Afganistan: Eight Years After CSC 1987 SUBJECT AREA History WAR IN THR MODERN ERA SEMINAR AFGHANISTAN: EIGHT YEARS AFTER Major Richard J.Dick The Royal Canadian Regiment 4 May 1987 Marine Corps Command and Staff College Marine Corps Development and Education Command Qantico, Virginia 22134 ABSTRACT Author: DICK, Richard J., The Royal Canadian Regiment, Canadian Army Title: Afghanistan: Eight Years After Publisher: Marine Corps Command and Staff College Date: 4 May 1987 The intent of this paper is to provide a survey examination of events in Afghanistan precipitating the Soviet invasion up to the present day. While some brief, modern, historical back- ground information is provided to add perspective to the current situation, the emphasis is on more recent developments, speci- fically those of 1986 and 1987. This will provide a basic appre- ciation for what is happening in Afghanistan today and will enable one to understand better what these events may mean for tomorrow. This paper will also highlight the military characteristics of the struggle beginning with a description of the invasion by Soviet forces in 1979 through to the current military quagmire. Opposing orders of battle, equipments, weapons and changing tactics and operational concepts and their effects and implications will be discusssed. But if the military clashes between the opposing sides are the most obvious and, certainly, the most dramatic aspect of the Afghan conflict, they may not necessarily be the most important. In any event, to view Afghanistan within a purely military context would be to miss the point entirely; it would fail to account for the many other powerful influences shaping the current situation. Therefore, this paper will also examine briefly other important considerations such as regional pressures, the Islamic faith, the refugee problem, the Kabul Regime, the "Sovietization" of Afghanistan, problems within the Resistance itself and the search for diplomatic settlement. A familiarity with these additional factors is necessary for a broader and more balanced perspective. Afghanistan is, prehaps, most important today as a symbol of an impoverished nation and its peoples struggling for release from Soviet occupation and brutal repression. It is hoped that a review of this paper will answer some question, possibly give rise to others but, at the very least, give pause for reflection over what is clearly an unfolding human tragedy and its attendant implications. TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Contents i List of Figures iv CHAPTER PAGE 1. INTRODUCTION 1 2. SETTING THE STAGE 4 The Land and the People 4 Earlier Soviet Invasions 6 The Intervening Years 9 Daoud Seizes Power 12 The Saur Revolution 14 The Saur Revolution Fails 15 3. INVASION 19 Planning 19 Execution 21 Motives and Calculations 25 4. JIHAD 29 Order of Battle 30 Strategies and Factors 36 War from the Air 41 Other Weapons 42 Chemical Warfare 44 Spetsnaz 44 Air Assault Forces 45 Paramilitary Forces 46 Summary 47 5. BEYOND THE FIGHTING 49 Sovietization 49 KHAD 53 Religion 55 Refugees 56 Factionalism 57 6. TODAY 60 Political Situation 60 The Economy 63 The Social Sector 64 Military Operations 67 7. TOMORROW 71 The International Forum 72 Concluding Thoughts 79 8. EPILOGUE 82 Appendix A. Chronology of Significant Events 88 Notes 91 Bibliography 98 FIGURES Figure Page 1. Invasion Routes and Units 24 2. Afghanistan 83 3. Afghanistan 84 4. Main Ethnic Groups of Afghanistan 85 5. Dispostion - Soviet/Afghan Forces - Fall 1986 86 6. Mujahidin with Soviet Weapons 87 CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION A nation is dying. People should know. Mohammed Es-Haq, Panjshir resistance.1 Anywhere you go in Afghanistan you will face thousands of destroyed villages. Every day you can see in Afghan- istan that our villages are bombed by Russian fighter aircraft and shelled by Russian heavy and long range artillery. Every day you can see that crops are burned, animals killed and the people themselves massacred. Commander Ahmed Shah Massoud, Panjshir resistance.2 A nation is dying. These are dramatic words but, in the case of Afghanistan they are not overstated. The war of resistance against Soviet occupation, the war of national liberation, is now into its eighth year and despite some general indications that the Soviet Union may be growing weary of this conflict and seeking a way to disengage itself, the violence, the terror, and the destruction continue, if anything, at increased intensity. And with these unfolds a human and political tragedy. A nation is being destroyed physically, politically and morally and those of her population who are not dead, maimed or imprisoned are either fighting a harsh, brutal war or have been driven into exile to constitute what is the largest refugee population in the world today. Set against a background or austere beauty with vague exotic remembrances such as Hindu Kush and Khyber Pass, set against a background of international intrigue, cross and double-cross, foreign invasion, rebel resistance, religious fervour and untold stories of human suffering and courage, why has there not been a "Great Movie", television mini-series or "Great Novel" (although Ken Follett's Lie Down With Lions may come close) to portray the Afghan struggle? Perhaps it is because this drama has no romance. But this lack of widespread media coverage, particularly in North America,is also part of the tragedy. Without the continuing support of the media the realities of the Afghan conflict remain a mystery to many in the West and support is slow to come, if at all. What were the events and motives that lead to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan? What form did the invasion take, what were the tactics involved and how successful were they initially? What have been the military characteristics of the conflict over the past eight years and what are some of the other powerful influences at work which, in the long run, may be more important than the military factor? Finally, what is the situation that has developed in Afghanistan in the past year and a half and what possibly lies ahead for the foreseeable future? Is it possible that, this time, under new initiatives by Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviets are sincere about withdrawal from Afghanistan and that the current round of U.N. negotiations in Geneva may yet bear fruit? It is these questions that this paper will attempt to answer, not so much in the expectation of providing definitive answers but more in the hope of providing useful, current information to stimulate further reflection about the events in Afghanistan, which in the final analysis should be measured not with cool academic pronouncements but rather should be remembered as a story of human struggle and survival and all that that entails. A note on sources and references is appropriate at this point. All the reterences used for this paper are unclassified although information used in some of the references may have been previously classified but has since been declassified. Furthermore, given the increasing abundance of wide-ranging material (although it must be sought out) and particularly some of the primary sources, it is considered that the existence of classified material, if made known, would not substantively alter the content of this paper. Some excellent books on Afghanistan have just come into circulation within the past six months or so and have proved valuable sources of information. Most useful, of course, have been the primary sources and newspaper articles. In a similar light, a comment must also be made on the accuracy of facts and figures and on spelling. Not all the facts and figures of this war are clear for obvious reasons. Data presented, unless otherwise specified, are those considered most accurate upon review of the various sources. Similarily, spellings presented are those considered most common in North America although it is not uncommon to see three different spellings for the same word depending on the source. CHAPTER TWO SETTING THE STAGE The position of Russia in Central Asia is that of all civilized states which are brought into contact with half savage, nomad populations possessing no fixed social organization. In such cases it always happens that the more civilized state is forced, in the interests of security of its frontiers and its commercial relations, to exercise a certain ascendency over those whom their turbulant and unsettled character makes undesirable neighbors...The greatest difficulty is knowing where to stop. Prince Alexander M. Gorchakov Russian Foreign Minister, 1864 1 The Land and the People To understand the events in Afghanistan today it is necessary to have some understanding of the country, its people and its history. Afghanistan is a country about the size of Texas. It is generally arid with four-fifths of the area classified as desert or semi-tropical steppe; the country is broken by the high mount- ains of the Hindu Kush and the Pamir which rise out of the centre of Afghanistan and slice the breadth of the country in a southwest to northeast direction. Her boundaries have never been determined by her people, but rather by her neighbors or conquerors. Over time Afghanistan has been a "highway of conquest" for the Persians, Greeks, Huns, Mongols, Arabs, Turks, English, and Russians; thus, the borders have fluctuated with the rise and fall of the invading empires.2 This aspect is compounded by a population which is mixed both culturally and ethnically. There are ten distinct ethnic groups which account for differing languages, differing cultural heritages, and different customs. The pre-invasion population was approximately fifteen and one half million and within this population the largest and politically most dominant group are the Pushtuns who number just over six million, still less than half the population.3 In addition to being ethnically mixed, the peoples of Afghanistan have been traditionally nomadic, historically crossing back and forth over the borders of what are now the Soviet Union, Pakistan and Iran. One can , then, readily see the problems of attempting to impose a national unity over such diversity particularily when the essential social dynamic is clan or tribal loyalty.4 But, if Afghanistan can be characterized by difference, diversity and contradiction there are also some broad and important factors which connect, if loosely, the various peoples of the land. First, they are almost one hundred percent devotees to Islam, with approximately ninety percent belonging to the Sunni sect. Secondly, Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world with annual per capita income estimated at approx- imately US$ 168. Along with this fact goes a life expectancy of forty years and a literacy rate estimated at ten percent.5 Given the vast destruction and dislocation visited upon this proud but poor country over the past eight years it is reasonable to assume that the actual figures may well be worse than those quoted above. Thirdly, Afghanistan has always been and remains underdeveloped both economically in the sense of the absence of rail lines, few decent road and communications networks and administratively in the sense that a strong, efficient, central- ized government administration has never really existed and particularly beyond the outskirts of Kabul local provincial chieftains have tended to run things pretty much as they pleased.6 Finally, while Afghanis have difficulty agreeing with one another on many issues, resistance to foreign domination is not one of them and this is further strengthened by the strict codes of conduct which control intergroup and intragroup behaviour. One such influential code is the Pushtunwali which has among other tenets the call for blood to be avenged when blood has been taken and to fight to the death for a person who has taken refuge in one's home.7 Upon reflection, one can see that these loosely connecting factors carry with them the elements of pride, independence, resolution and physical toughness which have made Afghani ability to successfully resist Soviet occupation much greater than might have been expected. Earlier Soviet Invasions To review the history of Afghanistan is not the purpose of this paper but to briefly describe some earlier Russian and Soviet dealings with her southern neighbor may be useful in showing that Russian interference in Afghanistan is nothing new and that the fate of Afghanistan must, of necessity, be firmly linked to that of the Soviet empire. The first manifestation or Russian involvement in Afghanistan occurred in 1837 when Russia provided advisers and mercenaries to a Persian military force attempting to capture the city of Herat in what is today western Afghanistan. The British, rearing that Russian-Persian control of Herat would by extension pose a threat to British India, intervened politically and militarily and the Persian attempt to annex Herat failed. But, with this attempt began the "Great Game" between Russia and Britain in which Afghanistan figured as the crucial buffer zone between British India and Russian territorial expansion into Central Asia.8 In 1924 King Amanullah, a reformer king, pro-Soviet and anti-British, was attempting internal reforms to modernize his feudal country when rebellion broke out in opposition to his changes. The Soviets, at his request, used warplanes to bombard the rebels into submission and provided further assistance in the form of telephone and telegraph lines, a radio station and airplanes, pilots and mechanics. Having just rescued Amanullah, the Soviets promptly turned around and invaded Afghanistan the following year, December, 1925, occupying an island in the Amu Darya River which historically had been settled by Afghans. The island had been serving as a base for raids against the Soviet Union by Uzbek refugees of the Russian Revolution and Soviet soldiers, dressed as natives, simply seized the island and proclaimed its annexation to the U.S.S.R. The king sent troops to the disputed area, threatening war and the British also expressed alarm. In the face of this opposition, Moscow withdrew its troops in 1926 recognizing Afghan ownership of the island.9 King Amanullah encountered no further problems with his northern neighbor but the same could not be said of his dealings with his own subjects. Once again, instituting unpopular reform- ist measures which caused economic hardship for many and violated many religious and social customs of the Afghan tribes, the King faced another revolt and this time was forced to flee Kabul in