The Huks And The New People's Army: Comparing Two Postwar Filipino Insurgencies CSC 1985 SUBJECT AREA General Marine Corps Command and Staff College Marine Corps Development and Education Command Quantico, Virginia 22134 THE HUKS AND THE NEW PEOPLE'S ARMY: COMPARING TWO POSTWAR FILIPINO INSURGENCIES By Major Rodney S. Azama, U.S. Army War Since 1945 Seminar and Symposium 1 April 1985 ABSTRACT Author: Azama, Rodney S., Major, U.S. Army Title: The Huks and the New People's Army: Comparing Two Postwar Filipino Insurgencies Date: 1 April 1985 Insurgencies are a popular form of modern warfare, and the Philippine government's suppression of the Huk rebellion - between 1946 and 1954 - is often cited as a model of effective counterinsurgency policies. While that rebellion was defeated, the Huks came fairly close to achieving success in 1950. In 1969, the newly-established Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) joined forces with the remnants of the Huk movement to form a new military arm - the New People's Army (NPA). Expanding continuously since its formation, the NPA currently is an internal security threat to the Philippine Republic. While the Marcos administration has downplayed the NPA threat, this guerrilla army may upset the future stability of the government. The intent of this paper is to compare and contrast the NPA with the almost successful Huks in order to test a hypothesis - that the New People's Army potentially presents a more significant threat to the existing government than the Huk movement did to the three presidential administrations it fought. Moving from a general overview of the two Communist movements to specific aspects of these insurgencies, this paper examines two guerrilla "armies" and related Communist parties. After an introduction, the study is divided into three sections, with the first (Chapter 1) briefly describing the Philippine setting and the wartime Hukbalahap resistance movement - the predecessor of the Huk guerrillas. A subsequent section (Chapters 2 and 3) traces the general history of both insurgencies. The final section analyzes specific aspects of these guerrilla movements: the Filipino environment with its causes and conditions (Chapter 4); the organization, composition, expansion and strength of the insurgents (Chapter 5); their strategy, doctrine, and operations (Chapter 6); the movements' logistics, communications, and external support (Chapter 7). The two insurgencies had similar causes and faced problem-ridden government organizations and forces. However, the implementation of more rational counterinsurgency policies by Ramon Magsaysay (He became the defense secretary in 1950) turned the situation around. Magsaysay instituted significant internal defense and development programs. By 1954, the Huk rebellion was essentially suppressed. The current Marcos regime has not pursued such an effective counterinsurgency program. Although the present size of the Filipino military organization is much larger than during the time of the Huks, other government weaknesses persist. In addition, the recent Aquino assassination has resulted in a political polarization - moving "moderates" toward the radical left. There are significant differences in the insurgent organizations: the CPP-NPA organization is more sophisticated, having a united front notably stronger than that of the Huks aud their Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP); the CPP-NPA leadership is younger, sophisticated, and more radical; the CPP enjoys a much closer relationship with the NPA; and while both insurgent groups had large mass bases, the CPP-NPA mass organization has a more diverse membership. Although the number of armed NPA guerrillas now approximates the peak strength of the Huks, the NPA has expanded into almost all areas of the country while the Huks were essentially limited to Luzon island. In addition, the NPA appears to have some links with another Filipino insurgent organization - the Moro National Liberation Front. While both the Huks and the NPA followed a Maoist strategy, the NPA has adapted Communist doctrine to specific conditions in the Philippines. The Huks overestimated their military capabilities and sought an "early seizure of power in 1950"; NPA leaders are more patient and pragmatic. Although there are similarities in both groups' operations - as far as size of operations, types, target selectivity, training, and discipline - the NPA employs more sabotage and has displayed a deeper understanding of urban guerrilla warfare and psychological operations. Unlike the Huks, the NPA is formally employed as an organizing and propaganda force - in addition to being a fighting arm. Both groups were plagued with logistical difficulties, but the NPA possesses more firepower and employs more sophisticated methods of obtaining funds. The NPA also has better communication systems available. Neither the NPA nor the Huks received any significant external support, although the CPP-NPA has planned and organized for this future contingency. While it is difficult to compare separate organizations at different points in time, it appears that the New People's Army potentially presents a more significant threat to the existing Philippine government than the Huks did during the 1950 to 1954 period. There is still time, however, for the government to introduce much-needed reforms and programs to defeat this ongoing insurgency. This study utilized both published and unpublished sources. While there is no shortage of material on the Huk rebellion, much less information is available on the New People's Army. Although many have examined the Huks in retrospective, there were no detailed studies that drew parallels between the Huk and NPA insurgencies. Primary sources utilized consisted of personal interviews, speeches and books by participants, published memoirs, and other publications. Secondary sources consisted of research papers, government studies, books, journals, and other periodicals. "WE ARE PEASANTS" We are what they call mere peasants; Who were created by God in sincere love; We who live by our own toil, We are those peasants, always in poverty, always sacrificing; No rest from work, suffer more and more, While others depend on us. We are peasants who always wear shorts, We work in rain or shine without resting; We are the planters who show no fear, Who prepare the land with carabao, plow, and rake; We are those planting with bended bodies, Mud to our knees on rainy days. When we peasants quit working, All will go hungry and the nation will cry; Those who are selfish and usurpers, Only pretend they know poor people's feelings; That is why we peasants and all workers, All act together to DRAG DOWN THE DEMON! (A Filipino peasant song sung by Huk rebels) *Benedict Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 132. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Chapter LIST OF FIGURES vii A. INTRODUCTION 1 B. BACKGROUND 1. The Setting 8 C. THE INSURGENCIES 2. The PKP and the Huk Rebellion 18 3. The CPP and the New People's Army 26 D. AN ANALYSIS: COMPARING & CONTRASTING THE INSURGENCIES 4. The Environment: Insurgency Causes and Conditions 37 5. Organization, Composition, and Strength 59 6. Strategy, Doctrine, and Operations 127 7. Logistics, Communications and External Support 184 E. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 199 APPENDICES A. Chronology of Key Events 208 B. Glossary of Abbreviations 215 C. Map of the Philippine Provinces 218 D. By-Laws of the Hukbalahap, 1942 219 E. Constitution of the PKP, 1946 223 F. Constitution and By-Laws of the HMB, 1950 227 G. Programme for a People's Democratic Revolution 230 H. The New People's Army (document) 240 I. Basic Rules of the New People's Army 248 ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 254 LIST OF FIGURES Page Figure 1. Philippines in its Asian Setting 9 2. Geographic Setting of the Philippines 10 3. Cultural-Linguistic Groups 12 4. The Central Plain of Luzon 39 5. Percentage of Cultivated Land Farmed by Tenants 40 6. National Organization of the PKP 60 7. The Military Organization of the PKP 62 8. Hukbalahap Squadrons and Their General Locations 64 9. The Regional Commands of the Huks 65 10. The Organization Department of the PKP 68 11. The Education Department of the PKP 70 12. The Finance Department of the PKP 71 13. Party Control of Finances through Interconnections 72 14. Estimates of Huk Strength, 1942-1970 82 15. Huklandia, 1946 83 16. Huklandia, 1950 85 17. CPP-NPA Organizational Structure 87 18. The Party (CPP) and Army (NPA) Relationship 90 19. Organization of the Philippine Government 91 20. People's Organizing Group 93 21. NPA Guerrilla Formations and Territorial Jurisdiction 96 22. Agricultural Activity 113 23. Guerrilla Activity, 1980 114 24. Guerrilla Activity, 1983 117 25. Estimates of NPA Strength, 1984 118 26. Curriculum for Huk Schools 145 27. Huk Incidences, 1962-1969 154 28. Growth of the New People's Army, 1969-1979 161 29. Chart of NPA Strategy 165 30. NPA Propaganda Themes as Defined by the NPA 172 INTRODUCTION I know now from experience that the nationalism of the Communists is indeed opportunism, and that they use it for their own ends. Any nationalist who makes an ally of the Communist is going for a ride on a tiger. We must learn from our lessons in the past, and this is one that nationalists need to remember today, when once again the Communists are trying to use them. Former Huk leader Luis Taruc in He Who Rides the the Tiger: The Story of an Asian Guerilla Leader You do not kill Communism with the sword and gun alone. Communism is an idea. When a man in a rice paddy with a hungry belly, working on land which is not his - in debt, and his children hungry too - when a man in that position hears somebody say: 'The land belongs to the man who works it - come with us and we will give it to you!' then my friend, something happens. To that man, it is a cool wind blowing through a hell on earth. Ramon Magsaysay in 1953 Revolutionary Warfare Sir Robert Thompson in Revolutionary War in World Strategy, 1945-1969, defines this form of warfare as one "which enables a small ruthless minority to gain control by force over the people of a country and thereby to seize power by violent and unconstitutional means." He characterizes modern revolutionary war as being three-phased, consisting of an initial defensive phase, a second phase that seeks to obtain a point of equilibrium or stalemate with the government, and a final offensive phase. Thompson also differentiates revolutionary war from conventional warfare, partisan warfare, coups d'etat, and other forms of warfare.1 The Huk Rebellion of 1946-1954 and the ongoing New People's Army insurgency in the Philippines could be categorized as two cases of revolutionary warfare. Both illustrate a form of warfare that is growing increasingly prevalent in modern times. While numerous instances of revolutionary warfare have occurred in southeast Asia, the Philippine insurgencies may be instructive due to the characteristics of that country. Unique Characteristics of the Philippines As Professor David Rosenberg points out, the Philippines has long been regarded as an exceptional case in southeast Asia. It never had a monarchy or any extensive, centralized city- states. It was not noticeably affected