Operation Steadfast: The United States Army Reorganizes Itself
CSC 1985
SUBJECT AREA Topical Issues
USMC Command and Staff College April 1985
Quantico, VA
Operation STEADFAST: The United States Army
Reorganizes Itself
JAMES A. BOWDEN
MAJ, IN
USA
The history of the United States Army is more than the stirring
accounts of battles, campaigns, leaders, and soldiers arrayed in a
chronology or divided along any analytical azimuth. There is another
history, the history of the Army in peace, which is very important.
What happens in the peacetime Army helps to determine the performance
of the Army in war. The study of the Army as an organization is a
vital to understanding the Army in war or peace. The Army as an org-
anization is at once a federal bureaucracy and a professional Ameri-
can institution. Consequently, the study of the Army requires an in-
terdisciplinary approach to fully appreciate the complexity of the
organization and the interrelationships of simulataneous endogeneous
and exogeneous forces at any point in history. Therefore, the hist-
ory of the Army is to a surprisingly large degree the history of the
organization as much as it is the history of the relatively brief,
violent, and vitally important encounters which are the raison d'etre
for the organization.
A study of the organization may begin with structure and proced-
ures, political relationships and the environment of the era. The
structure and processes, informal and formal, sociological and
political, help to determine who shall "run" the uniformed,
professional Army. This is very important despite the outward
appearances today of a great, green machine and consumer of vast
resources. This was important in the pre-World War II Army which
appeared to be so many far-flung small outposts peopled by polo-
players and dedicated students of war alike.
People really make the difference in the Army as an organizat-
ion. The organizational structure and procedures which help to
select the uniformed leaders of the service are subject in turn to
the influence of the leaders. We have come full circle. The
idiosyncratic influences in this mass organization are as vital as
the individual pyschological factrors are in combat. Individuals in
key positions leave an imprint on the organization which is difficult
to quantify but impossible to ignore. The success and failure of the
Army on the battlefield and its ability to help deter war is
predicated on the Army as an organization of structure, procedures,
and people in peace. Obviously, politics intervene in the vertical
spectrum of war from individual combat to global strategy. Yet,
success and failure at all levels is influenced by the Army, as it
is, in peace. Operationally, battlefield success in war in the
tactical levels from squads to the theater operations is largely a
function of the Army, rather than politics of any stripe. Also, the
environment of a period of time affects all aspects of the
organization. The history of the United States Army as an
organization parallels the growth of the modern, American, democratic
state.
This paper is a detailed account of the Army Reorganization of
1973, Operation STEADFAST. It examines how, given the structure,
procedures, people and environment, a very important reorganization
was conceived and managed by the professional officers of the
institution which led to real changes in the structure, procedures.
and people of the organization.
Once the decision was made to begin the withdrawal of U.S.
Forces from Vietnam in the Summer of 1969, the Army was a bureaucracy
facing a classic situation of organizational retrenchment. Yet, the
obvious external pressures on the Army as an institution from every
direction in American society and from every other national
institution did not dictate the timing nor the exact shape of the
changes in the organization. It seems that the direction of change
would necessarily be a reduction in size and resources for some years
to follow.
However, the Army Reorganization of 1973 was the first of three
reorganizations, which as a sum became a fundamental reformation of
the organization. The change was profound because, unlike the
changes of the turn-of-the-century Root Reforms or the 1942
Reorganization (or the incremental changes in iterations of the
National Security Act of 1947), this reorganization was internally
directed with the assistance of the civilian leadership in the
Department of the Army. Whereas, all former reorganizations required
the alliance of a very activist Secretary and a reform-minded
contigent of officers to battle the entrenched bureaucratic interests
of another alliance of officers and their allies in Congress. This
reorganization is more limited in scope than the Prussian reforms of
the early 19th Century because it did not involve the society at
large, nor did it explicitly reform the principal organizations
within the Army. It was a reform which preserved and enhanced the
opportunities for the professional officer corps to maintain its
autonomy in the management of the organization within the framework
of civilian control over the military. This was an absolutely
essential prerequisite to marshal the human and material resources
needed to rebuild the Army after the political debacle in Vietenam
and the disintegration of the Army which was away from the fight.
The United States Army in 1985 was painfully rebuilt from the
uniformed mob of the early 1970's by the investment of the hard work
of the officer and non-commissioned officer corps and the infusion
of some fine young people and carefully managed resources. The key
individuals to set the stage for the rebuilding of a national
institution were Army Generals William E. DePuy, Bruce C. Palmer Jr.,
and Creighton W. Abrams Jr. This is an examination of the first step
in the reformation, Operation STEADFAST.
BETWEEN REORGANIZATIONS - A TURBULENT DECADE
1962-1972
WE TRAINED HARD -- BUT IT SEEMED THAT EVERY TIME WE WERE
BEGINNING TO FORM UP INTO TEAMS, WE WOULD BE REORGANIZED. I WAS TO
LEARN LATER IN LIFE WE TEND TO MEET ANY NEW SITUATION BY
REORGANIZING, AND THE WONDERFUL METHOD IT CAN BE FOR CREATING THE
ILLUSION OF PROGRESS WHILE PRODUCING CONFUSION, INEFFICIENCY AND
DEMORALIZATION.
PETRONIUS ARBITER, 66 AD
Petronius Arbiter's quote was a beloved epigram for many Army
officers as the Army reorganized itself during the throes of the
traumatic withdrawal from Southeast Asia. The epigram was facile
enough to vent the frustrations of staff offficers pushing papers in
the Pentagon. Yet, as the epigram gave no indication of the real
training and expertise of someone called Petronius Arbiter, the Army
Reorganization of 1972-73 could appear to be much less than it really
was. Actually, Petronius Arbiter was the chronicler of the
pornographic carryings on of the court of the Emperorer Nero. (1) In
fact the Army Reorganization of 1972-73 was more than a shuffling of
the housekeeping duties of the stateside Army to meet the pressures
of the Executive Branch and the Congress to drastically reduce after
a war. The Army's Reorganization was an extraordinary, internally-
directed move to develop improved control of the management of the
Army and, consequently, increase the autonomy of the Army under the
direction of the professional, uniformed officers. The turbulent
decade since the last major reorganization of the Army in 1962 (based
on the Hoelscher Committee's Project 80 Study) had not sown the seeds
for the need to reorganize as much as it had created the opportunity
for major changes.
The "reforms" and reorganization brought about during the
McNamara era threatened the autonomy of the Army more than any other
Service. When the analysts for the Secretary of Defense sought to
develop a programmatic approach to manage the department under the
direction of a chief executive officer, the Army was ill-prepared to
report its assets in personnel, equipment and finances. It was
equally at a loss to explain how all the pieces of the puzzle of
commands, combat units and headquarters' staffs fit together to man,
equip, train and employ an "Army". Since the 19th Century the Army
had been a series of semi-autonomous bureaus, which were loosely
federated as the "staff", and the units spread out in the field,
which were the "line". The organizational history of the Army is the
story of conflict between the line and the staff. The opportunities
for conflict are neither accidental nor neglected anachronisms. As a
member of the Executive Branch, the War Department (the Department of
the Army), the United States Army (the regulars), the Army of the
United States (the National Guard and the conscripts), and the United
States Army Reserve (the Reserves - also part of the Army of the
United States) have their perogatives in the management of resources
and their internal autonomy written into the legislative concrete of
the United States Code. The internal bureaucratic struggles of the
organization are fanned in the fires of the budgetary process.
In the decade of the Sixties the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) was about to abrogate the autonomy, divided as it
was, of the Army. The war in Vietnam diverted the attention of OSD
and the Army to the pressing details of present-tense crisis after
crisis. The Army Staff in Washington and the line organizations in
the Continental United States (CONUS) did an excellent job in
preparing and prosecuting a distant war with minimal support from
mobilization. The fighting Army which was built after the post-
Korean doldrums from the latter 1950's through the 1968 may have been
the finest, professsonal Army fielded by the United States. The Army
as a bureaucracy, however, was in different shape. Since OSD had
taken the steps to bring the Services in line with the programmatic
approach of major U.S. corporations, the Army existed in the note-
books of organizations and commands on the shelf behind Secretary
Mcnamara's desk. (2) The sum of the notebooks, theoritically, was
the Army "program". Every change within the Army which changed
resource allocations had to be approved through the OSD. The Army,
staff and line, was becoming the handmaiden to the notebooks. While
the daily attention of the Army and OSD were focused on Vietnam
several steps were taken which would allow the Army to move towards a
thoughtful reorganization. The start of the withdrawal from Vietnam
in the Summer of 1969 created the pressures which plunged the Army
headlong into the pursuit of reorganization. The events which
prepared the way for reorganization included the following.
The Haines Board - 1966. The Report to the Army Board to Review
Officers Schools in February 1966 concluded the Continental Army
Command had too much to do. The report recommended further study to
reduce the span of control for the Continental Army Command. (3)
Interestingly enough the report was chaired by the officer who would
later oppose such a reorganization as the CONARC Commander, General
Ralph E. Haines.
