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Operation Steadfast: The United States Army Reorganizes Itself

 

CSC 1985

 

SUBJECT AREA Topical Issues

 

 

 

 

USMC Command and Staff College April 1985

Quantico, VA

 

Operation STEADFAST: The United States Army

Reorganizes Itself

 

JAMES A. BOWDEN

MAJ, IN

USA

 

 

The history of the United States Army is more than the stirring

 

accounts of battles, campaigns, leaders, and soldiers arrayed in a

 

chronology or divided along any analytical azimuth. There is another

 

history, the history of the Army in peace, which is very important.

 

What happens in the peacetime Army helps to determine the performance

 

of the Army in war. The study of the Army as an organization is a

 

vital to understanding the Army in war or peace. The Army as an org-

 

anization is at once a federal bureaucracy and a professional Ameri-

 

can institution. Consequently, the study of the Army requires an in-

 

terdisciplinary approach to fully appreciate the complexity of the

 

organization and the interrelationships of simulataneous endogeneous

 

and exogeneous forces at any point in history. Therefore, the hist-

 

ory of the Army is to a surprisingly large degree the history of the

 

organization as much as it is the history of the relatively brief,

 

violent, and vitally important encounters which are the raison d'etre

 

for the organization.

 

A study of the organization may begin with structure and proced-

 

ures, political relationships and the environment of the era. The

 

structure and processes, informal and formal, sociological and

 

political, help to determine who shall "run" the uniformed,

 

professional Army. This is very important despite the outward

 

appearances today of a great, green machine and consumer of vast

 

resources. This was important in the pre-World War II Army which

 

appeared to be so many far-flung small outposts peopled by polo-

 

players and dedicated students of war alike.

 

People really make the difference in the Army as an organizat-

 

ion. The organizational structure and procedures which help to

 

select the uniformed leaders of the service are subject in turn to

 

the influence of the leaders. We have come full circle. The

 

idiosyncratic influences in this mass organization are as vital as

 

the individual pyschological factrors are in combat. Individuals in

 

key positions leave an imprint on the organization which is difficult

 

to quantify but impossible to ignore. The success and failure of the

 

Army on the battlefield and its ability to help deter war is

 

predicated on the Army as an organization of structure, procedures,

 

and people in peace. Obviously, politics intervene in the vertical

 

spectrum of war from individual combat to global strategy. Yet,

 

success and failure at all levels is influenced by the Army, as it

 

is, in peace. Operationally, battlefield success in war in the

 

tactical levels from squads to the theater operations is largely a

 

function of the Army, rather than politics of any stripe. Also, the

 

environment of a period of time affects all aspects of the

 

organization. The history of the United States Army as an

 

organization parallels the growth of the modern, American, democratic

 

state.

 

This paper is a detailed account of the Army Reorganization of

 

1973, Operation STEADFAST. It examines how, given the structure,

 

procedures, people and environment, a very important reorganization

 

was conceived and managed by the professional officers of the

 

institution which led to real changes in the structure, procedures.

 

and people of the organization.

 

Once the decision was made to begin the withdrawal of U.S.

 

Forces from Vietnam in the Summer of 1969, the Army was a bureaucracy

 

facing a classic situation of organizational retrenchment. Yet, the

 

obvious external pressures on the Army as an institution from every

 

direction in American society and from every other national

 

institution did not dictate the timing nor the exact shape of the

 

changes in the organization. It seems that the direction of change

 

would necessarily be a reduction in size and resources for some years

 

to follow.

 

However, the Army Reorganization of 1973 was the first of three

 

reorganizations, which as a sum became a fundamental reformation of

 

the organization. The change was profound because, unlike the

 

changes of the turn-of-the-century Root Reforms or the 1942

 

Reorganization (or the incremental changes in iterations of the

 

National Security Act of 1947), this reorganization was internally

 

directed with the assistance of the civilian leadership in the

 

Department of the Army. Whereas, all former reorganizations required

 

the alliance of a very activist Secretary and a reform-minded

 

contigent of officers to battle the entrenched bureaucratic interests

 

of another alliance of officers and their allies in Congress. This

 

reorganization is more limited in scope than the Prussian reforms of

 

the early 19th Century because it did not involve the society at

 

large, nor did it explicitly reform the principal organizations

 

within the Army. It was a reform which preserved and enhanced the

 

opportunities for the professional officer corps to maintain its

 

autonomy in the management of the organization within the framework

 

of civilian control over the military. This was an absolutely

 

essential prerequisite to marshal the human and material resources

 

needed to rebuild the Army after the political debacle in Vietenam

 

and the disintegration of the Army which was away from the fight.

 

The United States Army in 1985 was painfully rebuilt from the

 

uniformed mob of the early 1970's by the investment of the hard work

 

of the officer and non-commissioned officer corps and the infusion

 

of some fine young people and carefully managed resources. The key

 

individuals to set the stage for the rebuilding of a national

 

institution were Army Generals William E. DePuy, Bruce C. Palmer Jr.,

 

and Creighton W. Abrams Jr. This is an examination of the first step

 

in the reformation, Operation STEADFAST.

 

 

 

BETWEEN REORGANIZATIONS - A TURBULENT DECADE

 

1962-1972

 

 

WE TRAINED HARD -- BUT IT SEEMED THAT EVERY TIME WE WERE

 

BEGINNING TO FORM UP INTO TEAMS, WE WOULD BE REORGANIZED. I WAS TO

 

LEARN LATER IN LIFE WE TEND TO MEET ANY NEW SITUATION BY

 

REORGANIZING, AND THE WONDERFUL METHOD IT CAN BE FOR CREATING THE

 

ILLUSION OF PROGRESS WHILE PRODUCING CONFUSION, INEFFICIENCY AND

 

DEMORALIZATION.

 

PETRONIUS ARBITER, 66 AD

 

 

 

Petronius Arbiter's quote was a beloved epigram for many Army

 

officers as the Army reorganized itself during the throes of the

 

traumatic withdrawal from Southeast Asia. The epigram was facile

 

enough to vent the frustrations of staff offficers pushing papers in

 

the Pentagon. Yet, as the epigram gave no indication of the real

 

training and expertise of someone called Petronius Arbiter, the Army

 

Reorganization of 1972-73 could appear to be much less than it really

 

was. Actually, Petronius Arbiter was the chronicler of the

 

pornographic carryings on of the court of the Emperorer Nero. (1) In

 

fact the Army Reorganization of 1972-73 was more than a shuffling of

 

the housekeeping duties of the stateside Army to meet the pressures

 

of the Executive Branch and the Congress to drastically reduce after

 

a war. The Army's Reorganization was an extraordinary, internally-

 

directed move to develop improved control of the management of the

 

Army and, consequently, increase the autonomy of the Army under the

 

direction of the professional, uniformed officers. The turbulent

 

decade since the last major reorganization of the Army in 1962 (based

 

on the Hoelscher Committee's Project 80 Study) had not sown the seeds

 

for the need to reorganize as much as it had created the opportunity

 

for major changes.

 

The "reforms" and reorganization brought about during the

 

McNamara era threatened the autonomy of the Army more than any other

 

Service. When the analysts for the Secretary of Defense sought to

 

develop a programmatic approach to manage the department under the

 

direction of a chief executive officer, the Army was ill-prepared to

 

report its assets in personnel, equipment and finances. It was

 

equally at a loss to explain how all the pieces of the puzzle of

 

commands, combat units and headquarters' staffs fit together to man,

 

equip, train and employ an "Army". Since the 19th Century the Army

 

had been a series of semi-autonomous bureaus, which were loosely

 

federated as the "staff", and the units spread out in the field,

 

which were the "line". The organizational history of the Army is the

 

story of conflict between the line and the staff. The opportunities

 

for conflict are neither accidental nor neglected anachronisms. As a

 

member of the Executive Branch, the War Department (the Department of

 

the Army), the United States Army (the regulars), the Army of the

 

United States (the National Guard and the conscripts), and the United

 

States Army Reserve (the Reserves - also part of the Army of the

 

United States) have their perogatives in the management of resources

 

and their internal autonomy written into the legislative concrete of

 

the United States Code. The internal bureaucratic struggles of the

 

organization are fanned in the fires of the budgetary process.

 

In the decade of the Sixties the Office of the Secretary of

 

Defense (OSD) was about to abrogate the autonomy, divided as it

 

was, of the Army. The war in Vietnam diverted the attention of OSD

 

and the Army to the pressing details of present-tense crisis after

 

crisis. The Army Staff in Washington and the line organizations in

 

the Continental United States (CONUS) did an excellent job in

 

preparing and prosecuting a distant war with minimal support from

 

mobilization. The fighting Army which was built after the post-

 

Korean doldrums from the latter 1950's through the 1968 may have been

 

the finest, professsonal Army fielded by the United States. The Army

 

as a bureaucracy, however, was in different shape. Since OSD had

 

taken the steps to bring the Services in line with the programmatic

 

approach of major U.S. corporations, the Army existed in the note-

 

books of organizations and commands on the shelf behind Secretary

 

Mcnamara's desk. (2) The sum of the notebooks, theoritically, was

 

the Army "program". Every change within the Army which changed

 

resource allocations had to be approved through the OSD. The Army,

 

staff and line, was becoming the handmaiden to the notebooks. While

 

the daily attention of the Army and OSD were focused on Vietnam

 

several steps were taken which would allow the Army to move towards a

 

thoughtful reorganization. The start of the withdrawal from Vietnam

 

in the Summer of 1969 created the pressures which plunged the Army

 

headlong into the pursuit of reorganization. The events which

 

prepared the way for reorganization included the following.

 

 

 

The Haines Board - 1966. The Report to the Army Board to Review

 

Officers Schools in February 1966 concluded the Continental Army

 

Command had too much to do. The report recommended further study to

 

reduce the span of control for the Continental Army Command. (3)

 

Interestingly enough the report was chaired by the officer who would

 

later oppose such a reorganization as the CONARC Commander, General

 

Ralph E. Haines.

 

The Brown Board - 1967. The Brown Board was an in-depth

 

examination of the Army's equipment management from Company-level to

 

Headquarters, Department of the Army. The Board recommended changes

 

in the Army's logistical procedures and organization. (4)

 

The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel - 1970. The Report to the President

 

and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense was an

 

across the board review of the Department. Mr. Gilbert H. Fitzhugh,

 

Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the Metropolitan

 

Life Insurance Company, headed a bi-partisan panel which produced 133

 

recommendations for Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird on July 1,

 

The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA or the "Vice") Gen. Bruce

 

Palmer Jr. attended a briefing with Secretary Laird, Mr. Fitzhugh and

 

members of the Blue Ribbon Panel on 19 July. When Gen. Palmer

 

briefed the Army's General Staff Council the following day he was

 

critical of the Panel's recommendations. He did not agree with the

 

Panel's recommendations for "a single program budget structure". (5)

 

Secretary Laird had taken the responsibility for the Army programs

 

and budget from the notebooks behind the desk and given it back to

 

the Army. However, the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff (AVCSA or the

 

"A-Vice") Lieutenant General (Lt.Gen.) William E.DePuy was aware of

 

the need to review the Army's organization and management. The

 

coming reduction in the size of the Army in the post-Vietnam era

 

would put new pressures on the Army. If the Army failed to influence

 

the process of cutting back, then it might have been reduced and

 

controlled with a capriciousness and completeness far exceeding

 

McNamara's notebooks. Consequently, the appointment of the Blue

 

Ribbon Panel in 1969 was the impetus for the Chief of Staff, Gen.

 

William E. Westmoreland, the Vice Chief, Gen.Palmer, and the

 

Asssistant Vice Chief, Lt.Gen. DePuy to appoint an ad hoc study group

 

from the Force Planning Analysis Directorate of the Army Staff to

 

look at the organization of the Department of the Army.(6) Lieutenant

 

Colonel (Lt.Col.or LTC) Winthrop Whipple, Jr., an operations analyst

 

and LTC John V. Foley, a cost accountant, spent the summer of 1969

 

studying the Army organization. They reported to Lt.Gen. DePuy and

 

formally briefed Gen. Westmoreland at the end of September. The

 

Whipple-Foley "Pillot Study on DA (Department of the Army)

 

Organization" was a tightly controlled review of organizational

 

problems and the especific personalities involved. Dissemination of

 

any information outside of the Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of

 

Staff (OAVCSA) was expressly forbidden. The report was an outline of

 

the problems of organization, management, and personalities. The

 

report found Continental Army Command (CONARC) had too many roles and

 

missions. The Combat Developments Combat (CDC) was a command without

 

resources. The Army Material Command (AMC) did not have life-cycle

 

control for the equipment management. Personnel management was

 

fragmented among three agencies: OPO (Office of Personnel

 

Operations), TAGO (The Adjutant General's Office), and DCSPER (Deputy

 

Chief of Staff for Personnel). (8)

 

Based on this report, Gen. Westmoreland appointed Major General

 

David S. Parker as the chairman of a Special Review Panel (SRP) on

 

Department of the Army organization on 30 September 1969. "The

 

Parker Panel" had a charter to report recommendations to the problems

 

identified in the Whipple-Foley Pilot Study by July 1970. The panel

 

would not look at tactical organizations. The panel would closely

 

examine the U.S. Continental Army Command, the Combat Developments

 

Command, the Army Material Command, and the Headquarters Department

 

of the Army Staff (the Army Staff or ArStaff). (9)

 

 

 

The Parker Panel. Maj.Gen. David S. Parker selcted LTC Richard W.

 

Thompson as the Executive Officer for the panel. LTC Thompson came

 

from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS)

 

at the end of 1969. (10) The "Initial Terms of Reference" were ap-

 

proved by Gen. Westmoreland to give guidance for the panel. The pan-

 

el was to investigate the roles of the U.S.Continental Army, the sub-

 

ordinate numbered armies of the continental United States (CONUSA),

 

the Military District of Washington, the Combat Developments Command,

 

the Class II Activities reporting directly to the Department of the

 

Army Staff, and the Headquarters, Department of the Army Staff. (11)

 

The panel was to examine the agencies to look at the organization and

 

management of the resources to run the Army. Specifically, the panel

 

would look at the allocation of functions within the Army Staff and

 

the major CONUS commands. It would look at proposals for alternative

 

organization and management practices which would help the Army

 

operate with reduced resources. The panel would recommend procedures

 

to carry out the changes.

 

Maj.Gen. Parker chose 13 officers from a pool of 80 to serve on

 

the panel by January 1970. One civilian, a budget expert from the

 

Deputy Chief of Staff of Logistics (DCSLOG), was also a member. The

 

panel interviewed widely throughout the headquarters in Washington

 

and the installations across the United States. It interviewed some

 

retired officers. Additionally, the panel interviewed representat-

 

ives of major civilian industries (for example IBM and Xerox).

 

The questions to the military commanders and to the captains of

 

industry were to the point. Executives were asked about the level of

 

decision-making, systems management (horizontal) vs. functional

 

management (vertical), and the growth and use of ad hoc committees.

 

Staff issues of organization, function and growth were addressed.

 

The Army leadership wanted to know if the shape of management

 

information systems was a function of the techniques of management,

 

the nature of the business, or the degree of supervision by a board

 

of governors. It was especially important to see how organizations

 

dealt with the related functions of research and development,

 

material procurement, storage, sale, rental, maintenance, and

 

elimination of obsolete equipment. (12)

 

The panel developed 41 "Revised Problem Statements" by 28 April

 

1970. Seven of the problems were with the Army Staff, one was with

 

CONARC, and the other thirty-three were with the functional

 

responsibilities shared by the Army Staff and the three major

 

commands in the United States; CONARC, Combat Developments Command

 

(CDC), and the Army Material Command (AMC). (13) Many of the

 

complaints dealt with the procedures used on the staff to complete

 

the paperwork for any "staff action". The overlapping

 

responsibilities among the staff lead to endless "turf fights".

 

The Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff (OAVCSA) was

 

a source of controversy. The panel reviewed the functions of the

 

OAVCSA in detail. The OAVCSA had been intended as a stop-gap measure

 

which would work its way out of a job in two years as it addressed

 

the issues driven by OSD. (14) After General Johnson retired in

 

1968, the new Chief of Staff, Ben. William E. Westmoreland, brought

 

in his team with Gen. Bruce C. Palmer,Jr. as the Vice Chief of

 

Staff. The new Assistant Vice-Chief was William E. DePuy, Lt Gen.