by Hindu or Confucian ideas. The Philippines were colonized twice - by Spain and the United States - over three and a half centuries. The Spanish legacy made the Philippines the only predominately Christian country in Asia, and American influence left English as a first national language. Political independence was accepted, essentially without violence, by an established indigenous elite that emerged under a paternalistic American rule.2 In addition, the Philippines is the only independent nation that is a former American colony.3 On the other hand, the country shares several basic characteristics with the rest of southeast Asia. The kinship group is the basic unit of society and the overwhelming majority of the population lives in relatively isolated rural areas. The Philippines remained a diverse collection of ethnolinguistic regions until colonial rule imposed uniform authority within territorial boundaries. There was frequent resistance to colonial rule in the country, and Filipino nationalists were the first in Asia to declare their independence from Western colonial rule.4 Pertinence of the Filipino Insurgency Experience The success of the Philippine government in suppressing the Huk rebellion - between 1946 and 1954 - is often cited as a model of effective counterinsurgency policies. While that rebellion was defeated, the Huks came fairly closely to achieving success in 1950. In 1969, the newly-established Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) joined forces with the remnants of the Huk movement to form a new military arm - the New People's Army (NPA). Expanding continuously since its formation, the NPA currently is an internal security threat to the Philippine Republic. Because of national security-related links and a longstanding historical relationship with the Philippines, U.S. officials are obviously concerned with the recent trend of events in that country. While the Marcos administration has downplayed the NPA threat, this guerrilla army may upset the future stability of the Philippine government. The intent of this paper is to compare and contrast the NPA with the almost successful Huks in order to test a hypothesis - that the New People's army potentially presents a more significant threat to the existing government than the Huk movement did to the three presidential administrations that it fought. In this context, the term "Huks," while originally applied to the World War Two Hukbalahap (Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon or People's Army against the Japanese) resistance movement, has evolved as a generic term that is also applied to the postwar Hukbalahap and HMB movement (In 1948, the Hukbalahap were renamed the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB) or People's Liberation Army). Scope of the Study While the purpose of this study is to examine the two guerrilla armies, it must necessarily also examine their related Communist parties and mass organizations. Especially with Communist organizations, one cannot simply examine one organ in isolation. Although this paper does not focus on Filipino counterinsurgency operations, the evolution of Filipino Communism, or political, economic, and social factors in the Philippines, these will be briefly discussed due to their pertinence. Moving from a general overview of the two Communist movements to specific aspects of these insurgencies, this study is divided into three sections. The first (Chapter 1) briefly describes the Philippine setting and the wartime Hukbalahap resistance movement - the predecessor of the Huk guerrillas. A subsequent section (Chapters 2 and 3) traces the general history of both insurgencies. The final section analyzes specific aspects of these guerrilla movements: the Filipino environment with its causes and conditions (Chapter 4); the organization, composition, expansion and strength of the insurgents (Chapter 5); their strategy, doctrine and operations (Chapter 6); the movements' logistics, communications, and external support (Chapter 7). Lastly, a summary and conclusions are presented. Sources Used in the Study This study utilized both unpublished and published sources. While there is no shortage of material on the Huk rebellion, much less information is available on the New People's Army - a clandestine and security-conscious organization. Significant information gaps exist on the current, internal workings of the NPA and its related Communist organizations. Although many have examined the Huks in retrospective, there were no detailed studies that drew parallels between the Huk and NPA insurgencies. Hopefully, this study is a first step in that direction. Primary sources used consisted of personal interviews, speeches by participants, official publications, and published books and memoirs. Secondary sources consisted of research papers, government studies, books, periodicals, and journals. An annotated bibliography is included at the end of this study. Useful Appendices Several appendices are included that may prove valuable to the reader. A general chronology of significant events is included as Appendix 1 and may prove useful in placing the numerous events in chronological perspective. With the proliferation of Filipino government, Communist, and related organizations, various abbreviations and acronyms are necessary; these are listed in Appendix 2. As one examines the significant expansion of the New People's Army and geographical locations are referred to, Appendix 3 - a map of the Philippine provinces - may prove useful. In addition, several Huk, NPA, and party documents are included as appendices. NOTES 1Robert Thompson, Revolutionary War in World Strategy, 1945-1969 (New York: Taplinger Publishing Company, 1970), pp. 4, 15-17. 2David Rosenberg, ed., Marcos and Martial Law in the Philippines (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1979), p. 14. 3Ross Munro, "Dateline Manila: Moscow's Next Win?" Foreign Policy, No. 56 (Fall 1984), 187. 4Rosenberg, pp. 14-15. BACKGROUND CHAPTER 1 THE SETTING The United States occupation of the Philippines was a half century of compromise. It was a compromise between claims of jingoistic American imperialism at the turn of the century, and the ideals of Filipino nationalism..." Onofre D. Corpuz in The Philippines Some Huks were recognized despite the official anti-Huk attitude of the American Army...In the main, however, recognition was never extended as a policy to the Hukbalahap." Huk leader Luis Taruc in Born of the People Geography and Topography The Republic of the Philippines comprises some 7,100 islands extending about 1,100 miles from north to south, separating the South China Sea from the Philippine Sea (see Figure 1 - Philippines in Its Asian Setting). These islands cover a total land area of about 16,000 square miles. The two largest islands - Luzon and Mindanao - comprise about 65 per cent of the total land area. The large Philippine archipelago embraces some 520,700 square miles of land and sea (see Figure 2 - Geographic Setting).1 Over 95 percent of the population is concentrated on 11 larger islands. Seven large islands and over 3,000 islets form the central Visayan Group - between Luzon and Mindanao - which comprises 19 percent of the Philippine's total land area.2 Manila, the largest city, is also the capital. The topography of the Philippines is largely mountainous, creating narrow coastal plains and interior valleys and plains. Major plains include those of central Luzon, the Cagayan valley of Click here to view image northeastern Luzon, the Agusan Basin on the southern island of Mindanao, and the coastal plains of Cebu. These are the most densely settled regions. Much of the country is covered with lush tropical forests and jungles that benefit from heavy rains. About 38 percent of the land has been cleared for cultivation and another 7 percent is used for pasturage.3 The Philippines lie entirely in the tropics. The tropical climate is governed by the northeast and the southwest monsoons, with three main seasons: the wet, typhoon season from June through October; the cool,dry season from November through February; and the hot, dry season from March through May. Seasonal variations in temperature are relatively minor. The country's rivers, which are generally short and shallow, are prone to seasonal flooding.4 Demographics of the Philippines The population of over fifty-three million includes numerous cultural and linguistic groups (Filipino tribal groups are depicted in Figure 3) Filipinos are principally a blend of Malay, Chinese, Spanish, Negrito, and American stock. Social cleavages are based mainly on religious (Muslims versus lowland Christians), sociocultural (upland tribes versus lowlanders), and urban-rural differences rather than ethnic or racial ones. The overwhelming majority of Filipinos are descendants of Malayo-Polynesian peoples who migrated from the southeast Asian mainland and Indonesia. Christian Malays make up 91.5 percent of the population, and Muslim Moros comprise the remaining 4.5 percent of ethnic Malayans. Those of Chinese descent make up Click here to view image one-third of the non-Malayan minority, and about 20,000 aboriginal Negritos live in the remote interior of the country.5 Growing at a recent average rate of 2.5 percent a year, the population has an average density of 421 inhabitants per square mile. Over 60 percent of the population lives in rural areas, although migration to the cities continues. More than half of the population (54.4 percent) is found on the island of Luzon. Approximately 43 percent of all Filipinos are less than 14 years old.6 Pilipino, a variant of the Tagalog people of southern Luzon and Mindoro, is the official language. English, the second official language, is widely understood. Other diverse languages, such as Ilocano and Cebuano, are spoken. Among some elements of the populations, knowledge of Spanish and Arabic is significant. About 85 percent of the population is Roman Catholic, but a strong Filipino Muslim minority (Moros) makes Islam important in the southern part of the archipelago. Literacy is estimated at over 89 percent.7 Origins of the Huk Rebellion Before examining post-World War Two Communist insurgency movements in the Philippines, it is useful to examine the roots of insurgency. The events which led to the Huk insurgency can be traced to activities of Communist organizers in the Philippines during the 1920s and 1930s. The Communist movement began during this period as an urban political party inspired by the Comintern. The Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) was founded on 7 November 1930 by Crisanto Evangelista. The PKP focused on organizing Filipino industrial workers, and on 7 November 1938, it merged with the Philippine Socialist Party. For about thirty years after this merger, the PKP was, virtually, the only radical party in the country.8 However, this merger was not a "complete" one. The emphasis was on the formulation of a united front, and ignored doctrinal and ideological differences. Both original parties retained some structural integrity, with the "complete" organizational merger planned to take place gradually. Two fundamentally different trends of thought would remain among the leadership, a factor that proved important later.9 With the onset of World