The All-Weather Attack Aircraft For The '90's: A-6F or A-18(AW)? CSC 1985 SUBJECT AREA Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: THE ALL-WEATHER ATTACK AIRCRAFT FOR THE '90'S: A-6F OR A-18 (AW)? I. Purpose: To determine which of the two candidates proposed to replace the A-6E can best meet the requirements for a successful follow-on all-weather attack aircraft. II. Problem: Although the A-6E has performed well since its introduction in the 1960's, it now has serious problems that will require its replacement by the early 1990's. The A-6F and A-18(AW) have been proposed as replacement candi- dates. Both aircraft have advantages and disadvantages that must be weighed to determine which aircraft should be chosen. III. Data: The current all-weather attack aircraft, the A-6E, has developed serious problems due to its age. The airframe, designed in the '50's and built mainly in the '60's, is reaching service-life limits, has severe mainte- nance and structural problems, and lacks the speed and maneu- verability to survive modern air defenses. Its ability to perform the all-weather mission of sea control and power projection in bad weather and in darkness against the projected threat is questionable. Two candidates, the A-6F and the A-18(AW), have been proposed to replace the A-6E. They have been compared in the following three requirement areas: pay- load and range, maintenance and availability, and survivabil- ity. In the payload and range area the A-6F was the better aircraft, able to carry more ordnance at any given distance with a maximum range beyond that of the A-18(AW)'s. Main- tenance and availability was a definite advantage of the A-18(AW)'s. It not only improved on the A-6E's performance in this area, but easily met maintenance goals set by the Navy for the next generation aircraft that-the A-6F would not be able to achieve. Finally, the A-18(AW) scored the highest in the most important area--survivability. The A-6F would not improve in the vital characteristics of speed, maneuverability and ease of detection. The A-18(AW) makes the quantum leap in those factors required to meet the projected improvements in enemy air-defense capabilities. IV. Conclusions: The A-6E must be replaced by the early 1990's. A comparison of the two replacement candidates shows that they both have advantages and disadvantages. However, not only does the A-18(AW) perform better in two out of the three requirement areas, but it performs best in the key area of survivability. The A-18(AW)'s ability to survive the pro- jected threat makes it the only choice to replace the A-6E. V. Recommendation: The aircraft selected to replace the A-6E should be the A-18(AW). THE ALL-WEATHER ATTACK AIRCRAFT FOR THE '90'S: A-6F OR A-18(AW)? OUTLINE Although the A-6F out performs its rival in some ways, the replacement for the A-6E should be the A-18(AW) because this aircraft scores the highest in the one area that counts the most--survivability in the high-threat environment of the 1990's. I. Reasons for replacing the A-6E A. Service life projections B. Maintenance and structural problems C. Inability to meet advances in threat technology II. Requirements for the replacement aircraft A. All-weather attack mission B. Payload and range characteristics C. Maintenance characteristics D. Survivability characteristics III. Description of the A-6F A. Payload and range characteristics B. Maintenance characteristics C. Survivability characteristics IV. Description of the A-18(AW) A. Payload and range characteristics B. Maintenance characterisitics C. Survivability characteristics V. Comparison of the two aircraft A. Payload and range characteristics B. Maintenance characteristics C. Survivability characteristics LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES Table Page 1. Aircraft Comparison Factors 18 Figure 1. Projected Number of Available and Required A-6E's and KA-6D's 3 2. Anti-Air Defense Coverage 10 3. Interceptor Aircraft Radar Capability 10 THE ALL-WEATHER ATTACK AIRCRAFT FOR THE '90'S: A-6F OR A-18(AW)? The choice of a replacement aircraft for the durable A-6E has developed into a serious contest between two quality adversaries. What started as a quiet search within the all-weather attack community for a follow-on aircraft for the '90's has developed into a slug-fest being fought out at the top levels of the Department of Defense. With mil- lions of dollars at stake, both Grumman and McDonnell Douglas have jumped into the fray with expensive campaigns touting the capabilities of the two replacement candidates--the Grumman A-6F and the McDonnell Douglas A-18 All Weather(AW). News of this growing battle has begun to appear in the media. In a Defense Week article, Navy Secretary John F. Lehman was said to favor the A-6F, only using discussions about the A-18(AW) as "a stick with which to prod Grumman into trim- ming its cost projections." (2:7) However, this same article went on to say that many other sources in the Pentagon felt that the all-weather A-18 was better because it could be produced for a considerably lower cost. (2:12) Finally, there has even been disagreement between the Navy