January 1929. The leader of the rebellion was an illiterate bandit named Bacha-i-Saqao ("Son of a Water Carrier") who immed- iately proclaimed himself king. The Soviets, being practical in matters of foreign policy and perhaps being influenced by come supporters of Amanullah, decided that their best interests, which naturally included stability on the Afghan border, lay with Amanullah. As a result, in April 1929 a mixed force of Afghans and Soviet soldiers, disguised as Afghans, totalling approximately 1,500 once more crossed the Amu Darya supported by Soviet weapons and equipment including airplanes. This force, ostensibly led by the King's ambassador to Moscow, Ghulam Nabi, gained support as it marched toward Kabul. With apparent victory in sight, Amanullah suddenly abdicated and fled to India leaving the invasion without a cause. As many Afghan soldiers now deserted the force, Stalin withdrew the Soviet forces in June, 1929; he had certainly taken into consideration the growing hostile reaction to the invasion, particularly by Persia, Turkey and Great Britain. Stalin was, at this time, in no position to ignore these concerns and withdrawal was a wise and prudent move.10 Bacha-i-Saqao, Son of a Water Carrier,had ruled less than a year when he was overthrown in October 1929 by Mohammed Nadir Khan, a member or the royal family. No sooner had Nadir Khan regained the crown for Afghanistan and begun to consolidate his monarchy than Soviet forces crossed the Amu Darya a third time, in June, 1930, in search of a Basmachi rebel, Ibrahim Beg, who had been using Afghanistan as a secure base from which to launch raids into the Soviet Union. The Soviets did not capture Beg on that incursion but understandably Kabul was alarmed at this high-handed and open violation of Afghanistan's border.11 To this point, then, it can be seen that Russian interest in Afghanistan dates back some 150 years. It is also evident that when it came to matters of security on the Soviet-Afghan border, or matters of perceived national interest, the Soviets were neither shy nor slow to use military force beyond their own borders to attempt to influence or restore a situation to their favour. Quite clearly, this Soviet adventurism was also realis- tically tempered by an awareness of what constituted acceptable limits or costs particularily in terms of possible British counter-moves. The Intervening Years Nadir Kahn, as King from 1929 onward, returned the country to customary Islamic law and did away with Amanullah's reform measures. At the same time he reduced Soviet influence in the country, particularly in the air force but retained balanced and cordial relations with both Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. in a true spirit of non-alignment which seemed to satisfy all parties, especially the pragmatic Soviets, very well. Nadir Kahn's reign was short-lived in the turbulent world of Afghan politics, cut down as he was by an assassin's bullet in 1933. Characteristically, too, the assassin seeking revenge was the adopted son of Ghulam Nabi, the former Ambassador to Moscow, who had led the Soviet-backed second invasion of Afghanistan and was executed by Nadir in 1932 for plotting against the throne.12 Nadir Kahn was succeeded by his son, Zahir Shah, who would reign from 1933 until 1973 although the actual running of the country appears to have been in the hands of Zahir's three uncles and some cousins. It was during Zahir's reign that some major developments occurred which would alter the traditional balance in that part of Asia. First and foremost, perhaps, was the outcome of World War II . Following the defeat of Germany and Japan in 1945, a new world order had developed which recognized the United States and the Soviet Union as the two dominant world powers while at the same time the British Empire and its colonies began to disintegrate rather rapidly. The British departure from India in 1947 removed the counter weight to Soviet influence which had been in effect since the 1830's and also provided for the partition of British India into what is today predominantly Hindu India and Moslem Pakistan. This quickly gave rise to a crisis in what has become known as the Pushtunistan Issue. In essence, Afghanistan made claims upon the approximately six million Pushtuns and their land in what had been the Northwest Frontier Province, the British, having given them the narrow option of joining either India or Pakistan with no alternatives; the Pushtuns being Moslem chose Pakistan. The friction caused by Afghan agitation over Pushtunistan and Pakistani reaction which included border clashes and closing of the frontier borders denying historic trade routes to Afghan imports and exports escalated to the point that, by 1950's Afghanistan and Pakistan had become major antagonists. With the borders closed, and racing a hostile and militarily superior Pakistan, Afghanistan sought both aid and arms from the United States. To the United States, at this time, Afghanistan held little or no importance and, as a result, received correspondingly little economic aid and no arms. Pakistan, on the other hand, as a member of SEATO (South East Asia Treaty organization) in 1955 was an ally of the United States and received both aid and arms. Afghanistan was left with but one choice; she turned to the Soviet Union. The Pushtunistan Issue marked a major introduction of Soviet influence into Afghanistan13 and laid the foundation for events to come. Between 1950 and 1955 trade between the two countries rose by 50 percent. In 1955, the Soviets extended a $10O million line of credit in military and economic aid and from this point onward, thousands of young Afghan army and air force officers, the majority of the officer corps, would be trained in the Soviet Union and would naturally be exposed to pro- Marxist indoctrination. In the see-saw world of Afghan politics, the armed forces would always play an important role and an officer corps, the majority having been trained in the U.S.S.R., would always be a factor of consequence. Given the growing Soviet influence in Afghanistan it was not surprising that on January 1, 1965, the communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was founded14 by an intellectual, poet and dreamer Nur Mohammed Taraki, a pragmatist, the dramatic activist Babrak Karmal, and a former teacher, the tough radical but smooth Hafizullah Amin. All three would become president of Afghanistan and all three would abruptly be removed from power with Taraki and Amin being executed for their efforts. In 1967 the PDPA split into two rival factions, the Khalq (Masses) led by Taraki and the Parcham (Banner) led by Karmal. The split was one of tactics and personalities (Taraki and Karmal disliked one another intensely) rather than ideology,for both parties were strongly pro-Moscow. The Parcham tended to draw support from non-Pushtun, better educated, more prosperous urban backgrounds such as Kabul,while the Khalq were largely Pushtuns, poorer, rural dwellers but also with a large following of army officers. The intense rivalry between these two parties has been the major divisive factor within the PDPA which exists to this day and has weakened the hand of successive Kabul regimes through the continuous bickering, plotting, manoeuvering, assassinations and gunfights on the streets of Kabul. Daoud Seizes Power On July 17, 1973, after 40 years of laissez-faire government by Zahir Shah, Prince Mohammed Daoud, former Prime Minister to the king as well as cousin and brother-in-law,seized power with the support of the army. The successful coup was almost bloodless and was achieved in less than twenty-four hours. Zahir Shah, who had been on vacation in Italy, remained there.15 Daoud now abolished the monarchy and proclaimed himself President and Prime Minister of the new Republic of Afghanistan. Under Daoud, relations between Afghanistan and the U.S.S.R. remained good, initially. Afghan trade and dependence on Soviet aid increased as did reliance on Soviet military training and support. As well, the PDPA grew stronger adding military re- cruitment to its activities and in 1977 the Khalq and Parcham agreed to unite, under pressure from the Soviet Union exerted through the Communist party of India.16 Beginning in 1975, Daoud, attempting to strengthen his own power base and demonstrate independence signalled a change to the Soviets and some members of his government who were members of the PDPA by shifting Afghanistan toward a policy of non- alignment.17 This included new military training agreements with India and Egypt, the dismissal of forty Soviet-trained officers within his army, pledges of foreign aid from Iran and China, widening diplomatic contacts with countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, and much-improved relations with Pakistan. At the same time, Daoud's increasingly autocratic and repressive manner coupled with severe economic discontent and rising taxes soon alienated a wide cross-section of society such that by summer 1977 almost no popular support remained for him. The Soviets appear to have been prepared to live with the faltering Daoud regime, at least for the time being. But the PDPA was not; as Daoud's grip weakened the PDPA made plans to overthrow him. Their opportunity would come sooner than they anticipated. The Saur (April) Revolution On April 17, 1978 a prominent Parcham leader of the PDPA, Mir Akbar Khyber, was assassinated. At his funeral procession two days later the PDPA organized 15,000 marchers shouting anti- U.S. slogans. Street demonstrations being a rare event in Afghan- istan, the size of this communist inspired demonstration shocked Daoud, who, on 26 April began arresting PDPA leaders including Taraki, Karmal and Amin. Unbelievably, though, Hafizullah Amin was initially put under house arrest only,with various people being allowed to visit him. Through these visitors, Amin imme- diately sent out orders to PDPA elements of the armed forces. to initiate the coup.18 The coup began at 6:00 A.M. on the 27th or April. Forty- eight hours later Daoud and his family were dead and power had passed to a very much surprised PDPA. Although Soviet advisers would quickly have learned of the coup, there is as Joseph Collins has stated, "no substantive proof that the Soviets planned, directed or participated in the coup."19 The coup succeeded not so much because of the skill and organization of the communists but because of the disorganization and blunder- ing of Daoud. Probably no one was as surprised at the success of the coup as the PDPA, unless it was Moscow. On April 30, 1978, the Soviet Union recognized the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). The Saur Revolution Fails Nur Mohammed Taraki became prime minister and head of the Revolutionary Council. Hafizullah Amin and Babrak Karmal served as his deputy prime ministers and soon the excesses that histor- ically accompany revolutions in the early days of heady power were all too evident. Thousands of civil servants who had served Daoud were arrested and replaced by unqualified and inexperienced PDPA members. Butby July 1978, the rival jealousies of the Party factions, subdued prior to the revolution, flared again and under the Khalq Taraki and Amin, various Parcham members at all levels were purged of their jobs including Babrak who was sent to Czechoslovakia as ambassador. This radical surgery on a government apparatus already short of qualified administrators could only prejudice the government's attempts to carry out its own policies. In addition, Taraki pressed ahead with hasty, ill-conceived reforms which once again violated long-standing economic, cultural and religious practices. One illustrative example was changing the traditional green Islam flag to a Communist red one. Widespread hostility and opposition grew against the regime, and the regime reacted with correspondingly widespread and harsh repression, violating individual and collec- tive human right with callous disregard. Thomas Hammond put it most precisely,"If the communists had set out deliberately to make themselves hated, they could hardly have done a more thorough job."20 The significance here lies in the fact that the seeds of the revolt which continues today against the Kabul regime and the Soviets were first sown in opposition against Taraki, Amin and their Khalq clique and their ever-increasing numbers of Soviet advisers at all levels and across all departments of the military and government administration. The first armed opposition broke out in the summer of 1978 in Nuristan and the Panjshir and government forces retaliated swiftly with indiscriminate aerial incendiary bombing and strafing of villages by MIG-17 and MI-8 Hind attack helicopters. Most illustrative, perhaps, though is what is generally referred to as the "Herat Incident".21 In March 1979 many of the inhabitants of Herat, Afghanistan's third largest city (population 200,000) and many of the Afghan troops stationed there revolted, marching through the streets, plundering government arsenals and most significantly hunting down Soviet advisers and their families, killing approximately 50 and parading a number of their severed heads through the streets on pikes. As Edward Girardet points out, "The degree of hatred for the Russians on the part of the crowds indicated the extent to which the population had come to associate the Soviet Union with the Khalqi regime."22 Kabul again reacted quickly and violently sending in loyal Afghan troops supported by tanks, assault helicopters, artillery, Soviet advisers and Soviet Ilyushin 11-28 bombers to suppress the revolt, killing and wounding several thousand Afghan is in the process. But the fires of revolt now flared throughout the entire country. The 4500 Soviet advisers were also directly threat- ened as was the ever-weakening Kabul regime which now relied on ever-increasing Russian support and brutal retaliation. Moscow could not remain indifferent to this unstable,unpredictable situation and in June 1979 Pravda warned that the war on Afghan- istan was "in direct proximity to us...a question of actrual agression against a state with which the USSR has a common border".23 By now, in the fantasy-world of unravelling Afghan politics, the last props would be positioned on-stage in order to raise the curtain for Soviet invasion. In this deteriorating situation, the Soviets urged Taraki to follow a program of moderation, if not restraint, and to rid himself of Amin who had virtually assumed all power in Kabul. Returning from Moscow on September 11, 1979, Taraki found Amin trying to arrest