War Two and the almost immediate Japanese invasion of the Philippines, the PKP joined forces with an agrarian protest movement in central Luzon to form a military branch of the PKP. This military organization was formally launched on 29 March 1942 as the Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon (People's Army Against Japan), whose abbreviation was "Hukbalahap." The Huks, as they were popularly known, emerged as a large resistance movement against the Japanese. Luis Taruc was selected to lead the Huks. Initially organized as five squadrons of 100 men each, the Huks - using mountain bases - operated in rice paddies and sugarcane fields north of Manila. Successful in recruiting and in extending operations into other areas of Luzon, the Huks increased their strength to about 10,000 men by March of 1943.10 The Huks' partial success was due to political and military factors. Politically, the Communists created a clandestine civil administration in the barrios (hamlets) and towns of provinces where their forces operated. Its base structure was the Barrio United Defense Corps (BUDC) with a membership of 5 to 12 persons in each barrio. The BUDC carried out recruiting, intelligence, logistics, and civil justice functions. Initial guerrilla training was conducted at training camps, known as "Stalin's University," by veterans of the Chinese Communist 8th Route Army. Later, the Chinese became disenchanted with the Huks and formed an all-Chinese force of their own, operating close to Manila. Huk forces attacked Japanese garrisons, patrols, and convoys, and waged a war of attrition against the "puppet" Filipino Constabulary. The Japanese Imperial Army retaliated in the spring of 1943, beseiging the Huk stronghold of Mount Arayat for ten days, capturing or killing many of the Huk leaders. The remaining Huks went underground and reorganized, focusing on political control of main Huk areas. Many clashes with other Filipino guerrilla forces ensued. It is estimated that of the 25,000 killed by the Huks during that war, only about 5,000 were Japanese.11 NOTES 1Frederica Bunge, ed., Philippines: A Country Study (Washington: The American University, 1984), p. xiv. 2"Republic of the Philippines," Journal of Defense and Diplomacy, February 1984, p. 28. 3Bunge, p. xiv; "Republic of the Philippines," p.29. 4Ibid. 5Bunge, p. xiv; "Republic of the Philippines," p. 30. 6Ibid. 7Bunge, p. xiv. 8U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The Situation in the Philippines, Staff Report by Frederick Brown and Carl Ford, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess., October, 1984 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 22; David Rosenberg, "Communism in the Philippines," Problems of Communism, XXXIII (September/October 1984), 30. 9Luis Taruc, He Who Rides the Tiger: The Story of an Asian Guerrilla Leader (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), pp. 17-19. 10Edward Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 6-7. 11Lansdale, pp. 7-8. THE INSURGENCIES CHAPTER 2 THE PKP AND THE HUK REBELLION The situation here is critical, it does not at this moment seem possible for the Filipino people, ravaged and demoralized by the cruellest and most destructive of wars, politically split between the loyalists and enemy collabo- rators, with several sizeable well-armed dissident groups still at large, to cope with the coincidence of political independence and the tremendous economic demands of re- habilitation. Paul V. McNutt, U.S. High Commissioner to the Philippines, January 1946. Any democratic government is neither of necessity nor automatically better in the eyes of comman man than a Communistic government. In order to stamp out Communism, the local government must clean its own house. A status quo that has bred virulent Communism cannot remain un- changed. Communism seldom flourishes where the people are content and prosperous basically." Ramon Magsaysay The Rebellion Begins The PKP and the Hukbalahap began the postwar period with much greater strength than they had possessed in the 1930s. Both organizations had greatly enlarged memberships and had attained full legal status. The association of Huk veterans had about 16,000 fully-armed members. The PKP-associated peasant union, the Pambansang Kaisahan ng Magbubukid (PKM) had local branches in almost every town and barrio in southern and central Luzon. The allied Congress of Labor Organiations (CLO) controlled unions in all the major industries in Panay and Manila, representing most of the organized labor force in Manila. PKP influence was also strong in other labor organizations, such as the Philippine Government Employees Association (PGEA). The PKP-led political party, the Democratic Alliance, won six congressional seats in the 1946 elections. One of these seats was won by Luis Taruc, leader of the Huks. These elected candidates were not allowed to take office, however, due to evidence of Huk terrorism to influence the electorate.1 The Democratic Alliance candidates and the central Luzon farmers they represented were also partly targets of a campaign by local landlords to overcome wartime agrarian policies implemented by the Huks. When many landlords abandoned their lands physically during the war, their tenants took over the abandoned farms and defended them. Jose Lava, Secretary of Organization for the PKP, advocated armed struggle to resist efforts by the landlords and their armed guards to reimpose the status quo ante. The peasants, who constituted the bulk of the wartime Huk movement, were organized, well-armed, and experienced in battle. The new government of the Philippine Republic was weak and discredited by overblown charges of collaboration with the Japanese. Pedro Castro, head of the PKP, and most other members of the PKP's Central Committee publicly favored fighting for control via a parliamentary struggle. However, by the time that the Central Committee had met to resolve this issue, many peasants and PKP members were taking up arms and disappearing underground.2 The Early Huks In 1946, the wartime Hukbalahap organization was reacti- vated. Luis Taruc, the Huk leader, stated later in his memoirs that most of the Huk rank-and-file initially did not view the insurgency as a "military rebellion," but as "resistance to the resurgent reaction" of the government. First to rejoin the fight were the Hukbalahap veterans and the Huk force soon had 10,000 fully-armed fighters, with 2,000 organizers, activists, and sympathizers. The insurgent forces were on the defensive initially, executing limited attacks occasionally to maintain morale. By 1948, the Huks were getting stronger. A government amnesty declared by President Quirino that year proved unsuccessful and the insurgency continued.3 The Peak of the Huk Rebellion By 1949, the Huks had an army of 12,000 to 13,000 regulars, with the support of over 100,000 peasants in central Luzon. While the Huk stronghold was central Luzon, there were Huk supporters in the Cagayan Valley, and in the Visayas. The Filipino government had responded to the Huks with a "mailed fist" policy of suppression, scorched earth tactics, cordon and search operations, and heavy reliance on mortars and artillery. Massacres of peasants, theft, rape, burning and looting by government forces helped to expand Huk membership during this period. Government forces were relatively undisclined and inept. The Communist leadership of the insurgency began to assert the initiative.4 When the PKP publicly announced its support for the Huks in 1948, the Huks were renamed the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB) or the People's Liberation Army. Government graft and corruption was so widespread that national elections held in 1949 were declared scandalous and conceded to be fraudalent. By this time also, a leadership split became evident between the more ideological "Communists" and some of their more "socialist" brothers in the PKP. "Nationalism" versus "Communism" became an issue. The expulsion of Yugoslavia's President Josef Broz Tito at the this time resulted in the labelling of Luis Taruc and other "nationalists" as "Titoists."5 By 1950, PKP leader Jose Lava declared that a revolutionary situation existed and the PKP should plan for an "early seizure of power." By this time, the HMB consisted of three types of forces: 1)mobile striking units operating as a regular military force; 2)seven regional commands; 3)a local self-defense corps. In January 1950, the PKP adopted a series of policies based on its overly-optimistic view of the situation. The Politburo decided to avoid tactical alliances with other groups opposed to the unpopular government of President Elpidio Quirino, essentially abandoning its legal mass organizations and efforts at parliamentary struggle. The PKP also began a very rapid, over- ambitious membership drive in a "geometric expansion" program. PKP leader Jose Lava directed all PKP and HMB members to recruit at least three other members every three months, starting in July 1950 and continuing until September 1951. According to this, the PKP would increase in size from 3,500 to 50,000 members and the HMB would increase to over 170,000. As a consequence, the PKP and HMB were opened to various opportunistic and disgruntled elements of Philippine society. Poorly-motivated and poorly- trained recruits entered the organizations and some recruits were sent to regions where they had few local ties. These developments weakened PKP and HMB discipline, and caused the organizations to lose popular support. Some HMB leaders, such as Luis Taruc, disagreed with Lava's 1950 Politburo Resolutions.7 As part of the PKP plan for an early seizure of power, the small, mobile guerrilla units of the HMB were reorganized into larger units. The HMB thus greatly increased its logistical requirements and could no longer rely heavily on local peasant support for material needs. Special food production and procurement units became necessary. The improved effectiveness of Philippine Army intelligence, largely due to JUSMAG assistance, also made it easier for the government to locate HMB units. To demonstrate HMB power, a number of raids on major cities and constabulary camps were conducted to commemorate important dates in the revolutionary movement. Jose Lava, the PKP leader called these "dress rehearsals of greater things to come."8 The Beginning of the Decline By mid-1950, the HMB controlled central and southern Luzon. It was on the Manila outskirts, anxious for the expected urban uprising. But the HMB was still not strong enough. Poor coordination between the HMB and the PKP organizations existed within the city. This was exacerbated by the leadership schism, but the PKP Politburo went ahead with plans. However, on 18 October 1950, Jose Lava and several other Politburo members were arrested in Manila - along with numerous plans and documents - while planning major "dress rehearsal" raids on the city.9 Based on American advice, Quirino had appointed on 31 August 1950 a Congressman from Zambales, Ramon Magsaysay, to be Secretary of National Defense. With the assistance of two U.S. intelligence advisors, Colonel Edward Lansdale and Major Charles Bohannan, Magsaysay had implemented numerous intelligence reforms and had a personal role in the Politburo capture. The two