, infantry was used very poorly. Fourth, intelligence was not received in a timely manner nor applied effectively in operations.19 The overall result of IDF changes following 1973 was a much larger and more sophisticated force, with more combat formations and a greater combined arms Click here to view image capability. Operational doctrine may have changed in some technical aspects, but basic doctrine remained the same. That doctrine is based on consideration of the threat and factors of geography, population, economic resources, and superpower intentions: Israel has no strategic depth; its population is vastly less than its Arab opponents; its economy will not sustain a prolonged war; and the superpowers will intervene to prevent the total defeat of an Arab nation. Therefore, doctrine emphasizes deterrence through the identification of casus belli, decisive military victory, defensible borders, and an image of autonomous action. These translate into operational emphasis on offensive operations, pre-emption, speed, maneuver, exploitation of technical and command superiority, and combined arms.20 THE PLO AND LEBANON For much of the forty years of Arab-Israeli conflict Lebanon has been the one area devoid of direct confrontation. After agreeing to a ceasefire with the new state of Israel in 1949, Lebanon was left with a major problem relating to the continuing conflict -- the more than 100,000 Palestinian refugees who fled north from 1947 to 1950.21 These refugees, mostly from Arab settlements in northern Israel, were initially settled in camps built by the French in the 1930's for Armenian and Kurdish refugees. Rather quickly, however, the Lebanese government began transferring them to some fifteen camps based on place of origin in Israel. As was the case in other Arab countries, the Lebanese government discouraged the integration of Palestinians into Lebanon's own population, both because Arab states maintained a tacit agreement that Palestinian refugees were politically more useful than Palestinian citizens and because the Christian leadership in Lebanon feared a sizable increase in the Muslim population.22 In Lebanon, the conditions were worse for refugees than in Jordan, Syria, or Egypt: regarded as "non-nationals," Palestinians were barred from any government work, including the military, and their children were generally excluded from Lebanese schools. However, a number of Palestinians who either had money, were educated, or were related to Lebanese did manage to obtain Lebanese citizenship.23 As the camps grew during the 1950's, so did the fledgling resistance movement. The original Palestine National Assembly, formed in Gaza in 1948, gradually gave way to more active groups. In October 1954 a secret resistance group was formed by Yasser Arafat called "Fatah."24 By 1960, the headquarters of Fatah was located in Beirut and had published a credo containing five main points, central of which was the need for "armed struggle" to liberate Palestine.25 As Fatah expanded its base of support, another group, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), was established in early 1964 replete with an Executive Committee, a National Council of elected representatives, and a military branch -- the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA).26 Late the same year, Fatah launched its first raid into Israel. Backed mainly at this point by Syria, Fatah moved its headquarters to Damascus and increased the number of its raids staged from Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan's West Bank. The swift and thorough Israeli victory in June 1967 left a frustated Palestinian diaspora, one which became increasingly convinced that Fatah's program of phasing a guerilla struggle from hit and run raids to limited confrontation to permanent occupation was the only hope of wresting Palestine from the Israelis.27 Many resistance groups sprang up, with differing goals and ideologies, but all committed to armed struggle. As a result of the war and the flood of refugees into Jordan from the West Bank, Fatah activities increased dramatically in Jordan and the PLO itself became more militant. Fatah's reputation and popularity received a tremendous boost in the aftermath of the war, when a large Israeli raid on the Jordanian village of Karameh in March 1968 resulted in scores of Israeli casualties; although the Jordanian Army was largely responsible for the Israeli losses, Fatah fighters performed well and Arafat turned the clash into a propaganda victory which resulted in thousands of volunteers and which consolidated Fatah's position as the leading organization in the Palestinian movement.28 Again, violent clashes between Palestinian groups and Israel increased in number and frequency: nearly a thousand border incidents occurred between Israel and Jordan in 1968,29 and skirmishes between guerillas and the IDF along the Lebanese border were taking place several times a week.30 In December 1968 these incidents brought the first significant retaliatory raid in Lebanon when IDF commandos landed at the Beirut airport, carefully evacuated passengers and crew members, and destroyed thirteen planes belonging to Lebanon's Middle East Airlines -- with no casualties on either side.31 In February 1969, Arafat was elected Chairman of the PLO and Fatah became the dominant force of the organization [see Figure 3].32 The strength of the movement (and resulting Israeli response) had by now become such that Lebanon began to feel the pressure. A series of battles between PLO groups and the Lebanese Army resulted in mediation by Egypt's President Nasser, and in October 1969 Arafat and Lebanese Army Chief General Emile Bustany met in Cairo and signed what became known as the Cairo Agreement. This agreement in effect legitimized the PLO position in Lebanon: Palestinians were allowed "to participate in the Palestinian revolution through armed struggle," and even were granted bases for operations in return for acceptance of Lebanese government sovereignty.33 Thus, by 1969, Arafat's Fatah had taken over the leadership of the PLO, had become the chief Palestinian player in the armed struggle against Israel, and had established a legitimate basis of operation in both Jordan and Lebanon. In addition, the second great exodus of Palestinians, this time from the West Bank, had swollen the ranks of all Palestinian groups. However, 1970 saw a series of events in Jordan which had severe consequences for both the PLO and Lebanon. The growing strength of the PLO in Jordan following the June 1967 war was becoming a threat to King Hussein's government. In addition, each terrorist attack launched from Jordan brought retaliation from the Israelis -- in ever-increasing severity. During the early months of 1970, several clashes occurred as the Jordanian Click here too view image Army attempted to control PLO activities, but in September these battles erupted into all-out war. Following an attempt on Hussein's life. George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked four American and European airliners, flew them to remote fields in Jordan, and blew them up. Hussein turned his army on the Palestinians and by the end of the month, after thousands of Palestinian deaths, the PLO in Jordan was crushed. Thousands of fighters fled, mostly to Lebanon.34 Left in a state of reduced capability and reputation by the losses of "Black September," elements of the PLO turned increasingly to terrorism. After more than a year of recuperation in Lebanon, PLO-trained teams embarked on a series of spectacular terrorist acts which included the Lod airport Massacre in May 1972 and the killing of eleven Israeli athletes in Munich the following August. Israeli reaction again provoked tension between the PLO and the Lebanese Army which climaxed in May 1973 then slackened during the Yom Kippur War. During 1974, terrorist and guerilla actions continued by some PLO factions, although Fatah curbed its violent activities when it appeared likely for a while that real political progress was possible. In the Arab League summit conference in October 1974 Arab leaders recognized the PLO as the "sole legitimate representative of all Palestinian people," and the next month Yasser Arafat was invited to address the United Nations General Assembly.35 Yet, as the PLO seemed within reach of international legitimacy, the situation in Lebanon was rapidly deteriorating. Click here to view image Faced with the growing power of the PLO in Lebanon and monstrated weakness of the Lebanese Army, the Christians in Lebanon began seriously to arm themselves. Tensions within the country rose during the spring of 1975, exemplified by endless demands and ultimatums, political violence, and denial of Lebanese government authority by all factions. These tensions had a number of causes: the PLO was an armed force not integrated into Lebanon's political system; the Palestinian issue strained relations between Lebanese Christians and Muslims, since the former felt abused by Arab support for PLO activities and the latter felt an almost sacred duty to provide that support; the Marxist and leftist PLO factions reinforced the Lebanese Left as a political force; and as southern Lebanon became a PLO base, the geo-political problem was further exacerbated by the movement of the Shia population north to Beirut.36 In April, an armed clash between radical Palestinians and Phalange militia in the Ein al Rumani quarter of Beirut ignited a civil war which officially lasted eighteen months but which in fact continues today. That internal conflict has been described in detail elsewhere,37 but since it directly affected the Israeli-PLO conflict and set the stage for the 1982 Israeli invasion, it is worth recounting in broad terms. The 1975-76 civil war in Lebanon can be broken into four relatively distinct phases. Figure 5 shows the line up of forces as it evolved during the civil war. During the first phase. from April to June 1975, the clashes between the PLO and leftist militias on the one hand and the Phalange on the other Click here to view image intensified. Phase two, which lasted from June 1975 to January 1976, consisted of all out war between two coalitions: the coalition for status quo consisted of the Lebanese Front and other mostly Christian forces, and the revisionist coalition was made up of mostly Muslim and generally leftist militias and -- sometimes, but not always -- the more left-leaning factions of the PLO. The third phase saw the initial intervention of Syria from January 1976 to May 1976; this intervention at first consisted of sending Syrian-controlled Palestinians to aid the revisionists, then