three government ministers. On the 14th Taraki summoned Amin to the Arg Palace, with the complicity of the Soviet Ambassador, Puzanov, in order to arrest Amin. No fool, Amin had plans or his own. A shootout ensued and when firing died and the smoke had cleared it was Taraki who was under arrest. The next day, the Kabul Times reported that Taraki had asked "to be relieved from Party and state posts on health grounds",24 naturally to be replaced by Amin. On October 9 it was announced that Taraki had died "as a result of the serious illness from which he had been suffering for some time". The reality, offered in several accounts, appears to be that he was murdered on the orders of Amin.25 Despite the fact that Brezhnev extended personal greetings to Amin on September 17th in recognition of his new leadership posts, Moscow was clearly chagrined at this sudden, unexpected turn of events. Amin was ruthless, ambitious and had been in control of the government, army and police for some time. Amin had no popular support whatsoever and it was mostly he whom the Soviets blamed for the widespread insurgency, economic chaos and general collapse of administration and order throughout the country. It was Amin whom the Soviets had wanted to get rid of, with the help of Taraki, and now, in an ironic twist it was Amin Moscow had to deal with. Worse, despite being pro- Soviet, Amin had shown increasing independence snubbing the Soviets on social occasions and allegedly demanding the recall of Ambassador Puzanov. Even more worrisome to the Soviets, perhaps, was a vague overture to the American charge d'affaires in Kabul that Amino wanted better "Afghan-American relations."26 In the meantime, despite coolrelations, Moscow continued to provide economic aid and increasing military support and advisers. But given the foregoing considerations and the fact that a communist regime, on Russia's southern border, led by a stubborn unpopular leader, was in chaos and perhaps, in danger of being toppled, Hafizullah Amin's days were numbered. CHAPTER THREE INVASION Recently, the Western and especially the American media have been intentionally spreading deceptive rumours about the "interference" of the Soviet Union in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. They have even asserted that Soviet "combat troops" have been moved into Afghan terri- tory. All this, of course, is pure fabrication... It is well known that relations between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan are based on a solid foundation of good-neighborly relations and non-interference in the internal affairs of one another... Pravda, December 23, 1979 1 Soon, the Soviets would invade. Soon, much to their surprise, they would find themselves embroiled in their first war since 1945. They would also find themselved entangled in one of the longest and most costly guerrilla struggles of this century and they have, as of yet, achieved neither victory nor a way out. Planning It is not exactly clear when the Soviets first began to consider military intervention but the evidence points to the spring of 1979. The actual decision to intervene was probably taken in October 1979. In April 1979 General Aleksey Yepishev, head of the Soviet Army's Political Directorate, visited Afghanistan with a dele- gation to "assess the training, morale, and political conscious- ness of the Afghan armed forces."2 With the worsening situation in Afghanistan at that time Yepishev returned to Moscow and recommended an increase in military aid and advisers. Not long after, in August 1979, another high-level delegation returned to Kabul, without publicity, and stayed until October. This delegation was led by General Ivan G. Paviovskiy, Deputy Minister of Defence and Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Ground Forces. With him he had a dozen generals and fifty other officers. It may have been that they were carrying out a ground reconnaissance and preparations for intervention but whatever the truth, clearly something important was going on. After all, Pavlovskiy had planned and commanded the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Soviets had reportedly tried to persuade Amin a number of times to request Russian troops to restore order on Afghan soil under the terms of the Afghan-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation which had been signed 5 December 1978. The independent and ambitious Amin had refused. On 28 November Lieutenant General Victor S. Paputin, Deputy Minister of the Interior, arrived in Kabul to prevail upon Amin for one last time to request Russian troops and to lay the political groundwork for the invasion.3 Paputin failed to change Amin's mind and , instead, he now prepared to eliminate Amin. But, in two apparent assassination attempts (3 December and 17 December) by poisoning and gunfire, Amin managed to survive.4 Paputin, who had returned to the Soviet Union on 13 December, had failed again. Shortly after, Pravda announced that Paputin had died on December 28 under "unspecified circumstances". The circumstances were probably suicide. While these political manoeuverings had been on-going, Soviet commanders were not idle. On 8 December a regiment of 2,500 men from the 105th Guards Ariborne Division was posted to security duties at Bagram Airbase, 30 miles north of Kabul. Twelve days later a battalion from this regiment secured the vital Salang Tunnel which lay as a key choke point on the major overland route from Termez in the U.S.S.R. to Kabul. Similarily, a smaller Russian unit took up "security duty" at Kabul Inter- national Airport. Because of the heavy reliance on Soviet military aid and advisers no undue suspicion appears to have been aroused but it should have been obvious that the pattern for the invasion of Czechoslovakia was being re-printed. Soviet advisers were now at company level and Russian pilots were flying many combat missions for the Afghan air force. Soviet advisers now recalled "faulty ammunition", called in tank batteries for "winterization", rationed fuel because of shortages and generally carried out these sabotage operations on a wide scale with almost complete success.5 As a finishing touch, important Afghan officials and military officers would be invited to partied in Kabul on the evening of the 27th and there imprisoned as the assault began. Execution At 11:00 P.M. on Christmas Eve, 1979, Soviet Antonov transport planes began landing the 105th Guards Airborne Div- ision at Kabul International Airport. According to one Kabuli witness: The planes started landing at night. You couldn't see anything (it was so dark). You could only hear the constant roar of planes overhead. For two days and three nights the planes kept landing without a break.6 Encountering no resistance, airborne troops, including elements of the 1O3rd Guards Airborne Division also began to land at Bagram Air Base, Jalalabad to the east, Shindand: to the west and Kandahar to the south. By Thursday morning 27 December there were about 5,000 Soviet soldiers at the Kabul airport alone. Girardet points out that incredibly ...as late as 26 December, President Amin showed no indication of recognizing what the Soviets were up to. Judging by an interview given to an Arab journalist on the morning before the coup, he (and many other Afghanis) may still have believed that the military transports, now landing and taking off at ten minute intervals on the other side of town, were indeed there to aid his rebel-besieged government.7 On the evening of the 27th Soviet troops, under cover of dark- ness, moved into Kabul. They blew up the telephone exchanges, seized Radio Kabul and secured other vital posts in the capital such as government ministries, key road junctions and ammunition depots. By midnight most of Kabul was under Soviet control, although resistance did continue sporadically. Earlier in December, on Soviet advice, for"his own safety", Amin had moved to the Darulaman Palace about five miles from the city centre. According to a defecting KGB major, Vladimir Kuzichkin: ...a few hundred Soviet army commandos (SPETSNAZ), plus a specially trained KGB assault unit, all of them dressed in Afghan army uniforms and using vehicles with Afghan army markings, attacked the palace with orders that no Afghan be left alike to reveal the involvement of Soviet personnel. Amin, his mistress, members of his family and hundreds of Afghans defending the palace were killed. At 2:40 A.M. on the 28th Radio Kabul, in a broadcast actually originatihg from inside the Soviet Union,declared that Babrak Karmal, exiled leader or the Parcham faction, was now General Secretary of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, President of the country and Commander of the armed forces.9 Fifteen minutes later Radio Kabul explained that Afghanistan had requested Soviet assistance to defend the "gains of the Saur Revolution" and at 3:15 A.M. it was announced that Amin had been sentenced to death by a revolutionary tri- bunal for "crimes against the people" and that he had already been executed. Among the crimes, Babrak would later accuse Amin of having been a CIA agent, a preposterous accusation. By the dawn of 28 December Soviet tanks and armoured per- sonnel carriers guarded key intersections and patrolled the streets. Kabul was under Soviet control. At the same time, lead elements of the 360th Motor Rifle Division and 201st Motor Rifle Division were crossing the Amu Darya and would bring the total of Soviet troops in Afghanistan to 50,000 by the end of the first week in January 1980. Overhead, MIG 21, MIG 23, SU-17 and Mi-24 helicopter gunships provided air cover for the advancing Soviet forces. By the end of March there were six divisions in Afghanistan totalling approximately 80,000 thousand troops. They had come complete with all organic equipment including air defence and missile units. In the early weeks Soviet troops rapidly and methodically consolidated key objectives, disarmed unreliable Afghan army units and carried out small patrols. They kept a low profile and encouraged Afghan authorities to deal with local security problems wherever possible. But, almost immediately guerrilla attacks began and by the end of January major civil unrest had erupted in many areas including key urban centres. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan had begun. Click here to view image Invasion by 105 Guards Airborne Division (24-25 Dec 79) and 357, 66, 201,360 Motor Rifle Divisions (25-27 Dec 79) Followup by 16 and 54 Motor Rifle Divisions, March 1980. Source: Albert A. Stahel und Paul Bucherer, Afghanjstan 5 Jahre Widerstand und Kleinkrieg, (Huber and Co, AG Liestal, Schweiz, Dez 1986) p.5 Invasion - Motives and Calculations Joseph Collins is correct when he says that the Soviets moved into Afghanistan to unseat Amin, install Babrak Karmal in his place and use Soviet troops to gain time for the new regime to restore order and rebuild the Afghan army.10 But, what were the underlying motives and calculations behind these actions? Much was written, particularly immediately following the invasion, speculating on motives.11 One school of thought, still attractive to many is that the Soviets were simply con- tinuing their historical thrust for warm-water ports in the Indian Ocean plus eventual control over the strategic Straits of Hormuz. The reality is that there was probably no one single factor but that the decision to invade was based on a combina- tion of ractors and perceived opportunities driven by the imperative need to do something quickly and decisively about the disliked, distrusted Amin and his tottering government. First, and most important, then, the Russian move was not pro-active in the sense of being part of a Soviet grand design for power projection for strategic goals. It was most probably and simply a reaction to the unpopular, chaotic Amin regime which was losing control of Afghanistan despite Soviet support. The Amin regime would most likely fall without intervention, possibly to be succeeded by a less friendly or even hostile Islamic regime (Iran was clearly a worrisome model) which could generate unrest for the 40 million Moslems living in the south central U.S.S.R. or worse invite an American presence in Afghan- istan. This sort of instability and insecurity immediately on the Russian border was a threat which the collective Soviet psyche absolutely could not tolerate. A second, closely related factor was that, in addition to security reasons, for reasons of prestige the Soviet Union could not allow a Marxist, pro-Soviet government to be overthrown by a popular rebellion when a communist government itself was supposed to be the popular expression of the masses. This would represent the first time in history that a communist government had fallen, a tremendous blow to Soviet prestige and Marxist- Leninist ideology; it might also engender unsettling ideas in other communist states within the Soviet orbit. Tied to this wigs the Brezhnev Doctrine, used to justify the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, which warned that socialist countries had not only the right but also the duty to intervene where the security and order of another socialis country was threatened by hostile forces. When appraising additional factors in their estimate of the situation the Soviets must also have noted the following apparent potential spin-off from any intervention. Clearly, successful domination of Afghanistan would be another step towards warm- water ports and the Soviet Union, with the largest navy in the world, would capitalize on this new-found opportunity. Simi- larily, longer-range Soviet aircraft positioned in western Afghanistan would now be in a position to threaten the strategic Arabian Sea through which oil, vital to the West, passed. A Soviet move into Afghanistan could also prepare the stage for an eventual, later move into Iran, the real strategic prize of the Middle East. This scenario could, perhaps, be carried out following the death of the Ayatollah Khomeini (although, given Soviet difficulties in Afghanistan now, it is unlikely that they would want to risk the far greater problems they would be certain to encounter in Iran). A Soviet move into Afghanistan would also allow Moscow to exert tremendous pressure on Pakistan and, indeed, on all the countries in that region. It is also probable that, given the U.S. hostage crisis which was occurring in Tehran, the Soviets had real fears of a U.S. move towards Iran and felt the need to pre-empt any American moves in that direction. Finally, as precedent, Russian military intervention both direct