The Falkland Islands War 1982: A Rifle Company Commander's Perspective CSC 1986 SUBJECT AREA History THE FALKLANDS WAR 1982 A RIFLE COMPANY COMMANDER'S PERSPECTIVE by Major David G. Wheen, Royal Marines Command and Staff College Education Center Marine Corps Development and Education Command Quantico, Virginia 22134 25 March 1986 TABLE OF CONTENTS Subject Page Presentation 1. 1.1 - 1.50 Presentation 2. 2.1 - 2.49 Video Tape Clips V.1 Slides: Presentation 1 S.1 Presentation 2 S.2 Maps: Falkland Islands Map 1 East Falkland Map 2 The Beachhead Map 3 42 Cdo's Battle Map 4 Citation: 42 Cdo RM C.1 THE FIRST PRESENTATION TO USMC COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE ON THE FALKLAND WAR BY MAJOR D. G. WHEEN, RM 19 DECEMBER 1985 VIDEO - (2 MINUTES) LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THIS IS THE FIRST OF TWO PRESENTATIONS ON THE FALKLANDS WAR OF 1982; AND BEFORE I GO ANY FURTHER LET ME SAY FOR THE BENEFIT OF OUR SPANISH SPEAKERS THAT THE WORD "FALKLAND" IS AS FAR AS I AM CONCERNED INTERCHANGEABLE WITH THE WORD "MALVINAS". I INTEND DURING THIS SESSION TO SKIP QUICKLY THROUGH THE POLITICAL, HISTORICAL AND GEROGRAPH- IC BACKGROUND AND SO SET THE SCENE FOR THE INITIAL ARGENTINIAN INVASION; THEREAFTER, I SHALL CONCENTRATE ON PERMA. THE NEXT SESSION WILL COVER THE LAND BATTLE, PRIMARILY 42 CDO'S LAND BATTLE FOLLOWING THE BREAKOUT OF THE BEACHHEAD. YOU MAY WELL ASK WHY SHOULD YOU SPEND YOUR TlME LISTENING TO ME WHEN YOU CAN, AND PROBABLY HAVE, READ ABOUT THE WAR FROM VARIOUS BRITISH AND AMERCIAN BOOKS AND PUBLICATIONS. MY RESPONSE IS THREEFOLD: FIRST, THE ALTERNATIVE FOR MY INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH PAPER WAS AN IN-DEPTH STUDY OF EARL HAIG, THE BRITISH FIELD MARSHALL DURING WORLD WAR I, EVEN THOUGH HE WAS INVOLVED IN THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME, THAT WE HEARD ABOUT ON 1 DEC 1985. THIS WAS A FAR LESS ATTRACTIVE PROPOSITION TO ME PERSONALLY. NEXT THE FALKLANDS WAR IS THE FIRST MAJOR NAVAL, AMPHIBIOUS AND NAVAL AIR WAR CONDUCTED IN THE MISSILE AGE. IT INVOLVED SIGNIFICANT SHIP AND AIRCRAFT LOSSES: THIS SLIDE EG SHOWS SHIP LOSSES IT DOES NOT SHOW THE 8 RN SHIPS DAMAGED BY BOMBS/EXOCET BUT NOT SUNK; AND HIGH INTENSITY OPERATIONS ASHORE, AFLOAT, AND IN THE AIR. IT SHOULD BE STUDIED TO DRAW OUT ANY SIGNIFICANT LESSONS THAT WE CAN LEARN FROM IT. AND FINALLY, I HAVE BEEN ASKED MANY TIMES BY FELLOW STUDENTS ABOUT THE FALKLANDS WAR AND MY EXPERIENCES IN IT. THIS SLIDE IS PARTICULARLY FOR BOB CHURCHILL. I WAS A RIFLE COMPANY COMMANDER, IN COMMAND OF COY L, 42 CDO RM, SO MY EXPERIENCES ARE PERHAPS OF MORE RELEVANCE TO A COMPANY COMMANDER'S COURSE SUCH AS AWS; NEVERTHELESS, I FEEL I NOW HAVE A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, AND AM KEEN TO PASS ON SOME RECOLLECTIONS AND OBSERVATIONS FOR YOU TO ACCEPT OR REJECT AS YOU WISH. IN ADDITION TO MY OWN EXPERIENCES MY SOURCES OF INFORMATION INCLUDE LONG CONVERSATIONS OVER THREE YEARS WITH CO 42 CDO RM, LTCOL NICK VAUX, FOR WHOM I WORKED BOTH AS A COY COMD AND SUBSEQUENTLY WHEN HE WAS PROMOTED TO COLONEL AND WAS MY CHIEF OF STAFF, HE WAS HERE AS RM ADVISOR 79-81 SO YOU MAY HAVE MET HIM AT AWS;ALSO WITH THE BRIGADIER COMMANDER, 3 CDO BDE RM, BRIGADIER NOW MAJ GEN JULIAN THOMPSON, ON WHOSE STAFF I WORKED FOR TWO YEARS, AND ALSO WITH CLFFI MAJOR GENERAL JEREMY MOORE, FOR WHOM I HAVE THANKFULLY NEVER WORKED AS HE IS MARRIED TO MY COUSIN! ON THE NAVAL SIDE I HAVE SPOKEN TO COMMODORE AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE, THE CATF, AND MANY OTHER NAVAL OFFICERS BEFORE DURING AND AFTER THE CONFLICT. I HAVE ALSO READ A LARGE NUMBER OF BOOKS ON THE FALKLANDS AND WOULD BE HAPPY TO RECOMMEND SOME, IF ANYONE WISHES TO FOLLOW-UP THIS PRESENTATION. I DO NOT INTEND DISCUSSING SOUTH GEORGIA AS I WAS NOT THERE. I WILL OF COURSE ENDEAVOR TO ANSWER QUESTIONS ON THIS AND ANY OTHER ISSUES AT THE END OF EACH PRESENTATION. GEOGRAPHY MAY I JUST FIRST CRAVE YOUR INDULGENCE AND JUST REMIND YOU OF THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE FALKLANDS BECAUSE IT LATER BECAME A VERY INFLUENTIAL FACTOR IN THE CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS AT ALL TIMES. YOU WILL BE AWARE THAT IT IS SOME 8,000 MILES FROM UK BUT ONLY APPROXIMATELY 35O MILES FROM ARGENTINA, BUT OF EQUAL OR MORE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE LAND FORCE IS ITS RELATIVE POSITION TO THE VAST ANTARCTIC LAND MASS. THIS HAS A PROFOUND AFFECT ON THE WEATHER. THERE IS NO GULF STREAM AS THERE IS IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC TO WARM UP THE SEA AND PRODUCE THE MILD WEATHER IN WINTER THAT WE EXPERIENCE IN BRITAIN -- AND WE WERE, OF COURSE, DOWN THERE IN THE SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE'S MID WINTER. THE WINDS BLOW NEARLY ALL THE TIME AND CHANGE IN INTENSITY VERY RAPIDLY AND WITHOUT WARNING -- SOMETIMES CHANGING A NOTCH ON THE BEAUFORT SCALE EVERY MINUTE. THE WEATHER OBVIOUSLY DOES EXACTLY THE SAME AS THE WIND AND ONE CAN GET SEVERAL PERIODS OF SNOW, RAIN AND BRIGHT SUNSHINE, ALL IN ONE DAY. EACH SUCCEEDING THE OTHER INCREDIBLY RAPIDLY. THE LAND MASS OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS OF 4,697 SQUARE MILES IS ABOUT THE SAME SIZE AS THAT OF WALES OR CONNECTICUT. THE COUNTRY IS ALMOST ALL PEAT BOG WITH MOUNTAINS RISING UP THROUGH THE BOG. ALTHOUGH THE MOUNTAINS ARE NOT HIGH BY SOME STANDARDS, THEY ARE EXTREMELY RUGGED (THE HIGHEST IS MT. OSBORNE AT JUST OVER 2,000 FEET, MT. KENT IS JUST OVER 1,200 FEET). THE TOPS ARE CROWNED WITH CRAGGY, TOR-LIKE FEATURES. ALL OVER THE ISLANDS THERE ARE ROCK-RUNS. THESE ARE LIKE MAXI-SCREE AND EXTEND FOR MILES. SOME OF THE ROCKS ARE HUGE. AS WE LATER DISCOVERED, IT CAN TAKE HOURS TO CROSS A ROCK-RUN WHEN HEAVILY LADEN ESPECIALLY AT NIGHT. THERE ARE NO ROADS EXCEPT IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF STANLEY AND A FEW TRACKS NEAR EACH SETTLEMENT. THERE HAD THEREFORE BEEN VERY LITTLE BRITISH INVESTMENT IN TERMS OF CONSTRUCTION OVER THE YEARS; ALL MATERIALS FOR WHICH WOULD HAVE HAD TO BE IMPORTED. YOU WILL HAVE NOTICED THAT THERE ARE NO TREES IN THE ISLANDS EXCEPT WHERE THEY'VE BEEN CAREFULLY NURTURED AROUND THE HOUSES. CONCEALMENT PARTICULARLY OF HQS WAS A MAJOR PROBLEM, AS HQ 3 CDO BN RM FOUND OUT THE HARD WAY WHEN SUBJECTED TO AN AIR ATTACK INTEIAL INLET. THE POPULATION AS OF 1 APRIL 1982 WAS 1800. ALL BUT 40 WERE OF BRITISH ORIGIN AND SPOKE ENGLISH. THE REMAININING 40 WERE ARGENTINIANS CONCERNED WITH THE OPERATION OF THE AIRFIELD AND IN PLANNING CONSTRUCTION OF A NATURAL GAS STORAGE FACILITY. HISTORY THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WERE DISCOVERED BY THE ENGLISH NAVIGATOR, JOHN DAVIS, IN 1592. THOUGH THE ISLANDS WERE VISITED BY SIR RICHARD HAWKINS IN 1594, AND OTHERS LATER, THEY WERE NOT NAMED THE FALKLAND ISLANDS UNTIL 1690 AFTER THE THEN TREASURER OF THE NAVY VISCOUNT FALKLAND. THE FRENCH WHO SAILED TO AND FROM RIO DE LA PLATA CALLED THEM LES ILLES MALOUINES (MALOOENES) AFTER THEIR HOME PORT OF ST. MALO. THE SPANIARDS ON THE MAINLAND CORRUPTED THIS TO LAS ISLAS MALVINAS. IN 1764 SETTLERS LED BY DE BOUGAINVILLE OF FRANCE LANDED IN EAST FALKLAND, WHILE IN THE 1765 CAPTAIN JOHN BYRON CLAIMED THE ISLANDS FOR GREAT BRITAIN AND LEFT A SMALL PARTY AT SAUNDERS ISLAND (NW FALKLAND ISLANDS). IN 1766 THE FRENCH SETTLERS UNDER PRESSURE FROM SPAIN WITHDREW. IN 1770 WITH SPAIN AND BRITAIN ON THE BRINK OF WAR, THE SPANIARDS EJECTED THE ENGLISH! THE FOLLOWING YEAR PORT EGMONT WAS REOCCUPIED BY THE BRITISH, BUT VOLUNTARILY ABANDONED THREE YEARS LATER. IN 1829 (I'M SORRY ABOUT THE MISPRINT IN THE SLIDE) THE NEW REPUBLIC OF BUENOS AIRES, CLAIMING TO HAVE INHERITED THE RIGHTS OF SPAIN, SENT LOUIS VERNET TO THE ISLANDS TO DEVELOP A COLONY IN ITS NAME. TWO YEARS LATER VERNET SEIZED 3 X US SEALING VESSELS; THIS BROUGHT DOWN THE AMERICAN CORVETTE USS LEXINGTON WHICH "LAID WASTE THE SETTLEMENT AND PROCLAIMED THE ISLANDS FREE OF ALL GOVERNMENT". THE BRITISH, HOWEVER, HAD NEVER RENOUNCED THEIR CLAIM, AND RESUMED OFFICIAL OCCUPATION. THE COLONY WAS ESTABLISHED UNDER A SUCCESSION OF NAVAL OFFICERS WHO WERE ENGAGED IN HYDRO- GRAPHIC WORK UNTIL 1841 WHEN CIVIL ADMINISTRATION WAS ESTABLISHED, THIS HAS REMAINED IN BEING EVER SINCE. IN ORDER TO PROVIDE AS BALANCED AND IMPARTIAL A PERSPECTIVE AS POSSIBLE LET ME MENTION ARGENTINA'S POINT OF VIEW. ARGENTINA CLAIMED OWNERSHIP OF THE ISLANDS BECAUSE: A. IT HAD SUCCEEDED SPAIN IN THE TERRITORIES FORMERLY RULED FROM BA. B. SPAIN BY PURCHASING THE ISLANDS FROM FRANCE HAD ACQUIRED THE RIGHT OF PRIOR OCCUPATION. C. ARGENTINA THEN CLAIMED THAT BRITAIN HAD ABANDONED. ITS CLAIM IN A SECRET, UNWRITTEN CLAUSE OF A 1771 DECLARATION. D. BECAUSE BRITAIN HAD ABANDONED ITS SETTLEMENT IN EAST FALKLAND IN 1774. NOT MUCH CHANGED UNTIL SEPTEMBER '67 WHEN, FOLLOWING UN INTERVENTION TWO YEARS EARLIER, TALKS ON SOVEREIGNTY OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS COMMENCED. ALL FOUNDERED EVENTUALLY, PRINCIPALLY BECAUSE THE ISLANDERS ARE BRITISH, SPEAK ENGLISH AND WISHED TO REMAIN BRITISH. IN EARLY '81 THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT KEEN TO REDUCE OUT-OF-NATO AREA DEFENSE EXPENDITURE ANNOUNCED THE PHASING OUT OF HMS ENDURANCE, OUR ONLY RN SHIP PERMANENTLY ON STATION IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, MEANWHILE THE MILITARY REGIME NOW UNDER GENERAL GALTIERI IN ARGENTINA WAS SUFFERING RAMPANT INFLATION AND NATIONAL UNREST, AND FINALLY IN MARCH 82 THERE WAS A GROUP OF ARGENTINIAN SCRAP METAL WORKERS UNLAWFULLY OPERATING ASHORE IN S. GEORGIA. THESE THREE APPARENTLY UNRELATED EVENTS TRIGGERED THE ARGENTINIAN INVASION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND SOUTH GEORGIA ON 12 APRIL 1982. ON 13 APRIL THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL CONDEMMED THE ARGENTINIAN INVASION AND DEMANDED THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARMY TROOPS. DEFENSE THE DEFENSE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WAS VESTED IN: A. NAVAL PRESENCE OF HMS ENDURANCE (AT THE TIME OF THE INVASION NEARING S. GEORGIA SUPPOSEDLY TO DEAL WITH THE SCRAP METAL WORKERS.) B. FI DEFENSE FORCE - A HOMEGUARD OF 120 MEN DISPERSED AROUND ISLAND - ONLY 23 MEN REPORTED FOR DUTY. C. NP 8901 - A 40 MAN DETACHMENT OF RM COMMANDED BY CAPTAIN RM GIVEN ACTING RANK OF MAJOR. THIS FORCE, UNDER COMMAND OF MAJOR GARY NOOTT, RM HAD JUST BEEN RELIEVED IN PLACE BY ITS SUCCESSOR, UNDER MAJOR MIKE NORMAN. TO GET TO FI THIS GROUP HAD TO FLY TO MONTE VIDEO AND BE TRANSPORTED BY SEA TO FI. FOR OBVIOUS SOUND, PRACTICAL REASONS, THIS FORCE TRADITIONALLY HAS TO TRAVEL UNARMED, IN CIVILIAN CLOTHING AND WITH ONLY MINIMAL MILITARY PERSONAL EQUIPMENT. THUS ON THE ISLAND WERE FOR EXAMPLE, 40 RIFLES, RADIOS FOR 40 MEN, ETC. AND MINIMAL DEFENSE STORES. THIS DETACHMENT HAD PREVENTED SURREPTITIOUS ARGENTINIAN OCCUPATION ON A COUPLE OF OCCASIONS BUT IT IS SCARCELY A DETERRENT FORCE. IT WAS AT BEST A TRIP WIRE FORCE AND IN THE EVENT OF A DETERMINED INVASION, REINFORCEMENTS WERE CLEARLY ESSENTIAL. CONSIDERATION HAD BEEN GIVEN TO REINFORCING THIS DETACHMENT IN LATE MARCH 82 BUT THE STUMBLING BLOCK REMAINED, HOW DO YOU POSITION IT? IT MAY HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE TO ORGANIZE A SINGLE C130 TO FLY THE 8,000 MILES RETURN TRIP FROM ASCENSION ISLAND WITH INFLIGHT REFUELING, AND LAND OR PARACHUTE TROOPS INTO THE FALKLANDS - BUT THE EFFECT OF 1 X C-130 LOAD, EVEN IF IT COULD HAVE ARRIVED IN TIME, WOULD HAVE BEEN MINIMAL! MIKE NORMAN AND GARY NOOTT THEREFORE HAD TO PLAN FOR THEIR DEFENSE WITHOUT REINFORCEMENT. IN ESSENCE, THE KEYPOINT WAS GOVERNMENT HOUSE, KEY TERRAIN - THE AIRPORT, SAPPER HILL, THEI APOLOGIZE FOR THE SCRUFFY MAP, IT HAD BEEN IN MY MAP POUST FOR 20 DAYS! THE MILITARY BARRACKS AT MOODY BROOK WERE ABANDONED WHICH IS JUST AS WELL BECAUSE IT WAS SUBJECTED TO AN OVERWHELMING ASSAULT 12 HOURS LATER THE DEPLOYMENT WAS AS FOLLOWS: 2 MEN = YORK BEACH/CHRISTMAS BAY/SAPPER HILL/ 8 MEN (SECTION) HARBOUR TOWN/OVERLOOKING ROAD/N OF HARBOUR THE MAIN DEFENSIVE POSITION WAS AT GOVERNMENT HOUSE, TO WHICH THE 2 SECTIONS IN PORT STANLEY AREA WERE TO WITHDRAW. THE 2 MEN OPS WERE TO MAKE THEIR WAY BACK TO THE TOWN AS WELL AS POSSIBLE. THE SECTION N OF THE WATER WAS TO GO INTO CAMP (THE COUNTRYSIDE) AND ORGANIZE RESISTANCE. MR. REX HURT (GOVERNOR) HOWEVER ORDERED THE SURRENDER BEFORE SIGNIFICANT BRITISH CASUALTIES WERE RECEIVED, ONCE IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT THE DEFENCE WAS OUTNUMBERED 20:1. II IS THOUGHT THAT SOME 20 ARGENTINIANS WERE KILLED IN THE INVASION. AT S. GEORGIA, IT WAS A SIMILAR STORY, WHERE LT KEITH MILLS' DETACHMENT DISPLAYED GREAT GALLANTRY, INFLICTING SERIOUS CASUALTIES. S. GEORGIA WAS LATER REOCCUPIED BY M. COY, ONE OF THE OTHER 2 RIFLE COYS OF MY UNIT, 42 CDO ON 26 APR 82. M COY WAS SPECIALLY SELECTED FOR THIS UNIQUE MISSION SOLELY BECAUSE THE COY COMMANDER CAPT CHRIS NUNN WAS SHE FIRST COY COMMANDER TO WALK PASS THE CO OFFICE AND BE SEEN BY THE CO THAT CRUCIAL MORNING. PETER BABBINGTON, THE OTHER COY COMD AND I WERE GREEN WITH ENVY, AND WISHED WE'D ARRIVED AT WORK EARLIER THAN NORMAL. EVENTS IN THE FALKLANDS SUBSEQUENTLY ENDORSED PETER'S AND MY MORE LAID BACK APPROACH. MIKE NORMAN HAVING BEEN RETURNED TO UK AS A POW ON 5 APRIL 1985 AND BEEN DEBRIEFED, JOINED CANBERRA IN ASCENSION -- AND FORMED COMPOSITE COMPANY (J) AS 42 CDO 3RD RIFLE COMPANY (TO REPLACE MCOY). WHILE MIKE NORMAN AND HIS DETACHMENT WERE ORIGINALLY ON ROUTE TO FI, 42 CDO WERE UNDERTAKING ARCTIC TRAINING IN NORWAY. ON 27 DECEMBER 1981, I FLEW OFF WITH THE REMAINDER OF THE CDO ADVANCE PARTY TO PREPARE FOR THE ARRIVAL AND SUBSEQUENT TRAINING OF 42 CDO RM IN NORTH NORWAY. FOR THE SAME REASONS OF ECONOMY THAT HAD FORCED THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PHASING OUT OF THE SOUTH ATLANTIC ICE PATROL SHIP HMS ENDURANCE, THE 1982 ANNUAL ROYAL MARINE ARCTIC DEPLOYMENT WAS REDUCED FROM BRIGADE LEVEL TO COMMANDO (BATTALION) LEVEL. I HAVE BEEN ASKED TO DESCRIBE THIS TRAINING DURING THE FMF IN THE OFFENSE EXERCISE; SUFFICE TO SAY THAT WE SPENT THREE MONTHS INTENSIVE TRAINING SUCH THAT AT THE END OF THE PERIOD I KNEW THE PERSONALITY, SHORTCOMINGS AND CAPABILITIES OF EVERY VOICE ON THE RADIO, AND OF COURSE EVERY MAN IN MY COMPANY. IN ADDITION TO 6 WEEKS OF INTENSIVE COMPANY TRAINING, WE HAD CONDUCTED TWO MAJOR EXERCISES AT CDO LEVEL OR ABOVE -- AND THE UNIT HAD A WELL PRACTICED BATTLE PROCEDURE; PROBABLY SIGNIFICANTLY BETTER THAN THE OTHER UNITS WHICH HAD BEEN TRG IN U.K. FOR THE PREVIOUS 3 MONTHS, AND SUBJECTED TO THE USUAL BARRACKS ROUTINES OF "DOG AND PONY" SHOWS ETC. WE RETURNED FROM NORWAY IN THE ILL-FATED LSL SIR GALAHAD ON 23 MARCH 1982, AND PROCEEDED ON TWO WEEKS LEAVE, 3 OR 4 DAYS LATER; THE UNIT DISPERSING ON THE USUAL 7 DAY NOTICE. WE WERE OF COURSE AWARE OF THE ARGENTINIAN SCRAP METAL WORKERS' ILLEGAL OCCUPATION OF SOUTH GEORGIA, BUT CLEARLY DID NOT KNOW WHAT WAS TO HAPPEN ON 1 APRIL 1982. I HAD A TELEPHONE CALL AT MY HOME IN SOMERSET AT 0400 HOURS ON 2 APRIL 1982 RECALLING ME TO BICKLEIGH, PLYMOUTH, 42 CDO UK BASE. THIS PHONE CALL WAS A MERE 25 MINUTES AFTER THE BRIGADE COMMANDER HAD BEEN CALLED -- AND THE REMAINDER OF THE UNIT WAS RECALLED DURING THE COURSE OF THE MORNING. 