The Brown Board - 1967. The Brown Board was an in-depth
examination of the Army's equipment management from Company-level to
Headquarters, Department of the Army. The Board recommended changes
in the Army's logistical procedures and organization. (4)
The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel - 1970. The Report to the President
and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense was an
across the board review of the Department. Mr. Gilbert H. Fitzhugh,
Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company, headed a bi-partisan panel which produced 133
recommendations for Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird on July 1,
The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA or the "Vice") Gen. Bruce
Palmer Jr. attended a briefing with Secretary Laird, Mr. Fitzhugh and
members of the Blue Ribbon Panel on 19 July. When Gen. Palmer
briefed the Army's General Staff Council the following day he was
critical of the Panel's recommendations. He did not agree with the
Panel's recommendations for "a single program budget structure". (5)
Secretary Laird had taken the responsibility for the Army programs
and budget from the notebooks behind the desk and given it back to
the Army. However, the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff (AVCSA or the
"A-Vice") Lieutenant General (Lt.Gen.) William E.DePuy was aware of
the need to review the Army's organization and management. The
coming reduction in the size of the Army in the post-Vietnam era
would put new pressures on the Army. If the Army failed to influence
the process of cutting back, then it might have been reduced and
controlled with a capriciousness and completeness far exceeding
McNamara's notebooks. Consequently, the appointment of the Blue
Ribbon Panel in 1969 was the impetus for the Chief of Staff, Gen.
William E. Westmoreland, the Vice Chief, Gen.Palmer, and the
Asssistant Vice Chief, Lt.Gen. DePuy to appoint an ad hoc study group
from the Force Planning Analysis Directorate of the Army Staff to
look at the organization of the Department of the Army.(6) Lieutenant
Colonel (Lt.Col.or LTC) Winthrop Whipple, Jr., an operations analyst
and LTC John V. Foley, a cost accountant, spent the summer of 1969
studying the Army organization. They reported to Lt.Gen. DePuy and
formally briefed Gen. Westmoreland at the end of September. The
Whipple-Foley "Pillot Study on DA (Department of the Army)
Organization" was a tightly controlled review of organizational
problems and the especific personalities involved. Dissemination of
any information outside of the Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of
Staff (OAVCSA) was expressly forbidden. The report was an outline of
the problems of organization, management, and personalities. The
report found Continental Army Command (CONARC) had too many roles and
missions. The Combat Developments Combat (CDC) was a command without
resources. The Army Material Command (AMC) did not have life-cycle
control for the equipment management. Personnel management was
fragmented among three agencies: OPO (Office of Personnel
Operations), TAGO (The Adjutant General's Office), and DCSPER (Deputy
Chief of Staff for Personnel). (8)
Based on this report, Gen. Westmoreland appointed Major General
David S. Parker as the chairman of a Special Review Panel (SRP) on
Department of the Army organization on 30 September 1969. "The
Parker Panel" had a charter to report recommendations to the problems
identified in the Whipple-Foley Pilot Study by July 1970. The panel
would not look at tactical organizations. The panel would closely
examine the U.S. Continental Army Command, the Combat Developments
Command, the Army Material Command, and the Headquarters Department
of the Army Staff (the Army Staff or ArStaff). (9)
The Parker Panel. Maj.Gen. David S. Parker selcted LTC Richard W.
Thompson as the Executive Officer for the panel. LTC Thompson came
from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS)
at the end of 1969. (10) The "Initial Terms of Reference" were ap-
proved by Gen. Westmoreland to give guidance for the panel. The pan-
el was to investigate the roles of the U.S.Continental Army, the sub-
ordinate numbered armies of the continental United States (CONUSA),
the Military District of Washington, the Combat Developments Command,
the Class II Activities reporting directly to the Department of the
Army Staff, and the Headquarters, Department of the Army Staff. (11)
The panel was to examine the agencies to look at the organization and
management of the resources to run the Army. Specifically, the panel
would look at the allocation of functions within the Army Staff and
the major CONUS commands. It would look at proposals for alternative
organization and management practices which would help the Army
operate with reduced resources. The panel would recommend procedures
to carry out the changes.
Maj.Gen. Parker chose 13 officers from a pool of 80 to serve on
the panel by January 1970. One civilian, a budget expert from the
Deputy Chief of Staff of Logistics (DCSLOG), was also a member. The
panel interviewed widely throughout the headquarters in Washington
and the installations across the United States. It interviewed some
retired officers. Additionally, the panel interviewed representat-
ives of major civilian industries (for example IBM and Xerox).
The questions to the military commanders and to the captains of
industry were to the point. Executives were asked about the level of
decision-making, systems management (horizontal) vs. functional
management (vertical), and the growth and use of ad hoc committees.
Staff issues of organization, function and growth were addressed.
The Army leadership wanted to know if the shape of management
information systems was a function of the techniques of management,
the nature of the business, or the degree of supervision by a board
of governors. It was especially important to see how organizations
dealt with the related functions of research and development,
material procurement, storage, sale, rental, maintenance, and
elimination of obsolete equipment. (12)
The panel developed 41 "Revised Problem Statements" by 28 April
1970. Seven of the problems were with the Army Staff, one was with
CONARC, and the other thirty-three were with the functional
responsibilities shared by the Army Staff and the three major
commands in the United States; CONARC, Combat Developments Command
(CDC), and the Army Material Command (AMC). (13) Many of the
complaints dealt with the procedures used on the staff to complete
the paperwork for any "staff action". The overlapping
responsibilities among the staff lead to endless "turf fights".
The Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff (OAVCSA) was
a source of controversy. The panel reviewed the functions of the
OAVCSA in detail. The OAVCSA had been intended as a stop-gap measure
which would work its way out of a job in two years as it addressed
the issues driven by OSD. (14) After General Johnson retired in
1968, the new Chief of Staff, Ben. William E. Westmoreland, brought
in his team with Gen. Bruce C. Palmer,Jr. as the Vice Chief of
Staff. The new Assistant Vice-Chief was William E. DePuy, Lt Gen.
DePuy redefined the duties of the A-Vice to solve some of the more
pressing problems of the Army Headquarters. The A-Vice got involved
in the need to reach budgetary compromises somewhere below the
absolute pinnacle of the organization. More of the efforts of the A-
Vice and the importance of the office as a means to intervene in the
Army Headquarters will be discussed later. The "off-line" office of
the OAVCSA allowed the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army
to have a very high-popwered office for fire-fighting the issues of
crucial importance to the organization without becoming bogged down
in the details of day-to-day responsibilities The Parker Panel
reported, "In spite of the announced trend toward decentralization
within the DOD, the requirement for rapid and detailed response is
likely to require a continuing capability such as is provided by the
OAVCSA." (15)
The Parker Panel determined that the responsibility for
management doctrine for all the non-tactical management of
information systems was fragmented among the Army Staff. The Army
needed to closely examine how its many systems were operating, how
they were regulated and interacted, and how they contributed to the
management of the Army. The Army Authorization Documents System
(TAADS) is the paperwork which shapes, supports, directs, and
authorizes the Army at one level of authority below public law. An
Army does not move on its stomach, it moves on its Regulations
and Tables. TAADS had become too slow to keep up with the Army in
transition. The Army had not standardized its Automatic Data
Processing Systems (ADPS) communications. (16)
There were many cooks and no chef for material development. The
Office, Chief of Research and Development (OCRD) did not have the
sole authority in the research and developoment field. The
criticisms in the area of material development were not restricted to
OCRD. The problems were an indictment of the entire system by the
users of any piece of equipment in the Army, the Army Staff, the DOD,
and the Congress. The AMC, CDC, OCRD, ODCSOPS, and the OAVCSA were
involved in the research, development and acquisition of material for
the Army. General Chesarek, the former A-Vice and the Commanding
General of AMC at the time, wanted to put another Deputy Chief of
Staff on the Army Staff. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Material
Systems (DCSMS) would consolidate many of the functions spread across
the staff and among the major commands. (17) This would help to
solve the problem of running all requirements for materiel through
the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force development (ACSFOR).
Furthermore, the Army lacked the technically competent officers to
manage a weapon or piece of equipment from its conception through
development until it is phased out of the inventory. The career
development of officers needed for the material life-cycle management
was not receiving enough attention.
The Combat Developments Command (CDC) was criticized because it
was a major command without any clout. CDC should have been the
organization for the Army to develop the doctrine to guide the
employment of its many weapons systems and units across the spectrum
of combat. There were overlapping responsibilities between CONARC
and CDC for doctrinal publications. There was inadequuate
interaction between the doctrine developer and the schools. Yet, the
CDC was lacking in manpower and financial resurces. Consequently,
the officer in CONARC who was supposed to monitor the training in one
of the Army schools had no corespondent at CDC who could write
doctrine. The officer at CONARC would have to fill both functions.
The organization had problems remaining a conceptual research-
oriented organizationl. Finally, there was overlapping assignment of
logistics doctrine responsibilitiies. (18)
The Parker Panel noted problem areas in Army force development.
Since CDC did not contribute to the development of doctrine and
material requirements, it could not effectively contribute to the
Planning and Programming aspects of the budget cycle. CONARC did not
incorporate new doctrine into its training and educational programs.
Logistics doctrine was split among DCSLOG, AMC, and the CONARC
schools . There was criticism of the Combat Developments Experiment
Center (CDEC) at Fort Ord and the Mobile Army Sensor System, Test and
Evaluation Center (MASSTER) at Fort Hood. The Army Staff needed to
develop force mobilization plans which integrated logistics. The
Parker Panel also noted the problems for ACSFOR, and the ACSFOR
directorates for Aviation, Air Defense, and Nuclear, Biological and
Chemical Operations. (19)
The personnel side of the house illustrated the problems of
fractured responsibilities among the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Personnel (DCSPER). The Adjutant Generl's Office (TAGO), and the
Office of Personnel Operations (OPO). Problems existed in personnel
actions (promotions, efficiency reports), procurement of personnel,
civil schooling, personnel records, separations, and Reserve forces
records administration. (20)
The Army Staff could not agree on the role of the Comptroller.