 

DePuy redefined the duties of the A-Vice to solve some of the more

 

pressing problems of the Army Headquarters. The A-Vice got involved

 

in the need to reach budgetary compromises somewhere below the

 

absolute pinnacle of the organization. More of the efforts of the A-

 

Vice and the importance of the office as a means to intervene in the

 

Army Headquarters will be discussed later. The "off-line" office of

 

the OAVCSA allowed the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army

 

to have a very high-popwered office for fire-fighting the issues of

 

crucial importance to the organization without becoming bogged down

 

in the details of day-to-day responsibilities The Parker Panel

 

reported, "In spite of the announced trend toward decentralization

 

within the DOD, the requirement for rapid and detailed response is

 

likely to require a continuing capability such as is provided by the

 

OAVCSA." (15)

 

The Parker Panel determined that the responsibility for

 

management doctrine for all the non-tactical management of

 

information systems was fragmented among the Army Staff. The Army

 

needed to closely examine how its many systems were operating, how

 

they were regulated and interacted, and how they contributed to the

 

management of the Army. The Army Authorization Documents System

 

(TAADS) is the paperwork which shapes, supports, directs, and

 

authorizes the Army at one level of authority below public law. An

 

Army does not move on its stomach, it moves on its Regulations

 

and Tables. TAADS had become too slow to keep up with the Army in

 

transition. The Army had not standardized its Automatic Data

 

Processing Systems (ADPS) communications. (16)

 

There were many cooks and no chef for material development. The

 

Office, Chief of Research and Development (OCRD) did not have the

 

sole authority in the research and developoment field. The

 

criticisms in the area of material development were not restricted to

 

OCRD. The problems were an indictment of the entire system by the

 

users of any piece of equipment in the Army, the Army Staff, the DOD,

 

and the Congress. The AMC, CDC, OCRD, ODCSOPS, and the OAVCSA were

 

involved in the research, development and acquisition of material for

 

the Army. General Chesarek, the former A-Vice and the Commanding

 

General of AMC at the time, wanted to put another Deputy Chief of

 

Staff on the Army Staff. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Material

 

Systems (DCSMS) would consolidate many of the functions spread across

 

the staff and among the major commands. (17) This would help to

 

solve the problem of running all requirements for materiel through

 

the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force development (ACSFOR).

 

Furthermore, the Army lacked the technically competent officers to

 

manage a weapon or piece of equipment from its conception through

 

development until it is phased out of the inventory. The career

 

development of officers needed for the material life-cycle management

 

was not receiving enough attention.

 

The Combat Developments Command (CDC) was criticized because it

 

was a major command without any clout. CDC should have been the

 

organization for the Army to develop the doctrine to guide the

 

employment of its many weapons systems and units across the spectrum

 

of combat. There were overlapping responsibilities between CONARC

 

and CDC for doctrinal publications. There was inadequuate

 

interaction between the doctrine developer and the schools. Yet, the

 

CDC was lacking in manpower and financial resurces. Consequently,

 

the officer in CONARC who was supposed to monitor the training in one

 

of the Army schools had no corespondent at CDC who could write

 

doctrine. The officer at CONARC would have to fill both functions.

 

The organization had problems remaining a conceptual research-

 

oriented organizationl. Finally, there was overlapping assignment of

 

logistics doctrine responsibilitiies. (18)

 

The Parker Panel noted problem areas in Army force development.

 

Since CDC did not contribute to the development of doctrine and

 

material requirements, it could not effectively contribute to the

 

Planning and Programming aspects of the budget cycle. CONARC did not

 

incorporate new doctrine into its training and educational programs.

 

Logistics doctrine was split among DCSLOG, AMC, and the CONARC

 

schools . There was criticism of the Combat Developments Experiment

 

Center (CDEC) at Fort Ord and the Mobile Army Sensor System, Test and

 

Evaluation Center (MASSTER) at Fort Hood. The Army Staff needed to

 

develop force mobilization plans which integrated logistics. The

 

Parker Panel also noted the problems for ACSFOR, and the ACSFOR

 

directorates for Aviation, Air Defense, and Nuclear, Biological and

 

Chemical Operations. (19)

 

The personnel side of the house illustrated the problems of

 

fractured responsibilities among the Deputy Chief of Staff for

 

Personnel (DCSPER). The Adjutant Generl's Office (TAGO), and the

 

Office of Personnel Operations (OPO). Problems existed in personnel

 

actions (promotions, efficiency reports), procurement of personnel,

 

civil schooling, personnel records, separations, and Reserve forces

 

records administration. (20)

 

The Army Staff could not agree on the role of the Comptroller.

 

The functions of the Comptroller had not changed since its inception

 

in 1948, but the management environment had changed significantly.

 

The Comptroller is the director of Army budgeting, but the A-Vice and

 

the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development (ACSFOR) had a

 

great deal to do with the programming end of programming and

 

budgeting. The Comptroller's role in cost analysis needed

 

definition. The flow of automated data reports should be included in

 

the duties of the Comptroller, yet much of the control of the

 

management of information systems was being controlled by the OAVCSA.

 

Finally, the Comptroller had dual responsibilities to the Chief of

 

Staff and to an Assistant Secretary of the Army. The Army had to

 

decide how to allocate increasingly scarce resources. (21)

 

The Continental Army Command (CONARC) suffered from its wide

 

span of control. It had four major functions of individual education

 

and training, force development, force employment, support and

 

service. The support and service mission, alone, entailed

 

the management of 42 Army posts in the U.S. Furthermore, there was

 

the layering of the Continental Army (CONUSA or subordinate numbered

 

armies) between CONARC and the installations. The Military District

 

of Washington as a separate headquarters under CONARC jurisdiction

 

was another issue. (22)

 

Maj.Gen. Parker briefed the A-Vice, Gen. DePuy, on 15 May. Gen.

 

DePuy noted that programming was not one of the workload indicators

 

which generated the staff workload statistics. The result did not

 

reflect the true workload for the army Staff. (23) He also noted

 

that programming guidance came from the Secretary of the Army. Since

 

the OAVCSA was doing the troubleshootiong for the Secretary, any

 

agency given more responsibility for programming would have to work

 

with the OAVCSA. DePuy asked the Panel to look at the integrator-

 

coordinator role of the OAVCSA.

 

Lt.Gen. DePuy "insisted that technology drives doctrine." (24)

 

The responsibilitly for doctrine should be assigned to a new Deputy

 

for Material Systems (DCSMS). He believed that CONARC let the

 

schools develop doctrine independently. Consequently, he wanted to

 

put all of the schools, including the Army War College, under the

 

Combat Developments Command. The schools should be taken away from

 

CONARC because "CONARC has too great a workload, is too big, too

 

broke, and ultra-conservative ... too much routine and too much to

 

do." (25) "If CONARC is to look at relative costs and installation

 

management, they can't do anything else. They can't be the

 

instrument for getting new ideas into young leaders." (26) DePuy

 

recognized the problem of dividing training and education, yet he

 

still wanted to give CDC control of the curriculum in the Army

 

schools.

 

The briefing for the Vice, Gen. Palmer, was 21 May. Ben. Palmer

 

did not want to move the Weapons Systems Analysis (WSA) out of the

 

OAVCSA because the WSA gave the Office of the Chief of Staff an

 

"independent review capability." (27) Furthermore, he did not want a

 

DCSMS with a WSA to be "in bed" with the Army Material Command (AMC).

 

He preferred to transfer WSA functions to ACSFOR instead of DCSMS.

 

Gen. Palmer was against moving the installation functions from

 

the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics to the Chief of Engineers.

 

Also, he did not want to reduce the Assistant Chief of Staff for

 

Communications-Electronics from a General Staff to a Special Staff

 

Agency. (28)

 

Gen. Palmer noted that Gen. Westmoreland looked at CONARC "as

 

the largest and perhaps most important command in the Army" which

 

will be important in the next ten years "in maintaining a modern Army

 

and in developing new concepts." (29) Furthermore, the Army War

 

College should remain under the Army Headquarters. The Military

 

District of Washington should be transferred from CONARC to the Army

 

Headquarters. Gen. Palmer approved releasing the proposals to the

 

Army Staff, but he did not want the Commanding Generals of CONARC or

 

CDC to be informed until "we get guidance from Gen. Westmoreland."

 

(30) Maj.Gen. Parker gave an "interim" report to Generals DePuy,

 

Palmer and Westmoreland on 2 June 1970. Gen. Westmoreland directed

 

Maj. Gen. Parker to "solicit comments from the Major Commands,

 

arrange for a special session with the Army Staff before final

 

decisions, and to inform the Secretary of the Army of the panel

 

proposals as soon as possible." (31) Gen. Westmoreland was

 

interested in the concept of a DCSMS and requested further

 

development of the concept. He wanted to generally retain CONARC "in

 

its present configuration", although he was willing to put the

 

Command and General Staff College and the Army War College under the

 

Combat Developments Command. He noted that the CDC could be made

 

responsible for doctrine and curricula and place all officer schools

 

under CDC. In most cases Gen. Westmoreland did not want to change

 

things. For example, he did not want to split CONARC into two

 

separate commands. When Maj.Gen. Parker met with Gen. Westmoreland

 

again on 6 June, the Chief directed the Special Review Panel submit

 

its complete report with recommendations and alternatives on 31 July.

 

The Chief would appoint a panel of Senior officers under Gen. Palmer

 

to consider two issues. Gen. Palmer would look at the CONARC and CDC

 

reorganization proposals to create a Combat Doctrine and Schools

 

Command and to create a Deputy Chief of Staff for Material Systems.

 

The rest of the panel report would be sent to the Army Staff for

 

normal staff procedures of review. (32)

 

Maj.Gen. Parker briefed the General Staff Council on 16 June

 

1970. The key officers of the Army Staff gave the report mixed

 

reviews and many different suggestions. Secretary of the Army

 

Stanley Resor, UnderSecretary Thaddeus R. Beal and the Assistant

 

Secretaries were briefed on 18, 20, and 24 June. Mr. Resor was not

 

anxious to transfer the Weapons Systems Analysis from the OAVCSA to

 

the new DCSMS. He wanted to retain an independent office to review

 

and analyse the big budget programs of modernizing the Army. Mr.

 

Resor did not endorse or reject the Special Review Panel report.

 

Since the Chief gave guidance to staff the report through normal

 

channels, the required written comments began to surface. The first

 

comments came from Colonel John B. Wadsworth, Jr. the Deputy

 

Secretary to the General Staff for Staff Action Control. He

 

supported some of the proposals for a new Deputy Chief of Staff for

 

Materiel Systems, for trnasferring personnel management to a Person-

 

nel Command, and for the management of information systems by the

 

Comptroller. He opposed redesignating the A-Vice as the Director of

 

the Army staff and placing him directly between the principals of the

 

Army Staff and the Chief.

 

Gen. Palmer held a special Senior Officer's meeting on 24 July.

 

The meeting's agenda was limited to the issues of creating a Combat

 

Development and Schools Command and a Deputy Chief of Staff for

 

Materiel Systems. The Commanding General of CONARC, Gen. Woolnough,

 

was the most adamant in his opposition to the recommendations of the

 

panel. He argued that CONARC was responsible for individual and unit

 

training. Furthermore, all of the units, training centers, and

 

schools support CONARC's training mission. Additionally, Gen.

 

Woolnough urged the Combat Developments Command be returned to CONARC

 

to compliment the training mission. (33) He believed the

 

organizational strength was found in keeping together the Command

 

which accounted for 45% of the Army's military personnel. Dividing

 

functions would only serve to push disagreements up to the Army Staff

 

when they could be resolved at CONARC Headquarters.

 

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development (ACSFOR), Lt.

 

Gen. Weyand, strongly opposed the proposal for a DCSMS. He contended

 

the problem was not the need for a single manager of all the

 

resources. He questioned the entire Special Review Panel report on

 

omitting the "why". A DCSMS would not solve the problems raised in

 

the report. The problem was the requirements. Thus, the real problem

 

was to determine what the real needs of the Army were. (34)

 

In July the Parker Panel submitted its recommendations to Gen.

 

Westmoreland. The Panel proposed the following major changes for the

 

Army Staff: Consolidation of the responsibilities for materiel

 

development and acquisition into a Deputy Chief of Staff for Materiel

 

Systems (DCSMS), by involving the merger of CRD with DCSLOG PEMA

 

(Procurement, Equipment and Missilies, Army) operations;

 

consolidation of personnel functions in OPO by transferring it to

 

personnel functions from the Adjutant General's Office and DCSPER

 

into a new organization called the Army Personnel Center (APC);

 

eliminating or transferring to AMC certain operating functions of

 

DCSLOG; eliminating the Office of the Chief of Support Services and

 

transferring its functions to DCSLOG and the Army Personnel Center

 

(35) The office-of the A-Vice would keep its hand in the budget and

 

management of information systems. The Weapons Systems Analysis

 

office in the OAVCSA would move to the new DCSMS. In the field the

Military District of Washington (MDW) wouold be moved from CONARC to

 

Headquarters, Department of the Army. The Combat Developments

 

Schools Command (CDSC) would be created by combining the Combat

 

Developments Command, Project MASSTER at Fort Hood and the Combat

 

Developments Experiment Center (CDEC).

 

Gen. Westmoreland met with the Parker Panel on 24 September.

 

Gen. Westmoreland was not ready to move ahead to create a DCSMS since

 

"a clear case had not been presented, and the staff is split wide

 

open." (36) He ordered further study of the issues around developing

 

a single Deputy Chief of Staff for Materiel Systems. At a briefing

 

on 10 October Maj.Gen. Parker attempted to answer some of the

 

questions about DCSMS. He outlined the differences on the issue of

 

the DCSMS as being a split between those who felt the change was

 

inadequate to the problem and those who felt the change would put

 

too much power in the hands of a single principal on the Army Staff.

 

He also indicated he wanted to move some officer billets from WSA to

 

ACSFOR to improve the analytical capability of the ACSFOR. Gen.

 

Westmoreland sent Maj.Gen. Parker back for further research. He

 

wanted a study of the "Two Deputy Concept". One deputy would be the

 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs. The other Deputy would be the

 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans.

 

By 30 November Gen. Palmer had made 34 management improvements.

 

He agreed to take no further action until Gen. Haines' staff at

 

CONARC had completed their study on management. Gen. Palmer told

 

Lt.Gen. DePuy in a personal note on 20 December 1970 that he wanted

 

to have a meeting with the Chief in January. He noted that he did

 

not want to go for any great changes because he felt "this is a poor

 

time for any drastic" reorganizations and he wanted to "continue to

 

improve our organization and modus operandi through evolutionary

 

changes." (37) He outlined a number of interim steps he wanted to

 

have taken by the Army Staff, CONARC, and CDC.

 

On 21 January Maj.Gen. Parker returned to brief the Chief. The

 

Vice, Gen. Palmer, argued against the Two Deputy concept. Gen. West-

 

moreland told Maj.Gen. Parker to study the problem further. Maj.Gen.

 

Parker returned on 1 February to brief again. Both Gen. Palmer and

 

Maj. Gen. Parker argued against the Two Deputy concept. Gen.

 

Palmer's briefings on the DCSMS on 22 October, 7 December, and 11

 

December proved to be inconclusive. In the meantime the principal

 

commanders of CONARC, AMC, and CDC changed. Maj.Gen. Parker prepared

 

a memorandum for Gen. Palmer which gave the views of the new

 

Commanding Generals and two Generals from the Army Staff. The

 

consensus of the new views was to not change.(38) When the

 

memorandum was routed through the A-Vice, Lt.Gen. DePuy, he added the

 

following comment for Gen. Palmer, "I have taken the liberty of

 

making some margin notes -pointing out some dubious statements and

 

conclusions. The staff is divided - confused - and bickering. We

 

need a decision." (39)

 

Gen. Westmoreland reviewed the Parked Panel report for the last

 

time on 27 and 29 January 1971. No major changes were approved

 

except for moving the Military District of Washington (MDW) from

 

CONARC and making it a MACOM (Major Command) of the Army on 1 July

 

1971. Gen. Westmoreland supported his new set of senior staff

 

officers and commanders. The Parker Panel had outlined the problems

 

and some solutions. Yet, the procedure had failed to bring about

 

change. Why? The panel had had "carte blanche" in the selection of

 

the personnel for the panel, in the organization and in the

 

procedures to be followed. Unlike the Hoelscher Committee from

 

McNamara's days, there were no directives from the Secretary's

 

Office. The problems were not beyond the wit of man to perceive.

 

The major problems were: "(1) Control over the overall materiel

 

acquisition cycle -particularly the interrelationship (interfaces)

 

between development and production and the fragmented responsibility

 

for the whole materiel cucle at the Army Staff level involving

 

ACSFOR, OCRD, and DCSLOG. (2) The relationships between CONARC and

 

CDC, including the unmanageable span of control at CONARC and the

 

practical subordination of CDC to ACSFOR. CDC had responsibility

 

without the effective authority especially in the area of developing

 

doctrine. (3) The Personnel Management area, especially the

 

continued fragmentation of its functions among TAGO, OPO, and DCSPER.

 

(40) Furthermore, there was no problem in getting the data and

 

information desired, although the quality of much of the statistics

 

was indicative of the nature and scope of the problems.