and the Marine Corps, with the Navy supporting the A-6F while the Marine Corps pushes for the A-18(AW). (5:4) This type of disagreement and controversy is cer- tainly nothing new in aircraft procurement, with the fight over the B-1 bomber program being the most recent case. However, even though it may be painful to those involved, there can be no argument that healthy competition has proven to be a potent antidote to overpricing, and can also result in a rapid advance in technology. What must be avoided is getting wrapped up in rhetoric and making a choice before all of the facts are known. Choosing a new aircraft because the manufacturer is located in your home district may be enough of a reason for a congressman, but it is incumbent upon those in the Defense Department involved in this type of decision to have a total understanding of the situation. Why a replacement is needed, what requirements the replace- ment must meet, and the ability of the replacement candi- dates to meet those requirements must be researched and documented. Only then can a choice be made and justified to both those who have to approve the choice and those who have to fly the chosen product. Before any discussion of a new attack aircraft takes place, it should first be determined why the one already operating must be replaced. The A-6E has supplied the need for an aircraft that can attack targets in bad weather or darkness since the early '60's. Unfortunately, it has devel- oped some serious problems that make its future use highly doubtful. The problem that initiated the search for a new aircraft was the simple fact that the Navy and the Marine Corps are running out of A-6E's. Their numbers have been decreasing over the past several years as attrition has exceeded production. The attrition rate is projected to be 2.6% of operational aircraft per year, or a loss of about six aircraft every year. (5:1) In some years fund- ing was not provided to meet that attrition rate, and in other years the actual attrition rate exceeded the pro- jected rate. The year 1983 was an unfortunate example of this when eight aircraft were lost. This decrease in total aircraft available has already resulted in the primary aircraft authorization for A-6 squadrons being cut from 12 to 10 aircraft in order to maintain the current squadron structure in the Navy and the Marine Corps. (3:32) Without this reduction the services would have had to shut down operational units that are needed to meet fixed commitments. Far more serious than this gradual decrease in num- bers is the problem looming on the horizon for the major- ity of the A-6's now in service. Most of the present force was built during the 1960's. Although the weapons systems in those aircraft have been updated several times, the air- frames are still basically the same. All airframes have a prescribed service life at the end of which they must be retired. Since the A-6's service life is approximately 23-25 years, block obsolescence can be expected during the 1990's when close to 25 aircraft per year will have to be retired. (6:3) Figure 1 gives a graphic picture of require- ments versus total aircraft available by year, clearly show- ing a need for some type of action by the 1990's. Click here to view image Another drawback affecting the A-6E is its contin- uing maintenacne and strctural problems. Repairs and maintenance on the A-6E are much more difficult and time- consuming than on newer aircraft designed and built with modern avionics and engines. (6:3) Also, because of ad- vances in technology, items designed in the '50's and built in the '60's cannot match the durability of comparable items being designed and built today. A quick comparison of the A-6E's and the much newer F/A-18's maintenance man-hours per flight hour (MMPFH) over a six-month time period in 1984 shows it took 52.1 MMPFH to keep the A-6E flying compared to the F/A-18's 25.9 MMPFH. (4:1) While this may be somewhat like comparing apples and oranges, the fact that it takes double the effort to keep the older A-6E flying cannot be ignored. The greater the MMPFH, the greater the operating costs will be and the lower the the mission capability. This certainly proves true as a further comparison shows the A-6E running a 62% mission-capable rate compared to the F/A-18's much better 75% rate. (5:XIX) The A-6E is also experiencing significant structural problems. Cracks in the wings resulting from a shorter than predicted fatigue life caused by the aircraft being operated at heavier weights and with higher load factors than were originally anticipated, have resulted in the grounding of 176 of the 344 total A-6E's in the inventory. Many of the remaining aircraft have been G-limited to prevent further cracks, and service-life estimates have been reduced from the 4,400 hours originally projected for the wings to 2,000- 3,000 hours. It will require six months to rewing each A-6 at a considerable cost to the government. (11:21) While this wing problem is the most dramatic and visible of the A-6E's maintenance and structural problems, there are numer- ous others as can be expected in any piece of machinery