The functions of the Comptroller had not changed since its inception
in 1948, but the management environment had changed significantly.
The Comptroller is the director of Army budgeting, but the A-Vice and
the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development (ACSFOR) had a
great deal to do with the programming end of programming and
budgeting. The Comptroller's role in cost analysis needed
definition. The flow of automated data reports should be included in
the duties of the Comptroller, yet much of the control of the
management of information systems was being controlled by the OAVCSA.
Finally, the Comptroller had dual responsibilities to the Chief of
Staff and to an Assistant Secretary of the Army. The Army had to
decide how to allocate increasingly scarce resources. (21)
The Continental Army Command (CONARC) suffered from its wide
span of control. It had four major functions of individual education
and training, force development, force employment, support and
service. The support and service mission, alone, entailed
the management of 42 Army posts in the U.S. Furthermore, there was
the layering of the Continental Army (CONUSA or subordinate numbered
armies) between CONARC and the installations. The Military District
of Washington as a separate headquarters under CONARC jurisdiction
was another issue. (22)
Maj.Gen. Parker briefed the A-Vice, Gen. DePuy, on 15 May. Gen.
DePuy noted that programming was not one of the workload indicators
which generated the staff workload statistics. The result did not
reflect the true workload for the army Staff. (23) He also noted
that programming guidance came from the Secretary of the Army. Since
the OAVCSA was doing the troubleshootiong for the Secretary, any
agency given more responsibility for programming would have to work
with the OAVCSA. DePuy asked the Panel to look at the integrator-
coordinator role of the OAVCSA.
Lt.Gen. DePuy "insisted that technology drives doctrine." (24)
The responsibilitly for doctrine should be assigned to a new Deputy
for Material Systems (DCSMS). He believed that CONARC let the
schools develop doctrine independently. Consequently, he wanted to
put all of the schools, including the Army War College, under the
Combat Developments Command. The schools should be taken away from
CONARC because "CONARC has too great a workload, is too big, too
broke, and ultra-conservative ... too much routine and too much to
do." (25) "If CONARC is to look at relative costs and installation
management, they can't do anything else. They can't be the
instrument for getting new ideas into young leaders." (26) DePuy
recognized the problem of dividing training and education, yet he
still wanted to give CDC control of the curriculum in the Army
schools.
The briefing for the Vice, Gen. Palmer, was 21 May. Ben. Palmer
did not want to move the Weapons Systems Analysis (WSA) out of the
OAVCSA because the WSA gave the Office of the Chief of Staff an
"independent review capability." (27) Furthermore, he did not want a
DCSMS with a WSA to be "in bed" with the Army Material Command (AMC).
He preferred to transfer WSA functions to ACSFOR instead of DCSMS.
Gen. Palmer was against moving the installation functions from
the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics to the Chief of Engineers.
Also, he did not want to reduce the Assistant Chief of Staff for
Communications-Electronics from a General Staff to a Special Staff
Agency. (28)
Gen. Palmer noted that Gen. Westmoreland looked at CONARC "as
the largest and perhaps most important command in the Army" which
will be important in the next ten years "in maintaining a modern Army
and in developing new concepts." (29) Furthermore, the Army War
College should remain under the Army Headquarters. The Military
District of Washington should be transferred from CONARC to the Army
Headquarters. Gen. Palmer approved releasing the proposals to the
Army Staff, but he did not want the Commanding Generals of CONARC or
CDC to be informed until "we get guidance from Gen. Westmoreland."
(30) Maj.Gen. Parker gave an "interim" report to Generals DePuy,
Palmer and Westmoreland on 2 June 1970. Gen. Westmoreland directed
Maj. Gen. Parker to "solicit comments from the Major Commands,
arrange for a special session with the Army Staff before final
decisions, and to inform the Secretary of the Army of the panel
proposals as soon as possible." (31) Gen. Westmoreland was
interested in the concept of a DCSMS and requested further
development of the concept. He wanted to generally retain CONARC "in
its present configuration", although he was willing to put the
Command and General Staff College and the Army War College under the
Combat Developments Command. He noted that the CDC could be made
responsible for doctrine and curricula and place all officer schools
under CDC. In most cases Gen. Westmoreland did not want to change
things. For example, he did not want to split CONARC into two
separate commands. When Maj.Gen. Parker met with Gen. Westmoreland
again on 6 June, the Chief directed the Special Review Panel submit
its complete report with recommendations and alternatives on 31 July.
The Chief would appoint a panel of Senior officers under Gen. Palmer
to consider two issues. Gen. Palmer would look at the CONARC and CDC
reorganization proposals to create a Combat Doctrine and Schools
Command and to create a Deputy Chief of Staff for Material Systems.
The rest of the panel report would be sent to the Army Staff for
normal staff procedures of review. (32)
Maj.Gen. Parker briefed the General Staff Council on 16 June
1970. The key officers of the Army Staff gave the report mixed
reviews and many different suggestions. Secretary of the Army
Stanley Resor, UnderSecretary Thaddeus R. Beal and the Assistant
Secretaries were briefed on 18, 20, and 24 June. Mr. Resor was not
anxious to transfer the Weapons Systems Analysis from the OAVCSA to
the new DCSMS. He wanted to retain an independent office to review
and analyse the big budget programs of modernizing the Army. Mr.
Resor did not endorse or reject the Special Review Panel report.
Since the Chief gave guidance to staff the report through normal
channels, the required written comments began to surface. The first
comments came from Colonel John B. Wadsworth, Jr. the Deputy
Secretary to the General Staff for Staff Action Control. He
supported some of the proposals for a new Deputy Chief of Staff for
Materiel Systems, for trnasferring personnel management to a Person-
nel Command, and for the management of information systems by the
Comptroller. He opposed redesignating the A-Vice as the Director of
the Army staff and placing him directly between the principals of the
Army Staff and the Chief.
Gen. Palmer held a special Senior Officer's meeting on 24 July.
The meeting's agenda was limited to the issues of creating a Combat
Development and Schools Command and a Deputy Chief of Staff for
Materiel Systems. The Commanding General of CONARC, Gen. Woolnough,
was the most adamant in his opposition to the recommendations of the
panel. He argued that CONARC was responsible for individual and unit
training. Furthermore, all of the units, training centers, and
schools support CONARC's training mission. Additionally, Gen.
Woolnough urged the Combat Developments Command be returned to CONARC
to compliment the training mission. (33) He believed the
organizational strength was found in keeping together the Command
which accounted for 45% of the Army's military personnel. Dividing
functions would only serve to push disagreements up to the Army Staff
when they could be resolved at CONARC Headquarters.
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development (ACSFOR), Lt.
Gen. Weyand, strongly opposed the proposal for a DCSMS. He contended
the problem was not the need for a single manager of all the
resources. He questioned the entire Special Review Panel report on
omitting the "why". A DCSMS would not solve the problems raised in
the report. The problem was the requirements. Thus, the real problem
was to determine what the real needs of the Army were. (34)
In July the Parker Panel submitted its recommendations to Gen.
Westmoreland. The Panel proposed the following major changes for the
Army Staff: Consolidation of the responsibilities for materiel
development and acquisition into a Deputy Chief of Staff for Materiel
Systems (DCSMS), by involving the merger of CRD with DCSLOG PEMA
(Procurement, Equipment and Missilies, Army) operations;
consolidation of personnel functions in OPO by transferring it to
personnel functions from the Adjutant General's Office and DCSPER
into a new organization called the Army Personnel Center (APC);
eliminating or transferring to AMC certain operating functions of
DCSLOG; eliminating the Office of the Chief of Support Services and
transferring its functions to DCSLOG and the Army Personnel Center
(35) The office-of the A-Vice would keep its hand in the budget and
management of information systems. The Weapons Systems Analysis
office in the OAVCSA would move to the new DCSMS. In the field the
Military District of Washington (MDW) wouold be moved from CONARC to
Headquarters, Department of the Army. The Combat Developments
Schools Command (CDSC) would be created by combining the Combat
Developments Command, Project MASSTER at Fort Hood and the Combat
Developments Experiment Center (CDEC).
Gen. Westmoreland met with the Parker Panel on 24 September.
Gen. Westmoreland was not ready to move ahead to create a DCSMS since
"a clear case had not been presented, and the staff is split wide
open." (36) He ordered further study of the issues around developing
a single Deputy Chief of Staff for Materiel Systems. At a briefing
on 10 October Maj.Gen. Parker attempted to answer some of the
questions about DCSMS. He outlined the differences on the issue of
the DCSMS as being a split between those who felt the change was
inadequate to the problem and those who felt the change would put
too much power in the hands of a single principal on the Army Staff.
He also indicated he wanted to move some officer billets from WSA to
ACSFOR to improve the analytical capability of the ACSFOR. Gen.
Westmoreland sent Maj.Gen. Parker back for further research. He
wanted a study of the "Two Deputy Concept". One deputy would be the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs. The other Deputy would be the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans.
By 30 November Gen. Palmer had made 34 management improvements.