attempting political mediation, and finally (when the revisionists spurned Syria-backed reform plans) dispatching al-Saiqa and Syrian PLA units to aid the Lebanese Front. In the fourth phase, in May 1976, limited Syria armed forces invaded Lebanon on behalf of the Lebanese Front and were defeated; in September, Syria launched an all-out military offensive which brought the revisionist and PLO forces to the brink of defeat. By the end of the year, although some sporadic fighting continued, some sense of normalcy returned in Syria- controlled Lebanon.38 As a result of the Civil War, the lines were drawn which continued for several years: the Syrians controlled the north, east, and Beirut areas; the Christians dominated from Beirut north along the coast; the Druze controlled the Shouf; and the PLO exercised authority along the coast from Tyre to Beirut. Although Syria initially fought against the PLO, it switched sides once again when Syrian efforts to impose a long-term political solution (one which would preserve Syrian superiority in Lebanon came to nought. Syria-PLO cooperation increased with Click here too view image the coming of peace between Israel and Egypt, and by 1980 Syria had withdrawn from the coastal areas and turned them over to the PLO. Of all the combatants, the PLO came out of the war in the best position, with a free hand within the Palestinian "mini- state." By the early 1980's, the key players in Lebanon had clearly defined roles. Syria, with military forces in the Bekaa and Beirut, was able to influence events in Lebanon. The Druze controlled the Shouf and the enmity between Druze and Christians had become implacable hatred. The Christians had received the worst of the fighting, had lost Damour and other towns on the coast and in the Shouf, and tenuously hung on to the reins of Lebanese government. The leftist militias had failed to reform the Lebanese government. The PLO was free to expand its forces and to concentrate on the struggle against Israel. The Shiites were building their own forces and attacking the PLO in the south, after having been a minor player in Lebanon despite their huge population. ISRAEL-PLO CONFLICT, 1970-1982 Each instance of PLO-sponsored international terrorism in the early 1970's brought about swift Israeli response in the form of bombing attacks on Palestinian refugee camps. For example, after a PLO attack on a school in Maalot in May 1974, the IAF launched extensive attacks on PLO positions throughout southern Lebanon. Other types of retaliation also occurred, such as the assassination in Beirut of three prominent PLO leaders by Israeli commandos and agents in April 1973. These retaliatory raids reflected Israel's belief in swift and severe retribution for attacks on its citizens, but they also were intended to persuade the Lebanese government to deal with the PLO in the same way as King Hussein had in September 1970.40 The Lebanese did not have the strength to clamp down successfully on the PLO, and the real effect of the Israeli raids was to intensify Lebanese internal conflicts and polarize the Lebanese into pro- and anti- Palestinian camps -- thus contributing to the outbreak of civil war.41 Israel's response to the Lebanese Civil War was to strengthen its ties to the Maronite Christians. In response to appeals for weapons and training, Israel began a program of covert aid which grew as the Christians began to lose ground in the fighting.42 In the early months of the war, Israel established the "good fence" policy wherein southern Lebanese were provided medical and other care at locations along the border and were even allowed to enter Israel to work. Israel provided limited support to Christian militias in the south by the use of air and artillery attacks on threatening PLO forces. When the Syrians entered Lebanon, they did so under a tacit agreement with Israel that Israel would only tolerate Syrian presence north of a "red line" roughly along the Litani River. In February 1977, in a rare merging of Syrian and Israeli interests, the PLO was forced to agree to withdraw its forces from the Israeli border area in return for the cessation of Syrian shelling of PLO camps in Beirut. In April, Christian militias supported by Israeli artillery launched a drive to clear the border area of PLO and leftist forces, a drive which quickly stalled but which brought an Israeli declaration that no Palestinian presence would be tolerated within six miles of the border.43 Soon after Menachem Begin was elected Prime Minister in May 1977, Israeli intervention in the south increased and the IDF openly coordinated with Christian militias -- establishing training programs, conducting joint patrols and support operations, and building the militia of Lebanese Army Major Saad Haddad. Responding to a PLO announcement of its intent to increase operations within Israel, IDF armor and infantry units crossed into Lebanon in September 1977 in support of Christian forces, remaining until late in the month. As the PLO grew in strength with increased arms and a joint pact with the revisionist Lebanese National Movement, it stepped up its artillery and rocket attacks on Israelis northern settlements. The object of Israeli activities in southern Lebanon was to create a Christian buffer between Israel and the PLO, and during early 1978 that object seemed plausible. But on 2 March, a joint leftist-PLO force overran the Christian village of Marun al Ras, just one mile north of the border, and captured a quantity of IDF-supplied weapons and vehicles.44 Some response was deemed necessary by Israel to ensure continued Christian cooperation, and during the next week IDF forces concentrated at the border as IAF planes flew reconnaissance missions over Tyre and other towns in southern Lebanon.44 On 11 March, in an action Israel could not ignore, PLO terrorists landed on the coast near Tel Aviv, commandeered a full Israeli bus, and conducted a running gun battle with security forces before being killed; 37 people died and 82 were wounded. At dawn on 14 March, the IDF launched Operation Stone of Wisdom, soon to be known as Operation Litani. In an action planned for some time, some 15,000-20,000 IDF soldiers crossed the border and advanced frontally about seven miles into Lebanon, attacking suspected PLO bases along the way. The PLO, having had ample warning of the impending attack, withdrew most of its forces northward. The IDF then advanced all the way north to the Litani River, and in this move a number of PLO fighters were caught in villages and in the camps around Tyre. With little regard for civilian casualties, the IDF attacked villages used by the PLO and leftist militias 46 cordoned off the Tyre area without entering it, and attacked PLO locations around Tyre with air and artillery. The IDF intended to push the PLO out of artillery range of Israel, to destroy its bases, and to inflict such losses as to discourage PLO activities in southern Lebanon. Sufficient Palestinian resistance was met, particularly from al-Saiqa fighters, for the IDF to suffer 16 dead against an estimated 200 PLO fighters killed.47 IDF troops remained in Lebanon until a ceasefire agreement was concluded, withdrawing in June. The results of the Litani operation were mixed: the PLO had been pushed north of the Litani and a double buffer created to keep them from returning -- the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) zone and the Haddad enclave; the Israeli commitment to the Christian forces was strengthened; Israel received, for the first time in any substance, adverse publicity in the world press for its heavyhanded treatment of southern Lebanon; some 200,000 people fled the area, mostly Shiites who ended up in the southern suburbs of Beirut; and, as an indirect result, the Syrian forces in Lebanon turned against the Christians in late June. It was this switch by Syria that brought about the crises of 1981 and ultimately made the 1982 invasion almost inevitable. After shelling Christian East Beirut for several months in the summer of 1978 and overrunning several Phalange strongholds in the north -- and also in the face of ominous Israeli moves on the Golan Heights -- the Syrians considered their hand sufficiently strengthened to stop the attacks. However, the reduced circumstances of the Christians allowed the PLO to greatly increase its store of arms, consolidate its position in Lebanon, and take the first steps toward building a conventional army. In the meantime, Bashir Gemayel had come to the conclusion that only a unified Christian force could improve Christian fortunes and had begun merging, sometimes by sheer force, the various militias into the Phalange-dominated "Kataeb." By the spring of 1981 Bashir felt strong enough to begin efforts to establish control of the Christian city of Zahle, in the Syrian- control led Bekaa Valley. A number of Phalange provocations resulted in a serious attack on Zahle by Syrian forces, during which Israel aided the Phalangists by shooting down two Syrian troop helicopters. The Syrians reacted by moving a number of SAM batteries into the Bekaa. Israel threatened military action and Click here to view image war was narrowly averted by American mediation -- but the missiles remained in the Bekaa. Then, in May, Israel resumed air and sea bombardments of PLO concentrations in southern Lebanon; Palestinian reaction was restrained and the attacks halted in early June. But the next month, Israel renewed its air strikes, and after five days the PLO responded by shelling the coast town of Nahariya. Israeli retaliation came in the form of an air attack on Palestinian headquarters in West Beirut in which, despite IAF attempts at pinpoint bombing, over l00 people were killed, only 30 of whom were PLO fighters. The PLO then began a twelve-day artillery and rocket barrage that caused over 60 Israeli casualties and brought northern Galilee to a standstill, with Israelis fleeing south for the first time since 1947. The strength of the bombardment and the IDF"s inability to completely stop it made it relatively easy for Philip Habib to negotiate a ceasefire. This ceasefire, although halting the attacks, left Israelis with a feeling that they were at the mercy of PLO guns in Lebanon. The combination of that feeling and the appointment of Ariel Sharon as Defense Minister made invasion a mere matter of time.48 CHAPTERS II NOTES 1There is a strong tendency among certain groups in Israel to speak of Israel's place in the Middle East in Biblical terms. One who has done so is former Prime Minister Menachem Begin, who invariably has spoken of the West Bank as Judea and Samaria. A growing political/social movement, Gush Emunim, rationalizes its many settlements on the West Bank and its generally antagonistic stance toward Arabs by Biblical argument. 