close to 20 years old. Although the problems mentioned already are serious enough, it could be argued that buying new A-6E's would solve many of these problems and that there is no need to spend money on the research and development of another air- craft. However, before one jumps to that conclusion, the A-6E's biggest handicap must be examined--its inability to survive on the modern battlefield. The sophistication and proliferation of surface-to-air weapons, the increasing capabilities of eastern block fighters, and the increasing ability of radars to detect aircraft at greater ranges and lower altitudes will make the battlefield of the 90's a much more difficult place on which to operate and survive than the one that the A-6E was originaly designed to meet. This was brought home in a forceable manner during the most recent use of the A-6E in combat, the bombing raid of 4 Dec- ember 1983 on Syrian positions in Lebanon. While some pilots claimed that the targets and attack time were inappropriate for the A-6E, (18:A5) many other critics pointed out that the aircraft's lack of speed and agility in the combat area exposed it to high risk and resulted in the loss of an A-6E, (6:2) This lack of speed and agility will penalize the A-6E no matter what the target or attack time happens to be, and will certainly be a bigger factor if, unlike Lebanon, the enemy force can call on the full spectrum of Soviet air-defense capabilities. The A-6E has other survivability drawbacks beyond this lack of combat speed and its limited maneuverability when loaded with ordnance. Most of its fuel is carried in non- self-sealing tanks, its flight controls are hydraulic and have less redundancy than newer aircraft, and its self- defense capability is limited by the lack of air-to-air radar and ordnance stations dedicated to air-to-air mis- siles. The A-6E is forced to rely on passive defenses such as electronic warning and countermeasures, night or bad weather attacks and evasion. All of these methods are quickly losing their effectiveness as anti-air defenses improve. (6:3) What is needed is an aircraft capable of performing the all-weather attack mission and surviving in the face of the projected threat of the '90's. The A-6E has done a fine job in the past, but it can no longer meet that challenge. Determining which aircraft can best meet that challenge is a difficult task, so the requirements that will be used to compare the two replacement candidates being considered must be carefully chosen. Fair requirements that all com- bat aircraft must meet can be broken down into the following three broad areas: payload and range, maintenance and avail- ability, and survivability. (5:5) Since it has been deter- mined already that the A-6F and A-18(AW) are the only candi- dates, (6:1) a new aircraft will not be built from scratch. Therefore, what is expected in each of these three areas will only be described in general. Exact standards that must be met do not need to be set, as the characteristics of the A-6F and A-18(AW) have already been established in contractor proposals. These characteristics can be easily compared in the three areas to determine which aircraft will best perform the all-weather attack mission for the Navy and the Marine Corps. Before the requirement areas are described, it is essential to have a firm understanding of the all-weather attack mission. To a large extent, mission dictates the requirements that each individual type of aircraft must meet. The all-weather attack mission includes many differ- ent tasks which are emphasized differently by the Navy and the Marine Corps. The Navy describes the all-weather mis- sion as the destruction of moving and fixed sea and land targets in all-weather conditions and during darkness. (6:1) While land targets are included in that mission statement, the Navy naturally puts more emphasis on sea control tasks such as anti-ship operations, open-ocean interdiction, aerial mining, surface surveillance and aerial refueling mis- sions. (3:34) On the other hand, the Marine Corps' number one task is to conduct close air support under all-weather conditions. While the capability to deploy and operate from aircraft carriers is mentioned, the majority of Marine tasks deal with power-projection missions such as supporting the infantry scheme of maneuver and destroying land tar- gets. (9:36-37) Although difficult to combine all these tasks into one mission statement, it is clear that the replacement aircraft will have to operate at sea and over land, be capable of performing a variety of high and low altitude attacks during conditions of darkness and bad weather, and operate in both the sea control and power- projection roles. The requirements established for the replacement aircraft must reflect that mission in order for the aircraft selected to successfully perform all required tasks. The first requirement area that will be used to compare the two candidates is fairly straight forward. Payload and range characteristics are closely related and inter-dependent on each other since the more ordnance loaded on any given aircraft, the less its range. This is