The Argentine Seizure Of The Malvinas [Falkland] Islands: History and Diplomacy CSC 1987 SUBJECT AREA History WAR IN THE MODERN ERA SEMINAR The Argentine Seizure of the Malvinas [Falkland] Islands: History and Diplomacy Lieutenant Commander Richard D. Chenette, USN 4 May 1987 Marine Corps Command and Staff College Marine Corps Development and Education Command Quantico, Virginia 22134 ABSTRACT Author: Chenette, Richard D., Lieutenant Commander, USN Title: The Argentine Seizure of the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands: History and Diplomacy Date: 4 May 1987 This research paper traces the history of Argentina's dispute with Great Britain over sovereignty of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands from the time they were discovered though their seizure by Argentina in April 1982. It presents opposing positions of Argentina and Great Britain on the sovereignty issue, reviews diplomatic efforts to solve the sovereignty question, describes the political and economic situation facing the Argentine ruling junta in early 1982, and provides details of the amphibious operation mounted by Argentina to seize the Islands. The author offers his analysis, conclusions, and opinions in the final chapter. The overall intent of the paper is to provide the reader with insights into how and why Argentina seized the Islands. TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page INTRODUCTION 1 1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND THROUGH 1833 5 2 OPPOSING CASES FOR SOVEREIGNTY 12 3 DIPLOMACY 1964-1981 19 4 THE JUNTA AND HINTS OF AN INVASION 27 5 THE SOUTH GEORGIA INCIDENT 33 6 OPERATION ROSARIO 38 7 ANALYSIS, CONCLUSIONS, AND OPINIONS 45 FOOTNOTES 52 BIBLIOGRAPHY 59 APPENDIX A: MAPS 66 APPENDIX B: HISTORICAL CHRONOLOGY 68 INTRODUCTION Four hundred and eighty miles northeast of Cape Horn, in the South Atlantic Ocean, lie two large islands * surrounded by approximately two hundred small islands and inlets.(1) Covering an area of 4700 square miles (slightly smaller than the state of Connecticut) the large Islands (see map, Appendix A) are characterized by irregular coastlines and a rugged, hilly landscape dotted with many ponds, lakes, marshes, and peat bogs.(2) The year-round median temperature of 43oF varies only 12oF between seasons, from 27oF in July, the coldest month, to 49oF in January, the warmest. A wildlife sanctuary for centuries, the Islands are to this day a safe haven for huge quantities of birds including five species of penguins.(3) The majority of the 1800 Island inhabitants (or "kelpers," so called because of the large amounts of kelp that surrounds the Islands) are descendants of British settlers who settled there after British occupation of the Islands in 1833. In addition to those of British descent, a few Islanders trace their roots to cosmopolitan origins. In 1972, the heads of Island families had been born in the following locations: the Islands, 431; Great Britain, 127; Argentina, 2; Australia, 1; Canada, 1; Chile, 9; * The British have named these islands "The Falklands" and the Argentines "Las Malvinas." Henceforth in this paper, they will be referred to simply as "the Islands." Denmark, 1; Germany, 1; Ireland, 3; Tanzania, 1; United States,3; and Uruguay, 1.(4) Sheep raising and the production of wool comprise the mainstay of Islander work force, who enjoy a modest lifestyle and few luxuries. There are less than 60 miles of paved roads, and few homes have refrigerators. All consumer goods are imported by charter vessel four times a year.(5) Half of the Islanders live in Stanley, the only major town and administrative center.(6) The remainder live in isolated settlements connected by trails which in winter are often impassable by motor vehicles or horses.(7) The economy of the Islands is dominated by the Falkland Islands Company, which owns 46% of the land (about 1.3 million acres) and about half the sheep. The Company not only employs a third of the work force, but controls wholesale and retail business, banking, and the charter vessels which transport virtually all goods to and from Britain.(8) It seems improbable that such isolated islands would be of much interest to any nation other than Great Britain. Yet during the first half of the twentieth century, virtually all Argentinians had become convinced these Islands were rightfully theirs. The cause of the return of "Las Malvinas" had become firmly rooted in numerous facets of Argentine society. A generation of school children had been taught that the Malvinas were Argentine. Postage stamps proclaimed that the Islands were a part of the Argentine Republic. Argentine maps labeled the Islands as "occupied territory." The Islanders were counted in the Argentine census and by Argentine law male Islanders could technically be drafted into Argentine military service.(9) But the predominantly British ancestry and culture of the Islanders had strongly influenced their resolve to remain under British rule, particularly after sovereignty negotiations intensified in the mid 1960's. As a result, the Islanders steadfastly opposed all proposals which would lead to eventual transfer of sovereignty to Argentina. Argentina's obsession for the return of the Islands was finally realized on April 2, 1982, when Argentine military forces forcibly seized them after 150 years of British possession and administration. The British quickly dispatched a task force which recaptured the Islands after six weeks of bloody air, sea, and land combat. The cost to both sides was enormous. Aside from the huge economic expenditures required to support the war, the death toll amounted to over one thousand Argentine and two hundred and fifty British military personnel.(10) This research paper traces the history of Argentina's dispute with Great Britain over sovereignty of the Islands from the time they were discovered through their seizure by Argentina in April 1982. It presents opposing positions of Argentina and Great Britain on the sovereignty issue, reviews diplomatic efforts to solve the sovereignty question, describes the political and economic situation facing the Argentine ruling junta in early 1982, and provides details of the amphibious operation mounted by Argentina to seize the Islands. The overall intent of the paper is to provide the reader with insights into how and why Argentina seized the Islands. To maximize objectivity, the author's conclusions and opinions are not presented until the final chapter. The author is indebted to U. S. Coast Guard historian Dr. Robert Scheina, who provided notes and interviews used to write the chapter on Operation Rosario. CHAPTER ONE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND THROUGH 1833 Argentina's invasion and seizure of the Islands in April 1982 was the culmination of a complex dispute, the roots of which date back over two hundred years. The identity of the country which deserves credit for the original discovery of the Islands is clouded by inconclusive evidence from accounts of early voyages of exploration.(1) Spaniards, Britons, and Dutchmen each claim explorers who were first to sight the Islands.(2) The first sighting * which remains generally unchallenged is that of Dutchman Sebald de Weert in 1600.(3) France was the first country to establish a settlement on the Islands. In apparent disregard for the Treaty of Utrecht **, French nobleman and explorer Antoine de Bougainville landed on the Islands in 1764. Claiming them for France and Louis XV, De Bougainville also established a small settlement called Port * By international law, mere sightings of new territories are considered insufficient to establish legal claim to them. ** In this treaty, signed in 1713, England and France formally agreed to Spanish sovereignty over its traditional territories in the Americas, including the Islands. Louis. A year later, British explorer John Byron surveyed the Islands. He claimed them for England, but promptly departed,unaware that the French had already established a settlement there.(4) In 1766 another British expedition, headed by Captain John McBride, was dispatched from England, armed with 100 settlers to consolidate John Byron's claim. They arrived at the Islands only to find the French settlement at Port Louis now numbering 250 persons.(5) The French refused to quit their settlement, despite McBride's non violent efforts to convince them that they were inhabiting British territory. He returned to England in early 1767 to report on the situation, leaving Captain Anthony Hunt in charge of a small British garrison at Port Egmont.(6) On the basis of the Treaty of Utrecht, Spain objected vehemently to what she considered to be an intrusion by both France and England into her territory. France, Spain's ally, was willing to negotiate. In exchange for substantial compensation to Antoine de Bougainville, the French sold Port Louis to Spain in 1767. A Spanish governor was promptly appointed over the settlement which was renamed Puerto Soledad.(7) This left Spain with only the British at Port Egmont with whom to contend. Both sides managed to avoid contact with each other until 1769 when Captain Hunt, embarked in his sloop, encountered a Spanish schooner. In the dialogue that followed during the next few months, the Spanish and British leaders each claimed total sovereignty and each demanded the other quit the Islands. This dispute was resolved in 1770 after the Spanish government had dispatched 1400 soldiers embarked in five frigates to expel the British. Confronted by such an overwhelming force, the handful of soldiers at the British garrison capitulated under protest in June and promptly returned to England. This left Spain in complete control of the Islands.(8) King George III reacted to Spain's forced takeover of the Islands, by withdrawing the British ambassador from Madrid. Spain and Britain were poised on the brink of war. It was then that Charles III of Spain learned that France was unwilling to join him in war with England. Fearing he could not defeat Britain without France's assistance, Charles abandoned his war plans and quickly began negotiations with the British which led to the exchange of Spanish and British peace declarations in January 1771. The Spanish declaration returned Port Egmont to England but firmly reasserted Spanish sovereignty over the Islands. The corresponding British declaration omitted any reference to Spanish sovereignty. Spain later claimed that she had agreed to restore Port Egmont to the British only because of an alleged secret promise by England to abandon any claim to the Islands after an undisclosed period of time. (9) This controversial claim remains undocumented and is denied to this day by the British. The British reoccupation of Port Egmont in September 1771 lasted only three years. A plaque left in 1774 by the departing governor read "Be it known to all nations, that Falkland's Island, with this fort, storehouses, wharf, harbour, bays, and creeks thereunto belonging, are the sole right and property of His Most Sacred Majesty George III..... in witness whereof this plaque is set up."