42 CDO RM WAS ILL-PREPARED FOR A FAST MOVE AS OUR HEAVY EQUIPMENT WAS STILL ON THE HIGH SEAS RETURNING FROM NORWAY. ALTHOUGH WE HAD THE LEAVE ADDRESS/PHONE NO OF ALL RANKS OF THE CDO, WE WERE SCATTERED FAR AND WIDE. OUR S2 WAS IN CAMP LEJEUNE MARRYING THE DAUGHTER OF THE DENTIST THE JW ATTACHE FROM THE BRITISH EMBASSY, WHO WAS A GUEST AT THE WEDDING ACTUALLY HANDED THE UNFORTUNATE BRIDEGROOM A NOTE WHILE HE WAS WALKING UP THE AISLE OF THE CHURCH, TELLING HIM TO CATCH A FLIGHT BACK TO THE UK AT 0700 THE FOLLOWING DAY; THE S3 WAS IN TUNISIA, THE XO AND OC HQ CO WERE ON A LONG CIVILIAN SKI TOUR IN NORWAY. NEVERTHELESS WITHIN 72 HOURS WE WERE READY TO GO. THE WHOLE COUNTRY HAD MOBILISED, IN A WONDERFUL DISPLAY OF SOLIDARITY, TO PREPARE THE 100 SHIPS COMPRISING 2X CARRIER BATTLE GROUPS AND AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE FOR DEPLOYMENT AND OERATIONS IN THE FALKLANDS. TRUCKS HAD BEEN ENTERING OUR BASE AROUND THE CLOCK; I WAS ON DUTY ONE EVENING WHEN THE ORDERLY OFFICER OF THE DAY REPORTED ON THE TELEPHONE THAT OUR COMMANDO'S AMMUNITION HAD ARRIVED. I SUGGESTED HE GET A WORKING PARTY AND UNLOAD IT, HE SEEMED NOT TO UNDERSTAND, SO I ASKED HIM WHAT THE PROBLEM WAS. HE THEN EXPLAINED THAT WE HAD 26 X 16 TON TRUCKS FULL OF IT! VIDEO - (4 MINUTES) CONCURRENTLY WITH OUR PREPARATIONS, THE RN AND DEPARTMENT OF TRADE WERE ASSEMBLING SHIPS FOR THE ATF. AN EARLY DECISION HAD BEEN MADE TO REQUISITION SHIPPING TAKEN UP FROM TRADE (STUFT), INCLUDING SS CANBERRA, FLAGSHIP OF P&O, THEN IN THE MEDITERRANEAN ON COMPLETION OF A WORLD CRUISE. LIAISON OFFICERS FROM THE UNITS TO BE EMBARKED FLEW TO GIBRALTAR, ALONG WITH THE RN SHIP CONSTRUCTOR OFFICERS, AND HAD A WORKING HOLIDAY ON THE THREE DAY RETURN PASSAGE TO SOUTHHAMPTON. WITHIN TWO DAYS OF THE RETURN, DOCKYARD WORKERS HAD ERECTED TWO NEW HELICOPTER LANDING SPOTS, ONE OVER THE BEST OF THE THREE SWIMMING POOLS, THE OTHER ON TOP OF THE WARDROOM BAR AND THE EMBARKATION OF 2,500 TPS WAS COMPLETE. THAT SAME DAY WE SAILED TO RV WITH THE REMAINDER OF THE ATF AT ASCENSION ISLAND. LIVING AND TRAINING CONDITIONS ON BOARD WERE OUTSTANDING; A LUXURY LINER IS DEFINITELY THE WAY TO GO TO WAR. VIDEO - (2 MINUTES) EMBARKED, ON THE SHIP WERE THREE BATTALION SIZED UNITS, LATER TO BE REINFORCED BY A FURTHER RIFLE COPY, BAND OF HQ CDO FORCES RM, ELEMENTS OF THE BDE MEDICAL SQUADRON, AND HOSPITAL SURGICAL SUPPORT TEAMS, A SEAKING HELICOPTER AND OTHER MISCELLANEOUS SUB UNITS; ON BOARD WAS ALSO THE SPECIALLY APPOINTED DEPUTY BRIGADE COMMANDER COLONEL TOM SECCOMBE WHO WAS THE EMBARKED FORCE COMMANDER. THE ACCOMMODATION WAS LUXURIOUS IN THE EXTREME. I LIVED IN A CABIN WITH A DOUBLE BED (SADLY BY MYSELF) COMPLETE WITH BATHROOM AND TWO BIG PICTURE WINDOWS. THE COST OF THIS ACCOMMODATION IN 1982 PRICES FOR THE WORLD CRUISE WAS $170 PER DAY. WE ALSO HAD EXTREMELY GOOD FOOD, THOUGH WE REDUCED FROM A FIVE COURSE TO A THREE COURSE DINNER EACH NIGHT DUE TO THE DIFFICULTIES OF RESUPPLY. THE ENLISTED MEN LIVED IN SIMILAR COMFORT IN TWO BED AND AT THE MOST FOUR BED CABINS. THE TRAINING FACILITIES WERE ALSO FAR BETTER THAN ANY RN SHIP THAT I HAVE BEEN IN. WE USED THE PROMENADE DECK, A CONTINUOUS 4OOM LOOP AROUND THE SHIP, FROM 0700-2300 DAILY FOR FITNESS TRAINING. THIS BUILT UP TO 9 MILE SPEED MARCHES WITH EQUIPMENTI IN 90 MINUTES AND 20 MILE LOAD CARRIAGE MARCHES IN BOOTS OF COURSE! WE ALSO HAD ACCESS TO LANDING SPOTS, GAMES DECKS, TWO SWIMMING POOLS AND OTHER AREAS NOT NORMALLY FOUND IN GREY LINE SHIPS. VIDEO - 1 MINUTE WE ALSO CONCENTRATED ON MEDICAL TRAINING. EVERY MAN WAS TO BE ISSUED WITH MORPHINE AND EVERY OTHER MAN WITH A DRIP BAG. EACH MAN LEARNED THE TREATMENT FOR TRAUMA, WOUNDS, AND BURNS; AND HAVING SPENT THE WINTER IN NORWAY WAS WELL AWARE OF THE TREATMENT FOR ALL COLD WEATHER INJURIES. WE ALSO PRACTICED TREATING EVERYDAY INJURIES AS WELL AS BATTLE WOUNDS AND LEARNED HOW TO DO SUTURES. THE GALLEY WAS SOMEWHAT CONFUSED BY THE REQUEST FOR SO MANY RAW PORK CHOPS UNTIL THEY GOT THESE BACK, COVERED IN STITCHES. OUR DINNER THAT NIGHT WAS PREDICATABLY NOT SUITABLE FOR MUSLIMS OR THOSE WITH DELICATE STOMACHS. THE OTHER MILITARY SKILL I WOULD HIGHLIGHT AS RECEIVING PARTICULAR ATTENTION WAS THAT OF CALLING FOR AND CONTROLING NAVAL, ARTILLERY, TANK AND MORTAR FIRE SUPPORT. EVERY MAN IN MY COY WAS CAPABLE BY THE TIME WE LANDED, OF CALLING FOR AND ADJUSTING FIRE SP, AND HAD PRACTICED THIS ON WHAT WE CALL A "PUFF RANGE"; IN THIS CASE A DETAILED CLOTH MODEL OF THE APPROACHES TO PORT STANLEY BUILT IN THE EMPTY SWIMMING POOL UNDER THE LANDING SPOT. I GOT A GREAT KICK PRIOR TO THE ACTUAL BATTLE PERSONALLY CALLING FOR, AND ADJUSTING, A TWO BATTERY FIRE MISSION. WE ALSO HAD INTELLIGENCE AND ORIENTATION BRIEFS FROM PREVIOUS COS OF NP8901, INCLUDING MAJ MIKE NORMAN AND MAJ EWEN SOUTHBY TAILYOUR WHOM I SHALL MENTION LATER. WE ALSO CONCENTRATED ON WEAPON HANDLING AND SHOOTING, RADIO PROCEDURE AND REACTION TRAINING. WE SPENT A LOT OF TIME ASSESSING WHAT EQUIPMENT WE MUST TAKE ASHORE AND HOW THIS SHOULD BE TRANSPORTED, PACKED OR CARRIED. WE ENDED UP WITH A LANDING LOAD OF APPROXIMATELY 120-145 LBS. PER MAN. THIS WAS BROKEN DOWN AS FOLLOWS: TWO MORTAR BOMBS AT 26 LBS, PERSONAL WPN AND AMMO 50 LBS., 2 WATER BOTTLES, FOOD FOR 48 HOURS, SLEEPING BAG, SHELTER, SPARE CLOTHING; RADIO AND BATTERIES, AND OTHER SPECIALIST EQUIPMENT REQUIRED BY THAT INDIVIDUAL, HIS SECTION OR TROOP (SQUAD OR PLATOON). WE ALSO REHEARSED THE ASSAULT ROUTINES AND HAD TO SORT OUT AND PRACTICE BY DAY AND NIGHT HOW TO EMBARK IN LCVP/LCU FROM A 56,000 TON LUXURY LINER! THIS SLIDE SHOWS LOADING DOORS OPEN AND 2 HELOS ON THE SPOTS. OUR RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE RUNNING OF THE SHIP WERE MINIMAL. EACH COY WAS DUTY FOR 1 X 24 HOUR PERIOD EVERY 15 DAYS. MORE IMPORTANTLY, WE HAD TO DARKEN SHIP PRINCIPALLY FOR ANTI-SUBMARINE DETECTION -- A DIFFICULT PROBLEM FOR A LUXURY LINER WHICH MORE USUALLY IS LIT LIKE A CHRISTMAS TREE, AND PREPARE AN AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY. THIS WE DID BY DEPLOYING 50 MACHINES GUNS AROUND THE UPPER DECKS AND 12 BLOWPIPE MISSILES ON THE SUPERSTRUCTURE. WE KNEW OUR INITIAL DESTINATION WAS TO BE ASCENSION ISLAND WHERE WE WOULD HAVE TO RV WITH THE ATF SHIPS AND RESTORE. TAPE - 4 MINUTES ASCENSION ISLAND, LIKE DIEGO GARCIA, IS A BRITISH ISLAND WITH CERTAIN FACILITIES LEASED TO U.S. ON ASCENSION THIS IS PRIMARILY WIDEAWAKE AIRFIELD. IT WAS TO HERE THAT CONSIDERABLE LOGISTIC SP FROM USA WAS SENT TO HELP; PRINCIPALLY SIDEWINDER MISSILES AND COMMS EQUIPMENT. BUT THE TIMESCALE FOR THE LANDING IN THE FALKLANDS WAS DEPENDENT UPON THE FRANTIC POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING AL HAIG, PERES DE CUELLAR (UN SEC GENERAL) AND THE PRESIDENT OF PERU. DESPITE WHAT THE TAPE SAID, FEW OF US HONESTLY BELIEVED THAT WE COULD RESOLVE OUR DIFFERENCES BY NEGOTIATION -- EVEN THOUGH ARGENTINA AND BRITAIN HAVE BEEN CLOSELY ALLIED FOR YEARS. THE FUTURE OF GALTIERI AND HIS REGIME DEPENDED UPON RETENTION OF THE MALVINAS FOR ARGENTINA AND MARGARET THATCHER'S POLITICAL CAREER WAS AT STAKE TOO! THE MOTIVATION FOR TRAINING WAS THEREFORE UNBELIEVABLE. WE HAD WITH US FOR EXAMPLE APPROXIMATELY 15 CHAPLAINS AND 10-12 MEDIA MEN. THOUGH TRADITIONALLY THESE PEOPLE DO NOT CARRY WEAPONS, THEY UNDERTOOK THE FULL RANGE OF WEAPON TRAINING, MEDICAL TRAINING, ETC. HAVING MENTIONED THE MEDIA, LET ME DIGRESS A LITTLE. WE HAD WITH US NEWSPAPER, RADIO AND TELEVISION MEN; THEY ARE TRADITIONALLY LEFT WING AND SUSPICIOUS OF THE MILITARY. ONE OR TWO HAD BEEN WAR CORRESPONDENTS IN VIETNAM, AFGHANISTAN OR LEBANON WHILE MOST HAD REPORTED AT ONE STAGE OR ANOTHER UPON NORTHERN IRELAND. IN IRELAND THE MEDIA APPEAR AFTER AN INCIDENT HAS OCCURRED IN WHICH EITHER THE MILITARY MAY HAVE SUFFERED CASUALTIES (AND THEREFORE "FAILED") OR INFLICTED CASUALTIES PERHAPS "UNACCEPTABLY"! IN NO INCIDENTS SUCH AS THESE COULD THE MEDIA BE FOREWARNED OF THE MILITARY PLANS OR INTENTIONS FOR SECURITY REASONS, NOR HAD THEY BEEN AWARE OF THE DEGREE OF TRAINING, PLANNING, PREPARATION AND REHEARSALS NECESSARY FOR EVEN THE MOST MUNDANE OPERATION. WHILST ON BOARD CANBERRA, THEY BECAME FRIENDS WITH TROOPS OF ALL RANKS AND BECAME ACTIVELY INVOLVED WITH OUR TRAINING; AFTER ALL, THEIR LIVES WERE FOR ONCE AT STAKE! THIS IS MAX HASTINGS, TAKING THINGS A LITTLE SERIOUSLY FOR ONCE! WE, THE MILITARY IN GENERAL AND THE RM IN PARTICULAR, NOW HAVE SOME FIRM FRIENDS IN THE MEDIA. HOPEFULLY SOME WILL BECOME EDITORS OF NATIONAL NEWSPAPERS OR TV PROGRAMMES IN THE YEARS TO COME WHERE THEY WOULD HE VERY POWERFUL ALLIES TO HAVE. NOW BACK TO PERMA. AS WE ARE TAUGHT, PLANNING IS OF A CONTINUOUS AND DEVELOPING NATURE. HOWEVER, DUE TO THE IMMENSE POLITICAL PRESSURE TO SAIL, THE INITIAL PRE-EMBARKATION PLANNING DID NOT EXTEND TO PLANNING A CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS ASHORE. PLANNING WAS LIMITED TO BALANCING THE AVAILABLE (RN & STUFT) ASSETS WITH THE BRIGADE COMMANDER'S ASSESSMENT OF WHAT FORCES HE WISHED TO HAVE ASHORE. THE ORDER OF BATTLE EVENTUALLY DEPLOYED WAS AS FOLLOWS: (BRIGADE) (ATTACHED) MANY DESIRABLE ASSETS WERE OMITTED DUE SOLELY TO LACK OF SPACE. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT OF THESE WERE PERHAPS RPVs & 155 GUNS. RPVs BECAUSE WE HAD NO AVAILABLE ASSETS FOR AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE AND PHOTOGRAPHY, AND THESE WOULD HAVE GIVEN US THE REQUIRED REAL TIME INFORMATION. THE 155 GUNS WOULD HAVE BEEN USEFUL AS THEY WOULD HAVE ENABLED US TO ENGAGE THE AIRFIELD PRIOR TO THE BATTLES FOR PORT STANLEY; AND ALSO THEY DELIVER A MUCH GREATER PUNCH THAN THE 105's THAT WE PRESENTLY HAVE. AS IT HAPPENED, THE LOGISTIC TAIL TO SP THESE GUNS WOULD HAVE BEEN UNATTAINABLE; BUT MORE ABOUT THAT IN PT II THE LAND BATTLE. AS YOU CAN IMAGINE, THE LANDING FORCE WAS EFFECTIVELY A "COME AS YOU ARE, IF YOU CAN PARTY". ONCE WE HAD EMBARKED, THE PLANNING FOR THE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT AND SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS ASHORE WAS CONTINUOUS. THE TASK FORCE COMMANDER, WAS CINCFLEET, ADMIRAL SIR JOHN FIELDHOUSE, BASED IN NORTHWOOD LONDON; HIS MILITARY ADVISOR WAS INITIALLY MAJ0R GENERAL JEREMY MOORE FROM HQ CDO FORCES RM. UNTIL HE BECAME CLFF1, ON DEPLOYMENT OF A SECOND BRIGADE ON D + 12. THE COMMANDER OF THE CARRIER GROUPS WAS REAR ADMIRAL WOODWARD ABOARD HMS HERMES, WHILE THE COMMODORE AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE, COMMODORE CLAPP, WHO WAS CATF, AND BRIGADIER THOMPSON, INITIALLY THE CLF WERE EMBARKED IN HMS FEARLESS. THESE FLAG OFFICERS AND THEIR STAFFS WERE THE KEY PLANNERS. THOUGH GOOD MAPS OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS EXISTED, THESE WERE ACCURATE ONLY DOWN TO THE HIGH WATER MARK. NEITHER OFFICIAL CHARTS NOR CONTINGENCY PLANS EXISTED FOR A MILITARY OPERATION TO RECOVER THE FALKLANDS FOLLOWING A HOSTILE INVASION. FORTUNATELY, A FORMER CO OF NP 8901, MAJOR EWEN SOUTHBY TAILYOUR WAS A VERY KEEN, SINGLEHANDED YACHTSMAN AS WELL AS A DISTINGUISHED ARTIST. HE HAD SPENT HIS YEAR IN THE FALKLANDS DOING DETAILED BEACH AND COASTAL SURVEYS THROUGHOUT THE ISLANDS. IN DECEMBER 1981, HE HAD SENT A COPY OF HIS MANUSCRIPT TO VARIOUS PUBLISHING, HOUSES. SADLY, AS THERE ARE NO YACHTS OR INSHORE FISHING BOATS IN THE AREA, THERE APPEARED TO BE NO MARKET FOR A FALKLAND ISLANDS COASTAL NAVIGATION BOOK, THESE MANUSCRIPTS HAD THEREFORE BEEN RETURNED WITH REGRETS! 14 WEEKS LATER, THE MOD IMPOUNDED THESE MANUSCRIPTS AND CLASSIFIED THEM "TOP SECRET". THESE, SUPPORTED BY EWEN'S EXPERTISE, BECAME THE FUNDAMENTAL PLANNING DOCUMENTS. I AM PLEASED TO SAY THAT THE BOOK IS NOW UNCLASSIFIED AND HAS BEEN PUBLISHED. MANY WOULD ARGUE THAT A WAR IS A LITTLE EXCESSIVE AS A PUBLICITY STUNT! MANY FACTORS AFFECTED THE LANDING FORCES RECOM- MENDATIONS ON THE LOCATION OF THE FBH. AN ASSUMPTION INITIALLY WAS THAT WE WOULD HAVE AIR SUPERIORITY; AND WHAT A FALSE AND COSTLY ASSUMPTION THIS WAS -- A POLITICAL DECISION WAS MADE THAT THE OPERATION COULD NOT BE DELAYED AND SO WE NEVER HAD AIR SUPERIORITY, AND THE FLEET SUFFERED ENORMOUSLY BECAUSE OF IT. NEVERTHELESS THE MAJOR FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED WERE: * PROTECTION FOR THE AMPHIBOUS FLEET BOTH IN TERMS OF AIR DEFENSE, AND FROM THE SOUTH ATLANTIC STORMS AND * ENEMY DISPOSITIONS -- AN OPPOSED AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT CLOSE TO PORT STANLEY WAS THANKFULLY SWIFTLY REJECTED DUE TO LACK OF RESOURCES AND CASUALTY ESTIMATES. THREE ALTERNATIVES WERE FINALLY CONSIDERED ON 17 APRIL AT ASCENSION ISLAND AT A MEETING CHAIRED BY ADMIRAL SIR JOHN FIELDHOUSE. THESE WERE: A. OCCUPY WEST FALKLAND FOR THE PURPOSE OF BUILDING AN AIRSTRIP TO TAKE C130 AND F4 PHANTOM AC. THIS WAS ADMIRAL WOODWARD'S PREFERENCE. B. LAND IN LAFONIA, A FLAT AREA SOUTH OF GOOSE GREEN AND THEN PRESS NORTH. THIS WAS A STAFF ALTERNATIVE WITH MINIMAL ADVANTAGES, THAT WAS REJECTED VERY QUICKLY. C. ASSAULT AT SAN CARLOS. THE SAN CARLOS LANDING SITE OFFERED THE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE MANY ADVANTAGES. SAN CARLOS WATER WOULD PROVIDE A SHELTERED ANCHORAGE IN WHICH THE SHIPS AND LANDING CRAFT COULD EASILY UNLOAD THE LANDING FORCE AND ITS EQUIPMENT. BY CLOSING OFF THE RELATIVELY NARROW FALKLAND SOUND TO THE NORTH AND SOUTH OF SAN CARLOS WATER, THE NAVY COULD DEFEND THE AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS AGAINST ANY ENEMY SURFACE OR SUB-SURFACE ATTACKS. SINCE THE SITE WAS 50 MILES OVER VERY ROUGH TERRAIN FROM THE ENEMY'S MAIN FORCE AT PORT STANLEY, THE ARGENTINES COULD PROBABLY ONLY ATTACK THE BRITISH BEACHHEAD BY AIR OR WITH A RELATIVELY SMALL HELICOPTERBORNE FORCE. FINALLY, THE HIGH GROUND THAT SURROUNDED SAN CARLOS WATER WOULD PREVENT ARGENTINE AIRCRAFT FROM USING THEIR FEARED, SEA-SKIMMING EXOCET MISSILES TO ATTACK THE SHIPS UNLOADING IN SAN CARLOS WATER. THE SAN CARLOS SITE ALSO POSED A COUPLE OF DISADVANTAGES. THE SURROUNDING HILLS THAT WOULD HELP DEFEND AGAINST THE EXOCETS WOULD ALSO RESTRICT THE RADAR ACQUISITION OF LOW-FLYING AIRCRAFT UNTIL THEY EMERGED OVER THE HIGH GROUND. ALSO, THE NARROW WIDTH OF FALKLAND SOUND WOULD GIVE THE ATF SHIPS LITTLE ROOM IN WHICH TO MANEUVER AWAY FROM ENEMY AIR ATTACKS. ADMIRAL FIELDHOUSE INDICATED THAT, SUBJECT TO ENEMY DISPOSTION, HE PREFERRED THE SAN CARLOS OPTION AS HE WANTED TO SEIZE EAST FALKLANDS VITAL OBJECTIVES INCLUDING PORT STANLEY AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. ADVANCE FORCE OPERATIONS COMMENCED ON 27 APRIL AND CONTINUED FOR THE SUCCEEDING 3 1/2 WEEKS UNTIL D-DAY, FINALLY SELECTED FOR 21 MAY 1982. THEY DEPLOYED AS FOLLOWS: I WOULD HIGHLIGHT STANLEY, GOOSE GREEN, LAX MAY, PORT HOWEN & PEBBLE ISLAND. THE AIMS OF THESE ADVANCE FORCE OPERATIONS WERE INITIALLY BEACH RECONNAISSANCE AND IDENTIFICATION OF ENEMY DISPOSITIONS. THESE WERE EVENTUALLY IDENTIFIED AS SHOWN. THE ENEMY HAD A SIGNIFICANT RADIO DIRECTION FINDING CAPABILITY, WERE WELL AWARE OF THE PRESENCE OF SF OPS ASHORE, AND TRIED HARD TO LOCATE THEM. AT THAT TIME WE HAD NO BURST TRANSMISSION FACILITY, AND THE BEACH SURVEY REPORT FOR SAN CARLOS FOR EXAMPLE TOOK 2 1/2 HOURS TO SEND, IN MORSE. FORTUNATELY THE ARGENTIAN HELICOPTERBORNE REACTION FORCE FAILED TO FIND THEM, SO WELL WERE THEY CAMOUFLAGED. ALTHOUGH ON ONE OCCASION IT LANDED WITHIN 50 METERS OF AN O.P. POSITION. THE OFFENSIVE AIMS OF ADVANCE FORCE OPERATIONS ASHORE WERE TO HARRASS THE ENEMY AND, FUNDAMENTAL TO A LANDING AT