either because more fuel is burned to move a heavier aircraft, or because exter- nal gas tanks are removed to make room for more ordnance. Although not equally important to every task, as some can be accomplished with less ordnance or at closer ranges, payload and range are obviously important factors when the overall mission of an attack aircraft is examined. (5:5) Without the ability to carry a large amount of ordnance a long way, the capability to perform many of the power-projection tasks is greatly reduced. Much of the criticism directed towards the AV-8 attack aircraft was due to its lack of range and restricted ordnance load. Of course, if only payload and range were used as criteria for selecting the replacement aircraft, a large blimp might win the compe- tition. Payload and range must be tempered by the other characteristics needed in a successful attack aircraft. The second requirement concerns an aircraft's main- tenance and availability characteristics. These charac- teristics are equally important to any task the all-weather attack aircraft is expected to carry out. No matter how else an aircraft performs the mission, if it is unreliable and sitting in the hangar the majority of the time it is going to be a liability, not an asset. Included within the overall aspects of maintenance and availability are five factors that will be used to compare the two candi- dates. (5:5) First, is deck spotting, or the amount of parking space an aircraft occupies. One deck spot is equal to a certain amount of space on an aircraft carrier deck and is standard throughout the Navy. Smaller is better in this case, allowing more aircraft to fit into any given main- tenance work area, and allowing aircraft to be moved in and out of hangar spaces with greater ease. Second, is mean flight hours between failures (MFH/BF) which states how long an aircraft can fly before a major component fails. In the Navy's specification sheet for the testing of a replacement aircraft, a goal of 1.1 hours was set. (8:9-3) For compar- ison the A-6E is currently running a very poor .6 hours MFH/BF. (5:XIX) Third, is maintenance man-hours per flight hour (MMPFH), or the amount of work required so that an aircraft can fly for one hour. The lower this figure, the more the aircraft will be available and the less mainte- nance personnel that will be required. The Navy's specifi- cation sheet calls for 23 MMPFH (8:1O-3), which is a large improvement over the A-6E's current 52 MMPFH. Fourth, is an aircraft's mission-capability rate which indicates the per- centage of aircraft that will be capable of performing the mission at any given time. This is normally a direct reflec- tion of MFHBF and MMPFH. The worse those two are, the lower the aircraft's mission capability. Last, is the fatigue life of an aircraft which gives the amount of hours an air- craft can fly before it is retired and is a strong indica- tor of the useful life of the aircraft. (5:5) The third and final requirement area is also the most important. Survivability characteristics of an aircraft will determine if it is a success or a failure. An attack aircraft that can go 2,000 miles, carry 20 tons of ordnance, and is 100% mission capable is worth nothing if it cannot penetrate enemy defenses. The replacement aircraft must be able to survive in a severe-threat environment as, other than the Maverick missile, there is little indication of development of effective standoff weapons in the U.S. (10:1538) Additionally, certain power-projection missions, such as deep interdiction, will always require penetration of enemy defenses. Unfortunately, penetration is becoming increasingly more difficult as anti-air weapons improve. The increasing effectiveness of today's anti-air defenses can be easily seen by comparing the Middle East Wars of 1967 and 1973. During the first war no Israeli Air Force Aircraft were lost to surface-to-air missiles (SAM's). In the second war over 100 Israeli combat aircraft were lost, mainly due to the rapid improvements in SAM's and detection capabili- ties. (14:25-26) Since that time, Soviet forces have added at least four new SAM's to their inventory and are expected to soon add four more, which will further saturate the battlefield. The illustration on the next page gives some idea of the coverage that an attack aircraft must penetrate. Click here to view image There are several survivability characteristics that can reduce losses during penetration. Speed and maneuver- ability, especially in the target area, are vital. (15:1) Increased speed during penetration and egress reduces the amount of time the aircraft is exposed to the threat. Improved maneuverability allows the aircraft to better evade the threat once it is encountered. Also important is the aircraft's ability to remain undetected by radar and visual optics. (15:1) This is primarily a function of size and is best reflected in an aircraft's square-meter radar-reflection value and an aircraft's overall square-footage value. Both numbers are arbitrary values that are useful for comparing one aircraft against another. Finally, the attack aircraft of tomorrow will require