The Maritime Pre-Positioning Ships (MPS) Program: Not All Is Well CSC 1985 SUBJECT AREA National Military Strategy EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This research paper investigates the implications of the Maritime Pre-Positioning Ships (MPS) Program on the Marine Corps' readiness, sustainability, and force projec- tion capability. Since the inception of the MPS Program in early 1980, there has been much favorable publicity surrounding the Program. However, the publicity has been associated mostly with the many functions necessary to implement a program. The military capability aspects of the Program (readiness, sustainability, and the force projection capability), have not been addressed. The implication of the MPS Program on the Marine Corps' readi- ness appears to be quite favorable. In the sustainability and force projection capability areas, however, some significant shortfalls exist. This research paper identi- fies and discusses these shortfalls, and concludes by calling for a thorough investigation of the MPS Program in order to identify and correct the Program's shortfalls. THE MARITIME PRE-POSITIONING SHIPS (MPS) PROGRAM: NOT ALL IS WELL Outline Thesis Statement: The implications of the MPS Program on the Marine Corps' readiness, sustainability, and force projection capability need to be thoroughly investigated in order to identify and correct the Program's shortfalls. I. READINESS A. MPS MAB flexibility B. Marine Corps Reserve enhanced mobilization capability C. MPS MAB rapid deployment capability II. SUSTAINABILITY A. Supplies and equipment B. Ammunition and missiles C. Medical support D. Maintenance support III. FORCE PROJECTION CAPABILITY A. New capability B. Increased amphibious lift C. MPS Squadron and MAB survivability 1. MPS Squadron in-transit survivability 2. MPS Squadron and MAB survivability during initial phasing ashore THE MARITIME PRE-POSITIONING SHIPS (MPS) PROGRAM: NOT ALL IS WELL The fall of the Shah of Iran, the Iranian hostage crisis, and the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan shifted the strategic focus of the United States and created a new political-military situation.1 These events resulted in former President Carter declaring the Persian Gulf as vital to the interests of the United States. In late 1979, the United States began to recognize both the necessity of the Nation to be able to rapidly deploy combat forces to the Persian Gulf and the inability to do so because of an inherent stategic mobility shortfall. These two recognitions resulted in the establishment of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) and the Near-term Prepositioning Ships (NTPS) Program. The RDJTF would provide the forces; the NTPS Program would provide the supplies and equipment. With the Administration change in 1981, the RDJTF was redesignated the U.S. Central Command (USCentCom) and the NTPS Program was enhanced and redesignated the Near-term Prepositioning Force (NTPF) dedicated to Southwest Asia contingencies. Paralleling the development of the NTPS Program and the NTPF was the beginning of a Marine Corps program that was envisioned to provide a world-wide rapid response capability and an eventual replacement of the NTPF. During December of 1984, the Program came to life as the first of three squadrons were deployed. The Maritime Pre-Positioning Ships (MPS) Program became a reality. The MPS Program includes the maritime pre-positioning of three sets of supplies and equipment for three Marine Amphibious Brigades (MABs). Eventually, three MPS squadrons(designated as MPS-1, 2 and 3) will be deployed on a world-wide basis. In the event of a situation in which an MPS MAB might be employed, an MPS squadron would sail to the crisis area and the corresponding MAB would be air- lifted to "marry up" with the supplies and equipment.2 The MPS MAB could be used in one of five power projection roles: (1) seizure of an advance naval base; (2) rein- forcement of an amphibious assault; (3) establishment of a flank force; (4) diplomatic/political purposes; and (5) deterrence of adventurism.3 The strategic mobility shortfall identified in the late 1970s will be partially offset by the MPS Program's capability to either mass or separately employ three formidable combat forces in a relatively short period of time. Since the inception of the MPS Program in early 1980, there has been much favorable publicity surrounding it. The equipment procurement, embarkation, and ship deployment schedules have been on schedule.4 The Program has been advertised as a news means of mobility, sustainability, and world-wide response.5 The first of three MPS squadrons (MPS-1) has been deployed. However, much