and indirect had a string of successes which included Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, Angola in 1975 and South Yemen in 1978. Why not Afghanistan in 1979? The sum of these additional factors must have made the propo- sition of intervention an attractive option, particularly if the costs were low. In terms of costs the original arithmetic would have yielded a marginal figure. Moscow could not conceive that the dis- jointed, poorly armed, poorly trained Mujahidin would pose a long-term security threat to the might of the Soviet forces. World opinion would lash out at the U.S.S.R. but would be of short duration until overtaken by other events. Moscow has often and successfully weathered the brief storms of world opinion. The only reaction of any consequence to be taken seriously would be any American action, especially a military action. But U.S. military action was most improbable. American attention was still focused on the hostage crisis in Iran; further, the United States was not going to get involved militarily in a country which seemingly had no importance to most Americans and certainly not after having left Vietnam less than five years earlier. It was also the Christmas season and any reaction was going to be slow and, in this case, too late. Other peaceful, punitive measures might by taken by the U.S. ( and, indeed, Moscow would be surprised by the speed and scope of retaliation by President Carter beginning with the 1980 Olympic boycott) but again, this might be a small price to pay given the potential gains. On balance, then, most of the arguments seemed to favour intervention, indeed, made it imperative. And the costs, if any, would be small. The Soviets were probably correct in all their assumptions save one; they did not understand the enemy they had created. They had attached little or no importance to the complex ethnic, tribal, cultural and religious make-up of the Afghan warriors. In turn, the Soviets underestimated their capabilities and, more importantly, they underestimated their will to resist. CHAPTER FOUR JIHAD After the Communists took power in April 1978, they started to penetrate the life of the people, attacking religion and traditional leaders, but the Afghan people are deeply attached to their traditions. So the fire started, first in Kunan and Paktia provinces, then spreading. We began by attacking the communists in the mountains, then removing them from the countryside. When the Soviets invaded, practically all the people took up arms. Abdul Haq Leader Hezbi-I-Islami forces, Kabul1 When Soviet forces entered Afghanistan in December 1979 they expected to be an army of occupation with limited objec- tives in a low-profile, passive role. The initial strategy was to install Babrak Karmal as the new president and use Soviet troops to control cities and lines of communication in order to buy time to build up the Democratic Republic of Afghan- istan (DRA) army and to allow the new regime to secure its grasp on the nation at large. They also expected that the DRA army would do most of any fighting that needed to be done which would be politically convenient for the Soviets and, at the same time, would ensure minimum Soviet casualties. The Soviets referred to their presence as "The Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan". Little did the Soviets realize that the DRA army had disintegrated to the point where it was little effective as a fighting force. In fact, this disintegration only accelerated immediately following the invasion. This, in turn, would force the Soviets to become actively engaged in fighting through the whole spectrum of low-intensity, mid- intensity and, some would argue, high-intensity conflict by day and night in mountain, rural and urban terrain. As the intensity and scope of the fighting quickly increased and the Soviets realized how tenuous their hold on the country was, they would be forced to send additional troops to augment their "limited contingent". And so the current military struggle began to take shape. What had begun as the small, disjointed actions of a civil war in response to the April Revolution of 1978 now took on the broader context of "jihad", a nation-wide holy war of liberation fought by holy warriors or "Mujahidin" against the godless, foreign invaders and their puppet regime. What follows is an attempt to high-light some of the military aspects of this struggle. Order of Battle Soviet Military Forces. The Soviet armed forces that in- vaded Afghanistan in December 1979 numbered about 40,000 officers and men. They were part of the Soviet 40th Army and included elements of nine Soviet army divisions: the 5th, 54th, 103rd, 104th and 105th airborne guards divisions; and the 66th, 201st, 357th and 360th motorized rifle divisions.2 The fierce resist- ance of the Mujadihin and ineffectiveness and unreliability of the DRA armed forces forced the Soviets to increase their strength and by the end of 1980 Soviet troop strength in Afghanistan had grown to approximately 85,000 supported by an additional 30,000 stationed in the U.S.S.R. just across the Amu Darya. Troop levels rose agnin in 1981 to 90,000 men and once more in 1982 to 105,000. By the end of 1984 troop levels stood at 115,000 and appear to have remained more or less constant since that time although some estimates put them as high as 118,000.3 Of these troops, 50 to 60% are combat troops and, perhaps, up to 10,000 belong to the Soviet secret police and other special units. Soviet army operations in Afghanistan are believed to be headquartered in Kabul or Bagram Air Base 45 miles north of Kabul while Soviet air force operations are directed from Termez in the U.S.S.R., again just across the border.4 From time to time, for example in June 1980 and the fall of 1986, the Soviets announced troop withdrawals of 10,000 and 7,O00 men respectively but these were generally suspect aS pro- paganda ploys. The actual number of troops withdrawn is sus- pected to be one half to two thirds of the stated figure and the units withdrawn were from anti-aircraft, anti-tank and FROG rocket battalions mostly unsuited for Afghanistan where resist- ance forces were certainly without aircraft and tanks. These units were then quietly replaced with more useful infantry units. But, whether the Soviets have 115,000 or 118,000 troops in Afghanistan and whether a few thousand were withdrawn or not is, on balance, not that significant. As Ahmed Shah Massoud pointed out in a recent interview! Militarily speaking, the withdrawal of 7,000 troops has no value because the Russians have sufficient forces in Afghanistan. Moreover, the Russians have brought and are bringing thousands of their commando troops from Soviet Russia into Afghanigtan by helicopters and Antonov planes whenever they need. I think it is just a political manoever to propagate and confuse the world public opinion.5 DRA Armed Forces. At the time of the 1978 coup the Afghan army numbered about 80,000. By 1981, the strength had dropped to between 20,000 and 25,000 men through casualties, purges but mostly desertion. By lowering the draft age in 1984 from 17 to 16 years or age and by lengthening the term of service from three to four years the numbers in the Afghan army were increased to approximately 40,000 men by mid-1985.6 The army was divided into 11 infantry divisions, three armoured divisions, two mountain infantry regiments, three commando regiments and miscellaneous other units. These same units appear to remain operational at this time although the divisions are clearly under-strength, the over-all manpower in the army having dropped again to about 30,000.7 The Afghan air force had always been small comparatively and its numbers are currently estimated between 7,000 and 10,000 but probably closer to the lower figure. The air force flies relatively few missions in its obsolescent Soviet aircraft and is denied all access to advanced aircraft because the quality of pilots and staff in terms of training and reliability is considered low.8 It is also estimated that there may be as many as 5,000 Czechoslovak and Cuban military advisers attached to the Afghan air force in addition to Soviet personnel.9 Despite Soviet training, Soviet equipment, Soviet advisers and almost a decade of combat, the Afghan armned forces remain incapable of defending the Kabul regime. Some specialized units have fought well but the serious problems which plagued the Afghan military at the time of the invasion still continue. Desertion is the most serious problem; individual soldiers desert, high-ranking officers desert and, occasionally, whole units desert. Whenever possible they bring their weapons with them. Poor morale is also rife among Afghan ranks and trans- lates into poor fighting effectiveness. It has at its roots sympathy for the Mujahidin, dislike of the "foreigners", and dislike of the fact that Afghan units are often made to spear- head attacks bearing the brunt of the fighting and the majority of casualties. Afghan units are accorded little Soviet air and artillery support and Soviet medical treatment of Afghan casualties is considered poor, if considered at all. In addition to desertion and low morale, the Afghan armed forces have been infiltrated by the resistance, "up to the highest levels".10 The distrust and rivalry bred by the factionalism between the Khalq and Parcham has resulted in purges and, sometimes, gun- battles and continues to be a great weakness of the Afghan forces. These factors all contributed to low recruiting and retention rates and in an effort to stem the tide the government has resorted to enhanced conscription, eliminating most exemptions and literally using press-gang methods. However, if anything, these measures have had the opposite effect. They have increased desertion rates, alienated many of the regime's supporters and driven potential draftees into hiding or into the arms of the resistance.11 The poor performance, unreliability and treachery of the Afghan forces in Soviet eyes has led to outright distrust of DRA units. This is commonly seen in such examples as Afghan pilots not being allowed to fly on their own, airfield "security zones" where all Afghans are forbidden, limiting supplies (particularly weapons and ammunition)to Afghan units and ensuring that Soviet advisers from company level upward approve all orders issued.12 Needless to say, this type of distrust and friction can only have negative results and does nothing to enhance the combined operational effectiveness of Soviet-Afghan forces. Mujahidin. Arrayed against the might of the Soviet ground and air forces and the discredited though still existent Afghan armed forces were the Mujahidin. David C. Isby, an Afghan analyst has put his finger on it, "the Afghan resistance is not an army but rather a people in arms".13 Thus, it is imposs- ible to characterize the resistance in conventional military terms for it reflects the fragmentation of Afghan society along tribal, ethnic, regional, religious and ideological lines.14 It began as a disorganized, untrained, poorly equipped rabble fighting for limited objectives which reflected, often, narrow self-interest. No one resistance party or political coalition dominated the scene and that fact remains true at present. Instead, there is a broad patchwork of ihdependent guerrilla bands numbering between 150 to 200,according to Amstutz, up to as many as 300 by Girardet's count.15 These bands operate with varying degrees of effectiveness in about 90 fairly well- defined areas which in turn constitute the 271 districts and 28 provinces of Afghanistan. Actual numbers for the resistance vary widely but are estimated at between 80,000 and 150,000 full and part-time fighters. These fighters are supported by civilians and refugees in Pakistan and Iran who can act as partisans and "reserves" when necessary and whose numbers probably run to the hundreds of thousands. In many ways, the Mujahidin are a brave and tough but simple, primitive force. They lack aircraft, tanks, mobility and ade- quate sophisticated support weapons. They have poor means of communication and transport and this is aggravated by the fact that most Mujahidin are illiterate. Rivalries among competing bands make central direction and coordination of effort very difficult. While these characteristics are generally seen as weaknesses in the resistance movement it may also be these thou- sands of bold, simple, disjointed, small unit actions carried out in familiar terrain which have allowed the guerrillas to avoid decisive engagement with the superior Soviet forces while at the same time subjecting them to unrelenting harassment and attack, Whether these characteristics are seen as strengths or weaknesses, there is no doubt that she overall effectiveness of the Mujahidin is strongly enhanced by their high morale (an observation made by many observers), widespread public support and increasing military expertise. Despite the independent operating nature of the resistance bands, most are affiliated with one of the seven, major political resistance parties headquartered in Peshawar, Pakistan. (Paki- stan does not permit the existence of more than seven parties on its soil.) Although these parties exert little or no influence over military operations in Afghanistan they are important to the guerrillas in terms of publicizing the struggle to the outside world, gaining financial and moral support,and providing weapons, ammunition and other much needed supplies. The political parties themselves differ on issues, tactics and Afghanistan's future and tend to reflect personalities, and thus the differences, of their leaders. Nevertheless, they fall into two alliances, the "traditionalists" or "moderaties" and the "fundamentalists". As the names imply, the traditionalists are loosely aligned, and conservative in nature, while the fundamentalists tend to be better organized and disciplined but reflect more extreme Islamic views, some seeing Khomeini's Iran as a model. Thus, the major division separating the alliances is what form the new Afghanistan should take ranging from constitutional monarchy to radical Islamic republic. Strategies and Tactics The Soviets. The model for the invasion of Afghanistan had been the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. And, the actual invasion was well-executed; it showed the results of good planning, tight command and control and impressive logistical capability. Once on Afghan soil, Soviet strategy would have their troops relieve DRA units from garrison and security duties in towns, vital points such as airfields and key road