an effective self-defense capabil- ity. (15:1) Air superiority is something that U.S. forces can no longer take for granted. The capability to engage and defeat enemy fighter aircraft will become very important if the U.S. becomes involved in a conflict with the Soviet Union which now has over 3,200 air defense interceptors. (7:37) While survivability in combat must remain a somewhat sub- jective evaluation without an actual war to use as a test, the characteristics described will give a firm indication of an aircrat's ability to survive in the high-threat envi- ronment of the '90's. The A-6F and A-18(AW) must now be examined for the var- ious characteristics in each comparison area. Obviously, since neither aircraft has been built, great reliance must be placed on contractor proposal information. While this type of information must always be taken with a grain of salt, the information is grounded in reality as both candi- dates are growth versions of aircraft already flying. The A-6F is an improved version of the A-6E, and the A-18(AW) is a two-seat version of the F/A-18. Additionally, the manufac- turers must be prepared to produce the chosen aircraft with the capability to perform as they advertise to maintain future credibility. Therefore, the information given in the following sections can be used with confidence to compare the two aircraft. The Grumman A-6F is proposed to be a two-seat, sub- sonic, multi-purpose, all-weather attack aircraft. It will be a greatly improved version of the current A-6E with new communications equipment, a more powerful and versatile radar, new instruments and avionics, better engines, and numerous other maintenance-related improvements. (1:3-6) The A-6F will retain the A-6E's impressive payload and range characteristics, carrying up to 17,000 pounds of ordnance on seven external stations. Depending upon its weapon and fuel payload distribution, the aircraft will be able to attack targets with two 1,000 pound bombs more than 700 nautical miles from its base, or carry twelve 1,000 pound bombs at shorter ranges. The A-6F's external stations could also be configured to carry fuel tanks instead of ordnance, enabling the aircraft to act as an airborne tanker with up to 13,000 pounds of give-away fuel. (5:XIX and XXIII) It will be able to carry a larger payload over a longer range than any other carrier-based aircraft. This heavy payload and long range are important advantages for an attack air- craft and give the A-6F a high rating in this requirement area. The A-6F's predicted performance in the maintenance and availability area will be enhanced by using state-of- the-art avionics equipment and engines to solve many of the A-6E's reliability problems. However, improvements will be made in only three of the five comparison factors used in this area. No space will be gained as deck spotting will remain 1.5, since the aircraft will be the same size as the A-6E. Also, the fatigue life of the A-6F will decrease to 8,800 hours from the A-6E's 9,800 hours, resulting in a shorter service life. On the plus side, Grumman is fore- casting an improvement in MMPFH of 10-15 manhours by pro- jecting that the A-6F will require only 35-40 MMPFH. While this is an improvement on the A-6E, it still falls short of the Navy's goal of 23 MMPFH. The A-6F will also improve the A-6E's MFH/BF, increasing it from .6 to .8 hours; but this again falls short of the Navy goal of 1.1 MFH/BF. The improvements in these two areas will result in the mission- capability rate increasing to 70% from the A-6E's current 62%. (5:XIX) The Navy figures this increase in mission capability will produce the operational equivalent of 24 more aircraft due to better availability. (6:6) These improvements give the A-6F a significant advantage over the A-6E, but they do not meet the maintenance goals set by the Navy. This must be considered a disappointing lack of growth for the next generation attack aircraft and gives the A-6F a neutral rating in this comparison area. In the third requirement area, survivability, there is some disagreement on the A-6F's capabilities. In a letter to Navy Secretary Lehman, Mr. Peter Oram, a Grumman Vice President, claims the A-6F can achieve acceptable surviva- bility in high-threat areas by using a combination of stand- off weapons, electronic counter-measures, and support from other aircraft. (16:1) This claim may be true for some all- weather attack missions, but not all of them. As discussed earlier, the development and availability of standoff weapons is questionable, and penetration of enemy airspace will still be needed to perform all of the required missions. What the A-6F will correct are several of the A-6E's obvious defi- ciencies in the survivability area. It will have a much improved Halon fire detection and extinguishing system, an isolated fuel system with self-sealing tanks and lines, and an improved electronic-deception capability. (1:5) More importantly, the A-6F will improve its air-to-air defense by adding an air-to-air radar capability and two additional wing ordnance stations that will carry Aim-9 Sidewinders without detracting from the aircraft's payload. This will give the A-6F a limited ability to engage enemy fighters.