of the good news surrounding the MPS Program pertains to issues such as funding, ship conversions, delivery schedules, and other necessary functions required to initiate a program. The important, discerning issues that pertain to military capabilities and tactical employment have not been addressed. The implications of the MPS Program on the Marine Corps' readiness, sustainability, and force projection capability need to be thoroughly investigated to identify and correct the Program's shortfalls. Readiness Combat readiness is the hallmark of the Marine Corps. This term is measured in several ways such as manning levels, equipment statuses, and training accomplishments. The Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (JCS Pub. 1) defines readiness as, "The ability of forces, units, weapon systems, or equipment to deliver the outputs for which they were designed (includes the ability to deploy and employ without unacceptable delays)."6 Since the first part of the JCS definition applies equally to all Marine Corps units, consideration will not be given to it. However, the latter part of the definition applies most specifically to the MPS-designated units and warrants close scrutiny. The MPS Program has three specific implications on the Marine Corps' readiness. All three of these implications appear to be quite favorable. The flexibility of an MPS MAB is the first implication on the readiness of the Marine Corps. Currently, the Marine Corps has designated only two MPS MABs--the 6th MAB for MPS-1 and the 7th MAB for MPS-2.7 A third MPS MAB will eventually be designated as MPS-3 and is scheduled to deploy during 1985-1986. When fully deployed, each MPS MAB will have a complete set of MPS supplies and equipment available in addition to the MAB's organic set of supplies and equipment.8 The inherent flexibility is in the employ- ment options. First, the MPS MAB could be airlifted to its respective MPS squadron, which contains a complete set of supplies and equipment. Second, the MPS MAB could be employed with some or all of its organic supplies and equipment by means of airlift or commercial sealift. The latter option is unlikely, but it should still be con- sidered as a capability. The duplication of the supplies and equipment is the ingredient that provides this unique flexibility and the resultant positive impact on readiness. The second implication on the Marine Corps' readiness is the capability of selected reserve units to rapidly mobilize. The Commandant of the Marine Corps' "Total Force Policy" of 21 July 1977 established the Marine Corps Reserve as a "mirror image" of the Active Force.9 This policy provided the capability for the quick assimilation of the Marine Corps Reserve into the Active Force during mobilization. One of the roles of the Marine Corps Reserve during mobilization is to augment the Active Force.10 For those MPS MABs which might be flown in to their correspond- ing MPS squadrons, a complete set of MAB supplies and equipment would be left behind.11 Augmenting Marine Corps Reserve units would then be able to utilize this remain behind equipment (RBE). Upon mobilization,these units would have only minimal training allowances (T/As) available. Normally, the difference between the units' T/As and tables of equipment (T/Es) would have to be drawn from the Prepositioned War Reserve Materiel Stocks (PWRMS) held at the Marine Corps Logistics Bases, Albany, Georgia and Barstow, California.12 However, the availability of this RBE would allow the augmenting units to be mobilized much faster. The readiness of the Marine Corps is positively influenced by this enhanced mobilization capability. The third implication on readiness is the capability of an MPS MAB to be rapidly employed. The goal in the employment of an MPS MAB is to have it established ashore within 1O days of the decision to do so.13 To meet this employment goal, the Marine Corps has established the MPS deployment objective to take maximum advantage of airlift speed and sealift capacity in order to rapidly move the MPS MAB with 30 days of supplies/ammunition (DOS/A) to the objective area.14 In a benign environment or perhaps even in reinforcing a hostile situation, the MPS MAB is recognized as the most rapid means to deploy and employ a credible combat force into a potentially hostile or hostile environment.15,16 The combination of airlift and sealift is the basis of the rapid employment capability of an MPS MAB. Again, the Marine Corps' readiness is enhanced by the MPS Program. Sustainability Readiness is the first part of the military capability equation. As was previously demonstrated, the MPS Program has had a positive implication on the Marine Corps' overall