SAN CARLOS, DESTROY THE ARGENTINIAN AIRBASE AT PEBBLE ISLAND. A RAID ON PEBBLE ISLAND WAS CARRIED OUT BY 48 MEMBERS OF SAS SUPPORTED BY NAVAL GUNFIRE SPOT TEAMS, HMS INVINCIBLE AND A GUIDED MISSILE DESTROYER WITH A SINGLE 5 INCH GUN. THE RAID WAS PLANNED AND EXECUTED WITHIN 5 DAYS. SUCH A TIME SCALE IS NOT RECOMMENDED BUT THE OPEATION WAS A COMPLETE SUCCESS. ELEVEN ENEMY AIRCRAFT PRINCIPALLY THE COUNTERINSURGENCY PUCARA, AND A RADAR STATION WERE COMPLETELY DESTROYED, AND WE SUFFERED NO CASUALTIES. THE TRAGIC DEATH OF 20 OF THESE MEN A FEW DAYS LATER IN A HELICOPTER ACCIDENT WAS A GRIEVEOUS AND POIGNANT LOSS. OTHER ADVANCE FORCE OPERATIONS INCLUDED CHECKING FALKLANDS SOUND FOR MINES, AND DOMINATION OF THE SEA AREA. THE FORMER WAS ACHIEVED BY SENDING A FRIGATE THROUGH THE SOUND, THE LATTER WAS ACHIEVED IN THE TAILING AND SUBSEQUENT SINKING OF THE CRUISER GENERAL BELGRANO (PREVIOUSLY THE U.S.S. PITTSBURGH. A WWII HEAVY CRUISER) BY SUBMARINE AFTER WHICH THE ARGENTINIAN NAVY NEVER AGAIN LEFT TERRITORIAL WATERS. THE NAVAL AIR BATTLE CONTINUED THROUGHOUT THE WAR STARTING WITH THE SINKING OF HMS SHEFFIELD BY EXOCET. THIS WAS TWO DAYS AFTER GENERAL BELGRANO WAS TORPEDOED, AND THOSE OPTIMISTS WHO HAD REMAINED HOPEFUL OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WERE FINALLY RECONCILED TO THE NEED FOR COMBAT ASHORE. THE OTHER SHIP SUNK BY EXOCET WAS THE ATLANTIC CONVEYOR, SHOW HERE. THE NAVAL AIR WAR WAS EFFECTIVELY CONCLUDED ONLY 2 DAYS BEFORE THE SURRENDER, WITH THE LAND LAUNCHED EXOCET STRIKE ON HMS GLAMORGAN ON 12 JUN. I SAW THIS ATTACK DURING THE BATTLE FOR MOUNT HARRIET, BUT MORE ABOUT THAT IN SESSION 2, THE LAND BATTLE! IN ALL WE LOST 6 SHIPS AND HAD 8 DAMAGED; ARGENTINA LOST 4 AGEING OR SMALL SHIPS. ALL ARE AWARE OF THE SUCCESS OF THE HARRIER. MANY CORRECTLY ARGUE, HOWEVER, THAT THE ARGENTINE AF WAS OPERATING AT THE LIMIT OF ITS RANGE -- AND THEREFORE THEIR A/C WERE UNABLE TO BE DETRACTED FROM THEIR BOMBING MISSION IN MANEUVER AND COUNTEROFFENSIVE OPERATIONS, THE COUNTER IS ALSO TRUE THAT WE HAD NO AWAC CAPABILITY THOUGH WE DID ACTUALLY REQUEST IT FROM USA, AND THE HARRIERS WERE THEREFORE FIGHTING BLIND. FURTHERMORE, THE HARRIERS WERE ALSO OPERATING AT THE LIMIT OF THEIR RANGE SINCE THE CARRIER BATTLE GROUPS WERE STATIONED WELL EAST OF THE ISLANDS TO AVOID EXOCET. NEVERTHELESS, HARRIERS WERE ALL WE HAD AND THEY PERFORMED SUPERBLY. NAVAL SHIPS ALSO CONDUCTED NIGHTLY SHELLING OVER ARGENTINE POSITIONS AROUND PORT STANLEY, GOOSE GREEN, MARE HARBOUR, FOX BAY, PORT HOWARD AND PORT LOUIS. YOU WILL NOTICE THAT SAN CARLOS WAS NOT INCLUDED. TOGETHER WITH THE PEBBLE ISLAND RAID, THE MISSION BY THE RAF, WITH CARRIER BASED HARRIER ASSISTANCE, TO BOMB PORT STANLEY AIRFIELD WAS THE MOST STIMULATING TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC. THE WAR CABINET HAD INCIDENTALLY REJECTED THE IDEA OF BOMBING AIR BASES IN MAINLAND ARGENTINA AS BEING ESCALATORY. 2 VULCAN BOMBERS, THE VANGUARD OF BRITAIN'S NUCLEAR DETERRENT IN THE 195Os AND DUE FOR SCRAPPING ONCE TORNADO WAS INTRODUCED, AND 23 VICTOR K2 TANKERS WERE EARMARKED, TRAINED AND DEPLOYED TO ASCENSION ISLAND. DUE TO A FAULTY WINDOW WHICH PREVENTED THE NECESSARY PRESSURIZATION, ONE VULCAN HAD TO TURN BACK, THE OTHER CONTINUED AND DROPPED 21 X 1000 BOMBS. THE LOGISTIC SUPPORT BEHIND THIS MISSION WAS ENORMOUS. THE VULCAN BOMBER ON ROUTE TO THE TARGET HAD TO HAVE 7 IN FLIGHT REFUELS, AND THE REFUELLERS THEMSELVES HAD TO BE REFUELLED. THE OVERALL RANGE ASCENSION TO FALKLAND RETURN, IN EXCESS OF 8OO0 MILES, EQUATES TO A MISSION FROM MOSCOW TO NEW YORK AND BACK OR ENGLAND TO PAKISTAN RETURN. THE DAY BEFORE THIS MISSION, MY COMPANY HAD BEEN TRAINING ASHORE IN ASCENSION ISLAND ON A 15 MILE LOAD CARRY AND SHOOTING EXERCISE. JUST AS WE WERE ABOUT TO RETURN TO THE CANBERRA, I WAS ORDERED TO PROVIDE TWO OF MY 3 RIFLE TROOPS TO GUARD THE AIRFIELD, AND RETAIN THE SECURITY OF THE OPERATION. IT WAS A DRAMATIC AND NOISY EXPERIENCE, AND EXHILARATING TO REALIZE WE WERE AT LAST STRIKING BACK. THE BBC WORLD SERVICE REPORTED THAT THE ATTACK WAS A SUCCESS, AND PUNDITS IN U.K. DECLARED THAT THE AIRFIELD MUST HAVE BEEN DAMAGED BEYOND USE. IT WAS A CRUEL SHOCK A FEW WEEKS LATER TO FIND THAT THE AIRFIELD HAD NEVER BEEN BLOCKED AND I SAW A/C MOVEMENTS UP TO THE DAY BEFORE THE SURRENDER FROM 15 KM AWAY! REPORTING THIS RAF/RN ATTACK, BRIAN HANRAHAN, A BBC TV REPORTER ABOARD HMS HERMES, MADE THE CLASSIC REPORT WHICH GAVE NOTHING AWAY. HE SAID, "I CANNOT TELL YOU HOW MANY A/C WERE INVOLVED BUT I COUNTED THEM ALL OUT, AND I COUNTED THEM ALL BACK IN." THERE WAS GREAT ELATION THAT THIS ATTACK WAS APPARENTLY SUCCESSFUL AGAINST A WELL DEFENDED AIRFIELD WITHOUT LOSS. THE SHARP EYED AMONGST YOU WILL HAVE NOTICED THAT THESE 2 INDIVIDUALS ARE PARAS. THAT'S BECAUSE THE CARTOONISTS WERE ALL RM. WE SPENT ABOUT 3 WEEKS OFF ASCENSION ISLAND, WHILE DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUED AND THE NAVY ENDEAVORED TO ENFORCE THE MARITIME EXCLUSION ZONE (BY SUBMARINE) AND THE SUBSEQUENT TOTAL EXCUSION ZONE (BY (AIRCRAFT/SURFACE) BUT REGRETABLY COULD GET ASHORE ONLY 3 TIMES. THIS WAS THERE WAS ONLY 1 SMALL BEACH, AND ALL LANDING CRAFT AND MANY HELOS WERE INVOLVED BY DAY IN RESTORING THE SHIPS IN A TACTICAL MANNER. THE SPEED WITH WHICH THE ATF AND PARTICULARLY GREY FUNNEL TRANSPORT SHIPS DEPLOYED FROM UK WITHIN 2-3 DAYS HAD PRECLUDED COMBAT LOADING -- PLANNING HAD AT THAT STAGE NOT PROCEEDED BEYOND THE COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE AND A POSSIBLE SCENARIO FOR LANDING. BY NIGHT WE SAILED AROUND THE ISLAND, FEARFUL OF THE ARGENTINIAN TANKER SPYING ON US MIGHT BE EQUIPPED WITH THE ITALIAN COSMOS SDV THAT THEY THE ARGENTINIAN'S HAD RECENTLY PURCHASED. WE SHALL NOW BREAK FOR 10 MINUTES WHILE THE ATF LINGERS IN THE SUN AT ASCENSION ISLAND. VIDEO 2 MINS (SILENT) BY THE TIME WE LEFT ASCENSION ISLAND ON 7 MAY 82, THE CONCEPT OF OPS ASHORE HAD BEEN PREPARED, THOUGH THE 47 PAGE BRIGADE OP ORDER WAS NOT ISSUED UNTIL 12 MAY, WITH "O" GP ON 13 MAY. HAVING SAID THAT, I RECEIVED A WARNING ORDER WHILE STILL IN ASCENSION, THAT MY COY WAS TO PREPARE FOR AMPHIBIOUS RAIDS ON THE WESTFALKLANDS USING 1 X FRIGATE, 2 HELOS AND SMALL BOATS. THE FULL BRIEFING PROCESS HAD BEEN COMPLETED DOWNS TO MNE LEVEL BY 18 MAY 82, WHILE THE ATF SAILED SOUTH INTO HEAVIER SEAS, STRONGER WINDS AND COLDER WEATHER. THE TEMPO OF TRAINING SLACKENED A LITTLE AS FINAL PREPARATIONS WERE MADE, MORE BLOOD WAS TAKEN, LETTERS WERE WRITTEN HOME AND THE EQUIPMENT SCALES LAID DOWN, TRIALLED AND TESTED OVER THE PREVIOUS WEEKS WAS CHECKED, REVIEWED AND PACKED. ON 19 MAY, THE 1500 MEN OF 4O CDO AND 3 PARA, OUR FELLOW PASSENGERS ON CANBERRA CROSS DECKED. IT HAD BEEN ENVISIONED THAT THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE BY JACKSTAY TRANSFER, ONE MAN OF A TIME A HORRIFIC WAY OF PREPARING TO GO TO WAR, BUT FORTUNATELY A BREAK IN THE WEATHER ENABLED LANDING CRAFT TO BE USED. THE AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE RV'D WITH THE LIGHT CARRIER BATTLE GROUPS DURING THE NIGHT OF 19/20 MAY. WE AWAKENED TO FIND OURSELVES IN SS CANBERRA IN THE CENTER OF THE LARGEST OPERATIONAL AMPHIBIOUS FLEET THAT HAD ASSEMBLED SINCE WORLD WAR II. IT WAS A TRULY MEMORABLE EXPERIENCE, BUT ONE TINGED WITH GREAT APPREHENSION. APPROACHING FROM THE EAST WE SPENT THE DAY WITHIN THE TEZ AND WERE WITHIN THE RANGE OF THE SUPER ETENDARD AIRCRAFT ARMED WITH EXOCET FROM LUNCHTIME ONWARDS. FORTUNATELY THE DAY WAS IDEAL WITH A VERY LOW CLOUD BASE AND INTERMITTENT RAIN, AND STILL WE PLOWED ON TOWARDS THE FALKLANDS. DURING THE NIGHT OF 20-21 MAY, WE HEADED TOWARDS PORT STANLEY, AND NAVAL GUNFIRE SOFTENED UP TARGETS IN THAT AREA IN A DEMONSTRATION DECEPTION. HAVING BEEN INFLUENCED BY USMC, THE ARGENTINIANS ANTICIPATED AN OPPOSED LANDING IN THE PORT STANLEY AREA, AND THE DEMONSTRATION WAS SO SUCCESSFUL THAT EVEN AFTER D-DAY THEY THOUGHT SAN CARLOS WAS A DIVERSION! CONCURRENTLY, THE SAS UNDERTOOK A MOST OVERT FEINT IN A STANDOFF ATTACK ON GOOSE GREEN WITH ADDITIONAL NGS. AS THE AMPHIBIOUS TRANSPORT SHIPS, NAVAL GUNFIRE AND AIR DEFENSE SHIPS HEADED TOWARDS FALKLAND SOUND, SBS WITH NGS ATTACK THE 1/2 COY POSITION ON FANNING HEAD, IDENTIFIED DURING ADVANCE FORCE OPERATIONS, TO DIVERT THE ENEMY'S ATTENTION. WITH SBS WENT A RM OFFICER BORN AND BRED IN COSTA RICA WHO WAS A FLUENT SPANISH SPEAKER. HE WAS ARMED WITH A LOUD SPEAKER AND HIS JOB WAS TO PERSUADE THEM TO SURRENDER, BUT SADLY HIS VOICE COULD NOT BE CLEARLY HEARD. AFTER A SOMEWHAT FRUSTRATING 7 HOUR ACTION, 9 ARGENTINIANS WERE CAPTURED, THE REMAINDER FILTERED INTO THE DARKNESS JUST BEFORE DAWN. HOWEVER THE OVERALL MISSION WAS A SUCCESS IN THAT THE ACTION CLEARLY DIVERTED THE ATTENTION OF THE ARGENTINIANS FROM INTERFERING WITH THE MAIN LANDING. LEFT TO THEIR OWN DEVICES, THEY COULD HAVE USED THEIR 1O5 MM RECOILLESS ANTI-TANK GUN WITH DEVASTATING EFFECT AGAINST THE UNARMOURED LCUs PACKED WITH TROOPS, AS THEY PASSED SOUTH OF FANNING HEAD ON THEIR WAY INTO SAN CARLOS WATER. THE BRIGADE MISSION WAS TO CONDUCT A SILENT NIGHT LANDING BY LANDING CRAFT, SO THAT BY FIRST LIGHT THE BRIGADE WOULD HAVE SECURED THE HIGH GROUND OVERLOOKING PORT SAN CARLOS, SAN CARLOS SETTLEMENT AND AJAX BAY. AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE AFTER 1ST LIGHT, ONE LIGHT GUN BATTERY WOULD BE FLOWN IN, FOLLOWED BY THE RAPIER BTRY AND THEN THE REMAINING GUNS. THE DESIGN BEING THAT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THE BDE SHOULD BE IN A GOOD REVERSE SLOPE DEFENSIVE POSITION READY TO FIGHT ARGENTINIAN AIR OR GROUND ATTACKS, OR ANY COMBINATION OF THESE 2. THE PLAN CALLED FOR 40 CDO TO LAND AT SAN CARLOS SETTLEMENT AND 45 CDO AT AJAX BAY FIRST AND THEN 2 AND 3 PARAS TO COVER S & N RESPECTIVELY. WHEN THE SAS FEINT ATTACK LOCATED WHAT WAS CONSIDERED LIKELY TO BE THE ENEMY STRATEGIC RESERVE AT DARWIN GOOSE GREEN, THE NEED TO GET TO SUSSEX MOUNTAIN QUICKLY WAS OBVIOUS. THE PLAN WAS THEREFORE CHANGED AT THE LAST MOMENT TO LAND 40 CDO ON BLUE BEACH ONE AND 2 PARA AT BLUE BEACH TWO FIRST, THEN 45 CDO ON RED BEACH AND 3 PARA ON GREEN BEACH ONE. 42 CDO(-) WAS TO REMAIN ON CANBERRA IN RESERVE UNTIL ORDERED. MY COY WAS STILL EARMARKED FOR RAIDS IN WEST FALKLANDS, A ROLE WHICH PROMISED TO BE BOTH STIMULATING AND EXCITING. THE TIME FOR H-HOUR WAS SELECTED FOLLOWING A BALANCING ACT BETWEEN RN WHO DID NOT WISH TO BE IN HOSTILE AIRCRAFT RANGE BY DAY, AND JULIAN THOMPSON WHO REQUIRED THE MAXIMUM TIME TO DEPLOY TROOPS BY NIGHT. EVENTUALLY IT WAS SET FOR 2:30 AM LOCAL TIME. 4O CDO WAS ALLOCATED 2 SCORPION AND 2 SCIMITAR LIGHT TANKS UNDER COMMAND AND THESE LANDED SIDE BY SIDE IN THE FIRST 2 X LCUS. THE INTENTION BEING TO FIRE THE MAIN ARMAMENT IF NECESSARY WHILE APPROACHING THE BEACH. 40 CDO HAD 4 X LCUS AND 4 X LCVPS WHILE 2 PARA HAD JUST 4 X LCUS. THOUGH THERE WAS NEARLY AN HOUR'S DELAY IN H-HOUR THE LANDING WAS A CLEAR SUCCESS AND ALL PERSONNEL GOT ASHORE WITHOUT CASUALTIES. THE DELAY IN H-HOUR WAS CAUSED PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICULTY THAT HEAVILY LADEN MEN EXPERIENCED IN MOVING THROUGH THE NARROW PASSAGEWAYS AND EXIT IN CIVILIAN SHIPS. PARTICULARLY BY ONE MAN FROM 2 PARA WHO FELL AND WAS INJURED GETTING OFF NORLAND ONTO AN LCU. VIDEO - (1 MIN) AS IMPLIED BY THE TAPE, FRANTIC EFFORTS WERE MADE TO BUILD UP THE AIR DEFENSES ASHORE WHILE WE WAITED TENSELY FOR THE FIRST AIRCRAFT ATTACK WHICH WE KNEW MUST COME SOON. AT 8 A.M. A SEA KING HELICOPTER WITH THE RAPIER MISSILE AIR DEFENSE BATTERY RECONNAISSANCE PARTY WAS FIRED AT, EAST OF PORT SAN CARLOS, ITS 2 ESCORTING LIGHT GAZELLE HELOS WERE HIT BY SMALL ARMS FIRE. THESE AIRCRAFT WERE ARMED WITH SNEB ROCKETS AND GPMGS, AND ACTED AS GUNSHIPS. ONE GAZELLE MANAGED TO GET BACK TO AN LSL; SGT EVANS THE PILOT OF THE OTHER WAS HIT. BY A BRILLIANT PIECE OF FLYING AND, ALTHOUGH DYING OF HIS WOUNDS, HE MANAGED TO PUT HIS AIRCRAFT GENTLY IN THE WATER. HIS AIRCREWMAN SGT CANDLISH TENDED HIM AND SWAM, DRAGGING HIM WHILE UNDER MACHINE GUNFIRE, THE 500 M TO PORT SAN CARLOS. AS CANDLISH WAS PULLING HIS MORTALLY WOUNDED PILOT AND FRIEND FROM THE WATER HE SAW ANOTHER GAZELLE DISINTEGRATE IN THE AIR, HAVING BEEN HIT BY THE SAME GROUP. THE CREW OF TWO WERE KILLED INSTANTLY. THESE THREE AIRCREW WERE THE ONLY MEN OF 3 CDO BDE RM KIA ON D-DAY. BUT OUT IN FALKLAND SOUND AND IN SAN CARLOS WATER, WHERE MOST OF THE ATF SHIPS WERE, MANY MORE GALLANT SAILORS WERE TO DIE UNDER ARGENTINE AIR ATTACK. ON CANBERRA WE HAD ASSEMBLED IN OUR COY ASSAULT STATION FROM H-HOUR, THOUGH MOST OF US WERE AWAKE ALL NIGHT, WAITING AND WATCHING. WATCHING THE ATTACK ON FANNING HEAD AND THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE ASSAULT, WATCHING THE SHIPS EASING INTO SAN CARLOS WATER AND DISGOURGING LANDING CRAFT. WAITING FOR THE ARGENTINA REACTION. EVERY MINUTE THAT PASSED GAVE US TIME TO IMPROVE OUR AIR DEFENCES; WOULD THE DELAY ENABLE US TO GET THESE ASHORE AND FULLY EFFECTIVE BEFORE THE FIRST ATTACK. THE WAITING LASTED UNTIL 8:55 AM, WHEN A SINGLE PUCARA ATTACKED CANBERRA BUT WAS DRIVEN OFF BY MACHINE GUNFIRE. THEN AT 9:38 TWO MORE PUCARA ATTACKED 2 PARA ON SUSSEX MOUNTAIN AND D SON, 22 SAS, WITHDRAWING FROM THEIR SUCCESSFUL DIVERSIONARY RAID ON DARWIN. ONE WAS SHOT DOWN BY D SQN USING THE AMERICAN STINGER MISSILE. THESE PUCARA WERE BASED AT GOOSE GREEN ONLY 12-14 MILES TO THE SOUTH OF THE BEACHHEAD. THEREAFTER, WE WERE SUBJECT PRINCIPALLY TO JET AIRCRAFT. THE NEXT WERE A PAIR OF MIRAGE WHICH ATTACKED THE ANCHORAGE AT 9:45. FROM THEN ON THE, RAIDS SEEMED CONTINUOUS. CAPT BURNS THE SENIOR NAVAL OFFICER IN CANBERRA, WHO HAD BEEN CALLING THOSE BELOW DECKS TO TAKE COVER AT EACH AND EVERY ATTACK, ASSURED US THAT HE COULD GIVE 2 MINUTES WARNING OF FUTURE ATTACKS. AS HE WAS MAKING HIS ANNOUNCEMENT WE HEARD THE ROAR OF ANOTHER MIRAGE OVER THE PA SYSTEM FOLLOWED BY ABJECT APOLOGIES FROM CAPT BURN. THE AIRCRAFT HAD APPROACHED AT WAVE TOP LEVEL TOTALLY UNDETECTED. VIDEO (4 MINS) SOME 72 AIRCRAFT BOMBED AND STRAFED THE ATF ON D-DAY AND BY LATE AFTERNOON ALL OF THE FRIGATES IN OR NEAR THE ANCHORAGE HAD BEEN HIT AND DAMAGED, ONE OF THEM HMS ARDENT MORTALLY. AMAZINGLY NO FURTHER ATTACKS CAME AND CANBERRA, THE LPDS AND THE LSLS REMAINED INTACT. THIS WAS THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY THAT THE ARGENTINE AIR FORCE MISSED TO CRIPPLE THE CDO BDE BY ATTACKING AND SINKING OUR SUPPLIES. ON D-DAY ALL OF THE BRIGADE AMMUNITION, FUEL AND RATIONS WERE STILL EMBARKED, AND THE LOSS OF THE LSLS WOULD HAVE RESULTED IN THE BRIGADE BEING WITHOUT ITS COMBAT SUPPLIES OTHER THAN THOSE WHICH WE CARRIED OURSELVES. INSTEAD THE ARGENTINIANS ATTACKED BUT FAILED TO DESTROY THE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS, THAT IS THE RN SHIPS; TO US GRUNTS THIS WAS CLEARLY A TACTICAL ERROR. DUE TO IHE VULNERABILITY AND LACK OF AVAILABILITY OF RN SHIPS IN FALKLANDS SOUND, MY COY MISSION WAS CHANGED AND I REJOINED 42 CDO IN RESERVE. MY COMMANDO WAS THANKFULLY ORDERED ASHORE AT ABOUT 11 AM, TO FOLLOW UP THE 1/2 COY THAT SHOT DOWN THE TWO HELICOPTERS. BRIGADIER THOMPSON WAS ALSO KEEN TO GET US OFF THE CANBERRA, THE MOST PRESTIGIOUS SHIP OF THE ATF SO THAT SHE COULD GET TO SEA AT LAST LIGHT. AS WE MOVED ASHORE IN 4 X LCU'S WE WERE OF COURSE MOST FEARFUL OF ANOTHER AIR ATTACK, BUT FORTUNATELY WITH ALMOST PREDICTABLE BRITISH ROYAL AIR FORCE CUSTOM, THE ARGENTINIANS