(6:6) However, the A-6F will not improve on the other vital survivability characteristics--speed, maneuverability, and ease of detection. The A-6F already described as vulnerable because of its slow speed and lack of maneuverability, can only do 450-460 knots and pull 4.8 G's in the combat zone. The A-6F, because it weighs more, will actually be a few knots slower and pull only 4.6 G's, making it easier to hit than the aircraft it is supposed to replace. Also, no im- provement will be made in the A-6F's square-meter reflective value and overall square-footage value as the aircraft is still the same shape and size. (5:XIX) While some improve- ments will be made in the survivability area by the A-6F, it will not be improved in the characteristics that are vital for survival in the high-threat environment of the '90's. Due to its slow speed, lack of maneuverability, and large size, the A-6F will still be an easy target to detect and hit. While the improvements made will enable the A-6F to take more of a beating than the A-6E, its ability to survive against improved anti-air weapons must be questioned. This lack of a large improvement in survivability, compared to a quantum improvement in enemy anti-air capabilities, gives the A-6F a negative rating in this area. The competition for the A-6F is the McDonnell Douglas A-18(AW). It is proposed to be a two-seat, supersonic, multi- purpose, all-weather aircraft. It will be a modified version of the single-seat F/A-18 designed to perform both air-to-air and air-to-surface missions without any changes to the air- craft other than loading a different type of ordnance. Although the manufacturer initially claimed the ability to carry up to 19,000 pounds of ordnance over very short ranges, (3:39) more reasonable comparison figures would be six 1,000 pound bombs at ranges up to 600 nautical miles, or eleven 1,000 pound bombs at shorter ranges. (5:XIX) Tests flown by VMFA-314 during 1983 in the F/A-18, while carrying 6,000 pounds of ordnance, demonstrated that air- craft's ability to reach a range of 600 nautical miles. Those tests deflated much of the criticism about the F/A-18's lack of range and give a good indication of the A-18(AW)'s eventual range and payload capabilities. (12:29) The A-18(AW) will also be able to act as an airborne tanker with up to 6,700 pounds of give-away fuel. (5:XXIII) Because the aircraft must make some trade-offs in payload and range to retain speed and maneuverability advantages, it will not be able to carry the amount of ordnance over ranges that the A-6E currently can. It will have the payload and range capability to perform the majority of all-weather attack missions successfully, but it must be given a neutral rating in this performance area since it will not match the current, very high capabilities of the A-6E. The A-18(AW)'s predicted performance in the maintenance and availability area shows significant improvement in all five comparison factors used in this area. Design features that will help accomplish this include the F/A-18's current capability of engines that can be replaced by a four-man crew in less than thirty minutes, extensive use of built-in-test to reduce ground support equipment, state-of-the-art avionics installed in quick-access compartments, and a host of other maintenance-related features. (3:17) Deck spotting will improve from the A-6E's 1.5 to 1.2, providing more space for additional aircraft and allowing easier movement aboard an aircraft carrier. The fatigue life of the aircraft will be close to 12,000 hours, almost a 20% improvement in life span. Its MMPFH will be approximately 21 hours, which is lower than the Navy's specification goal and better than a two- fold improvement on the A-6E. The A-18(AW)'s MFH/BF will triple the A-6E's current rate and, at a predicted rate of one failure every two hours, almost double the Navy's re- quirement for this factor. Naturally, the above improvements will result in a high mission-capability rate, climbing from the A-6E's 62% to 75%. (5:XIX) This high mission-capability rate will mean that the same number of A-18(AW)'s will provide many more available aircraft at any given launch time than a similar number of A-6E'S. The A-18(AW) shows a large im- provement in the maintenance and availability area compared to the A-6E, and also exceeds maintenance goals set by the Navy for the replacement aircraft. Its projected performance gives the A-18(AW) a very high rating in this requirement area. Survivability, like reliability, will be designed into the A-18(AW) from the start. Strong emphasis has been given to this area to allow the A-18(AW) to carry out its mission effectively and return to base safely. The aircraft will have separate self-sealing fuel tanks and lines, multiple self-sealing hydraulic systems, smokeless engines separated by a titanium keel, and state-of-the-art fire detection and extinguishing systems. (3:18) Since it will retain most of the outstanding air-to-air capability of the F/A-18 (a small reduction in speed and maneuverability can be