(10) The Islands remained in possession of Spain for the next 40 years until the collapse of her New World empire. During this period, there is no evidence of any British interest in the Islands nor any record of demands by Britain that Spain abandon them. In fact, in 1790 England disavowed any colonial ambitions in South America "and the islands adjacent" by signing an agreement with Spain at the Nootka Sound Convention. * Spanish authorities removed Spanish settlers from Puerto Soledad in 1811 in response to growing factions in Buenos Aires who sought independence from Spain. Once abandoned by Spain, the Islands were freely and indiscriminately used for many years by mariners from numerous countries for sealing, whaling, and fishing.(11) In 1816, the newly formed United Provinces of Rio de la Plata, forerunner of present day Argentina, declared independence from Spain. The new "government of Buenos Aires" declared its sovereignty over the Islands by right of succession from Spain since the Islands had been previously governed by Spain, from Buenos Aires. An envoy was dispatched from Buenos Aires by frigate in 1820 to officially lay claim to the Islands. He * The British would later deny that the islands referred to in this agreement included the Falkland/Malvinas Islands. informed the crews of the fifty or more vessels berthed at Puerto Soledad that his government now had jurisdiction over all fishing and hunting on the Islands.(12) The new Government of Buenos Aires appointed its first governor of Puerto Soledad in 1823. Three years later it granted an enterprising business man of French origin named Louis Vernet substantial rights to commercial development of territory in and around the Islands including exploitation of the wildlife and sea life. This was done to settle a rather large debt that the government owed Vernet's wife. In 1826 he established a colony on the Islands comprised of 90 settlers.(13) Vernet was appointed governor in 1829 under protest from the British consul in Buenos Aires who took that opportunity to reassert the British claim to the Islands but without taking further action. Vernet proceeded to impose restrictions on the mariners in the area who had been slaughtering the seal population.(14) His efforts to consolidate control over the Islands culminated in July 1831 with the seizure of three United States vessels on the grounds that they were engaging in illegal fishing. One captain was permitted to continue fishing only after agreeing to share profits with Vernet. The second vessel escaped. The third was commandeered by Vernet and sailed to Buenos Aires to put the captain on trial for illegal fishing.(15) The incensed American consul in Buenos Aires dispatched the United States warship Lexington to Puerto Soledad to seek restitution for sealskins and other property which Vernet had confiscated from the commandeered American ship. Upon arriving there in December 1831, Lexington's captain, Silas Duncan, not only recovered the sealskins but also destroyed Argentine guns and settlement buildings, arrested numerous Argentine inhabitants, and declared the Islands free of all government. Vernet resigned as governor and never again set foot on the Islands.(16) The Government of Buenos Aires then decided to establish a penal colony on the Islands, presumably because most of the Argentinians left by Duncan were convicts. The new civil and military governor, appointed in the fall of 1832 to run the penal colony, was murdered upon his arrival there by mutinous soldiers. The Argentine government responded by dispatching troops commanded by Don Jose Maria Pinedo to restore law and order. In January 1833, while Pinedo and his troops were pursuing the murderers, British Captain James Onslow arrived at the Islands on HMS Clio, under instructions to take and hold the Islands for Britain. The British had ordered the expedition after receiving word from their consul in Buenos Aires of the unstable situation in the Islands.(17) The arrival of the British forces caught the Argentines by surprise. According to historian W. F. Boyson, Clio's presence constituted "the embodiment of dazzling order, discipline and restraint." Onslow convinced outnumbered Pinedo to quit the Islands under protest but without firing a single shot. Except for two months in 1982, Britain has maintained control of the Islands ever since.(18) News of the British capture of the Islands was bitterly received in Buenos Aires. Boyson states: "The young republic was ablaze with indignation at the insult to her dignity.... "(l9) In London, the Argentine ambassador protested the British occupation. Arguments between Britain and Argentina over the sovereignty question, discussed in the next chapter, have abounded ever since. CHAPTER TWO OPPOSING CASES FOR SOVEREIGNTY The controversy over sovereignty of the Islands has grown steadily in intensity ever since their discovery almost three centuries ago. The British have adamantly retained their resolve not to relinquish their "Falkland Islands." The Argentines have accused the British of illegally occupying their "Malvinas" since 1833. This chapter presents a brief description of the opposing Argentine and British positions on the sovereignty issue. ARGENTINE POSITION Argentine historians and apologists have advanced one or more of the following points to support their claim to the Islands: 1. Spanish explorers were the first to discover the Islands: Magellan in 1520 and Camargo in 1540.(1) 2. Spain had purchased the Islands from France in 1767 and thus acquired the right to France's prior occupation.(2) 3. The Islands were peacefully occupied and administered by 19 Spanish governors from 1774 until Argentina declared independence in 1816.(3) 4. Britain had secretly promised to abandon its claim to the Islands during negotiations leading to the peace declarations of 1771.(4) 5. Britain abandoned its settlement in 1774 and showed no interest in the Islands for the next sixty years. The British did not claim the Islands when Spain left them in 1811. Britain recognized Argentina's independence in 1825 but made no claim at that time to the Islands which were then governed by Argentina.(5) 6. By the Nootka Sound Convention of 1790, Britain disavowed any colonial ambitions in South America "and the islands adjacent." Argentina claims this included the Islands.(6) 7. Argentina properly inherited the Islands in 1816 upon gaining its independence from Spain since these territories were formerly ruled by Spain from Buenos Aires.(7) 8. Some Argentine apologists claim the Islands on the basis of their geographical proximity to Argentina's mainland or because they are geologically a part of the South American continent.(8) 9. Argentines consider British colonization of the Islands "incompatible with the American ideal." This argument has been made since passage in 1960 of United Nations Resolution Number 1515 which "solemnly proclaims the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations."(9) The foundation of the Argentine claim lies in their avowed right to the Islands by succession of Spanish sovereignty. In the Argentine view, the British relinquished sovereignty of the Islands by signing the Treaty of Utrecht with Spain in 1713. Argentina insists that Britain agreed in this treaty to the territorial integrity of all Spanish territories in the Americas, including the Islands.(10) COUNTER ARGUMENTS BY THE BRITISH 1. The British maintain that the Spanish claim that Magellan discovered the Islands in 1540 rests on imprecise evidence. 2. Britain never accepted the Spanish claim to sovereignty over the Islands based on purchase from France. 3. The British disavow knowledge of the "secret understanding" which Spain alleged was made prior to the signing of the exchange of peace declarations in 1771. The British declaration made no comment on the issue of sovereignty. The British claim both sides accepted a return to the status quo. 4. The British never relinquished their claim to the Islands when they abandoned Port Egmont in 1774. Proof lies in the plaque which was left behind. 5. The British insist that mutual agreements made between Spain and England during the Nootka Sound Convention of 1790 did not affect existing claims to sovereignty. The agreement stipulated that in the future neither party should establish any settlement on the eastern or western coasts of South America or on adjacent islands to the south of those already held by Spain. (Refer to page 8.) 6. Britain insists that Argentina had no more right to claim inheritance of the Islands after she declared her independence from Spain in 1816 than over other separate and independent countries such as Uruguay and Paraguay.(11) BRITISH POSITION The British base their claim on one or more of the following points: 1. British explorers were the first to discover the Islands: John Davis in 1592 and Sir John Hawkins in 1594 and the first known landing on the Islands was by British Captain John Strong in 1690.(12) 2. Britain established a settlement at Port Egmont in 1766 which remained there until 1774 when the British withdrew on the grounds of economy, leaving behind a plaque which asserted British sovereignty.(13) 3. Spain vacated her settlement in 1811.(14) 4. Britain had protested the Government of Buenos Aires' 1828 appointment of Louis Vernet as governor of the Islands and asserted at that time that the British Crown had not permanently abandoned the Islands when they left them in 1774.(15) 5. Britain repossesed Port Egmont in 1832 and occupied Port Louis in 1833.(16) 6. The British have continuously and effectively occupied the Islands since 1833.(17) Britain originally argued that she established sovereignty of the Islands when British settlers arrived there in 1765. Prior to World War II, her primary argument shifted to the doctrine of prescription which states that sovereignty of a territory can be established by peaceful occupation over a period of time.(18) Most recently the backbone of the British position has centered on the right and stated desire of the Islanders to remain under British rule.(19) COUNTER ARGUMENTS BY ARGENTINA 1. The earliest voyagers to the Islands were Spanish, not English. 2. The plaque left by the British when the abandoned Port Egmdnt in 1774 refers to only one 'island' on which Port Egmont is located. 3. Argentines insist they perfected their title to the Islands during the years from 1829 to 1833 and that displacement of her citizens by Britain in 1833 was "an act of usurpation carried out by illegal means."(20) DOUBTS BY BOTH SIDES Both British and Argentine politicians expressed doubts about the legitimacy of their respective cases during the first few decades of the 20th century. 1. A memorandum published by an official of the British Foreign Office's Research Department in 1910, for example, lent a great deal of credence to the standing Argentine position. It indicated concern over the fact that the sovereignty issue had not been resolved in the 1771 peace declarations and allowed that there probably was some truth to the Argentine claim of the secret agreement that was allegedly made prior to the signing of those declarations. The head of the Foreign Office's American Department stated that from reading the memorandum it was "difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Argentine government's attitude is not altogether unjustified and that our action has been somewhat high-handed."