Light Attack Helicopters In The Light Division - The Need Is Now AUTHOR Major Jesse R. Timmerman, Jr, USA CSC 1985 SUBJECT AREA Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: LIGHT ATTACK HELICOPTERS IN THE LIGHT DIVISION - THE TIME IS NOW I. Purpose: To establish that there is an immediate need for a light attack helicopter in the Army's new light divisions. II. Problem: The AH-1S "Cobra" attack helicopter presently assigned to the Army's new light divisions requires a major portion of available Air Force strategic airlift assets for transport to given crisis areas worldwide. A smaller, equally lethal, light attack helicopter is needed in the light division to project a substantial anti-armor force into the crisis area with a minimum number of already limited strategic transports. III. Data: The United States Army has recently organized several light infantry divisions specifically for immediate deployment on a global basis. These units will funtion as immediate deployment forces for the Central Command and Readiness Command under the Unified Command Plan. Light divisions currently depend on the AH-1S "Cobra" attack helicopter for enemy armor destruction. Transporting these helicopters to the crisis area on strategic airlifters uses a major portion of the total mobility assets available. Adding the light at tack helicopter to the force structure of the light division would significantly reduce strategic airlift requirements. Logistic sustainment and budgetary constraints would also be reduced with the smaller and less expensive light attack helicopter. IV. Conclusions: The light attack helicopter is a unique anti-armor asset that is available today to the Army. The nature of its small design and lethal killing power make it desirable for the light division. V. Recommendations: The acquisition of the light attack helicopter in the light division will increase deploy- ability, lower budget costs, improve logistics sustainment, and enhance mission accomplishment well into the next decade. Its immediate purchase is imperative. LIGHT ATTACK HELICOPTERS IN THE LIGHT DIVISION - THE NEED IS NOW OUTLINE Thesis Statement: Strategic deployment flexibility, versatility as an anti-armor weapon, and cost effectiveness make the light attack helicopter a vital and necessary asset for the light division. I. Light division characteristics a. Less equipment to transport b. Need for formidable anti-armor capability II. Long-Range trends a. Use of attack helicopters in Airland Battle doctrine b. Light helicopter experimental (LHX) c. AH-64 III. Light attack helicopter characteristics and capabilities a. Hughes 500MD b. Bell OH-58C IV. Logistics and maintenance comparisons a. AH-1S/AH-64 versus Hughes 500MD b. AH-1S/AH-64 versus Bell OH-58C V. High technology costs versus simplicity and reliability a. Burden of increased systems maintenance requirements b. Cost effectiveness of Hughes 500MD VI. Strategic Deployment a. Availability of Air Force strategic transport aircraft b. Outloading of attack helicopters aboard strategic airlifters VII. Conclusion a. Low technological risks b. High cost effectiveness c. Vital asset for light division LIGHT ATTACK HELICOPTERS IN THE LIGHT DIVISION - THE NEED IS NOW THE LIGHT DIVISION The US Army depends on the light division for rapid force projection anywhere in the world. The airborne and air assault divisions require less logistical support than equivalent mechanized/armor units. The light division's characteristically light equipment and less complex weapons systems require correspondingly less maintenance support and less favorable conditions in which to operate.1 These potential Central Command (CENTCOM) and Readiness Command (REDCOM) forces will enter the battlefield using varied modes of strategic or tactical transport. The limited amount of organic heavy equipment allows the light divisions to be more easily transported by land, air (airland, airmobile, and airborne), and naval vessel (amphibious operations). The limited available transport can be devoted to moving combat troops instead of large amounts of heavy maintenance support equipment. Once employed, the light division can be readily repositioned to critical engagement areas.2 In April 1982, the Secretary of Defense announced that the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF), now CENTCOM, would become a separate unified command with responsibility for the Persian Gulf. The Soviet threat tactics expected in that area are commensurate with their doctrine. Aggressive offensive operations characterized by mass, momentum, and continuous echelonment of forces can be anticipated. They will use numerically superior armor forces in concert with firepower for frontal attacks, deep thrusts, envelopments, and holding attacks. Our commanders must concentrate sufficient combat power at the right place and time. These forces must be placed against the enemy's main effort and force him to slow down or withdraw. The wide frontages of attacking forces coupled with the echeloning of follow-on elements requires maxi- mizing weapons capability and flexibility.3 The attack helicopter is the most manueverable and responsive lethal tank-killing system available to the ground commander. Attack helicopter units can engage in