expected), its ability to engage and defeat enemy fighters will be excellent. The A-18(AW)'s air-to-air capabilities will enable it to act as a force multiplier in situations that dictate a heavy em- phasis on air defense. With the proper training and the capa- bility to easily switch to the air-to-air mode, an A-18(AW) attack squadron can quickly become an all-weather fighter squadron. (17:1) This is a significant advantage in a high-threat scenario where U.S. fighters are likely to be greatly out-numbered at the beginning of the fight. The reason that the A-18(AW) makes such an excellent air-to-air weapon is its predicted performance in the other vital survivability characteristics. It will be much harder to detect either visually or on radar than the A-6E. The A-18(AW) will have a square-meter reflective value of only .3 compared to the A-6E's reflective value of one, and its overall square-footage value will be only .4, half of the A-6's. At a projected rating of 5.9 G's when loaded with ordnance, it will pull over one G more than the A-6E, about a 20% improvement in maneuverability. However, where the A-18(AW) will really shine will be in its speed. Being a supersonic aircraft, its top speed will be well beyond the A-6E's. More importantly, it will be able to reach 540 knots when loaded with ordnance in the combat zone, almost 100 knots faster than the aircraft it is replacing. (5:XIX) The A-18(AW)'s survivability characteristics improve greatly on the A-6E's, with significant improvements that will match the improvements made by Soivet anti-air defenses. The A-18(AW)'s performance in this comparison area earns it a high rating. With the characteristics of the two replacement can- didates described, their capabilities can now be matched against each other in the three comparison areas. It is recognized that many other factors impact on a decision to buy an aircraft, not the least of which are political pres- sures and cost factors. However, to choose the best air- craft available, competition in the three areas discussed should be used. These areas include vital, straight-forward requirements that any replacement aircraft should meet. Table I, on the following page, is a quick review of the factors used to compare aircraft. Click here to view image The A-6F edges the A-18(AW) in the performance area of payload and range. This is one area in which the A-6E still excels. The upgraded A-6F will retain those capabilities which earned it a high rating in this area. It will be able to strike targets over 700 nautical miles away, compared to the 600 nautical miles that will be the A-18(AW)'s maximum strike range. The A-6F will also carry more ordnance than the A-18(AW) at any given distance, although it must be noted that the A-18(AW) will carry only a thousand pounds less at the shorter ranges. Additionally, the A-6F will retain a decisive edge in air-refueling capabilities with a give-away amount almost twice the A-18(AW)'s. This figure would be tempered somewhat by the A-18(AW)'s higher availa- bility rate. This rate would allow more tanker aircraft to *(5:XIX) be launched to make up for the decrease in fuel carried by individual aircraft. (3:50) The bottom line, however, is that the A-6F will go further and carry more than the A-18(AW). Its advantage up to 600 nautical miles will not be significant, but past that range it will be the only choice. The A-18(AW) is superior in the next comparison area of maintenance and availability. The A-6F will improve on the A-6E's dismal performance, but this improvement will not be enough to meet Navy maintenance and availability goals established for the next generation aircraft. This pre- vented the A-6F from getting any rating higher than neutral in this area. In comparison, the A-18(AW) earned a very high rating. It will not only significantly out perform the A-6E in all five comparison factors, but it will exceed the Navy goals. Its impressive MMPFH, MFH/BF and mission capa- bility will result in numerous savings in personnel and maintenance costs, and also result in many more aircraft being available at any given time. While the A-6F will im- prove on the current aircraft, the A-18(AW) will easily ex- ceed both the A-6E and the goals set for the next generation aircraft in the maintenance and availability area. This accomplishment gives the A-18(AW) a decided advantage in this field. In the key area of survivability, the A-18(AW) is once again clearly the better aircraft. The A-6F will make some improvements where it can, but the basic airframe will still be the same as the A-6E. This fact will restrict it from making any improvements in the vital areas of speed, maneu- verability and detection avoidance. Its lack of any improve- ment in these areas gives the A-6F a negative rating in this very important area, resulting in serious doubts about its ability to perform any all-weather mission that calls for penetration of high-threat defenses. The A-18(AW), on the other hand, will make the large advance in survivability factors required to penetrate the projected high threat and return safely. Its dramatic improvement in the major