(21) Twenty-six years later, the Foreign Office addressed the subject again. In 1936 the head of the British Foreign Office's American department in 1936 stated that "it is therefore not easy to explain our possession without showing ourselves up as international bandits."(22) 2. In 1927, after examining the British position on the sovereignty issue, Argentina's foreign minister concluded that it was "exceedingly strong."(23) This summary of the Argentine and British positions brings to light the complexity of the sovereignty question. A brief analysis of these arguments from the standpoint of present-day international law is presented in the final chapter. The next chapter examines the "modern day" era of the dispute. CHAPTER THREE DIPLOMACY 1964-1981 Publicly little occurred in the way of negotiations during the 130 years following Britain's possession of the Islands in 1833. The position of both sides remained largely the same. Argentina's protests of the British occupation never ceased and Britain tended to avoid the sovereignty issue. Then in 1964, Argentine lobbyists, using as ammunition a 1960 United Nations resolution pledging to "bring to an end everywhere colonialism in all its forms"(2) convinced the United Nations General Assembly to call upon Britain and Argentina to "proceed without delay with negotiations..... with a view to finding a peaceful solution to the problem..... bearing in mind..... the interests of the population of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)."(3) This resulted in passage of United Nations resolution number 2065 in December 1965 which brought international attention to the sovereignty issue and forced Britain, which listed the Islands and Dependencies as one of its colonies, to begin serious negotiations with Argentina.(4) A series of secret meetings were held in London in July 1966 between representatives of the British Foreign Office and officials from the Argentine embassy. Underlying the discussions was an understanding that sovereignty would eventually be transferred to Argentina and that the major obstacle lay in protecting the the rights and way of life of the Islanders.(5) These negotiations continued until by September 1967 they were being led by the Argentine Foreign minister Nicanor Costa Mendez, and his British counterpart, George Brown. Brown did not inform either the Islanders or Parliament of the secret negotiations because he wanted to wait until he could present them with a proposal that would hold strong appeal for all parties concerned. When word of the negotiations was leaked to the Islanders, a number of them sent letters to supporters in London expressing concern that the negotiations might destroy their (the Islanders') desire to remain under British rule. One of those receiving a copy of the letter was William Hunter Christie, a lawyer who had formerly served in a diplomatic position at the British embassy in Buenos Aires. He promptly contacted the chairman of the Falkland Islands Company and convinced him to establish a campaign designed to represent the position of the Islanders in London. Out of this was born the Falkland Islands Emergency Committee and what later was termed the "Falklands lobby."(6) This lobby dedicated itself to the prevention of any compromise of British sovereignty over the Islands.(7) The influence wielded by the Falklands lobby in Parliament became evident in March 1968. Lord Chalfont, the Foreign Office Minister responsible for the talks with Argentina, was confronted with a series of tough questions, posed by members of the House of Lords, concerning the content of the negotiations with Argentina. They were probing to confirm their suspicions that negotiations were being conducted with Argentina which might lead to British concessions on the issue of sovereignty. Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart, now George Brown's successor, after being subjected to a similar but more grueling interrogation in the House of Commons, reluctantly conceded that "the wishes of the Islanders are an absolute condition for any settlement."(8) Lord Chalfont embarked on a campaign designed to convince the Islanders of the benefits they would enjoy by establishing closer economic ties with Argentina. He hoped the Islanders would be more open to negotiation of the sovereignty issue once such ties were established. An expedition to the Islands by Lord Chalfont in 1968 soured his hopes for a change of heart by the Islanders and convinced him that they were determined not to give an inch on the sovereignty question. Apparently fearing a political backlash, Prime Minister Harold Wilson decided not to push the issue with the Islanders despite Chalfont's warning upon his return to England that the deadlock had the potential of leading to war.(9) The British Foreign Office continued negotiations during the early 1970s through David Scott, the new Under-Secretary of Dependent Territories. He was determined to arrange an agreement which would at a minimum strengthen economic ties between Argentina and the Islanders, even if it avoided the key issue of sovereignty. He proposed the opening of an air link between the Islands and Argentina to replace the Falkland Islands Company's unprofitable monthly runs to the mainland using their vessel, the Darwin. The new air service promised to increase tourism and offered the Islanders a new opportunity to use mainland schools and hospitals. Scott convinced the Islanders to accept his proposal after repeatedly assuring them that the deal would have no impact on the sovereignty question. The resulting Communications Agreement was signed with Buenos Aires in July 1971. It stipulated that the British would build a new airstrip on the Islands for the air service which was to be provided by Argentina.(10) But construction of the new airstrip was delayed because the British Foreign Office had failed to secure adequate funds for the project. The Argentines, anxious to execute the Communications Agreement, voluntarily built a temporary airstrip after the British provided the requisite steel-mesh.(11) The signing of two supplementary communications agreements in 1974 enabled Argentina to immediately build and supply fuel tanks adjacent to the temporary airfield and man the tanks with military personnel. This resulted in heightened concern among the Islanders. On one hand, the new presence of the Argentine troops who were manning the fuel tanks made the Islanders feel Argentina was gaining a stronger foothold in the Islands. On the other hand, the delay in construction of the permanent airfield made them feel cheated of the previously promised reliable air service. They vented their frustration by asking the new Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan, to terminate all talks with Argentina. News of the stalled talks was not favorably received in Buenos Aires. A car bomb exploded outside the British embassy and the new British ambassador, Derek Ashe, received demands for the Islands on notes inscribed in blood. The British Foreign Office gave Ashe permission to resume talks but make no concessions.(12) In 1976, Prime Minister Callaghan initiated an expedition headed by Lord Shackleton to assess the economic condition of the Islands. Shackleton concluded that the Islands' economy was declining and recommended establishment of new economic ties between Argentina and the Islanders.(13) This opened the door for yet another British diplomat, Ted Rowlands, to negotiate with the Islanders in February 1977. Although the Island leaders were at first determined to remain under British rule, Rowlands convinced them to put the sovereignty issue back on the bargaining table. There was now at least a ray of hope that the Islanders could be sold on an agreement that provided them economic advantages in return for some concessions on the sovereignty question.(14) But Rowland's hopes for an agreement never materialized. During the next two years of negotiations new proposals were discussed such as joint sovereignty and administration of the Islands (referred to as the condominium concept) and leasing of the Islands for a predetermined number of years (the leaseback concept).(15) All such proposals were attacked by the Falklands lobby and the British press. Thus no substantive progress in negotiations was made during the remainder of the Callaghan government.(16) Margaret Thatcher, newly elected as Conservative Prime Minister in May 1979, assigned Nicholas Ridley as Rowland's successor. Ridley returned from familiarization tours of Buenos Aires and Port Stanley in July with the same concerns his predecessors had expressed concerning the inflexibility of the Islanders. Having learned from intelligence sources that Argentina had developed invasion plans in 1976, Ridley warned the Islanders that the government had decided not to provide funding for positioning of a permanent task force in the South Atlantic. The Islanders seemed unconcerned.(17) With backing from the Prime Minister's cabinet, Ridley decided to push for a leaseback settlement. This, he thought, was the only solution which offered both sides what they wanted. The Argentines would technically gain possession of the Islands but the Islanders would be able to preserve their lifestyle for the duration of the lease, possibly for as long as several generations. Ridley managed to gain support for his proposal from as much as fifty percent of Islanders.(18) Even Ridley's Argentine counterpart was willing to accept his leaseback proposal, at least in principle. Returning to London on 2 December 1980, Ridley immediately reported his efforts to Parliament and assured its members that any settlement would have to have their approval and that of the Islanders. But no less than 18 members of Parliament viciously attacked his diplomatic efforts, expressing abhorence at any plans to concede sovereignty to Argentina. Later that evening Ridley warned: "If we don't do something, they will invade. And there is nothing we could do." Ridley's reception in London and the ensuing debate rekindled the Islanders' concern. The Island legislative council promptly voted to discontinue all negotiations on sovereignty.(19) Negotiations had thus reverted to the status quo. A high level meeting was held in London in June 1981 to discuss the future of the negotiations. The officials attending included Ridley, Islands Governor Rex Hunt, and the British Ambassador to Argentina. They concluded that the prospects of a negotiated settlement were now bleak in light of the general lack of acceptance of the leaseback proposal. With no other viable options for Britain, they discussed an intelligence report which estimated that Argentina would likely take one or more of the following actions, once convinced that a negotiated settlement was deadlocked: 1. Denouncement of Britain at the United Nations. 2. An air and fuel embargo of the Islands. 3. Action against British economic interests in Argentina. 4. A landing on South Georgia. 5. A full scale invasion of the Islands.(20) The officials worried that Argentina might take one or more of these actions prior to 3 January 1982, the 150th anniversary of the British occupation of the Islands.