2Sydney Nettleton Fisher, The Middle East: A History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1979), p. 406. 3Lieutenant Colonel Stephen R. Woods,Jr., The Palestinian Guerilla Organizations: Revolution or Terror as an End (Individual Research Report, U.S. Army War College, 1 May 1973), p. 8. 4Ze'ev Schiff, A History of the Israeli Army (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1985), pp. 1-4. 5Fisher, p. 407. 6Edward N. Luttwak and Daniel Horowitz, The Israeli Army, 1948-1973 (Cambridge, Mass.: Abt Books, 1983) p. 8. 7Ibid., pp. 10-27 and Schiff, pp. 9-23. 8Schiff, pp. 22-44. 9Luttwak and Horowitz, pp. 141-64. In light of the-subject of this paper, it is worth noting that after Ariel Sharon, who was the Brigade commander at Mitla Pass, attacked in violation of orders with severe casualties, two of his battalion commanders went over his head to urge Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan to remove and prosecute him. These two young paratroopers were Mordechai Gur, Chief of Staff during the late 1970's, and Rafael Eitan, Chief of Staff during the Lebanon War. Dayan took no action, but Gur and Eitan thereafter refused to serve under Sharon (Gabriel, p. 172). 10Ibid., pp. 209-281. 11Schiff, pp. 178-89. 12Ibid., pp. 207-226. 13Reuven Gal, A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1986), pp. 3-10. 14Ibid., pp. 11-14. 15Ibid., pp. 15-18. 15Ibid., pp. 15-18. 16The Military Balance (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1973 and 1982). 17Gal, pp. 20-24. 18Lawrence Meyer, Israel Now: Portrait of a Troubled Land (New York, Delacorte Press, 1982), pp. 315-23. 19Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East (New York: Random House, Inc., 1982), pp. 321--322. Also confirmed by interview with Major General Amos Yaron, 4 May 1987. 20Yoav Ben-Horin and Barry Posen, Israel's Strategic Doctrine (Rand Corporation, September 1981). 21John K. Cooley, "The Palestinians," in P. Edward Haley and Lewis W. Snider, eds., Lebanon in Crisis: Participants and Issues (Syracuse University Press, 1979) p. 22. 22Itamar Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, 1970-1983 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 40. 23David Gilmour, Lebanon: The Fractured County (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1983). p. 89. 24Helena Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organization: People, Power and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 6. Yasser Arafat was born Abdel-Rahman Abdel- Raouf Arafat al Qudwa al-Husseini in 1929. His organization was named Harakat al-Tahru al-Filastiniyya (Palestine Liberation Movement) whose acronym, Hataf, means "death" in Arabic; Arafat reversed the acronym to form Fatah or "victory". 25Ibid., p. 24. 26Woods, p. 16. 27Gresh, Alain, The PLO: Towards and Independent Palestinian State (Bath: Zed Books, Ltd., 1985), p. 15. 28Woods, pp. 20-21. 29Gresh, p. 14. 30Gilmour, p. 93. 31Luttwak and Horowitz, pp. 310-311. 32Cobban, p. 44. 33Cooley, p. 31-32. 34Cobban, pp. 48-53. 35Cooley, pp. 32-33. 36Rabinovich, p. 42. 37See the following sources: Rabinovich, pp. 34-120; Haley and Snider, pp. 21-112; Cobban, pp. 63-77; Gilmour, pp. 86-157; et al. 38Rabinovich, pp. 43-56. 39Cobban, p. 55. The commandos landed at night on a Beirut beach, were met by Israeli agent and driven to the apartments of the Fatah leaders, killed them, and escaped by sea. The dead Palestinians were Kamal Udwan, Muhammed Yussef al-Najjar (called Abu Yussef and PLO "foreign minister"), and Palestinian poet Kemal Nasir. 40Gilmour, p. 147. 41Halim Barakat, "The Social Context, in Haley and Snider, p. 19. 42Lewis W. Snider, et al., "Israel," in Haley and Snider, p. 91. For a revealing and detailed account of the initiation and development of Israeli-Phalange ties between 1975 and 1982, see Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984). 43Ibid., pp. 93-95. 44Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), 5(43), March 2, 1978, p. G1. Hereafter cited as FBIS. 45FBIS 5(48), March 10, 1978, p. N1. 46The Chief of Staff of the IDF, Mordechai Gur, explained in an interview on Israeli television that "the questions faced us: How justified was it for us to take casualties by using less fire on these villages, and what was the most correct way to hit the terrorists. We decided that, on all grounds, it would be better to use the method of directing fire and afterwards moving in to mop up. As a result of that, these villages were badly hit. FBIS 5(59), 27 March 1978, p. N9. 47Snider, pp. 97-107. 48Schiff and Ya'ari, pp. 25-37. CHAPTER III -- PLANS AND PREPARATIONS IDF PLANNING IDF planning for an invasion of Lebanon is some respects began in 1978, as the IDF reviewed its performance in Operation Litani. These lessons formed the basis of the "Pine Tree" plan, in preparation since 1980 and virtually completed for about six months prior to the invasion. Actually, the plan comprised three alternative plans, subject to decision and approval by the civilian authorities. The first, commonly known as "Little Pines," was an expanded version of Operation Litani, and called for an advance to the Awali River, north of Sidon. The plan's salient features were as follows: a hard strike against the PLO, particularly its military formations and artillery and rocket positions; avoidance of combat against the Syrians at all costs; and a forty-kilometer limit of advance as measured from Rosh Hanikra (on the junction of the coast and Lebanese border). The question of whether or not to conduct operations in the cities of Tyre and Sidon was not defined.1 The second plan was a more ambitious version of the first. The IDF would advance as far north as the vicinity of Beirut, but would not enter the city, which would be taken by the Phalange militia. The IDF would avoid combat with Syrian forces and again a forty-kilometer line was mentioned, this time measured from Metulla, in the east.2 The advantage of this plan was that it would include the PLO training and operational base at Damour, some 12 kilometers south of Beirut. The third and most ambitious plan, called "Big Pines," included war against both the PLO and the Syrians. This plan called for the seizing of Lebanese territory up to and including Beirut, which would be taken in a coordinated operation with the Phalange forces; an advance beyond the Beirut-Damascus highway, which would cut off Beirut from the main Syrian forces; and the expulsion of Syrian units from the Bekaa valley.3 One would expect that this plan would entail deep penetrations, landings north of Beirut and the Beirut-Damascus highway, and other tactical maneuvers of the type espoused in IDF doctrine. Yet, when Major General Amir Drori took over the Northern Command in September 1981, he instructed his staff to take into account the contingency that the operation would unfold in successive stages as approval came piecemeal for further advances deeper into Lebanon in a more open-ended campaign.4 Detailed planning proceeded throughout the winter and early spring, even though a decision had not been made as to which plan would be implemented. When the "Big Pines" plan was proposed to the Israeli cabinet in December 1981, the reaction was totally negative. Within the IDF disagreement existed concerning the efficacy of the plan, with a number of high ranking officers expressing reservations concerning the abilities and intentions of the Phalange and the wisdom of attacking the Syrians as well as the political and military advisability of operations in Beirut, an Arab capital. Despite these reservations, a number of Israelis (including Sharon, Eitan, and Drori) visited Beirut and held liaison discussions with the Phalange. In addition to these discussions, IDF officers were able to survey the terrain on the ground, send out reconnaissance patrols to check narrow roads, passes, and bridges. and even to observe Syrian positions of the 85th Brigade in Beirut.5 Drori's detailed plan for the "Big Pines" contingency had originally included final objectives in the Beirut and the Beirut-Damascus highway areas, deep landings and assaults at key points, and other creative tactical measures. However, because his mission was being only vaguely defined, and as it became obvious that the objectives of the Israeli Cabinet were less ambitious than those of the plan, Drori's planners were forced to fall back on a more conventional operation -- primarily a mechanized frontal assault on a wide front -- which could, if necessary, be tailored to fit any of the three plans.6 TERRAIN Comprising a rough rectangle some 100 kilometers north to south and 75 kilometers east to west, southern Lebanon is compartmented in both directions. Several key rivers flow into Click here to view image the sea from the east and form potential barriers: the Litani, north of Tyre; the Zaharani, eight kilometers south of Sidon; the Awali, just north of Sidon; and the Damour, 14 kilometers south of Beirut. The major terrain zones, however, run north-south: the coastal plain, which extends anywhere from a few meters to several kilometers from the Mediterranean to the foothills of the mountains; the Lebanon ridge, which ranges from foothills to heights of 6,000 feet, encompasses the Shouf and Jbaal Barouk subranges, and covers roughly two-thirds of the area of southern Lebanon; the Bekaa Valley, a flat but narrow plain beginning some 25 kilometers north of the Israeli border and extending into northern Lebanon; and the Anti-Lebanon Ridge, which forms a natural border between Lebanon and Syria from Mount Hermon in the south to the Beirut-Damascus highway. In tactical terms, the terrain is ideally suited to the defense, especially against armor. In all zones the roads are few, narrow, and poor. In the coastal zone, the main road is bordered by the sea and the hills, and when the plain does widen somewhat, citrus groves cover the area. Few parallel tracks exist, and wadis and ravines inhibit off-road movement. Along the road itself, the rivers form obstacles, and the towns of Tyre, Sidon, and Damour are build astride the road. In the Lebanon ridge, the roads are worse, steep and serpentine, with villages at every level area, hilltop, and crossroads; in the Jbaal Barouk area, only one north-south road exists, with numerous turns overlooked by steep cliffs. In the Bekaa, the valley floor does have several roads and allows for off-road movement, but the entire valley can be covered by direct-fire weapons from the