one sector and on a moment's notice react to a threat many kilometers away in the battle area. The total number of these systems introduced into the conflict will have a direct bearing on the ground commanders' success in destroying the Warsaw Pact divisions. The light attack helicopter equipped with the effective tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) anti-tank system can be introduced in greater numbers than the AH-1S attack helicopter. Combat ratios of this aircraft to the enemies' ground forces become more favorable, which make it a viable option in our current force structure. LONG RANGE TRENDS The future for US Army infantry, airborne, and air assault divisions and similar divisions in armies of major foreign powers is generally toward better survivability and more lethal firepower. Special consideration is being given to anti-armor firepower.4 These divisions will learn how to utilize the Army's new AirLand Battle doctrine. They will seek the initiative early and retain it, aggressively defeating the enemy. Destruction of the opposing force is accomplished by throwing the enemy off balance with powerful blows from unexpected directions and then following up rapidly to prevent his recovery.5 Ground commanders will creatively apply aviation assets to multiply their own organic capabilities. Attack helicopters will give commanders an ability to strike the entire depth of the battlefield and flexible ability to act faster than the enemy.2 As we look to the future, the Army has plans for a new, lightweight, multi-purpose helicopter that will replace our aging utility, scout, and attack fleets. This light helicopter experimental (LHX) is expected to join the force by the early 1990s. The LHX will incorporate many emerging technologies such as composite materials, dynamic compon- ents, and fly-by-wire flight controls that reduce size and gross weight.7 The focus of the LHX is to provide an aircraft that is small and deployable with multi-mission capabilities for the twenty-first century.8 LHX appears to be an excellent aircraft for the future; however, we need a small attack helicopter today. The newest advanced attack helicopter, the Hughes AH-64 "Apache", is currently in the production and deployment acquisition phase. The powerful, two engine AH-64 is designed to perform anywhere in the world under the most demanding conditions of altitude and climate. It represents a tremendous advancement in weapon technology and target acquisition. The first AH-64 was delivered in the Spring of 1984 and the first operational unit is scheduled to receive them in mid-1985. Priority for deployment is initially to European-based divisions; the AH-64 will not be deployed in the United States until much later in the decade. Even if the AH-64 was available now to CENTCOM and REDCOM units, it would further complicate strategic airmobility. Its larger size and increased logistical support requirements require a significant additional number of strategic transports. Light attack helicopters, which are available today, offer an attractive immediate alternative for force modern- ization. They can complement the advanced systems that are coming into the Army's helicopter fleet while providing a tool to solve current contingency requirements. LIGHT ATTACK HELICOPTER CHARACTERISTICS AND CAPABILITIES The Hughes 500MD and the Bell OH-58C are the prime candidates for our light attack helicopter needs. The Hughes 500MD is already in service in our special operations units. It is a product improvement version of the OH-6A "Cayuse" which saw extensive service during the Vietnam conflict. The OH-6A is still being utilized in US Army National Guard and Reserve units. Our active attack helicopter and air cavalry units utilize the OH-58C helicopter in scout, reconnaissance, and command and control roles. The OH-58C aircraft are not armed but have been successfully tested for the anti-armor mission equipped with the TOW missile system. However, it must be pointed out that there are high technological risks associated with the OH-58C application as a light attack helicopter since it has never been actually employed in that role by the United States or any other nation. Proven reliability and survivability are crucial to any aerial weapons platform acquisition. The Hughes 500MD enjoys that reputation as demonstrated recently in the Middle East and South Korea. Attack helicopter units in Israel utilize the AH-1S "Cobra" and the Hughes 500MD. The Israelis used the Hughes 500MD equipped with the TOW missile system to engage and destroy many Syrian tanks and mechan- ized vehicles in recent action in the Beka Valley.9 The Hughes 500MD utilizes a modular weapons system that permits rapid conversion to different weapons configura- tions. It can be equippped with a seven shot, 2.75 inch aerial rocket system, or a 7.62 millimeter M-134 (mini-gun) system as well as the TOW missile system. This concept allows the aircraft to be adapted to perform multiple missions with minimal time required for weapon conversion. An air-to-air missile pod can be added; however, it requires additional wiring and the installation of a heads-up display for the pilot. The light attack helicopter's compact size is a signi- ficant aspect of its survivability. The