networks and passes in order to allow DRA units to actively pursue and pacify the insurgents. But, unlike Czechoslovakia, the insurgency was not cowed but spread rapidly and fiercely and the DRA army proved either unable or unwilling to hunt down and destroy the rebel bands Thus, almost immediately, Soviet forces were drawn into heavy fighting in mountains, and valleys, and cities. The Soviets had probably not given much thought to this possibility, in part, because their doctrine emphasized mass armour formations striking opposing mass forces over relatively flat and open terrain. While they retained their large armoured and motorized formations, they were now in unfamiliar terrain fighting an unorthodox enemy. Counter-insurgency operations had not been part of the plan. Between 1980 and 1982 Soviet tactics16 relied on sending armoured columns and motorized infantry into valleys to fire on villages and suspected guerrilla camps. These columns were accompanied by helicopters and bombers. While much property damage resulted, Soviet infantry rarely dismounted and when they did, never ventured far from their vehicles. As a result, Soviet casualties were kept low but, equally, few guerrillas were killed. As one Mujahid said, "They seldom go into battle against us as infantry." Nevertheless, some of these offensives were of major scale such as the sixth Panjshir campaign of 1982 in which 12,000 to 15,000 Soviet and DRA troops attacked about 5,000 Mujahidin under command of Massoud. After six weeks, the Soviet-DRA forces withdrew, having failed to capture Massoud or destroy his forces and having suffered an estimated 3,000 casualties. In 1982, in addition to search and destroy, the tactic of encirclement or cordoning was initiated by Soviet forces. Typically, a cluster of villages in an open area would be cordoned off and then clearing troops would move in to search for guerrillas. However, the terrain did not generally favour these operations and, understandably, the Soviets rarely achieved surprise, enabling the guerrillas to escape. By 1983 there was increasing emphasis on the use of light infantry, less reliance on armour and a stated need for better mountain fighting tactics stressing rapid deployment, flexi- bility and surprise. Despite these changes, the results were mixed. Perhaps, because of the lack of clear-cut victories on the battlefield Soviet strategy changed at this time. In the words of Abdul Hag: The Soviets then tried with small-scale attacks, hoping to scare people with the sheer weight or their military hardware. Then came larger offensives, and the effort of forcing the population into submission by heavy pressure on the economic side, destroying crops and villages. They hoped that once impoverished, the people would eventually turn to the DRA government for help. Scorched earth policy began in 1983.17 Perhaps the scorched-earth policy was signalled in April 1983 when Soviet bombers, probably Ilyushin 11-28s, "carpet- bombed" Herat, Afghanistan's third largest city. This heavy, prolonged bombing resulted in half the city being level led and the deaths of an estimated 3,000 civilians.18 This scorched- earth warfare continues today.19 It involves indiscriminate destruction of dwellings, food stocks, crops, water systems and the indiscriminate killing of livestock and people. Another term now commonly heard but coined by Dr. Louis Dupree is that of "migratory genocide". It describes the same strategy and its aims are simple: to either bludgeon the people into submission or to destroy all their means of survival and,for those still remaining, to force them to flee the country or seek refuge in the cities where they could more easily be controlled by Soviet forces. At the same time, there has been no scaling- down of offensives. Perhaps the opposite is true. In September 1986, 13,000 Afghan and Soviet troops were engaged in a major offensive just north of Kabul and, at the same time, an estimated 20,000 Afghan and Soviet troops were reportedly attacking rebel forces between Herat and the Iranian border.20 Each of these offensives was backed by hundreds of tanks, massive artillery and rocket barrages and waves of fighter-bombers and helicopter gunships. The Mujahidin. Given the diverse, independent and numerous resistance bands it is difficult to characterize their strat- egies and tactics but some generalizations can be made. Imtiaz H. Bokhari states that "Mujahidin tactics indicate a three pronged strategy: firstly, to prove by large scale sabotage that the government at Kabul is not in control of the country; secondly, to alienate support of the government by assassina- tions, arson, and looting; and thirdly, to weaken the army by inciting defections and discouraging fresh recruitments."21 This strategy is not designed to defeat Soviet military forces for that is an unlikely event. It is, though, a bitter war of attrition in which the Mujahidin show no sign of weakening. In support of this strategy Mujahidin originally used simple tactics of sniper fire, ambushes on convoys and assassin- ations of Afghan and Soviet officials. As explosives and mines became available, these were used to destroy bridges, electric power pylons and mine major military highways. In general large, direct attacks on well-defended posts were avoided where the army could bring its superior air and firepower to bear. Mujahidin tactics have definitely improved over the years, tested by practical experience and enhanced by greater cooper- ation among rebel groups and more sophisticated weapons. The tactics are constantly under review and are quickly adapted to fit changing situations. Again, Abdul Hag notes: We're studying and learning tactics too. At the beginning we were really scared of the Mi-24 gunship helicopters... Eventually we learned to wait on mountain-tops, shooting when the helicopters were flying down lower to strike at the valleys.22 Rebel tactics now appear to range through a broad, flexible spectrum still retaining sniping and assassination but also including major, well-planned, well-coordinated attacks (under the right circumstances) supported by Chinese BM-12 rocket launchers as was seen in the capture of Ferkhar Garrison by Commander Massoud.23 Rockets are also used with good effect on airbases and urban areas and although not common, occasion- ally car bombs are used such as the one that blew up in Kabul near the Soviet Embassy in February 1987, killing five people and wounding 20.24 War from the Air Rebel forces have no air power. The best they can hope for are the few defections from time to time such as the two Afghan pilots who flew two Mi-24 D helicopter gunships to Pakistan in 1985.25 Thus,the Soviet airforce enjoys complete air superiority. Helicopters. Perhaps, the most significant Soviet weapon in Afghanistan had been the helicopter. Mi-6 Hip and Mi-8 Hook helicopters are used to move weapons, supplies, evacuate wounded and land heliborne troops who have been judged fairly effective against the Mujahidin. Most feared, though, is the heavily armed Mi-24 Hind helicopter gunship whose protective armour plating, 12.7 mm machine gun, anti-tank missiles and 128 57 mm rockets make it a powerful weapon platform. Only when guerrillas received heavy machine guns in 1983 and later missiles were they able to defend against the Hind. The Hinds were originally used singly or in pairs but now appear to be used in larger formations with greater effect. There are an estimated 600 helicopters in Afghanistan. Total aircraft losses to the Mujahidin since 1979 are estimated at 1,000, mostly helicopters.26 Fighter-bombers. Early in the war, the MiG-21 Fishbed was used with generally poor results in the ground attack role. By late 1983 two new aircraft were introduced. The TU-16 Badger medium- range bomber was used for high-altitude bombing of valley floors and urban areas and the SU- 25 Frogfoot ground attack fighter bomber was used for close support missions and, often, in con- junction with Hind helicopters. The SU-25 carries Gatling-type machine guns, 10,000 pounds of bombs and rockets, performs the same type of missions as the U.S. A-10 and has been used most effectively against rebel forces. Other Weapons Small Arms. The Mujahidin are generally armed with Kalashnikov AK-47 or AK-74 assault rifles which have been purchased in Pakistan or, most often, taken from Russian soldiers. Machine Guns. Similarily, heavy machine guns such as the 12.7mm KshK and 14.5mm Zikoyak used by the rebels are usually captured weapons. Anti-tank Weapons. Again, rebels use the RPG 7 and the newer RPG 16 to good effect against Soviet vehicles and armour; once more, these are usually captured weapons. Tanks and Artillery. The Soviets use T-72 tanks and 152 mm self-propelled howitzers standard with their formations. Soviet artillery has used flechette rounds with great effectiveness. Mujahidin forces have some mortars, little artillery and occa- sionally are able to capture a Soviet tank or armoured vehicle. Air Defense. While Soviet forces have no requirement for air defence weapons, this has been the most critical need of the guerrilla forces. In the last year and a half their air defence capabilities have improved considerably. The Soviet DShK 12.7mm heavy machine gun remains the mainstay of resistance air defence augmented by captured Soviet SA-7 air defence missiles. But the newest additions to the rebel air defence arsenal include the British-built Blowpipe surface to air missile and the U.S. Stringer missile. The Blowpipes were reportedly supplied by Nigerian sources, are immune to Soviet infra-red countermeasures and have been successful in destroying Soviet helicopter gun- ships.27 After adequate training Stinger missiles are also reported to be very effective. These latest air defence weapons accounted for 24 Soviet and Afghan aircraft kills in March 1987 alone.28 Rockets. Increasingly, the Mujahidin have come to rely upon surface-to-surface rockets when available. Targets include towns, cities, airfields, ammunition dumps and even small installations on the Soviet side of the border. Commonly used rockets are the 107mm with a range of 8 km now being replaced by the heavier 122mm missile. August 1986 saw 300 rockets fired in one night at Bagram Air Base while in the same period rockets fired at Kabul nightly hit Soviet and Polish Embassies, an Afghan army barracks and housing compounds used by Soviet adviser.29 In reply, Soviet forces have used massive air and artillery strikes which include the BM-21 122mm multiple rocket launcher system. Supplementing these systems in Afghanistan now is the BM-27 220mm (16 round) multiple rocket launcher with a range of 40 km and warheads which include high explosive, incendiary, anti-personnel cluster and anti-personnel mines. The BM-27 hens been used in Afghanistan for area suppression and fire sup- port for heliborne assaults.30 Mines. Mines are used by both sides. The Mujahidin use Chinese plastic mines and any others they can acquire. Most trouble- some to them, though, have been Soviet "butterfly" mines. Spread by Hip helicopters or 152 mm artillery they blend in with the terrain, and are designed to maim, not kill. Because these mines cannot be detected by normal means and have an unlimited lifespan, they are banned by the Geneva Convention.31 Chemical Warfare Despite overwhelming circumstantial evidence, two United Nations investigations in 1981 and 1982 were not clearly able to establish the use of chemical warfare in Afghanistan. One simple reason for this was that the investigating teams were denied access to Afghanistan and any cooperation by the Afghan government.32 Nevertheless, there is sufficient evidence to reasonably assume that toxic agents were used in Afghanistan until at least 1986.33 Since that time it is difficult to establish any use; the Soviet may have discontinued use because of world opinion or may be highly selective in their use. Spetsnaz Spetsnaz,or "Special Purpose Forces",are deployed in Afghan- istan under control of Soviet military intelligence (GRU) and ultimately under control of the KGB.34 These highly trained, clandestine, commando units are organized into companies of about 115 men (although they will operate in smaller groups) and were originally designed for use in support of strategic missions such as selective assassination, sabotage and destruc- tion of command, control, and communications nodes. There are an estimated three Spetsnaz brigades35 currently in Afghanistan comprising 4,500 to 5,000 troops. The Spetsnaz are deployed in counter-guerrilla and ambush operations, often at night, Their success against resistance forces has been limited.36 Although they fight well and show more initiative and flexi- bility than regular Soviet units, they are also without tanks, mobility and heavy support weapons, They also find it difficult to move undetected, even at night and Mujahidin forces have the advantage of knowing the terrain better. As a result, they have occasionally been defeated by resistance forces. The Mujahidin are the wrong target and as Abdul Haq has noted, "It is not very clever on their part (Soviets) to risk losing Spetsnaz, who cost much more in terms of training and prepar- ation," It is also suspected that they are used in cross-bor- der operations against rebels in Pakistan but little informa- tion is available. Air Assault Forces Beginning in 1982 the Soviets began to use heliborne assaults on a modest scale in surprise raids on rebel positions or to establish blocking positions in key mountain passes. Initially these units, despite special training, suffered heavy losses, with entire commando groups being exterminated while landing in the Panjshir valley.37 Since then, their performance has improved measurably to the point where surprise heliborne assault is probably the most effective Soviet tactic against Mujahidin forces. Heliborne assault is carried out by Spetsnaz, paratroop units and units of Soviet air assault brigades. These tactics, however, have been constrained by mountainous terrain and severe weather, mechanical failure, inadequate pilot training and rebel counter-attacks,including surface to air missiles. and mining and ambush of helicopter landing zones. Paramilitary Forces In support of Soviet and Afghan forces the paramilitary forces of the Kabul regime must be remembered. First among these is the KHAD (Afghan Secret Police) which will be discussed further in the next chapter. Regular police, under the Ministry of the Interior, perform various security duties in addition to their normal police duties and are under the close supervision