readiness. The second part of the equation, sustain- ability, is much more elusive to analyze than readiness. Sustainability involves the projected activities of both the friendly and the enemy forces in terms of resource consumption. JCS Pub. 1 defines sustainability as, "The ability to maintain the necessary level and duration of combat activity to achieve national objectives. Sustain- ability is a function of providing and maintaining those levels of force, materiel, and consumables necessary to support a military effort."17 On the surface, it appears that the MPS Program has had an overwhelming positive implication on the Marine Corps' sustainability. The Marine Corps Capabilities Plan and the Memorandum of Agreement on Joint USN/USMC Concept of Operations for Maritime Prepositioning both allude to the capability of a 30 day level of sustainability.18,19 However, there are some critical sustainability issues that need to be addressed in order for sustainability to complement the very favorable implications that the MPS Program has had on the readiness of the Marine Corps. In the first category of sustainability, supplies (less ammunition and missiles) and equipment, the MPS Program has had a favorable implication on the Marine Corps' sustainability. This category might very well be the one on which the Marine Corps bases its advertised capability of a 30 day level of sustainability. Funding the MPS Program has been consistent with the objectives of providing equipment and sustainability for the MPS Program by the end of the FY 1985 funded delivery period which ends in mid-1986.20 A total of $324 million in procurement, operation and maintenance, and stock fund dollars has been dedicated to the MPS Program's supplies and equipment.21 Similar funding has also been dedicated to MPS-2 and MPS-3.22 The first category of sustainability is in a favorable position. The good news on sustainability declines in the other three categories. Ammunition and missiles constitute the second category of sustainability. Unlike equipment which has both allow- ances (or T/Es) and sustainability, this category consists of only sustainability. Thirty days of ammunition is currently loaded to MPS-1 and is funded for MPS-2 and MPS-3. However, due to production constraints, there are critical shortages in the 155mm ADAM, 155mm RAAMS, and 155mm Copperhead ammunition.* These shortages are not expected to be remedied until at least 1988.23 During the interim period, a definite risk exists in ammunition sustainability. The situation is even more severe in missiles. Hawk and Stinger surface-to-air missiles have 60 DOA programming objectives, but currently have only a limited number of missiles available for use.24,25 The amount available is for total Marine Corps use and is shared with the MPS *ADAM--area denial anti-personnel munitions RAAMS--remote anti-armor munition system Copperhead--laser seeking munition **Hawk--mobile, low to medium altitude, air defense, surface-to-air missile Stinger--light-weight, man-portable, shoulder-fired, low altitude, surface-to-air missile Program. Neither of these air defense missiles are loaded nor will be loaded to the MPS squadrons. The missiles will be flown in to the MPS squadrons when required. Another risk is realized in the ammunition and missile category not only in the limited quantity of air defense missiles avail- able but also in the reliance on their having to be flown in to the MPS squadrons. As an aside, critical low-density items or limited high-cost repair parts for the Hawk missile are also in very low supply.26 TOW and Dragon anti-armor missiles are in a more favorable posture when compared to the Hawk and Stinger missiles.* Thirty DOA of TOW and Dragon missiles are either loaded or will be loaded to the MPS squadrons.27 However, the drawdown on an already moderate inventory level for the MPS Program might have a somewhat negative implication on overall Marine Corps anti-armor sustainability. The sustainability of ammunition and missiles is unfavorable and needs to be addressed. The items in this category are critical combat items and their limited combat availability or complete absence in combat could be catastrophic. The status of the second catgegory of sustainability is very unfavorable. Medical support is the third category of sustain- ability. The issue of medical support is associated with *TOW--tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-command link, anti-tank guided missile Dragon--man-portable, medium anti-tank missile neither the supplies and equipment available nor the concept of medical support. Both of these areas are in favorable positions relative to near-term sustainability.28 