He agreed to take no further action until Gen. Haines' staff at
CONARC had completed their study on management. Gen. Palmer told
Lt.Gen. DePuy in a personal note on 20 December 1970 that he wanted
to have a meeting with the Chief in January. He noted that he did
not want to go for any great changes because he felt "this is a poor
time for any drastic" reorganizations and he wanted to "continue to
improve our organization and modus operandi through evolutionary
changes." (37) He outlined a number of interim steps he wanted to
have taken by the Army Staff, CONARC, and CDC.
On 21 January Maj.Gen. Parker returned to brief the Chief. The
Vice, Gen. Palmer, argued against the Two Deputy concept. Gen. West-
moreland told Maj.Gen. Parker to study the problem further. Maj.Gen.
Parker returned on 1 February to brief again. Both Gen. Palmer and
Maj. Gen. Parker argued against the Two Deputy concept. Gen.
Palmer's briefings on the DCSMS on 22 October, 7 December, and 11
December proved to be inconclusive. In the meantime the principal
commanders of CONARC, AMC, and CDC changed. Maj.Gen. Parker prepared
a memorandum for Gen. Palmer which gave the views of the new
Commanding Generals and two Generals from the Army Staff. The
consensus of the new views was to not change.(38) When the
memorandum was routed through the A-Vice, Lt.Gen. DePuy, he added the
following comment for Gen. Palmer, "I have taken the liberty of
making some margin notes -pointing out some dubious statements and
conclusions. The staff is divided - confused - and bickering. We
need a decision." (39)
Gen. Westmoreland reviewed the Parked Panel report for the last
time on 27 and 29 January 1971. No major changes were approved
except for moving the Military District of Washington (MDW) from
CONARC and making it a MACOM (Major Command) of the Army on 1 July
1971. Gen. Westmoreland supported his new set of senior staff
officers and commanders. The Parker Panel had outlined the problems
and some solutions. Yet, the procedure had failed to bring about
change. Why? The panel had had "carte blanche" in the selection of
the personnel for the panel, in the organization and in the
procedures to be followed. Unlike the Hoelscher Committee from
McNamara's days, there were no directives from the Secretary's
Office. The problems were not beyond the wit of man to perceive.
The major problems were: "(1) Control over the overall materiel
acquisition cycle -particularly the interrelationship (interfaces)
between development and production and the fragmented responsibility
for the whole materiel cucle at the Army Staff level involving
ACSFOR, OCRD, and DCSLOG. (2) The relationships between CONARC and
CDC, including the unmanageable span of control at CONARC and the
practical subordination of CDC to ACSFOR. CDC had responsibility
without the effective authority especially in the area of developing
doctrine. (3) The Personnel Management area, especially the
continued fragmentation of its functions among TAGO, OPO, and DCSPER.
(40) Furthermore, there was no problem in getting the data and
information desired, although the quality of much of the statistics
was indicative of the nature and scope of the problems.
In June 1970 Maj.Gen. Parker advised the Chief of Staff that one
way of dealing with the recommendations would be to "bite the bullet"
and accept the recommendations of the Special Review Panel without
staffing the recommendations of the panel through the very staffs who
have vested interests in maintaining the status quo. This was the
method used by the McNarney Committee in 1942 and by Secretary
of Defense Robert McNamara in 1962. (41) However, General
Westmoreland chose to staff the Panel Report. Also, there was a six
month delay in making decisions because of the Blue Ribbon Defense
Panel. The Army had to see what the OSD would do. Finally, the
changes in senior personnel shifted the attitudes of the key
decision-makers of the Army against major changes in CONARC, CDC, and
the issue of a Deputy Chief of Staff for Materiel Systems. The Panel
had recommended comprehensive changes in almost everyone's turf in
the Commands and on the Army Staff. Gen. Westmoreland chose to stand
pat.
Continental Army Command 72 : Mission and Structure, November
1971. The U.S. Continental Army Command anticipated the coming
reductions in the budget. On 3 October 1970 a special Management
Improvement Panel was established to "develop new innovative concepts
for management improvements within the U.S. Continental Army Command
and to list those concepts in order of feasibility, suitability, and
desirability; and to develop the methodology for converting such
concepts to command action. This special panel was to conduct its
review based on the following assumptions: That the pressure to
reduce the size of the Army would continue as a result of the rollup
in Vietnam and reductions in other overseas areas; that austere
funding of the U.S. Continental Army Command's misson and support
program would continue through FY 1972 and into future fiscal years."
(42) CONARC's panel met from 17 November 1970 through the end of
February 1971. The panel concluded there were five areas which
demanded much in resources: organizational structure, mission
prioristies, school training, intraservice support, and contractual
requirements. The panel concluded in their report in March 1971 that
"streamlining" the command structure "provided the most far-reaching
method of acheiving economies while modernizing and simplifying
operations." (43)
Interestingly, the report on the command structure was the only
report of five which was not forwarded to the Department of the Army.
General Haines did not believe the reorganization recommended was
appropriate at the time. He informed the Vice Chief of Staff about
the report and his reasons for asking the panel to revise it.
General Haines did not want to eliminate the subordinate Army
headquarters from CONARC because he wanted them "to provide effective
co-ordination in the event of domestic emergencies or disasters; to
provide co-ordination of the support of Reserve Component training;
to insure the co-ordinated planning and execution for rapid
mobilization; and to preserve the Army visibility in major
metropolitan areas. (44)
While the CONARC panel was revising Report No. 1 on the command
structure, the Department of the Army eliminated one of the major
subordinate Army commands. The Fifth Army at Fort Sheridan, Illinois
was eliminated and the boundaries were redrawn to have four Armies
(CONUSA) in the continental U.S. The revised report shifted
responsibilities and the size of staffs among the commands in CONARC.
Gen. Haines did not approve the report. However, the report
demonstrated the difficulty of resolving the problems with CONARC's
organizational structure. Much work had produced an effort which did
adequately provide an answer to the problem of scarce resources and
many headquarters.
In the meantime the Special Review Panel (SRP - Parker Panel)
had concluded its work with two recommendations of particular
interest to CONARC. A Recommendation No. 31 dealt with the Reserve
Component structure and Recommendation No. 32 considered the
allocation by function of administrative, logistical, and other
management functions to different headquarters in CONARC. The CONARC
Management Panel did not address these recommendations. Furthermore,
Gen. Palmer, the Vice, let Gen. Haines know that "there was a
growing feeling in the Pentagon that one level of headquarters
between the Department of the Army and the installations in the
continental United States should be eliminated." (45) Gen. Haines
had asked Gen. Palmer not to act on the recommendations of the
Parker Panel in January 1971 until CONARC completed its own study.
When Gen. Haines rejected his staff's work in September he decided to
address the Parker Panel criticisms directly. He directed his Deputy
Chief of Staff, Comptroller, to prepare a major policy statement for
the Vice Chief of Staff. A report was prepared in October 1971, but
Gen. Haines did not believe the letter and short report were adequate
to make CONARC's case. Gen. Haines discussed his desires for the
CONARC 72 study with his Chief of Staff and Deputy Chief of Staff,
Comptroller. The CONARC 72 -- Mission and Organization Study was
completed in mid-November 1971 and forwarded to the Department of the
Army on 25 November 1971. (46) Five alternative solutions for
restructuring the command organization in CONARC were presented. The
study concluded the present command structure should be retained. It
indicated "that the existing command structure of the U.S.
Continental Army Command had a single headquarters responsible for a
major portion of the Army's mission relative to combat-ready forces,
and base operations in the continental United States. The day-to-day
performance of these missions was decentralized, insofar as possible
to four geographical commands, relieving Headquarters, U.S.
Continental Command, of many co-ordinating and operating functions
and ensuring a workable span of command and control. At the same
time, the overall structure permitted maximum flexibility, efficient
use of available resources, close co-ordination of Active Army and
Reserve Component activities and a rapid expansion of the training
base in the event of mobilization. The structure above installation
level - Headquarters, CONARC, and the four area (Army) headquarters
in the continental United States -- included fewer headquarters than
at any time in the history of the U.S. Army since World War I." (47)
The report left three major functional missions -- forces for
two unified commands, training, and base operations in the hands of
one headquarters, CONARC. The efforts of the CONARC Commander, Gen.
Haines, helped delay the Vice Chief of Staff, Gen. Palmer, from
taking any action to change the command structure of CONARC. Yet,
two years had passed since the formation of the Parker Panel and the
problems of the management of the resources sent to the vast array of
organizations under the umbrella of CONARC Headquarters remained.
CONARC was a budget-managed command. Gen. DePuy observed that the
management was in the hands of civilians in the comptroller shops at
every level. (48) CONARC simply divided the money as they saw fit
and then let the numbered Armies (CONUSA) divide the money to the
subordinate elements. The money was not dedicated to programs down
to the using program element. As the Army was reducing, cuts would
be made to the combat force structure and to the training base.
CONARC would pass the cuts down with a cookie-cutter rather than
drawing down within a program at all levels in the organization.
Lt. Gen. DePuy noted," They would pass out the money and wait
for the screams. That was the manageemnt system, and some of those
screams were intolerable at the Department of the Army level, because
some dumb things were being done." (49) The pressure to manage the
shrinking budget was insufficient to force change on its own. A
change in the Headquarters, Department of the Army, helped to
facilitate the major reorganization which could not be accomplished
by studies alone. The Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of
the Army (OAVCSA) was a key to enable the future Army reorganization.
The Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff (OAVCSA). Gen.