 

In June 1970 Maj.Gen. Parker advised the Chief of Staff that one

 

way of dealing with the recommendations would be to "bite the bullet"

 

and accept the recommendations of the Special Review Panel without

 

staffing the recommendations of the panel through the very staffs who

 

have vested interests in maintaining the status quo. This was the

 

method used by the McNarney Committee in 1942 and by Secretary

 

of Defense Robert McNamara in 1962. (41) However, General

 

Westmoreland chose to staff the Panel Report. Also, there was a six

 

month delay in making decisions because of the Blue Ribbon Defense

 

Panel. The Army had to see what the OSD would do. Finally, the

 

changes in senior personnel shifted the attitudes of the key

 

decision-makers of the Army against major changes in CONARC, CDC, and

 

the issue of a Deputy Chief of Staff for Materiel Systems. The Panel

 

had recommended comprehensive changes in almost everyone's turf in

 

the Commands and on the Army Staff. Gen. Westmoreland chose to stand

 

pat.

 

Continental Army Command 72 : Mission and Structure, November

 

1971. The U.S. Continental Army Command anticipated the coming

 

reductions in the budget. On 3 October 1970 a special Management

 

Improvement Panel was established to "develop new innovative concepts

 

for management improvements within the U.S. Continental Army Command

 

and to list those concepts in order of feasibility, suitability, and

 

desirability; and to develop the methodology for converting such

 

concepts to command action. This special panel was to conduct its

 

review based on the following assumptions: That the pressure to

 

reduce the size of the Army would continue as a result of the rollup

 

in Vietnam and reductions in other overseas areas; that austere

 

funding of the U.S. Continental Army Command's misson and support

 

program would continue through FY 1972 and into future fiscal years."

 

(42) CONARC's panel met from 17 November 1970 through the end of

 

February 1971. The panel concluded there were five areas which

 

demanded much in resources: organizational structure, mission

 

prioristies, school training, intraservice support, and contractual

 

requirements. The panel concluded in their report in March 1971 that

 

"streamlining" the command structure "provided the most far-reaching

 

method of acheiving economies while modernizing and simplifying

 

operations." (43)

 

Interestingly, the report on the command structure was the only

 

report of five which was not forwarded to the Department of the Army.

 

General Haines did not believe the reorganization recommended was

 

appropriate at the time. He informed the Vice Chief of Staff about

 

the report and his reasons for asking the panel to revise it.

 

General Haines did not want to eliminate the subordinate Army

 

headquarters from CONARC because he wanted them "to provide effective

 

co-ordination in the event of domestic emergencies or disasters; to

 

provide co-ordination of the support of Reserve Component training;

 

to insure the co-ordinated planning and execution for rapid

 

mobilization; and to preserve the Army visibility in major

 

metropolitan areas. (44)

 

While the CONARC panel was revising Report No. 1 on the command

 

structure, the Department of the Army eliminated one of the major

 

subordinate Army commands. The Fifth Army at Fort Sheridan, Illinois

 

was eliminated and the boundaries were redrawn to have four Armies

 

(CONUSA) in the continental U.S. The revised report shifted

 

responsibilities and the size of staffs among the commands in CONARC.

 

Gen. Haines did not approve the report. However, the report

 

demonstrated the difficulty of resolving the problems with CONARC's

 

organizational structure. Much work had produced an effort which did

 

adequately provide an answer to the problem of scarce resources and

 

many headquarters.

 

In the meantime the Special Review Panel (SRP - Parker Panel)

 

had concluded its work with two recommendations of particular

 

interest to CONARC. A Recommendation No. 31 dealt with the Reserve

 

Component structure and Recommendation No. 32 considered the

 

allocation by function of administrative, logistical, and other

 

management functions to different headquarters in CONARC. The CONARC

 

Management Panel did not address these recommendations. Furthermore,

 

Gen. Palmer, the Vice, let Gen. Haines know that "there was a

 

growing feeling in the Pentagon that one level of headquarters

 

between the Department of the Army and the installations in the

 

continental United States should be eliminated." (45) Gen. Haines

 

had asked Gen. Palmer not to act on the recommendations of the

 

Parker Panel in January 1971 until CONARC completed its own study.

 

When Gen. Haines rejected his staff's work in September he decided to

 

address the Parker Panel criticisms directly. He directed his Deputy

 

Chief of Staff, Comptroller, to prepare a major policy statement for

 

the Vice Chief of Staff. A report was prepared in October 1971, but

 

Gen. Haines did not believe the letter and short report were adequate

 

to make CONARC's case. Gen. Haines discussed his desires for the

 

CONARC 72 study with his Chief of Staff and Deputy Chief of Staff,

 

Comptroller. The CONARC 72 -- Mission and Organization Study was

 

completed in mid-November 1971 and forwarded to the Department of the

 

Army on 25 November 1971. (46) Five alternative solutions for

 

restructuring the command organization in CONARC were presented. The

 

study concluded the present command structure should be retained. It

 

indicated "that the existing command structure of the U.S.

 

Continental Army Command had a single headquarters responsible for a

 

major portion of the Army's mission relative to combat-ready forces,

 

and base operations in the continental United States. The day-to-day

 

performance of these missions was decentralized, insofar as possible

 

to four geographical commands, relieving Headquarters, U.S.

 

Continental Command, of many co-ordinating and operating functions

 

and ensuring a workable span of command and control. At the same

 

time, the overall structure permitted maximum flexibility, efficient

 

use of available resources, close co-ordination of Active Army and

 

Reserve Component activities and a rapid expansion of the training

 

base in the event of mobilization. The structure above installation

 

level - Headquarters, CONARC, and the four area (Army) headquarters

 

in the continental United States -- included fewer headquarters than

 

at any time in the history of the U.S. Army since World War I." (47)

 

The report left three major functional missions -- forces for

 

two unified commands, training, and base operations in the hands of

 

one headquarters, CONARC. The efforts of the CONARC Commander, Gen.

 

Haines, helped delay the Vice Chief of Staff, Gen. Palmer, from

 

taking any action to change the command structure of CONARC. Yet,

 

two years had passed since the formation of the Parker Panel and the

 

problems of the management of the resources sent to the vast array of

 

organizations under the umbrella of CONARC Headquarters remained.

 

CONARC was a budget-managed command. Gen. DePuy observed that the

 

management was in the hands of civilians in the comptroller shops at

 

every level. (48) CONARC simply divided the money as they saw fit

 

and then let the numbered Armies (CONUSA) divide the money to the

 

subordinate elements. The money was not dedicated to programs down

 

to the using program element. As the Army was reducing, cuts would

 

be made to the combat force structure and to the training base.

 

CONARC would pass the cuts down with a cookie-cutter rather than

 

drawing down within a program at all levels in the organization.

 

Lt. Gen. DePuy noted," They would pass out the money and wait

 

for the screams. That was the manageemnt system, and some of those

 

screams were intolerable at the Department of the Army level, because

 

some dumb things were being done." (49) The pressure to manage the

 

shrinking budget was insufficient to force change on its own. A

 

change in the Headquarters, Department of the Army, helped to

 

facilitate the major reorganization which could not be accomplished

 

by studies alone. The Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of

 

the Army (OAVCSA) was a key to enable the future Army reorganization.

 

The Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff (OAVCSA). Gen.

 

Harold K. Johnson, the Chief of Staff, told the General Staff he was

 

creating a new Office of Assistant Vice Chief of Staff within the

 

office of the Vice Chief of Staff on 11 February 1967. The Chief was

 

responding to the pressures of the McNamara reforms in the Department

 

of Defense. The Army had to get control of the two issues which were

 

coming to head. First, the Army had to learn to handle the

 

programmatic approach to budgeting under the Planning, Programming,

 

and Budgeting System (PPBS). The Army had to be able to explain how

 

it spend its resources to the accountants in the Office of the

 

Secretary of Defense (OSD). Second, the Army had to manage the

 

automatic data processing systems (ADP) coming on line at the time.

 

The Army was only beginning to develop the systems to account for all

 

the soldiers and all of the pieces of equipment and the distribution

 

of funds around the world. As the computers came on line they would

 

simply produce reams of inaccurate information at high speeds until

 

the management techniques and controls were developed to close all

 

the loops in reporting to produce accurate and timely reports.

 

Consequently, the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, the A-Vice, would be

 

the principal assistant to the Vice Chief of Staff for developing

 

guidance and integrating the efforts of the Army staff to improve the

 

management of Army resources of personnel, materiel, forces,

 

facilities, studies, and funds. In addition to PPBS and management

 

of information systems, the A-Vice would look at weapons systems

 

analyses. The A-Vice was never intended to be a permanent change in

 

the Army Staff. The A-Vice received his power from the Vice and the

 

Chief. He did not have any formal organizational power as an

 

intermediate or super-staff above the Army Staff.

 

The A-Vice's Office had four staff agencies. The three

 

directorates were the Force Planning Analysis (later Planning and

 

Program Analysis), Weapons Systems Analysis (later Materiel

 

Programs), and the Management Information Systems. Additionally,

 

there was an office of the Coordinator of Army Studies.

 

The OAVCSA was not without controversy. The Chief, Gen. Harold

 

K. Johnson, had an obvious intent for an office as a "stop-gap"

 

measure to produce "an improved resource planning and management

 

system".(50) Yet, the OAVCSA was perceived by some on the Army Staff

 

as an interloper on their perogatioves. The principal officers of

 

the staff and their subordinates did not want the A-Vice to intervene

 

in decisions which they believed were wholly within their area of

 

responsibility. Common criticisms included:

 

1. The power and position of the OAVCSA tended to disrupt

 

and distorted the normal operations of the Army Staff.

 

2. The size of the OAVCSA generated a high demand for

 

quality personnel at the expense of the remainder of the

 

staff.

 

3. The size of the OAVCSA resulted in its getting into

 

primary staff activity-- tended to develop parallel actions

 

which have been assigned to staff agencies and then to be a

 

proponent of these uncoordinated "solutions."

 

4. The existence of the OAVCSA tended to insulate the

 

staff from interaction with the Secretariat.

 

5. The development of a strong inter-disciplinary

 

capability in the OAVCSA reinforced the tendency to handle

 

quick-response actions in-house rather than requiring and

 

assisting the appropriate staff agencies to become more

 

responsive.

 

6. The size of the OAVCSA resulted in an increased

 

requirement for detailed information to support the

 

monitoring and review role. A duplication of data

 

available from the staff resulted.

 

7. The principal of management by exception was violated

 

by the OAVCSA monitoring role.

 

8. The existence of the OAVCSA had an adverse impact on

 

staff morale since the OAVCSA projected a "palace guard"

 

image.

 

9. The OAVCSA constituted one more agency in the coord-

 

ination exercise. Virtually, every action had to touch

 

base with the OAVCSA due to its broad, vague charter.

 

10. The OAVCSA was oriented to the Office of the Secretary

 

of Defense and does not understand or support the Army

 

position.(51)

 

The criticisms actually help to illustrate, point-by-point, why the

 

OAVCSA was a means which facilitated the Reorganization of 1973. The

 

office was the organizational key to bring about major change in a

 

short time in a large organization. Lt. Gen. DePuy was able to use

 

his office to prepare, criticize, and promote reorganization in a

 

decisive manner without losing control of the process to the

 

organizational biases and prerogatives of the Army Staff and the

 

Major Commanders. The organizational key was in hand, but here we

 

must take a close look at the influence of the individual in

 

bureaucratic politics. It took a General Officer with the unique

 

combination of drive, vision, and in-fighting expertise to use the

 

OAVCSA to drive through a major reorganization. It took an office of

 

specially selected individuals in the OAVCSA to support the

 

initiative which Lt. Gen. DePuy and Gen. Palmer sought.

 

CAS. The Coordinator of Army Studies (CAS) had no standing staff

 

supervision responsibilities. In this respect Lt. Gen. DePuy used

 

the office in a unique mannner. In December of 1971 the office was

 

headed by LTC John Seigle. One of the principal officers involved in

 

planning the Reorganization of 1973, LTC James S. V. Edgar, recalled

 

that LTC Seigle "ran an amazing little shop. It was sort of the

 

distilled essence of the Social Sciences Department (at West Point)."

 

"It was a very good group of people, almost all of them are general

 

officers now. (Although that's not necessarily a guarantee of good

 

people, it's pretty close.) John ran a very collegial shop. There

 

was very little directive involved. Each person, when he came in,

 

was encouraged to get involved. Each person when he came in, was

 

encouraged to get something out of his craw - the one project that he

 

always wanted to do or to get done - how would you change the Army,

 

if you had a chance. And this happpened to be the chance, because an

 

amazing number of these projects were carried out successfully,

 

mainly because of the tremendous access that we had to Gen. DePuy as

 

a result of John's close relationship with him." (52)

 

The office was less than fifteen officers. Some of the officers

 

were recruited from the Department of Social Sciences at West Point,

 

some were recruited from the graduating classes at the National War

 

College, and some were gleaned from the Army Staff. Once the

 

officers were in the office, they would spend several months working

 

to get up to the speed of the office. On Saturdays Lt. Gen. DePuy

 

would chair seminars where the office would review all the actions

 

CAS was involved in. These sessions were important to keep the

 

entire office informed on what was occurring. Moreover, theme

 

sessions helped build the enthusiasm of the officers by letting them

 

know they were a part of all the major and interesting actions in the

 

Army Headquarters. Lt.Col. Seigle held staff calls on Thursday.

 

Also, Lt. Gen. DePuy took the opportunity to continue the

 

professional training of the lieutenant colonels. He felt the need to

 

have a "small select group" like the CAS to do "offline" projects for

 

the Chief or the Vice (53). Lt. Gen. DePuy wanted to have "some

 

group of people in reserve to do things that can't be described ahead

 

of time". He used the group to start pilot studies. He noted that

 

"real trick" in the Army "in getting anything important done, is to

 

be able to anticipate what will be important at some time, to back

 

off from the date that it will be important, a year, to work on it

 

with intelligent people, for a long time, meaning that you do it over

 

and over and over and over again. And the first twenty times it's

 

wrong, and then it begins to get right, then you do it twenty more

 

times, and then it's pretty good. But nobody knows, you don't have a

 

deadline, because it's your own project. Nobodys saying where is

 

that study, you see, because if it isn't ready, you don't want to

 

float it. That is a capability that I've tried to protect, because

 

it produces very good work" (54).

 

 

 

THE REORGANIZATION OF 1972

 

The Parker Panel passed into oblivion but the problems identi-

 

fied by the Special Review Panel did not disappear. CONARC continued

 

to be a very large command which was not program-oriented. CONARC

 

was a "budget-managed command".(55) CONARC did not know what they

 

were spending money for when they divided their budget among the

 

Continental Armies. The Continental Armies would divide their money

 

to their subordinate elements of Divisions, schools, training

 

centers, and installations. As the Army continued to withdraw from

 

Vietnam throughout 1971 cuts were made to reduce the training base

 

and the combat units in the States. When CONARC did not manage the

 

cutbacks "all sorts of things would suddenly flair up out at some

 

division or post that made no sense at all." (56)

 

Finally, in December 1971, Gen. Palmer approached the A-Vice,

 

Lt. Gen. DePuy, and gave him the job of looking into the

 

reorganization of CONARC. Lt. Gen. DePuy said he accepted it with

 

enthusiasm. He turned to the studies group. The officers were given

 

a month to come up with the concept (57).

 

LTC Louis Menetrey was about to take over from LTC Seigle as the

 

head of CAS when he was asked to start an effort to to reorganize

 

CONARC. LTC Menetrey listened as LT. Gen. DePuy laid out the broad

 

parameters of his thinking. The effort was to be very close hold.

 

LTC Menetrey could have one other person to work on the project. He

 

"made all kinds of notes from this conversation which probably took

 

and hour, an hour and a half." (58) Gen. Palmer and Lt. Gen. DePuy

 

worked very closely on the project. It was DePuy who worked with the

 

officers from the CAS as they refined the broad thinking through to

 

more specific proposals. LTC Menetrey began an iterative process.

 

"Every day or every other day, we'd spend a few minutes with General

 

Depuy and show him what we had. He would spin out his idea some

 

more, and this evolved over time, maybe a month, into a series of

 

"Butcher" charts.(59) Lt. Sen. DePuy had his mission-type order

 

taken from general concepts "to the next level of specificity" and

 

broken out "with some of its implications, but on a very close hold

 

basis".(60) Lt. Gen. DePuy did not want to let the information get

 

out until he knew he had "the high Command" with him. (61). LTC

 

Menetrey had LTC James S. V. Edgar working with him on the project.

 

Edgar "became aware of a paper that somebody was working on that was

 

going to do away with or carve up Combat Developments Command (CDC),

 

Since that was my area, I hopped in and began to have some thoughts

 

of my own 'CDC must be doing a number of things. How do we make

 

sure that those things that it does do and used to do don't get lost

 

in the shuffle?' I began to get associated with that." (62)

 

LTC William Tuttle was told to get the thoughts together in a

 

draft paper. LTG DePuy felt he had the right idea for the

 

reorganization and directed that Edgar and Tuttle put the plan

 

togetter. No more papers would be written. Everything was put on

 

large "butcher" paper so that nothing could find its way to a copying

 

machine. The charts were put in the safe every night. Lt. Gen.