officers were part of the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG). One of President Quirino's earlier acts - following JUSMAG advice - was a reorganization of the entire armed forces of the country. The Constabulary was placed under the Defense Department, with many of its members transferred to the regular army. Quirino also formed twenty-six battalion combat teams (BCT's) - totalling about 26,000 men - as the core of the new counterinsurgency force. Total government fighting strength (regular army and Constabulary) was about 30,000 men.11 Magsaysay dismissed incompetent and corrupt army officers, and made provisions to ensure honest elections. Resettlement areas for surrendered and captured Huks were established under the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR) program. Habeas corpus was suspended in order to detain government officials suspected of corruption, as well as suspected Communists and sympathizers. Magsaysay expanded the counter- insurgency program even further after his election to the Presidency in 1953. In 1954, Huk leader Luis Taruc surrendered and the rebellion essentially came to an end.12 The End of the Rebellion By 1954, the HMB had suffered defeats on the battlefield and the erosion of popular support after Magsaysay's successful counterinsurgency programs. Dr. Jesus Lava, who had succeeded his brother as PKP Secretary General after his capture in 1950, finally acknowledged the futility of his plan for an early seizure of power and proclaimed a strategic return to the format of parliamentary struggle. At this time, there were very few party members left for the pursuit of open, legal activities. Many had abandoned mass organizations in 1950, when Jose Lava first declared his plan for an early seizure of power. The shift to parliamentary struggle was blocked, however, by the Anti-Subversion Law, which declared the communist party and its affiliates illegal and imposed stiff penalties on party mem- bers.13 The Anti-Subversion Law contained a one-month grace period during which PKP and HMB members were encouraged to surrender in exchange for amnesty. Recognizing defeat, Lava urged party members to "return to civilian life" during the grace period. He also effectively disbanded the PKP party structure by ending the collective, or cell-unit, membership requirement. Thereafter, party members were expected to use their own initiatives. Jesus Lava was only able to exercise his leadership by issuing ineffective "political transmissions," occasional statements analyzing the political situation and prescribing courses of action. Under the new "single file policy," political transmissions were passed verbally from one party member to another, one at a time. Lava's actions ended almost all political activity by the PKP and party organizations essentially ceased to function. For all practical purposes, the PKP had succeeded in self-liquidation.14 NOTES 1David Rosenberg, "Communism in the Philippines," Problems of Communism, XXXIII (September/October 1984), 31; letter from General Edward Lansdale, formerly of JUSMAG, Philippines, 28 March 1985. 2Ibid. 3Luis Taruc, He Who Rides the Tiger: The Story of an Asian Guerrilla Leader (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), pp. 27-29. 4Taruc, pp. 36-38, 43, 45; Eduardo Lachica, The Huks: Philippine Agrarian Society in Revolt (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 5. 5Taruc, pp. 58-60. 6Adrian Jones and Andrew Molnar, "Internal Defense Against Insurgency: Six Cases" (Report prepared by the Center of Research in Social Systems of The American University for the Department of the Army, 1966), p. 40. 7Taruc, p. 73; Rosenberg, p. 31. 8Rosenberg, p. 31; Lansdale letter. 9Taruc, p. 67; Rosenberg, p. 31, 10Rosenberg, p. 32; Lansdale letter. 11Andrew Molnar and others, "Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare" (Report prepared by the Special Operations Research Office of The American University for the Department of the Army, 1963), pp. 314-315; Lansdale letter. 12Molnar and others, p. 315. 13Rosenberg, p. 32. 14Ibid. CHAPTER 3 THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES (CPP) AND THE NEW PEOPLE'S ARMY (NPA) We would be far from wise if we thought, as many would like to think today, that our Communist problem here had ended with the surrender of Taruc or will end with the cap- ture, death, or surrender of the other Communist leaders. Communists are Communists. They have a way of shifting with ease from surface activities to underground movement, depend- ing on the exigencies of the situation they are in...They will seek to associate with worthy causes. They will adopt misleading party names and alliances. They will maintain the 'hardcore' of membership. They will enhance hatred and promote strikes and violence. They will resort to sabotage. They will seek to divide us. Above all, they will infiltrate into the government, universities, civic organizations, even churches. That is the usual Communist pattern..." Major General Jesus Vargas, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines The people are to the army (guerrillas) what water is to fish. General Vo Nguyen Giap in People's War, People's Army The Beginning of the CPP By the 1960s, the PKP was largely inactive except for a few renegade units degenerating into criminal bands. These practiced extortion and banditry, mainly in the hills of central Luzon. Most notable among them was the Sumulong Gang, a group of Huk remnants led by Commander Sumulong. Sumulong broke away from the PKP and set up prostitution, gambling, and other criminal activities in Angeles City, nearby Clark Air Base.1 During the 1960s, many of the HMB members returned to the central Luzon countryside from whence they had come. By 1968, most of the original Huk leaders had been captured or made their own peace with the government. The insurgency, without leader- ship, seemed on the brink of extinction. Instead, a new genera- tion of leaders was emerging among the Communists.2 This movement had roots in Filipino college campuses in the late 1950s, when students supported Senator Claro Recto, an unsuccessful 1957 Presidential candidate who had espoused a more militant nationalism criticizing the "subservient" policy of the Philippines towards the United States. U.S. "imperialism" continued to be a campus rallying cry in the 1960s, and this was influenced by other events of the time: the Cuban revolution; the assassination of Patrice Lumumba; the escalation of the war in Vietnam, and the rise of the Sukarno government in Indonesia. This new generation of Filipinos had little or no recollection of the painful Japanese occupation nor fond memories of U.S. assistance during the war or in the immediate postwar period.3 Indignation in the academic community over an investi- gation by the Philippine House of Representatives into accusations of Communist subversion on the campus of the University of the Philippines led to the establishment of the Students' Cultural Association of the University of the Philippines (SCAUP) in the early 1960's. An English literature instructor at the University of the Philippines, Jose Maria Sison, was one of the leaders. In November 1964, a new youth movement, the Kabataan Makabayan (Nationalist Youth) or KM was organized, with Sison as national chairman. Other organizations were formed, including some with PKP leadership. These included a peasant federation (MASAKA), a labor organization (Lapiang Manggagawa), and a Philippine chapter of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation. In February 1967, the Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism (MAN) was organized as a coalition of opposition nationalist groups. Old and new members circulated at PKP meetings, where sharp generational differences emerged among the political activists. The older leaders, mostly of peasant background, had tasted defeat in the 1950s and tended to be more cautious and bureaucratic. The younger members, primarily intellectuals and urban workers, were more daring and were inspired by revolutionary successes in China, Cuba, and Vietnam.4 Jose Sison was commissioned to prepare a draft PKP study to guide future policy. He wrote, criticizing Jose Lava for the "early seizure of power" strategy, and exoriating Jesus Lava for the "single-file" policy. PKP followers of Lava, suspicious of Sison and other junior PKP members, expelled them from the PKP in April 1967. Sison formed his own provisional Politburo and issued his first public statement on May Day, 1967. On December 26, 1968, Sison formally established the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). Citing the "death" of the PKP in 1957, the CPP felt that it was necessary to "re-establish" the Communist Party. Sison naturally became chairman of the CPP.5 CPP leaders, unlike their pro-Moscow predecessors in the PKP, looked to China and Mao Tse-tung for a model agrarian revolution to inspire and guide. A 1969 CPP document entitled, "Programme of a People's Democratic Revolution" (See Appendix G) stated: The Communist Party of the Philippines is now re-estab- lished and rebuilt as a party of Mao Tse-tung's thought. It is the most advanced detachment of the Filipino working class leading the Philippine revolution forward. It strives to be a well-disciplined Party armed with the theory of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought, using the methods of criticism and self-criticism and linked with the masses of the people. It wields the two weapons of armed struggle and the national united front to deal death blows to U.S. imperialism and feudalism. These leaders were primarily teachers, students, and other intellectuals involved in protest activities in and around metropolitan Manila. Their educational achievements and middle- class backgrounds differed from the majority of the traditional Huks from peasant backgrounds in central Luzon.6 The Establishment of the New People's Army CPP leaders now faced a fundamental problem - they advocated a peasant-based revolutionary strategy, but had no peasant base. While well-schooled in Maoist theory, the leadership had no experience in guerrilla warfare. Within a few months, however, the CPP was able to obtain the support of a group of peasant guerrillas under the command of Bernabe Buscayno - alias Commander Dante - an HMB cadre who had rebelled from the increasingly criminal activities of Commander Sumulong. Together Sison and Dante formed the New People's Army (NPA) on March 29, 1969.7 Better educated than most Huks, the ambitious Dante per- ceived the union as a means of consolidating and expanding his influence at the expense of older leaders in the HMB. Dante also appeared to be impressed with the ideological fervor and persuasiveness of CPP leadership. He accepted NPA subordination to CPP control and allowed the civilian cadre to dominate the CPP-NPA Central Committee. Dante and his commanders were outnumbered on the committee and occupied lesser positions. Beginning with just several hundred men in 1969, the NPA grew to several thousand by the early 1970s, and shifted activities from Tarlac and Pampanga provinces in central Luzon to Isabela province in northeastern Luzon and remote Quezon province in southeastern Luzon. NPA efforts in central Luzon had focused