small size, nap-of- the-earth agility, and maneuverability allow the aircraft to operate lower and closer to the terrain. This reduces target size and thermal signature to enemy direct fire and heat-seeking air defense systems. The Hughes 500MD incorporates the same crash atten- uation features as the OH-6A. It has crew station rollover, energy absorption landing gear, and a main rotor hub retention system. Service in the Vietnam war vividly demonstrated its crashworthy design in numerous operations. In comparison, the AH-1S "Cobra" suffers from a serious degradation in ordnance load and endurance capabilities when compared to the light attack helicopter in a Southwest Asia environment. A "Cobra" can carry only four TOW missiles and has an endurance time of 1.5 hours (no reserve) while operating out of ground effect.10 The Hughes 500MD is only slightly affected by the hot temperatures and high mountain altitudes but, under the same conditions, can carry four TOW missiles, operate out of ground effect, and enjoy an endur- ance time of 2.3 hours.11 The "Cobra" becomes even more limited in ordnance load ability as extremes in temperature and altitude increase. Iran hosts many areas that range well over 12,000 feet above sea level and temperatures that reach over ninety-five degrees fahrenheit. While it is true pilots can trade more fuel for ammunition, the corresponding reduction of endurance time does not facilitate the expanded coverages required in a Southwest Asian conflict. LOGISTICS AND MAINTENANCE COMPARISONS We have long had unique forces identified for contin- gency missions, most notably the light divisions already discussed. The Marines, the Special Forces, the Rangers, and the Navy are also part of our contingency elements. It is important to mention at this point the serious deficien- cies in the quality of our planning and associated joint- service plans for logistical support of these units. Dr. Paul K. Davis, Director of the Rand Strategic Assessment Center, points out that measuring readiness for contingen- cies for Southwest Asia depends on many factors, particu- larly; operational planning; intelligence collection and analysis; combat maneuver forces; strategic mobility; supportability; and logistical military support. He and others feel that there is a tendency to make irrational optimistic assessments concerning our logistical support abilities in our rapid deployment forces.12 Although the light attack helicopter may not cure our overall logistic problems, it does offer several advantages worthy of discussion. Use of light attack helicopters drastically reduces fuel support requirements on the battlefield when compared to the AH-1S "Cobra." Fuel consumption for the Hughes 500MD and the OH-58C is half that required for the AH-1S aircraft. Average AH-1S fuel consumption is 115 gallons per hour as compared to thirty-five gallons per hour for the light attack helicopter.13 An attack company will require 10,200 gallons of fuel per day for its assigned AH-1S helicopters. Substituting the light attack helicopter for the AH-1S represents a reduction of 7,140 gallons of fuel under identical conditions.14 In addition, this reduces the necessity for utility and cargo class helicopters transporting vast amounts of fuel to forward area rearming and refueling points. Simplistic design features of light attack helicopters enable them to be flown longer between scheduled maintenance inspections. Major disassembly and detailed inspections are required every 150 flying hours for the AH-1S. In contrast, the light attack helicopter requires these inspections after 300 flying hours.15 Requirements are much more extensive and time-consuming for the larger and more complex "Cobra." Austere conditions in Southwest Asia and the lack of dust- free repair facilities may contribute to excessive AH-1S maintenance downtime. The Hughes 500MD incorporates a modular design philo- sophy which allows for rapid change of major components. It has a mechanical flight control system, small modular trans- mission and engine, and a bearingless tail rotor drive-shaft assembly. Engineering features optomize the location and access to all major integral parts thereby reducing the time needed for repair and replacement. The Hughes 500MD also utilizes the exact same TOW missile system as the AH-1S and all modular line replaceable units (LRU) are interchange- able. This also includes the new laser rangefinder tele- scopic sighting unit.16 All of these simplistic features constitute a higher "fully mission capable" operational readiness rate for the light attack helicopter. HIGH TECHNOLOGY COSTS VERSUS SIMPLICITY AND RELIABILITY One of the most important tasks aviation unit com- manders have is maintaining aircraft readiness. The product improvements made on the AH-1S over the years and the intro- duction of the advanced AH-64 attack helicopter have given the commander new challenges. With these advanced technical improvements comes the burden of increased systems mainte- nance requirements. The fact is that as a helicopter or missile system becomes more complicated, the probability that all its parts will be working at the same time goes down.17 For example, the latest generation AH-1S is the "Fully Modernized Cobra" which