 

DePuy used the charts as a means to keep updating and changing the

 

plan. LTC Edgar remembered,

 

"We didn't just sit around and BS, and we didn't do a study

 

either. We sat down, and we worked on a briefing with General

 

DePuy. These were, I think, some of the happiest hours of my

 

military career. In order to get General DePuy's time, we

 

would come in on Sarturday morning. So we would all be sitting

 

around in our civilian clothes, and you know how it is when you

 

come in on Saturdays and you wear slightly loud, civilian

 

clothes, just to demonstrate that you're on your own time. But

 

we would sit in General DePuy's office at this conference

 

table. It would be General DePuy and maybe John Seigle or Lou

 

Menetrey, who followed John, and Tuttle and I, and maybe Fred

 

Mahaffey. There would be just a few of us. Maybe Jerry

 

Galloway upon occasion. We would work on this briefing, and we

 

would work, as I recall, on yellow pads just sort of roughing

 

out the idea of what the briefing charts would be. That was

 

the things that imposed some disicipline upon our discussions.

 

DePuy would say, 'Well, here's the point we ought to make,' and

 

we would argue about how to make this point or whether it was a

 

valid point to make or how to structure the argument, and that

 

sort of thing. Then, we would go on to the next thing, and

 

this was basically the way that it was done. Then I guess when

 

we got closer to the final version, it was all put on butcher

 

paper. I can remember making those damn butcher paper charts

 

myself, and although I had studied inclined, single stroke

 

lettering while a cadet, my lettering was not that good. So we

 

had what were obviously a bunch of homemade butcher paper

 

charts, which I think added to the aura of the briefing when it

 

was finally given."(63)

 

 

 

The iterations of the concept moved along in December. Guidance

 

from the A-Vice included "cooling" the language, stressing the

 

overextension of CONARC, describing four alternatives, and outlining

 

the problem area; of the future -- forces, training, and material

 

acquisition -- rather than criticising CONARC and CDC (64). Also, in

 

December Gen. Haines asked for a meeting in Washington to present his

 

staff's report, CONARC 72. The meeting was set for 12 January 1972.

 

Since Gen. Haines of CONARC could be expected to present the most

 

opposition to the reorganization, the timing of the meeting was

 

fortunate for the proponents of change. It would provide the CAS the

 

opportunity to surface the major problem areas which mitigated

 

towards change. They would learn Gen. Haines' explanations and the

 

basis for his possible future arguments while they were still

 

preparing their briefing to sell the reorganization to the Army

 

leadership.

 

The conference on 12 January 1972 lasted for seven hour. The

 

meeting had Gen. Haines, his executive - Col. Morton, Brig.Gen. West

 

-his comptroller, and BG Hannum- his force developer from CONARC.

 

There were twenty-five officers from the Army Staff, including Lt.

 

Gen. DePuy and seven other general officers. General Haines began

 

the meeting with opening remarks. He had the following criticisms:

 

OSD is "180 degrees in the wrong direction" when it

 

suggests personnel reductions in vital areas such as HQ, CONUSA. HQDA

 

(Headquarters, Department of the Army) should have used the option to

 

choose alternative ways of acheiving the reductions required.

 

There had been a recent trend toward creating both small

 

functional commands and special functional assistants for the

 

Volunteer Army initiatives, drug programs, etc. These actions had

 

caused burdens for HQ,CONARC by generating resource requirements and

 

ceation of parallel monitoring staff elements without resource

 

allocations.

 

There was too much centralization of both authority and

 

personnel talent within HQDA. On the other hand, the five CONUSA HQS

 

had the very lowest priority for talented officers.

 

General Haines reviewed the historical evolution and

 

organizational structure of HQ, CONARC and HQ, CONUSA. He stressed

 

that CONARC had its expertise in training, readiness, and operations

 

of forces but personnel, supply and financial management functions

 

had been thrust upon CONARC. He pointed out that schools and

 

training deserved the primary attention of a command and that the

 

four CONUSA HQS were his "resource brokers" in addition to

 

commanding Reserves, providing area representation, etc.

 

Th e Comptroller of the Army's study of management

 

functions in CONUSA has an "over-simplified mission". Functions will

 

have to be evaluated individually to determine appropriate final

 

placement of management responsibility.

 

HQ, CONARC has made and is continuing to make many

 

recommendations for cutting back on nonessentials and overhead:

 

combining the Institute for Military Assistance with the JFK Center;

 

creating one "Center" for Adjutant General and Finance Schools;

 

moving the Military Police School to Ft. McClellan; closing aviation

 

training at Ft. Wolters and Hunter Army Airfield; consolidating the

 

Signal School at Ft. Gordon; and either closing Ft. Polk or beginning

 

essential permanent construction. Gen. DePuy commented that such

 

decisions will have to be targeted on apprpriate 1972 "Windows".(65)

 

Discussion followed on many topics. The management functions

 

were discussed in detail. Gen. Haines wanted to keep the resource

 

management functions at the Continental US Armies. Yet, the new

 

supply and personnel automatic data processing systems operated from

 

the installation level and "seemed" to be moving toward centralized

 

management at the Department of the Army. Gen. Haines also wanted to

 

have force development at HQ,CONARC. Funds for base operations for

 

the Army Reserves should have been handled with Active Army funds and

 

directed to the installations. Yet, funds for operations for the

 

Reserves should have gone through the Continental US Armies to the

 

Reserve units. (66) The action officers from the Staff asked

 

questions and tbe discussion continued. Gen. Haines stated the trend

 

of returning more Active Army forces to the US would probably require

 

organizational changes in CONARC in about five years. Additionally,

 

the CDC-CONARC interface was not a serious problem since the Center

 

Team" concept had proven quite efffective. The worldwide

 

responsibility for unit training was primarily executed through the

 

CONARC school system while the unit training for actual CONARC forces

 

was executed through the command channels of CONARC.(67)

 

In two weeks the planning for the Reorganization was complete

 

and ready to run the gauntlet for approval. Lt. Gen. DePuy had a

 

series of murder-board sessions where he had "all the other hotshots"

 

from throughout the OAVCSA criticize the briefing. As the Army's

 

manager, "the guy who did the budgeting and the planning," he "had

 

spent a lot of time briefing Congressional staffs on the Army's

 

programs, and he was very much aware of the outside pressures that

 

were pushing the Army -- The pressure to improve the teeth to tail

 

ratio, the pressure to do better on development of equipment", the

 

pressure to make the Volunteer army work. Edgar noted "He had a very

 

well-developed sense of who was pressing from outside the Army - from

 

DOD, from Congress, and those places. I thinK one of his essential

 

criteria was that the thing had to be marketable to meet those

 

pressures and meet those demands. I don't think I ever recall him

 

sitting down and spelling that out in one discourse, but we became

 

aware of it... As we would float ideas on Saturday mornings, he would

 

say, 'That won't work. That won't sell.' On occasion he would float

 

an idea and we would tell him that it would not work, which was the

 

fun of Saturday morning."(68)

 

When DePuy was confident that the briefing was where it should

 

be he scheduled meetings with the Vice and the Chief.(69) Gen.

 

Palmer was briefed on Thursday, 27 January 1972. Gen. Palmer, who

 

initiated the effort and had been kept abreast of developments, was

 

very enthusiastic". (70) Gen. Westmoreland approved the plan

 

after his briefing on the next day, 28 January 1972. The following

 

day, Saturday 29 January 1972 was the crucial briefing with Secretary

 

of the Army, Robert Froehlke. Given the statutory authority of the

 

Secretary, no reorganization could take place without his approval.

 

Furthermore, since the days of Elihu Root at the turn of the century,

 

no reorganization or reform had taken place without the active and

 

early participation of the Secretary. This major reorganization was

 

internally conceived and directed by uniformed officers.

 

Mr. Froehlke was personally briefed by Lt. Gen. DePuy. In the

 

earlier briefings DePuy had only used the butcher paper charts. He

 

had a short paper, "The Impetus for Change", written from the

 

briefing. It was almost a transcript of the briefing. As Col. Edgar

 

noted, "The figures in there, the diagrams, like the one on the Army

 

organizations since 1962 is right out of the briefing. There was a

 

diagram just like that in the briefing." Looking at the paper, "you

 

can just imagine a butcher paper chart that said 'three things we

 

have to do better -- maintaining the forces in readiness, training

 

individuals, devleloping new force structure' there would be a

 

butcher chart which had those three ticks on it."(71) LTC Tuttle

 

noted that DePuy did the briefings unassisted. "The simplicity and

 

directness of the approach, the lack of the normal trappings of

 

decision briefings with their twin projector; and prepared script,

 

unquestionably impressed the recipients -- and contributed to the

 

reception of the succinct, direct approach of the proposal itself."

 

(72) Mr. Froehlke appproved the plan. After a whirlwind three

 

days, Lt.Gen. DePuy had to wait until Monday to brief the Secretary

 

of Defense. Secretary Melvin Laird approved the plan. However, the

 

approval process was not over.

 

Earlier, Lt. Gen. DePuy had a series of briefings for all the

 

heads of the staff agencies. The Deputy Chiefs of the army Staff

 

were briefed by LTC Tuttle or Edgar. LTC Edgar observed that Lt.

 

Gen. DePuy would "sit back a little disassociated from it." "DePuy

 

would sit there and listen to the briefing and then talk about it.

 

This way DePuy wasn't having to defend the briefing. They could both

 

sit there and criticize the briefing," (73) Lt. Gen. DePuy emphasized

 

the case for reorganization on its own merits for the good of the

 

Army. He sold the case to the army Staff as having "a lot of logic

 

in the thing. There's a basic, fundamental simple logic that is

 

awfully hard to argue against and that was that the combat

 

development process and the schools are both part of a larger

 

process of doctrine and training in the Army. Training stems

 

from doctrine. Doctrine has to be informed by training

 

experience and weapons systems. Tactics is the application of

 

weapons to the enemy on behalf of a mission. Putting that set

 

of functions back together was obviously right. Everybody was

 

worried about one aspect of it, and rightly so. That was that

 

CONARC had many training centers at predominantly troop

 

installations and vice versa. From a management point of view

 

there was a fear that we were slicing through almost every

 

installation in some awkward way and that we might lose the

 

potential economy of scale which was represented by CONARC, and

 

there was merit in that worry. There was then and there is

 

today. It is not easy... the relationship between FORSCOM

 

(Forces Command) and TRADOC (Training and Doctrine Command) at a

 

place like Fort Sill where you have the III Corps Artillery, the

 

Artillery School, and a training center is not necessarily an

 

easy one. But we were willing to pay that price in order to

 

acheive the focus of CONARC on readiness and the focus of TRADOC

 

on doctrine and training. Those are natural divisions with a

 

powerful logic of their own. Everybody agreed. Even Jack

 

Norton (Commanding General CDC) agreed the first time I went out

 

and talked to him about it". (74)

 

 

 

Furthermore, the "Impetus for Change" emphasized the management

 

improvements to "reduce both the number of intermediate echelons and

 

the size and number of headquarters." (75) The reduction of personnel

 

from "manpower intensive headquarters and support activities" would

 

save money because of the "high per capita cost of personnel". (76)

 

Also, the nature of the post-Vietnam Army was illustrated as follows:

 

Vietnam meant: - The attention of the Army as a whole

 

shifted from training from the full spectrum of war to fighting a

 

particular type of war.

 

- A large proportion of our units were stationed outside of

 

the Continental United States (CONUS).

 

-Emphasis was placed upon the active forces at the expense

 

of the reserves, since the expansion was performed without a large

 

call-up.

 

-That part of the Army not in Vietnam became a sustaning

 

base, training and providing individual replacements for Vietnam.

 

-The materiel system was oriented to combat consumption.

 

Constraints on the defense budget were relaxed and the system for

 

materiel development was, in the case of many items, short-circuited.

 

The post-Vietnam Army is different: -With a higher

 

proportion of the Army in CONUS it will be of increasing importance

 

that deployable forces maintain a high state of readiness.

 

-A smaller active Army must peace a greater reliance on

 

reserve forces.

 

-A smaller, volunteer Army requires that each soldier

 

receive individual training that develops his potential more fully.

 

-Extremely limited resources for defense present much more

 

difficult choices in developing and fielding new organizations,

 

weapons and doctrine.

 

In short, the requirements of the immmediate future mean that

 

three Army functions will assume increased importance:

 

-Maintaining the forces in readiness.

 

-Training individuals in tactics, techniques, and skills.

 

-Developing new structure and materiel systems. (77)

 

The paper related the functions to the organizations in being.

 

CONARC was divided into a "Force Mission" and a "Training Mission

 

(Doctrine)". The case for reorganization was cogently presented to

 

show how the reorganization would really do all of the following:

 

- Reduce CONARC span of control.

 

- Emphasize training, readiness, and contingency planning

 

for deployable forces.

 

- Close the loop between doctrine and schools.

 

- Rationalize the combat and force development process.

 

- Simplify the test and experimentation process.

 

- Be manageable.

 

- Fulfill area responsibilities in CONUS. (78)

 

Lt. Gen. DePuy said it was a very remarkable experience that

 

should go "in the Guinness Book of records" to go from concept to

 

approval in one week. (79) DePuy had gained approval from the

 

decision-makers who had to approve the reorganization and he had

 

received agreement from the key players on the Army Staff which

 

effectively isolated the two major commands to be reorganized, CONARC

 

and CDC. The day after Secretary of Defense Laird aprroved the plan,

 

Lt. Gen. DePuy briefed Gen. Haines, Commanding General of CONARC.

 

The Vice, Gen. Palmer, told Gen. Haines two days earlier that some

 

reorganization would take place. It was up to Lt. Gen. DePuy to

 

explain the nature of the reoganization on 2 February. CONARC would

 

be divided into a Force Command, whose headquarters would move to Ft.

 

McPherson, Ga. and a Doctrine and Training Command which would move

 

into the old CONARC headquarters at Ft. Monroe, Va. "On 8 February

 

1972, General DePuy informed the CONARC Chief of Staff that the

 

Department of the Army was then planning to appoint an overall

 

Project Manager for the reorganization process and would then task

 

the major commands involved as executive agents for the actual

 

planning and implementation. He further indicated that the U.S.

 

Continental Army Command would be designated as the executive agent

 

for planning, developing, and establishing the two new major

 

commands." (80)

 

Gen. Haines took action on two fronts. He asked for a "reclama"

 

meeting with the Chief to make his case against the reorganization.

 

He prepared his own command to take the guiding hand for any changes

 

if they must come. The Special Study Group (SSG) at CONARC headquar-

 

ters was established as a permanent planning board. The principals

 

were Brig. Gen. L.M. Jones, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for

 

Military Operations and Reserve Forces, who was designated as Special

 

Assistant for the development of the Force Command; Brig. Gen. G. J.

 

Duquemin, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Individual Training,

 

who was designated as the Special Assistant for the development of

 

the Doctrine and Training Command; and Brig. Gen. R.L. West, Deputy

 

Chief of Staff, Comptroller, who was designated as CONARC Staff Co-

 

ordinator. Generals Jones and Duquemin were assigned to the Study

 

Group for fulltime duty. Maj. Gen. Donald R. Pepke, the CONARC Chief

 

of Staff, named the study "Operation Steadfast" on 14 February. He

 

chose the title from the motto of the 4th Infantry Division ("Stead-

 

fast and Loyal"), which he had commanded in combat in Vietnam.(81)

 

The Special Study Group became the STEADFAST Study Group (SSG).

 

Meanwhile officers in the OAVCSA were preparing for Gen. Haines

 

reclama visit. Col. Menetrey (he was promoted), the chief of CAS,

 

briefed Gen. Westmoreland on 11 February to prepare him for the 16

 

February meeting with Gen. Haines.

 

Gen. Haines presented five major points at a luncheon with the

 

Chief on 16 February. He argued the development of the plan on a

 

very close hold basis by Department of Army staff officers neglected

 

the "installation point of view" for feasibility and desirability.

 

Second, he felt the study did not deal with a mobilization situation.

 

Third, he did not feel that two new headquarters could be organized

 

within the spaces presently authorized for CONARC. He thought some

 

personnel spaces could be saved at intermediate levels as the

 

automatic data processing systems for personnel, logistics,and

 

financial management (BASOPS II) for base operations came on line.

 

Fourth, he felt strongly that the number of continental Armies should

 

not be reduced from four to three until the BASOPS II systems became

 

operational. Finally, he argued against the timing of a major

 

reorganization of the Army. He let all of his arrows fly.