MUST HAVE TAKEN A SHORT LUNCH BREAK, THEREBY ALLOWING US TO LAND AT GREEN BEACH ONE WITHOUT INCIDENT. NEVERTHELESS WE WERE SO KEEN TO GET OFF THE LCUS THAT WE MADE NO COMMENT ABOUT THE THIGH DEEP WET LANDING TO WHICH WE WERE SUBJECTED. WE WERE POSITIVELY ELATED TO GET ASHORE, IN AN ENVIRONMENT SIMILAR TO DARTMOOR OR SCOTLAND, WHERE WE FELT MUCH SAFER THAN ABOARD SHIP OR LC. THROUGHOUT OUR TIME IN THE BEACHHEAD WE WERE VERY MUCH AWARE OF THE VERY VALIANT DEFENSE BY THE ROYAL NAVY, AND OF THEIR CRUCIAL AND FUNDAMENTAL NAVAL GUNFIRE AND AIR DEFENSE ACTIONS. DUE TO OUR HOT PURSUIT ROLE WE WENT ASHORE IN FIGHTING ORDER, A BELT/WEBBING EQUIPMENT WITHOUT RUCKSACK BUT CARRYING 2 X MORTAR BOMBS ETC. HAVING DUMPED THESE BOMBS AT THE MORTAR BASE PLATE POSITION AT PORT SAN CARLOS, WE WERE ABLE TO MOVE MUCH FASTER AND MY COY HAD THE FIRST CONTACT SOME HOURS LATER. WE SAW 4 FIGURES MOVING IN THE ROCKS ON "THE KNOB" A SMALL PROMINATORY IN THE SAN CARLOS RIVER, WHICH ONE TROOP (PLATOON) PROCEEDED TO ATTACK. IT WAS WITH CONSIDERABLE EMBARRASSMENT THAT WE HAD TO REPORT ON COMPLETION, NOTHING MORE THAN PENGUINS! MY BOSS LTCO NICK VAUX WAS SIMPLY FURIOUS, BUT IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES I BELIEVE WE WERE RIGHT TO SHOOT FIRST AND ASK QUESTION LATER! THAT NIGHT AND THE NEXT WE SLEPT IN THE OPEN WITHOUT SLEEPING BAGS OR OVERHEAD COVER. HAVING GOT THOROUGHLY WET IN SALT WATER IN THE LANDING, WE WERE VERY COLD, BUT DELIGHTED TO BE DOING THE JOB FOR WHICH WE HAD TRAINED SO HARD. DURING THE AFTERNOON OF D+1, HAVING FAILED TO CATCH THE FLEEING ENEMY, WE OCCUPIED A DEFENSIVE POSITION IN CERRO MONTEVIDEO. FROM HERE WE WATCHED THE REPEATED AIR ATTACKS ON SAN CARLOS OUR SW AND CAME TO KNOW THAT IF THE AIRCRAFT TURNED LEFT AS THEY FLEW OVER US THEY'D BE SHOT DOWN IN A BIG RED PUFF OF SMOKE, THIS WAS A MANEUVER NORMALLY PREPARATORY TO A SECOND STRIKE AT THE FLEET. GO STRAIGHT ON PAST US AND THEY SURVIVED BUT PERHAPS ONLY UNTIL THEY MET THE HARRIER CAP OPERATING WEST OF THE FALKLANDS. HERE INCIDENTALLY IS A CHART OF ENEMY AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN AND HOW. MOST AIRCRAFT ATTACKED FROM THE SOUTH, BUT IN ORDER TO HIT ATTRACTIVE LF TARGETS ASHORE THEY HAD TO APPROACH FROM EAST OR WEST. THIS WAS ONLY DONE ONCE WHEN FOUR MARINES WERE KILLED, 12 WOUNDED, AND THE AMMO DUMP HIT. I HAD A SPECTACULAR VIEW OF THIS FROM SUSSEX MOUNTAIN. THIS SLIDE SHOWS FRIENDLY A/C LOSSES. VIDEO (4 MINS) AFTER 2 OR 3 DAYS IN CERRO MONTEVIDEO WE WERE WITHDRAWN BY NIGHT BY LCU TO PORT SAN CARLOS WHERE WE WERE RECONSTITUED AS A RESERVE. IT BEING A SUNDAY WE EVEN HAD TIME FOR A COY CHURCH SERVICE, CONGREGATIONS EXPANDED ENORMOUSLY DURING THE COURSE OF THE DISPUTE! ON THE AFTERNOON OF 26 MAY, I WAS GIVEN AN ORDER OVER THE RADIO TO MOVE MY COY IN 20 MINS; AND I TO CATCH A HELO IN 5 MINS. NO FURTHER DETAILS WERE GIVEN FOR SECURITY REASONS. I WAS FLOWN TO SUSSEX MOUNTAINS BY GAZELLE TO TAKE OVER 2 PARA'S TAOR IMMEDIATELY. AFTER A SHORT BRIEF BY THE CO, I WAS QUICKLY ABLE TO SELECT THE KEY AREAS AND INDENTIFY THE VULNERABLE APPROACHES TO THE BRIGADE ADMIN AREA THAT HAD TO BE COVERED BY STANDING PATROLS. THE COY MOVED IN WITHOUT DIFFICULTY AND ONCE MY XO AND CSM HAD A FIRM UNDERSTANDING OF THE PLAN, I WENT TO ATTEND THE CO'S ORDERS FOR THE BATTLE OF GOOSE GREEN. THE BATTALION MOVED OUT UNDER COVER OF DARKNESS A COUPLE OF HOURS LATER. AS I LISTEDNED ON MY HF RADIO TO TGE BBC WORLD SERVICE EVENING NEWS, I WAS SIMPLY HORRIFIED--AND THE CO APOPLECTIC WITH RAGE--TO HEAR A REPORT ISSUED FROM LONDON THAT 2 PARA WAS NOW HEADING TOWARDS GOOSE GREEN. THIS NEWS REPORT WAS HEARD BY THE ARGENTINIANS WHO WE LATER DISCOVERED MOVED A REINFORCED COY TO GOOSE GREEN FROM MOUNT CHALLENGER/MOUNT KENT TO COUNTER THE THREAT. THE COMMANDING OFFICER OF 2 PARA LTCOL H. JONES WAS KILLED IN ACTION AT GOOSE GREEN, 2 NIGHTS LATER WHEN THE ATTACK WAS FALTERING AND IN NEED OF A DRAMATIC ACTION. HE WAS POSTUMOUSLY AWARDED THE VICTORIA CROSS, THE SUPREME BRITISH AWARD FOR GALLANTRY, AND ONE OF ONLY TWO AWARDED DURING THE WAR. WE HAVE NOW REACHED THE STAGE WHERE WE ARE BREAKING OUT OF THE BRIDGEHEAD, AND I INTEND TO COVER THE LAND BATTLE IN THE NEXT PRESENTATION. NOW, HOWEVER, IS A GOOD TIME TO MENTION SOME OF THE LESSONS THAT CAN BE DRAWN FOR THE BATTLE SO FAR, WHILE THEY ARE STILL FRESH IN OUR MINDS. FIRST OF ALL, MODERN WARSHIP CONSTRUCTION HAS UNTIL NOW FAVOURED LIGHT AND USUALLY HIGHLY FLAMMABLE TOXIC MATERIALS. DAMAGE CONTROL AND FIREFIGHTING WAS SO DIFFICULT THAT ON AT LEAST TWO OCCASIONS THE SHIP HAD TO BE ABANDONED AND LATER SANK. THE USE OF ALUMINUM IN THE SUPERSTRUCTURE IS UNDER REVIEW, WHILE OTHER MATERIALS SUCH AS MATTRESSES ARE NOW FIRE RETARDENT. THE VALUE OF ANTIFLASH PROTECTION FOR HEAD AND HANDS WAS CLEARLY ILLUSTRATED. THE MAN-MADE FIBRE OVERALLS MELTED TO THE SKIN AND CONTRIBUTED TO MANY SERIOUS INJURIES. NATURAL FIBRE OVERALLS ARE NOW ISSUED. THE NAVY IN PARTICULAR AND THE FORCE IN GENERAL LACKED AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING AND CONTROL SYSTEMS, THEREBY LEAVING US PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE. A NUMBER OF A/S SEAKING HELOS HAVE NOW BEEN CONVERTED TO ACCOMPLISH THIS VITAL ROLE. HELICOPTER ASSETS ARE VITAL WHERE TERRAIN PROHIBITS MOBILITY, AND WE DID NOT HAVE ENOUGH. ALL AVAILABLE SORTIES OF MEDIUM OR HEAVY HELO WERE USED FOR ARTILLERY DEPLOYMENTS AND RESUPPLY. IT WAS ALSO RELEARNT THAT A LIGHT RECONNAISSANCE OR COMMAND HELICOPTER WITH ONLY LIMITED ARMAMENT AND IN COUNTRY DEVOID OF NATURAL COVER IS VULNERABLE TO GROUND FIRE. HARRIER WAS A MAJOR SUCCESS AND SHOWED ITSELF TO BE FLEXIBLE, ROBUST, RELIABLE AND EFFECTIVE ESPECIALLY WHEN EOUIPPED WITH YOUR AIM 9L AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE. HOWEVER, DESPITE ITS SUCCESS, IT IS NOT A FIGHTER AND IS NOT AS EFFECTIVE AS A FIGHTER WOULD HAVE BEEN IN THE SAME CIRCUMSTANCES. THE UK HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO USE THE HARRIER, WHICH PROVED ITSELF BETTER THAN WAS EXPECTED. AS FOR ATTACKS ON AIRFIELDS, THERE IS A NEED FOR AN ADVANCED AIRFIELD ATTACK WEAPON. I UNDERSTAND THESE ARE UNDER DEVELOPMENT. THE ABSENCE OF A DEDICATED LAND FORCE, AIR RECONNAISSANCE CAPABILITY WAS A SEVERE HANDICAP IN OUR ABILITY TO GAIN ENEMY DISPOSITIONS. AT THE TIME OF THE FALKLANDS THERE WERE TWO PLATOONS OF RPV WITH THE BRITISH ARMY IN GERMANY. THIS FORCE IS NOW BEING EXPANDED. THE NEED FOR DEFENSE SUPPRESSION WEAPONS WAS CLEARLY ILLUSTRATED. HARRIERS WERE EXPOSED TO HEAVY AND ACCURATE GROUND FIRE DUE TO THE LACK OF THESE WEAPONS, AND THREE WERE SHOT DOWN. SIMILARLY SMALL ARMS FIRE ACCOUNTED FUR A NUMBER OF ARGENTINIAN AIRCRAFT. IN THE AIR DEFENCE FIELD ALL SURFACE SHIPS REQUIRE A POINT DEFENCE CAPABILITY TO COUNTER THE MISSILE THREAT. VULCAN PHALANX GUNS HAVE NOW BEEN FITTED TO ALL WARSHIPS, AND ANTI MISSILE CHAFF DISPENSERS DEVELOPED FOR ATTACHMENTS TO ALL SHIPS INCLUDING MERCHANTMEN. THERE IS ALSO A NEED FOR MORE REALISTIC AIR DEFENSE TRAINING. IN PARTICULAR ALL SHIPS NEED TO BE FITTED WITH A WIDE RANGE OF ON-BOARD TRAINERS IF THE NAVY IS TO OPTIMIZE THE PERFORMANCES OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS. AND WE REQUIRE MORE REALISTIC TARGETS FOR PEACETIME TRAINING OF AIR DEFENCE WEAPON SYSTEM OPERATORS. ASHORE, THERE WERE INSUFFICIENT LAND AIR DEFENCE ASSETS. EVERY MANOEVRE BATTALION REQUIRES AN AIR DEFENCE CAPABILITY. WE HAVE NOW STRENGTHENED OUR OWN FAAD TROOP AND ISSUED THE BRANDNEW JAVELIN MISSILE. IN DUE COURSE WE SHALL ALSO BE GETTING A RAPIER BATTERY ORGANIC TO 3 CDO BDE. THE RAPID DISPATCH OF THE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE IN THREE DAYS WAS GOOD POLITICALLY, BUT CAUSED PROBLEMS TO THE LANDING FORCE WHICH EMBARKED WITH LITTLE OR NO INTELLIGENCE, AND NO FIRM MISSION OR PLAN. IT IS NOT A RECOMMENDED METHOD OF GOING TO WAR, AND WAS NOT MILITARILY NECESSARY. THE SSN NUCLEAR POWERED SUBMARINES WERE FLEXIBILE AND POWERFUL INSTRUMENTS THROUGHOUT THE CRISIS, POSING AN OBIQUITOUS THREAT WHICH THE ARGENTINES COULD NEITHER MEASURE NOR OPPOSE. SPECIAL FORCES PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN ADVANCE FORCE OPERATIONS. THE COMBINATION IN A SINGLE PATROL OF INTELLIGENCE GATHERING SKILLS WITH THE CAPACITY TO MOUNT HIGHLY DESTRUCTIVE RAIDS GIVES THE MILITARY COMMANDER A FLEXIBLE AND POTENT WEAPON. FINALLY I'D LIKE TO QUOTE FROM A REPORT SENT TO OUR CAPTAIN GENERAL HRH PRINCE PHILIP, THE DUKE OF EDINBURGH. "THE AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS AT SAN CARLOS ON 21 MAY 1982 WERE THE FIRST OCCASION THAT AN ASSAULT LANDING HAD TAKEN PLACE AT BRIGADE LEVEL SINCE THE SUEZ CRISIS AND THE FIRST TIME SINCE 25 APRIL 1915 (AT CAPE HELLES) THAT SUCH A LANDING HAD BEEN LAUNCHED FROM A TASK FORCE INCORPORATING NON-SPECIALIST AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS. THE AMPHIBIOUS DIMENSION WAS A PARAMOUNT FEATURE OF THE OPERATION AND IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT ANY OTHER AMPHIBOUS OPERATION HAS BEEN UNDERTAKEN WITH OPERATION CORPORATE'S COMBINATION OF SPEED AND DISTANCE FROM THE MOUNTING BASE. WITHOUT AN AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY AND THE EXPERTISE IN THE SPECIALIST TECHNIQUES INVOLVED, THE UNITED KINGDOM COULD NOT HAVE DELIVERED A MILITARY RIPOSTE TO THE ARGENTINE INVASION. THE PRESENCE OF SPECIALIST AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING FOR OPERATION CORPORATE WAS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN THE SUCCESS OF THE OPERATION, PARTICULARLY DURING THE INITIAL LANDINGS. THE AVAILABILITY OF THE TWO LPDS AND THE SIX LSLS PROVED INVALUABLE, BUT THE LACK OF SHIPPING WITH MULTI-SPOT HELICOPTER PLATFORMS, ESSENTIAL FOR ACHIEVING REALLY EFFICIENT SHIP-TO-SHORE MOVEMENT, WAS A SERIOUS HANDICAP. THIS COMMENT IN NO WAY DIMINISHES THE OUTSTANDING CONTRIBUTION MADE BY SHIPS TAKEN UP FROM TRADE (STUFT) WHICH PERFORMED ADMIRABLY WITHIN THEIR OWN CAPABILITIES. NONETHELESS, THE OPERATION EMPHASIZED FOUR POINTS CONCERNING AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING: A. THERE WAS A SHORTAGE OF SPECIALIST AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING, AND IN PARTICULAR, SHIPS THAT WERE CAPABLE OF OPERATING MORE THAN TWO HELICOPTERS AT A TIME. HMS HERMES WAS THE ONLY HELICOPTER ASSAULT PLATFORM OF SIGNIFICANCE BUT IT WAS NOT MADE AVAILABLE TO THE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE. B. EVEN WITH ALL SIX LSLS, DELIVERY OF VEHICLES AND STORES REQUIRED SUBSTANTIAL USE OF STUFT. C. THE INABILITY OF LSLS TO WORK HELICOPTERS OFF THE FORWARD SPOT AT NIGHT DELAYED THE OFF-LOAD PLAN AND PROVED TO BE A MAJOR HANDICAP. THE SAME APPLIED TO STUFT ON WHICH NO NIGHT FLYING WAS ALLOWED. D. STUFT SHIPPING WAS VERY VULNERABLE, BUT CLEARLY PROVED ITS WORTH. ALTHOUGH AN ESSENTIAL SUPPLEMENT TO THE AMPHIBIOUS GROUP, STUFT BY THEMSELVES COULD NOT PROVIDE ANY FORM OF AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY. APART FROM THEIR POOR COMMUNICATIONS AND TOTAL INABILITY TO PROVIDE COMMAND AND CONTROL FACILITIES, THEY ARE NOT BY THEMSELVES CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING AN ASSAULT LANDING, OR OPERATING OVER THE BEACH WHERE PORTS AND JETTIES DO NOT EXIST. EXPERIENCE OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS, AND THEIR EXTREME FLEXIBILITY, ENABLED THE COMMANDERS AND STAFFS INVOLVED TO ACHIEVE A SUCCESSFUL LANDING AND TO SECURE A HARBOUR AND BEACHHEAD FROM WHICH LAND OPERATIONS COULD BE DEVELOPED. THE ABSENCE OF ANY MAJOR SET-BACK SHOULD NOT BLIND ANALYSTS TO THE RISKS TAKEN DURING AND FOR A FEW DAYS AFTER THE LANDINGS. THE NECESSITY IN AN AMPHIBIOUS LANDING FOR LOCAL AIR SUPERIORITY REMAINS VALID. THE RELEVANCE OF THIS CAMPAIGN TO AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN EUROPE AND PARTICULARLY THE NORTHERN FLANK IS UNDOUBTED. THE LESSONS EMERGING ARE NOT NEW BUT IT HAS PROBABLY TAKEN A WAR TO REFRESH MEMORIES AND RE-EMPHASIZE THE VALUE OF A SPECIALIZED AMPHIBIOUS FORCE. THE NEED TO REPLACE THE CORE OF SPECIALIZED AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS, CAPABLE OF LAUNCHING SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS OF HELICOPTERS, AND THE PROVISION OF EFFECTIVE LOCAL AIR SUPERIORITY AND AIR DEFENCE ASSETS, ARE LESSONS WHICH APPLY AS MUCH TO OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF NATO AS THEY WERE SHOWN TO APPLY IN OPERATION CORPORATE." FORTUNATELY THIS NEED HAS NOW BEEN RECOGNIZED, AND REPLACEMENTS FOR THE AGEING LPDS AND LSLS ARE IN HAND FOR THE 1990S. I SUPPOSE THE TWO FUNDAMENTAL LESSONS LEARNT CAN BE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS: LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, I REGRET THAT TIME HAS NOT ALLOWED ME IN THIS PRESENTATION TO COVER INNUMBERABLE AREAS OF INTEREST TO THE NAVAL GUNFIRE, ARTILLERY OR AIR DEFENCE EXPERT, THE MEDIC, TANKER, THE LOGISTICIAN, AND EMBARKATION OFFICER, PILOT, PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER AND SO ON. FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE REST OF YOUR THOUGH, WE SHALL BREAK FOR 10 MINUTES AND I SHALL TRY TO ANSWER AS MANY QUESTIONS AS POSSIBLE WHEN WE RETURN. PLEASE LISTEN FOR THE BELL. THE SECOND PRESENTATION TO THE U.S. MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE ON THE FALKLANDS WAR 1982 BY MAJOR D. G. WHEEN, RM 10 MARCH 1986 VIDEO 11 LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, GOOD AFTERNOON AND WELCOME TO THE SECOND PRESENTATION ON THE FALKLANDS WAR. THOSE OF YOU WHO MANAGED TO STAY AWAKE, AND CAN STILL REMEMBER PART I, WILL REMEMBER WE COVERED THE POLITICAL, HISTORICAL AND GEO- GRAPHIC BACKGROUND TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS THAT LED TO THE ARGENTINIAN INVASION ON 1/2 APRIL 1982, AND THE BRITISH REACTION IN WHICH WE SENT OVER 100 SHIPS IN THE LARGEST AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION SINCE WW II. WE WENT THROUGH PERMA, AND DREW-OUT SOME OF THE MORE OBVIOUS LESSONS WE LEARNED IN THE NAVAL, AMPHIBIOUS, AVIATION, AND ANTI-AIR WAR. THE AIM OF THIS PRESENTATION IS TO COVER THE LAND BATTLE.I SHALL NOT COVER ALL OF THE OPERATIONS IN DETAIL BUT LET ME REMIND YOU THAT THE FORCE COMPRISED THE NECESSARY HQ, GCE, CSS AND, TO A CERTAIN LIMITED EXTENT, THE AVIATION ELEMENTS OF A 8/9 MAF. I SHALL PRIMARILY BE CONCENTRATING ON 42 COMMANDO'S OPERATIONS, PARTICULARLY L COY'S. WE LEFT 2 PARA EN ROUTE TO GOOSE GREEN, IN THE FIRST OVERT MOVE TO BREAK OUT OF THE BEACHHEAD. AS I THINK I EXPLAINED IN THE QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD LAST TIME, BRIGADIER (GENERAL) JULIAN THOMPSON HAD INITIALLY CONTEM- PLATED A RAID ON GOOSE GREEN BUT REJECTED THE IDEA BECAUSE HE FELT THE ENEMY FORCE AT GOOSE GREEN COULD BE CONTAINED AND BYPASSED. HE WAS, HOWEVER, PLACED UNDER POLITICAL DIRECTION FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM TO TAKE UP THE OFFENSIVE, AND EASE THE MEDIA AND MILITARY PRESSURE ON THE SHIPS OF THE ATF IN FALKLAND SOUND. I DON'T INTEND GOING THROUGH THE BATTLE IN DETAIL AS I WAS NOT INVOLVED, BUT IT WAS THE FIRST SET-PIECE BATTLE OF THE WAR AND 2 PARA's VICTORY WAS AN ENORMOUS BOOST TO MORALE. IT SET THE PATTERN FOR THE LATER BATTLES IN THAT THE ATTACKING FORCE WAS IN EACH CASE ENORMOUSLY OUTNUMBERED BY THE DEFENCE, WHO WERE IN WELL PREPARED DEFENSIVE POSITIONS. THE BATTLE FOR GOOSE GREEN WAS, HOWEVER, UNIQUE IN THAT IT SPILLED OVER THE FIRST NIGHT AND INTO THE WHOLE OF THE NEXT DAY. LOW GENTLY ROLLING HILLS MADE IT SEEM IDEAL TANK COUNTRY, BUT THESE WERE NOT USED AS IT WAS FELT THEY WOULD GET BOGGED DOWN IN THE PEAT. EXPERIENCE IN THE LONG MARCH ACROSS THE ISLAND EVENTUALLY SHOWED THAT THIS WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN THE CASE AND JULIAN THOMPSON FREELY ADMITS HIS MISTAKE. A LACK OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT FIRE SUPPORT WAS A PROBLEM THROUGHOUT THE BATTLE. 