is equipped with the heads-up display (HUD). The HUD interfaces with the ballistics computer, rocket management system, and the TOW missile system. The HUD must function correctly before any of the selected weapons systems can fire. The older generation AH-1S attack helicopter did not have this dependence on a singular component and could continue functioning in a partially operational mode.18 Obviously, then, a new design may not always be better. The new weapons systems on the latest generation "Cobra" and the advanced AH-64 require extensive test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment. Tests sets are generally large and have special power supplies. Test apparatus and power generators must also be transported strategically and they utilize valuable cargo loading space. Once in the field, they are not easily moved about and they do not lend themselves to airmobile transportation. The diagnostic test equipment for the AH-64 is so large that the aircraft must return to rear areas for repairs rather than being fixed well forward in the battle area. Many military officers and senior civilian officials are involved in this debate over weapons sophistication. They are skeptical of this great leap forward in technology, fearing it will leave us with weapons that will not work on the battlefield.19 Rising costs and the complexity of expensive systems has had an immediate impact on the numbers of aircraft in our defense force. For example, James Fallows has shown in his research that aircraft unit-cost increases in the Air Force have resulted in a smaller base of planes which are used less often than simpler, cheaper alternatives.20 The increasing complexity of these aircraft costs money and often leads to increasing difficulty in maintaining this high cost equipment. The end results are expensive fighters that have a poor readiness rate.21 The Army's advanced attack helicopter program has recently come under close public scrutiny. Unit-costs for the AH-64 have grown from a projected $11 million to $15.7 million.22 The AH-64 will replace the AH-1S aircraft which costs just over $3 million. Like the Air Force, there will be fewer attack helicopters in the total Army force. Current attack helicopter companies have twenty-one AH-1S aircraft and future AH-64 companies will have only eighteen. A Hughes 500MD costs $1.4 million equipped with the TOW missile system and at that price is a formidable anti-armor weapon. The unit cost of this system would allow us to procure enough of these systems to enhance the light divi- sion's ability to deploy an adequate force against the threat. STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT The Army relies on the Air Force and the Navy for the strategic mobility necessary to meet global commitments. Establishing an early presence that is credible in a crisis area is dependent on rapid air transport. Although there are significant shortfalls in the numbers of strategic airlifters, progress is being made as evidenced by the recent decision to purchase almost 100 KC-10s and C-5Bs.23 In future years, as we add to our current fleet of strategic air transports, we should consider current alternatives that reduce sortie requirements. The light attack heli- copter offers a significant savings in strategic mobility requirements and the following discussion will point this out along with the advantages. The C-141B and C-5A are the only global strategic transport aircraft available today in the Air Force. The C-141B can carry three AH-1S attack helicopters while the C-5A will carry nine. The AH-1S must be partially dis- assembled to load the C-141B and the C-5A. The reassembly at destination is a lengthy process for the AH-1S. Major flight components such as the main rotor system, tailrotor, and synchronized elevator must be installed. The armament system must go through a detailed boresight diagnostic alignment process. A test flight is required by a qualified maintenance pilot when the reassembly process is completed. Less disassembly is required for the AH-1S when seven or fewer are loaded on the C-5A. However, this introduces even fewer anti-tank systems into the theater of operations. The Hughes 500MD light attack helicopter maximizes the use of strategic transport capabilities. Ten of these helicopters can be loaded in the C-141B and twenty-two in the C-5A. The Hughes 500MD features folding rotor blades and hinged armament missile launch racks designed for strate- gic transportation. Since there is no major disassembly it does not require a maintenance test flight or armament boresight alignment check. The aircraft is essentially mission ready after unloading. The C-130 transport is the only intratheater airlifter. One AH-1S can be loaded on the C-130 after extensive dis- assembly and it requires an excessive amount of reassembly time at destination. Two Hughes 500MD aircraft can be carried on the C-130 and are mission ready at destination. Another C-130 option is to carry five Hughes 500MD aircraft disassembled. In this case, a four hour reassembly period is required by a three-man build-up crew to make all five flyable.24 CONCLUSION The light attack helicopter is a unique anti-armor asset that is available today to the Army. The nature of its small