Immediate medical support will be available to all of the MPS MABs should they be employed. On the other hand, the sustainability of hospital ships is presently non-existent, and the concept that will be implemented during 1986-1987 is questionable. Two T-AH hospital ships are funded in the FY 1985 Ship Construction, Navy budget for FY 1983 and FY 1984.29 The ships will be delivered in FY 1986 and FY 1987.30 Each ship will have a complete medical and surgical capability, and a 1,000 bed capacity. Although it is recognized that a critical deficiency exists, the two hospital ships will not fully remedy the deficiency as currently advertised.31 With MPS-1 available for use, and MPS-2 and MPS-3 deploying in 1985 and 1986, respectively, a serious medical sustain- ability gap exists. Even after the hospitals ships are deployed, they will be employed only as general purpose ships, rather than being dedicated to the MPS Program. The hospital ships could also be used for a variety of non-MPS Program purposes: support of the amphibious MABs; support of the U.S. Army; and support of the State Department (e.g., civil relief).32 Additionally, and notwithstanding the non-availability due to ship maintenance or closure time to the area of operations, there will be only two hospital ships and three MPS MABs. The hospital ships will not remedy the medical support deficiency even if there were no other operations occurring other than three committed MPS MABs. Human life is the issue in this category. The implication of this category on the Marine Corp's sustainability is very unfavorable. The last sustainability category is maintenance support. The ground equipment maintenance concept appears to be well thought out and capable of continuing the maintenance on the employed equipment that was previously carried out by the contact maintenance teams.33 The intermediate maintenance activity (IMA) maintenance of aircraft, however, could pose severe problems in the sustainability of an MPS MAB. The FY 1985 Ship Construc- tion, Navy budget funds for two aviation logistics support ships (T-AVBs) in FY 1985 and 1986.34 Both ships will be available in FY 1986 for use as IMAs.35 Like the hospital ships, the T-AVBs will be two in number and will be general purpose ships. Also, a short support gap will exist until these ships are deployed. Unlike medical support which provides limited in-theater medical, surgical and bed support, aviation intermediate maintenance is almost non-existent without the T-AVBs. Although a 10 day fly-in support package will be available to each MPS MAB, the capability is very limited and does not cover the T-AVB closure gap.36 Additionally, two T-AVBs in support of three MPS MABs, or perhaps a multitude of other general purpose missions, is a risky situation. An essential member in the Marine Air-Ground Task Force could cause some serious sustainability problems if the MPS MABs were employed independently as is advertised as a distinct capability.37,38 Like the second and third sustainability categories, this category also poses some potentially serious sustainability problems to the Marine Corps. Force Projection Capability Force projection is not considered to be a military capability as are readiness and sustainability. Rather, force projection is an extension of the two latter concepts through combat units being prepared (readiness) and ade- quate resources being available (sustainability). Forces are then airlifted or sealifted into potentially hostile or hostile areas. The MPS Program offers two major force projection implications--a new capability (though partially offset) and an increased amphibious lift capacity. On the contrary, the Program offers two negative force projection implications--the survivability of the in-transit MPS Squadron and the survivability of the MPS Squadron and MAB as they phase ashore. The MPS Program has clearly provided the Marine Corps with a new and unique capability. The capability can be expressed in a number of ways. First, the MPS Program provides for a pre-emptive response, both in an unopposed landing and in a reinforcement.39 Second, the Program allows for an MPS MAB to administratively "marry-up" with the corresponding MPS Squadron outside the Amphibious Objective Area, board amphibious ships, and conduct an amphibious assault.40 Third, a substitute to an amphibious assault is offered as an option;41 and fourth, the Program offers the Nation with a "diplomatic trump card."42 This new, unique capability can also be expressed in terms of flexibility. The MPS Program allows for either the multi-theater stationing of separate MPS squadrons or for the massing of all three MPS squadrons.43 