primarily on pursuing agrarian reform.8 Government forces learned of these operations in mid-1972, upon discovery of a grounded fishing vessel, the Karagatan, off Quezon province. The boat, from a still-unknown source abroad, was fully loaded with arms and ammunition intended for the NPA. The discovery led to a major counterinsurgency effort in the region, that cost heavy losses of NPA forces.9 President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law in 1972, justifying this action by the need to suppress the "state of rebellion" led by the NPA. By 1972, the NPA was estimated to have approximately 1,000 to 2,000 armed personnel, 7,000 to 8,000 cadres, and 100,000 sympathizers. Over the 1973-74 period, the government's counterinsurgency campaigns forced the NPA out of most villages and into more remote, mountainous regions. After substantially reducing the size of the NPA support base, the Filipino government eliminated many front organizations, and arrested many of the leaders.10 The Expansion of the NPA Subsequently, the NPA reorganized into more self-contained units for security and began to concentrate efforts in remote rural areas where the government presence was minimal. On the island of Luzon, NPA activity centered in the Sierra Madre Mountains and the Cagayan Valley in the northeastern part of the island. Samar in the Visaya Islands and the southern island of Mindanao also became major NPA target areas. In each of these remote, impoverished areas, the NPA supported local residents in disputes with the central government, local military forces, civilian officials, or landlords. For example, the NPA in 1976 became involved in the Chico River Dam dispute, siding with tribal minorities resisting development and desecration of their land. In many areas, the Communists were able to utilize peasant unrest over the loss of land to corporate enterprises and embrace issues related to land reform. During this period of the early 1970s, the government's attention was also turned southward to Mindanao, where a Moro Muslim insurgency erupted. Large numbers of Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) troops were redeployed to the threatened areas on Mindanao, and mopping-up of the NPA became a second priority.11 Government initiatives did little to check the NPA, although over a dozen top CPP and NPA leaders were captured or killed during 1976-77, including CPP Chairman Jose Maria Sison and the NPA chief Commander Dante. The government also undertook major anti-NPA campaigns on northern Luzon, Samar, and other areas during the late 1970's. Assassinations and ambushes increased, however, and CPP cadres continued to expand the geographical base of their mass movement. Largely responsible for NPA success were the NPA's decentralized organization that allowed local commanders wide autonomy, the rugged and dispersed Philippine geography, the AFP's preoccupation with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) insurgency, and popular discontent and frustration with social, economic, and political conditions.12 Beginning about 1975 and continuing after the 1976-77 capture of top CPP and NPA leaders, the NPA focused primarily on political and organizational activities. The number of NPA clashes with government troops declined, resulting in a false impression of NPA weakness. When AFP troops were reassigned to Mindanao, the NPA gained several years of valuable time to pursue political and clandestine activities. This included the establishment of local guerrilla fronts and infrastructures. In 1980, on the 11th anniversary of the NPA, the CPP through its "Ang Bayan" newspaper declared that conditions were right for resuming military operations. In this statement, the NPA proclaimed 26 guerrilla fronts in Luzon, the Visayas, and Mindanao.13 By early 1983, the NPA claimed to have units in the majority of the nation's provinces. A paper prepared in 1982 by a private Manila business organization estimated that the NPA "has penetrated if not controlled 20 percent of the barangays (hamlets) nationwide and can count on the sympathy if not the support of some 180,000 civilians." Government figures, understandably, estimated a lower NPA strength. Notwithstanding the disagreement over the strength of the NPA and its support base, the government and most sources agreed that the Communists were entrenched in the mountainous provinces of northern Luzon, southern Quezon province, peninsular southeastern Luzon, Samar, and eastern Mindanao.14 Despite the NPA's impressive growth, Communist leaders have admitted that they will not be in a position to topple the government for many years. The NPA has continued a "strategic defensive" phase of struggle, working in small units and avoiding large-scale confrontations with the armed forces. In late 1982, however, larger NPA units, sometimes 200 or 300 strong, began to be reported on Mindanao, where a major NPA expansion program was underway.15 By the end of 1983, according to CPP figures, party membership had increased threefold from 10,000 to 30,000, and the number of NPA soldiers (full or part-time) had increased from 8,000 to 20,000. With this increase in membership, the CPP was able to expand into new territories. The number of guerrilla fronts increased to 45. On Mindanao - economically and militarily important due to its rich resources and deepwater ports - Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile acknowledged that the NPA had most intensified its efforts with at least 16 guerrilla fronts.16 In addition to assassination of informers, policemen, and officials whom the NPA considers corrupt, the NPA has also conducted hit-and-run ambushes and raids. Many of these attacks have been to acquire arms, ammunition, and equipment. There have also been NPA attacks on fixed government installations, government projects, and short-term occupations of municipalities in areas where the guerrillas have strong local support. Large- scale ambushes, involving company and battalion-sized units, have also become more common. On September 29, 1983, about 70 NPA ambushed a patrol northwest of Zamboanga on Mindanao. Government forces suffered 46 KIA, the highest death toll suffered by government forces since NPA operations began in 1969. Almost every day in 1983 saw at least one NPA action against government authority somewhere in the vast country.17 By 1984, the NPA's forces were operating in 62 of the Philippines' 73 provinces. Armed NPA units now challenge the AFP across virtually the entire Philippines archipelago. Estimating NPA strength is understandably difficult. Until recently, the Filipino government downplayed the NPA insurgent threat, at least in part to defend its original rationale for martial law, which was lifted in 1981. Government officials suggested that a few thousand NPA guerrillas existed at most, and were constantly on the run due to the effectiveness of AFP operations.18 The official government line changed in May 1984, when President Marcos stated publicly that there were at least 6,800 armed guerrillas. Many observers believe that the true figure is closer to the NPA claim of 20,000 (part and full-time guerrillas) at the end of 1983. The NPA probably can now field some 10,000 to 12,500 full-time, armed guerrillas, and an additional 10,000 part-time militia soldiers. Until early 1984, reports of AFP operations consistently equaled or outnumbered the NPA-inspired incidents. But during 1984, that trend has changed; the level of NPA activity now exceeds the number of operations mounted by the AFP.19 NOTES 1David Rosenberg, "Communism in the Philippines," Problems of Communism, XXXIII (September/October 1984), 32. 2U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The Situation in the Philippines, Staff Report prepared by Frederick Brown and Carl Ford, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess., October, 1984 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 22. 3Rosenberg, p. 33. 4Rosenberg, p. 34. 5Ibid. 6U.S., Congress, Senate, p.22. 7U.S., Congress, Senate, p.23; Rosenberg, 36. 8U.S., Congress, Senate, p. 28. 9Rosenberg, p. 37. 10Frederica Bunge, ed., Philippines: A Country Study (Washington: The American University, 1984), p. 238. 11Bunge, p. 239; U.S., Congress, Senate, p. 24. 12Bunge, p. 239. 13Rosenberg, p. 38. 14Bunge, p. 239. 15Bunge, pp. 41, 239. 16Rosenberg, p. 38. 17Rosenberg, pp. 38-39. 18U.S., Congress, Senate, pp. 24-25. 19U.S., Congress, Senate, p. 25. AN ANALYSIS: COMPARING AND CONTRASTING THE INSURGENCIES CHAPTER 4 THE ENVIRONMENT: INSURGENCY CAUSES AND CONDITIONS The way of the reformer is hard...his problems are more difficult than those of the revolutionary...he necessarily fights a two-front war against both con- servative and revolutionary...The reformer, consequently, requires a much higher order of political skill than does the revolutionary. Reform is rare if only because the political talents necessary to make it a reality are rare. A successful revolutionary need not be a master politician; a successful reformer always is." Samuel P. Huntington in Political Order in Changing Societies It is not necessary to wait for the fulfillment of of all conditions for a revolution because the focus of insurrection can create them. Che Guevara The next five chapters will attempt to compare and contrast the postwar Huk rebellion and the ongoing insurgency of the New People's Army. Chapter five will examine the organization, composition and strength of the two insurgencies; chapter six will examine strategy, doctrine, and operations. Logistics, communications, and support will be the focus of chapter seven. This chapter will examine the environment of the two insurgencies, their causes and conditions. While the Philippines is the setting for both of these in surgencies, any environment will obviously not be identical at different points in time. We will examine the Philippines of the 1940s and 1950s, and contrast a revolution within that country occuring during the more recent years - 1970s and 1980s. A comparison of both environments is useful to analyze the two insurgencies fought against the same backdrop. The Huk Environment (1945 - 1954) The Wartime Legacy of the Huks The Philippines in the late 1940s was a country of about 20 million people. About 3/4 of these people lived on farms in rural areas. More than half of these farms were small - less than 5 acres in size. Manila in 1950 had a population of approxi- mately 1 million. The agrarian nature of the economy is a continuing key factor, with much of the best farmland located in the central plain of Luzon (see Figure 4 - The Central Plain of Luzon). A large portion of this farmland was farmed by tenants - about 2/3 of the cultivated land in "Huklandia" (see Figure 5 - Percentage of Cultivated Land Farmed by Tenants in Central and Southern Luzon). This fact underscores the agrarian quality of the Huk rebellion.1 When the wartime Hukbalahap resistance movement was formed in March 1942, it drew cadre and organizational bases directly from existing confederations of peasants and labor such as the KPMP (National Society of Peasants of the Philippines), PKM (National Peasants Union), AMT (General Workers' Union), and CLM (Collective Labor Movement), as well as the PKP (Communist party). Although predominately a rural-base