and sponsorship of their East German and Soviet advisers. In addition there are rural or tribal militias under the Ministry of Nationalities and Tribal Affairs and urban militia, known as Defence of the Revolution, under the Interior Ministry. The services of these units has been purchased through very high wages and various enticements. At best many are merely part- time militias and often support the rebels or at least do nothing to impede them. Their total numbers are estimated between 20,000 and 40,000 and although not generally acknowledged as a serious threat they can be effective against resistance forces because of their knowledge of the terrain, language, and local inhabitants. Summary Soviet military forces invaded Afghanistan with the expect- ation of shoring up a crumbling, neighbouring Marxist regime. They anticipated a low-profile, support role and minimal cas- ualties. Instead, they were immediately dragged into a fighting war. From a military perspective the Soviets have been able to use Afghanistan as their exclusive test-ground for weapons, formations and tactics. In addition, Afghanistan has provided several hundred thousand officers and men of the Russian army their first combat experience since World War II. Now, well into their eighth year of battle,they have adopted a mix of conventional and counter-insurgency tactics. Large scale armoured and mechanized offensives are still used,heavily supported by air and artillery. Agressive use of infantry is emphasized and heliborne assaults and special operations have had reasonable success. Targets appear to be more focused concentrating on border areas, guerrilla bases and supply routes. Supporting these tactics is an over-all policy of apparent indiscriminate destruction of the people, their homes and their livelihoods designed to grind them into submission and rob the resistance forces of any type of support. In reply, the Mujahidin have rejected any thought of conciliation or surrender. They have improved their tactics, their cooperation and their weapons. As Ahmed Shah Massoud discussed in an interview in the fall of 1986, "The most important change (in the last four years) is the escalation of the war. Every year the war has become more severe."38 In the meantime the costs have been high for both sides. Soviet casualties since 1979 are estimated between 35,000 and 50,000 with more than one-third having been killed.39 Muja- hidin casualties are unknown but probably range between 150,000 to more than 200,000. Because of inadequate medical treatment and medical supplies a much higher proportion of these casualties has resulted in death. While Mujahidin morale remains high in spite of severe pressures, Soviet morale is generally regarded as low and this and associated problems have bean publicized in the U.S.S.R. as soldiers rotate home. Finally, there has been the heavy cost in equipment losses. Losses in tanks, weapons, armoured personnel carriers, other vehicles and aircraft alone probably exceed $8 billion as already evidenced by the more than 1,000 aircraft losses to date. What is remarkable then, in spite of a massive Soviet effort and high costs, is that the Soviet forces have not accom- plished their mission. After almost eight years they have failed to defeat the counter-insurgency. They, themselves, are not in danger of defeat, either. The current military situation is a stalemate. CHAPTER FIVE BEYOND THE FIGHTING The Soviet Union, a world superpower, has been waging a costly and brutal war against one of the poorest nations on earth. Into the eighth year of fighting they have realized that they cannot conquer the Afghan national liberation movement with their current military commitment. The military aspect will not diminish and remains the most visible aspect of Soviet coercion in Afghanistan. But, there are other more subtle and more pervasive elements at work. In the long run these may play a more important role in the resolution of the Afghan struggle. What follows is a brief discussion of some of the major factors. Because the Soviet Union is largely in charge of the affairs of Afghanistan today, some of these factors are simply Soviet policy or initiative. Other of the factors discussed are more neutral in nature. However, they are all important to the broader and deeper understanding of this conflict. Sovietization First among these factors is probably the slow, subtle, sovietization of Afghanistan.1 This in itself is a major topic but for analysis purposes can be divided into some basic sub- categories. Administration/Command and Control. In terms of the administ- rative apparatus of the Kabul regime the Soviets maintain direct control of all key ministries from the highest levels to at least the middle levels of decision-making. Each minister has at least two Soviet advisers whose job it is to review and ap- prove all decisions. Even prior to the invasion, the influen- tial role of Soviet military advisers was seen in their ability to prepare the path for Soviet forces. Military advisers are now believed to number approximately 10,000. Most important, though, as an expression of freedom is a nation's ability to direct its own foreign policy. Abd-u-Samad Sherazi was a high- ranking Afghan foreign ministry official who defected to Paki- stan in November 1986. In an interview he confirmed the exist- ence of the two Soviet advisers at cabinet level and discussed the predominant role of KHAD not only in supervising the appoint- ment of officials and diplomats but in appointing a large number of its own agents to prominent diplomatic posts. Finally Sherazi reported: I must say that the foreign policy of Afghanistan lies in the hands of the Russians. They play an important role in the determination of the regime foreign policy. In this regard, all directions are received from Moscow.2 Education. Education is an important clement of sovietization for it is a clear effort to win the hearts and minds of the young who will be the leaders and led of tomorrow. "Education" applies notonly to schooling but also to cultural and social institutions. Students are taught in the classrooms of Afghan- istan and also in those of the U.S.S.R. and Eastern bloc satte- lites. About 6,000 Afghans, including young children, studied in the U.S.S.R. in 1986.3 The numbers of students being sent to the U.S.S.R. or Eastern Europe appear to be increasing each year; the total number of students trained and educated since the conflict is probably about 50,000. This does not include the thousands of officers and NCO's of the Afghan forces who receive training in the Soviet Union, annually. School curriculum conforms to that of the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc. Teachers are generally obliged to belong to the Party. An interview with a Kabul teacher noted that Islamic Studies, formerly an important subject, had been reduced to insignificance and that teachers not belonging to the PDPA were being threatened with dismissal and conscription. In addition, the teacher remarked The Polish educational program is being implemented in the Allaud in School by the authorities. In this regard, a Polish delegation daily visits the school and inspects its teaching affairs. In reality, these programs, which include compulsory Russian and Marxist-Leninist studies, operate only in major urban areas like Kabul where some degree of security is assured. The long- term effectiveness of the educational effort is yet to be judged, Control of the Media. Control of the media has two aspects. On the one hand it promotes only select images of the regime while at the same time circulating disinformation on other issues. On the other hand it prohibits access by foreign media unless by express invitation. The very real physical danger involved in collecting reports in Afghanistan is a major factor in the lack of major publicity for Afghanistan, especially in North America. Put succinctly, by Edward Girardet. ...the Kremlin has sought to impose its will through rigid control of communications systems and the media. International phone calls...run through Moscow. Private ownership of cameras, film and recording equipment has been banned...In radio and television, the Russians over- see every aspect of programing with the object of presenting the Soviet Union as a victorious and invin- cible nation supported by a firm tradition of anti- fascism and love of freedom.5 Economic Relations. In the broadest sense, the entire economic infrastructure of Afghanistan is now inextricably tied to the Soviet Union. Long before the invasion the U.S.S.R. provided relatively large amounts of foreign and military aid to Afghan- istan and was its biggest trading partner. Since the invasion Soviet-Afghan trade has tripled and overall reliance on Soviet support has chained Afghanistan to her neighbour. For example, aid does not come as a grant; rather, it comes as a loan and repayment is expected. Soviet economic aid between 1979 and 1985 totalled about $1.6 billion.6 Under the current Five-Year Plan, Soviet supported projects include a hydropower plant, tunnels on key transportation routes between Kabul and the Soviet border, technical schools and road construction and im- provement. It is also easy to see that these types of projects also support Soviet military and political efforts. Again, in 1985, there were a reported 5,000 Soviet technicians working on 63 projects. Food shortages are an increasing problem for the guerrillas and the population at large. These shortages have been caused by Soviet destruction. The Soviets, in turn, are able to exert leverage because they provide a large proportion of Afghanistan's food imports, especially for its urban populations. The last and most striking example is the exploitation of Afghanistan's natural gas. The Soviets "import" natural gas at roughly one half the world price and simply deduct the cost from Afghanistan's growing debt. The economy touches the existence of all Afghans; its infrastructure, weak and poor as it is, seems to rest securely in Soviet hands. KHAD The KHAD or Afghan Secret Police could correctly be con- sidered a paramilitary force in support of the Kabul regime. The KHAD is also a tool of sovietization in Afghanistan. How- ever, KHAD's influence and effectiveness is so pervasive in Afghan society that it deserves separate discussion. KHAD (Dari acronym for State Information Services) was promoted in January 1987 to WAD (acronym for Ministry of State Security). It is still commonly known as KHAD and is under the de facto control of the KGB. KHAD agents receive training from the KGB and East German specialists. Their numbers may total between 25,000 and 60,000 and include their own combat brigade of about 2,000 men.7 Their reputation is that of a ruthless, brutal organization whose missions are to detect and suppress antiregime elements, gather intelligence, sponsor organizations and programs designed to support regime policies and otherwise intrude on all aspects of Afghan society where the interests and security of the regime may be involved. In support of their activities KHAD effectively uses bribery to buy informants or turn resistance leaders, infiltrates all Afghan government organizations and institution and systematically uses widespread physical and psychological torture in its several detention centres throughout the country. As a result it has been frequently cited for its human rights violations by Amnesty International and the United Nations Human Rights Commission. For example,KNAD agents supervise certain education programs for war orphans and other select children; monitor courses, teachers and students at Kabul University; monitor the Afghan armed forces;and have heavily infiltrated the mosques and re- ligious societies where the rebels have traditionally drawn strength. By infiltrating various resistance groups they have also been able to subvert operations, spread disinformation and promote discord. An interview with an escaped prisoner reveals how he and his resistance group were betrayed and captured for bribes paid by KHAD. He then spent 14 months in prison in Herat where he was subjected to beatings, electrical shock, sleeplessness and other techniques which may be considered mild compared to other documented cases. During this period he believed 160 prisoners were executed at the Herat prison of which he remembered 49 names. He also mentioned 20 children between the ages of six and eight who had been imprisoned for cooperating with the Mujahidin. KHAD agents performed the interrogations and were directly assisted by the Russians on occasion. He was scheduled for execution on 27 December 1985. He escaped on the 26th through the prison latrine.8 KHAD operatives have also been instrumental in a subversive campaign among the refugee caps in Pakistan. There, they sow discord and rivalry among various factions and help promote ill-will by Pakistanis against the refugees by exploding bombs in the already over-crowded streets of Peshawar.9 Unlike the Afghan military, KHAD has proven itself an efficient, effective and dangerous force against the Mujahidin. Religion Religion need not be laboured upon but there may be a tendency, particularly in the western world, to under-rate its importance in this struggle. Even the Soviets badly mis- judged its impact. There are two aspects to Islam in this war. First, is the sincere belief in jihad or "holy war" which is the duty of the Muslims to establish God's will. Against the aetheistic Soviets the choice seems clear. Mujahidin are warriors who wage jihad and if they are killed in battle, accord- ing to the Koran they are martyred and, in fact, continue to love. This is a powerful belief and motivator as seen not only in Afghanistan but also dramatically in Iran. Second is the symbolic and potentially unifying aspect of Islam. Althought the various tribes and ethnic groups have difficulty reaching agreement on many issues Islam is one cause around which they can all rally. As such, it is vital to the overall resistance effort. Equally, the resistance movement has been able to draw upon material and moral support from neighbouring Islamic countries such as Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabis. This fact is not lost on the Soviets who remember the almost universal condemnation of their invasion by Islamic nations. Refugees One of the truly great tragedies of this was is that of the refugee. Afghans now constitute the largest refugee popu- lation in the world. Approximately three million live in camps in Pakistan and another two million have taken refuge in