Moreover, the capability can be expressed as, unlike NTPF, world-wide in scope.44 Insofar as a capability is concerned, the MPS Program has had a powerful implication on the Marine Corps' force projection means. Similarly, the MPS Program has had a significant impact on the Marine Corps' amphibious lift capacity. However, there is a significant negative aspect involved. Two events called the attention of the Nation to the strategic mobility shortfall--the Iranian hostage crisis and the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan.45 As was previously discussed, the NTPS Program, the ENTPS Program, the NTPF, and now the MPS Program were designed to mitigate this strategic mobility shortfall. The MPS Program is recognized as not a substitute for amphibious shipping but an addition to it. In reality, the Program has clearly been a substitute. As early as 1976, the Brookings Institution highlighted the Marine Corps' strategic mobility dilemma. Brookings showed that the Marine Corps could only deploy three Battalion Landing Teams (BLTs) (two with helicopters and one without) in 1976. Brookings also stated that the 1976 Department of Defense long-term goal was to be able to deploy 1 1/3 Marine Amphibious Forces (MAFs) on amphibious shipping by FY 1979.46 Nine years later, the FY 1985 Ship Construction, Navy budget projects that amphibious shipping will be available by FY 1994 to lift only the assault echelons of a MAF and a MAB.47 The advantage of the increased amphibious lift capacity realized by the MPS Program is partially offset by the deleterious effect of the premise that the MPS Program is a substitute for the amphibious shipping that the Marine Corps desperately needs. The first negative implication that the MPS Program has had on the Marine Corps' force projection capability is the survivability of the in-transit MPS Squadron. A critical period exists between the time an MPS squadron is deployed in peacetime and the time the Navy provides in-transit security after the decision is made to employ an MPS MAB. Research has not disclosed any indication that direct protection will be afforded to the unarmed MPS squadrons during this critical period. Although an MPS squadron has a good communications system and falls under the "umbrella of seapower," it is extremely vulnerable without direct protection.48 After the decision is made to employ an MPS MAB, the fleet commander's initiating direc- tive will contain operations security guidance.49 Damage or loss of an MPS squadron could occur if this aspect of fleet survivability is not resolved. The second negative implication on the force projection capability is the survivability of the MPS Squadron and MAB as they phase ashore. The Commandant of the Marine Corps has implemented measures such as anti- terrorist training for deploying units.50 Despite the awareness of terrorist activities, there appears to be a "benign" mindset attendant to those individuals involved in the MPS Program. The landing of an MPS squadron and an MPS MAB will, except in a few remote cases, be administrative. The landing will be in a non-hostile environment but it will not necessarily be benign. Terrorists can quickly turn a non-hostile environment into a hostile one. OH 4-11, Maritime Prepositioned Deployment, provides guidance for security during the previously-discussed, vulnerable build-up/marry-up phase. This mindset needs to be changed and operational security must be thoroughly understood and practiced if survivability is to be maintained during the critical phasing ashore of the MPS Squadron and MAB. Conclusion The MPS Program has had some positive implications on the Marine Corps' readiness, sustainability, and force projection capability. In terms of readiness, there have been three significant implications: MPS MAB flexibility, selected reserve unit rapid mobilization capability, and MPS MAB rapid employment capability. In the area of sustainability, favorable implications exist in supplies (less ammunition and missiles) and equipment; ammunition and missiles; medical supplies and equipment, and medical support; and ground equipment maintenance support. Lastly, two positive force projection capability implications exist. First, a new and unique capability is realized through the MPS Program. Second, the Marine Corps' amphibious lift capacity has been enhanced. Unfortunately, the positive implications of the MPS Program are offset by several significant negative implications. Three major negative implications exist in the area of sustainability. First, limited ammunition and missile availability could cause critical problems to an employed MPS MAB. Second, the current hospital ship non-avail- ability