survivability factors gives it a very high rating in this comparison area. The A-18(AW) will be hard to detect and will penetrate and egress quickly. If it is detected, it will have the maneuverability and speed to evade the threat or defend itself against an air-to-air enemy. These fac- tors give the A-18(AW) a large edge over the A-6F in the ability to carry out the all-weather attack mission. It has been established that the Navy and the Marine Corps must find a replacement aircraft for the all-weather A-6E. The A-6E is not only reaching the end of its usable life span, but its ability to survive in the high-threat environment of the 1990's is extremely limited. Its replace- ment should be an aircraft that can best meet the perform- ance, maintenance, and survivability characteristics re- quired to ensure an aircraft can successfully perform the all-weather attack mission. Two aircraft, the A-6F and the A-18(AW), have been identified as the replacement can- didates and examined for the various factors in each require- ment area. Both aircraft have features that can be used to make a case for that particular aircraft being chosen as the replacement. The A-6F is a strong contender. It is based on a proven design that enables it to retain the advantage in the important ability to carry weapons a great distance. However, Admiral Lenox, in a statement to Congress during the F/A-18 range controversy, put that kind of ability into proper context when he made this comment: ...there is a danger, in my judgement, in comparing aircraft on only the maximum range for a single mission or sortie. Readiness is a state of health...it requires repeated trips to the target area, the ability to have other aircraft available, to turn them around quickly, and to survive in a combat area. (13:38) The A-6F does hold an edge in the payload and range area over the A-18(AW), but it falls far short of the A-18(AW) in the maintenance and availability field. The A-18(AW) is clearly superior in the ability to make repeated trips without components failing (MFH/BF), to have more aircraft available at any given time (mission capability rate), and to be turned around quickly for another launch (deck spotting and MMPFH). However, the final point in the Admiral's statement is the key one. The ability to survive in the combat area is the final test. Without this ability the mission will not be accomplished, no matter how well an aircraft excells in other areas. Although the A-6F outer- forms its rival in the range and payload area, the replace- ment for the A-6E should be the A-18(AW) because this air- craft scores the highest in the one area that counts the most--survivability in the high-threat environment of the 1990's. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. A-6F All Weather Attack System. Grumman Aerospace Corp- oration, December 1983. 2. Barnard, Richard. "All Weather F-18 Assessed for Navy, Marine Squadrons." Defense Week, 21 May 1984, pp. 7 and 12. 3. Bauer, W.D., LtCol, USMC, and J.H. Rullifson, Cdr, USN. The RA-18...Expanded Roles for the Hornet. Center for Advanced Research, Naval War College, June 1980. 4. Carr, William D., LtCol, USMC. "A-6E Tram/F/A-18 Comparisons." Department of Aviation Route Sheet, Washington, D.C.: October 19, 1984. 5. Carr, William D., LtCol, USMC. "Should the A-6E be Replaced or Continue to be Procured?" Department of Aviation Briefing Paper, Washington, D.C.: 1984. 6. Cooper, Bert H. Library of Congress Congressional Research Service. Tactical Aviation: A-6E Attack Aircraft (Weapons Facts). Issue Brief 84022, Washing- ton, D.C.: April 16, 1984. 7. Department of Defense. Soviet Military Power. Washing- ton, D.C.: April 1984. 8. Department of the Navy. Detail Specification for Model A-6E Upgrade Aircraft Weapon System All-Weather Low- Altitude Carrier-Based Two-Place Attack (u). Naval Air Systems Command, Washington, D.C.: March 15, 1984. 9. Department of the Navy. Headquarters United States Marine Corps. Marine Aviation, FMFM 5-1. Washington, D.C.: 1979. 10. "Derivative Fighter Decision Due." International Defense Review, 16 (1983), 1538. 11. "Fatigue Problem Grounds 187 A-6E's, KA-6D's." Aviation Week and Space Technology, 7 January 1985, p. 21. 12. Field, Peter. "F/A-18 Hornet-Best Little Strike Fighter Around." Amphibious Warfare Review, 1 (July 1983), 24-29. 13. Gilson, Charles. "F/A-18 Hornet-One Aircraft, One Man, Multiple Missions." International Defense Review, 14 (1982), 31-38. 14. Hansen, James. "The Development of Soviet Tactical Air Defense." International Defense Review, 14 (1982), 23-27. 15. Marine Air Weapons Training Squadron-One, Yuma, Arizona. Message concerning follow-on all-weather attack aircraft to CMC, Unclassified lines only, 062350 Sep 83. 16. Oram, Peter B., Senior Vice President, Grumman Aero- space Corporation, Bethpage, New York. Letter concern- ing A-6F, October 31, 1983. 17. Strohsahl, G.H., Captain, USN. "F/A-18 All Weather Var- iant." Pre-Brief for VAdm J.B. Busey, USN, Washington, D.C.: April 19, 1984. 18. Wilson, George C. "Navy Secretary Urges High-Tech Bomb Tactic," The Washington Post, February 23, 1985, Section A., p. 5.