 

"He stated that the Army needed a period of stabilization to

 

digest and implement the large number of directives from the

 

Department of the Army and ,in addition, to get on with the job

 

of improving professionalism, discipline, and attitude

 

throughout the Army. He stressed again the momentum gained in

 

these areas by the team effort of the commanders in the

 

continental United States and the adverse effect that the

 

proposed reorgaization could have on that effort. He pointed

 

out the difficulties in meeting the proposed date of 1 July 1972

 

for organizing two new commands -- only four and one-half months

 

in the future -- since both the U.S. Continental Army Command

 

and its subordinate Armies were well into the development of

their Command Operating Budgets of FY 1973. He also cited the

 

awkwardness of the 1 July date since it fell in the middle of

the summer training period for the Reserve Components and the

 

Reserve Officer Training Corps. In addition, this date would

 

affect the conduct of the Williamson Board tests which were

 

sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and involved

 

almost all elements of the U.S. Continental Army Command.

 

General Haines felt that there was a clear requirement carefully

 

to spell out the responsibilities of the the two new commands and

 

the subordinate numbered armies for conducting and supporting

 

the training of the Reserve Components and the Reserve Officer

Training Corps. Moreover, he was convinced that the above

 

factors presented a valid argument for a new slower

 

implementation schedule. He stated his belief that the new

 

Chief of Staff should have the opportunity to guide the

 

reorganization and not be faced with a fait accompli on the very

 

date he was to assume his new assignment. He also suggested

 

that prior to final approval, the Chief of Staff seek the advice

 

of certain retired officers -- such as Generals Bruce Clarke,

 

Hamilton Howze, and Paul Freeman -- who were accomplished troop

 

leaders and trainers.(82)

 

 

Generals Westmoreland and Palmer held their positions that the

 

reorganization should continue. They agree to extend the timetable

 

for reorganization to two years. The new Chief of Staff would be

 

informed at the earliest possible moment. They rebutted some of Gen.

 

Haines criticisms. Gen. Westmoreland noted the reduction of the

 

subordinate numbered armies was not firm. Also, the location for the

 

Forces Command headquarters would be studied further. Finally, Gen.

 

Westmoreland stated that he felt the job at U.S. Continental Army

 

Command was too big for one individual, although he complimented Gen.

 

Haines on his performance of duty in that assignment."(83) The rest

 

of the conversation delved into the details of the plan itself.

 

While Gen. Haines opposed the reorgainization at each step, Lt.

 

Gen. John Norton, whose CDC was to become two smaller agencies and

 

transfer some functions to the new training and doctrine command,

 

initially agreed to the plan. His memo to Lt. Gen. DePuy on 9

 

February stated, "In general, I feel that we can move ahead toward

 

the new organization in minimum amount of time. In the end I see the

 

Army in general and Combat Developments in specific receiving a net

 

gain once the new organization and way of doing business settles

 

down. I am prepared to furnish any assistance you or your staff

 

require to translate the broad plan into the detailed implementation

 

plan." (84)

 

In response to Gen Haines' criticisms of the lack of focus and

 

understanding for the problems of the installations, the Installation

 

Model Team was formed. Maj.Gen. Robert Fair had responsibility for

 

the project and made Col. H.L. Myron the team chief. The team was to

 

travel to several posts in the U.S. and develop the data base to

 

detail the problems and issues in dividing CONARC and removing the

 

subordinate numbered armies as a management level above the training

 

and combat forces units and installations. The team examined the

 

concept for reorganization in 27 separate functional areas. It was a

 

functional analysis of all the systems and procedures that flowed

 

from an individual unit or installation up through levels of command

 

to Headquarters, Department of the Army. It was a preparation to

 

counter the entrenched bureaucratic defense, "you did not go into

 

enough detail." The Headquarters, Department of the Army acquired

 

far more detailed data in the six weeks of research during February

 

and March 1972 than CONARC or any other headquarters possessed. (85)

 

The draft for the proposed charter for the Project Manager for

 

Reorganization was prepared by Headquarters, Department of the Army

 

and forwarded to the Headquarters, CONARC a day before the meeting

 

among Gen. Haines, the Chief, and the Vice. Two days after the

 

meeting the proposed charter was revised. The revisions reflected

 

the points of agreement between Gen. Haines and the Chief. This

 

included the revised schedule to have the new headquarters become op-

 

erational 1 July 1973 instead of 1 July 1972. The Commander,CONARC,

 

was directed to consult with the Commander, CDC, in planning and

 

developing the new organizations. Also, Gen. Haines would have the

 

formal task of disestablishing his own command. Some compromises had

 

been made to the perogatives of a four-star general.

 

In the corporate structure of the U.S. Army the Chief of Staff

 

is not the Chief Executive Officer of the corporation. Titles 10 and

 

50 of the U.S. code do not give him the statutory authority of a

 

Chief Executive. However, he has vast authority in officer

 

assignments and retirements, if the Secretary of the Army supports

 

him. He operates in a mode of consultation and consensus with the

 

other four-star generals who are not assigned out to the unified and

 

joint commands.

 

On 28 February Secretary Froehlke sent a memorandum to the

 

Secretary of Defense on the reorganizaton. He stated", Based on

 

your approval of the concept, planning has progressed to the point

 

where we are now ready to proceed with more detailed study." (81)

 

Furthermore, "Unless you object, we plan to initiate the detailed

 

study of the reorganization by naming a Project Manager this week.

 

He will coordinate the detailed planning and propose phasing for the

 

reorganization, and will report to me through the Chief of staff. I

 

am satisfied that this reorganization concept goes in the correct

 

drection. I am less certain, however, whether it goes quite far

 

enough. Before making such a final determination, I intend to

 

discuss the concept thoroughly with the designate to replace the

 

Chief of Staff." (87)

 

The Secretary kept the action with the uniformed officers. The

 

Project Manager faced a difficult task. Lt. Gen. DePuy wanted Maj.

 

Gen. James F. Kalergis to be the program manager because he was

 

"probably the most experienced and effective organizational expert in

 

the Defense Department ... He is one smart cookie, also tough." (88)

 

DePuy is quoted as saying," There is only one guy in the Army who can

 

run this reorganization and I am going to give the names of three

 

people. Two of them will not be available, and one of them will, and

 

that's going to be General Kalergis." (89)

 

LTC's Edgar and Tuttle briefed Maj. Gen. Kalergis before he was

 

appointed to be the Project Manager. They briefed him with the old

 

butcher charts in a "nice dog and pony show, a Huntley-Brinkley sort

 

of thing." (90) After they finished they went to another office and

 

sat down across from Kalergis. He asked, "Well, where is the study?"

 

(91) There was no study per se. The Parker Panel a year earlier was

 

the only recent formal study of the problem. All Kalergis had was

 

the briefing paper, "Impetus for Change", which was created from the

 

the old butcher charts. The two Lt. Colonels were loaned to

 

Kalergis. Eventually LTC Tuttle went back to other projects in the

 

CAS. LTC Carl Vuono was brought out of the Program, Planning and

 

Analysis Officer to join LTC Edgar. They became the nucleus of the

 

Special Projects Office. LTC Vuono recruited the officers for the

 

office of the Project Manager. Officers came from the Army War

 

College and the Army Staff. "The word went out from DePuy,

 

certainly, and maybe from the Palmer level or higher that while we

 

may not want the best man in DCSOPS, we want the second best guy in

 

DCSOPS. So, we got a bunch of very, very good people." (92) Maj.

 

Gen. Kalergis immediately demanded Col. Paul Raisig be assigned to

 

his office. Raisig had worked with Kalergis in Vietnam and had "done

 

a marvelous job taking over a battalion that had a couple of

 

commanders relieved or shot." (93) Col. Paul Raisig eventually became

 

Kalergis' deputy. LTC Vuono became "sort of the vice chief" and LTC

 

Edgar became the "resident ideologue." Edgar remembered, "I was the

 

keeper of the pure flame of the reorganization, since I had been with

 

it since its birth and I interpreted 'Impetus for Change'."(94) On 6

 

March 1972 Maj. Gen. James Kalergis was taken from his duties as the

 

Deputy Commanding General for Logistical Support, U.S. Army Materiel

 

Command to be the Army Project Manager for Reorganization (DA-PMR).

 

He met with the Chief on 8 March and the CONARC STEADFAST principals

 

on 9 March.

 

When he met with the STEADFAST group, he let them know he had

 

decided to draw up a new charter for his managership. Also, he would

 

issue a reorganization directive under the authority of his new

 

charter which would have all the details he wanted promulgated.

 

Checkpoints would be built into the reorganization plan where both

 

the Department of the Army and CONARC would stop, thoroughly review

 

the plans, and validate that they were on the right course. (95)

 

Maj. Gen. Kalergis met with Secretary of the Army Froehlke on 10

 

March. He was directed by the Chief of Staff to report by means of

 

In-Process Reviews according to the following schedule:

 

-Outline Plans for Organization and 25 Mar 1972

 

Transfer of Functions

 

-FY 1974 Program Estimates 1 May 1972

 

-Organization Plan 1 Jun 1972

 

-Budget Adjustments 1 Aug 1972

 

Also, he was to "inform the Chief of Staff on all significant matter

 

that arise in the execution of his mission." (96) The action was

 

kept with the uniformed officers. The Assistant Secretaries of

 

the Army and the General Counsel wrote memorandums to the Mr.

 

Froehlke in the first week of March on the proposed reorganization.

 

The results were generally favorable with specific comments

 

reflecting their individual interests. They were not to carry the

 

action.

 

During March and April 1972, Maj. Gen. Kalergis worked to flesh

 

out the details of the reorganization in an atmosphere of some

 

progress, cooperation, and some stone-walling. He had to evaluate

 

all on-going staff actions and studies throughout the Army which

 

might be affected by the reorganization. These included the CONUS

 

Medical Activities Study, Troop Support Command Study, the effort of

 

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics to examine a

 

centralized commissary management system for the continental U.S.,

 

the Myron Study of installation management, the Army Materiel Command

 

reorganization plan, the study to establish a centralized military

 

personnel center for the Army, and all of the automated maagement

 

information systems unique to personnel, finance and logistical

 

resource management, etc.,etc. Generals Palmer and DePuy did not get

 

involved in supervision, although they were kept abreast of the

 

situation at all times. Their main relationship was to "support him,

 

give him access, and keep the forces that were opposed to the plan

 

sufficiently at bay so that he could get the job done." (97)

 

For example, a 1 March memorandum to Lt. Gen. DePuy reported on

 

visit by LTC Tuttle, CAS, to the Installation Model Team at Ft. Lee,

 

Va. In addition to the progress being made in the area of logistics,

 

force development, and other manpower areas, Tuttle noted the team

 

needed the authorization to expand their research. Specifically, the

 

Team's charter was limited to the installation. Since some

 

management information systems went through the Continental Armies,

 

the team needed to have a team go to one of the Continental Armies

 

(a subordinate numbered army). Then, he noted," There is a major

 

conflict brewing (exemplified by General Haines' letter to

 

General Palmer on the "All Installations Under One Command").

 

General Jones apparently did the staff study and was rather

 

adamant about the necessity of the proposal. CONARC seems to

 

start from the assumption that each installation commander will

 

command everything on the post. General Jones sees the need.

 

therefore, for the installation commander to report to both the

 

Doctrine and Training commander and to the Force commander. The

 

rationale for this postition seems to lie in the difficulty that

 

small units might have if no one supervises them directly.

 

General Jones seems convinced that no parallel now exists in the

 

tenancy arrangements which sveral CONARC schools operate on AMC

 

installations. Likewise, there are several STRAF (Strategic

 

Army Forces) units on AMC installations. It appears that a lot

 

of fixed positions are being established on command

 

relationships before the Installation Model Team gets done with

 

its work. We do not believe that Colonel Myron is persuaded by

 

the CONARC position and seems to be heading in the direction of

 

not separating mission and resources. This is one issue that

 

must be watched closely, else the objectives of the

 

reorganization could well be thwarted." (98)

 

 

 

The memorandum illustrates the struggle to control the details

 

of the implementation of the reorganization. At this stage it was

 

possible for one headquarters (CONARC vs. Department of the Army) or

 

the other to gain de facto control of resources and the direction of

 

the new organizations by manipulating the relationship any unit or

 

installation will have with CONARC's shadow successor in the Forces

 

Command.

 

The STEADFAST Study Group completed a charter which was approved

 

through CONARC to delineate responsibilities. It began work on the

 

Outline Plan which was due at the Department of the Army on 5 May

 

1972. Maj. Gen. Kalergis met with the STEADFAST Study Group in late

 

March and early April. He emphasized "the fact that the major impact

 

of the reorganization would be at the installation level, but that

 

the area responsibilities of the subordinate army headquarters should

 

not be minimized. The existing functions of the subordinate armies

 

in the continental United states would have to be analyzed in depth;

 

Operation STEADFAST planning elements would have to pay particular

 

attention to mobilization requirements and to the integration of

 

training for both the Active Army and the Reserve Components. With

 

regard to manpower requirements, General Kalergis pointed out that

 

the two new major commands world require sizeable staffing and that

 

they should be accorded an appropriate place on the Department of the

 

Army Master Priority List (DAMPL) in order to ensure an adequate

 

quality of staffing." (99) The concern over personnel spaces in the

 

chain of command from the installation up to Washington would provide

 

an opportunity for the proponents of reorganization. The proposal

 

would give the installation commanders control of their resources for

 

their installations and "stovepipe" the logistical, personnel and

 

financial systems up to Department of the Army. (100) The proposal

 

would help to eliminate intermediate headquarters personnel spaces

 

and to make the installation commanders around the country the allies

 

of the reorganization as they looked to gain control of their own

 

resources. CONARC and CDC headquarters were isolated from the head

 

shed" of the Chief and the Secretary of the Army, the principals on

 

the Army Staff (the deputy Chiefs of Staff), and the subordinate

 

installation commanders on the issues of reorganization.

 

The process of planning would progress in three consecutive

 

stages. They were as follows:

 

Stage 1 - Develop an outline (feasibility) plan and the

 

preliminary validation of the concept.

 

Stage 2 - Develop a detailed plan, resolve issues and con-

 

duct final validation of the concept.

 

Stage 3 - Implementation plan.

 

Stage 1, the preliminary validation of the concept began, with

 

the publication of the Initial Planning Guidance on 5 April 1972.

 

This provided the staffs and commands with the authority to initiate

 

detailed planning. It oulined the concept in clear, simple terms.

 

Actions - a. Establish a Force Command over all active and reserve

 

army combat forces in the continental United States (CONUS).

 

b. Establish a Doctrine and Training Command devoted to

 

developing doctrine, associated force organization, requirements for

 

materiel, and training officers and soldiers.

 

c. Establish an independent agency for the direction of

 

operational test and evaluation.

 

d. Establish a Concepts and Analysis Agency to provide

 

an in-house capability at the Department of the Army level for

 

analysis of force design and major weapons systems requirements.

 

e. Eliminate one headquarters echelon between Department

 

of the Army and the major tactical commands and installations in the

 

United States. (101)

 

The guidance delegated responsibilities and restated that the

 

Project Manager for Reorganization (PMR) "has the full line authority

 

of the Chief of Staff, Army, for planning and coordinating the

 

implementation of those organizational changes directed by the

 

Secretary of the Army." (102) The Army had formal marching orders to

 

get on with the reorganization. The Executive Agents were given a

 

suspense of 5 May for their initial plans.

 

Meanwhile, concern over the reorganization at CONARC manifested

 

itself in more pleas for changes in the pace and direction of the

 

reorganization. Gen. Haines sent a personal correspondence to Gen.

 

Westmoreland on 14 April 1972. Gen. Haines was concerned that the

 

combat developments program would be subordinated to the individual

 

training mission in the new organization. He argued that "the

 

current readiness posture of Active Army forces stemmed from the

 

personnel posture of the entire army which would not be changed by

 

the proposed reorganization. He went on to point out, while there

 

might be some long-range improvement in individual training by

 

recombining that function with combat developments, the split of

 

individual and unit training might eventually prove to be

 

detrimental. General Haines was not convinced that the attainment of

 

the third objective (to develop new force structure, doctrine, and

 

materiel systems) rested on the split of the U.S. Continental Army,

 

Command and the stripping down of its subordinate armies. He felt

 

that the reorganization was untimely because of all of the factors

 

affecting the Army in the continental United States at that time.

 

Such matters as high turnover rates; a zero draft environment;

 

contemporary problems of race, drugs, dissent, and absenteeism; the

 

lack of completely workable and standardized ADP systems; the concept

 

tests conducted under the MASSTER Program; and the tests involving

 

the employment of the Reserve Components, all combined to create an

 

environment in the Army which could ill afford the turbulence and the

 

loss of effectiveness which the reorganizational concepts would

 

create." (103) He added, "Rather than carefully reasoned, thorough

 

analyses, we are making hurried estimates as to the functional

 

concepts that will govern after reorganization and from these

 

estimates we are determining the manpower requirements to staff

 

reorganized headquarters. I place little confidence in the validity

 

of these estimates. I am apprehensive that someone at the Department

 

of the Army will consider the data sufficiently precise to support a

 

decision to reorganize. Most importantly, I am concerned that

 

someone would use these hastily developed data to support the POM

 

which will be submitted on 22 May." (104)

 

The Secretary of the Army was briefed on 24 April. Secretary

 

Froehlke, Under Secretary BeLieu, Gen. Westmoreland, Gen. Phillips,

 

Gen. Palmer, Maj. Gen. Kalergis, Col. Gosling and LTC Pihl were

 

present. When the Secretary asked who was causing the problems in

 

the development of the plans for the reorganization, Maj. Gen.