and the questionable T-AH hospital ship employment concept are definite sustainability detractors. Third, the IMA maintenance support concept, similar to the T-AH hospital ship problem, is fraught with risk. Two additional negative implications also exist in the force projection capability area: the survivability of the in-transit MPS Squadron and the survivability of the MPS Squadron and MAB as they phase ashore. At present, only cursory attention has been directed to these two force projection capability areas. A combination of any of the sustainability and force projection shortfalls, or perhaps only one of these shortfalls, could offset all of the positive aspects of the MPS Program and jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission of an employed MPS MAB. The Commandant of the Marine Corps has advertised the MPS Program as "a significant new dimension in mobility, sustainability, and global response."51 If the Marine Corps wants to be able to stand behind this claim, then a discerning investigation of the MPS Program needs to be accomplished. The implications of the MPS Program on the Marine Corps' readiness, sustainability, and force projec- tion capability need to be thoroughly investigated in order to identify and correct the Program's shortfalls. FOOTNOTES 1Maxwell O. Johnson, Maj, USMC, "The Role of a Mari- time Based Strategy," Marine Corps Gazette, 68 (February 1984), p. 65. 2Dov S. Zakheim, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Policy/Resources), "The Role of Amphibious Operations in National Military Strategy," Marine Corps Gazette, 68 (March 1984), p. 36. 3David B. Brown, LtCol, USMC (Ret), "MPS: An Evolving Entity," Marine Corps Gazette, 69 (January 1985), pp. 34-35. 4R. F. Itnyre, LtCol, USMC, Special Assistant on Amphibious and Prepositioning Matters (SAAPM), Head- quarters, U.S. Marine Corps, personal interview about MPS Program delivery schedules and equipment costs, Washington, D.C., 19 February 1985. 5Paul X. Kelley, Gen, USMC, "CMC FY-85 Posture State- ment," Marine Corps Gazette, 68 (April 1984), p. 33. 6Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (JCS Pub. 1), p. 229. 7Brown, p. 37. 8U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Defense Guidance FY 1985-1989, p. 56. 9U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Development and Education Command, The Marine Corps Reserve, IP 15-1, (Quantico, March 1983), p. 37. 10Ibid., p. 37. 11U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Development and Education Command, Maritime Prepositioned Deployment, OH 4-11, (Quantico, June 1984), p. 1-2. 12U.S. Marine Corps, Headquarters, Marine Corps Capabilities Plan (Washington, D.C., 13 July 1984), p. II-2-37. 13CNO/CMC, Memorandum of Agreement on Joint USN/USMC Concept of Operations for Maritime Pre-Positioninq, dated 14 April 1983, p. 2. 14U.S. Marine Corps, Maritime Prepositioned Deploy- ment, p. 1-1. 15Brown, p. 35. 16Andrew Jampolar, Capt, USN, "A Central Role for Naval Forces?...to Support the Land Battle," Naval War College Review, 37 (November-December 1984), p. 11. 17JCS, JCS Pub. 1, p. 358. 18U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Capabilities Plan, pp. I-2-12,13. 19CNO/CMC, Memorandum of Agreement on Joint USN/USMC Concept of Operations for Maritime Pre-Positioning, p. 3. 20U.S. DOD, DOD Defense Guidance FY 1985-1989, p. 56. 21Itnyre. 22F. Marutolla, Programs and Financial Management Branch (LPF), Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, telephone interview about Procurement, Marine Corps costs of MPS Program, Washington, D.C., 13 February 1985. 23William Z. Dement, Maj, USMC, Ammunition/Missile Branch (LMG), Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, telephone interview about ammunition, Washington, D.C., 4 March 1985. 24Keith H. Stivers, LtCol, USMC, Weapons Branch (LMW), Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, personal interview about Hawk missile, Washington, D.C., 19 February 1985. 25Robert Halliday, Maj, USMC, Weapons Branch (LMW), Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, personal interview about Stinger missile, Washington, D.C., 19 February 1985. 26Stivers. 27Thomas Shirk, Capt, USMC, Weapons Branch (LMW), Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, personal interview about Dragon and TOW missiles, Washington, D.C., 19 February 1985. 28John Lawrence, LCdr, USN, Logistics Plans and Policy Branch (LPP), Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, personal interview about hospital ships, the Fleet Hospital Program, and the Rapidly Deployable Medical Facility, Washington, D.C., 19 February 1985. 