(21) But exactly which of these steps would the Argentine leadership take? And precisely when? The next chapter provides insights to these questions by examining the Argentine junta's rise to power and the political situation in Argentina prior to the invasion. CHAPTER FOUR THE JUNTA AND HINTS OF AN INVASION Prior to the 1982 invasion of the Islands, Argentina's citizens had suffered for decades under a series of military and civilian regimes characterized by corruption and repression. By 1976, the government of Isabel Peron, wife of late dictator Juan Peron, proved to be no better. Consequently, insurgents resorted to terrorism in their attempts to overthrow the Peron government. Murder, bombings, and kidnappings were commonplace. The economy ran out of control as the inflation rate soared to 800 per cent per year.(1) The 1976 military coup of Army General Jorge Videla occurred in the midst of the chaos and marked the beginning of rule by a three-man military junta composed of the commanders-in-chief of Argentina's three armed services. General Videla was both president and presiding junta member. Rather than rely on the judicial system, the junta elected to fight the insurgents by establishing a police state which abducted, tortured, and killed thousands of leftists and idealists. The "dirty war" as it came to be known, continued for the next two years, finally subsiding in 1978. Human rights organizations claim that as many as 1800 Argentinians vanished during the two years following the coup.(2) By 1980 order had been restored and the junta was willing to permit a gradual return of civilian rule in an effort to improve the economy. Accordingly, in March 1980, Videla resigned and appointed retired Army General Roberto Viola as president. But by then General Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri was making his move for the presidency. Pressured by the newly constituted junta, Viola resigned in November 1981 under the pretense of ill health, enabling Galtieri to assume the presidency during the following month. The new three-man junta composed of General Galtieri, Navy Admiral Issac Anaya, and Air Force Brigadier General Arturo Dozo now held the reigns of government.(3) Galtieri was not an all-powerful dictator, even though he was both president and commander-in-chief of the army. No major decisions could be made without a consensus among the three junta members, whose decisions in turn depended on the approval of a number of senior subordinate officers in their respective forces. This "leadership by consensus" frequently hindered the junta's ability to act promptly and decisively.(4) Of the three junta members, Admiral Anaya was the most determined to recapture the Islands and the one who undoubtedly most strongly influenced the junta's eventual decision to invade. A close friend of Galtieri, Anaya had backed his rise to the presidency. In Anaya's mind, the loss of control of the Beagle Channel to neighboring Chili in 1979, and with it potential sites for operating bases to the south, made recapture of the Islands essential. He believed that by seizing the Islands, Argentina could control the sea routes around Cape Horn. Thus for Anaya, the Islands held especially great strategic and symbolic importance.(5) Galtieri had reason to believe the super powers would support or at worst remain neutral if Argentina seized the Islands. He had assumed the presidency under extremely good relations with the United States, having favorably impressed numerous high ranking U. S. government and military officials during reciprocal visits to and from the U. S. in 1981. The Reagan administration was particularly pleased with Galtieri's strong anti-communist stand and apparent willingness to help stem the expansion of Marxism in Latin America. Galtieri also enjoyed favorable relations with Moscow. The Soviets had reason to be grateful for Argentine grain shipments during the American grain embargo imposed during the Carter administration.(6) At home, Galtieri quickly took steps to improve Argentina's immense economic and social problems. He instituted economic reforms designed to drive down inflation, stimulate investments, and denationalize the economy. He relaxed the grip of the police, broadened press freedom, and permitted greater union and political activity. But Galtieri's economic reforms, however well intentioned, were met by the public with frequent demonstrations. A few days before the Argentine invasion of the Islands, more than 1500 citizens were arrested following bloody riots in Buenos Aires. These were instigated primarily by workers' unions who disapproved of the junta and its economic policies.(7) Many writers suggest that Galtieri and the junta ordered the invasion to rally the people in the midst of this political repression and economic uncertainty. Argentine officials had plenty of reasons to question Britain's resolve to defend the Islands. Perhaps most significant was the fact that Britain had tolerated, since 1977, Argentina's military presence on Southern Thule, a dependency of the Islands. Defense cuts were another significant indicator of this apparent lack of resolve. HMS Endurance, an ice patrol ship which had been Britain's only consistent naval presence in the area for years, was scheduled to be withdrawn from the South Atlantic at the end of her 1981-1982 tour.(8) Furthermore, the British government had recently either sold or disposed of no less than two amphibious assault ships and two fixed-wing aircraft carriers. The remaining carriers were scheduled to be disposed of within the coming year.(9) But what would British analysts make of what they saw happening in Argentina? Aside from the conditions previously described, the three months preceeding Argentina's invasion marked the emergence of the following hints that the junta might be contemplating use of military action to recover the Islands: 1. Speculation and discussion of an invasion intensified in the Argentine press. The Argentine newspaper La Prensa reported in January 1981 that Galtieri had pledged to take control of the Islands no later than 3 January 1983 *, the 150th anniversary of Britain's occupation.(10) An influential columnist wrote in the same paper on 17 January 1982 that the taking of the Malvinas would enjoy international approval. A week later the same columnist warned of Argentine military action if Britain failed to accept Argentine demands for sovereignty over the Islands. He also stated that "The United States..... would support all acts leading to restitution, including military ones....."(12) 2. On 12 February 1982, President Galtieri obtained a promise of neutrality from Uruguay in the event of invasion of the Islands.(13) 3. Early in March 1982, the junta declared its dissatisfaction with the outcome of the negotiations held between British and Argentine representatives in February 1982. It implied Argentina was no longer bound to pursue a peaceful solution. Significantly, a communique dispatched to British officials from Buenos Aires stated that Argentina had negotiated with Britain for 15 years with "patience, fidelity, and good faith" but with little benefit. * The deadline for Galtieri's pledge fell just after the scheduled expiration of his role as commander-in-chief of the army on 22 December 1982, although his term as president ran until 1984.(11) The Argentine Foreign Ministry also announced that "if a solution should not be reached, Argentina maintains the right to end the system (of British rule) and freely choose the procedure it may deem most convenient to its interests."(14) 4. During the week of 12 March 1982, an Argentine Air Force Hercules C-130 made an "emergency" landing at the Port Stanley airport raising suspicions that Argentina might be testing the feasibility of landing troops on the Islands.(15) The evidence all pointed to an invasion. A review of the South Georgia incident, described in the next chapter, will provide some possible explanations as to how and when it would begin. CHAPTER FIVE THE SOUTH GEORGIA INCIDENT Located 800 miles southeast of Stanley, South Georgia is an isolated island approximately 150 miles in length and characterized by a harsh winter climate. In 1982, it was the home of a number of scientific research bases manned by approximately thirty members of the British Antarctic Survey Team at Grytviken.(1) Click here to view image In September 1979 an Argentine scrap metal dealer named Constantine Davidoff had contracted with a firm in Edinburgh to remove 35,000 tons of scrap metal from abandoned whaling stations at Leith on South Georgia.(2) Trouble began when Davidoff inspected the whaling stations in December 1981 and escalated to crisis proportions when his workers returned there in March 1982 to begin dismantling operations. To understand the confusion which surrounded the South Georgia incident, it is necessary to review some background relating to the 1971 Communications Agreement. The agreement had established the so-called "white card," a document which provided the holder freedom to travel between the Islands and Argentina. At the time of the initiation of the United Nations program of decolonization, described in chapter 3, Britain had listed the Falkland Islands and Dependencies (which included South Georgia) as one of its colonies. Thus, as far as Argentina was concerned, the holder of a "white card" could legally travel to South Georgia as well as the main Islands. But by December 1981, when Davidoff first visited Leith, Britain insisted that the South Georgia was a separate colony governed directly from Britain and administered from the Islands only for the sake of convenience. Accordingly, a British regulation was established which required anyone disembarking on South Georgia to first obtain official permission from the commandant of the Antarctic Survey Team at Grytviken. Argentine officials were apparently never formally notified of the new status of South Georgia or of the requirement to check in at Grytviken.(3) Davidoff arrived at Leith aboard the Argentine icebreaker Almirante Irizar on 20 December 1981, completed his inspection, and returned to Argentina. Although he had been in touch with British embassy officials in Buenos Aires on several occasions during 1980 and 1981, it remains unclear whether or not he was aware of the British regulation which required him to check-in with officials at Grytviken before going to Leith. On 31 December, Island Governor Rex Hunt informed the British Foreign Office of Davidoff's unauthorized visit at Leith in South Georgia. The governor insisted Davidoff was aware of the requirement to obtain clearance at Grytviken and succeeded in convincing the Foreign Office to lodge a strong protest with the Argentine government. Argentine officials subsequently rejected the protest, claiming no knowledge of Davidoff's trip. Davidoff apologized for the incident in person at the British embassy in Buenos Aires on 23 February 1982. He then stated his intent to send workers to Leith, South Georgia to begin scrap metal dismantling operations and requested detailed instructions to preclude any further misunderstanding. The British ambassador requested guidance from Governor Hunt. On 9 March, having not received the guidance, Davidoff formally notified the British embassy that 41 of his salvage workers would sail from Buenos Aires for South Georgia on 11 March aboard the Argentine naval supply ship Bahia Buen Suceso and remain there for four months. On 11 March, having still not received the guidance, the salvage crew sailed for South Georgia.