movement, the Hukbalahap recruited somewhat beyond the peasantry. Many labor leaders joined the movement, including Luis Taruc, the Huk "supremo," who was a leader of Pampangan sugar workers and a member of the National Commission of Labor. Manila groups including the PKP, carried out communications, intelligence, and support activities.2 It was easy to recruit in Manila, due to Click here to view image the large numbers of disillusioned students and intellectuals, unemployed, discontented, and labor organizations.3 The Hukbalahap had strong peasant support because it was viewed in the light of its earlier and favorable resistance to landlords and constabulary, having successfully protected civilians from the Japanese invaders with guerrilla tactics, and having provided a shadow government with local peacekeeping forces through the infiltration of Japanese-created neighborhood associations. The stature of the Huks also increased because some Filipinos, including many absentee or self-exiled landlords and political figures, were collaborators during the war. In the absence of the exploiting landlords and thanks to bountiful harvests, the wartime economic situation of the peasants actually improved.4 The war produced a legacy: "The Huks fought the Japanese while at the same time righting some of the economic inequities of the past. While attacking the enemy, the Huks also put toge- ther the rudiments of a new social organization with its own leadership, customs, and institutions based on a rough form of socialist democracy."5 After the war ended, the Filipino government and economy were damaged and disorganized. The Huks appointed civilian leaders in their strongholds and hoped to use these to increase their political influence - a start towards their dictatorship of the proletariat. The Filipino government disallowed these Huk claims and appointed its own officials to hold office until elections could be held later, Luis Taruc and some of the other Hukbalahap leaders were imprisoned briefly, but released later in 1945.6 American haste in concluding its Pacific affairs resulted in poor government administration, corruption, and a failure to recognize and compensate some Filipino guerrillas. This crea- ted bitterness that the Huks exploited. Professor John Walton in his sociological analysis of the Huk rebellion emphasized four interrelated circumstances that were proximate causes of the postwar rebellion. The first, already alluded to above, was the conflict between Huks on one side, and U.S. occupation forces and other non-Communist Filipino groups. Even during the liberation struggle in 1945, this friction existed and government forces began arresting Hukbalahap members. Huks were asked to turn in weapons and membership lists, a request that was met with some resistance. Another minor factor was the issue of back pay given to the USAFFE (U.S. Armed Forces in the Far East) guerrillas, but denied to Huks who spent much of their time fighting other Filipinos. Some known or suspected collaborators of the Japanese were also elevated to positions in the new government - an issue that was overblown by the Huks.8 The Huks in September 1945 submitted numerous personnel rosters as requested by American administrators. Hukbalahap forces, although they had resisted the Japanese, had refused to serve under the complete authority of the USAFFE. The Huks also had extra-governmental political organizations in the villages and this also caused considerable resentment. Even during the resistance, several armed clashes erupted between Huks and USAFFE units. Many of these USAFFE veterans were integrated into the postwar Military Police Command (MPC) and this further alienated the Huks and the government.9 A second circumstance was the resurgence of popular democratic forces that the Huks captalized upon. Immediately after the war, the same popular front forces of the late 1930s were reorganized.10 As Huk leader Luis Taruc noted, "It was extremely easy to organize among the people after the work of the Hukbalahap."11 In the countryside, the PKM inherited the disbanded Huk followers and grew to half-million people, twice the size of the various prewar peasant organizations combined. In the labor movement, a Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO) was organized in 1945. It quickly became the dominant labor federation of the early postwar period, including though not dominated by the PKP. The CLO used activism to press labor demands.12 In anticipation of the 1946 election that would select the first government of the new Philippine republic, the PKP, the Hukbalahap Veterans' League, and various peasant and labor unions combined forces to form the Democratic Alliance (DA). The DA was successful in electing six Congressional candidates, all from central Luzon. Due to the Huk use of terrorism alluded to in Chapter 2, the DA was prevented from taking lesgislative seats.13 Thirdly, the Philippine Trade Act of 1946 (or the Bell Trade Act), a continuance of neocolonial policies, exacerbated historical conflicts. The act called for a twenty-eight year extension of free trade relations and parity for American investors along with Filipino nationals. This meant that the Philippines would continue to be a completely open, duty-free market for American goods. The arrangement, strongly backed by Filipino landlords, perpetuated the old colonial relationship. The parity agreement virtually prohibited the development of independent Filipino industries by placing them on the same footing with U.S. multinationals; it preserved the dominant position of American investment in the Filipino economy.14 The Bell Act also had important military arrangements, with ninety-nine year leases for twenty-three bases, including fertile agricultural land in central Luzon.15 Finally, there was some abuse of the Huks. Huk and peasant organizations were declared illegal, with members or sympathizers harassed, raided, jailed or killed. For the Huks, the murder of peasant leader Juan Feleo in August 1946 was a highpoint of this period. At that time, Huk resistance was reorganized out of the same constituents as the wartime resistance and was mobilized allegedly for "self-defense", but ostensibly for the furtherance of Huk political goals.16 The landlords had successfully resisted postwar reforms at a time of general political and economic chaos, leading to a ra- pid deterioration in the material conditions of the peasantry, especially when contrasted with the relatively prosperous years of the Japanese occupation. In the midst of some government abuse of the Hukbalahaps, and some historical, accelerating economic and political grievances, the Huk began their rebellion.17 How did the conditions under which the Huk insurgency operated affect it? The Huks thrived during the 1946 to 1949 period due to the inability of the Presidents Roxas and Quirino to effectively mount a counterinsurgency campaign. Just prior to inde- pendence, the Filipino military had to demobilize from a strength of 132,000 to about 37,000. This caused severe organizational problems. 24,000 of the 37,000 were in the Military Police Command (MPC) under the Department of the Interior, with the remainder in the armed forces under the Department of Defense. This large constabulary force was not suited to dealing with a revolutionary guerrilla force. The overblown collaborationist issue also complicated officer recruitment for the army. An officer had to be cleared of charges before assignment - a controversial, time-consuming, and often subjective process.18 The Roxas Regime In addition to the internal defense problems caused by the postwar state of government security forces, internal development was largely neglected. At the time, President-elect Roxas had promised to restore law and order and to eliminate the Huks within sixty days after his election. The MPC - though lacking competent leaders, equipment, and proper training - was given the mission of eliminating the Huks. To augment the MPC, provincial governors and landlords organized Civil Guard units and recruited private and local police to participate in internal defense operations. These various untrained forces presented coordination, control, and discipline problems.19 The Civil Guard units, one of the first paramilitary units, served as auxiliaries of the military units. Some indiscriminate destruction, pillaging, and massacres caused further resentment against government forces.20 After several months of armed confrontation proved ineffective, Roxas became convinced that police methods were insufficient to counter the rebellion. A new approach to Roxas' "mailed fist" policy of force, that of mediation and negotiation, was attempted. Roxas arranged a three-month truce and tried to persuade the rebels to lay down their arms. A new land tenancy act was proposed, but this failed. The Huks continued their propaganda efforts and the MPC used the truce period to reorganize and reequip. Both sides repeatedly violated the truce.21 As the truce period ended, the MPC reinforced the Civil Guards and local police, and the army began new offensive opera- tions in central Luzon. The "mailed fist" policy continued even more indiscriminately than before. Whole barrios (hamlets) and villages were burned, crops destroyed, and peasants innocent of Hukbalahap sympathies were sometimes killed or imprisoned. Popular disaffection increased and government forces failed to decisively engage the mainbody of Huks. In March 1948 Roxas, perhaps partly out of frustration, declared the Huks and their political arm to be illegal and seditious.22 The Quirino Administration The following month Roxas died of a heart attack. He was succeeded by Vice President Elpidio Quirino. Quirino believed that the Huks could be defeated through a coordinated policy of amnesty and grievance mediation. Quirino enacted a temporary amnesty in June 1948 and proposed a program of land reform, abrogation of the Bell Act, and other concessions attractive to the Communists. The Huks used the amnesty period for propaganda purposes and negotiations failed with the termination of the amnesty period on 15 August 1948.23 For the next two years, government operations were essentially ineffective against the growing Huk movement with Quirino later adopting a "mailed fist" policy like his predecessor. The fraudalent elections of 1949 furthered the Huk cause. Two exceptions to government ineffectiveness were the success of "Force X" - a pseudo-Huk unit of constabularies used to deceive and attack Huks, and a successful brigade-sized pursuit of Huks after the 28 April 1949 murders of the widow and daughter of ex-President Quezon in a Huk ambush.24 During the Roxas administration and the first year of Qui- rino's elected term, the Filipino government continued to be a government of the privileged few. Farmers were suffering econo- mically due to high rentals; decisions in the land courts often favored landlords; and the moneylenders charged peasants mounting interest on the originally small debts of their ancestors.25 There was corruption in the government and the arrogant behavior of the military caused fear and resentment.26 Things began to improve in 1950. In the spring of that year, the national police force was moved out of the Department of the