2 PARA HAD JUST 3 X 1O5MM GUNS IN DIRECT SP, AND ONLY TWO OF THEIR OWN 6 X 81MM MORTARS; HMS ARROW PROVIDED NGS FROM 1 X 4.5" TURRET DURING THE NIGHT BUT HAD DEPARTED BEFORE DAWN IN ORDER TO GIVE PROTECTION TO THE ATF AROUND THE BEACHHEAD. 2 HARRIER GR3 (GROUND ATTACK VARIANT) SORTIES EACH INVOLVING 2 HARRIERS WERE USED IN THE DAY PRECEDING THE BATTLE, BUT ON THE FIRST MISSION THE FAC AND HARRIER NEVER MADE CONTACT. MUCH OF THE FAC's EQUIP- MENT HAD BEEN LEFT BEHIND DUE TO THE 12 MILE MANPACK MOVE. THIS ALSO EXPLAINED THE LACK OF MORTARS AND ARTILLERY ASSETS. THE SECOND ILL-FATED SORTIE WAS FLOWN BY WING COMMANDER PETE SQUIRE AND SQUADRON LEADER BOB IVESON; IVESON HAD ALSO FLOWN THE FIRST SORTIE. THE HARRIERS MADE TWO PASSES AND THEN BOB IVESON DECIDED, ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE, TO MAKE A THIRD RUN TO ATTACK SOME TRENCHES, IRONICALLY THE TRENCHES ON DARWIN HILL THAT WERE LATER TO CAUSE SO MUCH TROUBLE TO 2 PARA. LET ME TELL YOU FAST MOVERS, HARRIER PILOTS PARTICULARLY, WHAT HE WROTE; "IT WAS A SILLY MOVE, A VERY POOR TACTICAL MOVE, AND IT COST ME BECAUSE IT WAS ON THAT PASS THAT I WAS HIT. I WAS COMING OFF TARGET, HEADING ROUGHLY WEST, AND WAS HIT BY TWO FAIRLY LARGE-CALIBRE SHELLS - PROBABLY 30 OR 35 MILLS - A HELL OF A THUMP WHICH RATTLED ME ROUND IN THE COCKPIT BANGING MY HEAD ON THE SIDE OF THE CANOPY - IT MOVED THE AIRCRAFT SIDEWAYS THAT MUCH. THINGS WENT VERY WRONG, VERY QUICKLY, AFTER THAT. THE CONTROLS STOPPED WORKING; THERE WAS SMOKE IN THE COCKPIT AND FINALLY FIRE, AT WHICH POINT I PULLED THE HANDLE. I WAS IN A GOOD ATTITUDE TO EJECT BUT I WAS A BIT FAST AND A BIT LOW - ABOUT 450 KNOTS AT 100 FEET. THE CHUTE OPENED AND I FOUND MYSELF GOING RIGHT TOWARDS THE FIREBALL OF MY AIRCRAFT IN FRONT OF ME. I COULDN'T TELL WHETHER IT HAD STRUCK THE GROUND OR NOT. I THINK NOW IT HAD BLOWN UP IN THE AIR. I WAS ONLY ON THE CHUTE FOR ABOUT TEN TO FIFTEEN SECONDS BEFORE I HIT THE GROUND, IN A BIT OF A HEAP AND VERY WINDED." THE HARRIER'S SPEED HAD TAKEN IT WELL AWAY FROM GOOSE GREEN. IVESON SUFFERED A COMPRESSION FRACTURE OF HIS BACK AND WINDBLAST DAMAGE TO HIS EYES. HE MADE CONTACT WITH FRIENDLY AIRCRAFT ON HIS SURVIVAL RADIO AND WAS PICKED UP BY A NAVAL HELICOPTER TWO DAYS LATER. HE RECOVERED FROM HIS INJURIES AND RETURNED TO THE FALKLANDS FOR A SECOND TOUR AFTER THE WAR. THROUGHOUT THE BATTLE FOR GOOSE GREEN, 2 SCOUT HELICOPTERS FROM 3 CDO BDE AIR SQN WERE USED TO FLY IN AMMUNITION AND EVACUATE CASUALTIES, INCLUDING THE CO, LTCOL H. JONES. THEY WERE FINALLY ATTACKED BY A PUCARA AIRCRAFT, AND AFTER A 5 MINUTE GAME OF CAT AND MOUSE, ONE WAS SHOT DOWN KILLING CAPTAIN DICK NUNN RM INSTANTLY. HE WAS THE BROTHER OF CHRIS, COY CMD OF M COY 42 CDO, AT THIS TIME IN SOUTH GEORGIA. THE LONG AND WEARY BATTLE STARTED AT 0230 ON 28 MAY BUT THE ARGENTINIANS DID NOT FINALLY SURRENDER UNTIL DAY- BREAK ON 29 MAY, 32 HOURS LATER. THE BATTLE COST 20 BRITISH LIVES AND 37 WOUNDED. 1100 PRISONERS WERE TAKEN AND THE CAPTURED EQUIPMENT INCLUDED 4 X 1O5MM HOWITZER, 6 X 12OMM MORTARS, 6 X ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS AND 2X PUCARA AIRCRAFT. I SAID EARLIER THAT THIS VICTORY WAS AN ENORMOUS BOOST TO MORALE; I THINK YOU CAN NOW SEE WHY! J COY 42 CDO WAS FLOWN TO THE AREA DURING THE NIGHT OF 28/29 MAY BUT ARRIVED TOO LATE TO TAKE PART IN THE BATTLE SINCE THE ARGENTINIANS VERY SENSIBLY SURRENDERED. THEY DID, HOWEVER, HELP SORT OUT THE PRISONERS, REHABILITATE THE LOCALS AND EVACUATE CASUALTIES. DURING THE AFTERNOON OF 28 MAY, MY COY L WAS RELIEVED ON SUSSEX MOUNTAIN BY B COY 40 CDO AND WE MADE OUR WAY BACK ON FOOT TO SAN CARLOS SETTLEMENT WHENCE WE WERE CARRIED AFTER LAST LIGHT BY LCU TO PORT SAN CARLOS, PREPARATORY TO FLYING FORWARD TO THE MOUNT KENT AREA. I SHALL NOW GET MAJGEN JEREMY MOORE TO SET THE SCENE FOR SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS. VIDEO 12 CONCURRENT WITH THE END OF THE BATTLE FOR GOOSE GREEN, 45 CDO AND 3 PARA STARTED THE BIG YOMP ACROSS EAST FALKLANDS. THEY MARCHED 80 MILES IN THREE DAYS CARRYING ALL THEIR PERSONAL EQUIPMENT FOR COMBAT; THE PACKS WEIGHED UP TO 110 LBS. IT HAD BEEN HOPED THAT THE WHOLE FORCE COULD HAVE BEEN HELICOPTERED TO THE MOUNT KENT/MOUNT CHALLENGER AREA WEST OF PORT STANLEY, BUT THE LOSS OF 3 CHINOOKS CH47 ON THE ATLANTIC CONVEYOR DASHED THESE HOPES. THIS IS THE ACCOUNT FROM THE DIARY OF CAPTAIN IAN GARDINER, A FELLOW COY COMD IN 45 CDO RM. "THE WALK FROM PORT SAN CARLOS (NORTH EAST) TO NEW HOUSE, SOME TWENTY KILOMETRES, WAS THE WORST OF MY LIFE. THE WEATHER WAS NOT TOO BAD BUT THE GROUND WAS BOGGY. WHERE IT WAS NOT BOGGY, THERE WERE STRONG LUMPS AND TUFTS OF GRASS WHICH, HOWEVER ONE STANDS ON THEM, EVEN IN DAYLIGHT, ONE STANDS A GOOD CHANCE OF TURNING ONE'S ANKLE. IN PLACES IT WAS PRETTY STEEP BUT ALL FADED INTO INSIGNIFICANCE COMPARED TO THE CURSED WEIGHT WE WERE CARRYING - MUCH OF WHICH I KNEW TO BE WHOLLY UNNECESSARY. I PROBABLY MAKE THINGS WORSE FOR MYSELF BY ALLOWING MY BITTERNESS TO BURN UP ENERGY - BUT THE MARINES WERE MAGNIFICENT. WE LOST THE FIRST MAN AFTER 200 YARDS - A MAN KNOWN TO BE THE COMPANY SKATE - AND ABOUT SIX MORE OVER THE NEXT FEW HOURS. THEY WERE MOSTLY THE WEAKER-SPIRITED MEN WHO, ALTHOUGH THEY POSSIBLY DID HAVE SOMETHING WRONG WITH THEM, WOULD PROBABLY HAVE FOUND SOME PRETEXT OR OTHER TO ROLL AROUND IN AGONY IN ANY EVENT. THE REST WENT ON WITH THE GREATEST OF STOICISM AND GOOD HUMOUR ALL DAY AND THROUGH UNTIL 2 O'CLOCK THE FOLLOWING MORNING. I WAS IMMENSELY PROUD OF THEM. IF POSSIBLE, MARCHING IN DARKNESS WAS WORSE THAN DAYLIGHT, AND, FOR THOSE AT THE TAIL END OF A QUEUE OF 600 MEN BUMPING AND STUMBLING THROUGH THE BLACK NIGHT, LIFE MUST HAVE BEEN HELL. I WAS FAIRLY PREOCCUPIED BY TRYING TO KEEP PEOPLE TOGETHER AND PERHAPS DIDN'T NOTICE SO MUCH, BUT BY THE TIME WE HARBOURED UP, I WAS NEAR MY WIT'S END. AT 2 A.M. I GAVE THE ORDER TO BED DOWN WITHOUT ERECT- ING BIVOUACS. OUR BIVVIES WERE SIMPLY A WATERPROOF GROUND- SHEET SUPPORTED BY A SMALL STICK AND SOME RUBBER BUNGIES. THIS WAS A BAD MISTAKE. IT RAINED DURING THE EARLY MORNING, AND THE PLASTIC BAGS IN WHICH OUR SLEEPING BAGS WERE STRETCHED DID NOT KEEP THE WATER OUT. OUR SLEEPING BAGS WERE SOAKED. THE LAST CITADEL OF A MAN'S MORALE IS HIS SLEEPING BAG. THE COMFORT AND RESOURCE IT OFFERS IS AMAZING. ON SUBSEQUENT OCCASIONS, WHEN ONE WAS BEING SHELLED OR HEARD BOMBING CLOSE BY, IT WAS AN INSTINCTIVE AUTOMATIC REACTION TO WRIGGLE DEEPER INTO THE 'GREEN SLUG'. WHEN ALL ELSE FAILED, WHEN THE WORLD CRUMBLED AROUND US, EVEN IF THE SLEEPING BAGS HAD FAILED TO TURN UP IN THE EVENING, ONE ALWAYS WAS VAGUELY COMFORTED BY THE PROSPECT OF CLIMBING INTO A DRY BAG EVENTUALLY. WHEN MY CITADEL WAS DRENCHED BY RAIN, MY MORALE WAS AT ITS LOWEST...I WAS SUBSEQUENTLY TO SPEND MORE UNCOMFORTABLE AND MORE BITTER NIGHTS AND IT WAS NOT THE LAST TIME MY CITADEL WAS BREACHED - BUT ONE HARDENED. THE MEN WHO SURVIVED THAT MARCH BASICALLY STUCK IT RIGHT THROUGH TO THE END." THIS ACCOUNT ACCURATELY REFLECTS THE EXPERIENCES OF THE WHOLE OF THE FORCE THAT MADE IT AS FAR AS THE APPROACHES TO PORT STANLEY. BACK NOW TO MANEUVRE OPERATIONS; JULIAN THOMPSON WAS KEEN TO OCCUPY MT KENT AND MT CHALLENGER, THE KEYSTONES TO SUBSEQUENT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AROUND STANLEY, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. AN SAS SQN HAD CONDUCTED OPS IN THIS AREA FOR A COUPLE OF DAYS, AND A SECURE LZ WAS LOCATED. THE FIRST ATTEMPT ON 29 MAY TO FLY IN K COY, TAC HQ, MOR TP AND 3 X 105 WAS FRUSTRATED BY A WHITE OUT, DESPITE DETERMINED ATTEMPTS BY THE 4 PILOTS USING NIGHT VISION GOGGLES. THE PILOT OF THE CHINOOK CH-47 WAS FLYING SO LOW THAT HE ACCIDENTALLY DUNKED HIS WHEELS INTO THE WATERS OF A LAKE. THE ALERT CREWMAN, FEARING THAT THE A/C WAS ABOUT TO DITCH, JETTISONED THE DOOR. THEREAFTER THAT HELO, THE ONLY CHINOOK TO SURVIVE THE SINKING OF SS ATLANTIC CONVEYOR, WENT DOORLESS, THERE BEING NO SPARE PARTS AVAILABLE! THE FOLLOWING NIGHT OF 30 MAY, THE FLY IN USING SEAKING AND WESSEX FOR TROOPS AND THE CHINOOK FOR THE ARTILLERY WAS ACHIEVED SUCCESSFULLY BUT NOT WITHOUT EXCITEMENT. AT THE CRITICAL MOMENT, AN ARGENTINE SF PATROL WANDERED ACROSS THE AREA. AS THE FIRST WAVE WAS LANDING, D SQN 22 SAS ENGAGED THE ENEMY AND SWIFTLY DEALT WITH THEM, BUT THE PILOTS HAD SOME WORRYING MOMENTS AS TRACER BULLETS CRISS-CROSSED THE LANDING SITE. BY FIRST LIGHT ON 31 MAY, K COY HAD REACHED THE SUMMIT OF MOUNT KENT, ITS OBJECTIVE, TO FIND THAT THE ENEMY HAD WITHDRAWN. FROM THIS SUMMIT COULD BE SEEN STANLEY AND THE AIRFIELD ABOUT 20 KMS AWAY, WELL OUT OF RANGE OF OUR 1O5MM GUNS; BUT THESE WERE ABLE TO ENGAGE MOODY BROOKE MARINE BARRACKS: THE END WAS LITERALLY IN SIGHT BUT THERE WAS MUCH STILL TO BE DONE. COMMANDO TACTICAL HEADQUARTERS, ONE RIFLE COMPANY, ONE SAS SQUADRON, SIX 81MM MORTARS AND THREE LIGHT GUNS WITH VERY LITTLE AMMUNITION WERE SITTING ON A KEY PIECE OF GROUND NEAR, AND NOBODY KNEW EXACTLY HOW NEAR, FIVE ARGENTINE INFANTRY REGIMENTS, SUPPORTED BY THIRTY 1O5MM GUNS AND SOME 155MM GUNS. THE NEAREST BRITISH TROOPS WERE 3 PARA AT LEAST HALF A DAY'S MARCH AWAY. THE NEAREST GUNS, OTHER THAN THE THREE ALREADY FORWARD, WERE SIXTY-FIVE KILOMETRES AWAY, NEARLY FOUR TIMES THE RANGE OF A 1O5MM LIGHT GUN. EXCEPT FOR HARRIERS IN THE GROUND ATTACK ROLE, THE 200 OR SO COMMANDOS AND SAS MEN WERE ON THEIR OWN. MY COMPANY, L COY, WAS TO FLY FORWARD TO TAKE MOUNT CHALLENGER THE FOLLOWING NIGHT 31 MAY/1 JUNE 1982, BUT LTCOL VAUX SAID HE WISHED ME TO CONTACT HIM ON THE RADIO TO CONFIRM MY ORDERS. I WAS UNABLE TO GET THROUGH ON MY MAN-PACK PRC 320 HF RADIO OR ON ANY OF MY OTHER RADIOS FOR THAT MATTER, SO I FLEW TO THE SAS COMMS SHACK AT SAN CARLOS SETTLEMENT WHERE A SATTELITE TERMINAL LOANED BY USA WAS LOCATED; D SQN BELOW MT. KENT ALSO HAD ONE. INITIALLY, I GOT THROUGH TO ASCENSION ISLAND, 4,000 MILES AWAY, WHERE I RECOGNIZED THE VOICE OF 21C 22 SAS WHO HAD BEEN MY OFFICE MATE IN N. IRELAND FOR NEARLY 2 YEARS. I THEN GOT THROUGH TO HEREFORD 8,000 MILES AWAY, AND FINALLY SPOKE TO MY BOSS 45 MILES AWAY. THE IMPLICATIONS OF A FEW INDEPENDENT PATROLS BEING ABLE TO TALK TO HEREFORD, AND BE "PATCHED THROUGH" TO WHITEHALL ARE IMMENSE: FIRST OF ALL, IT GUARANTEED POLITICAL INTERFERENCE IN THE MILITARY CAMPAIGN; SECOND, IT MEANT THAT THE WHOLE COMMAND STRUCTURE COULD BE CIRCUMVENTED. FOR EXAMPLE, CEDRIC DELVES, THE OC OF D SQN 22 SAS, WAS "TWIDDLING HIS THUMBS" BACK ON BOARD SHIP, AFTER THE RECAPTURE OF S. GEORGIA WONDERING WHAT TO DO, WHEN HE REALIZED THAT A RAID ON PEBBLE ISLAND WOULD BE A SUITABLE TASK. HIS SUGGESTION WHICH WOULD INVOLVE THE USE OF HMS INVINCIBLE, A GUIDED MISSILE DESTROYER AND OTHER VALUABLE ASSETS WAS APPARENTLY REJECTED BY ADMIRAL WOODWARD. A QUICK CALL BACK TO HEREFORD ENSURED THAT ADMIRAL WOODWARD WAS DIRECTED A FEW HOURS LATER BY THE TASK FORCE COMMANDER TO CARRY OUT SUCH AN OPERATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE! ANYWAY I SPOKE TO LTCOL NICK VAUX WHO CONFIRMED MY ORDERS TO MOVE AS FAR EASTWARD ON MT. CHALLENGER AS POSSIBLE. FROM THERE WE COULD DOMINATE THE ROAD FROM STANLEY TO GOOSE GREEN AND THE GROUND TO MT. WALL. THAT NIGHT WE FLEW INTO THE SAME LZ AND WERE GUIDED TO JUST BELOW THE RIDGELINE BY SAS. THIS WAS OUR FIRST EXPERIENCE OF CROSSING ROCK RUNS AT NIGHT WHILE HEAVILY LADEN. EVEN THOUGH WE ONLY HAD OUR BELT EQUIPMENT, WPNS AND AMMO, INCLUDING BLOWPIPE AIR DEFENCE MISSILES, 2 DAYS' FOOD, SLEEPING BAG AND MINIMAL SHELTER, THE AVERAGE WEIGHT WAS 60-70 LBS. IT TOOK US 8 HOURS TO COVER THE 5 MILES. AS WE REACHED THE RIDGE WE SPREAD OUT INTO ATTACK FORMATION AND CONDUCTED AN ADVANCE TO CONTACT ALONG THE RIDGELINE, AND AS DAWN OF 1 JUNE 1982 ARRIVED, WE WENT FIRM IN A PARTICULARLY SUITABLE ROCKY OUTCROP 3OOM X 2OOM 2KM WEST ALONG THE RIDGELINE ON YOUR MAP 4 (AT GR 230705). THIS WAS HOME FOR THE NEXT 11 DAYS FOR THE 189 MEN OF MY COY GROUP. THIS GROUP INCLUDED MY 3 RIFLE TROOPS EACH OF 34, COY HQ (10), FOO PARTY (5), FAC TEAM (3), SNIPER TEAM (2), RECCE SECT (2 X 4), AE TP (20), RE TP (24) AD SECT (8), MFC PARTY (2). VIDEO 13 LIFE IN OUR HOME WAS RUGED. FIRST OF ALL, AS I MENTIONED LAST PRESENTATION, THE WIND BLOWS MOST OF THE TIME BUT CHANGES IN INTENSITY AND DIRECTION FREQUENTLY. WITH OUR MAKESHIFT SHELTERS WE HAD TO CHANGE LOCATION FROM ONE SIDE OF THE RIDGE TO THE OTHER, TO STOP BEING BLOWN AWAY. WHEN THE WIND WAS NOT BLOWING, THE CLOUD BASE WAS GENERALLY VERY LOW; TO THE EXTENT THAT IT, OR NONAVAILABILITY OF HELD ASSETS PROHIBITED RESUPPLY FOR 5 DAYS. AS YOU CAN IMAGINE, WE WERE FAIRLY HUNGRY WHEN IT EVENTUALLY CAME: 2 DAYS' RATIONS DON'T STRETCH THAT FAR. FORTUNATELY, WE HAD LOCATED A SMALL ABANDONED ARGENTINIAN POSITION, AND SO AFTER CAREFUL EXAMINATION OF EACH TIN AND PACKAGE TO MAKE SURE IT HAD NOT BEEN CONTAMINATED, WE GRATEFULLY ATE THEIR RATIONS. NEVERTHELESS WE EAGERLY AWAITED THE ARRIVAL OF THE FIRST HELO! DESPITE THESE ARGENTINIAN RATIONS, WE WERE DOWN TO ONE CUBE OF HEXAMINE PER TROOP - THIS WILL HEAT 1 PINT OF WATER IN CALM CONDITIONS TO BOILING POINT! AND A VERY LITTLE DEHYDRATED FOOD WHICH WAS USELESS AS IT NEEDED COOKING! THERE ARE AS YOU'LL RECALL NO TREES IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND THE PEAT BOG WAS COMPLETELY SODDEN SO WE HAD NO COMBUSTIBLE MATERIALS. LIFE WAS PRETTY MISERABLE, WITH FREEZING TEMPERATURES, RAIN OR SNOW AND 20-30 KNOT WINDS, SO I WAS OBVIOUSLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE EFFECTS PARTICULARLY OF EXPOSURE AND BATTLE CASUALTIES IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. I AM PLEASED TO SAY THAT I HAD TO EVACUATE ONLY 1 MEDICAL CASE, AND HE HAD A STOMACH PROBLEM. THERE WAS GREAT ELATION ON DAY 5 WHEN THE SKIES CLEARED AND WE WERE INFORMED A HELO RESUPPLY WAS EN ROUTE. IMAGINE OUR DISAPPOINTMENT WHEN THE HELO ARRIVED NOT WITH FOOD OR COOKING FUEL BUT MAIL. YOU CAN'T EAT LETTERS. FORTUNATELY, OUR DISAPPOINTMENT DID NOT LAST LONG AND 15 MINUTES LATER FOOD THANKFULLY ARRIVED BEFORE THE MISTS RETURNED FOR A FURTHER 24 HOURS. HAVING MENTIONED MAIL, LET ME EXPAND A LITTLE. PRIOR TO ANY COMBAT OPERATION, MOST MEN IN THE COY WROTE AT LEAST ONE LETTER TO A WIFE, GIRLFRIEND, OR NOK. THESE WERE NOT NECESSARILY WRITTEN IN A MORBID MANNER BUT YOU HAD TO MAKE SURE THAT, WHAT YOU WROTE, WAS WHAT YOU INTENDED YOUR LOVED ONES TO KEEP AND TREASURE, SHOULD YOU NOT SURVIVE OR PERHAPS WORSE SHOULD YOU BE DESPERATELY WOUNDED OR BURNT. I REMEMBER I WROTE 7 SUCH LETTERS HOME TO VIV, AND EACH ONE WAS WRITTEN AS IF IT WAS MY LAST. IT REALLY EMPHASIZED IN MY MIND, AND I THINK IN VIV'S TOO, WHAT WAS IMPORTANT IN LIFE AND WHAT WAS UNNECESSARY OR FRIVOLOUS; AND FOR 2 OR 3 MONTHS AFTER OUR RETURN, I DARE SAY WE WERE THE BETTER FOR IT. I REGRET IT DIDN'T TAKE LONG THOUGH TO GET THE URGE FOR COMFORTABLE AND MATERIALISTIC CAPITALISM! ANYWAY TO GET BACK TO WHAT WAS THEN OUR HOME, WHERE WE ACCEPTED WHAT LITTLE WE HAD WITH GRATITUDE. AS YOU'VE HEARD, FOOD WAS SCARCE, AND SO FAR AS WATER IS CONCERNED, WE HAD TO FIND OUR OWN. THE NEAREST STREAM WAS 5 MILES AWAY - EAST OF THE ARGENTINIAN REGIMENT AT MT. HARRIETT. WE WERE ON TOP OF A MOUNTAIN BUT FORTUNTATELY THE WATER SETTLED AND REMAINED ON THE SURFACE! IN COY HQ, 10 OF US USED A PUDDLE 6 FT. LONG, 2 FT. WIDE AND 6 INCHES DEEP FOR THE DURATION OF OUR STAY. HYGIENE OF COURSE WAS OF CRUCIAL INTEREST BUT LUCKILY NO ONE AT THIS STAGE SUFFERED FROM THE 'DOG'. WE WERE ON THIS OUTCROP VIRTUALLY INVULNERABLE TO SURFACE ATTACK AND SO I CANCELLED THE 1OO% STAND TO AT DAWN AND DUSK, BUT WE WERE SUBJECTED TO PERIODIC 155MM HARASSING FIRE. ON SEVERAL EVENINGS WE RECEIVED SALVOS OF 6X 155MM SHELLS EVERY 20 MINUTES OR SO FOR A COUPLE OF HOURS EACH TIME. THESE CAUSED NO CASUALTIES AND WERE NOTHING MORE THAN A NUISANCE. THE ARGENTINE ARTILLERY WAS FIRING ONTO THE HIGH FEATURES ALL ACROSS THEIR FRONT, AND I GOT THE IMPRESSION THAT THIS WAS A BATTERY FIRING IN GENERAL SUPPORT WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF FORWARD OBSERVERS. WE WERE INDIRECTLY SUBJECTED TO ONLY ONE AIR ATTACK. 