 

Kalergis replied that he expected opposition from Generals Norton and

 

Haines when they were faced with external reorganization proposals.

 

The Secretary was assured that the Department of the Army

 

Installation Management Team was not implementing actions. The Team

 

was conducting a formal analysis survey. The Under Secretary, Mr.

 

BeLieu "made the statement that we had left out a most important

 

objective and that addresses the question of area responsibilty. It

 

was pointed out that this was a subordinate objective and this

 

objective would be covered -- and that, in fact, it is in the

 

criteria for analysis. Mr. Belieu stressed the importance of three-

 

star general officers being located in areas where they could sneak

 

authoritatively to the Governors, other responsible officials, and

 

the public." (105) The Secretary wanted to be able to present a

 

package to the Secretary of Defense which would present the forward-

 

looking image of the reorganization to the Department of Defense and

 

the public. The Secretary was advised that the actual reorganization

 

should not be moved forward of 1 January 1973 because of the

 

election. Maj. Gen. Kalergis emphasized "the requirement for

 

detailed planning prior to any announcements, and pointed out that we

 

are trying to give ourselves more time for detailed planning so as to

 

insure a systematic, successful reorganization once reorganization

 

starts."(106) A press release, letter to Congressmen, and the

 

Charter of the Office of the Project Manager for reorganization were

 

approved as written. Secretary Froehlke stated that when the new

 

Chief of Staff was announced, he wanted to have a picture taken of

 

General Westmoreland, the new Chief of Staff, himself, and the

 

Project Manager for the Reorganization to emphasize the importance

 

and the support behind the reorganization plans. At the end of the

 

meeting the Chief and the Vice stayed behind to discuss the Back

 

Channel messages for Generals Haines and Norton.

 

Maj. Gan. Kalergis was directed to prepare the "EYES ONLY" Back

 

Channel reply from Gen. Westmoreland to Gen. Haines. LTC Vuono

 

drafted a message which included the admonition, "the basic decisions

 

as to the form of this reorganization have been made." Later in the

 

message the guidance was given; "Each of the sequential steps which

 

you have described in your message obviously must be taken and this

 

is what I expect to be done." Finally, he concluded, "I have

 

discussed the substance of this position with Secretary Froehlke and

 

we both agree that we must adhere to the planning and implementation

 

schedule that I have outlined. Warm Regards." (107) Remaining

 

problems were to be directed to the Project Manager, Maj. Gen.

 

Kalergis. Gen. Haines had gone to the mat and lost. Lt. Gen. Norton

 

would retain some control of combat developments by being designated

 

as the Deputy Commander for Combat Developments, CONARC.

 

The opponents of change still had an opportunity to stop the

 

reorganization. It was widely "known" that Gen. Creighton Abrams

 

would come home from the top job in Vietnam to replace Westmoreland

 

as the Army Chief of Staff in June 1972. Secretary Froehlke's only

 

concern with forging ahead with the reorganization was the position

 

the new Chief would take. This suggests several things. It may mean

 

this reorganization was not an issue important enough to the

 

Secretary to let the new Chief's position influence his suitability

 

for the job. Alternatively, it may mean that the reorganization was

 

truly an internally-driven issue which should be left for the

 

uniformed officers to resolve. Since this was the Spring of the

 

Vietnam Easten Offensive, the McGovern candidacy through the

 

primaries, and the "stop the government" demonstrations, perhaps this

 

was an issue which was not so crucial to the Secretary without the

 

new Chief's active sponsorship. Maj. Gen. Kalergis briefed Gen.

 

Abrams sometime after 28 February. The new Chief would support the

 

concept of the reorganization. He could fine tune the

 

reorganization as he wished after he took over his new duties.

 

The Office of the Project Manager was organized to develop a

 

procedure for validating the feasibiity of the Executive Agents'

 

outline plans along functional lines. The office was organized into

 

numbered teams. Each officer within the team was assigned functional

 

areas of responsibility to monitor.

 

Maj. Gen. Kalergis issued his reorganization directive on 24

 

April 1972. The directive served to "provide the authority for the

 

initiation of the detailed planning which was to required to properly

 

validate the concepts for reorganizing certain functions of the

 

Department of the Army; to designate executive agents who would

 

develop the detailed plans for the orderly activation of the new

 

commands and the modification of existing commands and agencies; to

 

develop planning guidelines; to identify actions which would have to

 

be accomplished concurrently with the planning; to establish a

 

tentative schedule for the actual reorganization processes and to

 

develop the detailed plans for the orderly activation of the new

 

commands and the modification of existing commands and agencies, to

 

develop planning guidelines; to identify actions which would have to

 

be accomplished concurrently with the planning; to establish a tent-

 

ative schedule for the actual reorganization processes; and to out-

 

line channels of communication and administrative procedures."(108)

 

This directive stipulated, again, that the Project Manager for

 

Reorganization had the full line authority of the Chief of Staff for

 

planning and co-ordinating the implementation of "those changes

 

directed by the Secretary of the Army." He was responsible for

 

validating plans and their implementation. Furthermore, he was the

 

sole agent for all of the Departmant of the Army for co-ordination

 

and direction of all actions required for the reorganization. Yet,

 

Commander, CONARC, the Commander,CDC, and the Assistant Chief of

 

Staff for Force Development on the Army staff were the executive

 

agents to actually make the transfers for the changes. The opponents

 

of change were the "do-ers" for the manager of change. Despite this

 

marriage of necessity, the planning moved forward. The planning

 

concepts for the Force Command and the Training and Doctrine Command

 

were written.

 

On the same day that Kalergis issued his directive, the

 

Secretary of the Army signed the Charter of the Office of the Project

 

Manager for Reorganization. The manager had all of the statutory

 

authority the Department of the Army could muster on its own. On 27

 

April the first public announcement was made.

 

The CONARC Operation STEADFAST Outline Plan was submitted to the

 

Project Manager on 4 May 1972. This plan gave the organizational

 

structure for the two new commands, U.S. Army Force Command and the

 

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. The subordinate numbered

 

armies would command the U.S. Army Reserve, manage the Reserve

 

Officer Training Corps Program, co-ordinate support for domestic

 

emergencies, co-ordinate geographical area responsibilities, plan for

 

mobilization, and supervise training over the National Guard. (109)

 

The report projected estimated costs for the establishment of the two

 

new commands and the maintenance of the three U.S. armies. The

 

estimate indicated annual manpower savings of 1,289 spaces and annual

 

savings in operating costs of approximately $13.5 million. (110)

 

Several problems surfaced. The Project Manager's staff response

 

criticized CONARC for accepting the input from the Combat

 

Developments Command almost verbatim and not putting enough detail

 

into the planning for Training and Doctrine Command. Furthermore,

 

the figures for manpower and costs for Recruiting Command would have

 

to be separated from the overall figures. There was some question as

 

to whether the Reserve Officer Training Corps should be in the Forces

 

command or the Training and Doctrine Command. The wiring diagrams

 

were criticized for having too many blocks. CONARC was advised to

 

consolidate more functions. Maj. Gen. Kalergis "warned CONARC that

 

all plans for the reorganization would have to reflect a reduction in

 

grade structure for military and civilian spaces and steps would have

 

to be taken to ensure a proper balance between the military and

 

civilians." (111) The outline plan would serve as a feasibility plan.

 

The next plan, the detailed plan for reorganization would really

 

develop the alternatives for decisions.

 

The Project Manager, Maj. Gen. Kalergis, met with the CONARC

 

Commander, Gen. Haines, and the CONARC staff on 9 May 1972. There

 

were twelve points raised. All of the observations were problem

 

areas in the reorganization. There was no suggestion of any

 

diversion or postponement of the effort. One of Gen. Haines'

 

greatest concerns was the role of the installations. If a senior

 

commander had both combat forces and training units or a school on

 

his post, as the installation commander he might have to report to

 

two commanders in the new commands.

 

Also on 9 May, the Office of the Project Manager released their

 

validation document, "Validation Process for Continental United

 

States Reorganization". This document provided the methodology for

 

validation the Outline Plans submitted by the Executive Agents.

 

For example, the "Functional Study of CONUSA Management" was a

 

validation of the earlier study "Functional Study of Installation

 

Management, April 1972." The functional study developed three

 

organizational concepts to support a reorganization of CONARC. The

 

report also recommended the disposition of CONUSA management

 

functions with the associated staffing and reports. (112) Each

 

option outlined the "who would report to whom" for every office on

 

an installation in excruciating detail. Each option was examined to

 

identify places where manpower spaces could be cut. Meanwhile, Maj.

 

Gen. Kalergis continued to visit local comnmanders to discuss the

 

feasibility of automated systems in resource management under the new

 

commands.

 

The decision to continue planning and complete the first phase

 

of the reorganization was made on 7 June 1972. The Secretary of the

 

Army approved the concept of the feasibility of the outline plans and

 

directed continuation of the next phase of the planning effort. Maj.

 

Gen. Kalergis issued the "Guidance for Reorganization Detailed

 

Planning" to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development.

 

Department of th4e Army, the CONARC Commander and the Commander of

 

CDC on 15 June 1972. The next suspense for the Executive Agents was

 

set for 20 July 1072. Guidance for detailed planning went from "a to

 

g". for example, the manpower strength targets were set for the

 

major organizations. The management philosophy was to have "full

 

management" at the installations level and "exception management" at

 

higher levels. Other guidance was given for the command and control,

 

schools , assignment of US Army Recruiting Command, management of

 

combat developments, implementation of 'Basic Policies for Weapons

 

Stystems Acquisition in the Department of the Army', logistics

 

management planning, troop support, mobilization, location of Force

 

Command Headquarters, Department of the Army Personnel Center.

 

medical activites, STRATCOM, Army Materiel Command, costs, and

 

sensitivity to personnel. (112)

 

CONARC was working a concept to establish doctrinal centers to

 

develop new concepts, doctrine, and organization. The centers were a

 

Tactical Center at Ft. Leavenworth, a Logistical Center at Ft. Lee,

 

and an Administrative Center at Ft. Benjamin Harrison. (114)

 

Supplemental Guidance from the Office of the Project Manager was

 

approved on 20 June. These instructions were on stationing,

 

installations, and economic analysis. (115)

 

The period from 15 June to 20 July was the development of the

 

detailed plans. Work continued at a furious pace in the CONARC and

 

CDC Headquarters. Since CONARC served as the housekeeper to almost

 

every Army activity in the U.S., the reorganization touched almost

 

every functional area in the Army. A conference was held on civilian

 

personnel displacement at CONARC Headquarters. One problem was the

 

Reserve Office Training Corps and the U.S. Army Reserve were spread

 

across the country, so it was difficult to determine who would be

 

their landlord, pay different bills, provide transportation,

 

maintenance, repair parts and general supplies etc. Another problem

 

was units (and nearby commanders) on any given post may be from the

 

subordinate numbered armies, the Forces Command, or the Training and

 

doctrine Command. The Chief of Staff, CONARC, Maj. Gen. Pepke,

 

forwarded a letter to Maj.Gen. Kalergis on the installation

 

management studies and their utility in rewriting Army Regulation 10-

 

10. The Army regulations are the organizational concrete which

 

estabish relationships, policies and procedures for the vast

 

enterprise. When Maj. Gen. Kalergis forwarded the letter to his

 

superiors, he added this telling remark on the cover sheet,"Attached

 

letter from MG Pepke on the functional studies of CONARC and

 

installation management conducted by COL Myron's group reinforces our

 

view of what a singularly important effort that was. CONARC is

 

making extensive use of the studies in their reorganization planning.

 

This is a long step in the right direction as it reflects the

 

positive attitude for CONARC." (116)

 

Gen William C. Westmoreland retired on 30 June 1972. While

 

Gen. Abrams confirmation was held up in Congress, the Vice, Gen.

 

Palmer became the Acting Chief of Staff of the Army. Congress held

 

up the confirmation to question the administration's war in Cambodia.

 

Lt. Gen. Norton presented the CDC Detailed Plan for Reorganiza-

 

tion on 19 July 1972. CDC was able to eliminate 416 manpower spaces

 

and release a 90- man tank company to another command, but they had

 

not met the overall goals of the reduction. Norton voiced his con-

 

cern over unresolved problems. He noted there were basic differences

 

of opinion concerning the command structure and the procedures for

 

conducting operational testing and field experimentation. As pre-

 

viously described, the automated Basic Policies for Systems Acquisi-

 

tion in the Department of the Army had not been developed for appli-

 

cation to the new organization of the Army in the continental U.S.

 

Also, how was the Department of the Army going to manage the new Test

 

Agency and the new Concepts Analysis Agency? Once again he argued

 

that the timing of the reorganization precluded a thorough look at

 

all of the alternatives. (117)

 

The CONARC Detailed Plan for Reorganization also was submitted

 

on 19 July 1972. The CONARC historian's account of the concerns of

 

the CONARC Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. Pepke, will be given in full to

 

illustrate the nature of the problems.

 

"He was concerned about the command relationships which were

 

apparent in the Detailed Plan, particularly that which he

 

labeled the "dual-hat syndrome." Throughout the Detailed Plan

 

it was very evident that the basic reorganization concept had

 

forced the subordinate amy commanders, as well as every

 

installation commander, to report to more than one senior

 

headquarters. While this split in responsibility was not

 

unique, the proliferation of this practice at almost every level

 

was a grave concern to the U.S. Continental Army Command.

 

General Pepke pointed out that this meant that total

 

responsibility was being thrust upon the installation commander

 

and it was he who would have to account for all resources

 

received and expended. Looking down, the installation

 

commander/manager "commanded" as far as he could see; looking

 

up, on the other hand, he could see several managers, any one of

 

which would be his "commander" under certain circumstances. The

 

position of the CONUS Army Commander would be equally

 

difficult, since he had the burden of tremendous

 

responsibilities and an increased geographical area to oversee,

 

yet his control of resources was minimal and his authority was

 

tenous. His relationship to the major installation commanders

 

in his area of responsibility was merely one of "co-ordination

 

before crisis."

 

 

 

While the STEADFAST planners had attempted to specify the

 

command relationships of the subordinate armies with the major

 

commands and their subordinate installations, those relationships had

 

been difficult to define and left room for misunderstandings. Maj.

 

Gen. Pepke pointed out that, fundamentally, management was not

 

synonymous with command, a fact that heated problems with the

 

implementation of plans already developed. While the management

 

arrangements contained in the Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan

 

appeared to be practicable and workable, the command arrangements

 

departed substantially from the traditionally understood military

 

principle of unity of command. A decision to execute this plan

 

constituted a decision to abandon this long accepted principle and

 

accept in its stead the concept of a split in allegiance, loyalty,

 

and responsibility as a normal command alignment. Maj. Gene Pepke

 

pointed out that the consensus of his staff was that this constituted

 

a dangerous departure from sound command theory and practice.

 

However, Maj. Gen. Pepke firmly pointed out that the Operation

 

STEADFAST planners would continue to review the Detailed Plan for

 

reorganization and would use it as the basis for te required

 

Implementation Plan." (118) The last comment was the most telling.

 

CONUS was on board with the program for reorganization.

 

The Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan was submitted to the

 

Project Manager on 20 July 1972. The detailed plan was in literally

 

very detailed. In addition to the Executive Summary there were three

 

books. Book I had data which would be related to Phases I and II in

 

the Outline Plan for the period from January to December 1973. This

 

book had personnel and cost data. This book also had the

 

chronological sequence of actions to complete the reorgainzation.

 

Book I had the various levels of management from the highest

 

headquarters down to all the schools and installations. Book II

 

covered the period from January to July 1974. This book was

 

concerned with the final co-ordination of the new commands being

 

formed. Book III was a list of the on-going actions. These actions'

 

relationships with STEADFAST were not clear. Potential changes in

 

Books I and II were noted. (119) The detailed plans gave the

 

reorganization its shape.

 

The Training and Doctrine Command would be responsible for "the

 

development , direction, management, and supervision of individual

 

training for the Active Army and the Reserve Components as well as

 

for formulating and documenting concepts, doctrine, training

 

literature, materiel requirements, and orgainzation for the Army as a

 

whole." The Commander would develop the plans and programs for the

 

introduction of new materiel into the Army. Also, he would command

 

the Army school system and would be additionally responsible for the

 

recruitment and procurement of officer and enlisted personnel. This

 

means the Commander of Training and Doctrine Command would directly

 

command 20 major installations, 35 schools, 3 doctrine and

 

development centers, the Army training centers, and the U.S. Army

 

Recruiting Command. He would direct Reserve Officer Training Corps

 

programs and maintain operational control of the U.S. Army Reserve

 

Schools and Training Divisions through the Continental U.S. Armies.