Harold K. Johnson, the Chief of Staff, told the General Staff he was
creating a new Office of Assistant Vice Chief of Staff within the
office of the Vice Chief of Staff on 11 February 1967. The Chief was
responding to the pressures of the McNamara reforms in the Department
of Defense. The Army had to get control of the two issues which were
coming to head. First, the Army had to learn to handle the
programmatic approach to budgeting under the Planning, Programming,
and Budgeting System (PPBS). The Army had to be able to explain how
it spend its resources to the accountants in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD). Second, the Army had to manage the
automatic data processing systems (ADP) coming on line at the time.
The Army was only beginning to develop the systems to account for all
the soldiers and all of the pieces of equipment and the distribution
of funds around the world. As the computers came on line they would
simply produce reams of inaccurate information at high speeds until
the management techniques and controls were developed to close all
the loops in reporting to produce accurate and timely reports.
Consequently, the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, the A-Vice, would be
the principal assistant to the Vice Chief of Staff for developing
guidance and integrating the efforts of the Army staff to improve the
management of Army resources of personnel, materiel, forces,
facilities, studies, and funds. In addition to PPBS and management
of information systems, the A-Vice would look at weapons systems
analyses. The A-Vice was never intended to be a permanent change in
the Army Staff. The A-Vice received his power from the Vice and the
Chief. He did not have any formal organizational power as an
intermediate or super-staff above the Army Staff.
The A-Vice's Office had four staff agencies. The three
directorates were the Force Planning Analysis (later Planning and
Program Analysis), Weapons Systems Analysis (later Materiel
Programs), and the Management Information Systems. Additionally,
there was an office of the Coordinator of Army Studies.
The OAVCSA was not without controversy. The Chief, Gen. Harold
K. Johnson, had an obvious intent for an office as a "stop-gap"
measure to produce "an improved resource planning and management
system".(50) Yet, the OAVCSA was perceived by some on the Army Staff
as an interloper on their perogatioves. The principal officers of
the staff and their subordinates did not want the A-Vice to intervene
in decisions which they believed were wholly within their area of
responsibility. Common criticisms included:
1. The power and position of the OAVCSA tended to disrupt
and distorted the normal operations of the Army Staff.
2. The size of the OAVCSA generated a high demand for
quality personnel at the expense of the remainder of the
staff.
3. The size of the OAVCSA resulted in its getting into
primary staff activity-- tended to develop parallel actions
which have been assigned to staff agencies and then to be a
proponent of these uncoordinated "solutions."
4. The existence of the OAVCSA tended to insulate the
staff from interaction with the Secretariat.
5. The development of a strong inter-disciplinary
capability in the OAVCSA reinforced the tendency to handle
quick-response actions in-house rather than requiring and
assisting the appropriate staff agencies to become more
responsive.
6. The size of the OAVCSA resulted in an increased
requirement for detailed information to support the
monitoring and review role. A duplication of data
available from the staff resulted.
7. The principal of management by exception was violated
by the OAVCSA monitoring role.
8. The existence of the OAVCSA had an adverse impact on
staff morale since the OAVCSA projected a "palace guard"
image.
9. The OAVCSA constituted one more agency in the coord-
ination exercise. Virtually, every action had to touch
base with the OAVCSA due to its broad, vague charter.
10. The OAVCSA was oriented to the Office of the Secretary
of Defense and does not understand or support the Army
position.(51)
The criticisms actually help to illustrate, point-by-point, why the
OAVCSA was a means which facilitated the Reorganization of 1973. The
office was the organizational key to bring about major change in a
short time in a large organization. Lt. Gen. DePuy was able to use
his office to prepare, criticize, and promote reorganization in a
decisive manner without losing control of the process to the
organizational biases and prerogatives of the Army Staff and the
Major Commanders. The organizational key was in hand, but here we
must take a close look at the influence of the individual in
bureaucratic politics. It took a General Officer with the unique
combination of drive, vision, and in-fighting expertise to use the
OAVCSA to drive through a major reorganization. It took an office of
specially selected individuals in the OAVCSA to support the
initiative which Lt. Gen. DePuy and Gen. Palmer sought.
CAS. The Coordinator of Army Studies (CAS) had no standing staff
supervision responsibilities. In this respect Lt. Gen. DePuy used
the office in a unique mannner. In December of 1971 the office was
headed by LTC John Seigle. One of the principal officers involved in
planning the Reorganization of 1973, LTC James S. V. Edgar, recalled
that LTC Seigle "ran an amazing little shop. It was sort of the
distilled essence of the Social Sciences Department (at West Point)."
"It was a very good group of people, almost all of them are general
officers now. (Although that's not necessarily a guarantee of good
people, it's pretty close.) John ran a very collegial shop. There
was very little directive involved. Each person, when he came in,
was encouraged to get involved. Each person when he came in, was
encouraged to get something out of his craw - the one project that he
always wanted to do or to get done - how would you change the Army,
if you had a chance. And this happpened to be the chance, because an
amazing number of these projects were carried out successfully,
mainly because of the tremendous access that we had to Gen. DePuy as
a result of John's close relationship with him." (52)
The office was less than fifteen officers. Some of the officers
were recruited from the Department of Social Sciences at West Point,
some were recruited from the graduating classes at the National War
College, and some were gleaned from the Army Staff. Once the
officers were in the office, they would spend several months working
to get up to the speed of the office. On Saturdays Lt. Gen. DePuy
would chair seminars where the office would review all the actions
CAS was involved in. These sessions were important to keep the
entire office informed on what was occurring. Moreover, theme
sessions helped build the enthusiasm of the officers by letting them
know they were a part of all the major and interesting actions in the
Army Headquarters. Lt.Col. Seigle held staff calls on Thursday.
Also, Lt. Gen. DePuy took the opportunity to continue the
professional training of the lieutenant colonels. He felt the need to
have a "small select group" like the CAS to do "offline" projects for
the Chief or the Vice (53). Lt. Gen. DePuy wanted to have "some
group of people in reserve to do things that can't be described ahead
of time". He used the group to start pilot studies. He noted that
"real trick" in the Army "in getting anything important done, is to
be able to anticipate what will be important at some time, to back
off from the date that it will be important, a year, to work on it
with intelligent people, for a long time, meaning that you do it over
and over and over and over again. And the first twenty times it's
wrong, and then it begins to get right, then you do it twenty more
times, and then it's pretty good. But nobody knows, you don't have a
deadline, because it's your own project. Nobodys saying where is
that study, you see, because if it isn't ready, you don't want to
float it. That is a capability that I've tried to protect, because
it produces very good work" (54).
THE REORGANIZATION OF 1972
The Parker Panel passed into oblivion but the problems identi-
fied by the Special Review Panel did not disappear. CONARC continued
to be a very large command which was not program-oriented. CONARC
was a "budget-managed command".(55) CONARC did not know what they
were spending money for when they divided their budget among the
Continental Armies. The Continental Armies would divide their money
to their subordinate elements of Divisions, schools, training
centers, and installations. As the Army continued to withdraw from
Vietnam throughout 1971 cuts were made to reduce the training base
and the combat units in the States. When CONARC did not manage the
cutbacks "all sorts of things would suddenly flair up out at some
division or post that made no sense at all." (56)
Finally, in December 1971, Gen. Palmer approached the A-Vice,
Lt. Gen. DePuy, and gave him the job of looking into the
reorganization of CONARC. Lt. Gen. DePuy said he accepted it with
enthusiasm. He turned to the studies group. The officers were given
a month to come up with the concept (57).
LTC Louis Menetrey was about to take over from LTC Seigle as the
head of CAS when he was asked to start an effort to to reorganize
CONARC. LTC Menetrey listened as LT. Gen. DePuy laid out the broad
parameters of his thinking. The effort was to be very close hold.
LTC Menetrey could have one other person to work on the project. He
"made all kinds of notes from this conversation which probably took
and hour, an hour and a half." (58) Gen. Palmer and Lt. Gen. DePuy
worked very closely on the project. It was DePuy who worked with the
officers from the CAS as they refined the broad thinking through to
more specific proposals. LTC Menetrey began an iterative process.
"Every day or every other day, we'd spend a few minutes with General
Depuy and show him what we had. He would spin out his idea some
more, and this evolved over time, maybe a month, into a series of
"Butcher" charts.(59) Lt. Sen. DePuy had his mission-type order
taken from general concepts "to the next level of specificity" and
broken out "with some of its implications, but on a very close hold
basis".(60) Lt. Gen. DePuy did not want to let the information get
out until he knew he had "the high Command" with him. (61). LTC
Menetrey had LTC James S. V. Edgar working with him on the project.
Edgar "became aware of a paper that somebody was working on that was
going to do away with or carve up Combat Developments Command (CDC),
Since that was my area, I hopped in and began to have some thoughts
of my own 'CDC must be doing a number of things. How do we make
sure that those things that it does do and used to do don't get lost
in the shuffle?' I began to get associated with that." (62)
LTC William Tuttle was told to get the thoughts together in a
draft paper. LTG DePuy felt he had the right idea for the
reorganization and directed that Edgar and Tuttle put the plan
togetter. No more papers would be written. Everything was put on
large "butcher" paper so that nothing could find its way to a copying
machine. The charts were put in the safe every night. Lt. Gen.