5 X 1000 LB. BOMBS WERE DROPPED OUT OF THE TAILGATE OF A KC 130 ONE NIGHT. THE EARTH TREMBLED AT EVERY EXPLOSION AND I REPORTED TO CDO HQ THAT THESE LANDED 3 OR 400 METERS NORTHWEST OF US, K COY RECKONED IT WAS 200M SOUTHEAST OF THEM. AS WE WERE 5 KM APART, ONE OR BOTH OF US WAS WRONG, ALL I DO KNOW IS THEY MADE AN ENORMOUS IMPRESSION UPON ME. I COULD ONLY IMAGINE WHAT THE ARGENTINIANS AT THE AIRFIELD MUST HAVE FELT WHEN THEY WERE SIMILARLY ATTACKED, AND THE BOMBS LANDED VIRTUALLY ON TARGET, WITHIN THEIR MIDST! TALKING OF THE AIRFIELD, WE COULD SEE IT AND THE PORT FROM MT. CHALLENGER AND COULD SEE THE DAILY AIRCRAFT AND SHIP MOVEMENTS. IT WAS VERY FRUSTRATING TO BE ABLE TO DO NOTHING ABOUT IT. DESPITE THE TEZ, 2 OR 3 C 130 AIRCRAFT MOVEMENTS OCCURRED EACH NIGHT, AND COASTAL SHIPS OCCASIONALLY SEEMED TO RISK INTERCEPTION TOO. TO SAY I WAS FRUSTRATED IS IN FACT AN UNDERSTATEMENT; I WAS FURIOUS BECAUSE THE BBC WORLD SERVICE HAD SAID TIME AND TIME AGAIN THAT THE TEZ WAS COMPLETE AND UNBREACHABLE, AND THE AIRFIELD COMPLETELY BLOCKED. I WAS FURIOUS ABOUT HAVING BEEN FED PROPAGANDA AND BELIEVING IT. VISIBILITY IN THE FALKLANDS IS SUPERB WITH NO POLLUTION, AND FROM OUR POSITION WE HAD AN AMAZING VIEW EAST TOWARDS PORT STANLEY AND SOUTHWEST 12 KM TO PORT PLEASANT (GR 165635) WHERE ON 8 JUNE 2 LSLS COULD CLEARLY BE SEEN. IN THE WORST DISASTER OF THE WAR INCORRECTLY CALLED "BLUFF COVE" THESE LSLS, SIR GALAHAD AND SIR TRISTRAM, WERE BOMBED BY 5 SKYHAWKS. SIR TRISTRAM HAD ACTUALLY UNLOADED MOST OF ITS CARGO AND THE 2 BOMBS CAUSED LITTLE DAMAGE OTHER THAN KILLING 2. THE EFFECT ON SIR GALAHAD WAS VASTLY MORE SERIOUS. WITHIN 45 MINUTES THE WHOLE SHIP WAS ABLAZE WHEN THE SHIP'S MASTER, CAPTAIN ROBERTS, FINALLY ABANDONED SHIP HIMSELF. AFTER THE SURRENDER, THE GALAHAD WAS TOWED OUT TO SEA AND SUNK AS A WAR GRAVE. 48 MEN DIED IN THE ATTACK AND 150 WERE BURNED OR INJURED. WE WATCHED, TOTALLY IMPOTENT,AS THE ATTACK CAME IN, AND WITHIN SECONDS COULD SEE THE SMOKE AND FLAME BILLOWING OUT; MY FORWARD OP, 2 KM FROM THE ENEMY, ALSO CLEARLY HEARD THE CHEERS OF THE ARGENTINIANS ON MT. HARRIET. THEY COULD EQUALLY CLEARLY SEE THE ATTACK FROM 16 KMS AWAY, AND HAD SENT THE ORIGINAL SIGHTING REPORT. MY AIR DEFENCE DETACHMENT FIRED ONE BLOWPIPE MISSILE AT EXTREME RANGE, MORE OUT OF FRUSTRATION THAN HOPE, BUT IT FAILED TO GET CLOSE TO ANY OF THE AIRCRAFT AS THEY SWUNG SOUTH INSTEAD OF NORTH. VIDEO 14 LET ME NOW TALK ABOUT PATROLLING, SO THAT YOU CAN SEE HOW WE ACQUIRED THE INFORMATION NECESSARY FOR THE CO TO MAKE HIS PLAN FOR THE ATTACK. PATROLLING INVOLVED THE DOMINATION OF NO MAN'S LAND AND RECONNAISSANCE OF WHAT WAS LIKELY TO BE OUR OBJECTIVE, MT. HARRIETT. BRIGADIER THOMPSON OF COURSE REALIZED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO COORDINATE ALL PATROLS AND SO APPOINTED A PATROL MASTER, THE S03 G3TRG TO DO THIS. EACH CDO SENT OUT ONLY ONE TROOP STRENGTH PATROL EACH NIGHT. MY COY SENT OUT 5, ROUGHLY ONE EVERY OTHER NIGHT. THE FIRST WAS TO POSITION AN OP ON THE EAST END OF MT. WALL, AT GR 275707. AS THIS WAS ONLY 2,OOOM FROM THE MAIN ARGENTINIAN DEFENSIVE POSITON, IT SEEMED MOST LIKELY THAT IT WOULD BE ENGAGED FAIRLY EARLY ON. IT WAS, THEREFORE, A VERY STRONG TEAM OF 16, INCLUDING 2 X 4 MAN TEAMS FROM RECCE TP, 2 SNIPERS, FAC AND FOO TEAMS; I PLACED OC RECCE TP, WHO WAS UNDER COMMAND, AS THE OC. I SPENT ALL NIGHT CLEARING AND POSITIONING THIS POST WHICH EVENTUALLY MOVED IN WITHOUT DIFFICULTY. JUST BEFORE FIRST LIGHT, I WAS AT GR2587O8 RETURNING TO MY COY BASE WHEN VERY THICK MIST CAME DOWN. I STOPPED MY PATROL UNTIL IT LIFTED SINCE I HAD NO DESIRE TO GET DISORIENTATED. AND WE CRAWLED INTO OUR SLEEPING BAGS. TYPICALLY AS WE HAD NO SHELTER OVERHEAD, IT STARTED TO "PEE" WITH RAIN. MY SLEEPING BAG GOT SOAKING WET AND FOR THE NEXT 72 HOURS I HAD TO PUT ON WATERPROOFS BEFORE CLIMBING INTO MY "SLUG". AT THE QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD LAST TIME, SOMEONE ASKED WHAT KIT WAS THE MOST USEFUL; I FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO ANSWER BECAUSE IT WAS ALL USEFUL -- THAT WHICH I DID NOT HAVE BUT WHICH I SWEAR I SHALL NEVER AGAIN BE WITHOUT IS: A. A GORETEX SLEEPING BAG COVER/BIVVY BAG B. A HOLLOW-FILL SLEEPING BAG RATHER THAN A DOWN OR FEATHER SACK. SCIENTIFICALLY THEY DRY 27 TIMES QUICKER AND DON'T NOW SUFFER THE SERIOUS DEGRADATION THAT THEY USED TO, WHEN DAMP. IN MY LAST JOB PROCURING AND TRIALING KIT FOR SPECIAL FORCES, I CO-DIRECTED COMPREHENSIVE TRIALS LASTING 12 MONTHS AND INVOLVING LIVE TRIALS IN THE ARCTIC AND CONTROLLED COLD CHAMBER EVALUATION AT TEMPS DOWN TO -40oC (-40oF) AND INCLUDING 1 LITRE OF WATER PER BAG. THE AMERICAN NORTH FACE BIG FOOT SLEEPING BAG CAME OUT ON TOP, I CAN WHOLEHEARTEDLY CANRECOMMEND IT! ANYWAY THE OP WAS ABLE TO REMAIN IN POSITION FOR SEVERAL DAYS ENGAGING THE ENEMY WITH INDIRECT FIRE AND GAINING VALUABLE DETAILS OF ENEMY DISPOSITION ON THE FORWARD SLOPE OF MT. HARRIETT. AT DAWN ON DAY 1, HOWEVER, THEY WERE HORRIFIED TO SEE AN ARGENTINIAN 5 MAN TENT ABOUT 5OOM FROM THEIR POSITION, AT GR 282707, BUT IT DIDN'T BOTHER THEM UNTIL DAY 4 OR 5 WHEN THE ARGENTINIANS DECIDED TO HAVE BREAKFAST ON THE SUMMIT OF MT. WALL FROM WHERE 2 MNES WERE CONSTANTLY ON WATCH. CURIOUSLY ON REACHING THE SUMMIT, THE ARGIES FACED EAST, SAT DOWN AND STARTED TO COOK. LT. CHRIS MAWHOOD DECIDED THAT THIS PATROL MUST BE DEALTH WITH. AFTER DEPLOYING THE WHOLE FORCE INTO FIRE POSITIONS WITH MGs, 66s, AND SLRs, 2 MEN WENT DAGGER-IN- TEETH TO TRY TO CAPTURE THEM. WHEN ONLY 3 OR 4M OFF AND DESPITE ABSOLUTE SILENCE, ONE OF THE ARGENTINIANS TURNED TO LOOK OVER HIS LEFT SHOULDER, WITH WEAPON IN HAND, AND THE LAST THING HE EVER SAW WAS A MNE APPROACHING. AFTER A SHORT AND SUCCESSFUL ENGAGEMENT THE OP REQUESTED AND WAS GIVEN PERMISSION TO WITHDRAW. FEARING AN ENEMY FOLLOWUP THE OP FLED LEAVING MUCH HEAVY PERSONNEL EQUIPMENT BEHIND, INCLUDING SLEEPING BAGS. THE LOGISTICS ON THE FALKLANDS WAS SUCH THAT THERE WERE NO SPARE BAGS AVAILABLE; THEY HAD ALL BEEN SUNK ON THE ATLANTIC CONVEYER. THE OP PARTY HAD SEVERAL COLD NIGHTS UNTIL WE FINALLY OVERRAN THE ARGENTINIAN POSITION, AND LIBERATED SOME OF THEIR EXCELLENT BAGS! AS THE OP WITHDREW, I RECEIVED A SIGINT REPORT THAT 3 X ARGENTINIAN TROOPS WERE EN ROUTE BY VEHICLE ALONG THE ROAD TO CUT OFF THEIR WITHDRAWAL. I QUICKLY ASSEMBLED OUR 16 COY MGs AND MOVED FORWARD TO GR 257704 TO COVER THEIR RETIREMENT ACROSS THE OPEN SADDLE BETWEEN MT. WALL AND MT. CHALLENGER. THEY GOT ACROSS WITHOUT INTERFERENCE, AND THERE WAS NO SIGN THROUGH THE SWIRLING MIST OF ANY ENEMY FOLLOW-UP; ALONG THIS TRACK (POINT) BUT THAT IS NOT TO SAY IT WAS CONTEMPLATED OR EVEN PLANNED. THE NEXT SIGINT REPORT WE HAD WAS THAT THE ARGENTINIANS WERE GOING TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST US, AND WE DID NOT HAVE OUR GAS MASKS WITH US; THEY WERE AT PORT SAN CARLOS WITH OUR HEAVY EQUIPMENT. AMID FRANTIC EFFORTS, THESE WERE REMOVED FROM OUR PACKS AND FLOWNFORWARD. THERE WAS MUCH RELIEF WHEN THEY ARRIVED WITHIN TWO HOURS; THE EARLIER DISCOVERY OF NAPALM AT GOOSE GREEN LENT SOME DEGREE OF CREDENCE TO THE REPORT BUT WE WERE THANKFUL THAT WE WERE NEVER SUBJECTED TO A GAS ATTACK. THE FINAL INPUT FROM SIGINT CAME DURING THE BATTLE AT A VERY CRITICAL STAGE WHEN WE WERE HELD UP 600M FROM THE SUMMIT OF MT. HARRIETT. I WAS TOLD THAT 12 HELICOPTERS WERE INBOUND TO THE MOUNTAIN TOP. AT FIRST I THOUGHT THESE MUST BE MORTAR BOMBS SHOWING UP ON THE RADAR, BUT I WAS ASSURED THEY WERE HELICOPTERS. I SURMIZED THAT EVEN IF IT WERE ONLY 12 HUEYS, THE REINFORCEMENTS ALONE WOULD BE ENOUGH TO CAUSE ME TO FAIL IN MY MISSION. I THEREFORE HAD A RENEWED SENSE OF URGENCY THAT MIGHT HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO ONE OR TWO OF MY CASUALTIES LATER IN THE BATTLE. TO GET BACK TO OUR PATROL PROGRAMME. THE NEXT NIGHT, 6 TROOP, UNDER THE COMMAND OF 2 LT. JULIAN PUSEY, LAID AN AMBUSH DUE SOUTH OF OUR COY POSITION ALONG THIS TRACK FROM GOOSE GREEN TO STANLEY - IN THE HOPE OF CATCHING STRAGGLERS RETURNING TO STANLEY AFTER 2 PARA'S BATTLE BUT WE CAUGHT NOTHING. THE PATROL THE FOLLOWING NIGHT WAS OUR FIRST FORWARD OF MT. WALL, WHICH WAS STILL AT THIS TIME OCCUPIED BY THE O.P. WHO HAD IDENTIFIED THE POSITIONS OF THE FORWARD (WESTERN) SLOPE. ITS JOB WAS TO ENGAGE THE ENEMY ON THE SOUTHWEST SIDE OF MT. HARRIETT, IN ORDER TO PINPOINT OBSTACLES AND DFs, GAUGE THEIR LEVEL OF COMPETENCE AND PROCEDURES, AND GENERALLY HARASS THEM. 4 TROOP, UNDER LT KEN MCMILLAN MOVED OUT AT LAST LIGHT ALONG THE RIDGELINE AND SOUTH OF MT. WALL. 3 HOURS LATER MNE CURTIS, A 230 LB. RN RUGBY PLAYER, STEPPED ON AN ANTIPERSONNEL MINE, AT GR 285708. AT THAT TIME THE PATROL ALSO CAME UNDER ARTILLERY FIRE. CPL CUTHELL, HIS SECTION COMMANDER, ANOTHER LARGE RUGBY PLAYER, PICKED HIM UP AND CARRIED HIM BACK THE WAY HE'D COME, FOR ABOUT 250M. THERE THE TROOP STOPPED AND CURTIS GAVE HIMSELF MORPHINE WHILE THE REMNANTS OF HIS FOOT WERE BOUND AND STRAPPED UP BY THE CORPSMAN (MA). THE MISSION WAS ABANDONED, AND THEN STARTED THE LONG, SLOW BUSINESS OF EVACUATING HIM BACK. THE WEATHER WAS FOUL, AND THE LOW CLOUDS PROHIBITED HELICOPTER CASEVAC. WHENEVER THE PATROL STAYED ON THE LOW GROUND WHERE THE GOING WAS GOOD, THEY WERE SHELLED. AN OPTIMIST WOULD SAY THAT PART OF THE MISSION HAD BEEN ACHIEVED, AS WE'D FOUND SOME OF THEIR DFs AND LOCATED ONE MINEFIELD! ANYWAY THE PATROL HAD TO GO ON THE ROUGH GROUND AT THE FOOTHILLS TO THE SOUTH OF MT. WALL TO AVOID THE ARTILLERY. THERE THE ROCK RUNS IMPEDED THEIR PROGRESS ENORMOUSLY, AND MADE THE WHOLE THING A VERY TIRING EXERCISE FOR ALL. I'D REMIND YOU THAT THERE ARE NO TREES IN THE FALKLANDS -- AND NO LOCAL RESOURCES FOR MAKING A STRETCHER; I'M NOT SURE ANYWAY THAT OVER THE BOULDERS ONE COULD HAVE BEEN UTILIZED. EACH SECTION CARRIED 2X SLEEPING BAGS AND A KIP (KIT INDIVIDUAL PROTECTION), USED FOR CONSTRUCTION OF SHELTER TRENCHES. THESE WERE USED FROM TIME TO TIME BUT WERE NOT VERY GOOD. AFTER A SECOND STOP FOR MORE INTRAVENOUS DRIPS AND REST FOR ALL, THE TROOP EVENTUALLY GOT BACK ABSOLUTELY EXHAUSTED AT 9 A.M. THOSE OF US WHO HAVE IN THE PAST SKIPPED OVER THE CASEVAC PROCEDURES DURING EXERCISES IN THE NATO SEQUENCE OF ORDERS, HAD BETTER TAKE NOTE. AT ABOUT 10:30 THERE WAS A BREAK IN THE WEATHER AND CURTIS WAS EVENTUALLY EVACUATED BY HELICOPTER TO SS UGANDA. THOUGH THE OFFENSIVE MISSIONS OF THE PATROL WERE NOT ACHIEVED, THE CO SURMISED THAT HE COULD NOT HOPE TO SUCCEED IN A FRONTAL ASSAULT ACROSS THE OPEN GROUND THAT WAS LIKELY TO BE MINED ALONG THE W OF MT. HARRIETT NORTH OF THE TRACK. MNE CURTIS INCIDENTALLY HAS AN ARTIFICIAL LEG AND WITHIN 9 MONTHS WENT SKIING IN COLORADO. THOUGH HE CAN ALSO PASS OUR PHYSICAL FITNESS TEST HE HAS LEFT THE RM AND IS CURRENTLY AT UNIVERSITY. THE NEXT NIGHT I CLEARED A ROUTE WITH OUR COMBAT AND ATTACHED ROYAL ENGINEERS FROM THE SADDLE BETWEEN MT. CHALLENGER AND MT. WALL SOUTHWEST TRACK, TO THE TRACK, AND THE FOLLOWING NIGHT I SENT OUT 5 TROOP, UNDER SGT WESTON AND A SMALL RECCE SECTION UNDER SGT COLLINS TO FIND A ROUTE ROUND THE SOUTH OF THE MINEFIELD. THE TROOP COMMANDER, LT. BURNELLWAS SUFFERING FROM EXPOSURE SO DID NOT LEAD THE PATROL. HE FORTUNATELY REVIVED WHEN WE GOT THE HELICOPTER RESUPPLY OF FOOD THAT I'VE ALREADY SPOKEN ABOUT. SGT WESTON'S PATROL WAS TO ESTABLISH A PATROL BASE AT GR 290700, WHILE SGT COLLINS WAS TO GO FORWARD TO GR 310702. THEY WERE NEARING THE PATROL BASE LOCATION, WHEN "BANG", MNE PATERSON STEPPED ON A MINE. THE PATROL COULD NOT BE ABANDONED SINCE THE ATTACK WAS SCHEDULED FOR THE NEXT NIGHT. SGT WESTON WITH ONE SECTION TOOK PATERSON BACK 1500M WHERE A HELICOPTER RECOVERED HIM 35 MINUTES LATER. A SECTION COMMANDER ESTABLISHED THE PATROL BASE AND SGT COLLINS WENT OFF. AS THE RESULT OF THIS PATROL, THE CO HAD ALL THE INFORMATION NEEDED TO MAKE HIS PLAN. BUT NEXT DAY, LSL SIR GALAHAD WAS HIT IN THE ATTACK I'VE ALREADY MENTIONED, AND DUE TO THE REALLOCATION OF ALL HELO ASSETS FROM ARTILLERY RESUPPLY TO CASEVAC DUTIES, THE BDE COORDINATED ATTACK WAS DELAYED. ADHERING TO THE PRINCIPLE THAT TIME SPENT IN RECLE IS NEVER WASTED, THE FOLLOWING NIGHT, SGT COLLINS AGAIN WENT OUT; HE FOUND A SAFE ROUTE, IDENTIFIED THE START LINE WHICH WAS TO BE THE FENCE TO THE SE OF MT. HARRIETT AND CAME BACK WITH FIRST CLASS INFORMATION. -- DO PLEASE REMEMBER WE HAD NO AIR PHOTOGRAPHS NOR ANY UP-TO-DATE INFORMATION OTHER THAN THAT WHICH WE HAD OURSELVES GATHERED. VIDEO 15 CONCURRENT WITH OUR PATROLLING AND OP ACTIVITY, K COY AND LATER J COY ALSO CONDUCTED A SERIES OF PATROLS; IN ONE PARTICULARLY SUCCESSFUL OPERATION, A TROOP OF K COY DISCOVERED THAT GOAT RIDGE WAS UNOCCUPIED AND THAT THE ENEMY HAD NUMEROUS DEPTH POSITIONS ON THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST SLOPES OF MT. HARRIETT, ONE WELL FORWARD WITH AT LEAST TROOP SIZED UNITS ON THE WESTERN TIP AND, NORTH AND SOUTH OF IT, AND A COMPANY IN THE REAR. WITH THE BDE ASSAULT AT LAST CONFIRMED FOR THE NIGHT OF 11/12 JUNE, I WAS FLOWN TO THE COMFORT OF CDO HQ, WHERE THERE WERE 2XBVO2S AND 2-MAN TENTS AND A FULL CDO "O" GP WAS HELD ON 10 JUNE. IT SEEMED INCREDIBLE TO BE RECEIVING ORDERS FOR A FULLSCALE LIVE COMMANDO NIGHT ATTACK. 