Interior and became a part of the Armed Forces of the Philippines under the Department of Defense. This increased the strength of the armed forces to 50,000 men. Battalion Combat Teams (BCT's) were organized for actively engaging Huk units; these units had more manpower and firepower than the constabulary units that were being used.27 The constabulary forces had not been able to stem the growth of the Huk movement. Their company-sized units were inadequately equipped and not capable of conducting sustained antiguerrilla operations. The constabulary also frequently failed to obtain the cooperation of the populace. The regular army was not much better prepared for counterinsurgency. Promotions were awarded on the basis of political influence and corruption was prevalent. Morale was low and the army was also not organized for sustained operations. It consisted mainly of administrative, service, and training units, with only two infantry battalions ready for combat.28 The Arrival of Ramon Magsaysay On 1 September 1950 Ramon Magsaysay became the Secretary of National Defense under Quirino. As Edward Lansdale, personal advisor to Magsaysay in the JUSMAG, details in his memoirs, this marked the turning point in the insurgency. American advice and assistance through the JUSMAG was important, although the U.S. was strapped financially by the Korean War of the early 1950s. Magsaysay improved morale in the armed forces, organized Scout Ranger teams, emphasized small unit operations, and reduced corruption.29 As Filipino journalist Eduardo Lachica points out, Magsaysay was even more successful in his internal development programs.30 As the counterinsurgency efforts are not the primary focus of this paper, these efforts will not be examined in detail here. After 1951, once the government had significantly reduced military abuses of villagers and had begun agrarian reforms addressing the objectives of most rebels, the Huk insurgency withered. The government reforms had removed most of the revolutionary goale. By this time, many of the people were weary of fighting. Some decided to resume nonviolent efforts to obtain further agrarian reforms.31 The Environment of the New People's Army (1969-Present) The Social, Economic, and Political Legacy While demographic factors naturally changed from the mid- 1940's, many of the social, economic, and political factors changed relatively little. This was especially true in the remote areas. As mentioned in Chapter 3, at the end of the Huk rebellion, Huk survivivors simply melted into the countryside, more intent on survival than in continuing an active rebellion. After Magsaysay's death in 1957, President Garcia enacted an Anti-Subversion Law, outlawing the PKP, Huks, and other related organizations. President Macapagal, who was elected in November 1961, did relatively little toward agrarian reform. Although Macapagal was from Pampanga province in central Luzon and recognized that region's problems, he lacked political skills and his Agricultural Land Reform Code failed due to underfunding.32 Internal development efforts lagged, and by the 1960s, ex- ploitable conditions still existed to leverage the Communist cause. Illiteracy remained high in the remote provinces such as the mountain provinces, Cagayan, Samar and Mindanao. A wide social and economic gap still remained between the rich elite and the poor majority, reinforcing the belief that social justice belonged to the affluent. The economic growth of the nation could not cope with the needs of a rapidly increasing population, creating deficiencies in housing, public utilities, and social services. These deficiencies were especially acute in urban areas, such as Manila. The economy was still dependent on agriculture, but world commodity price fluctuations and technological advances caused disruptions to the Filipino economy. The initial stages of industrialization also produced uneven economic development in the country. Governmental graft, corruption, and inefficiency still prevailed. The majority of the people tend to equate economic opportunities with leadership, and the economic problems decreased government credibility.33 The Marcos Regime In contrast with the Huks, the NPA developed and has existed under the reign of only one administration - that of President Ferdinand Marcos. Marcos was elected in November 1965 and has retained power since. Initially Marcos' policies had a modernizing and reformist thrust. Marcos' pre-martial law administration, from 1965 to 1972, invested heavily in infra- structure projects - schools, irrigation, roads, bridges. Despite this improving environment, the Communist movement on Filipino campuses gained strength in the 196Os, attracting young and idealistic radicals who were inspired by the revolutionary experiences in China, Cuba, and Vietnam. The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) was formed in December 1969, and several months later joined with Huk remnants to form the New People's Army (NPA). By the early 1970s, Marcos had used his power to dismantle some provincial fiefdoms of the landholding oligarchy, enact a limited land reform in the rice and corn-growing regions of central and northern Luzon, partially modernize the economic infrastructure and the military, and lessen energy dependency. Economic growth rates were respectable, in the range of six percent per year.34 These successes were, however, overtaken by a combination of underlying structural problems and a cumulative abuse of power. There was always a clear bias towards large-scale urban industrial projects, a failure to integrate manufacturing with the rest of the economy, and a neglect of the agricultural base. By the mid-1970s, Marcos had replaced the old elite with a new system of "Marcos socialism." Through subsidies, credits, and other supports, the government increased its role in the economy, distorted the private sector by granting certain monopolies to Marcos associates, and engaged in often wasteful public projects. A recent report by the University of the Philippines lists 688 presidential decrees and 283 letters of instruction listed since 1972 that represent various forms of government intervention in the economy.35 Furthermore, many of Marcos' development programs were un- derfunded, like those of his predecessors. National roads, sani- tation, and employment were often neglected. Government programs, even more importantly, did not demonstrate government sincerity. While the development projects provided some economic benefits, they had little social impact where they were needed the most. Hospitals, camps, and courts were built in provincial capitals and in the major towns; the urban dwellers (such as the rich and middle class) benefited, but not the peasants.36 Some of Marcos' military reforms during the 1960s were commendable. A non-combatant Army Civic Action Force (ACAF) was created out of the Philippine Civic Action Group recalled from Vietnam, and included engineer, medical and support units. The ACAF unit was utilized to provide health care, improve roads, perform flood control work, and build schools, bridges, and buildings. The Philippine Constabulary (PC) Rangers were created, and the curriculum at military schools expanded to include more engineering, social science, and humanities topics. Constabulary forces were strengthened, and by 1970 the PC was the largest organization (21,000) in the 50,000 man AFP.37 Despite its strengthening, the basic failing of the military in the late 1960s may be that it did not have a clear idea of its enemy. Situational assessments were made at high levels and were rarely questioned by tactical units. The military appeared to have no clear concept of the enemy, except that it was fighting against "ideologues;" there was little sense of the social circumstances of the insurgency. The AFP viewed the Huks as an instrument of a global Communist conspiracy. Although barrio self-defense units were formed, the AFP was not perceptive to the distinction between the peasant rebels and the urban Communists. The insurgency provided the AFP with a reason for a strong military force and emphasis was placed on the quantitative aspects of troops and guns. The initial overuse of PSYWAR techniques also contributed to the government's credibility gap.38 In his export-growth development strategy to emulate the Japanese, Marcos attempted to create a stratum of aggressive Phi lippine entrepreneurs heading large holding companies. The result, however, has been a serious distortion of the Filipino economy that has exacerbated the unequal distribution of wealth, created a debt-ridden public sector, and caused economic problems. From the mid-197Os to 1983, the composition of government spending shifted, with less going to infrastructure projects and the majority being spent on corporate equity investment and other capital outlays.39 Like the government, the armed forces are affected by much corruption, mismanagement, and diversion of equipment and funds from the intended end-user - especially at the higher echelons. The military is underequipped with some serious morale, maintenance, and discipline problems like the army of the 1940s. Due to the economic problems, the army is also woefully underfunded.40 While the AFP has recently changed its military equipment procurement priorities to meet the NPA threat, it remains in dire need of upgrading in many respects.41 Economic strains, political violence and social frictions have continued to exist since independence and have deep roots in the colonial period. Despite these historical roots, many Filipinos hold the Marcos regime responsible for a political and economic deterioration that has grown steadily worse. There has been a profound loss of confidence in Marcos and in his ability to govern. Marcos' practice of saying one thing and doing the opposite has damaged his credibility, and there appears to be little expectation that the leadership will act for the national good as opposed to its own narrow interests.42 Marcos has appeared confused and often deliberately misleading in representing the insurgent threat. He has often changed strength estimates of the NPA, sometimes dramatizing the insurgent threat and sometimes claiming that the NPA posed no threat to state security. Some doubt that the administration understands or can effectively cope with the NPA threat. This situation is worsened by growing popular resentment of the gross corruption and rampant cronyism in the administration. The corruption by the leadership spawns corruption at other levels - the diversion of resources at ministerial levels, graft at the provincial level, bribes and extortion in the barangays by police and officials. Military involvement in business ventures in the provinces has increased rapidly in recent years and official positions are often used for personal gain. While, obviously, not all officials and officers are corrupt, corruption is pervasive enough to engender popular resentment.43 In addition to the corruption, military abuses have caused further resentment. The Philippine Constabulary (PC) and the Ci- vilian Home Defense Force (CHDF) are often criticized for deficient levels of training, lack of discipline, and habitual mistreatment of the populace. Local police, who are under the unified military