 

The Commander, U.S. Forces Command would command all units of

 

the Strategic Army Forces and of the U.S. Army Reserve and would

 

supervise the training of the Army National Guard. He would have

 

command, but not operational control of the Army Reserve and Training

 

Schools and Training Divisions. He would command all of the

 

installations associated with the Command and the Continental U.S.

 

Armies except for the Reserve Officer Training Corps Program. The

 

subordinate numbered armies (the Continental U.S. Armies) would have

 

the primary missions to "command the U.S. Army Reserve; management of

 

the Reserve Officer Training Corps Program; co-ordination of

 

geographic responsibilities; planning for mobilization; co-ordination

 

of support of domestic emergencies; and the exercise of training

 

supervision over the Army National Guard. The subordinate armies

 

would be completely eliminated from the chain of command with respect

 

to installations and Active Army units and activities. (120) Manpow-

 

er and cast figures were developed (see charts).

 

CONARC defined the following major issues as remaining in the

 

plan: civilian personnel management; civilian grade structure;

 

augmentation of the Third Army Headquarters; environmental impact

 

statements; manpower displays and troop lists; the new Medical

 

Command; the Army Personnel Center; installation mission statements

 

and area support responsibilities; the disposition of reports;

 

information systems; the new Logistics Management Concept; management

 

of Engineer functions; the Army Casualty System; management of the

 

ROTC programs, the Army Reserve Schools and Training Divisions; mobi-

 

lization planning; the U.S. Army Strategic Communications Command;

 

the development of the schools model; the University concept, the

 

Enlisted Evaluation Center; and the management of the combat

 

developments program. (121)

 

The Project Manager's Office conducted a detailed analysis of

 

the plans with the help of the Army Staff. This created an iterative

 

process with drafts being circulated to all staff agencies and

 

revisions made. The Chief of Staff designee, Gen. Creighton Abrams,

 

was briefed on the planning. He was interested in every aspect of

 

the project. He took a particular interest in the improved

 

management of the Reserve Components and Reserve Officers Training

 

Corps. (122) Gen. Abrams asked for a detailed layout of systems

 

support and time schedule for the overall reorganization. Maj. Gen.

 

Kalergis helped to establish a board of senior officers at the

 

Department of the Army level to develop an acceptable concept for

 

managing the Reserve Components. (123)

 

The Secretary of the Army approved the guidance for continuing

 

the reorganization plan on 23 August 1972. Lt.Gen. DePuy and Maj.

 

Gen. Kalergis showed that there should be no large increase in the

 

budget but there would be major reshuffling of the budget within

 

certain programs. "Mr. Froehlke commented that if there turned out

 

to be a large increase in the FY 74 budget to support the

 

reorganization, then 'this is not the way to go.'" Mr. Froehlke was

 

aware of Gen. Abrams interest in Reserve Components. Gen. Abrams

 

observed that the Reserve problem lay in the support and types of

 

people devoted to Reserve Components. The problem was not

 

organizational. Lt. Gen. Depuy commented on Gen. Abrams' interest

 

in systems development to show the inter-relationship between

 

organizational actions and systems actions. DePuy emphasized that

 

regardless of the organizational actions taken, the new automatic

 

data processing (ADP) systems should not drive the decisions to

 

reorganize. Interestingly enough, Mr. Froehlke said he must honor

 

his commitment to the Governor Linwood Holton of Virginia to inform

 

him first of any plan to move the Recruiting Command Headquarters

 

(USAREC) from Virginia. Finally, "the Secretary posed no objection

 

to the 23 August guidance and approved its issuance." (124)

 

The Guidance for Reorganization Planning was published. The

 

guidance directed "the development of Case Study and Justification

 

Folders, Civilian Personnel Reduction Plans, and/or Realignment Fact

 

Sheets, as appropriate, in accordance with existing directives."

 

(125) The principal planners were to develop the documentation. The

 

guidance lead to the formulation of the budget through coordination

 

with the Army Comptroller and the Project Manager. Additionally, the

 

guidance lead to a thorough analysis of area support

 

responsibilities. The research illustrated "uncoordinated,

 

overlapping, and conflicting area support missions which required 150

 

separate maps to display." (126)

 

During the next two months the steps necessary for the

 

implementation of the plan were completed and approved. On 26

 

September the joint Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel/ United

 

States Continental Army Command Reserve Officer's Training Corps

 

management concept was approved. The test agency implementation was

 

approved with the Operations Test and Evaluation Agency

 

implementation plan approval on 26 September. The CONARC plan for

 

the assignment of schools was resolved in mid-October. The Ballistic

 

Missile Defense Management Study was briefed in August. The

 

strategic communications recommendation for a single U. S.

 

continental communications management structure was approved by the

 

Army on 11 September. The Chemical Implementation Plan and the

 

Recruiting Command relocation plans were near completion. (127)

 

A summary of the Reorganization, "CONUS Reorganization - 1973"

 

was prepared and approved by the Chief of Staff and the Secretary.

 

The summary document was sent in a letter to all major commands on 2

 

October. This officially informed all of the commands (and the

 

commanders) that the validation of the Reorganization was completed

 

and approved. The details of the personnel spaces and the dollars

 

and cents allocation in the next budget were the only pieces of the

 

puzzle missing. The Army was commanded, "Forward, March."

 

CONARC's due date for the submission of the Detailed Plan was

 

moved from 30 September to 20 October. By 12 October the commanders-

 

designate for the two new commands had been selected. Lt. Gen.

 

William T. Kerwin, Jr. and Lt.Gen. DePuy were to command. It

 

appeared that the Forces Command would be commanded by a full

 

General, four-stars, while the Training Command would be commanded by

 

a Lt. General, three-stars. General Abrams wanted a four-star

 

general for the command, but he did not know if could get the

 

authorization for another four-star general. The Army had

 

75 more general officers in the Summer of 1972 than it would be

 

allowed to have by DOD and the Congress in the following year. Among

 

the generals to retire early to bring the number of general officers

 

to the authorized number would be Generals Haines and Norton. DePuy

 

remembers Abrams as being "somewhat undecided as to which of us ought

 

to go to which command." DePuy personnally preferred the Training

 

Command while Gen. "Dutch" Kerwin preferred the Forces Command. When

 

DePuy was told he would get the Training Command he was also told,

 

"But you will probably be a Lieutenant General." He responded that

 

it made no difference. (128)

 

When Lt. Gen. Kerwin met with the new STEADFAST Steering Group,

 

he "observed that the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for

 

Personnel in each of the new commands was too large; spaces would

 

have to be clearly earmarked for reduction when the Standard

 

Installation/Division Personnel Reporting System (SIDPERS) was

 

operational and on-line. In addition, the Directors of Management

 

Information systems (DMIS) would have to placed on the level of the

 

Chiefs of Staff as required by Army Regulation 18-1. It was not made

 

clear, however whether the establishment of this directorate as a

 

special staff section would suffice." (129) Both Generals wanted

 

spaces cut from the Logistics sections because the Logistics Center

 

at Ft. Lee would assume responsibility for the work then being done

 

at CONARC.

 

The CONARC STEADFAST Steering Group was directed to develop at

 

least four alternatives to handle the dismemberment of the CDC. The

 

alternatives included: "a combination of schools and combat

 

developments; a system somewhat paralleling that suggested by General

 

DePuy; a functional approach to combat developments similar to the

 

organization already established for the Office of the Deputy Chief

 

of Staff for Training and Schools; or the existing organization of

 

the Combat Developments Command reduced to approximately 150

 

personnel. It was abundantly clear to the participants at the

 

briefing that the intent of the guidance was to reduce the strength

 

of the combat developments staff office at TRADOC Headquarters; to

 

build up the three combat developments centers and make them strong;

 

and to ensure a close and continuous, effective and efficient

 

interface at the schools level." (130) The combat developments issue

 

was resolved at a meeting on 19 October. After some discussion

 

between the CONARC STEADFAST Steering Group and Lt. Gen. DePuy,

 

approved the CONARC recommendation to organize combat developments as

 

a Deputy Chief of Staff office in TRADOC organized along the

 

functional lines of operational control, quality control,

 

organizations, and miscellaneous with a 250 person ceiling. (131)

 

CONARC's revision to the Detailed Plan had to go through four

 

revisions between 20 October and 22 December 1972. The revisions

 

concerned the three functional combat developments centers (Combined

 

Arms, Logistics, and Administration), economic analysis, standardized

 

functional statements and organizational structures for the

 

Continental armies, Readiness Assistance Regions for Reserve

 

Components, and the ROTC Regions. Revisions from all of the

 

principal planners continued from 2 October through 9 November. On

 

2 November the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army briefed the

 

Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary. The Army's

 

reorganization was briefed as solving our manpower problems and

 

operating within limited funds. It would improve the development of

 

weapons and materiel. Most of the Active Army would be in CONUS.

 

The Active Army would be smaller. There would be a greater reliance

 

on the Reserves. It would reinforce the role of the installation

 

commander. (132) The reorganization had goals to improve the

 

readiness of the Active and Reserve Component forces, harness the

 

school and the combat development activities, improve the quality and

 

responsiveness of Army management, and reinforce the management role

 

of the installation commander. (133)

 

The installation managers, the commanders of major Army posts,

 

were responsible for the Forces Command and the Training and Doctrine

 

Command missions associated with their posts. Some of the

 

responsibility included the management service clubs, commissaries,

 

communications and medical support. Meanwhile, the Department of the

 

Army was to operate to keep all commands "pulled together", make

 

decisions on priorities and resource allocations, establish

 

centralized controls for tasking commands and provide resources, and

 

reduce the staff involvement in the day-to-day operations of the

 

major commands. (134)

 

The Army Materiel Command would undergo reorganization at the

 

same time as the CONARC/CDC Reorganization. Also, the major

 

initiative of the new Chief of Staff, the reorganization of the Army

 

Staff was briefed. This reorganization should be covered in the same

 

detail as OPERATION STEADFAST. It is important because within the

 

space of two years the Army was reorganized by its Major Commands,

 

its Staff, and by the units of the line. The three organizational

 

changes may be examined on their own, but they are interrelated.

 

Taken as a sum they are among the most significant changes in the

 

history of the United States Army and have shaped the Army, barring

 

unforeseen radical events, until well into the 21st Century.

 

Briefly, the Department of the Army Staff reorganization would

 

"Adjust Headquarters, Department of the Army procedures and/or

 

organizational structure consistent with the Continental United

 

States Reorganization, transfer operating functions to Major

 

Commands and field operating agencies, improve responsiveness of

 

the Army Staff, and reduce authorized spaces" for the Army

 

Staff, its 22 Staff support agencies, and 51 associated field

 

operating agencies." (135)

 

Finally, the decision was made to make a public announcement of the

 

Army's Reorganization in January 1973.

 

The role of the Army Staff was widened to execute the details of

 

the CONARC/CDC reorganization as normal staff actions. It was

 

epecially important to complete the cost estimates in time for the

 

budget. Once these figures were prepared by 30 November, the staff

 

had to turn its attention to set the Reorganization in the

 

institutiional concrete of documentation. A memorandum dated 5

 

December 1972 provided guidance for "Publication Changes Required by

 

the Reorganization of the Army in CONUS." At least thirteen Army

 

Regulations had to be changed from AR 1-24, Army Management Doctrine

 

to AR 10-13, US Army Strategic Communications Command. (136) Letters

 

were prepared to go to key members of Congress from Mr. Froehlke.

 

The letters contained a draft of legislation "to amend titles 10, 32,

 

and 37 United States Code, with respect to accountability and

 

responsibility for United States property, and for other purposes."

 

(137)

 

The Congress was notified of the Reorganization on 10 January

 

1973. A press conference was held on 11 January at the Pentagon.

 

The briefing covered the main points of the Reorganization. During

 

the question and answer period, it was disclosed that no bases would

 

be closed. The estimate for one-time costs was roughly $100 million.

 

Afterwards the savings were estimated to be approximately $190

 

million per year. Furthermore, there would be a reduction of 4,000

 

military and 11,000 civilian personnel. (138) The new Vice Chief of

 

Staff of the Army, Alexander Haig, was present.

 

The Army published information on the Reorganization in its

 

publication, Commanders Digest. The entire issue of 25 January was

 

given to the Reorganization. The highlights were given as folows:

 

-Elimination of the Continental Army Command (CONARC), the

 

Combat Developments Command (CDC) and the Third United States Army.

 

-Creation of the Forces Command (FORSCOM), a single field

 

headquarters to supervise the unit training and combat readiness of

 

all Army units to include the Army Reserve and the Army National

 

Guard.

 

-Creation of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) , a

 

single field headquarters to direct all Army individual training and

 

education, and the development of organizations, materiel

 

requirements and doctrine.

 

-Consolidation of the Munitions Command and the Weapons

 

Command into an Armaments Command.

 

-Consolidation of the major headquarters elements of the

 

Electronics Command.

 

-Consolidation and realignment of the Army depot system.

 

-Elimination of major administrative levels between all

 

major Army posts and the Department of the Army.

 

-Increased responsibility, authority, and flexibility or

 

installation commanders.

 

-Establishment of a major active Army organizational

 

framework, organized solely to improve reserve component readiness.

 

-Improving the quality and administration of the ROTC

 

program.

 

-Creation of a new command to provide improved delivery of

 

Army health care in the United States.

 

-Improving responsiveness to individual needs and goals in

 

handling personnel matters in the Army.

 

-Improving the weapons development and procurement

 

processes by updating managerial practices and organizations in

 

recognition of technological advances.

 

-Elimination of 813 personnel spaces from the Army staff in

 

the Pentagon.

 

-Transfer of an additional 1,986 individuals from the

 

Department of the Army Headquarters Staff to other commands or field

 

operating agencies.

 

-A reduction in requirements of approximately 15,000

 

military and civilian personnel spaces. (139)

 

Also, the Department of the Army Pamphlet 360-813 for the Fourth

 

Quarter of FY 73 carried an article on the reorganization.

 

Maj. Gen. Kalergis, the Project Manager, issued his final

 

guidance on 5 February 1973. Consequently, CONARC made what was

 

supposed to be its final revisions to OPERATION STEADFAST and

 

published them on 28 February 1973. There were further refinements

 

to the organizational structures and the functional statements for

 

the two new headquarters. The detailed overview of the Force

 

Developments/Combat Developments process within TRADOC were revised

 

as well as segments of the Combined Arms Center and the

 

Administration Center. There was an update to the Management

 

Information Systems chapters, while the Logistics Management concepts

 

were deleted. (140) The schedule for the final implementation was

 

prepared. The schedule began on 1 March 1973 and would be essentially

 

complete by 1 July 1973. Also, there was a list of Positive

 

Indicators to list events and conditions to indicate the

 

reorganization developed as planned. The Audit Trail traced the

 

savings and costs in dollars and personnel spaces.

 

A list of supplemental studies indicates how the reorganization

 

served as the impetus and the umbrella for Army-wide reorganization

 

and reformation. The list included:

 

Continental Army Command OPERATION STEADFAST Detailed Plan,

 

20 July 1972

 

Revision to OPERATION STEADFAST Detailed Plan, 20 October

 

1972

 

Revision to STEADFAST Detailed Plan, 30 November 1972

 

Revision to STEADFAST Detailed Plan, 18 December 1972

 

Revision to STEADFAST Detailed Plan, 22 December 1972

 

Reserve Component Management, Revision to STEADFAST

 

Detailed Plan, 10 January 1973

 

Revision to STEADFAST Detailed Plan, 17 January 1973

 

Audit Trails of CONUS Reorganization, Supplement to

 

STEADFAST Detailed Plan, 17 February 1973

 

OPERTION STEADFAST Revised Detailed Plan,28 February 1973

 

Continental Army Command OPERATION STEADFAST Phased

 

Implementation Plan, 30 November 1972

 

Installation and Activity Study, 22 November 1972

 

DA Plan for Consolidation for Chemical Corps Functions, 15

 

December 1972

 

Army Air Defense Command (ARADCOM) Installation and

 

Activity Consolidation, Realignments, and Reductions, 24 November

 

1972

 

Management of US Army Commissaries, 18 October 1972

 

Analysis of Proposal to Establish a Troop Support Command,

 

18 September 1972

 

US Army Criminal Investigation Command Reorganization,

 

US Army Strategic Communications Command Communications

 

Management Plan for CONUS-Vertical Command Concept, 5 September 1972

 

US Army Strategic Communications Command Implementation

 

Plan for Communications Management in CONUS, 1 December 1972

 

Modification of the US Army Correctional System, 13

 

December 1972

 

Detailed Implementation for AMEDD Reorganization in CONUS,

 

20 July 1972

 

US Army Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN) Plan, 11

 

September 1972

 

Detailed Plan for the US Army Club Management Agency, 4

 

December 1972

 

US Army Intelligence Command Reorganization Plan, 8 August

 

1972

 

US Army Combat Developments Command Reorganization One

 

Detailed Plan, 20 July 1972

 

Detailed Plan for the Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA), 20

 

July 1972

 

Detailed Plan for the US Army Test and Evaluation Agency,

 

20 Judy 1972

 

HQ, Department of the Army Staff Management Plans, 22

 

November 1972

 

Publication Changes Required by Reorganization of the Army

 

in CONUS, 5 December 1972

 

Revision of Reorganization Plan for the AMEDD in CONUS, 30

 

September 1972

 

Revision of Reorganization Plan for the AMEDD in CONUS, 30

 

November 1972. (141)

 

Gen. Kerwin assumed his duties as the Commanding General of

 

CONARC on 1 February 1973. On 1 March he became the provisional

 

commander of the two new (provisional) commands. He retained the

 

CONARC title until 31 December 1973. Lt. Gen. DePuy became a Deputy

 

at CONARC in March of 1973. DePuy brought some of his own officers

 

down with him to help form the new Headquarters. These included Max

 

Thurman, John McGiffert Jr., and Max Noah, who became General

 

officers.