(5) Arriving at Leith on 19 March 1982 with their white cards, the salvage workers raised the Argentine flag and sang their national anthem. Four of the British Antarctic Survey scientists observed the Argentines and, after informing the workers that their activities were illegal, reported the incident by radio to Governor Hunt. On Hunt's advice, the British Foreign Office secretly dispatched 22 Royal Marines aboard HMS Endurance from Stanley to South Georgia with the mission of expelling any scrap metal workers who failed to leave on their own recognizance.(6) The British ambassador in Buenos Aires protested the landing of Davidoff's men at Leith and all but a dozen of the workers left South Georgia aboard Bahia Buen Suceso sometime between 21 and 23 March. Then, on 23 March, the British Foreign Office informed Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Mendez that Endurance had been dispatched to expel the remaining group of Argentine workers. Costa Mendez expressed surprise that such action had been taken prior to exhaustion of all diplomatic solutions and warned of a possible strong reply. He said that Bahia Buen Suceso might yet return to retrieve the remaining workers.(7) A rumor now circulated among British government officials that Admiral Anaya had ordered the use of force to prevent a British attempt to remove the workmen by force. This rumor was confirmed on 24 March, when over one hundred Argentine troops, under command of Captain Alfredo Astiz, disembarked from the armed Argentine naval survey ship Bahia Paraiso under orders to "protect" the remaining workmen. The Royal Marines aboard Endurance arrived in time for their commander, Lieutenant Keith Mills, to covertly observe Astiz's men unloading arms and supplies from Bahia Paraiso in the vicinity of the scrap metal salvage sight. Mills reported this sighting to officials in London, who in turn ordered him not to take any action that might provoke an armed response, presumably because London was frantically trying to resolve the crisis by diplomacy.(8) Argentine and British diplomats failed to defuse the South Georgia crisis during the next few days. On 26 March, an announcement was made on British television, which later proved to be premature, that two British nuclear submarines had deployed from Gibralter to the South Atlantic. Bahia Paraiso sailed from South Georgia on 27 March , leaving the Argentine troops and remaining workmen behind. Then on 28 March the Argentine press reported the cancelation of all navy leave and the departure of a number of naval vessels for operations at sea. By then British intelligence had predicted the invasion of the Islands would occur on 2 April. Prime Minister Thatcher dispatched nuclear submarines to the South Atlantic and warned Governor Hunt of the imminent invasion.(9) The warning was warranted. Operation Rosario was well underway. CHAPTER SIX OPERATION ROSARIO The operation to recapture the Islands, code named Operation Rosario commenced in late March 1982. The architect is thought to be junta member Admiral Anaya. The invasion plans were developed in strict secrecy. Only a small number of high ranking officials were briefed on the operation.(1) Two task forces assembled in late March at Puerto Belgrano, Argentina's principal naval base. Amphibious Task Force Forty (TF-40), commanded by Rear Admiral Gualter Allara, was composed of two destroyers, two corvettes, the submarine Santa Fe, an LST, an icebreaker, and a cargo ship. The supporting task force (TF-20) was composed of the aircraft carrier Veinticinco de Mayo, four destroyers, a fleet oiler, and a tug boat.(2) The mission of TF-40 was to capture Port Stanley and take effective control of the population. Intermediate objectives included seizure of the airport and lighthouse near Stanley and the Royal Marine barracks. The plans called for mounting the amphibious assault under cover of darkness, capitalizing on the advantages of surprise and overwhelming numerical superiority. Injury to the Royal Marines and the Islanders was to be avoided as much as possible. The operation was designed to be conducted in five phases: 1. Embarkation 2. Movement to the objective area. 3. Assault and capture of objectives. 4. Consolidation of position and effective control of population. 5. Reembarkation of all Marines. Preparation of ships for sea, including fueling and loading of supplies, began on 26 March and was completed at night to minimize suspicion. On the same day, the Argentine frigates Drummond and Granville set sail. On 28 March a battalion of Marines, under command of landing force commander Rear Admiral Carlos Busser * had embarked on the LST Cabo San Antonio and other ships assigned to the task force.(3) By 29 March, the bulk of the invasion force was underway, ostensibly for naval exercises with Uruguay.(4) Supporting Task Force 20 took up a position about 450 miles due north of the Islands and used carrier based aircraft to conduct anti-submarine patrols. Amphibious Task Force 40 proceeded south, remaining * Argentine Marine Corps officers are integrated in their Navy and are promoted according to the Argentine Navy rank structure. relatively close to Argentina's border. Plans originally called for the invasion force to approach the Islands from the south west, then circle counter clockwise from the southeast in preparation for a landing on the eastern side of the Islands. But the weather deteriorated on 29 March. High winds and rough seas substantially slowed Task Force 40's advance and forced postponement of the landing, originally set for the morning of 1 April, to the morning of 2 April. To avoid storm damage, a decision was made to turn the task force to a northerly course and make the approach to the objective area from the northern side of the Islands. By mid-day on 31 March, the Argentine commanders knew the element of surprise had been lost because Argentine radio operators had intercepted radio broadcasts by Governor Hunt warning the Islanders of an imminent invasion. Plans to seize the lighthouse, now defended by Islanders, were cancelled. Invasion efforts were focused entirely on capture of Port Stanley.(5) The invading force faced an armed enemy only 68 strong, comprised of a Royal Marine nucleus and a handful of civilians from the Island's volunteer defense force. Island defenses were minimal. Major Mike Norman, commander of the British garrison, had not had enough time to destroy the airport, mine the beaches with improvised mines, or block the approaches to the harbor. Nevertheless, he did the best he could, in what little time remained, with the resources at his disposal. He equipped two Marines with a machine gun and 1600 rounds of ammunition and stationed them on a spot overlooking Purple beach, where he expected the first wave of the assault force to land. Six Marines were dug in at the airport, waiting to hit any enemy helicopters with small arms fire. Additional Marines, in groups of six, were strung out on the road leading from the airport back to Stanley. The rest were positioned to defend Governor House.(6) Click here to view image The British Marine commander then gave a final brief to his men at about midnight on 1 April. Realizing that he would be hopelessly outnumbered, his orders were to at least give the enemy a "bloody nose." The troops stationed on the road between the airport and Stanley were told to harass the enemy with small arms fire then fall back for a last stand at Government House, considered the key defensive position since it represented the seat of government.(7) The Argentines arrived after nightfall on 1 April. Anchoring within 500 meters of shore, the destroyer Santisima Trinidad disembarked 80 Marine commandos who paddled ashore in 20 rubber boats.(8) Their mission was to capture the British Marine Barracks and the Government House early on the following morning.(9) At 2300 on 1 April, the submarine Santa Fe secretly disembarked ten divers in the vicinity of York Point. After moving ashore in three Zodiac boats, the divers quickly marked Orange beach in preparation for landing of the amphibious vehicles on the following morning. The Santa Fe then submerged and repositioned east of Port Stanley.(10) By 0600 on 2 April one group of Marine commandos had arrived at Marine Barracks and found them deserted. At about the same time, a second group had engaged the thirty-three Royal Marines who were defending Government house.(11) By 0630 on 2 April, the main amphibious landing was well underway. The LST Cabo San Antonio, protected by a destroyer and corvette, began discharging 19 armored amphibious landing vehicles (LVTs) filled with troops. The LVTs proceeded unopposed to Orange Beach, adjacent to Purple beach where the two British Marines had set up their machine gun emplacement.(12) Argentine troops advancing on Port Stanley sustained no casualties and encountered little resistance other than harassing small arms fire coming from buildings on the edge of town. Only one of the 19 armored personnel carriers sustained damage. and that was negligible.(13) By 0830 on 2 April Argentine Army troops and Marines had captured the airstrip and cleared it of vehicles intentionally left by the British to obstruct the runway. Within minutes after the runway was seized, Argentine reenforcements began arriving on seven Lockheed C-130 Hercules transports and ten Fokker F-27 aircraft. The C-130s carried the bulk of the twenty-fifth Infantry Regiment, which would subsequently assume responsibility for defense of the Islands.(14) Royal Marines who had been dispersed at various locations around the Island were unable to reinforce their comrades at Government House because they encountered heavy enemy fire while approaching the outskirts of town. As the morning progressed, fighting at Government House intensified. The Argentine commandos peppered the House with automatic weapons fire and lobbed stun grenades at enemy defensive positions. The 33 defending Royal Marines returned fire but found it difficult to pinpoint enemy positions since enemy guns were fitted with flash suppressors. At one point, three Argentine commandos were cut down with automatic weapon fire as they attempted to rush the House. Three others gained entry through a bedroom window but were subsequently captured by Royal Marines inside.(15) Governor Rex Hunt realized resistance was useless when armored personnel carriers equipped with 30mm guns moved within firing range of Government House. He therefore ordered the surrender of the Islands after a brief conversation with Admiral Busser, who warned that civilians might be hurt if the fighting continued. By approximately 1000, the Union Jack was replaced by Argentina's blue and white flag. * By the end of the operation, Argentina had landed over 600 Marines and 280 Army and Air Force personnel. The invasion force had recovered the Islands without inflicting a single casualty to British military or civilian personnel. Unconfirmed Argentine casualties amounted to five killed (two confirmed) and seventeen wounded (two confirmed).