bordering hills; in addition, the lower Lebanon ridge must be crossed in order even to reach the Bekaa. The Anti-Lebanon is virtually impassable, with almost no road: and numerous steep wadis. The overall effect of the terrain on tactical formations is to slow and channelize motorized movement, reducing a formation's combat strength to that of its lead element [see Appendix A].7 TACTICAL PLAN The tactical plan, then, consisted of a three-pronged attack corresponding ding to the Coastal, Lebanon, and Bekaa zones. Drori, as Northern Command, would divide his forces into three sectors -- West, Center, and East. The invasion would begin in all three sectors simultaneously, with a pre-dawn attack preceded by night attacks to seize key areas, bridges, crossroads.8 In the West, a task force commanded by Major General Yekutiel Adam would originally consist of one division, the 91st, under Brigadier General Yitzhak Mordechai. Mordechai would attack north along the coastal road with two brigades of mechanized infantry and a lead armored brigade, the 211th, whose mission would be to punch through army defenses, bypassing Tyre and Sidon. Follow-on brigades would mop up resistance in those cities. The lead task force would link up with the 36th Division striking from Metulla through Nabitiye to the Zaharani and Sidon areas. Elements of the 96th Division, under Brigadier General Amos Yaron, would conduct an amphibious landing at one of three sites -- the mouth of the Zaharani, or the Awali, or north of Beirut at the Christian port of Jounieh. The mission of the western force as a whole was to destroy the PLO strongpoints up to and including Sidon. In the center, Division 36 under Brigadier General Avigdor Kahalani would attack from around Metulla, cross the Litani, seize Beaufort Castle and the road junctions around Nabitiye, then swing west along several routes to link up with Mordechai on the coast. Division 162, under Brigadier General Menachem Einan, would follow Kahalani to Nabitiye, then move north around Jezzine along the western slopes of the Jbaal Barouk. Einan's force was somewhat understrength and consisted of a tank brigade, two battalions of infantry, and an artillery regiment -- the 211th armored brigade under Colonel Eli Geva having been loaned to Mordechai. The mission of the central force was to destroy PLO resistance in the Lebanon ridge, to complete the encirclement PLO forces south of the Zaharani, and to prevent reinforcement or withdrawal between the coast and the Bekaa. The eastern task force was the largest, with three divisions and two independent forces, and was commanded by Major General Avigdor Ben-Gal, former commander of Northern Command. Division 252 (Brigadier General Immanuel Sakel), minus one tank brigade, would advance from the Golan Heights along two routes: one toward the town of Hasbaiya at the head of the Bekaa, and one along Wadi Cheba along the slopes of Mount Hermon toward Rachaiya. Division 90, under Brigadier General Giora Lev, was a full combined arms division which could advance through Marjyoun to the vicinity of Koukaba. Two special task forces were also placed under Ben-Gal: Vardi force, under Brigadier General Danni Vardi was a task organized, two-brigade force which would capture Jezzine and proceed north along the western slopes of Jbaal Barouk; Special Maneuver Force, under Brigadier General Yossi Reled, was also a two-brigade force, organized for tank killing and made up of paratroopers and infantry supported by anti-tank guided missiles and Cobra helicopters, which would advance along the crest of the Jbaal Barouk. Finally, Division 880 under Brigadier General Yom- Tov Tamir would be in reserve. The initial mission of Ben-Gal's force would be first to block Syrian forces in the Bekaa and second to make untenable any offensive action by them unfeasible by flanking movements to the east and west. The plan and organization of forces could support either the "Big Pines" or a less ambitious modification. It seems clear from the tactical planning and deployment that Drori's concept of operations was in fact open-ended. In the west, the force could stop at the Awali, continue to Damour, or push on to Beirut. In the center, Einan's division could continue north to cut the Beirut-Damascus highway. In the east, tactical dispositions would be such that favorable position and force ratio would enhance Ben-Gal if combat with the Syrians should take place; if not, then Peled and Vardi would be in position to support Einan in a move toward the Beirut-Damascus highway. Click here to view image IDF PREPARATIONS IDF preparation for war in Lebanon had, in effect, been taking place for a number of years. First, the evacuation of the Sinai and the Camp David Accords freed a number of units for deployment in the north. Second, the Operation Litani in 1978 and the near war in July 1981 had further increased Northern Command's readiness. Third, in December 1981 the IDF had concentrated forces along the Syrian and Lebanese borders,ostensibly to deter any Syrian response to Israel's annexation of the Golan Heights. In addition to concentrating its forces, the IDF had surveyed the terrain in southern Lebanon, checked roads and bridges, and created models of key terrain features.10 Many false alarms, whether by design or coincidence, had occurred during early 1962; during April, after the death of an IDF soldier in southern Lebanon from a land mine, an alert even went so far as to designate D-Day and H-Hour.11 The effect of these preparations and alerts, followed by the inevitable stand downs, was to allay the fears of Israelis, Palestinians, and Syrians alike. PLO PREPARATIONS The PLO had ample warning of an impending Israeli invasion. The massing of troops on Israel's northern border in December was followed by a statement by the Israeli ambassador to the United States that an Israeli invasion was only "a matter of time."12 Incidents such as the killing of an Israeli diplomat in Paris and the ensuing retaliatory attacks in Lebanon by the IAF produced war predictions in both the U.S. and Lebanon.13 Arafat's response to these events, and particularly to the July 1981 confrontation, was to increase his available firepower. He more than tripled the PLO's artillery capacity from July 1981 to June 1982, from about 80 pieces and rocket launchers to 250; these he divided among seven new artillery battalions.14 In addition, he took a number of other steps to prepare the PLO fighters for war: standing orders, along with range cards, were issued to Fatah units assigning specific targets in northern Israel; brigade-level Click here to view image maneuvers were held with the Karameh Brigade in the Bekaa Valley using 130 mm guns and T-34 tanks; regional commands were established in an attempt to provide some unity of command and transcend factional loyalties; militias in the refugee camps were given increased training to free the battalions in the south to fight a more flexible campaign; shelters and emergency stores were established in the camps and hillside tunnels; ammunition and supplies were distributed from main dumps to likely areas of combat; and fortifications were constructed, particularly around Nabitiye and Beaufort. As the likelihood of war increased in April, Arafat attempted to mobilize all Palestinian males from age 16 to 39, a move which elicited little response. Finally, Arafat raised the level of alert in 28 April and deployed the 460th Battalion, with T-54/55 tanks, along the coast between the Awali and Beirut.15 PLO defensive strategy was predicated on the assumption that the IDF would stop short of Beirut. For this reason the Karameh and Yarmuk Brigades were pulled back closer to the Syrian positions in the Bekaa and orders were issued to other units to hold back the Israelis, but not at the expense of sacrificing entire units -- in short, to fight a delaying action. The objective apparently was to offer stiff resistance, yet avoid the Israeli trap until a ceasefire imposed by the superpowers could take effect.16 Although PLO defensive strength has been estimated at 10,000 to 15,000 (including Beirut), only about 4,000 of this total were trained members of the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA); some of these were divided into three Click here to view image brigades -- Kastel around Nabitiye, Yarmuk in the so-called "iron triangle" south of the Litani, and Karameh integrated with Syrian positions in the Bekaa -- and one newly formed tank battalion near Beirut. This deployment consisted both of a series of platoon-sized outposts built on high ground, with trenches and bunkers protected by wire and minefields, and of other concentrations in groves, wadis, and open areas. Additional PLA forces were under direct control of the Syria Army in the Bekaa. The remainder of the PLO fighting strength consisted of armed militia in the refugee camps, particularly al-Bas and Rashidiye near Tyre, Ein Hilwe near Sidon, and the Beirut camps. In terms of equipment, the PLO did possess some 80 tanks (60 of which were obsolete T-34's), over 250 artillery pieces and rocket launchers, numerous small arms, and considerable ammunition. But despite this appearance of conventional strength, no battle plan was ever disseminated, and the PLO had no ability either to coordinate units or move supplies within the battle zone.17 SYRIAN PREPARATIONS The Syrian presence inLebanon had diminished from three divisions in 1976 to one division and one mixed brigade -- roughly 30,000 men. The 1st Armored Division in the Bekaa, commanded by Rifaat Assad (the brother of Syrian President Hafez Asaad), was deployed in defensive positions in depth. Both Syrian formations and doctrine followed the Soviet model, and Click here to view image defensive doctrine called for combined-arms operations, combat teams whose structure was fixed in advance, and a defense based on massive firepower. To provide this firepower, the Syrians depended on air defense in depth by various SAM sites reinforced by anti-aircraft guns, and a ground defense characterized by a profusion of anti-tank weapons and units. The defense would depend on intensive fortifications and exploitation of natural obstacles to a depth of 20-30 kilometers.18 The 85th Brigade was deployed in the Beirut area in an armed presence role, with the additional of the security of the Beirut-Damascus highway. Cick here to view image In addition to the three main antagonists, Lebanese militias could possibly become involved in any fighting. The Israelis expected the Christian Lebanese Forces, some 10,000 strong,to fight as allies against the PLO. The leftist National Movement coalition counted some 10,000-11,000 fighters who were nominal allies of the PLO.19 As war neared, the opponents consisted of some seven divisions and two independent brigades of the IDF, 60,000-78,000 strong, arrayed against 15,000 PLO fighters, one Syrian armored division, and one Syrian brigade. CHAPTER III NOTES 1Gabriel, pp. 60-61. 