DePuy used the charts as a means to keep updating and changing the
plan. LTC Edgar remembered,
"We didn't just sit around and BS, and we didn't do a study
either. We sat down, and we worked on a briefing with General
DePuy. These were, I think, some of the happiest hours of my
military career. In order to get General DePuy's time, we
would come in on Sarturday morning. So we would all be sitting
around in our civilian clothes, and you know how it is when you
come in on Saturdays and you wear slightly loud, civilian
clothes, just to demonstrate that you're on your own time. But
we would sit in General DePuy's office at this conference
table. It would be General DePuy and maybe John Seigle or Lou
Menetrey, who followed John, and Tuttle and I, and maybe Fred
Mahaffey. There would be just a few of us. Maybe Jerry
Galloway upon occasion. We would work on this briefing, and we
would work, as I recall, on yellow pads just sort of roughing
out the idea of what the briefing charts would be. That was
the things that imposed some disicipline upon our discussions.
DePuy would say, 'Well, here's the point we ought to make,' and
we would argue about how to make this point or whether it was a
valid point to make or how to structure the argument, and that
sort of thing. Then, we would go on to the next thing, and
this was basically the way that it was done. Then I guess when
we got closer to the final version, it was all put on butcher
paper. I can remember making those damn butcher paper charts
myself, and although I had studied inclined, single stroke
lettering while a cadet, my lettering was not that good. So we
had what were obviously a bunch of homemade butcher paper
charts, which I think added to the aura of the briefing when it
was finally given."(63)
The iterations of the concept moved along in December. Guidance
from the A-Vice included "cooling" the language, stressing the
overextension of CONARC, describing four alternatives, and outlining
the problem area; of the future -- forces, training, and material
acquisition -- rather than criticising CONARC and CDC (64). Also, in
December Gen. Haines asked for a meeting in Washington to present his
staff's report, CONARC 72. The meeting was set for 12 January 1972.
Since Gen. Haines of CONARC could be expected to present the most
opposition to the reorganization, the timing of the meeting was
fortunate for the proponents of change. It would provide the CAS the
opportunity to surface the major problem areas which mitigated
towards change. They would learn Gen. Haines' explanations and the
basis for his possible future arguments while they were still
preparing their briefing to sell the reorganization to the Army
leadership.
The conference on 12 January 1972 lasted for seven hour. The
meeting had Gen. Haines, his executive - Col. Morton, Brig.Gen. West
-his comptroller, and BG Hannum- his force developer from CONARC.
There were twenty-five officers from the Army Staff, including Lt.
Gen. DePuy and seven other general officers. General Haines began
the meeting with opening remarks. He had the following criticisms:
OSD is "180 degrees in the wrong direction" when it
suggests personnel reductions in vital areas such as HQ, CONUSA. HQDA
(Headquarters, Department of the Army) should have used the option to
choose alternative ways of acheiving the reductions required.
There had been a recent trend toward creating both small
functional commands and special functional assistants for the
Volunteer Army initiatives, drug programs, etc. These actions had
caused burdens for HQ,CONARC by generating resource requirements and
ceation of parallel monitoring staff elements without resource
allocations.
There was too much centralization of both authority and
personnel talent within HQDA. On the other hand, the five CONUSA HQS
had the very lowest priority for talented officers.
General Haines reviewed the historical evolution and
organizational structure of HQ, CONARC and HQ, CONUSA. He stressed
that CONARC had its expertise in training, readiness, and operations
of forces but personnel, supply and financial management functions
had been thrust upon CONARC. He pointed out that schools and
training deserved the primary attention of a command and that the
four CONUSA HQS were his "resource brokers" in addition to
commanding Reserves, providing area representation, etc.
Th e Comptroller of the Army's study of management
functions in CONUSA has an "over-simplified mission". Functions will
have to be evaluated individually to determine appropriate final
placement of management responsibility.
HQ, CONARC has made and is continuing to make many
recommendations for cutting back on nonessentials and overhead:
combining the Institute for Military Assistance with the JFK Center;
creating one "Center" for Adjutant General and Finance Schools;
moving the Military Police School to Ft. McClellan; closing aviation
training at Ft. Wolters and Hunter Army Airfield; consolidating the
Signal School at Ft. Gordon; and either closing Ft. Polk or beginning
essential permanent construction. Gen. DePuy commented that such
decisions will have to be targeted on apprpriate 1972 "Windows".(65)
Discussion followed on many topics. The management functions
were discussed in detail. Gen. Haines wanted to keep the resource
management functions at the Continental US Armies. Yet, the new
supply and personnel automatic data processing systems operated from
the installation level and "seemed" to be moving toward centralized
management at the Department of the Army. Gen. Haines also wanted to
have force development at HQ,CONARC. Funds for base operations for
the Army Reserves should have been handled with Active Army funds and
directed to the installations. Yet, funds for operations for the
Reserves should have gone through the Continental US Armies to the
Reserve units. (66) The action officers from the Staff asked
questions and tbe discussion continued. Gen. Haines stated the trend
of returning more Active Army forces to the US would probably require
organizational changes in CONARC in about five years. Additionally,
the CDC-CONARC interface was not a serious problem since the Center
Team" concept had proven quite efffective. The worldwide
responsibility for unit training was primarily executed through the
CONARC school system while the unit training for actual CONARC forces
was executed through the command channels of CONARC.(67)
In two weeks the planning for the Reorganization was complete
and ready to run the gauntlet for approval. Lt. Gen. DePuy had a
series of murder-board sessions where he had "all the other hotshots"
from throughout the OAVCSA criticize the briefing. As the Army's
manager, "the guy who did the budgeting and the planning," he "had
spent a lot of time briefing Congressional staffs on the Army's
programs, and he was very much aware of the outside pressures that
were pushing the Army -- The pressure to improve the teeth to tail
ratio, the pressure to do better on development of equipment", the
pressure to make the Volunteer army work. Edgar noted "He had a very
well-developed sense of who was pressing from outside the Army - from
DOD, from Congress, and those places. I thinK one of his essential
criteria was that the thing had to be marketable to meet those
pressures and meet those demands. I don't think I ever recall him
sitting down and spelling that out in one discourse, but we became
aware of it... As we would float ideas on Saturday mornings, he would
say, 'That won't work. That won't sell.' On occasion he would float
an idea and we would tell him that it would not work, which was the
fun of Saturday morning."(68)
When DePuy was confident that the briefing was where it should
be he scheduled meetings with the Vice and the Chief.(69) Gen.
Palmer was briefed on Thursday, 27 January 1972. Gen. Palmer, who
initiated the effort and had been kept abreast of developments, was
very enthusiastic". (70) Gen. Westmoreland approved the plan
after his briefing on the next day, 28 January 1972. The following
day, Saturday 29 January 1972 was the crucial briefing with Secretary
of the Army, Robert Froehlke. Given the statutory authority of the
Secretary, no reorganization could take place without his approval.
Furthermore, since the days of Elihu Root at the turn of the century,
no reorganization or reform had taken place without the active and
early participation of the Secretary. This major reorganization was
internally conceived and directed by uniformed officers.
Mr. Froehlke was personally briefed by Lt. Gen. DePuy. In the
earlier briefings DePuy had only used the butcher paper charts. He
had a short paper, "The Impetus for Change", written from the
briefing. It was almost a transcript of the briefing. As Col. Edgar
noted, "The figures in there, the diagrams, like the one on the Army
organizations since 1962 is right out of the briefing. There was a
diagram just like that in the briefing." Looking at the paper, "you
can just imagine a butcher paper chart that said 'three things we
have to do better -- maintaining the forces in readiness, training
individuals, devleloping new force structure' there would be a
butcher chart which had those three ticks on it."(71) LTC Tuttle
noted that DePuy did the briefings unassisted. "The simplicity and
directness of the approach, the lack of the normal trappings of
decision briefings with their twin projector; and prepared script,
unquestionably impressed the recipients -- and contributed to the
reception of the succinct, direct approach of the proposal itself."
(72) Mr. Froehlke appproved the plan. After a whirlwind three
days, Lt.Gen. DePuy had to wait until Monday to brief the Secretary
of Defense. Secretary Melvin Laird approved the plan. However, the
approval process was not over.
Earlier, Lt. Gen. DePuy had a series of briefings for all the
heads of the staff agencies. The Deputy Chiefs of the army Staff
were briefed by LTC Tuttle or Edgar. LTC Edgar observed that Lt.
Gen. DePuy would "sit back a little disassociated from it." "DePuy
would sit there and listen to the briefing and then talk about it.
This way DePuy wasn't having to defend the briefing. They could both
sit there and criticize the briefing," (73) Lt. Gen. DePuy emphasized
the case for reorganization on its own merits for the good of the
Army. He sold the case to the army Staff as having "a lot of logic
in the thing. There's a basic, fundamental simple logic that is
awfully hard to argue against and that was that the combat
development process and the schools are both part of a larger
process of doctrine and training in the Army. Training stems
from doctrine. Doctrine has to be informed by training
experience and weapons systems. Tactics is the application of
weapons to the enemy on behalf of a mission. Putting that set
of functions back together was obviously right. Everybody was
worried about one aspect of it, and rightly so. That was that
CONARC had many training centers at predominantly troop
installations and vice versa. From a management point of view
there was a fear that we were slicing through almost every
installation in some awkward way and that we might lose the
potential economy of scale which was represented by CONARC, and
there was merit in that worry. There was then and there is
today. It is not easy... the relationship between FORSCOM
(Forces Command) and TRADOC (Training and Doctrine Command) at a
place like Fort Sill where you have the III Corps Artillery, the
Artillery School, and a training center is not necessarily an
easy one. But we were willing to pay that price in order to
acheive the focus of CONARC on readiness and the focus of TRADOC
on doctrine and training. Those are natural divisions with a
powerful logic of their own. Everybody agreed. Even Jack
Norton (Commanding General CDC) agreed the first time I went out
and talked to him about it". (74)
Furthermore, the "Impetus for Change" emphasized the management
improvements to "reduce both the number of intermediate echelons and
the size and number of headquarters." (75) The reduction of personnel
from "manpower intensive headquarters and support activities" would
save money because of the "high per capita cost of personnel". (76)
Also, the nature of the post-Vietnam Army was illustrated as follows:
Vietnam meant: - The attention of the Army as a whole
shifted from training from the full spectrum of war to fighting a
particular type of war.