2 MONTHS EARLIER, PETER BABBINGTON, K COY COMMANDER AND I RECEIVED SIMILAR ORDERS FOR A NIGHT ATTACK IN EX ALLOY EXPRESS, THE NATO N. NORWAY EXERCISE. ON THAT OCCASION, WE SPENT A LONG TIME DISCUSSING BOUNDARIES AND HOW TO DECONFLICT. AND IT CERTAINLY SAVED A LOT OF TIME NOW. LET ME NOW QUOTE FROM THE OFFICIAL RECORD OF PROCEED- INGS. "THE DECISION TO ATTACK FROM THE REAR WAS FINALLY TAKEN. ALTHOUGH IT WAS A BOLD MOVE THE CO WAS CONFIDENT THAT, PROVIDED SECRECY WAS MAINTAINED UNTIL H-HOUR, SURPRISE WOULD BE ACHIEVED. A 2 PHASE ASSAULT WAS DECIDED UPON. K COY WAS TO CROSS THE SL FIRST AND SECURE THE EASTERN END OF THE FEATURE FOLLOWED 60 MINUTES LATER BY L COY SECURING THE W END. ONCE BOTH COYS WERE FIRM K WOULD THEN PRESS ON TO SEIZE GOAT RIDGE. A THOROUGH ARTILLERY AND MORTAR FIRE "SOFTENING-UP" WAS TO INCLUDE NAVAL GUN FIRE SUPPORT FROM THE FRIGATE HMS YARMOUTH WITH 1 X 4.5" TURRET. J COY HAD ALREADY MOVED FORWARD ONTO THE W SLOPE OF MOUNT WALL AND THE MORTARLINE HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THIS AREA TOO. AFTER LAST LIGHT (AROUND - 2015 HRS) ON 11 JUNE K AND L COYS MOVED FORWARD FROM MOUNT CHALLENGER (WHERE THEY HAD LAID-UP AND PREPARED FOR BATTLE DURING DAYLIGHT THAT DAY) TO A RECEPTION AREA CONTROLLED BY J COY IN THE LEE OF MOUNT WALL (GR264706). HERE, BERGEN RUCKSACKS WERE LEFT BEHIND AND THE MOVE FORWARD ALONG THE CLEARED ROUTE WAS UNDERTAKEN BY J COY GUIDES. HERE ALSO THE COMMANDO SUFFERED ITS FIRST CASUALITIES. ENEMY MORTAR FIRE KILLED ONE CPL AND WOUNDED 4 MVPS. ONE TP OF J COY HAD ALREADY GONE AHEAD AS SOON AS DARKNESS FELL TO MARK THE ROUTE AND TO DROP OFF TWO MILAN ANTI TANK MISSILE SECTIONS. ONE MILAN SECT WAS POSITIONED IMMEDIATELY S OF HARRIET NEAR THE TRACK IN THE AREA GR3O07OO. THEIR TASK WAS TO ENGAGE AND DESTROY THE ENEMY BUNKERS AND SANGERS ON THE S SLOPES OF THE FEATURE, TO BE ILLUMINATED BY THE CDO's MORTARS. THE SECOND MILAN SECT, ON THE STANLEY - GOOSE GREEN TRACK TO THE EAST OF HARRIET, WAS TO PREVENT ANY POSSIBLE ENEMY INTERFERENCE BY VEHICLES APPROACHING FROM THE EAST. THE TP ITSELF WAS TO MEET UP WITH THE RECCE TROOP OF 1 BN WELSH GUARDS WHICH HAD BEEN TASKED TO SECURE THE SL. THE PL COMD OF THE GUARDS RECCE PL HAD NOT ATTENDED 42 CDO's COMPREHENSIVE O GP, AND WE WERE ALWAYS CONCERNED ABOUT THIS CRUCIAL PART OF THE PROCEEDINGS. OC 12 TROOP SPENT AGES LOOKING FOR THE GUARDS PL AND DID NOT FIND THEM TILL NEARLY 0200, WELL AFTER THE PLANNED H-HOUR. NEEDLESS TO SAY, THERE WAS NO THOUGHT OF PROCEEDING BEFORE WE KNEW THAT THE GUARDS KNEW WE WERE THERE! AT 2130, JUST OVER AN HOUR AFTER LAST LIGHT, K COY SET OFF FOR THE SL AND H-HOUR WAS TIMED FOR 0100 HRS ON 12 JUN; THEY HAD 3-1/2 HRS TO COVER THE 6 KM. ACCOMPANYING THEM WAS A PORTER TP FORMED FROM HQ COY UNDER COMMAND OF THE ADJT, WHO HAD COME FORWARD FROM CDO MAIN HQ, WHICH HAD STAYED IN ITS ORIGINAL LOCATION NEAR MOUNT KENT FOR COMMS & LOGISTIC REASONS. THIS TP WAS TO ACT AS A PORTER GROUP, CARRYING THE SF KITS OF BOTH K AND L COYS THUS FREEING THEM OF THAT BURDEN, IN ADDITION, THEY CARRIED EXTRA AMMO. THIS TROOP WENT TO GROUND IN THE FUP JUST SHORT OF THE SL AND THE INTENTION WAS FOR IT TO CARRY UP THE SF KITS TO THE TOP OF HARRIET ONCE THE COY COMDS CALLED THEM FORWARD. TAC HQ MEANWHILE POSITIONED ITSELF IN AN ABANDONED ARGENTINIAN SOD-WALLED SANGER IN THE AREA GR275705. TAC HQ, CONSISTING OF CO, S3, BC AND NGFSO PARTIES, SIGNALLERS MOR OFFR SAPPER OFFR AND OC J COY, WAS TO SPEND 8 HRS IN THIS FREEZING POSITION UNTIL 6 AM. J COY (-) AND THE ENGR TP (26 STRONG) WERE AVAILABLE TO THE CO AS RESERVE. THE WHOLE OF THE ENEMY POSITION WAS SHELLED WITHOUT RESPITE AFTER LAST LIGHT. AT H-HOUR THE OP TP FROM J COY POSITIONED ON THE E END OF MOUNT WALL PLAYED ITS PART IN THE PLAN MOST EFFECTIVELY. AS A DIVERSION, IT OPENED UP ON THE ENEMY POSITIONS OPPOSITE, FIRING VARIOUS ENEMY WEAPONS CAPTURED PREVIOUSLY; IT SENT UP SCHERMULIES AND MADE A GREAT DEAL OF NOISE AIMED AT DECEIVING THE ENEMY INTO BELIEVING AN ARGENTINIAN PATROL WAS ENGAGED WITH IT. EVEN IF THIS DECEPTION WAS NOT BELIEVED, THE SPECTACLE WAS LIKELY TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM THE TWO RIFLE COYS SKIRTING SOUTH TO THE FUP. THE ENEMY PUT UP A COUPLE OF MORTAR ILLUM FLARES AS K AND L COYS WERE MOVING ROUND. WE EXPECTED HEAVY ARTILLERY AND MORTAR FIRE TO FOLLOW. NOTHING HAPPENED, AND ALTHOUGH THE ENEMY TWICE REPEATED THESE SINGLE FLARE ILLUMINATION SHOOTS BEFORE H-HOUR IT WAS A RELIEF TO REALIZE THEY WERE MERELY RANDOM SHOOTS AND THAT THE COYS HAD NOT BEEN SIGHTED. I'LL SHORTLY BE SHOWING A TAPE OF, AMONGST OTHER THINGS, K COY'S OPERATION BUT LET ME FIRST COVER THE REMAINDER OF THE OPERATION FROM MY PERSPECTIVE AS L COY COMD -- AND I'LL QUOTE FROM JULIAN THOMPSON'S BOOK "NO PICNIC". INCIDENTALLY, MY COY AT THIS STAGE WAS 129 STRONG. "L COMPANY'S TASK WAS TO CLEAR AND SECURE THE WESTERN END OF THE MOUNT HARRIET FEATURE. STARTING AFTER K COMPANY ACROSS THE SAME START LINE, SURPRISE HAD BEEN LOST AND SO L COMPANY CAME UNDER EFFECTIVE FIRE FROM HEAVY MACHINE GUNS WITHIN 200 METRES OF THE START LINE TAKING THREE CASUALTIES ALMOST AT ONCE. CAPTAIN WHEEN, COMMANDING L COMPANY, CALLED FOR MILAN TO FIRE AT THE MACHINE-GUN POSITIONS AND AT LEAST FOUR SNIPER TEAMS, ALL EQUIPPED WITH NIGHT SIGHTS, BEFORE REACHING ITS FIRST OBJECTIVE, THE WESTERN END OF THE HARRIET SPINEBACK. THIS INVOLVED A FIGHTING ADVANCE OF ABOUT 600 METRES AND, AS EACH POSITION TOOK A SEPARATE TROOP OR SECTION ATTACK TO DEAL WITH IT, IT TOOK ABOUT FIVE HOURS TO COVER THE DISTANCE FROM THE START LINE. THE COMPANY FOUND THAT IT WAS BEST TO KEEP SKIRMISHING FORWARD THROUGHOUT THIS ADVANCE, BECAUSE GOING TO GROUND FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME MEANT SITTING IN THE MIDDLE OF THE ENEMY ARTILLERY FIRE TASKS; HERE ARTILLERY AND SMALL ARMS CAUSED A FURTHER 4 GUNSHOT AND 7 SHRAPNEL CASUALTIES. AS THE COMPANY ARRIVED AT THE WESTERN END OF MOUNT HARRIET THEY FOUND LARGE NUMBERS OF ARGENTINES WISHING TO SURRENDER. IN THE DARKNESS THERE APPEARED TO BE ABOUT FIFTY OF THEM, ALTHOUGH WHEN DAYLIGHT ARRIVED MANY MORE APPEARED." INCIDENTALLY, IT WAS AT THIS STAGE THAT WE SAW A LAND LAUNCHED EXOCET MISSILE HEADING OUT TO SEA. HMS GLAMORGAN DID NOT NEED US TO TELL THEM IT WAS INBOUND. IT HAD ALREADY BEEN DETECTED AND AVOIDING ACTION INITIATED. SADLY, THE MISSILE STRUCK THE HELO HANGER KILLING 13 AND DESTROYING THE HELO. WHEN REORGANIZED HIS COMPANY, SENT THE PRISONERS TO THE REAR AND THEN ORDERED 5 TROOP TO MOVE FORWARD TO THE COMPANY'S NEXT OBJECTIVE, AN ENEMY POSITION IN THE ROCKY OUTCROP ABOUT 500 METRES DUE NORTH OF THE WESTERN END OF HARRIET. BEFORE THEY MOVED, HOWEVER, WHEEN CONCENTRATED ALL HIS MACHINE GUNS, LESS THOSE OF 5 TROOP, FIFTEEN GUNS IN ALL, ON THE RIDGE. AS 5 TROOP MOVED FORWARD DOWN THE SLOPE TO THE ROCKY OUTCROP, THEY CAME UNDER HEAVY FIRE FROM THEIR OBJECTIVE. WHEEN PULLED THEM BACK AND THEN HIT THE ENEMY WITH MORTAR, ARTILLERY AND MACHINE-GUN FIRE BEFORE ORDERING 5 TROOP FORWARD AGAIN. THEY DASHED FORWARD WITH GREAT DETERMINATION AND WINKLED OR KILLED OUT THE ENEMY." THE REASON I DID NOT USE INDIRECT FIRE WEAPONS AT THE START WAS BECAUSE THE FOO HAD ADVISED ME OF THE CRITICAL AMMUNITION SHORTAGE WITH ONLY A FEW ROUNDS LEFT PER GUN. L COMPANY WAS THEN ORDERED BY VAUX TO PRESS ON TO GOAT RIDGE, WHILE K COMPANY REMAINED ON THE WESTERN END OF HARRIET. TIME WAS GETTING SHORT AND VAUX WANTED TO BE FIRM ON BOTH FEATURES BEFORE FIRST LIGHT AND THE EXPECTED ARGENTINE COUNTERATTACK MATERIALIZED. L COMPANY FOUND GOAT RIDGE UNOCCUPIED, ALTHOUGH, AS THEY ARRIVED, THEY SAW ABOUT FIFTY ENEMY RUNNING UP THE SIDE OF TUMBLEDOWN AND CALLED DOWN ARTILLERY FIRE ON THEM. (I SURMIZE THAT THESE FLED FROM THE ROCKY OUTCROP FOLLOWING THE INTENSIVE INDIRECT FIRE WE BROUGHT UPON IT.) VAUX AND HIS TACTICAL HEADQUARTERS THEN LED J COMPANY DIRECTLY ON TO THE HARRIET FEATURE FROM THE EASTERN END OF WALL MOUNTAIN. HE DID NOT WISH TO WASTE TIME TAKING THEM ALONG THE ROUTE FOLLOWED BY K AND L COMPANIES. THEY SPRINTED THROUGH THE MINEFIELD WITH 'THEIR FINGERS CROSSED AND IF THEY COULD HAVE MANAGED IT, THEIR TOES AS WELL'. THE MOST DANGEROUS MOMENT TO AN ATTACKER IS OFTEN JUST AFTER HE ARRIVES ON AN OBJECTIVE AND IN THE EUPHORIA, OR EXHAUSTION, OR BOTH, RELAXES AND IS THEN HIT BY A COUNTERATTACK WHICH KNOCKS HIM OFF THE HARDWON POSITION. THE WELL-TRAINED TROOPS IN 3 COMMANDO BRIGADE SPEEDILY SET TO TO PREPARE THEMSELVES TO RECEIVE SUCH AN ATTACK, BUT, EXCEPT ON ONE OCCASION, THE ARGENTINES DID NOT MOUNT COUNTERATTACKS, ALTHOUGH IT IS ONLY WITH THE WISDOM OF HINDSIGHT THAT WE KNOW THIS NOW. THEY DID, HOWEVER, RESORT TO THE OTHER EXPEDIENT OF THOSE WHO HAVE LOST GROUND, WHICH IS TO SHELL AND MORTAR THEIR RECENT POSITIONS. VAUX CONSOLIDATED HIS COMMAND WITH L COMPANY ON GOAT RIDGE AND THE ROCKY OUTCROP, K COMPANY ON THE WESTERN END OF HARRIET AND J COMPANY ON THE EASTERN END. THE DAWN FOUND ALL 3 COMMANDO BRIGADE'S OBJECTIVE SECURE BUT WITH THE DAYLIGHT, THE ENEMY SHELLING INTENSIFIED." LOOKING BACK OVER THE GROUND WE HAD JUST COVERED, I RECKONED THAT WE WOULD HAVE DIED OF OLD AGE OR STARVATION BEFORE BEING DRIVEN OFF IT. WE RATHER HOPED THE ENEMY WOULD COUNTERATTACK SO THAT WE COULD SHOW THEM HOW THE FEATURE SHOULD BE DEFENDED! 2 COYS OF 42 CDO HAD TAKEN A REGIMENTAL POSITION FOR 2 KILLED AND 30 WOUNDED. I THINK I OUGHT TO GO INTO A LITTLE MORE DETAIL ON THE BATTLE. AS SOON AS WE CAME UNDER EFFECTIVE FIRE WE RETURNED DIRECT AND LATER ARTILLERY/NGS FIRE AT THE 3 MAIN SOURCES. THE EXTREME RIGHT MACHINE GUNPOST HAVING CAUSED THE FIRST CASUALTIES ATTRACTED THE GREATEST RESPONSE, WHEREUPON OC K COY PROTESTED OVER THE UCN THAT WE WERE SHOOTING PERILOUSLY CLOSE TO HIS MEN. IN THE DIN IT WAS DIFFICULT TO GET THROUGH ON THE RADIO TO TROOP AND SECTION COMMANDERS, SO I USED VOICE: WITHIN A COUPLE OF MINUTES OUR EFFECTIVE SUPPORTING FIRE STOPPED, -- BUT THIS DEMONSTRATES THE DECONFLICTION PROBLEM AT NIGHT. IT WAS OBVIOUS FROM THE START THAT THE ENEMY HAD EFFECTIVE NIGHT OBSERVATION DEVICES. FOR THIS REASON, AND SINCE SURPRISE HAD BEEN LOST DURING K COY'S ATTACK, I WAS HAPPY FOR VOICE TO BE USED, AND THIS PROVED EFFECTIVE. VISIBILITY WAS NOT TOO BAD, SO CONTROL AT SECTION LEVEL WAS NOT DIFFICULT. IN ORDER TO OBSERVE PROGRESS OF THE COY I CARRIED AN IWS. THIS WAS VERY EFFECTIVE UP TO 150M - 2OOM BUT BEYOND THAT RANGE MEN TENDED TO MERGE INTO THE ROCKS, PARTICULARLY AFTER THE MOON ROSE BEHIND THE MOUNTAIN. ON TWO OCCASIONS I TASKED 6 TP TO FIRE MINIFLARES. THIS PROVED USEFUL IN LOCATING THEIR FORWARD SECTION, AND SURPRISINGLY NEITHER COMPROMISED THEIR POSITION NOR DREW ENEMY FIRE. CLOSING WITH THE ENEMY. ONCE WE HAD IDENTIFIED THE APPROXIMATE AREA OF EACH MACHINE GUN/SNIPER POST WE HAD TO USE CONVENTIONAL METHODS, AT TP LEVEL, OF LOCATING THE ENEMY. THIS PROVED DIFFICULT IN THE ROCKY TERRAIN AT NIGHT, PARTICULARLY AS THE ENEMY WERE MOVING FROM COVER TO COVER, OR ELSE A SECTION POSITION WOULD OPEN UP WITH JUST ONE RIFLE AT A TIME; THE AID BEING TO DECEIVE US INTO BELIEVING THAT IT WAS A SINGLE SNIPER. ONCE IDENTIFIED, WE FOUND ANTI-TANK WEAPONS IDEAL FOR ENGAGING THE ENEMY. WE FIRED MILAN IN CONJUNCTION WITH MORTAR AND OTHER ILLUMINANTS, AND THOUGH ON ONE OCCASION IT HIT THE WRONG TARGET IT HAD A SHOCK EFFECT UPON THE ENEMY SUFFICIENT TO PERSUADE THEM TO STOP FIRING! 84MM CARL GUSTAV HESH ROUNDS PROVED REMARKABLY EFFECTIVE UP TO 150MM AND ON TWO OCCASIONS I WATCHED THEM COMPLETELY SHATTER ENEMY MACHINE GUN TEAMS. 66MM WERE ALSO USED EFFECTIVELY UP TO APPROX 5OM, TO SUPPRESS THE ENEMY FIRE. REGRETABLY WE HAD NO M203, M79 OR SMAW WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN MOST EFFECTIVE. WE WERE ALSO MOST CONCERNED ABOUT RECOGNITION AT NIGHT. EVENTUALLY WE DECIDED UPON A SMALL 2-4 INCH STRIP OF WHITE TAPE ON OUR BELT HARNESS JUST BELOW THE SHOULDERS. OUR HEADDRESS WAS ALSO DISTINCTIVE; OUR STEEL HELMETS LOOKED DIFFERENT TO THE ARGENTINIANS AND FURTHERMORE WERE FIENDISHLY UNCOMFORTABLE. MOST INCLUDING MYSELF DITCHED THE HELMET AND WORE OUR TRADITIONAL GREEN BERETS. FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE MEDICAL FRATERNITY, I HAD NO HEAD OR NECK INJURIES WITHIN MY COY. ALL 14 WERE TO THE TORSO AND LIMBS. AND NOW BACK TO THE RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS: THE PW SITUATION BEGAN TO CAUSE PROBLEMS AS IT BECAME A FLOOD. SURPRISE AND SHOCK ACTION HAD DISLODGED THE MAJOR PART OF 4 INFANTRY REGIMENT, AND 42 CDO TOOK OVER 300 PRISONERS. GUARDING THEM AND SENDING THEM BACK TO BDE CAGES BECAME A REAL PROBLEM FOR NO FIGHTING SUB-UNITS COULD BE SPARED AS A COUNTERATTACK SURELY MUST BE MOUNTED WITH US OCCUPYING SUCH IMPORTANT GROUND. BOOSTED BY RANKS FROM SURVEILLANCE TROOP, THE ADJUTANT'S PORTER TROOP DID STERLING SERVICE, DOUBLING AS A FORWARD FIRST AID POST, READYING THE MOST SERIOUSLY WOUNDED FOR CASEVAC BY HELI- COPTER; THIS WAS ACHIEVED SEVERAL TIMES AS INCOMERS WERE ACTUALLY LANDING BUT LUCKILY, NO HELICOPTER WAS HIT. WE REALIZED THAT K COY IN THEIR INITIAL ASSAULT HAD STRUCK THE REGIMENTAL HQ AND BATTALION SUPPORT ELEMENTS, WHILE L COY TOOK OUT 2 REINFORCED COYS. THE SURPRISE ACHIEVED DURING THE ATTACK WAS APPARENT FROM THE DEBRIS OF PERSONAL POSSESSIONS, RADIOS, AMMO, WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT STREWN EVERYWHERE. IT ALSO GAVE LIE TO THE RUMOUR THAT THE ENEMY WERE POORLY EQUIPPED AND SUPPLIED - ON THESE POSITIONS THEY CERTAINLY WERE NOT! 42 CDO CAPTURED 4 X 12OMM MORTARS AND 2 X 0.5 BROWNINGS ON MT HARRIET AND IT WAS WITH IMMENSE SATISFACTION DURING 12/13 JUN THAT WE TURNED THEM ON THEIR ERSTWHILE OWNERS, OCCUPYING TUMBLEDOWN AND MOUNT WILLIAM TO THE EAST, FEATURES WHICH WITHIN 48 HRS WERE TO BE IN BRITISH HANDS. VIDEO 16 LET ME BRIEFLY SUMMARIZE A FEW KEY POINTS IN THE CONDUCT AND SUCCESS OF THE BATTLE AGAIN QUOTING FROM G2 CRO L.O.P. COMPLETE SURPRISE WAS ACHIEVED AND, AS EVER, WAS A MAJOR REASON FOR SUCCESS. COMMAND AND CONTROL ARE OBVIOUSLY VERY IMPORTANT AT NIGHT AND IN THIS TERRAIN. MY PERSONAL VIEW (THAT IS OF THE COIOC OFFICER IS THAT WITH K & L HAVING WORKED CLOSELY IN THE FIELD IN NORWAY AT LENGTH IN FEB AND MAR WE HAD A BUILT-IN ADVANTAGE: I.E., WE WERE PROPERLY "WORKED-UP". IT WAS GOOD TO SEE THAT DARKNESS AND THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE TERRAIN COULD BE OVERCOME IN SUCH "BITTY" FIGHTING AND THAT THE COY & TP COMDS COULD EXERCISE FIRM CONTROL. GOOD & TIMELY RADIO PROCEDURE IS OBVIOUSLY VITAL. OUR (I.E., ALL BRITISH FORCES) SUCCESS IN NIGHT OPERATIONS MADE ME THINK THAT WE SELL OURSELVES SHORT WHEN IT IS SO FREQUENTLY RE-ITERATED IN STAFF COLLEGES AND ELSE- WHERE THAT THE SOVIETS DO SO MUCH MORE NIGHT TRAINING THAN US. WHETHER WE DO AS MUCH AS THE SOVIETS OR NOT, IT IS CLEAR THAT BRITISH INFANTRY DOES HAVE THE ABILITY AND THE INITIATIVE TO OPERATE VERY SUCCESSFULLY AT NIGHT. INCIDENTLY, IN CONVERSATION LATER WITH CO 4 INF REGT, HE REFUSED TO BELIEVE THAT EVERY ONE OF MY MEN DID NOT HAVE A NIGHTSIGHT. SPEEDY, ACCURATE ARTILLERY FIRE WAS ENCOURAGING TO HAVE ON ONE'S SIDE, AND WE INSTINCTIVELY FELT IT WAS HAVING A DETRIMENTAL EFFECT ON THE OPPOSITION'S MORALE. THE FOOs WITH THE COY HAD TO BRING DOWN SUPPORTING FIRE WITHIN 1OOM OF THE COYS. ON ONE OCCASION FOO WITH K COY CALLED FOR, AND GOT, A REGIMENTAL FIRE MISSION INVOLVING FOUR GUN BATTERIES. SECURING THE RIDGE WAS NO EASY MATTER AS THIS PERHAPS DEMONSTRATES. THE COORDINATION OF THE ARTILLERY, NAVAL GUNFIRE AND MORTAR FIRE DURING THE NIGHT WAS MOST IMPRESSIVE AND THE CO-LOCATION OF THE CO, BC, NGSFO AND MORTAR OFFER MEANT THAT THE FOOs AND THEIR RIFLE COY COMDS COULD BE SUPPORTED WITH THE RIGHT TYPE AND WEIGHT OF FIRE EXTREMELY QUICKLY. NOW EQUIPMENT. WE CARRIED FULL SCALE AMMO FOR ALL WEAPONS AND THE ONLY TROOP WEAPONS NOT CARRIED IN THE ASSAULT WERE THE 2" LT MORTARS. THE EFFECTS OF MAW AND LAW WERE TREMENDOUS AGAINST ENEMY INFANTRY. THE KIT CARRIED WAS: FIGHTING ORDER WITH A RESPIRATOR BAG ON THE BELT TOO - IT CARRIED SUCH THINGS AS WATER PROOFS, SURVIVAL RATIONS AND OTHER ITEMS SUCH AS EXTRA SOCKS, RADIO BATTERIES AND SOME EXTRA AMMO. WINDPROOF-SMOCKPOCKETS WERE ALSO CRAMMED WITH ODDS AND ENDS NOT CARRIED ON EXERCISES BUT CONSIDERED HIGHLY DESIRABLE IN ACTION, ESPECIALLY WITH LOGISTIC RESUPPLY SO TENUOUS! (E.G. EXTRA TORCH BATTERIES, DRINKS PACK, NUTTY, TOILET PAPER - THE MAJORITY HAD SOME SORT OF "DOG" AT ONE STAGE OR ANOTHER, FOR WE USED ANY WATER