2Ibid. 3Ibid. 4Schiff and Ya'ari, p. 45. 5Ibid., pp. 47-55. 6Ibid., p. 109. 7Gabriel, pp. 72-75. 8Ibid., pp. 75-80. See also Schiff, pp. 47-55. 9Personal interview with Major General Amos Yaron, 1 May 1987. 10Schiff and Ya'ari, p. 47. 11Ibid., p. 54. 12Facts on File (New York, 26 February 1982), p. 87. 13Current History (81:476, September 1982), pp. 282-285. 14Schiff and Ya'ari, p 84. 15Ibid., pp. 85-90. 16Mark Heller, ed., Thg Middle East Military Balance, 1983 (Tel Aviv: Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, 1983), p. 11. 17Gabriel, pp. 47-53. 18Heller, p. 233. 19Ibid, pp. 153-154. CHAPTER IV - INVASION The Israeli attack was preceded by two days of preparatory fires. All day Saturday IDF artillery had fired on targets within range, and on Sunday morning the IAF had attacked selected targets such as suspected bunkers, weapons storage areas, and known PLO positions. The storage areas were known to be well dug-in, so the IAF used ordnance to suit the occasion: delayed fuze bombs and cluster bombs around bunker entrances which effectively prevented Palestinians from gaining access to stored weapons and ammunition.1 As the Israeli Cabinet announced that an operation was under way which was designed to push the PLO beyond a forty-kilometer line and urged the Syrians to refrain from action, the tanks of Colonel Eli Geva's brigade attacked, supported by air strikes conducted along the coast and artillery fires which preceded the lead units.2 6 JUNE At 1100 on Sunday, 6 June, Colonel Eli Geva's 211th Brigade began moving north up the coastal highway through the UNIFIL zone. Already assembled in the Haddad Enclave north of the Israeli-Lebanese border, Geva's armored brigade formed the spearhead of the main attack as Operation Peace for Galilee began. Although Geva himself was a veteran of the desperate fighting on the Golan Heights during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, only two of his company commanders had seen combat.3 The 211th Brigade was followed by the remainder of Mordechai's Division 91. This division, like others in the Central and Western Sectors, was strung out along the narrow coast road. Its lead echelon consisted of Geva's tanks, M-113 armored personnel carriers (APC's), and jeeps with mounted machineguns. These were closely followed by combat engineer units with an array of bridges by which to pass over the river and wadi obstacles. Next came communications vans, supply trucks and ambulances, and bringing up the rear were self-propelled howitzers and 175mm guns, reserve infantry, and the remainder of the logistics vehicles.4 From the start, traffic jams plagued the column as Geva's brigade moved north. A half hour after starting, Geva's lead company ran into the first PLO ambush. Using RPG's (rocket propelled grenades), PLO fighters waited until Geva's column was extremely close before opening fire. IDF tanks destroyed the position, but the column lost time; ordered to push on by Geva, the tanks raced into a road junction just as IAF planes bombed it, resulting in some damage and further delay.5 Further ambushes from positions among the citrus orchards led Geva to order his leading elements to push on and leave the mopping up to follow-on units.6 This tactic increased the speed of advance, but PLO fighters were thus able to fire a second and third time from the same positions; RPG fires that left tanks unscathed had a greater effect on the following APC's, setting some on fire and causing the troops to ride on top or walk rather than risk burns. Acknowledging the risk, Geva ordered fuel and ammunition trucks to stay behind the mop-up forces, which prevented their destruction but also made rearming and refueling the tanks a slower process.7 Geva's mission was to bypass Tyre and push on toward Sidon. Tyre itself is located on a peninsula to the west of the main coast road, but six refugee camps spread roughly east from Tyre, across the Israeli axis of advance. Of the six, three were heavily populated and developed as PLO defensive strong points-- Rachidiyeh, east of the coast road and south of Tyre; al-Bas, alongside the road west of Tyre; and Burj al Shemali, west of al- Bas.8 Geva, with his lead battalion, decided not to drive through the crossroads next to al-Bas, but instead detoured inland off the road and bypassed the camps. Unfortunately , a following paratrooper battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Uri Geiger, missed the turn and stumbled into the al-Bas crossroads, where it was ambushed. Three tanks and two APC's were quickly lost, including Geiger's, and in the ensuing extrication Geiger was captured.9 The main force under Mordechai soon came up and established blocking positions along the coast road. By 1600, using an engineer bridge to replace the Qasmiye Bridge destroyed the day before by the IAF, Geva was across the Litani. At dusk, the 211th brigade halted and laagered in a soccer field at Sarafend, some 22 kilometers north of Tyre. The main force had halted about five kilometers north of the city, having left a brigade deployed around the camps at Rachidiyeh and al-Bas.10 Meanwhile, Yaron's amphibious force had finally received orders concerning its landing site, which was designated as a site near the estuary of the Awali River, five kilometers north of Sidon. These orders also informed Adam that the advance of Division 91 would continue past Sidon to the outskirts of Beirut. After dark, Navy teams conducted a beach reconnaissance area, and about 2300 Yaron's paratroopers began landing, unopposed but for some unaimed Katyushas. Initially, troops were brought in by helicopter, followed by tanks and other heavy equipment landed by LCU's. Their initial objectives were quickly taken as one platoon seized the bridges over the Awali and another the heights east of the highway. In only a couple of hours, tanks and other vehicles were brought ashore, the brigade landed, and the beachhead was secured. After disembarking their loads, landing craft headed south to Nahariya to embark more troops and equipment. By dawn, Yaron had cut the line of communication between units in the south and PLO headquarters in Beirut.11 In the Central Sector, Brigadier General Avigdor Kahalani's Division 36 also began its attack at 1100. From its assembly area around Metulla, the division launched a two-pronged attack toward Nabitiye through the Arnoun Heights. The left column, with the armored brigades, crossed the Litani via the Akiye Bridge, west of the PLO strongpoint at Beaufort Castle. The right column, with the Golani Infantry Brigade mounted on APC's, crossed at the Hardele Bridge to the east, under anti-tank and artillery fire from the heights. Both columns bypassed Nabitiye, and after seizing the road junction one kilometer north of the town, the Golani Brigade continued north toward Jbaa as most of the PLO withdrew in front of it; the tank brigades turned left along the road toward the Zaharani function.12 As the Division moved toward Nabitiye, it dropped off a reconnaissance unit from the Golani Brigade to seize Beaufort Castle. The castle, with its commanding view of the northern Galilee, had been a source of PLO propaganda and a sore spot for Israelis for years. Although defended by only a small PLO detachment and of little consequence to the invading forces, it was ordered taken despite reservations by a number of Golani officers, and it was seized in a desperate night attack in which several Israelis and all the PLO defenders were killed.13 Division 162, under Menachem Einan, was to follow in trace of Kahalani's force, then push north along the western slopes of the Jbaal Barouk. Einan's division had been sent south for exercises in late May; having returned to the northern border only the week before, it had not received either orders or an alert until late on Friday the 4th -- when many men had been sent home on weekend leave. With most of his force reassembled on the 6th, Einan did not receive permission to begin movement until 1530. One half hour later, his orders were changed instead of crossing the Litani at the Hardele Bridge he would cross via the Akiye to the west. After redirecting his force with some loss of time, Einan found himself bunched up behind a traffic jam of Kahalani's logistics vehicles, where he remained throughout the night.14 Aside from the Beaufort action and isolated PLO resistance, little fighting occurred in the Central Sector on the first day. Activities were limited in the east. Ben-Gal's force advanced from northern Galilee and the Golan Heights along a broad front. On the eastern flank, Immanuel Sakel's Division 252 advanced from the Golan Heights on two axes: the first through Wadi Cheba on the slopes of Mount Hermon, via a 12-mile engineer road constructed ahead of the column by IDF engineers; the second overland toward Hasbaiya. Division 90, commanded by Giora Lev, moved through Marjayoun toward Lake Qaraoun, with a brigade advancing on its right flank along the main highway leading into the Bekaa Valley. Moving through the night, Lev reached the vicinity of Koukouba in the early morning and halted. Vardi Force, with its three mixed brigades, followed in trace of Division 90, then continued northwest toward Masgharah; one armored brigade under Colonel Hagai Cohen, followed in trace of Einan's division, as did Peled's Special Maneuver Force. With the Syrians remaining north of the "Red Line," no fighting occurred in the Eastern Sector. Click here to view image 7 JUNE The next dawn found the IAF continuing to attack PLO strongpoints along the coastal route of advance and in Beirut. During the day, a few Syrian MiG's challenged IAF planes over Beirut, with the Syrians losing one MiG in the process.15 Geva got his brigade on the move early, pushing toward Sidon after overcoming an ambush in Sarafend which cost the lives of his lead tank and lead company commanders, along with the loss of two APC's.16 As Geva moved north, crossing the Zaharani River after finding the bridge intact, the main force under Mordechai began a series of link-ups and mopping-up operations. Leaving one armored and one infantry brigade to secure the refugee camps around Tyre, Division 91 pressed north af ter Geva to link up with Kahalani's division moving west from around Nabitiye. The road junction