(16) * Over 800 miles away at Leith, Captain Astiz's men raised the Argentine flag and signed a declaration in the presence of the scrap metal workers which renamed South Georgia as "Isla San Pedro." Arriving at Grytviken the following morning, Astiz and his men faced considerable British resistance. Lieutenant Mills surrendered his handful of Royal Marines only after destroying an Argentine helicopter, raking an Argentine corvette with machine gun fire, and inflicting casualties on 5 of Astiz's men. Only one British corporal was wounded. Mills was subsequently awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for gallantry.(17) CHAPTER SEVEN ANALYSIS, CONCLUSIONS, AND OPINIONS THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW Legal scholars in the international community have traditionally recognized five modes of acquiring territory. These are: cession, occupation, accretion, subjugation, and prescription.(1) Cession is defined as "title derived from another state by the transfer of sovereignty by the owner state to another state." It may result from the outcome of war, a gift, sale, or an exchange. It can only be effected by treaty between the ceding and acquiring states and normally requires that the new owner possess or occupy the territory. It is essential that cession occur with "the full consent of the governments concerned."(2) Occupation is "the act of appropriation of territory which is not at the time under the sovereignty of another state." It requires both possession and administration, implying the need for the presence of a settlement and a formal act of proclamation by the occupier to confirm his intent to keep the territory under his sovereignty. An uninhabited island not part of any state would be an example of a territory liable for occupation by another country. Abandonment by the occupying state would make it vulnerable for occupation by another.(3) Accretion refers to "an increase in existing land masses by new geological changes, such as the formation of a new island in a river." This type of acquisition does not apply in the case of the Islands.(4) Subjugation refers to firmly established conquest followed by formal annexation. It occurs only after an end to a state of war or hostilities.(5) Prescription is "the acquisition of sovereignty over a territory through continuous and undisturbed exercise of sovereignty over it during such period as is necessary to create.... the general conviction that the present condition of things is in conformity with international order." No rule defines the length of time necessary to create title by prescription. Uti possidetis is a principle related to prescription which has been adopted by Spanish-American republics to assert sovereignty over territories which at one time formed a part of the Spanish Colonial Empire. After winning independence from Spain, Argentina used this principle to defend her avowed "inheritance" of the Islands.(6) Sovereignty may be lost by any of these methods or by revolt "when the state which has broken off from another has established itself safely and permanently."(7) The series of events surrounding the sovereignty issue since the mid 18th century has made settlement dispute over the Islands a very complex legal problem. Argentina can argue that original Spanish sovereignty was not compromised when the British established their settlement at Port Egmont in 1770 or when Spain permitted the British to re-occupy Port Egmont in 1771. Argentina can further argue that she had more of a legal right to occupy the abandoned Islands in the 1820's than did Britain who seized them when they were clearly occupied by Argentina in 1833. However, the British point to the fact that they have perfected their title by maintaining a continuous presence on the Islands since 1833. Furthermore, the British insist that the Islanders should be able to determine their own future, referred to as the principle of "self-determination."(8) A review of existing case law regarding sovereignty leads this writer to conclude that there is not sufficient legal precedent to resolve the dispute by international law. One essayist points out that neither side would be likely to agree to a legal settlement anyway, since neither could be certain how a properly constituted international court would decide the case. Recognizing the difficulty of arriving at a legal solution in such disputes, the United Nations Charter charges member nations with solving them by peaceful means.(9) It is unfortunate that Argentina resorted instead to forcible seizure of the Islands in 1982, resulting ultimately in the loss of many British and Argentine lives. DIPLOMACY 1964-1981 Recognizing that the Islands held little strategic or economic value for Britain, British Foreign Office officials were committed in principle to returning the Islands to Argentine sovereignty after the passage of United Nations Resolution 2065 in December 1965. But because of the dogged determination of the Islanders and lobbyists in London not to concede on the sovereignty issue, Parliament was unwilling to back a leaseback settlement, which, in the long run, would have been advantageous to both sides. Thus, during the 17 years prior to the invasion, British negotiators could do little more than attempt to show good faith in the negotiations at the expense of mounting frustration by Argentina, while at the same time trying to persuade the Islanders to compromise on their hard line position. Parliament's consistent failure to make any concessions with regard to sovereignty resulted in the junta's conclusion that Britain was more interested in stalling for time than in reaching a settlement that would benefit both sides. TIMING OF THE INVASION The decision to proceed with the invasion cannot solely be attributed to a ploy by the junta to rally the people in the midst of the economic and political conditions in Argentina, although this undoubtedly contributed to an environment which favored the invasion. This writer concludes that the junta had not planned to recapture the Islands until sometime in the latter part of 1982 and therefore the Davidoff incident was not staged by the junta to provide them with an excuse to initiate the invasion. In my estimation, President Galtieri, pressured by Admiral Anaya, unexpectedly decided to proceed with the invasion in late March 1982 after receiving intelligence reports that Britain had dispatched nuclear submarines to the South Atlantic in response to the Davidoff incident. For Argentina. the invasion became a "now or never" situation. The junta believed that if the invasion was to succeed, it had to be completed prior to the earliest time the British submarines could arrive in the vicinity of the Islands. Without a British naval threat to cope with, the Argentine amphibious force faced only 68 Royal Marines assisted by a handful of civilian volunteers from the Island defense force. But once on station, the British submarines could remain indefinitely to deter any invasion attempt. MISCALCULATIONS BY BOTH SIDES Argentine and British officials were each guilty of a series of political and military miscalculations during the weeks leading up to Operation Rosario. The junta's most serious miscalculation was its belief that the British did not possess the resolve or resources to respond to an Argentine invasion of the Islands with military force. Britain's defense cuts and her failure to challenge Argentina's military presence on Southern Thule caused the junta to underestimate Britain's resolve to retain the Islands. Another serious Argentine miscalculation centered on junta's belief that Argentine recovery of the Islands would enjoy the support of the international community, especially if British casualties were minimized during the invasion operation. Galtieri's good relationship with the Reagan administration and other U. S. officials incorrectly led Galtieri to believe the United States would at worst remain neutral if Argentina proceeded with the invasion and at best come out in support for Argentina. As it turned out, the United States sided with the British. Many British officials suspected Argentina was planning an invasion, but most were surprised when it actually occurred. Distracted from the impending crisis by their own domestic and international problems, these officials failed to recognize the Argentine public's willingness to support a military seizure of the Islands in the midst of Argentina's political and economic turmoil. Furthermore, these officials failed to heed indications of the impending invasion such as speculation of the invasion found in the Argentine press, the promise of neutrality by Uruguay in the event of an Argentine invasion, and the "emergency" landing of the Argentine C-130. These signals should have left little doubt in the minds of these British officials that an invasion was very close at hand and prompted them to make diplomatic concessions or take military action which would have discouraged Argentina from attempting a military solution. OPERATION ROSARIO Operation Rosario was a well executed amphibious operation. The fact that Argentina had an immense numerical superiority does not minimize the fact that she successfully carried out a full scale amphibious landing and achieved virtually complete surprise during the embarkation and transit phases. It is remarkable that Argentine Marines were able to secure their objectives and turn them over to control of the Argentine Army without inflicting a single casualty to either British military or civilian personnel. THE FUTURE OF THE DISPUTE Britain's recovery of the Islands in June 1982 is not likely to diminish Argentina's determination to recover them in the future. Galtieri is reported to have stated after the war that "we won't wait another 149 years."(10) Faced with the potential of Argentine hostility, Britain is spending huge sums of money to defend the Islands which provide her with a relatively negligible economic return. Because of this expense, I suspect that within the next 10 to 15 years, Britain will make concessions on the sovereignty issue and negotiate a settlement with Argentina which will be advantageous to both sides. FOOTNOTES INTRODUCTION 1. Raphael Perl, The Falkland Islands Dispute in International Law and Politics., (London, England: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1983), p. 2. 2. Department of State Bulletin, June 1982, p. 83. 3. Fritz L. and Olga M. Hoffmann, Sovereignty in Dispute. The Falklands/Malvinas, 1493-1982., (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1984), p. 1-9. 4. Hoffmann, p. 13-15. 5. Department of State Bulletin, p. 83. 6. Ronald Stickney, Lessons of the South Atlantic Conflict, (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College, 1983), p. 6. 7. Hoffmman, p. 15. 8. Ibid, p. 11-12. 9. John Naughton, Lessons of the Falkland War, 1982. A Political Perspective. (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air Command and Staff College, 1983), p.6. 10. Lawrence Freedman, "The War of the Falkland Islands. 