AVAILABLE IN THE HILLS - WE RARELY GOT WATER RESUPPLY BY HEL, THE SPACE JUST WAS NOT AVAILABLE). THE '58 PATTERN WEBBING WAS AWFUL. WITH EXTRA RATS/AMMO AND WHATEVER HEXAMINE WE COULD CARRY, IT WAS HEAVY UN-COMFORTABLE, AND AWKWARD WHEN WET. NEVERTHELESS WE ALWAYS MEANT TO ASSAULT CARRYING IT: OUR PHILOSOPHY WAS THAT A BELT ORDER OR JUST WEAPON ALONE WITH MAGAZINES IN POCKETS WAS ALL VERY WELL IN PURSUIT OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF MOBILITY IN THE ASSAULT, BUT IF YOU WERE THEN PINNED DOWN/COUNTERATTACKED ON AN EXPOSED FEACTURE, IT WAS BEST TO SACRIFICE SOME COMFORT IN TERMS OF WEIGHT FOR THE COMFORT OF KNOWING THAT YOU COULD SURVIVE A SET LENGTH OF TIME BEFORE YOU HAD TO HAVE OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE. OUR SET LENGTH WAS 48 HOURS AND I THINK WE FELT MUCH HAPPIER KNOWING WE HAD THIS CAPABILITY. ADRENALIN IN THE ASSAULT CUSTOMARILY ENABLES "ROYAL" TO CARRY FEARSOME WEIGHTS AND STILL FIGHT HARD! ENEMY RESISTANCE WE MET WAS IN LINE WITH THAT ENCOUNTERED ELSEWHERE IN THE CAMPAIGN: A HARD INITIAL RESPONSE WHICH THEN CRUMBLED, EXCEPT FOR MACHINE GUNNERS AND SNIPERS WHO FOUGHT VIGOROUSLY FOR MUCH LONGER. VIDEO 17 WE HAD BEEN ORDERED TO BE PREPARED TO PRESS FORWARD THE ATTACK ONTO MOUNT TUMBLEDOWN AND MOUNT WILLIAM IF THE ENEMY FLED OUR INITIAL ATTACK, AND TIME ALLOWED. BY DAWN IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT WE WERE IN NO POSITION TO ATTACK. WE WERE EXHAUSTED, OUT OF AMMO AND SUFFERING SIGNIFICANT CASUALTIES. MY 21C, A RADIO OPERATOR, MY TAC HQ MACHINE GUNNER AND ONE OF MY TROOP COMMANDERS HAD ALL BEEN SHOT, AND A FURTHER 10 ALSO WOUNDED. ANOTHER TROOP COMMANDER I DISCOVERED WAS SUFFERING FROM SHELLSHOCK; AT 1330, I HAD CALLED AN "O" GROUP FOR 1430 HOURS, JUST AFTER THE BATTLE. AT 1425 THIS TROOP COMMANDER HAD NOT ARRIVED, NOR COULD I SEE THAT HE WAS ON HIS WAY. THE TROOP WAS POLITELY ASKED TO FIND HIM. HE WAS FINALLY DISCOVERED SITTING ON A ROCK, FORTUNATELY ON THE REVERSE SLOPE, WAVING AT THE HELI- COPTERS BRINGING IN THE SCOTS GUARDS! WHEN HE EVENTUALLY ARRIVED, HE HAD A COMPLETELY VACANT LOOK ABOUT HIM AND ON QUESTIONING WAS NOT AWARE OF WHAT HAD HAPPENED OVER THE PREVIOUS 24 HOURS. A CHANGE OF SCENERY AT CDO HQ FOR 72 HOURS CURED HIM, SUPERFICIALLY AT LEAST. I ALSO WAS SUFFERING FROM THE "DOG". IT HIT ME FIRST ON TOP OF MOUNT HARRIET AFTER WE HAD TAKEN THE MAIN POSITION AND WERE ABOUT TO STRIKE THE ROCKY OUTCROP. I MUST CONFESS THAT I COORDINATED BOTH THE ARTILLERY AND MORTAR FIRE MISSIONS AND FIVE MINUTES LATER THE TROOP ATTACK WITH MY TROUSERS ROUND MY ANKLES! ONE WAY AND ANOTHER NO ONE HAS EVER PACKED SUCH A PUNCH! THE FOLLOWING DAY THE SCOTS GUARDS PREPARED FOR THEIR ATTACK ON MT. TUMBLEDOWN FROM A POSITION IN TRENCHES LAID OUT IN THE OPEN BEHIND US AT GRID 295715, AND I REGRET TO SAY SUFFERED SOME SHRAPNEL WOUNDS. THEY WERE NOT ADEQUATELY DUG IN, HAD NO OVERHEAD COVER AND WERE IN THE OBVIOUS POSITION FROM WHICH TO LAUNCH THE NEXT ATTACK. WE HAD IDENTIFIED A MINEFIELD BETWEEN THE EAST END OF GOAT RIDGE AND THE WEST END OF MT. TUMBLEDOWN AT GR 323720. A HARRIER STRIKE WAS THEREFORE CALLED AND WE HAD A BIRD's EYE VIEW OF THE LASER GUIDED: BOMB STRIKING ON TARGET. THAT NIGHT THE SCOTS GUARDS LAUNCHED THEIR ATTACK THROUGH MY POSITION, THE EASTERN END OF WHICH WAS THEIR SECURE START LINE. WE PROVIDED 2 X 50MM MACHINE GUNS IN DIRECT SUPPORT, GRATEFULLY DONATED BY THE ARGENTINIANS. 42 CDO RM ALSO HAD TO PROVIDE MORTAR FIRE SUPPORT, AS THE SCOTS GUARDS TUBES GOT SUNK IN THE PEAT AFTER THE FIRST ROUNDS, HAVING BEEN INADEQUATELY BEDDED IN. DURING THIS ATTACK I ACTED AS LO WITHIN BRIGADIER WILSON'S ADVANCED TACTICAL HQ CONSISTING OF HIM, HIS COS,ARTY COMD, S3 AND 2 RADIO OPERATORS. IT STRUCK ME THAT THIS WAS INADEQUATE, THE BRIGADIER WAS WITHOUT THE ESSENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS AND HIS NECESSARY STAFF, AND THEY, BACK AT THE MAIN HQ, WERE NOT KEPT IN THE PICTURE. FORTUNATELY, SHORTLY AFTER DAWN ON 14 JAN, AS THE GHURKHA'S WERE ABOUT TO START THEIR ASSAULT ON MT. WILLIAM, WE HEARD A REPORT OF WHITE FLAGS OVER STANLEY -- AND SO CAME THE RUSH FORWARD. WITHIN 30 MINUTES OF CONFIRMATION, HELICOPTERS WERE EN ROUTE TO TAKE FIRST MY COY, THEN THE REMAINDER OF THE CDO UKM FWD TO THE NORTHEAST SLOPS OF MT. UMBLEDOWN (TO GR 340725). THE SITUATION WAS VERY UNCLEAR FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW, AND PRESUMABLY CHAOTIC FOR THE ARGENTINIANS. WE THEREFORE CONDUCTED THIS OPERATION AS A HELICOPTER ASSAULT. ON LANDING WE DEPLOYED AND EVENTUALLY MOVED OFF THROUGH WHAT WE FEARED MAY BE ANOTHER MINEFIELD. IT WAS A QUESTION OF "IN HIS MASTER'S STEPS HE TROD". I REGRET TO SAY THAT I WAS THE MASTER! FOR FAIRLY OBVIOUS REASONS I WAS MORE CONCERNED ABOUT CASUALTIES AFTER THE CEASEFIRE THAN DURING THE BATTLE. VIDEO 18 BY MIDAFTERNOON, WE WERE IN THE WESTERN SECTOR OF PORT STANLEY, WHERE COMPOSITE COY J, FORMED BY COL NICK VAUX TO REPLACE M COY IN SOUTH GEORGIA, AND CONSISTING PRIMARILY OF FORMER MEMBERS OF THE ORIGINAL NP8901 BASED IN THE FALKLANDS, HAD THE HONOR OF RAISING THE SAME UNION JACK THAT HAD BEEN LOWERED IN SURRENDER 2 AND 1/2 MONTHS EARLIER OUTSIDE GOVERNMENT HOUSE. MY COY AND J COY WERE BILLETED IN THE SEAPLANE HANGAR WHICH HAD BEEN HIT BY A CLUSTER BOMB. THE OFFICERS AND SNCOs OF OUR TWO COYS USED THE MECHANICS WORKSHOP AND LOUNGE. WHEN IT RAINED A RED STAIN IN THE CEILING SPREAD AND DRIPPED ONTO US, SO THE CSM DETAILED SOMEONE TO GO UP ONTO THE CEILING TO INVESTIGATE. WE THEN REALIZED THE HANGER MUST HAVE BEEN USED AS A MORGUE AS THERE MUST HAVE BEEN 10 OR 15 ASSORTED LIMBS PILED UP ON THE ROOF. OUTSIDE WAS A WHEELBARROW WITH A DEAD SOLDIER IN IT, ON TOP OF HIM WAS A KIT BAG. WHEN ONE OF MY LTs PICKED UP THE KIT BAG THE HEAD AND FOUR LIMBS FELL OUT IN 5 DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS. ANYWAY, WE WERE PLEASED A COUPLE OF DAYS LATER TO MOVE INTO THE SHEEP SLAUGHTER HOUSE; IT WAS VERY CLEAN EXCEPT FOR THE DEEP FREEZE ROOM WHICH WAS FULL OF DECAYED LAMB. THERE HAD BEEN NO POWER FOR A COUPLE OF WEEKS OR MORE. WHILE IN STANLEY, WE ALSO GOT MAIL AND MAGAZINES OF ONE SORT OR ANOTHER FROM THE GRATEFUL POPULATION IN THE UK WHO HAD DONATED SOME 25M POUNDS ($37M) TO THE SOUTH ATLANTIC FUND. IN STANLEY WE FOUND DOZENS OF LARGE CONTAINERS FULL OF FOOD, CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT; THERE WAS NO NEED FOR US NOW TO GO HUNGRY, BUT WATER REMAINED A PROBLEM AND MORE AND MORE MNES GOT THE "DOG" AS A RESULT. 42 CDO TASK WAS TO ACCEPT THE SURRENDER OF THE ARGENTINIANS WHO WERE TO ASSEMBLE AT THE AIRFIELD. THIS WAS A LARGE ENOUGH AREA TO PLACE THE 11,000 ARGENTINIANS, REPORTED TO BE ON THE ISLANDS, AND IT HAD ONLY ONE ACCESS POINT, WHERE MY COY WAS BASED FOR 48 HOURS EVERY OTHER 2 DAYS. MOST OF THE ARGENTIAN TROOPS SHAMBLED IN IN GROUPS OF 10 TO 30. WE DISARMED THEM AND CONFISCATED ALL WARFIGHTING EQUIPMENT EXCEPT STEEL HELMETS AND GAS MASKS. SOME SUCH AS THE 4TH MARINE REGIMENT MARCHED SMARTLY IN COLUMNS OF ROUTE. CO IN FRONT, THEN ADJUTANT, A RIFLE COY, THE COLOURS AND THEN THE REMAINDER. SOME 100M SHORT OF MY POSITION THEY HALTED AND BURNT THEIR COLOURS. WHEN THEY REACHED ME, THE CO HALTED THE REGIMENT, PLACED IT AT MY DISPOSAL AND PERSONALLY GAVE ME HIS MATCHING PAIR OF PERSONALIZED COLT .45's. OTHER SENIOR OFFICERS WERE LESS DIGNIFIED; PARTICULARLY AS THEY TRIED-TO DRIVE IN THEIR MERCEDES CROSS-COUNTRY VEHICLES, TO THE AIRFIELD. THESE I HIJACKED - $750,000 IN 3 HOURS, AND MADE THEM WALK THE 2 MILES. IN THE SURRENDER AGREEMENT, GENERAL MENENDEZ HAD REQUESTED THAT THE OFFICERS, SOME OF WHOM WERE MOST UNPOPULAR WITH THEIR MEN AND FEARED LYNCHING, BE ALLOWED TO KEEP THEIR PISTOLS. THIS WAS APPROVED BY GENERAL MOORE, ALTHOUGH ONLY A FEW FELT THE NEED FOR THEM! AS YOU CAN IMAGINE WE COLLECTED A GREAT PILE OF WEAPONS, MAGAZINES, BAYONETS, ETC.; SADLY WE AS INDIVIDUALS WERE ALLOWED TO BRING NONE BACK, BUT EACH UNIT RETAINED A NUMBER OF SPECIALIZED WEAPONS FOR SUBSEQUENT WORLDWIDE CONTINGENCIES. WHAT HAPPENED TO THE SURPLUS 8000 WEAPON: THEY WERE TRAGICALLY DUMPED IN THE SEA! LIFE AT THE AIRFIELD FOR THE ARGENTINIAN POWs WAS UNCOMFORTABLE, BUT IT WAS NO WORSE THAN FOR US. I WISH TO RECOUNT ONLY 2 STORIES. TWO OR 3 DAYS AFTER THE SURRENDER, THE BRIGADE MAJOR (MAB COS) TASKED 42 CDO RM - MY COY AND ANOTHER--TO GO TO THE AIRFIELD AND CLEAR IT FOR SUBSEQUENT FIXED WING AIR OPERATIONS. AFTER CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION OR MORE PERCISELY, ARGUMENT, I CONVINCED HIM THAT WE COULD "HACK THE PROBLEM" WITH MYSELF, MY CSM WHO IS A MILITARY POLICEMAN BY MOS, AND A COUPLE OF MARINES FOR PROTECTION. THE POWs REMAINED WELL DISCIPLINED UNDER THEIR OWN OFFICERS, MPS AND DOGS AND WERE EAGER TO HELP. WITHIN 3 HOURS OF INSTRUCTING THE COMMANDANT OF THE PRISONERS, 8500 MEN WERE SWEEPING THE AIRFIELD WITH HARD SCRUBBING BRUSHES, BROOMS, ETC. THE CARROT I GAVE THEM WAS THAT WE WISHED TO FLY IN TENTS, FOOD AND SO ON FROM ASCENSION ISLAND. COINCIDENTALLY, BEFORE THEY HAD FINISHED, THE FIRST BRITISH C130 TO FLY OVER THE ISLAND, APPEARED OVERHEAD, PROCEEDED TO DROP BY PARACHUTE A LOAD OF STORES SOME 4 MILES TO THE WEST. THIS BOTH ENHANCED MY CREDIBILITY WITH THE PRISONERS AND GOADED THEM TO GREATER EFFORTS! A DAY OR 2 LATER THE POW COMMANDANT ASKED ME IF I COULD GET ADDITONAL WATER FOR THEM. THOUGH IT WAS IN VERY SHORT SUPPLY, I MANAGED TO GET SOME - AND THEY WERE MOST GRATEFUL. SO GRATEFUL IN FACT THAT I AND MY XO WERE INVITED TO DINNER THE NIGHT BEFORE THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE POWs WERE EVACUATED IN SS CANBERRA TO BUENOS AIRES. THE DINNER WAS A TRULY MEMORABLE EXPERIENCE: NOT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE FOOD, WHICH WAS APPALLING-- EVEN THOUGH IT WAS THE FIRST FRESH FOOD I HAD HAD FOR A MONTH, NOR EVEN FROM THE SECURITY POINT OF VIEW. JUST AS IN IRELAND BOTH I AND MY XO HAD AUTOMATIC HAND GUNS LOADED AND READY FOR SELF-PROTECTION, AND I HAD A SECTION ON VEHICLE PATROL THROUGHOUT THE EVENING. THE DINNER WAS MEMORABLE BECAUSE OF THE FASCINATING COMPANY. THE "PRESIDENT" WAS THE COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE AIRFIELD AND ITS DEFENCE FORCES; MR. VICE, THE CO OF THE 4TH MARINE REGIMENT, THE OTHER INVOLUNTARY GUESTS WERE 2 STAFF OFFICERS, ONE TO EACH OF THE COLONELS. THE CONVERSATION WAS IN ENGLISH AND SIMILAR IN CONTENT AND SPIRIT TO ANY OTHER I OR ANY OF THE OTHER IOs HAVE HAD HERE WITH U.S. OFFICERS OR AMONGST OURSELVES. THEY HAD BEEN EDUCATED AT ENGLISH SCHOOLS IN ARGENTINA OR BEEN TO UNIVERSITY IN ENGLAND, OR TO SANDHURST OR CAMBERLEY, THE ARMY's TBS AND STAFF COLLEGE. WE DEBRIEFED EACH OF THE BATTLES AND I DISCOVERED FOR THE FIRST TIME THAT THEIR DEFENCES HAD BEEN INITIALLY DIRECTED TO THE SOUTH WITH THE FRONT LINE ALONG MT. HARRIET, MT. WILLIAM AND SAPPER HILL. WE ALSO DISCUSSED WORLD AFFAIRS AND THEY REITERATED THAT THE LAST PEOPLE THEY WISHED TO FIGHT WERE THE BRITS. THERE ARE, I THINK, MORE WELSH SPEAKERS IN ARGENTINA THAN IN WALES AND MANY OF THEIR EMOTIONAL TIES ARE WITH BRITAIN. THE ONLY SUBJECT UPON WHICH WE AGREED TO DIFFER WAS ON THE STATUS OF THE FALKLANDS. BUT EVEN THEN WHEN THEY SAID THIS IS ONLY THE FIRST ROUND, AND THEY'LL BE BACK-I HAD TO AGREE! WE PARTED AS GREAT FRIENDS-AND I EAGERLY AWAIT DIPLOMATIC APPROVAL TO TAKE UP THEIR INVITATION TO LECTURE TO THEIR STAFF COLLEGE ON "THE ATTACK." SINCE THEN I HAVE ONLY MET ONE ARGENTINIAN, A DELIGHTFUL CIVILIAN WHOM I SAT NEXT TO AT A FORMAL LUNCH AT THE FARNBOROUGH INTERNATIONAL AIR SHOW. HE WAS INTERESTED IN SECONDARY RADAR AND IFF- THANKFULLY NOT EXOCET-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT!! EIGHT DAY AFTER THE SURRENDER, WHEN SS CANBERRA RETURNED FROM TAKING ARGENTINIAN POW'S TO BUENOS AIRES, WE REEMBARKED ON CANBERRA TO A MARVELOUS WELCOME, DELICIOUS FOOD, OUR FIRST WASH FOR 31 DAYS AND THE LUXURY OF SITTING ON A CHAIR AND SLEEPING IN A BED. THE 20 DAY RETURN JOURNEY WAS ONE LONG MARVELLOUS PARTY: ON BOARD SS CANBERRA WERE 3 CDO BDE RM, SOME 50% OF THE STRENGTH OF THE ROYAL MARINES AND WHAT A REUNION WE HAD. THERE WAS A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF WORK TO BE DONE. POST OPERATION REPORTS AND RECORDS OF PROCEEDINGS TO BE WRITTEN, STORES TO BE CLEANED AND MUSTERED, MEDICAL SCREENING FOR TRENCH FOOT AND SO ON. EXCITEMENT MOUNTED AS WE NEARED ENGLAND. OUR LANDFALL WAS THE LIZARD IN CORNWALL AT ABOUT 1600 ON 10 JULY. THEREAFTER WE WERE EXCORTED BY A FLOTILLA OF SMALL BOATS. THAT EVENING THE CDO FORCES BAND THAT HAD PERFORMED QUITE ADMIRABLY THROUGHOUT THE WAR AS STRETCHER BEARERS, POW GUARDS, AIR DEFENCE CREW AND WORKING HANDS ABOARD SS CANBERRA, PLAYED THE TRADITIONAL SUNSET CEREMONY; A VERY MOVING OCCASION AT ANY TIME. HERE SO RAPTUROUS WAS THE APPLAUSE THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME IN HISTORY, THEY DID AN ENCORE, THE SUN SET TWICE THAT NIGHT! WE ARRIVED IN THE SOLENT SHORTLY AFTER DAWN TO THE FANTASTIC WELCOME OF THOUSANDS OF BOATS AND HUNDRREDS OF THOUSANDS OF SPECTATORS. WE DOCKED IN SOUTHHAMPTON, THE HOME PORT OF SS CANBERRA AND AFTER A TEARJERKING REUNION HEADED WEST IN A CONVOY OF BUSES TO PLYMOUTH. AT EVERY VILLAGE, ROAD JUNCTION, BRIDGE AND ROUNDABOUT ON THE 200 MILE JOURNEY, WERE CROWDS OF PEOPLE WAVING FLAGS AND GREETING US HOME. IN DORCHESTER FOR EXAMPLE, LADIES CAME ABOARD EACH BUS BEARING PINTS OF GOOD ENGLISH BEER FOR ALL. WE EVENTUALLY GOT HOME ON 12 JULY 1982, 3 MONTHS AND FOUR DAYS AFTER LEAVING. MY COMMANDING OFFICER, NICK VAUX, CALLED IT A FAIRY TALE WAR. WE DEPLOYED AND RETURNED ON A ROUNDTRIP OF 16,000 MILES IN A LUXURY LINER WITH FIRST CLASS TREATMENT THROUGHOUT. 7,000 OF US LANDED WITH MINIMAL LOSS IN SAN CARLOS WATER AND FOUGHT A WAR AGAINST A NUMERICALLY SUPERIOR FORCE OF 10,800, WHICH HAD HAD 6 WEEKS TO PREPARE HIS DEFENSIVE POSITIONS. WE BEAT THEM DESPITE ENORMOUS LOGISTIC AND OTHER DIFFICULTIES, AND THE COMMANDO SUFFERED ONLY 2 KILLED AND 26 WOUNDED. ALL THIS WITHIN THE SCHOOL SUMMER TERM, DURING WHICH MOST SERVICE CHILDREN IN ENGLANDS ARE AWAY AT BOARDING SCHOOL FROM MID-APRIL TO MID-JULY! VIDEO 19 I DON'T INTEND GOING THROUGH THE NITTY GRITTY OF ALL THE LESSONS THAT COULD BE LEARNED BECAUSE NOT ONLY WOULD IT TAKE TOO LONG, BUT ALSO SOME DO NOT SUPPORT THE ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE OF WAR! I THINK, HOWEVER, I SHOULD MENTION JUST 5 FUNDAMENTALS: A. THE FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENT FOR GOOD TRAINING AT ALL LEVELS. B. THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF USING THE NIGHT TO BEST ADVANTAGE. C. THE DECISIVE NATURE OF SUPPORTING ARMS IN AN INFANTRY BATTLE. D. THE NEED FOR GOOD COMMUNICATIONS. E. AND FINALLY, DON'T FORGET THAT LOGISTICIANS CAN NEVER WIN A WAR, BUT THEY MOST CERTAINLY CAN LOSE IT! LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, YOU HAVE BEEN VERY PATIENT IN LISTENING TO ME FOR A LONG TIME, AND THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION. I'LL SHORTLY TRY TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE, BUT FIRST I'D LIKE TO WELCOME FROM THE BRITISH EMBASSY, CAPTAIN RON CRAWFORD, A ROYAL MARINE SUPPORT HELICOPTER PILOT WHO FLEW IN 3 WEEKS, 140 HOURS ON SINGLE PILOT OPERATIONS WITH GREAT DISTINCTION DURING THE WAR. BETWEEN US WE'LL DO THE BEST WE CAN TO SATISFY YOUR PROFESSIONAL CURIOSITY. Click here to view image