at the mouth of the Zaharani was chosen as the link-up point: it was open enough to assemble a division-sized force; a petroleum refining area offered a refueling capability, if needed; and the area contained a small but excellent port facility. Around noon, Kahalani's two armored brigades linked up with Mordechai's remaining units, and both divisions artillery began to engage targets around Sidon.17 Near Sidon, Kahalani's remaining brigade -- the Golani -- reached the coast just south of the city. The Golani were to open the road, which passed through the Ein Hilwe camp (the largest in Lebanon), so that Geva's brigade could continue north and link up with Yaron's amphibious force. The infantrymen from the Golani Brigade attacked into Ein Hilwe in the early afternoon, but became pinned down and were forced to fight their way out again at dusk.18 Kahalani was in command. Short one brigade at the start of the operation (loaned to Sakel in the east), he lost two more to Mordechai at the Zaharani; Mordechai therefore sent his own lead brigade forward to assist Kahalani in opening the road through Sidon. This brigade did not arrive until after dark, however, and at the end of the day, the attack in the west was stalled in front of Sidon.19 A few kilometers to the north, Yaron's force waited for Geva's column to link up and to bring the empty APC's for Yaron's paratroopers. Meanwhile, though, the beachhead was strengthened as CH-53's ferried troops and equipment from Israel and a second landing was made at 1430. This landing, made in broad daylight less than three kilometers from the port of Sidon, was covered by continuous smoke missions requested by Yaron; Israeli F-4's managed to keep a layer of smoke between Sidon and the landing for nearly two hours, until the landing was completed. Pressure eased on Yaron's force as PLO attention turned to Geva and Kahalani, coming up from the south and east. By nightfall, Yaron's Division 96 was ashore, with one brigade of paratroopers having moved on foot from hill to hill to a position on the ridge overlooking the town of Damour.20 The amphibious operation had gone smoothly, but without the armored strength and additional APC's of Geva's column, Division 96 could make only limited progress. Behind the lead elements, other units began the task of mopping up bypassed Palestinian resistance.21 In the morning, one Click here to view image brigade attached to Mordechai had attacked from the Israeli border to the northwest, through Bint Jbail, and linked up at Jouiya with another brigade attacking east from Tyre. With this movement, the entire area south of the Litani was cut off from the north, and IDF units began the task of reducing pockets of resistance and rounding up suspected PLO members from the villages within the "Iron Triangle."22 Meanwhile, the brigades left by Mordechai around Tyre began the task of clearing the refugee camps. Palestinian resistance up to this point had been fitful and uncoordinated, largely through the fault of its leaders. The commander of the Kastel Brigade and overall commander in the south, Haj Ismail, fled after hearing of Yaron's landing, turning up the next day in the Bekaa with a report that he had led a tactical retreat when attacked by the U.S. Sixth Fleet.23 Other PLO commanders likewise ran out on their men, who then either resisted, fled north, or melted into the civilian population. Serious resistance, then, was not offered by the PLO regulars but by the militia forces in the refugee camps, whose built up areas and narrow alleyways afforded excellent defensive opportunities.24 The reduction of the Tyre camps -- particularly Rachidiyeh, Burj al Shemali, and al-Bas -- began the afternoon of 6 June, would take four days to accomplish, and would cost the Israelis 21 dead and 95 wounded. There was little urgency in subduing the Tyre camps, since the northbound column had already moved on, so Israeli soldiers were urged caution in order to hold down casualties. The IDF advanced by steadily securing chunks of the camps and forcing the defenders into an ever-smaller, area. Each camp was ideal for small-unit defense, however, and the PLO fighters were able to block the narrow roads and alleys, use RPG's at short range, drop hand grenades into Israeli APC's, then flee to other positions. IDF troops were fired on from the ground, windows, and rooftops -- from the front and from behind. All this occurred in an area thick with civilians. When the camps were finally taken, IDF soldiers uncovered some 74 bunkers in Rachidiyeh, 80 in Burj al Shemali, and some 213 underground shelters and arms stores in al-Bas.25 The fighting was made particularly difficult because of the IDF's rules of engagement, which dictated that soldiers in heavily populated areas would take risks to preserve the safety of civilians, that no grenades or satchel charges would be used prior to assaulting buildings, and that damage to mosques and churches would be avoided.26 Yet, mounting Israeli casualties led to heavy IDF use of air and artillery support with attendant civilian casualties.27 In the end, the camps at Tyre were subdued on 9 June, after four days of heavy fighting. In the Central zone, Einan's lead brigade finally broke free of Kahalani's supply train before dawn, but then had to stop to refuel. Not until after daylight did the brigade reach Nabitiye. Still behind Kahalani's forces, this time the Golani Brigade, Einan did not receive permission to cross the Zaharani until 1400. As the Golani moved west toward Sidon, Einan finally broke free; securing the key crossroads south of Jezzine -- the only east-west road south of the Beirut-Damascus highway between the Bekaa and the coast -- he bypassed Jezzine and pushed north into the Shouf, halting near the Basin River about 0100. During the night, with Cohen's brigade in a blocking position at the Jezzine crossroads, Syrian and PLA units in battalion strength occupied the town of Jezzine itself.28 The Eastern Sector remained quiet, with Lev's division halted around Koukouba and Hasbaiya, Sakel continuing northward along the slopes of Mount Hermon, and Vardi Force moving along secondary roads toward Masgharah--at the foot of Jbaal Barouk between Jezzine and the Bekaa. During the day, Ben-Gal began to mass his artillery in the vicinity of Hasbaiya, from where it could range from Masgharah in the northwest to Kafr Quq in the northeast.29 8 JUNE As in previous days, the IAF began launching strikes in the early morning of 8 June. Strikes against Beirut again brought Syrian reaction, this time resulting in the loss of six Syrian MiG's -- to none for the IAF. As the day progressed, the IAF flew dozens of Close Air Support strikes in the Central Sector and particularly in the west, against resistance at Tyre and Sidon.30 Syrian SAM radars locked on to IAF planes, but the batteries withheld fire. As battles continued at Rachidiyeh and Burj al Shemani, the Golani brigade made another attempt to create a corridor through the Ein Hilwe camp at Sidon. Attacking at 0700, the infantrymen again penetrated the camp only to become pinned down in the narrow streets. A second assault was mounted by paratroopers toward the city of Sidon itself, but it too bogged down. The IAF dropped leaf lets and on loud speakers urged civilians to flee, but dozens of airstrikes and considerable artillery support were needed in order to extricate the attacking forces at dusk. Geva, impatient at the delay, requested to be allowed to skirt the bottleneck to the east along secondary roads and tracks in the steep hills inland of the city. Moving out in the evening, Geva's force slowly worked its way through the hills, without headlights along the tracks and paths which were characterized by steep cliffs on the right and a sheer drop on the left. Although losing two tanks, Geva broke out of the hills north of Sidon and linked up with Yaron's force at dawn on 9 June. Yaron, not content merely to wait, had started his main force toward Damour on foot, supported by naval gunfire from Israeli boats moving up the coast.31 In the Central Sector, IDF ground units met Syria resistance for the first time. Einan's tired division moved out at 0700, reaching the road junction leading to Damour before halting for some four hours. Urged forward by Drori, the lead units advanced only to be attacked around 1530 by French-made Gazelle helicopterss the Gazelles popped up above a ridgeline and fired HOT missiles, hitting one Israeli tank; as the tank was being evacuated, the Gazelles fired again from another position. As the helicopters turned toward their base, a tank platoon and infantry Click here to view image battalion in APC's managed to find a way around the blocked road and continued toward Ein Zhalta. Around 2300, this force approached Ein Zhalta, some eight kilometers from the Beirut- Damascus highway but more than 20 by road. Unknown to the Israelis, the area around Ein Zhalta was defended by a brigade- strength Syrian force consisting of a few dozen tanks and commando units. After passing through the villages, the Israelis started descending a steep slope with tanks in the lead when the Syrians opened tire with tanks from the opposite ridge and RPG's and Saggers from the surrounding wadis. After two hours of fighting, during which the IDF infantry attempted to clear the wadis and reach the opposite ridge, the Israelis backed their vehicles out of range. Meanwhile, Einan's main force advanced through Beit ed Dein and joined the lead battalion at Ein Zhalta.32 To the south, Cohen's 460th Brigade was to advance from its blocking positions near jezzine to support an attack by Vardi on Masgharah, but Israeli RPV's (remotely piloted vehicles) discovered a Syrian force moving south through the Shouf toward the town. Israeli planes attacked the Syrian force, inflicting some losses, and at 1330 Cohen's attack commenced without artillery support. As IDF tanks reached the center of town they were ambushed by the Syrian and PLA force which had occupied defensive positions during the night. The first Israeli company managed to reach the tar side of town, but the following company was attacked by Syrian commandos with Saggers and forced to fall back after losing three tanks. A second battalion was sent into the town, but one company took a wrong turn and found itself on a ridge to the west; it was engaged by Syrian tanks from a nearby ridge and lost five tanks before retreating back into the town. The battle continued throughout the afternoon until the Syrian forces withdrew around nightfall.33 Leaving one battalion in Jezzine, Cohen sent two battalions eastward toward Masgharah -- one along the main road and the other on a narrow secondary road. The two battalions simultaneously approached a crossroad at Ein Katrina, mistook each other for Syrians, and engaged in a two-hour firefight resulting in a number of dead and wounded before the mistake became known.34 The day ended with significant casualties among IDF forces in the Central Sector, but with the area west of the Bekaa firmly in Israeli hands to within several kilometers of the Beirut-Damascus highway. On the other hand, Syrian forces had engaged IDF units, inflicted losses, and still held the strategic highway. In the East, Lev remained halted and Sakel continued toward Rachaiya in the eastern Bekaa Vardi occupied Masgharah during the night and Peled's Special Maneuver Force began moving northward along the eastern slopes of Jbaal Barouk, to the west of Lake Qaraoun. The Israelis had positioned their forces right up against Syrian positions in the Bekaa, but without attacking.35 However, the Syrian force was being slowly flanked to both sides: with the Israelis controlling the high ground to either side of the valley, the Syrian position in the southern Bekaa was becoming an indefensible salient. Recognizing the threat from both ground and air, the Syrians reinforced on the ground and moved five additional SAM-6 batteries into the Bekaa, bringing the total SAM batteries in Lebanon to 19.36 9 JUNE The ninth of June was a day when the war dramatically and substantially outgrew the objectives originally approved by the Israeli Cabinets the advance along the coast passed Damour and began to close in on Beirut; in the center, IDF forces immediately threatened the Beirut-Damascus highway; and in the west, the Israelis attacked the Syrians head-on both on the ground and in the air. The Eastern Sector battles raged from Tyre to north of Damour. In Damour, the PFLP had created well fortified positions in the ruins of the town, used as a training base for the PLO. After heavy air and artillery preparation (during which the sector commander, Major General Adam was killed by PLO artillery), Yaron's division, reinforced by units from Kahalani and Geva, attacked and seized the town. Faced with the continued prospect of heavy fighting along the coast road, Yaron tasked the commander of the 35th Paratrooper Brigade to take his brigade through the Shouf and approach Beirut from the hills rather than along the coast. Drori approved the maneuver and Yair led his paratroopers, reinforced by tanks, into the Shouf. As the tanks slowly advanced along the winding roads, the paratroopers proceeded on foot along the hills and ridges. In this way, the paratroopers surprised at least two PLO ambushes which were lying in wait for the tanks, routing both. In this maneuver, Yair advanced along the road toward Souk al Gharb, halting around midnight short of Kafr Mata. Meanwhile, as Yair had feared, Yaron's other two brigades were blocked south of Khalde.37 To the south, the camps at Rachidiyeh and Burj al Shemali were finally taken in the afternoon. But the real fight was at Ein Hilwe, where the main force was still stopped. At dawn, the paratroopers and infantry renewed their attack, concentrating on a route along the edge of Ein Hilwe, a few blocks from downtown Sidon. Preceded by artillery and air bombardment, the Israeli attack slowly advanced along two parallel streets and in the afternoon the way was finally opened through Sidon. Kahalani immediately sped north toward Damour, leaving the unenviable task of reducing Ein Hilwe and the Sidon casbah to Mordechai's men, moving up from their recent battles around Tyre. During the afternoon, Mordechai personally took command and began his systematic campaign by capturing the hills and villages around Sidon. As events unfolded elsewhere in Lebanon, Mordechai began the section-by-section assault on Ein Hilwe that was to take until 14 June to accomplish.38 At Ein Zhalta, Einan's force had closed up during the night and was strung out along the narrow road. At dawn, Syria commandos attacked. APC's and tanks were hit and caught fire. Men were killed trying to rescue the wounded from burning vehicles. Finally, Einan ordered a cessation of rescue attempts and the column retreated in reverse gear, with a loss of 11 killed and 17 Click here to view image wounded.39 Meanwhile, an infantry battalion was helilifted behind the Syrians and promptly attacked the defenses from the rear as Einan brought fire from the front. After a battle of several hours, the Syrian force withdrew, and Einan reorganized his force and continued north, halting for the night still some 12 kilometers short of the Beirut-Damascus highway.40 Lev's division in the Eastern Sector could advance no farther without meeting the Syrians, but Sakel and Peled could and did continue moving north along the flanks of the Bekaa. On this day, however, the Israeli Cabinet gave approval for offensive air operations against the Syrians in Lebanon.41 The resulting overwhelming IAF victory over Syrian SAM's and interceptors has been described in detail in a number of publications. 42 Briefly, the IAF had possessed a plan for attacking the SAM sites in the Bekaa at least since the summer of 1981. By midday on 9 June, RPV's had located most of the SAM sites and had relayed pictures back to Northern Command and the IAF's Northern Regional Control Unit. At 1400, the attack began. RPV's simulated attacking aircraft, forcing the Syrians to switch on their acquisition and fire control radars, and in some cases actually to engage the RPV's. The drones pinpointed the locations of radars and missile sites and relayed the information to Israeli E-2C Hawkeye and the RC-707 control aircraft. As the Hawkeyes and specially equipped tactical aircraft and RPV's conducted electronic jamming and deception, a flight of 96 IAF planes attacked the missile sites. Led by a flight of F-4's armed with Maverick and Shrike anti- radiation missiles which destroyed most of the radar systems, IAF F-4, F-15, F-16, and Kfir C-2 aircraft destroyed the batteries one-by-one using a variety of ordnance -- laser-guided and tv- guided bombs; television, infra-red, and anti-radiation missiles; and even iron bombs. At the same time, the IDF artillery provided suppression on all batteries and anti-aircraft gun locations within range. A second wave of 92 IAF planes struck at 1550. As this wave attacked, Syrian interceptors joined the fray, and in the ensuing air battle 29 Syrian MiG-21, -23, -25, and SU-7 aircraft were shot down. By the end of the day, 41 Syrian planes had been destroyed in air-to-air combat, mainly by F-15's but also by other IAF planes using AIM-9L Sidewinder missiles and Israeli-modified versions of the AIM-7 -- Shafir 2 and Python 3. By day's end, 17 of the 19 SAM batteries had been destroyed.43 As the air battle was unfolding, Ben-Gal was ordered to attack, and in mid-afternoon Lev attacked in the center and Vardi on the left, to the west of Lake Qaraoun. Both attacks aimed at the Syrian headquarters at Joub Jannine, some 25 kilometers from thu Koukouba-Hasbaiya line.44 10 JUNE The Israeli attacks on Syrian positions in the Bekaa brought Syrian reaction in the west. There, Syrian forces had remained in Beirut and out of the fighting, but now the 85th Brigade began to deploy tank and commando teams south and east of Beirut -- around Khalde and the hills south of Beirut and along the Shemlan ridge area. As Yair continued his advance through the Shouf villages toward Souk al Gharb, Yaron remained stalled before Kafr Sil, south of the airport. The Syrians had taken up fortified positions in the village, located on a ridge running almost to the sea across the coast road, with clear fields of fire and no room for Yaron to maneuver. Yaron sent the Golani Brigade, reinforced by a tank battalion and eight bulldozers, into the hills east of Kafr Sil in an attempt to flank the PLO-Syrian defense.45 In the Center, Einan pushed past Ein Zhalta and advanced to the outskirts of Ein Dara. During his advance, RPV's had spotted a Syrian ambush, and TOW Cobras were sent into action. Approaching from the rear, the Cobras destroyed several Syrian tanks and effectively broke up the ambush. By nightfall, Einan had deployed his force on the hills around Ein Dara, from where he could observe the Beirut-Damascus highway.46 Here he would remain for nearly two weeks. The main battles of 10 June were fought in the Eastern Sector, between the IDF and the Syrian 1st Armored Division. The Syrian air force again sent up interceptors as the IAF destroyed the remaining two SAM batteries, resulting in 25 more Syrian MiG's being shot down. Meanwhile, Ben-Gal continued to attack along a fairly wide front. On the right, Sakel broke out of the wadis and seized Rachaiya. In the center, Lev attacked along the winding roads, pushing through Syrian resistance. After seizing a key crossroads near Lake Qaraoun, Lev continued on to seize Joub Click here to view image Jannine around dusk. Peled had advanced through the foothills of the Jbaal Barouk to within five kilometers of the Beirut-Damascus highway before being ordered to pull back to more defensible positions by Drori.47 Although the advance in the east had covered a good deal of ground, Syrian resistance had been stiff. The Syrians defended a series of strongpoints along the winding roads. Each strongpoint conducted a separate, integrated defense with obstacles, mines, tanks, and commandos using Saggers and RPG's; at times, such as in the defense of the crossroads near Lake Qaraoun, the defense was supported by artillery and by Gazelle helicopters using HOT missiles. The Israelis used counterbattery fire, Cobra helicopters in both the anti-tank and anti-air mode, and infantry assaults to overcome Syrian defenses.48 Having breached the Syrian 1st Armored Division's front line and seized Joub Jannine, and with a ceasefire scheduled to take place the following day, Ben-Gal urged his units forward in the night. On the right flank, Sakel's lead unit began advancing from Rachaiya toward Kafr Quq, but was stopped by a destroyed bridge across a wadi; while it waited for engineer support to arrive, Syrian commandos attacked in the darkness, destroying several vehicles before withdrawing. Ordered to resume the advance, Sakel's units were unable to do so due to lack of fuel. The one narrow road which formed Sakel's main supply route was so clogged with traffic that neither the refuelers nor the engineer bridging unit could reach the lead elements until after 0300. A more severe problem occurred in Lev's advance, where a brigade moved up toward Sultan Yakoub, situated in a narrow