 

Revisions of the OPERATION STEADFAST Detailed Plan continued

 

with modifications on 9 March, 18 May, 5 June 1973, and 15 August

 

1973. The revisions cleared up the final details. The new hands were

 

on the tiller with Kerwin and DePuy. Their separate Headquarters

 

began to function on 1 July 1973 and the transfers of personnel and

 

functions were essentially complete by 1 December 1973. The

 

STEADFAST Steering Group was disestablished on 13 September 1973 at

 

TRADOC and on 7 October 1973 at FORSCOM. There were many details in

 

General Officer assignments and responsibilities as well as the

 

details of the routing of on-going and day-to-day actions.

 

Yet, the Spring and Summer of 1973 were the denouement to the

 

greatest reorganization of the Army since 1942. It was the beginning

 

of the next two phases of major reorganization in the Army Staff and

 

the line units of the Army. The first phase, the CONUS

 

Reorganization, may be called the Palmer-Depuy reorganization,

 

although Gen. Abrams helped shape the implementation of the change in

 

great detail. It led to the next two phases, changes in the Army

 

Staff and the changes in the Army configuration in the field from 11

 

to 16 Divisions which were the Abrams' "reformation". It was the

 

genesis for Gen. DePuy's tour of duty at TRADOC where he would put

 

his personal imprint on the training of the United States Army for

 

decades to follow in the DePuy "training revolution."

 

 

CONCLUSIONS

 

 

 

Operation STEADFAST was the first of three reorganizations of the

 

Post-Vietnam Army. The reorganization of the Army in the continental

 

United States was followed by the reorganization of the Army Staff,

 

Headquarters, Department of the Army, and the reorganization of the

 

line, the units in the field, to expand from 11 to 16 Divisions.

 

These reorganizations gave shape to what would become the post-

 

Vietnam Army. They pre-empted organizational change at the direction

 

of the Executive Branch or the Legislature. The reorganization

 

brought greater managerial efficiency to the organization which

 

allowed it to make better use of the constrained resources issued

 

during the decade when the Army should have been modernizing after

 

the years spent focused on Vietnam. Since the Army was in a better

 

position to manage its resources, it was arguably able to keep its

 

civilian superiors from becoming too involved in the micro-management

 

of the Army program. Furthermore, the degree of autonomy gained in

 

resource mangement enabled the Army to maintain relatively greater

 

autonomy in other internal matters of the organization. This

 

relative autonomy from the civilian dictation of the internal

 

leadership and management of the Army allowed the organization to

 

recapture its "essence" as a combat-ready organization and a trans-

 

national institution with a professional officer and non-commissioned

 

officer corps. This does not suggest there is a simple civilian-

 

military dichotomy in the management of the Army. There are changing

 

constellations of civilian allies and dilettantes through the levels

 

of the Office of the Presidency, the Department of Defense and the

 

Department of the Army (as well as those who would run parts of the

 

services from Capitol Hill). There were four Presidents between 1973

 

and 1981. The Army leadershlp was faithful to the tenet of civilian

 

control of the military. The issue was the internal management of

 

the organization rather than the overall direction of the defense

 

establishment. The reorganizations allowed the Army to persevere

 

through a period of excruciating national tumult and self-doubt with

 

its value system and purpose intact. It set the stage for all of the

 

hard work by many, many soldiers around the world to rebuild the Army

 

to be prepared to defend the nation and to remain constant to "Duty,

 

Honor, Country".

 

Let us review the points which are intrinsically supported by

 

the research.

 

 

 

- In late 1971 the Army was under pressure to change following the

 

Vietnam War. The Parker Panel had illustrated the need and some

 

possible alternatives for change in the Army organization and

 

management. Yet, the Parker Panel did not serve as a catalyst for

 

change.

 

- The Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff served as a unique

 

foci for the pressing issues of program cutbacks, budgeting,

 

compurterization, and other management issues near the top of the

 

Army pyramid. Furthermore, Lt.Gen. DePuy used one of his offices,

 

the Coordinator for Army Studies, to assist him in defining and man-

 

aging important issues "off-line" from the Army Staff and Commands.

 

- Gen. Bruce Palmer, the Vice, and Lt.Gen. DePuy recognized the

 

"impetus for change". They had a plan devised to address the most

 

pressing management issues at hand, which meant the enhanced control

 

of the units, schools, and installations in the continental United

 

States.

 

-Generals Palmer and DePuy finessed their opposition within the Army

 

and won approval for the reorganization from their superiors. They

 

were able to maintain control of the implementation of the

 

reorganization to insure the details did not skew the overall

 

results.

 

ENDNOTES

 

1. James E. Hewes Jr. "New Wine and Old Bottle; II: The Parker Panel

Fiasco, 1969-1971. Chapter VI- unpublished manuscript.(Center for

Military History, Washington,1982), p.1.

 

2. Ibid., p.3.

 

3. Anonymous. "Overview the Advanced Planning Process CONUS

Reorganization-1973". James E. Hewes Jr. Papers. (Center for Military

History,Washington,1974), p.2.

 

4. Ibid., p.3.

 

5. MFR, 22 July 1970,sub: VCofSA Discussion of Blue Ribbon Defense

Panel Report.

 

6. Hewes., p.9.

 

7. Ibid., p.10.

 

8. Ibid., p.11-12.

 

9.LOI, 30 September 1969, Gen. William C. Westmoreland,Jr.,sub:Review

of DA Organizations.

 

10. Hewes., p.13.

 

11. Report, 1 March 1971, sub:Report of SpecialReview Panel on DA

Organizatiion, Vol. II,TAB B. HQ DA.

 

12. Letters,Questionaires, March 1970, Files of CONUS Reorganization.

Folder labelled "Parker Panel".

 

13. Hewes., p.16.

 

14. Report of the Special Review Panel on DA Organization Vol.II.,

(HQ DA,Washington,1970), p. II-4 to II-6.

 

15. Ibid., p.II-4-10.

 

16. Ibid., p.II-5-19.

 

17. Hewes., p.21.

 

18. Report of Special Review panel on DA Organization., p.II-16-6 to

II-16-8.

 

19. Ibid., p.II-9-6 to II-9-16.

 

20. Ibid., p.II-7-1 to II-7-6.

 

21. Ibid., p.II-6-3 to II-6-4.

 

22. Ibid., p.II-15-7 to II-15-11.

 

23. MFR, 19 May 1970,sub: Briefing for AVCofSA,15 May 1970.

 

24. Ibid.

 

25. Ibid.

 

26. Ibid.

 

27. Hewes., p.31.

 

28. Ibid., p.32.

 

29. Ibid.

 

30. Ibid., p.33.

 

31. MFR. 10 June 1970,sub: DA Organization, 3,6 June 1970.

 

32. Ibid.

 

33. MFR. 27 July 1970, sub: Senior Officers Meeting, 24 July 1970.

 

34. Ibid.

 

35. Hewes., p.26.

 

36. Hewes., p.44.

 

37. Letter. 20 December 1970, Personal Note to LTG DePuy.

 

38. Memorandum. 14 December 1970,sub: Recent Comments on Draft

Special Review Panel (SRP) Report.

 

39. Ibid.

 

40. MFR. 12 July 1971, sub: Interview with LTC Richard W. Thompson,

Executive Officer, SRP OCS (The Parker Panel, Monday 12 July

1971,1000-1200.

 

41. Ibid.

 

42. Jean R. Moenk. Operation STEADFAST Historical Summary: A History

of the Reorganization of the U. S. Continental Army Command (1972-

1973). (Ft. McPherson, Ga., Ft. Monroe, Va.),p.7.

 

43. Moenik., p.8.

 

44. Ibid., p.9.

 

45. Ibid., p.10.

 

46. Ibid., p.12.

 

47. Ibid., p.14.

 

48. General (RET) William E. DePuy, Interview, June 1984, p.21.

 

49. Ibid., p.22.

 

50. Hewes., p.17.

 

51. Report of Special Review Panel on DA Organization., p. II-4-9 to

II-4-10.

 

52. Col. James S. V. Edgar, Interview, 8 December 1981.

 

53. General (RET) William E. DePuy, Interview (Doyle), 8 March

1973, p.21.

 

54. Ibid., p.2.

 

55. General (RET) William E. DePuy , Interview (Mullen/Brownlee), 19

March 1979, p.21.

 

56. Ibid., p.22.

 

57. Ibid.

 

58. Maj. Gen. Louis C. Menetrey, Interview, 31 March 1982, p.12.

 

59. Ibid.

 

60. DePuy (Doyle)., p.32.

 

61. Ibid.

 

62. Edgar., p.7.

 

63. Ibid., p.8.

 

64. MFR. 10 December, 20 December 1971,sub: Reorganization.

 

65. MFR. 19 January 1972, sub: Conference with Gen. Haines.

 

66. Ibid.

 

67. Ibid.

 

68. Edgar., p.19.

 

69. Ibid., p.9.

 

70. DePuy (Mullen/Brownlee).. p.23.

 

71. Edgar., p.10.

 

72. Col. William G. Tuttle, "Command and Practice", Army Command and

 

Management: Theory and Practice Vol. II., (Carlisle

Barracks,1976), p.692.

 

73. Ibid.

 

74. DePuy (Hewes)., p.34-35.

 

75. Briefing, "The Impetus for Change". January 1972.

 

76. Ibid.

 

77. Ibid.

 

78. Ibid.

 

79. DePuy (Mullen/Brownlee)., p.23.

 

80. Moenk., p.39.

 

82. Ibid., p.41-42.

 

83. Ibid., p.42.

 

84. Memorandum. LTG John Norton. February 1972.

 

85. Brig. Gen. William Tuttle, Interview, 23 September 1981, p.38.

 

86. DePuy (Hewes)., p.35.

 

87. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Robert Froehlke,sub:

Reorganization,28 February 1972.

 

88. DePuy (Hewes)., p.35.

 

89. Edgar., p.15.

 

90. Ibid.

 

91. Ibid., p.16.

 

92. Ibid.

 

93. Ibid.

 

94. Ibid.

 

95. Moenk., p.45.

 

96. Memorandum,10 March 1972,Gen, William C.

Westmoreland,Jr.,sub:CSA Guidance to PMR.

 

97. DePuy (Hewes)., p.36.

 

98. Memorandum, 1 March 1972, LTC William Tuttle,sub: Visit With

Installation Model Team at Ft. Lee.

 

99. Moenk., p.52.

 

100. Menetrey., p.18.

 

101. Memorandum, 5 April 1972, Maj.Gen. James G. Kalergis,

sub:Initial Planning Guidance.

 

102. Ibid.

 

103. Moenk., p.53-54.

 

104. Correspndence,14 April 1972, Gen. Ralph E.Haines,

sub:Reorganization Planning.

 

105. Memorandum, Maj. Gen. James G. Kalergis, 24 April 1972, sub:

Briefing to Secretary of the Army.

 

106. Ibid.

 

107. Message, 24 April 1972, LTC Vouno, sub:Reorganization Planning.

 

108. Directive, 24 April 1972, Maj. Gen. James G. Kalergis, sub: PMR

Reorganization Directive.

 

109. Moenk., p.86.

 

110. Ibid., p.91.

 

111. Ibid., p.94.

 

112. Study, April 1972, sub: Functional Study of Installation

Management.

 

113. Memorandum, 15 June 1972, Maj. Gen. James G. Kalergis, sub:

Guidance for Reorganization Detailed Planning.

 

114. Moenk., p.112.

 

115. Ibid., p.116.

 

116. Memorandum, 30 june 1972, Maj. Gen. James G. Kalergis,sub:

Letter from MG Papke.

 

117. Moenk., p.133-135.

 

118. Ibid., p.136-137.

 

119. Ibid., p.136.

 

120. Ibid., p.137, p.146.

 

121. Ibid., p.146.

 

122. Overview The Advance Planning Process CONUS Reorganization.

 

123. Moenk., p.152.

 

124. Memorandum, LTC Paul J. Raisig,Jr., sub:Briefing for the

Secretary of the Army on 23 August 1972 Guidance.

 

125. Memorandum, 24 August 1972, Maj. Gen. James G. Kalergis,

sub:Guidance for Reorganization Planning.

 

126. Ibid.

 

127. Overview the Advance Planning Process CONUS Reorganization.

 

128. DePuy (Mullen/Brownlee)., p.25.

 

129. Moenk., p.213.

 

130. Ibid.

 

131. Ibid., p.215.

 

132. Briefing, 2 November 1972, LTC Paul C. Raisig,Jr.,sub: Outline

of Opening Remarks by Secretary of the Army Froehlke.

 

133. Ibid.

 

134. Ibid.

 

135. Ibid.

 

136. Letters,December 1972,sub;Proposed Legislation.

 

137. Memorandum, 5 December 1972, OAVCSA, sub: Publication Changes

Required by the Reorganization of the Army in Conus.

 

138. News Briefing, 11 January 1973, Secretary of the Army Robert F.

Froehlke and Creighton W. Abrams.

 

139. Commanders Digest.,Vol.13 No.12, January 25, 1973, p.2.

 

140. Executive Summary., 28 February 1973, sub: Operation STEADFAST

Revised Detailed Plan.

 

141. Report of Special Review Panel on DA Organization.

 

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RESEARCH AND METHODOLOGY

 

Methodology

 

This paper is an historical account of the events of the

 

Reorganization of 1972-1973. I did not attempt to take one

 

historiographical approach or another. Also, there are many

 

political science paradigms for bureaucratic political science

 

framework. The political science literature on bureaucracies begins

 

with Max Weber. Every major contribution since Weber provides a new

 

perspective for analysis. Chester Barnard looked at the direction of

 

public orgaizations with the focus on the role of the executive

 

(The Functions of the Executive, 1938). Herbert Simon recorded and

 

refuted the parables of public administration (Administrative

 

Behavior,1958). Peter Blau and Richard Scott looked at the process

 

of organizational change with the key being innovations by the

 

executive in terms of inducement-contribution balance for

 

organizations (Formal Organizations, 1962). Edward Banfield looked

 

at planning as rational choice, means-ends schema (Concepts and

 

Issues in Administrative Behavior) and with emphasis on the mechanism

 

of choice of public interest as a partial determinant of the control

 

of public interest (Politics, Planning and the Public Interest,

 

1955). James March and Herbert Simon studied planning as result of

 

rational choice inproblem solving (Organizations,1958) and included

 

"Gresham's Law of planning which stated daily routines drive out

 

planning. Charles Lindblom (The Policy-Making Process, 1968) and

 

Yehzekhel Dror added to the literature with emphasis on the

 

incremental nature of change in organizations. Morton Halperin

 

specifically addressed the planning in organizations (Bureaucratic

 

Politics and Foreign, Policy, 1974). James Q. Wilson (The

 

Investigators, 1978), and Hugh Heclo (Government of Strangers) added

 

specificity as to the varying interests of different people within

 

organizations. There have been explanations of organizational

 

behavior as sociological interpretations (Selznick), cultural

 

interpretations (Crozier) and economic interpretaions (Niskanen).

 

This paper provides the grist for an analytical mill. The next step

 

would be to borrow from Karl Popper (Conjectures and Refutations) and

 

attemps to rigorously test a hypothesis. Consequently, the

 

conclusions from this paper are only inferences from the research and

 

observation of the author. The utility of the paper is the

 

exposition of the "facts", the data, of the case and the suggaestion

 

of their importance.The paper illustrates several issues in bureau-

 

cratic politics; the Army as an professional orgainzation, the Army

 

as a unique Federal bureaucracy, management in civil-military

 

relations, and the turning point in history for the post-Vietnam era.

 

 

Research

 

This paper is totally indebted to the work of Dr. James E. Hewes

 

Jr. Dr. Hewes gathered all of the primary source documents and had

 

conducted important interviews before his retirement from the Center

 

of Military History. The original documents had been retreived from

 

the U.S. Government storage. I went through the boxes of materials

 

Dr. Hewes had at the Center of Military History. I found twenty

 

boxes which had material for my paper. While researching at the

 

Center I acquired other papers and interviews for my research.



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