1982" Foreign Affairs, Fall 1982, p. 196. CHAPTER ONE: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND THROUGH 1833 1. J. C. J. Metford, "Falklands or Malvinas? The Background to the Dispute," p. xv. Published in The Struggle for the Falkland Islands by Julius Goebel (Yale University Press, 1968 edition). 2. Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falkland Islands.(New York, N. Y. and London: W. W. Norton and Company, 1983), p. 1. 3. Alfred P. Rubin, "Historical and Legal Background of the Falklands/ Malvinas Dispute," The Falklands War. Lessons for Strategy, Diplomacy, and International Law(Winchester Massachusets: Allen and Unwin, Inc., 1985), p. 10. 4. Rubin, p. 12. 5. Hastings, p. 3. 6. Paul Eddy and Magnus Linklater, The Falklands War. The Full Story by the Sunday Insight Team.(London: Sphere Books Limited, 1982), p. 36. 7. Hastings, p. 3. 8. Metford, p. xiii. 9. Eddy, p. 37; Rubin, p. 13. lO. Eddy, p. 38. 11. Hastings, p. 4. 12. Ibid 13. Metford, p. xix; Eddy, p. 38. 14. Hastings, p. 5. 15. Metford, p. xx. 16. Eddy, p. 39; Metford p. xx. 17. Hastings, p. 5 and 6. 18. Eddy, p. 39. 19. Ibid CHAPTER TWO: OPPOSING CASES FOR SOVEREIGNTY 1. Eddy, p. 39 2. Eddy, p. 39. 3. Perl, p. 23. 4. Eddy, p. 39. 5. Rubin, p. 39; Hastings, p. 6; Perl, p. 23. 6. Hastings, p. 4. 7. Eddy, p. 39. 8. Metford, p. xxiii. 9. Metford, pp. xxiii-xxiv; Perl, p. 349. 10. Perl, p. 21-22. 11. "Claims to the Falkland Islands" (Background Brief by the Foreign Commonwealth Office, London: April 1986), pp. 2-4. 12. "Claims to the Falkland Islands", p. 2. 13. Hastings, pp. 3-4. 14. Ibid, p. 4. 15. "Claims to the Falkland Islands", p. 5. 16. Ibid, p. 6. 17. Ibid, p. 7. 18. Hastings, p. 7. 19. "Claims to the Falkland Islands" p. 1. 20. Department of State Bulletin, June 1982, p. 88; Eddy p. 38; Perl, p. 24. 21. Eddy, p. 40. 22. Eddy, p. 44. 23. Eddy, p. 41. CHAPTER THREE: DIPLOMACY 1964-1981 1. Department of State Bulletin, June 1982, p. 89. 2. Eddy, p. 41. 3. Perl, p. 373. 4. Eddy, p. 41; Hoffmann, p. 141. 5. Hastings, p. 19. 6. Hastings, p. 18. 7. Humberto Ortero, Falkland Islands War: Roots, Development, and Military Lessons.(Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air Command and Staff College, 1983), p. 4. 8. Eddy, p. 47. 9. Hastings, p. 21. 10. Hastings, p. 23. 11. Hastings, p. 26. 12. Eddy, p. 49. 13. John Naughton, Lessons of the Falkland War, 1982. A Political Perspective. (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air Command and Staff College, 1983), p. 6. 14. Hastings p. 33. 15. Hastings, p. 34. 16. Eddy, p. 50. 17. Eddy, p. 52. 18. Hastings, p. 39. 19. Eddy, pp. 53-54. 20. Eddy, p. 54. 21. Eddy, p. 55. CHAPTER FOUR: THE JUNTA AND HINTS OF INVASION 1. "For Argentina, Troubles are Just Beginning." U. S. News and World Report, May 17, 1982. Author not identified. p. 30. 2. Eddy, p. 59. 3. Robert Korkin and Bruce Sanders, Falkland Islands - War for National Sovereignty. (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air War College, 1985), p. 14; Eddy p. 61. 4. Eddy, p. 61. 5. Eddy, p. 29 6. Korkin p. 14; Hastings, p. 45; Freedman, p. 199. 7. "For Argentina, Troubles Are Just Beginning." p. 30; Lang, p. 5. 8. Douglas Kinney, "The Falklands Campaign," p. 82-85. Published in The Falkland War, Lessons for Strategy, Diplomacy, and International Law. by Anthony Arend and Alberto Coll (Winchestor, Massachusets: Allen and Unwin, Inc., 1985); 9. Naughton, p. 5. 10. John Laffin, Fight for the Falklands! (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), p. 11. 11. Eddy, pp 61-62. 12. Gabriel Marcella, "The Malvinas/Falklands War of 1982. Lessons for the United States and Latin America.: (Carlisle Barracks, Penn.: Strategic Studies Institute, U. S. Army War College, August 1983), p. 5; Naughton, p. 15. 13. Marcella, p. 5; Korkin, p. 11. 14. Kinney, p. 87; Naughton, p. 16; Marcella, p. 5. 15. MarcelIa, p. 5. CHAPTER FIVE: THE SOUTH GEORGIA INCIDENT 1. Stickney, p. 14; Eddy, p. 65. 2. Lawrence Germain, "A Diary of the Falklands Conflict" p. 135. Published in Military Lessons of the Falkland Islands War Views from the United States. by Peter Dunn and Bruce Watson (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984.) 3. Hoffmann, p. 153. 4. Ibid, p. 154. 5. Ibid, p. 155; 6. Stickney, p. 15; Jesus Briasco and Salvador Huertas Falklands: Witness of Battles (Valentia, Spain: Federico Domenech, 1984), p. 135; Harry D. Train, The Malvinas Conflict Presented as a lecture to the National Defense College of Argentina on 10 November 1986; Germain, p. 135. 7. Hoffmann, p. 157. 8. Hoffmann, p. 158; Hastings, p. 56; Eddy, p. 70. 9. Train, p. 7; Hastings, p. 60; Marcella, p. 5; Eddy, p. 71. CHAPTER SIX: OPERATION ROSARIO 1. Kinney, p. 87; Korkin, p. 18. 2. Robert L. Scheina: From manuscript of his yet unpublished book. 3. Interview with Captain de Navio Coli, Chief of Operations of the Argentine Fleet, by Dr. Scheina. 4. Germain, p. 137. 5. Scheina manuscript. 6. Eddy, pp. 8-9. 7. Scheina manuscript. 8. Ibid. 9. Germain, p. 138. 10. Scheina manuscript. 11. Germain, p. 138. 12. Scheina manuscript; Eddy, p. 17. 13. Scheina manuscript; Germain, p. 138. 14. Scheina manuscript; Germain, p. 138; Captain Coli interview by Dr. Scheina. 15. Germain, p. 138; Eddy, pp. 16-17. 16. Eddy, p. 22; Germain, p. 138. 17. Eddy, pp. 93-94 CHAPTER SEVEN: ANALYSIS, CONCLUSIONS, AND OPINIONS 1. Raphael Perl, The Falkland Islands Dispute in International Law and Politics (London: Oceana Publications, Inc.: 1983), p. 13. 2. Perl, p. 14. 3. Perl, p. 14. 4. Perl, p. 15. 5. Perl, p. 15. 6. Perl, p. 15-16. 7. Perl, p. 18. 8. Perl, p. 53-54. 9. Rubin, p. 18. 10. Marcella, p. 15. BIBLIOGRAPHY ARTICLES, ESSAYS, PERIODICALS "A Bizarre Crisis that Worries U. S." U. S. News and World Report, April 19, 1982. Presents political challenges faced by President Reagan as middle man in the Falkland/Malvinas dispute. Author not identified. Limited value to my research. Cordesman, Anthony H. "The Falklands Crisis: Emerging Lessons for Power Projection and Force Planning." Army and Navy Journal September 1982. Discusses lessons learned in areas of U. S. intelligence, U. S. crisis management, air/missile conflict, and power projection. No value to my research. "For Argentina, Troubles Are Just Beginning." U. S. News and World Report, May 17, 1982. Author not identified. Provides insights into the economic and political challenges faced by Argentine President Galtieri and the military junta. Freedman, Lawrence. "The War of the Falkland Islands, 1982." Foreign Affairs Fall 1982. Seeks to explain why Britain's policies led to war. Valuable to my research because information concerning the history and negotiations leading to Argentine invasion. Germain, Lawrence, S. "A Diary of the Falklands Conflict." Published in Military Lessons of the Falkland Islands War - Views from the United States. by Peter Dunn and Bruce Watson. This diary provided some useful chronological details surrounding the Argentine invasion. Kerr, Nick. "The Falklands Campaign." Naval War College Review, November-December 1982. A Royal Navy commander provides his explanation of the British response to the Argentine invasion. No value to my research. Kinney, Douglas. "Anglo-Argentine Diplomacy and the Falklands Crisis." Published in The Falklands War, Lessons for Strategy, Diplomacy, and International Law. by Anthony Arend and Alberto Coll. Provides valuable information concerning diplomatic efforts preceeding the conflict. Marcella, Gabriel. "The Malvinas/Falklands War of 1982. Lessons for the United States and Latin America." Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, U. S. Army War College, August 1983. Distills the policy lessons of the war for the United States and Latin America. Provides brief historical background of the dispute, rationale behind Argentine decision to recover the Islands, diplomatic efforts after the invasion, and implications of the conflict for U. S. policy. Valuable to my research because it provided historical information and identified factors motivating Argentine and British actions prior to the Argentine invasion. Metford, J. C. J. "Falklands or Malvinas? The Background to the Dispute." Published in July 1968 edition of Julius Goebel's book The Struggle for the Falkland Islands. Provides valuable historical background concerning the dispute. Peterson, Neal H. "Background on the Falkland Islands Crisis." Department of State Bulletin, Vol 82, Number 2063, June 1982. Of value to my research for selected historical and geopolitical details. Rubin, Alfred P. "Historical and Legal Background of the Falklands/Malvinas Dispute." Published in The Falklands War, Lessons for Strategy, Diplomacy, and International Law by Anthony Arend and Alberto Coll. Valuable to my research for historical and legal details. "The Falklands War." Newsweek. June 7, 1982. Author not identified. Describes the British push against Stanley to retake the Islands. No value to my research. BOOKS Arend, Anthony and Coll Alberto. The Falklands War, Lessons for Strategy, Diplomacy, and International Law. Winchester, Massachusets: Allen and Unwin, Incorporated, 1985. A collection of essays by 15 authors on various aspects of the Falklands war. Two essays of value to my research were "Anglo-Argentine Diplomacy and the Falklands Crisis" by Douglas Kinney and "Historical and Legal Background of the Falkland/Malvinas Dispute" by Alfred P. Rubin. Bishop, Patrick and Witherow, John. The Winter War. New York, N. Y. : Quartet Books Inc., 1982. The authors give a personal account of what it was like to live alongside British fighting men during British reoccupation of the Islands. No value to my research. Briasco, Jesus and Huertas, Salvador. Falklands: Witness of Battles. Valentia, Spain: Federico Domenech, 1984. Translated from Spanish to English. Provides a detailed description of air and naval operations which occurred from April to June 1982, with an emphasis on air tactics employed. Limited value to my research. Provided a few details of initial Argentine Marine landings and arrival of following forces as well as some chronological information. Dunn, Peter M. and Watson Bruce W. Military Lessons of the Falkland Islands War - Views from the United States. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984. A collection of articles by various authors covering lessons dealing with submarines, surface combatants, aircraft, ground warfare, amphibious warfare, and intelligence. Very limited value to my research. Eddy, Paul and Linklater, Magnus. The Falklands War, The Full Story by the Sunday Insight Team. London: Sphere Books Limited: 1982. A comprehensive account of the war. Provides very good historical information concerning events leading to the Argentine invasion and details of actions by Royal Marines during the invasion. An important reference for my research. Note: Maps on pages 33 and 41 are reproduced from this book. Goebel, Julius. The Struggle for the Falkland Islands. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1927. A study of the history of the Falkland Islands from their discovery though their reoccupation by the British in 1833. Based on manuscript sources from France, Spain, and Britain. Discusses legal aspects of sovereignty. Hastings, Max and Jenkins, Simon. The Battle for the Falklands. New York, N. Y. and London: W. W. Norton and Company, 1983. A comprehensive account of British political decision making and naval and military operations conducted by Britain to recover the Islands. A valuable source of information for my paper regarding historical and diplomatic background surrounding the dispute. Hoffmann, Fritz L. and Olga M. Sovereignty in Dispute. The Falklands/Malvinas, 1493-1982. Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1984. Centers on the history of the dispute over the Islands. Based mainly on official documents and on contemporary periodicals, including newspapers, collected by the authors during extended stays in Argentina. Very valuable to my research because the authors do an excellent job of presenting the Argentine side of events leading up to the invasion. Laffin, John. Fight for the Falklands. New York, N. Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1982. Traces the story of the Falklands war from the political events leading to the Argentine invasion to the British military strategies that finally ended the conflict. Limited value to my research. Chapter 2 provides author's explanation of the "modern period" of the dispute and why Britain failed to foresee the invasion. Perl, Raphael. The Falkland Islands Dispute in International Law and Politics. London, England: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1983. A comprehensive compilation of documents and information related to the legal aspects of the sovereignty issue. Analyzes these sources from the viewpoint of international law and practice. Valuable reference for my research. Perrett, Bryan. Weapons of the Falklands Conflict. Dorset, England: Blandford Press, 1982. Provides British and Argentine order of battle and brief descriptions of air and land battle action, including hardware employed. No value to my research. INTERVIEWS Interview conducted by U. S. Coast Guard Historian Dr. Robert L Scheina with Captain de Navio Coli, Chief of Operations of the Argentine Fleet, conducted 15 September 1982 at Puerto Belgrano. Provides valuable details concerning execution of Operation Rosario. Periodic discussions conducted by the author with LCDR Hugo Santillan, Argentine Marine Corps. LCDR Santillan and the author were students to the USMC Command and Staff School Quantico during the 1986-1987 school year. LCDR Santillan, a combat veteran of Operation Rosario, clarified details surrounding Operation Rosario and provided the author with insights into the political situation in Argentina during the months leading to the Argentine invasion. LECTURES Train, Harry D. II, Admiral, Retired. The Malvinas Conflict. Presented to the National Defense College of Argentina on 10 November 1986. Admiral Train shared his views of the Malvinas Conflict based on months of personal study and interviews with principal leaders on both sides. He discusses "war starters," military strategies, rules of engagement, and the land war. His insights concerning the timing of the Argentine invasion were valuable to my research. Wheen, David, Major, Royal Marines. The Falkland Islands War 1982. A Rifle Company Commander's Perspective. Quantico, Virginia: Command and Staff College, MCDEC, 1986. A two part presentation by Major Wheen, a Royal Marine company commander in the Falkland/Malvinas War. Part one covers the political, historical, and geographical background behind the Argentine invasion. Part two covers the British amphibious operation and land battle. Extremely limited value to my research. TECHNICAL REPORTS Braswell, Nancy S. An Assessment of Intelligence In the 1982 Falklands Conflict. Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air War College, 1983. Provides an unclassified assessment of intelligence data held by Argentina and the United Kingdom about each other at the outbreak of hostilities. Discusses intelligence aid given to each side during the conflict. Limited value in my research. Haggart, James A., Lieutenant Commander, USN. The Falkland Islands Conflict, Air Defense of the Fleet. Quantico, Virginia: Marine Corps Command and Staff College, MCDEC, 1984. Examines air defense aspects of the conflict. No value to my research. Korkin, Robert and Sanders, Bruce. Falkland Islands - War for National Sovereignty. Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air War College, 1985. Presents the Argentine view of the conflict. Emphasizes the impact of international politics, military leadership, logistics, conventional weaponry, and time as major factors on the battlefield. Provides limited information on the Argentine Junta and Operation Rosario. Meister, Jurg. The Battle of the Malvinas: The Argentinian Version. Translated by Naval Intelligence Support Center, Washington, D. C., 1983. The author uses official Argentine publications to document Argentine and British losses during the war. Limited value to my research. Provided some information on composition of the Argentine Task Force used to seize the Islands. Naughton, John, Lessons of the Falklands War, 1982. A Political Perspective. Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air Command and Staff College, 1983. Analyzes the war from a political perspective. Takes a separate look at Great Britain, Argentina, and the United States to see what each did before, during, and after the conflict, and what the consequences of those actions were. Nevin, Michael. The Falkland Islands - An Example of Operational Art? Carlisle Barracks, PA: U. S. Army War College, 1986. The author examines the South Atlantic Conflict in his effort to determine if it is an example of operational art. No value to my research other than a small amount of historical information. Otero, Humberto. Falkland Islands War: Roots Development, and Military Lessons. Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air Command and Staff College, 1983. Analyzes the war from four major viewpoints: the logistical effort required, the weapons employed and their effectiveness, the strategy and tactics used and their results, and the composition of forces and employment concepts. Provided some details for my research concerning historical background, sovereignty negotiations, and Operation Rosario. Pelliccia, Antonio. Experiences and Lessons Learned from the Anglo - Argentinian Conflict. Translated by U. S. Army Foreign Science and Technology Center, Charlottesville, Virginia, 1984. Examines air warfare conducted during the conflict. No value to my research. Stickney, Ronald. Lessons of the South Atlantic Conflict. Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air Command and Staff College, 1983. Presents the geopolitical background of the crisis, provides a summary of major war actions, and discusses military lessons learned. Provides historical, diplomatic, and geopolitical details that were useful in my research. Zartmann, Carlos E. Operations of Argentine Submarines in the Malvinas War. Translated by Naval Intelligence Support Center, Washington, D. C., 1984. No value to my research. OTHER SOURCES "Claims to the Falkland Islands," Background brief by the Foreign Commonwealth Office: London, April 1986. Provides a detailed chronology of events from 1748 through Argentine seizure of the Islands in April 1982. Excellent summary of British position on the sovereignty issue. "Britain and Argentina: Towards More Normal Relations," Background brief by the Foreign Commonwealth Office: London, February 1986. Describes initiatives by British Government to normalize relations with Argentina after the South Atlantic War. No value to my research. Scheina, Robert L. Dr. Scheina, the U. S. Coast Guard historian, provided the author with a chapter of his soon to be published book. Entitled "The Malvinas Crisis, March-April 1982" this chapter provided numerous details concerning the execution of Operation Rosario. The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons. London, England: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1982. Presents a brief description of the British operation to recover the Islands from deployment through the British advance on Port Stanley. Contains lessons learned on a variety of topics including men, maritime operations, land operations, special forces, and equipment. No value to my research. Click here to view image APPENDIX B HISTORICAL CHRONOLOGY 1764 Antoine de Bougainville claims the Islands for Louis XV of France and establishes Port Louis, the first known settlement. 1765 John Byron claims the Islands for George III of England and establishes a settlement at Port Egmont. 1766 A British expedition, under John McBride, arrives to consolidate Byron's claim and discovers the French colony at Port Louis. 1767 France returns Port Louis to Spain. 1770 Spain expels British from Port Egmont. 1771 Spain and England sign declarations which return control of Port Egmont to Britain but do not officially settle the sovereignty issue. Spain claims England made a secret promise to abandon its claim to the Islands. British reoccupy Port Egmont. 1774 British garrison abandons Port Egmont but leaves plaque declaring British sovereignty over the Islands. Spain retains control for the next four decades. 1790 Britain and Spain sign the Nootka Sound Convention, in which Britain disavows any colonial ambitions in South America "and the islands adjacent." 1811 Argentine movement toward independence from Spain gains momentum. Spain withdraws settlement from the Islands. 1816 Forerunner of Argentina declares independence from Spain. 1820 The new government of Buenos Aires dispatches an envoy to officially lay claim to the Islands. 1823 Agentina appoints its first governor of Puerto Soledad. 1826 Louis Vernet establishes his colony on East Falkland Island. 1829 Louis Vernet is appointed governor. He issues a decree against whaling and sealing in the vicinity of the Islands. 1831 Louis Vernet seizes and American merchant vessel and takes the ship's captain to Buenos Aires to stand trail for illegal fishing. In retaliation, USS Lexington's captain, Silas Duncan, destroys "free of all government." 1832 The newly appointed Argentine governor of the Islands is murdered by mutinous soldiers. 1833 Captain James Onslow arrives at Puerto Soledad on 2 January to claim the Islands for England and convinces the Argentine commander, Jose Pinedo, to quit the Islands without firing a shot. From this point on, the Islands remain under British control until the 1982 invasion by Argentina. 1852 The Falkland Islands Company is chartered. 1960 United Nations Resolution 1514 calls for an end to colonialism. 1965 United Nations Resolution 2065 calls for Argentina and Britain to negotiate sovereignty of the Islands. 1968 The Falkland Islands Committee is organized to lobby against all efforts to return the Islands to Argentina. 1971 Argentina and Britain sign the Communications Agreement. 1981 Davidoff visits South Georgia in December to inspect the scrap metal sites. 1982 Davidoff's workers arrive at South Georgia on 19 March. Argentine troops seize Islands on 2 April. British forces land on the Islands on 21 May. Argentine forces surrender to Britain on 14 June.
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