valley some eight kilometers northeast of Joub Janine. Lacking intelligence concerning Syrian deployment in the area, the brigade was actually moving into the forward positions of a relatively fresh Syrian mechanized brigade. As the lead battalion, a reserve unit, approached the village, it was attacked by Saggers from both sides of the road. Most of the Saggers having been fired from too close, the damage was negligible and the battalion sped through the village. On the other side, now inside the narrow valley, the battalion commander discovered that only three of his companies had made it through the village and decided to wait until light. Unknown to him, he had halted in the middle of the Syrian positions, and during the night the Syrians realigned themselves and closed in toward the force without opening fire. Aware of Syrian presence but unable to pinpoint its location, the IDF tanks and APC's kept up a reconnaissance by fire throughout the night. At dawn, the force began to draw Sagger and armor-piercing fires from the hills, as Syrian commandos approached closer with RPG's and Saggers. An IDF attempt to relieve the force was halted to the east, and the situation began to grow desperate as a result of dwindling ammunition and increasing losses. After seeking help from higher headquarters, the commander coordinated artillery support for a breakout. Supported by some 11 battalions of artillery firing both on Syrian positions and in a box around the withdrawing companies, the Israelis buttoned up and raced the five kilometers back to safety, losing a tank and four men killed in the escape. The engagement had cost the Israelis some eight tanks and 35 men killed or seriously wounded. The tanks, containing equipment innovations and classified materials, were neither recovered nor destroyed, and the next day the Syrians towed them away.49 11 JUNE With a ceasefire scheduled to take effect at noon, both the Israelis and the Syrians spent the morning of 11 June maneuvering to gain the most advantageous positions. Sakel resumed his advance on the right flank of the Bekaa, but was immediately attacked by Syrian Gazelles, which slowed his progress and inflicted some losses. By noon, Sakel had pushed through Kafr Quq and had reached the village of Yanta, only 25 kilometers from Damascus, where it met the advance units of the deploying Syrian Third Division. At around 1100, elements of the division's 82nd Armored Brigade stumbled into Peled's position to the west and lost nine T-72 tanks. At 1200 the ceasefire took effect and fighting in the Eastern and Central Sectors halted.50 Such was not the case in the Western Sector, however. Along the coast, Yaron seized Khalde and attempted to advance toward the airport, only to be halted by stiff resistance from a joint force of PLO and Syrian 85th Brigade, dug in and equipped with Sagger and Milan anti-tank missiles. The Golani attempt to envelop to the east ran up against a Syrian ambush in the wealthy suburb of Dokha; the fight continued throughout the day until the Syrian positions were broken by artillery and air strikes. At 1115, Yair attacked Syrian defenses around Kafr Shem Shamoun and by noon had seized the vital crossroads leading to Aley on the Click here to view image one hand and to Souk al Gharb and Baabda on the other. At noon, the Israelis called for the Syrians to observe the ceasefire by standing aside -- an offer that was declined. At nightfall, Yair had seized the hills overlooking the road junction but failed to advance farther. At this point, Yair proposed that he change the direction of his attack from Aley, where a strong Syrian force was located, to Baabda, which would bring him to the Beirut- Damascus highway closer to Beirut but without engaging Syrian units. Drori agreed to the change.51 12 JUNE On 12 June, Yair cautiously continued his attack, opposed by a mixed battalion of Syrian commandos, PLO fighters, and tanks concealed in draws and among the houses. By 1600, he had advanced only some 500 meters toward the Shemlan ridge, but by nightfall his force had seized the ridge and halted a few kilometers short of Ein Anub, the last position before reaching the suburbs controlled by the Phalange. Meanwhile, the Golani enveloping force was in a serious fight around Kafr Sil. Opposed by a Syrian-PLO force consisting of some 28 T-54 tanks and commando units, the Golanis resumed the attack in the afternoon. As a paratroop battalion (detached from Yair at Damour) assaulted Syrian positions on Radar Hill overlooking the town, the Golani infantry fought their way into the center of town and Yaron's tanks came up from the south, supported by Cobra helicopters making runs from seaward. The battle raged all afternoon and into the night, with Israeli infantry taking on Syrian tanks with RPG's and even climbing tanks to drop grenades down the hatches. The fight continued for 19 hours, centered on two main streets only a kilometer long, and finally ended the next morning with the Israelis controlling the village, from where they could see the runways of Beirut Airport below.52 It was on 12 June that the main bunker in the Ein Hilwe refugee camp near Sidon was finally captured. On 7 June, a battalion from the Golani Brigade had tried and failed to penetrate the camp; a larger attack the following day yielded the same results. On the 9th, after a route had been opened through Sidon, Mordechai began a systematic attack to seize the Ein Hilwe camp section by section. The defenders, under a Muslim zealot called Haj Ibrahim, were mostly PLO militia fighting on home ground. Mordechai's attacks were made by infantry on foot, with tanks and self-propelled artillery close behind and able to be brought up against enemy positions. On 10 June, the Israelis seized two mosques used as strongpoints by the defenders, but came up against heavy fire from the camp hospital. Rather than attack the hospital and inflict heavy casualties among the civilians sheltered there, Mordechai chose to arrange for its evacuation. By Friday morning, 11 June, the hospital was deserted -- the PLO defenders having chosen to depart along with the civilians. In order to reduce casualties among the numerous civilians and his own force, Mordechai tried a number of means to encourage the civilians to flee and the defenders to surrenders leaflets, loudspeaker broadcasts, local delegations, Israeli psychologists, and demonstrations of fire power against selected targets. However, the defenders rejected all appeals and encouraged (in some cases by execution) the civilian population to remain in the camp. The Israelis resumed the attack, heavily supported by air and artillery; by Friday evening the school was taken, and at 1900 on Saturday, the main bunker was destroyed by Israeli engineers. The fighting would continue for two more days, when the PLO defenders of last position fought to the last man. The defense was zealous, cruel, and effective.53 13-25 JUNE At 0130 on 13 June, Yair continued his attack toward Ein Anub. At dawn, the PLO-Syrian force withdrew. By 1300, Yair had linked up with Phalange forces at Basaba and sent his force speeding toward Baabda, the Christian suburb overlooking the city and site of the Presidential Palace. Resistance had ceased outside the city itself, and by nightfall the Golani had reached Baabda from Ash Shuweifat, and Yaron had positions in the hills south of the airport, in Baabda, in blocking positions facing east along the Beirut-Damascus highway, and across the highway in the Monte Verde area. Consolidation continued on the 14th, and by the end of the day, the Israelis were firmly linked up with the Phalange in East Beirut and deployed across the highway, but with a substantial Syrian force along the Aley ridge and around Bhamdoun. For the next several days, except for artillery duels and occasional firefights in the Beirut area, both sides spent the time consolidating their forces. While the IDF built up its strength around Baabda and waited for the Phalange to act, the PLO began fortifying its strongholds in West Beirut. On 19 June, IDF paratroopers began to creep forward in the hills south of Bhamdoun in order to gain a more secure hold on the Beirut-Damascus highway. Drori asked permission to mount an orderly attack but, no such attack having been authorized by the Israeli Cabinet, his request was refused. The paratroopers continued their small-unit actions, losing several men. On 22 June, an IDF armored force was ambushed and trapped near the highway, and that night a Golani battalion was shifted from around Beirut to extricate the trapped tanks. At the same time, the IAF struck Syrian reinforcements moving west, destroying some 130 tanks and transporters. On 24 June, a coordinated attack was launched all along the highway. As paratroopers attacked from Baabda eastward toward Jamhur and the Golani attacked westward through Bhamdoun, other forces under Einan advanced on Sofar from the south. Syrian resistance was weak and units withdrew eastward along the highway, allowed to pass without harm by the Israelis. The Syrians consolidated their defense along the pass at Dar al Beidar, the last pass in the Jbaal Barouk and last strongpoint before the Syrian border. However, with the highway firmly in control from Beirut to Sofar, the Israelis were content to stop the attack except for some occasional shelling.54 Another ceasefire was declared on 25 June. The Israelis now found that they had outrun their own goals and plans. Somewhere along the line the announced war aims had grown from the original one of pushing the PLO beyond a forty- Click here to view image kilometer zone to goals which were much more, ambitious: establishment of a stable government in Lebanon, one which would be sensitive to Israeli interests; removal of all Syrian military forces in Lebanon; and extermination or expulsion of the PLO. Now, having defeated the PLO in the south, surrounded its forces and headquarters in Beirut, linked up with the Phalange, and pushed the Syrians back nearly to their border, the IDF had no plans for a next step. As it became apparent that the Phalange would not take on the PLO in West Beirut, the Israelis were being forced to decide among the following options: attacking into the city to destroy the PLO; laying seige to a city of half a million people; or attempting to reach a political settlement. CHAPTER VI--NOTES 1Schiff and Ya'ari, p. 118. 2Gabriel, p. 82. 3Schiff and Ya'ari, p. 118. 4John Leffin, The War of Desperation: Lebanon 1982-85 (London: Osprey Publishing, LTD., 1985), p. 47. 5Schiff and Ya'ari, p. 120. 6Ibid. 7Gabriel, p. 82. 8Cooley, p. 28. 9Schiff and Ya'