Iran. It is also estimated that there may be as many as two million "internal refugees" in Afghanistan whose homes and means of existence have been destroyed by the war. Some live in caves in the mountains; others have sought shelter in the cities. Kabul's pre-invasion population estimated between 600,000 and 800,000 has now swollen to more than a million and a half. These are striking figures given that the pre-war population of Afghan- istan was estimated at 15 million. A report from Baluchistan describes how approximately 18 thousand families left their bombed villages in August 1986 and for four months trekked across the mountains with little food or rest. En route they were obliged to sell their valuables and animals and were bombed by Russian aircraft on several occasions.10 Once inside Pakistan and Iran, the refugees are still not necessarily safe as the deliberate aerial bombing attacks on their camps of February and March 1987 can attest.11 If one accepts the premise of"migratory genocide", then this massive refugee population is certainly one of its mani- festations. It is difficult to forecast the economic and social costs to Afghanistan as a result of this exodus, but they will be significant. From the Soviet perspective, this depopulation may be seen as positive in that it robs the guerrillas of much of their support and drives out those opposed to the regime. From the Mujahidin perspective it poses a major problem. It not only robs them of support but more importantly suggests that the Mujahidin are unable to ensure the security and liveli- hood of the Afghan people against the Soviet threat. Since this is a war"of the people" the Mujahidin have begun to attempt to slow the tide of refugees by paying more attention to their physical security, by providing what special services they can, including education, by ensuring moreefficient distribution of relief supplies and by attempting to alleviate food shortages by operating agricultural projects in some provinces.12 How successful they will be remains to be seen. Factionalism Factionalsim, bred by fierce individual and tribal indepen- dence conditioned by geography, livelihood, culture and social and religious codes, is an inherent characteristic of Afghan society. It affects the PDPA and the resistance rorces equally. The PDPA was founded on 1 January 1965 and held its first full Party Congress on that date. Since then there have been other Party Congresses convened bat attendance has been as low as half the approximate 1700 delegates and the PDPA has been rent by Parcham-Khalq rivalry. As discussed previously, the majority rank-and-file Khalq are continually at odds with the minority Parcham-dominated upper ranks. Differences are fre- quently settled violently involving betrayal to rebel forces, assassination, imprisonment and torture and full scale gun battles. One shoot-out in September 1985 reported 14 people killed.13 More significantly the Afghan officer corps has been a major victim of rivalry purges. Following the Saur Revolution in 1978, the Khalq Taraki-Amin regime may have purged as many as 7,000 of a total of 8,000 officers before the invasion.14 Officers were either executed, imprisoned, dismissed or retired. Once the Parcham Karmal took power, the purges began again, this time to remove the Khalq-faction officers. Since then, the armed forces have been purged three or four times which had contrubuted nothing to their fighting effectiveness. More recently, it appears that the Parcham themselved may have split into a pro- Karmal faction (following his ouster from power in May 1986) and the faction which supports the current leader, Najibullah. This intense rivalry is a major weakness of the PDPA and their Kabul regime. It is also a great irritant to the Soviets who have, in vain, tried to bridge the gaps. It is also a weakness for the Mujahidin to exploit. However, a similar condition affects resistance parties.15 Although seven major resistance parties have headquarters in Peshawar, Pakistan there also exist numerous smaller groupings often reflecting personality more than ideology. The personal nature of various factions has been a key element in an inabil- ity to unite in a coordinated military effort and has weakened their ability to seek outside help with one voice. They differ on tactics, strategies and the future of Afghanistan. Their rivalry is frequently reflected in resistance party publications.16 The rivalry is further being reflected between successful mili- tary commanders fighting in Afghanistan and political party leaders, not actively involved in fighting, trying to direct affairs at a distance in Pakistan. Nevertheless, some elements now recognize the unity problem as essential to their survival and to their representation in the international forum. An example of this is an article written by a find commander, Abdul Rashid. He notes that, "The problem in achieving unity of the Afghan Resistance is to reconcile the sometimes conflicting interests of Isalm, demo- cracy and ethnic groups." He makes a number of concrete pro- posals towards unifying the Resistance and concludes, "Unless theResistance remains rooted in the culture of Afghanistan, it is destined to fail."17 Therein, lies the dilemma. The foregoing factors are subtle, complex and powerful considerations which deserve a basic understanding for their importance to the Afghan struggle. They are also domestic in nature and omit the critical role which the international forum has to play in this conflict. This role will be discussed in the final chapter. CHAPTER SIX TODAY In Afghanistan as a whole, this year the war has in- tensified much more than before. Resistance Leader November 1986 1 In the past year or year and a half military activity has increased on both sides and shows no sign of let-up. Other important changes and trends have also occurred. This chapter will offer an overview of events during the period 1986 to early 1987 in an attempt to provide the most current information and to give a picture of the situation in Afghanistan at this point in time. Political Situation The most important change in the Kabul regime since 1979 took place on 20 November 1986 when Babrak Karmal "requested to be relieved of party and state posts", for "deteriorating" health reasons. He was replaced by Najibullah, former head of KHAD. This move was orchestrated by the Soviets who had become disenchanted with Karmal's inability to heal the factional rift or to achieve any significant political and military gains. Because Karmal had been installed by Soviet forces he was also seen as a mere puppet both internationally and domestically and had, in this sense, become a liability to the Soviets. Karmal's ouster and subsequent purge of his followers has led to the emergence of a pro-Karmal faction within the Parcham which aggravates the serious differences which still exist between the Parcham and Khalq factions of the PDPA. The ruthless, efficient Najibullah immediately initiated a broad, propaganda plan of "national reconciliation" which included offers of selective amnesty for some political prisoners,2 an offer to negotiate with the rebels or "opposition" who had formerly been called "bandits", incentives such as land and money to encourage the return of some refugees and allusions to a Soviet troop withdrawal. The centre-piece of this "national reconciliation", as a measure of the regime's good faith, was a six month unilateral declaration of cease-fire on 15 January 1987. The timing was excellent as it came in the same period as an apparently more flexible approach to world politics was being adopted by the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev and in anticipation of some progress at the February 1987 U.N. talks on Afghanistan in Geneva. The atmosphere had been further softened by the apparent Soviet withdrawal of three anti-air- craft regiments, two motorized rifle regiments and one tank regiment in October 1986. The anti-aircraft regiments were withdrawn as scheduled since there was little Mujahidin threat from the air. The other three regiments were introduced into Afghanistan from the U.S.S.R. between July and September 1986 solely for the purpose of being able to "withdraw" them. There had been no decrease in Soviet combat capability.3 Najibullah's offer of reconciliation was rejected out of hand by resistance leaders in Peshawar on 17 January 1987. Before tens of thousands of refugees and fighters the leaders made a joint declaration from the Koran: "Fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression and there prevails justice and faith in God."4 Resistance units immediately stepped up attacks on communist targets and on 4 February 1987 Soviet and Afghan forces launched division-sized attacks accompanied by fighter bombers and helicopter gunships against guerrilla targets in Paktia province.5 The cease-fire had collapsed and so, apparently, has the plan for "national reconciliation". Despite further regime efforts to "conduct elections", enlarge the Revolutionary Council to include non-party members and otherwise enlist a broader and more popular support base for its programs, the regime has had little success. From the Mujahidin perspective the last year has been increasingly difficult because of the scale of the problems faced such as chronic ammunition shortages, food scarcities, depopulation and refugees, the critical need for medical supplies and the lack of education for children at the primary level. These problems are not only massive but require immediate atten- tion and pose major challenges to the limited resourced of the resistance. Of course, lack of a strong united political leader- ship among the Mujahidin organizations in exile still remains. Neverhteless, some progress has been made. The seven resistance parties in Peshawar have formed an alliance (Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahidin) governed by a council of party leaders. Spokesmanship rotates on a three month schedule and committees have begun work on education, social services and the coordination of outside humanitarian assistance. The governing council visited the United States in June 1986 at the invita- tion of President Reagan. Similarily, in the past year the alliance has been successful in promoting its cause at an Islamic foreign ministers meeting in Morocco, at meetings in Oslo and New Delhi and at a meeting of the European Parliament in Luxem- bourg last summer.6 The Economy Despite large scale Soviet economic aid which brings its own costs, as discussed previously, the economic situation in Afghanistan is deteriorating each year. 1986 was no exception. Since Afghanistan has a predominantly rural, agrarian economy the reasons for the deterioration are straightforward: depopu- lation and widespread destruction or damage to villages, culti- vated land, orchards, pastures, food stocks, domestic livestock and water and irrigation systems. Food shortages in 1986 have been particularly critical and have affected resistance opera- tions.7 The shortages are aggravated by the difficulties of transporting food stuffs in the war-torn country. The above factors,plus falling exports and rising imports, have contributed to the rising prices which have affected all sectors in the past year. Vegetables, oils, rice, sugar and tea are often in short supply while the price of staples such as wheat, rice, flour, beef, mutton and eggs has increased five- fold since the invasion.8 The destruction of about 10,000 villages and the displace- ment of as many as three million farmers9 has had a devestating impact on the economy. Those farmers that remain face increasing difficulties including lack of governmental assistance previously available to them prior to the April Revolution. Farmers and their families seeking shelter and employment in the cities tax the already over-burdened facilities and services, help drive up prices and will be most fortunate if they find work. Afghan- istan has always been a poor country but the current prospects are bleak. This constitutes a major reason why resistance parties have taken an increasing interest in the development of agricultural projects and the procurement of foreign assistance. The Social Sector Education. Prior to the communist revolution in 1978 Afghanistan was a largely illiterate society with, perhaps, 10 or 15 per cent of the population being able to read. Almost 10 years later, the percentage may not be much better and the educational system is in chaos. The Mujahidin recognize the importance of school- ing their children and have managed recently to establish some primary schools in liberated areas. Nevertheless, they are constrained by finances, facilities, qualified teachers and military operations which may sweep through their areas at any time. More success is being experienced in Pakistan, where, through outside assistance, many schools have been established for refugee students. The Kabul regime claims total school attendance of 685,000 but it is clear that the regime's education program does not extend much beyond the schools of Kabul and possibly a few other major urban areas. As noted, the system is being "soviet- ized"; compulsory Russian has been introduced in the past two years, courses in Afghan history have been "amended" and courses teaching "political knowledge" are compulsory.10 Furthermore, the effectiveness of the regime school system is suspect in terms of providing a basic education. Loyalty to the regime and party and not ability are reported to be the factors governing promotion for students and teachers alike. Classes are now often disrupted to have teachers and students perform "forced work",11 and because of recruiting problems, in 1986 the regime began to draft students directly from the classroom into the army. This forced many students to abandon their education and flee to the resistance or to Pakistan. Finally, it is also reported that many families in the villages surrounding Kabul have simply stopped sending their children to school because of their "anti-Islamic" nature.12 Health. The war has exacted a large cost from Afghanistan's health services infrastructure. Facilities and medicines are in short supply and, yet, the growing casualty lists place excessive demands upon them. Most indigenous doctors have fled to be replaced by Soviet doctors in urban areas or some volun- teer French doctors in resistance-controlled areas. A resistance health officer reports no clinics in two complete districts and not a single doctor in another district.13 Sanitation is now non-existent in many areas and