design coupled with its lethal killing power make it an ideal weapon for the light division. If a light division commander is assigned a CENTCOM or REDCOM mission, the Hughes 500MD presents the opportunity to project a substantial anti-armor force with a minimum number of already limited strategic transports. The Hughes 500MD has proven itself in the recent Israeli-Syrian conflict and in our own special operations units. The ease of maintenance and reduced logistic requirements of this helicopter complement the philosophy of a deployed light division. There are no technological risks with the purchase of the Hughes 500MD. It has total inter- face with existing TOW missile system components which further points out the suitability of this aircraft. The light attack helicopter offers an excellent return on the dollar when compared to the AH-1S and the AH-64. Strategic deployment flexibility and versatility as an anti-armor weapon make the light attack helicopter a vital asset for the light division. This aircraft, in proper mix with existing attack helicopters, can serve the Army's immediate needs until the LHX joins the fleet in the early 1990s. FOOTNOTES 1 US Department of the Army, Field Manual 71-101: Infantry, Airborne, and Air Assault Division Operations. Washington, 26 March 1980, p. 1-4. 2 Field Manual 71-101, p. 1-4. 3 US Department of the Army, Field Manual 71-100: Armored and Mechanized Division Operations Washington, 30 March 1979, p. 2-3. 4 Field Manual 71-101, p. 1-2. 5 US Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5: Operations, Washington, 20 September 1982. 6 Parker, Ellis D., Brigadier General, USA. "Department of the Army Aviation Update," US Army Aviation Digest, January 1982, p. 9. 7 Banks, Howard, "Cleared for Takeoff: Army Helicopters," Forbes, 10 October 1983, p. 35. 8 Merryman, James H., Lieutenant General, USA. "Near, Long-Term Modernization Are Army Research and Development Goals,", Army, October 1983, p. 179. 9 Everett-Heath, John, Colonel, U. K. "The Helicopter in the Armored Battle," NATO's Fifteen Nations, vol. 27, no. 5, October/November 1982, p. 60. 10 US Department of the Army, Technical Manual 55-1520-236-10: Operator's Manual Army Model AH-1S (Modernized Cobra). Washington, 11 January 1980, p. 7-15. 11 Turk, Paul A. "Hughes Updates its 500MD." Aerospace International. May/June 1980, p. 30. 12 Davis, Paul K. "Observation on the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force: Origins, Directions, and Mission." RAND Corporation Collection P-6751. Santa Monica, Cal., RAND Corporation, June 1982. 13 Technical Manual 55-1520-236-10, p. 7-39. 14 US Department of the Army, 82nd Airborne Division Antiarmor Defense Handbook, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 7 November 1980, p. 15-18. 15 82nd Airborne Division Antiarmor Defense Handbook, p. 15-18 16 Turk, p. 30. 17 Turk, P. 31. 18 Fallows, James. National Defense. New York: Random House, 1981, p. 28. 19 Technical Manual 55-1520-236-10, p. 4-3. 20 "Debate Rages Over High-Tech Arms," Daily Press (Hampton), 23 August 1983, p. 1. 21 Fallows, p. 38. 22 Fallows, p. 41. 23 "Tests in High-Tech War," US News and World Report, 16 August 1982, Vol. 93, p. 25. 24 Thompson, Richard H., Lieutenant General, USA. "Logistics Revolution: Providing the Means to Win Land Battle." Army, October 1983, p. 194. 25 Turk, p. 30. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Banks, Howard. "Cleared for Takeoff: Army Helicopters." Forbes. 10 October 1983, p. 35. 2. Davis, Paul K. "Observation on the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force: Origins, Direction, and Mission." Rand Corporation Collection P-6751. Santa Monica, Cal., RAND Corporation, June 1982. 3. "Debate Rages Over High-Tech Arms." Daily Press (Hampton), 23 August 1983, p. 1. 4. Everett-Heath, John, Colonel, U.K. "The Helicopter in the Armored Battle." NATO's Fifteen Nations, vol. 27, no. 5, October/November 1982, pp. 54-60. 5. Fallows, James. National Defense. New York: Random House, 1981. 6. Merryman, James H., Lieutenant General, USA. "Near, Long-Term Modernization Are Army Research and Development Goals." Army, October 1983, pp. 166-183. 7. Parker, Ellis D., Brigadier General, USA. "Department of the Army Aviation Update." US Army Aviation Digest, January 1982, p. 9. 8. "Tests in High-Tech War." US News and World Report. 16 August 1982, vol. 93, p 25. 9. Thompson, Richard H., Lieutenant General, USA. "Logistics Revolution: Providing the Means to Win Land Battle." Army, October 1983, pp. 188-200. 10. Turk, Paul A. "Hughes Updates its 500MD." Aerospace International, May/June 1980, pp. 30-31. 11. US Department of the Army. 82nd Airborne Division Antiarmor Defense Handbook. Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 7 November 1980. 12. US Department of the Army. Field Manual 71-100: Armored and Mechanized Division Operations. Washington, 30 March 1979. 13. US Department of the Army. Field Manual 71-101: Infantry, Airborne, and Air Assault Division Operations. Washington, 26 March 1980. 14. US Department of the Army. Field Manual 100-5: Operations. Washington, 20 September 1982 15. US Department of the Army. Technical Manual 55-1520-236-10: Operator's Manual Army Model AH-1S (Modernized Cobra). Washington, 11 January 1980.