29Dan Bergstrom, Maj, USMC, Amphibious Requirements and Prepositioning Programs Branch (PONP), Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, personal interview about amphibious and MPS Program shipbuilding, Washington, D.C., 19 February 1985. 30Itnyre. 31Zakheim, p. 39. 32Lawrence. 33U.S. Marine Corps, Maritime Prepositioned Deployment, p. 3-3. 34Bergstrom. 35Itnyre. 36David B. Brown, LtCol, USMC (Ret), "MPS: Aviation Combat and the TAVB," Marine Corps Gazette, 69 (February 1985), p. 67. 37U.S. Marine Corps, Advanced Amphibious Study Group, "Improving Operational Capabilities: Maritime Prepositioning and MAGTF Operations," (Quantico, 1 February 1983), p. I-1. 38CNO/CMC, Memorandum of Agreement on Joint USN/USMC Concept of Operations for Maritime Pre-Positioning, p. 2. 39Brown, "MPS: Aviation Combat and the TAVB," p. 64. 40Zakhein, p. 36. 41Jampolar, p. 11. 42Johnson, p. 67. 43CNO/CMC, Memorandum of Agreement on Joint USN/USMC Concept of Operations for Maritime Pre-Positioning, p. 2. 44U.S. Marine Corps, Advanced Amphibious Study Group, p. I-1. 45Michael J. Cross, Maj, USMC, "Sealift and Our Amphibious Capability," Marine Corps Gazette, 68 (March 1984), p. 40. 46Martin Binkin and Jeffrey Record, Where Does the Marine Corps Go From Here?, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1976), p. 26. 47Bergstrom. 48T.M. Witte, LCdr, USN, Strategic Sealift Division, Military Sealift Command Operations Branch (OP 422D), Chief of Naval Operations, telephone interview about Navy protection of MPS squadrons, Washington, D.C., 1 March 1985. 49U.S. Marine Corps, Maritime Prepositioned Deployment, pp. 2-2,3. 50Kelley, p. 48. 51Kelley, p. 33. BIBLIOGRAPHY Bergstrom, Dan, Maj, USMC, Amphibious Requirements and Prepositioning Programs Branch (PONP), Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Personal interview about amphibious and MPS Program shipbuilding, Washington, D.C., 19 February 1985. Binkin, Martin, and Record, Jeffrey. Where Does the Marine Corps Go From Here? Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1976. Brown, David B., LtCol, USMC (Ret). "MPS: An Evolving Entity." Marine Corps Gazette, 69 (January 1985), 34-39. Brown, David B., LtCol, USMC (Ret). "MPS: Aviation Combat and the TAVB." Marine Corps Gazette, 69 (February 1985), 64-67. Chief of Naval Operations/Commandant of the Marine Corps. Memorandum of Agreement on Joint USN/USMC Concept of Operations for Maritime Pre-Positioning. Washington, D.C.: 14 April 1983. Cross, Michael J., Maj, USMC. "Sealift and Our Amphibious Capability." Marine Corps Gazette, 68 (March 1984), 40-45. Dement, William Z., Maj, USMC. Ammunition/Missile Branch (LMG), Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Telephone interview about ammunition. Washington, D.C., 4 March 1985. Halliday, Robert, Maj, USMC. Weapons Branch (LMW), Head- quarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Personal interview about Stinger missile. Washington, D.C., 19 February 1985. Itnyre, R. F., LtCol, USMC. Special Assistant on Amphibious and Prepositioning Matters (SAAPM), Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Personal interview about MPS Program delivery schedules and equipment costs. Washington, D.C., 19 February 1985. Jampoler, Andrew, Capt, USN. "A Combat Role for Naval Forces?...to Support the Land Battle." Naval War College Review, 37 (November-December 1984), 4-12. 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Washington, D.C., 19 February 1985. Stivers, Keith H., LtCol, USMC, Weapons Branch (LMW), Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Personal interview about the Hawk missile. Washington, D.C., 19 February 1985. U.S. Department of Defense. Department of Defense Defense Guidance FY 1985-1989, 1 March 1983. U.S. Marine Corps. Advanced Amphibious Study Group, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. "Improving Operational Capabilities: Maritime Prepositioning and MAGTF Operations." Quantico, Virginia, 1 February 1983. U.S. Marine Corps. Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Capabilities Plan. Washington, D.C., 13 July 1984. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and Education Command. The Marine Corps Reserve, IP 15-1. Quantico, Virginia, March 1983. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Maritime Prepositioned Deployment, OH 4-11. Quantico, Virginia, June 1984. Witte, T.M., LCdr, USN, Military Sealift Command Operations Branch (OP 422D), Strategic Sealift Division, Chief of Naval Operations. Telephone interview about Navy protection of the MPS squadrons. Washington, D.C., 1 March 1985. Zakheim, Dov S., Assistant Secretary of Defense (Policy/ Resources). "The Role of Amphibious Operations in National Military Strategy." Marine Corps Gazette, 68 (March 1984), 35-39