hepatitis, typhoid and tuber- culosis are all reportedly on the rise. Some estimates suggest that Soviet forces experience an additional 5,000 men per year incapacitated because of these and other diseases.14 Religion. Under Najibullah's new initiatives the regime has tried to appear more pious, more pro-Islam, finally aware of the importance of religion to the people. This must pose a problem for she avowed atheist PDPA but, regardless; Najibullah and two other top leaders attended prayers, with much publicity, in Kabul's central mosque in August 1986.15 Not being able to eliminate the religious factor, the Soviets and their regime are now trying to control it. The new Islamic Affairs Ministry oversees all religious activities and claims some 10,000 mullahs in its employ. In this regard, Abdul Haq observes; The Soviets are doing all sortsto pursue their program of spreading ethnic divisions and consolidating their grip on Afghanistan. Seven years ago they were saying religion is the opium of the people and now they're founding mullahs and building mosques and trying to lull the people into neutrality by appeasing them.16 There is no evidence, yet, that the regime has had any success in this effort. Human Rights. Violations of human rights continue in Afghani- stan on a massive and brutal scale. They are perpetrated by both Afghan and Soviet forces and are reported upon continually in the resistance press.17 The total number of Afghans killed since 1978 is estimated at between 600,000 and 1,000,000. In a February 1986 report to the U.N. Human Rights Commission in Geneva, the Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan concluded that "continuation of the military solution in Afghanistan will lead to a situation approaching genocide."18 Refuges. In 1986 the number of refugees continued to grow although at a slower rate. It was also noted that newly arrived refugees appeared to be in worse condition than their predec- essors, having been more directly affected by the fighting, and that they brought fewer possessions with them, a fact again borne out in the resistance press.19 Pakistan not only offers it's hospitality but bears nearly one half the cost of the annual $360 million relief effort. The next major contri- butor is the United States; other major contributors include Japan, Canada, Australia, Saudi Arabia and some West European nations. Military Operations In Soviet eyes the major tool of pacification still remains the defeat of resistance forces by Soviet and Afghan military forces. In the past eighteen months combat operations have spread in scope and grown in intensity. While the Soviets have expanded operations in rural areas throughout the country, the resistance has increasingly brought the war to the cities, par- ticularly Kabul and Herat. The Soviets still carry out large scale offensives (usually division size) but operations appear to be more decentralized and more focused. Heliborne assaults are now used with good results and the Mujahidin admit that Soviet forces are increasingly effective as they gain experience and make some modifications to their tactics. Massive artillery and air support remains a feature of all Soviet combat operations. In 1986 some new tactics were adopted. Ambushes of guerrilla bands and their supply routes became more common, and air raids to cut off supply routes in the border areas with Iran and Pakistan were stepped up. In addition, new strong points were constructed along key routes. The new tactics have had some success and have forced the Mujahidin to seek longer, more difficult supply lines. Soviet forces in Afghanistan are fixed at approximately 115,000 but are supported heavily by the 30 to 40 thousand troops across the northern border. The Afghan army remains of questionable effectiveness, suffers severe recruiting short- ages and has a current strength also of 30 to 40 thousand men. Despite their many difficulties and heavy Soviet pressure the Mujahidin in 1986 continued to attack and, if anything, increased their attacks after Najibullah's offer of cease-fire in January 1987. Training and cooperation among various groups has improved considerably but most important in the past year has been an increase in both the quantity and quality of wea- pons. Of these, the BM-12 multiple rocket launcher system and the Stinger and Blowpipe surface-to-air missile systems have had the greatest impact allowing the rebels to attack enemy targets from a distance and enabling them to defend against their greatest threat, attack from the air. The introduction of more than 600 surface-to-air missiles in the last six months has forced Soviet jets and helicopters to alter their tactics; they no longer linger over targets and are also forced to bomb from higher altitudes, with less accuracy. The missiles are now accounting for 20 or more air- craft losses a month with a probability-kill rate of about 70 percent. One Stinger missile costs $75,000 and, at $8 million per Mi-24 HIND, the air war is becoming very costly to the Soviets.20 According to Kabul Radio 215 battles took place between the Mujagidin and regime forces in 1986.21 These battles were spread across all provinces but increasingly they are being fought house to house on city streets. Hardest hit of the cities is Herat which has more or less seen constant battle since February 1986. At the time, Herat's large Shia district was levelled by air and artillery but the Mujahidin fought on in the rubble. By August 1986 the resistance reportedly controlled more than 60 percent of the city and, on August 16, were attacked in the southern suburbs by Soviet and DRA forces comprising 10,000 men and hundreds of tanks.22 Fierce street battles were still reported in Herat in March and April 1987.23 Kabul, too, has been the scene of heavy fighting; the level of resist- ance pressure has never been so high as in the past year. The Kabul airport, military garrisons and soviet installations have all been under frequent rocket attack, car bombs are being used more frequently and a number of assassinations of Soviet and Afghan army officers in Kabul have been reported.24 Most dramatic was the rocket attack of 27 August 1986. On the huge Qargha arms and ammunition depot on the outskirts of Kabul. The explosions were spectacular and resulted in heavy losses to the communists. The fierce fighting of 1986 continues but has now spilled into other territory. In bold moves which must surely be cause for consternation among Soviet leaders, if only from the view- point of Kremlin prestige, Afghan guerrillas have recently begun to attack limited targets in the Soviet Union. Attacks have consisted of rocket barrage across the border, ambushes and mining of roads used by border patrols and military traffic.25 Although not a direct result, this led to deliberate Afghan airforce bombing assaults on refugee camps inside Pakistan's borders in February and March 1987, claiming more than 200 lives. After numerous warnings about border violations, Pakistani F-16 fighters shot down an Afghan jet on 30 March ten miles inside the Pakistani border. The Mujahidin have always claimed about 80 percent control of Afghan territory in the past, but by their own admission, estimate their overall control of territory to have diminished to 70 percent during 1986. This figure may not have much impor- tance particularly in view of the increased pressure on the cities. In the same period they also estimate 4,000 to 5,000 Russians killed, 10,000 regime troops and paramilitary forces killed, 200 aircraft downed, 1,000 Soviet tanks, APCs and vehicles destroyed, 4,000 Mujahidin killed and 50,000 civilians killed.26 These figures may be considered fairly accurate. The war in Afghanistan today remains a stand-off. CHAPTER SEVEN TOMORROW We will go on fighting until we achieve either vic- tory or death. Ahmed Shah Massoud, Panjshir Valley 1986 1 The Soviets continue to justify their position in Afghan- istan on the basis that they were invited there to help protect the Marxist regime against "foreign interference". But, this has been difficult for them to explain in light of the fact that Soviet troops immediately killed the Afghan president and PDPA General Secretary, Hafizullah Amin and then, a week after the invasion installed Babrak Karmal as the new Afghan leader. Although there were several associated reasons for the in- vasion, they condensed into two major arguments: one, that Russian security could not be threatened by an unpopular, defiant, unstable government on its border and two, that under the Brezhnev doctrine, not only for reasons of security but also for those of international communist prestige, brother Marxist governments were "obliged" to come to the aid of any neighboring Marxist regime being "threatened". What the Soviets anticipated as a relatively straight- forward occupation with potential high gains and limited costs has turned into a long and costly quagmire with no end in sight. Their recent attempt to strengthen their position and that of the Kabul regime by replacing the weak, uninspiring Babrak Karmal with the feared, former head of the secret police, Naji- bullah,has not yet bet with any notable success. His sweeping plan of "national reconciliation", supported by Soviet propa- ganda ploys, seems to have collapsed rather rapidly. If any- thing, these measures may have served to help-unify resist- ance forces, stiffen their resolve and to increase the number of attacks on communist targets. At the same time, the popu- lation at large is sympathetic to the Mujahidin and alienated from the Kabul regime and its Soviet backers. Despite increasingly fierce and widespread fighting the situation is that of a mili- tary impasse. Perhaps, then, another forum of resolution must be consid- ered. As a recent resistance editorial put it: Westerners often ask whether the mujahidin really hope to be able to defeat the Soviet army. In the eyes of the resistance the question is not to the point. The right question will be to ask the Russians whether they still believe they are able to crush the resist- ance militarily. During the past seven years, the muja- hidin of Afghanistan have been able to fight against one of the most powerful armies in the world. It is in itself an achievement, already a victory. Now the question is; what is the rest of the world going to do?2 The International Forum Afghanistan has been a war "of the people" with a complex mosaic of factors at play in addition to the dominant military effort. And, it has been the Afghan people who have paid the high and tragic costs of this war and their efforts and losses must not be diminished in any manner. But, in the final anal- ysis, it may well be the international forum which determines the future of Afghanistan. This suggestion begins with the simple proposition that the Kabul regime of Najibullah cannot survive, even a short time, against current resistance forces without active Soviet military support. A corollary is that resistance forces cannot survive in the long run against a Soviet-backed Kabul regime without outside support in terms of weapons, supplies and humanitarian aid. The third element is that of the "linkages" which connect or influence the various governments involved. U.S.S.R. The Soviets, despite the propaganda aspects of "glas- nost" or "openess" seem genuinely intent on improving their international image, particularly in view of increasing world criticism with regard to Afghanistan. To some degree, improved relations with the United States and Great Britain algo hinge on the Afghanistan issue as recently raised by Prime Minister Thatcher in her March 1987 visit to Moscow. Obviously it is in the Soviet interest to reach a solution in Afghanistan. Soviet troop withdrawal is hinted at but, in the meantime, Soviet military activity has increased. The Soviets are not prepared to withdraw unless survival of the communist Kabul regime can be guaranteed. The dilemma for the Soviets is that once their troops are withdrawn, the survival of the regime cannot be guaranteed; it will, in fact, probably fall quickly. At the same time, as the Soviets widen their military efforts they must become concerned about spillover into other areas.3 Recent assaults by rebels into Muslim-dominated Soviet territory, fighting near the Iranian border and the recent Pakistani retal- iatory downing of a Soviet jet with Afghan markings should give Soviet leaders pause for thought. Clearly they have enough problems in Afghanistan without further antagonizing other Islamic nations in the region. United States. United States support of the resistance effort is crucial and plays a role second only to that of Pakistan. The support includes a current budget of $450 million for wea- pons and related defence items such as the Stinger missile and $50 million for relief assistance which includes $25 million worth of food commodities through the World Food program.4 Not only is this assiatance essential but also it has set an example for other nations, particularly West European ones such as France, who have provided increasing humanitarian assistance while at the same time becoming more vocal and crit- ical of the Soviet role in Afghanistan. U.S. policy toward Afghanistan aims at a negotiated poli- tical settlement predicated on the prompt and complete with- drawal of Soviet troops. The U.S. has supported U.N.-sponsored efforts and resolutions to reach an agreements on Afghanistan but in the absence of a settlement is committed to support of the Afghan cause.5 At the same time in somewhat contradictory fashion the U.S. maintains an embassy in Kabul and recognizes the government of the DRA in the United Nations.6 Perhaps, this is done for the purpose of maintaining a conduit into Afghanistan but by these actions the U.S. publicly fails to recognize the resistance as representing the legitimate aspira- tions of the vast majority of Afghan people. This in turn helps to exclude the resistance from U.N. peace negotiations since the Mujahidin are not legitimately recognized as speaking for the Afghan nation. A final consideration of U.S. policy toward Afghanistan is that it is closely tied to policy toward Pakistan. Pakistan, concerned about being heavily pressured between the U.S.S.R. and India, has indicated that it is progressing toward the building of a nuclear bomb. The U.S. has stated this act could jeopardize U.S. military and economic aid. As the American ambassador in Islamabad remarked; The trick is to sustain the resistance in Afghan- istan so the Soviets see it is better to get out. At the same time we want to discoura