- A large proportion of our units were stationed outside of
the Continental United States (CONUS).
-Emphasis was placed upon the active forces at the expense
of the reserves, since the expansion was performed without a large
call-up.
-That part of the Army not in Vietnam became a sustaning
base, training and providing individual replacements for Vietnam.
-The materiel system was oriented to combat consumption.
Constraints on the defense budget were relaxed and the system for
materiel development was, in the case of many items, short-circuited.
The post-Vietnam Army is different: -With a higher
proportion of the Army in CONUS it will be of increasing importance
that deployable forces maintain a high state of readiness.
-A smaller active Army must peace a greater reliance on
reserve forces.
-A smaller, volunteer Army requires that each soldier
receive individual training that develops his potential more fully.
-Extremely limited resources for defense present much more
difficult choices in developing and fielding new organizations,
weapons and doctrine.
In short, the requirements of the immmediate future mean that
three Army functions will assume increased importance:
-Maintaining the forces in readiness.
-Training individuals in tactics, techniques, and skills.
-Developing new structure and materiel systems. (77)
The paper related the functions to the organizations in being.
CONARC was divided into a "Force Mission" and a "Training Mission
(Doctrine)". The case for reorganization was cogently presented to
show how the reorganization would really do all of the following:
- Reduce CONARC span of control.
- Emphasize training, readiness, and contingency planning
for deployable forces.
- Close the loop between doctrine and schools.
- Rationalize the combat and force development process.
- Simplify the test and experimentation process.
- Be manageable.
- Fulfill area responsibilities in CONUS. (78)
Lt. Gen. DePuy said it was a very remarkable experience that
should go "in the Guinness Book of records" to go from concept to
approval in one week. (79) DePuy had gained approval from the
decision-makers who had to approve the reorganization and he had
received agreement from the key players on the Army Staff which
effectively isolated the two major commands to be reorganized, CONARC
and CDC. The day after Secretary of Defense Laird aprroved the plan,
Lt. Gen. DePuy briefed Gen. Haines, Commanding General of CONARC.
The Vice, Gen. Palmer, told Gen. Haines two days earlier that some
reorganization would take place. It was up to Lt. Gen. DePuy to
explain the nature of the reoganization on 2 February. CONARC would
be divided into a Force Command, whose headquarters would move to Ft.
McPherson, Ga. and a Doctrine and Training Command which would move
into the old CONARC headquarters at Ft. Monroe, Va. "On 8 February
1972, General DePuy informed the CONARC Chief of Staff that the
Department of the Army was then planning to appoint an overall
Project Manager for the reorganization process and would then task
the major commands involved as executive agents for the actual
planning and implementation. He further indicated that the U.S.
Continental Army Command would be designated as the executive agent
for planning, developing, and establishing the two new major
commands." (80)
Gen. Haines took action on two fronts. He asked for a "reclama"
meeting with the Chief to make his case against the reorganization.
He prepared his own command to take the guiding hand for any changes
if they must come. The Special Study Group (SSG) at CONARC headquar-
ters was established as a permanent planning board. The principals
were Brig. Gen. L.M. Jones, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for
Military Operations and Reserve Forces, who was designated as Special
Assistant for the development of the Force Command; Brig. Gen. G. J.
Duquemin, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Individual Training,
who was designated as the Special Assistant for the development of
the Doctrine and Training Command; and Brig. Gen. R.L. West, Deputy
Chief of Staff, Comptroller, who was designated as CONARC Staff Co-
ordinator. Generals Jones and Duquemin were assigned to the Study
Group for fulltime duty. Maj. Gen. Donald R. Pepke, the CONARC Chief
of Staff, named the study "Operation Steadfast" on 14 February. He
chose the title from the motto of the 4th Infantry Division ("Stead-
fast and Loyal"), which he had commanded in combat in Vietnam.(81)
The Special Study Group became the STEADFAST Study Group (SSG).
Meanwhile officers in the OAVCSA were preparing for Gen. Haines
reclama visit. Col. Menetrey (he was promoted), the chief of CAS,
briefed Gen. Westmoreland on 11 February to prepare him for the 16
February meeting with Gen. Haines.
Gen. Haines presented five major points at a luncheon with the
Chief on 16 February. He argued the development of the plan on a
very close hold basis by Department of Army staff officers neglected
the "installation point of view" for feasibility and desirability.
Second, he felt the study did not deal with a mobilization situation.
Third, he did not feel that two new headquarters could be organized
within the spaces presently authorized for CONARC. He thought some
personnel spaces could be saved at intermediate levels as the
automatic data processing systems for personnel, logistics,and
financial management (BASOPS II) for base operations came on line.
Fourth, he felt strongly that the number of continental Armies should
not be reduced from four to three until the BASOPS II systems became
operational. Finally, he argued against the timing of a major
reorganization of the Army. He let all of his arrows fly.
"He stated that the Army needed a period of stabilization to
digest and implement the large number of directives from the
Department of the Army and ,in addition, to get on with the job
of improving professionalism, discipline, and attitude
throughout the Army. He stressed again the momentum gained in
these areas by the team effort of the commanders in the
continental United States and the adverse effect that the
proposed reorgaization could have on that effort. He pointed
out the difficulties in meeting the proposed date of 1 July 1972
for organizing two new commands -- only four and one-half months
in the future -- since both the U.S. Continental Army Command
and its subordinate Armies were well into the development of
their Command Operating Budgets of FY 1973. He also cited the
awkwardness of the 1 July date since it fell in the middle of
the summer training period for the Reserve Components and the
Reserve Officer Training Corps. In addition, this date would
affect the conduct of the Williamson Board tests which were
sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and involved
almost all elements of the U.S. Continental Army Command.
General Haines felt that there was a clear requirement carefully
to spell out the responsibilities of the the two new commands and
the subordinate numbered armies for conducting and supporting
the training of the Reserve Components and the Reserve Officer
Training Corps. Moreover, he was convinced that the above
factors presented a valid argument for a new slower
implementation schedule. He stated his belief that the new
Chief of Staff should have the opportunity to guide the
reorganization and not be faced with a fait accompli on the very
date he was to assume his new assignment. He also suggested
that prior to final approval, the Chief of Staff seek the advice
of certain retired officers -- such as Generals Bruce Clarke,
Hamilton Howze, and Paul Freeman -- who were accomplished troop
leaders and trainers.(82)
Generals Westmoreland and Palmer held their positions that the
reorganization should continue. They agree to extend the timetable
for reorganization to two years. The new Chief of Staff would be
informed at the earliest possible moment. They rebutted some of Gen.
Haines criticisms. Gen. Westmoreland noted the reduction of the
subordinate numbered armies was not firm. Also, the location for the
Forces Command headquarters would be studied further. Finally, Gen.
Westmoreland stated that he felt the job at U.S. Continental Army
Command was too big for one individual, although he complimented Gen.
Haines on his performance of duty in that assignment."(83) The rest
of the conversation delved into the details of the plan itself.
While Gen. Haines opposed the reorgainization at each step, Lt.
Gen. John Norton, whose CDC was to become two smaller agencies and
transfer some functions to the new training and doctrine command,
initially agreed to the plan. His memo to Lt. Gen. DePuy on 9
February stated, "In general, I feel that we can move ahead toward
the new organization in minimum amount of time. In the end I see the
Army in general and Combat Developments in specific receiving a net
gain once the new organization and way of doing business settles
down. I am prepared to furnish any assistance you or your staff
require to translate the broad plan into the detailed implementation
plan." (84)
In response to Gen Haines' criticisms of the lack of focus and
understanding for the problems of the installations, the Installation
Model Team was formed. Maj.Gen. Robert Fair had responsibility for
the project and made Col. H.L. Myron the team chief. The team was to
travel to several posts in the U.S. and develop the data base to
detail the problems and issues in dividing CONARC and removing the
subordinate numbered armies as a management level above the training
and combat forces units and installations. The team examined the
concept for reorganization in 27 separate functional areas. It was a
functional analysis of all the systems and procedures that flowed
from an individual unit or installation up through levels of command
to Headquarters, Department of the Army. It was a preparation to
counter the entrenched bureaucratic defense, "you did not go into
enough detail." The Headquarters, Department of the Army acquired
far more detailed data in the six weeks of research during February
and March 1972 than CONARC or any other headquarters possessed. (85)
The draft for the proposed charter for the Project Manager for
Reorganization was prepared by Headquarters, Department of the Army
and forwarded to the Headquarters, CONARC a day before the meeting
among Gen. Haines, the Chief, and the Vice. Two days after the
meeting the proposed charter was revised. The revisions reflected
the points of agreement between Gen. Haines and the Chief. This
included the revised schedule to have the new headquarters become op-
erational 1 July 1973 instead of 1 July 1972. The Commander,CONARC,
was directed to consult with the Commander, CDC, in planning and
developing the new organizations. Also, Gen. Haines would have the
formal task of disestablishing his own command. Some compromises had
been made to the perogatives of a four-star general.
In the corporate structure of the U.S. Army the Chief of Staff
is not the Chief Executive Officer of the corporation. Titles 10 and
50 of the U.S. code do not give him the statutory authority of a
Chief Executive. However, he has vast authority in officer
assignments and retirements, if the Secretary of the Army supports
him. He operates in a mode of consultation and consensus with the
other four-star generals who are not assigned out to the unified and
joint commands.
On 28 February Secretary Froehlke sent a memorandum to the
Secretary of Defense on the reorganizaton. He stated", Based on
your approval of the concept, planning has progressed to the point
where we are now ready to proceed with more detailed study." (81)
Furthermore, "Unless you object, we plan to initiate the detailed
study of the reorganization by naming a Project Manager this week.
He will coordinate the detailed planning and propose phasing for the
reorganization, and will report to me through the Chief of staff. I
am satisfied that this reorganization concept goes in the correct
drection. I am less certain, however, whether it goes quite far
enough. Before making such a final determination, I intend to
discuss the concept thoroughly with the designate to replace the
Chief of Staff." (87)
The Secretary kept the action with the uniformed officers. The
Project Manager faced a difficult task. Lt. Gen. DePuy wanted Maj.
Gen. James F. Kalergis to be the program manager because he was
"probably the most experienced and effective organizational expert in
the Defense Department ... He is one smart cookie, also tough." (88)
DePuy is quoted as saying," There is only one guy in the Army who can
run this reorganization and I am going to give the names of three
people. Two of them will not be available, and one of them will, and
that's going to be General Kalergis." (89)
LTC's Edgar and Tuttle briefed Maj. Gen. Kalergis before he was
appointed to be the Project Manager. They briefed him with the old
butcher charts in a "nice dog and pony show, a Huntley-Brinkley sort
of thing." (90) After they finished they went to another office and
sat down across from Kalergis. He asked, "Well, where is the study?"
(91) There was no study per se. The Parker Panel a year earlier was
the only recent formal study of the problem. All Kalergis had was
the briefing paper, "Impetus for Change", which was created from the
the old butcher charts. The two Lt. Colonels were loaned to
Kalergis. Eventually LTC Tuttle went back to other projects in the
CAS. LTC Carl Vuono was brought out of the Program, Planning and
Analysis Officer to join LTC Edgar. They became the nucleus of the
Special Projects Office. LTC Vuono recruited the officers for the
office of the Project Manager. Officers came from the Army War
College and the Army Staff. "The word went out from DePuy,
certainly, and maybe from the Palmer level or higher that while we
may not want the best man in DCSOPS, we want the second best guy in
DCSOPS. So, we got a bunch of very, very good people." (92) Maj.
Gen. Kalergis immediately demanded Col. Paul Raisig be assigned to
his office. Raisig had worked with Kalergis in Vietnam and had "done
a marvelous job taking over a battalion that had a couple of
commanders relieved or shot." (93) Col. Paul Raisig eventually became
Kalergis' deputy. LTC Vuono became "sort of the vice chief" and LTC
Edgar became the "resident ideologue." Edgar remembered, "I was the
keeper of the pure flame of the reorganization, since I had been with
it since its birth and I interpreted 'Impetus for Change'."(94) On 6
March 1972 Maj. Gen. James Kalergis was taken from his duties as the
Deputy Commanding General for Logistical Support, U.S. Army Materiel
Command to be the Army Project Manager for Reorganization (DA-PMR).
He met with the Chief on 8 March and the CONARC STEADFAST principals
on 9 March.
When he met with the STEADFAST group, he let them know he had
decided to draw up a new charter for his managership. Also, he would
issue a reorganization directive under the authority of his new
charter which would have all the details he wanted promulgated.
Checkpoints would be built into the reorganization plan where both
the Department of the Army and CONARC would stop, thoroughly review
the plans, and validate that they were on the right course. (95)
Maj. Gen. Kalergis met with Secretary of the Army Froehlke on 10
March. He was directed by the Chief of Staff to report by means of
In-Process Reviews according to the following schedule:
-Outline Plans for Organization and 25 Mar 1972
Transfer of Functions
-FY 1974 Program Estimates 1 May 1972
-Organization Plan 1 Jun 1972
-Budget Adjustments 1 Aug 1972
Also, he was to "inform the Chief of Staff on all significant matter
that arise in the execution of his mission." (96) The action was
kept with the uniformed officers. The Assistant Secretaries of
the Army and the General Counsel wrote memorandums to the Mr.
Froehlke in the first week of March on the proposed reorganization.
The results were generally favorable with specific comments
reflecting their individual interests. They were not to carry the
action.
During March and April 1972, Maj. Gen. Kalergis worked to flesh
out the details of the reorganization in an atmosphere of some
progress, cooperation, and some stone-walling. He had to evaluate
all on-going staff actions and studies throughout the Army which
might be affected by the reorganization. These included the CONUS
Medical Activities Study, Troop Support Command Study, the effort of
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics to examine a
centralized commissary management system for the continental U.S.,
the Myron Study of installation management, the Army Materiel Command
reorganization plan, the study to establish a centralized military
personnel center for the Army, and all of the automated maagement
information systems unique to personnel, finance and logistical
resource management, etc.,etc. Generals Palmer and DePuy did not get
involved in supervision, although they were kept abreast of the
situation at all times. Their main relationship was to "support him,
give him access, and keep the forces that were opposed to the plan
sufficiently at bay so that he could get the job done." (97)
For example, a 1 March memorandum to Lt. Gen. DePuy reported on
visit by LTC Tuttle, CAS, to the Installation Model Team at Ft. Lee,
Va. In addition to the progress being made in the area of logistics,
force development, and other manpower areas, Tuttle noted the team
needed the authorization to expand their research. Specifically, the
Team's charter was limited to the installation. Since some
management information systems went through the Continental Armies,
the team needed to have a team go to one of the Continental Armies
(a subordinate numbered army). Then, he noted," There is a major
conflict brewing (exemplified by General Haines' letter to
General Palmer on the "All Installations Under One Command").
General Jones apparently did the staff study and was rather
adamant about the necessity of the proposal. CONARC seems to
start from the assumption that each installation commander will
command everything on the post. General Jones sees the need.
therefore, for the installation commander to report to both the
Doctrine and Training commander and to the Force commander. The
rationale for this postition seems to lie in the difficulty that
small units might have if no one supervises them directly.
General Jones seems convinced that no parallel now exists in the
tenancy arrangements which sveral CONARC schools operate on AMC
installations. Likewise, there are several STRAF (Strategic
Army Forces) units on AMC installations. It appears that a lot
of fixed positions are being established on command
relationships before the Installation Model Team gets done with
its work. We do not believe that Colonel Myron is persuaded by
the CONARC position and seems to be heading in the direction of
not separating mission and resources. This is one issue that
must be watched closely, else the objectives of the
reorganization could well be thwarted." (98)
The memorandum illustrates the struggle to control the details
of the implementation of the reorganization. At this stage it was
possible for one headquarters (CONARC vs. Department of the Army) or
the other to gain de facto control of resources and the direction of
the new organizations by manipulating the relationship any unit or
installation will have with CONARC's shadow successor in the Forces
Command.
The STEADFAST Study Group completed a charter which was approved
through CONARC to delineate responsibilities. It began work on the
Outline Plan which was due at the Department of the Army on 5 May
1972. Maj. Gen. Kalergis met with the STEADFAST Study Group in late
March and early April. He emphasized "the fact that the major impact
of the reorganization would be at the installation level, but that
the area responsibilities of the subordinate army headquarters should
not be minimized. The existing functions of the subordinate armies
in the continental United states would have to be analyzed in depth;
Operation STEADFAST planning elements would have to pay particular
attention to mobilization requirements and to the integration of
training for both the Active Army and the Reserve Components. With
regard to manpower requirements, General Kalergis pointed out that
the two new major commands world require sizeable staffing and that
they should be accorded an appropriate place on the Department of the
Army Master Priority List (DAMPL) in order to ensure an adequate
quality of staffing." (99) The concern over personnel spaces in the
chain of command from the installation up to Washington would provide
an opportunity for the proponents of reorganization. The proposal
would give the installation commanders control of their resources for
their installations and "stovepipe" the logistical, personnel and
financial systems up to Department of the Army. (100) The proposal
would help to eliminate intermediate headquarters personnel spaces
and to make the installation commanders around the country the allies
of the reorganization as they looked to gain control of their own
resources. CONARC and CDC headquarters were isolated from the head
shed" of the Chief and the Secretary of the Army, the principals on
the Army Staff (the deputy Chiefs of Staff), and the subordinate
installation commanders on the issues of reorganization.
The process of planning would progress in three consecutive
stages. They were as follows:
Stage 1 - Develop an outline (feasibility) plan and the
preliminary validation of the concept.
Stage 2 - Develop a detailed plan, resolve issues and con-
duct final validation of the concept.
Stage 3 - Implementation plan.
Stage 1, the preliminary validation of the concept began, with
the publication of the Initial Planning Guidance on 5 April 1972.
This provided the staffs and commands with the authority to initiate
detailed planning. It oulined the concept in clear, simple terms.
Actions - a. Establish a Force Command over all active and reserve
army combat forces in the continental United States (CONUS).
b. Establish a Doctrine and Training Command devoted to
developing doctrine, associated force organization, requirements for