command structure, and regular army units have also been cited for abuses. The AFP has tended to treat the people as if they were the enemy and not the object of protection from the insurgents. Unlike the NPA, the AFP has the reputation among many villagers for indiscriminately using violence, utilizing excessive force against suspected NPA sympathizers, and relying on the use of massive firepower to influence the populace.44 Until the 1970s, the Catholic Church in the Philippines was not very active in the political process due to older, conservative leaders who believed in the separation of church and state.45 Recently, the church has emerged as a main defender of the people against military abuses. The church is now a leading critic of government corruption and an exponent of greater citizen participation in the political process. There is some antagonism between the government and the church.46 This development will be explored in more detail in Chapter 5. The government has responded to the NPA threat as it had in the late 1940's to the Huk rebellion. The AFP concentrated superior force in the affected regions and conducted conventional search-and-destroy missions to locate and defeat the NPA. Much emphasis was placed on capturing or killing the movement's leadership, with rewards offered for Communist cadre.47 Beneficiaries of the Marcos Regime Besides Marcos and his cronies, two groups have increased power since the declaration of martial law in 1972. One is the military, which has grown from 60,000 to 155,000 men with a substantial increase in budget. The AFP, PC, the Presidential Security Command, the National Intelligence and Security Authori- ty (NISA), and the various paramilitary units may have become essential to the continuity of the Marcos govenment. The other major, but intended, beneficiary has been the CPP-NPA movement. In addition to the Communist insurgency, the government has also had to contend with the Moro Muslim insurgency in the southern Philippines.48 The NPA insurgency's greatest strengths have been the abuses, inefficiencies, corruption, and complacency of a self-satisfied nineteen-year old regime. The recent Aquino assassination has been a further blow to the regime's credibility. While the Filipino political spectrum is a continuum that does not divide neatly into "moderates" and "liberals," that assassination galvanized the political center into active opposition - evidenced by the strong opposition showing during the May 1984 parliamentary elections. The "silent majority" of middle-class professionals, non-crony business elite, and the Catholic Church has become more vocal. The assassination provided a rallying point for the Left and deepened the economic crisis by spurring capital flight abroad.49 Thus, the Aquino assassination quickly rallied a wide range of opposition groups and marked an important turning point from passive compliance to active protest against government policy. It forced the political polarization of the country further than it has moved in recent years. The CPP was quick to align itself with the popular outrage over the assassination. It remains to be seen whether the "moderate" opposition will be able to overcome its own divisions and government dominance to build a coherent political force. If not, the CPP and the NPA will be ready to take advantage of the political ferment, economic stagnation, and government mismanagement.50 NOTES 1Napoleon Valeriano and Charles Bohannan, Counterguerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 31; Edward Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 17. 2John Walton, Reluctant Rebels: Comparative Studies of Revolution and Underdevelopment (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), p. 58. 3Valeriano and Bohannan, p. 33. 4Walton, p. 58. 5John Larkin, The Pampangans: Colonial Society in a Philippine Province (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1972), p. 311. 6Alvin Scaff, The Philippine Answer to Communism (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1955), pp. 25-26. 7Scaff, p. 26. 8Walton, pp. 58-59. 9Benedict Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 114-116. 10Walton, p. 59. 11Luis Taruc, Born of the People (New York: International Publishers, 1953), p. 218. 12Walton, p. 59. 13Walton, pp. 59-60. 14Walton, pp. 60-61. 15Walton, p. 61. 16Walton, pp. 61-62. 17Walton, p. 62. 18Scaff, p. 27. 19William Moore, "The Hukbalahap Insurgency, 1948-1954: An Analysis of the Roles, Missions, and Doctrine of the Philippine Military Forces" (Report of the Institute of Advanced Studies, US Army War College, 1971), p. 11. 20Eduardo Lachica, The Huks: Philippine Agrarian Society in Revolt (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), pp. 205-207. 21Moore, p. 9. 22Moore, pp. 9-11. 23Moore, pp. 11-12. 24Reginald Swarbrick and James Clark, "The Evolution of Communist Insurgency in the Philippines" (Report of the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1983), pp. 16-18. 25Edward Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 28. 26Lansdale, p. 25. 27Lansdale, p. 20. 28Andrew Molnar and others, "Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare" (Report prepared by the Special Operations Research Office of The American University for the Department of the Army, 1963), p. 325. 29Lansdale, pp. 42-48. 30Lachica, p. 250. 31Kerkvliet, p. xvi. 32Lachica, p. 251. 33Ramberto Saavedra, "The Role of Civil Affairs in Counterinsurgency in the Philippines" (Thesis of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1982), pp. 43-47. 34Robert Manning, "The Philippines in Crisis,"Foreign Affairs, Volume 63, No. 2 (Winter 1984/1985), 394. 35Ibid. 36Lachica, pp. 252-255. 37Lachica, pp. 245-248. 38Lachica, pp. 236-238, 241-244. 39Manning, pp. 393, 395. 40Statement by William Moore, Major General, U.S. Army, formerly of JUSMAG, Philippines, in a personal interview, Arlington, Virginia, 15 February 1985. 41U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The Situation in the Philippines, Staff Report prepared by Frederick Brown and Carl Ford, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess., October, 1984 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 5. 42U.S., Congress, Senate, pp. 12-13. 43U.S., Congress, Senate, pp. 13-15. 44U.S., Congress, Senate, p. 16. 45Lachica, p. 254. 46 U.S., Congress, Senate, p. 17. 47U.S., Congress, Senate, p. 24. 48Rosenberg, p. 25. 49Manning, p. 399; U.S., Congress, Senate, p. 4. 50Rosenberg, pp. 25-28. CHAPTER 5 ORGANIZATION, COMPOSITION AND STRENGTH The Huks For ruthlessness and cruelty are alien to Christian thought, and when men in the Free World use such methods, they do so in defiance of their own morality and ideals. The atheist Communist, however, believes that the end justifies the means, or in Lenin's words, "Morality is subordinate to the class struggle." For this reason, the Communist can pursue a policy of terror and cruelty with a clear conscience. Former Huk leader Luis Taruc In order to examine the organization of the Huks, it is necessary to examine party, military, and mass organizations. The Huk organization was similar to the wartime Hukbalahap's; it was both an underground mass organization and a guerrilla army. The underground government included villagers responsible for logistical and intelligence support. The Huk organization was closely intertwined with that of the party.1 Organization of the PKP The organization of the PKP followed the normal Communist concept. A National Congress of the Partido Komunista ng Pilipi- nas presumably would have been the top-level organization, but this body was never formed. Party affairs were directed by a 31- member Central Committee, which presided over an 11-member Polit- buro (see Figure 6 - National Organization of the PKP). A 5-mem- ber Secretariat, consisting of the General Secretary and the chairmen of the four national departments, conducted the basic work of the party. The four departments were the National Mili- Click here to view image tary Department (the Hukbalahap organization, later renamed the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan or HMB), the National Organization Department, the National Finance Department, and the National Education Department. A Chinese Bureau (CB) of the Chinese Communist Party provided liaison with the PKP (the CB is covered in more detail in Chapter 7). While there is general agreement on the composition of the Central Committee, Politburo, and Secretariat, there are some inconsistencies as to the number of national departments. Robert Ross Smith, in The Hukbalahap Insurgency - Economic, Political, and Military Factors, asserts the existence of a fifth National Intelligence Department.3 Ostensibly, this department would have coordinated intelligence activities. Every party member belonged to a cell of 3 to 5 members.4 Military Organization of the Huks The military organization is depicted in Figure 7. This organization closely resembles the wartime organization of the Hukbalahap, mentioned in Chapter 1. Field operations were under the control of Regional Commands (RECOs), military headquarters directly below the National Military Department (NMD). The RECOs were further subdivided into Field Commands (FCs); these FCs were similar to regiments. Below the FCs were battalions and squadrons; the squadrons resembled companies. In practice, battalions were almost never formed, and squadrons often reported directly to the RECO. There was no fixed number of units below the RECO echelon, although each of these echelons had two or more subordinate elements. A squadron, the basic Huk combat unit, had Click here to view image 50 to 100 men and was further divided into platoons and squads (a partial listing of Huk squadrons is contained in Figure 8 - Hukbalahap Squadrons and Their General Locations). Many of the squadron numbers were carried over from the wartime Hukbalahap days. Occasionally, special platoons were organized to perform security functions for leaders, production base personnel, and other noncombatants.5 The NMD formed a General Headquarters in the field, supported by a staff of five primary staff sections (similar to U.S. Army staff organizations). At the height of their power, the Huks had a total of ten existing or planned RECOs and a Manila City Command. The geographical orientation of nine of these RECOs and the Manila Command are depicted in Figure 9. In addition to these RECOs, the Huks also activated a RECO 10 for further expansion into Batangas and Cavite provinces in southwestern Luzon. All but two of these RECOs were on Luzon; RECO 6 encompassed the Visayan Islands and RECO 7 was planned for Mindanao. The Mindanao RECO was never actually organized.6 In 1948, the RECO system was set up to improve command and control as the movement had grown beyond the wartime Hukbalahap units. Prior to that time, when the movement was more disorga- nized, the Huks were divided into two "central Luzon" and "south- ern Luzon" districts. While the RECOs were military organiza- tions with their own logistical and intelligence systems, these military area commands were intertwined with political organiza- tions. Each RECO was complemented by a Regional Committee under the National Organization Department (to be discussed shortly).7 Together, the Regional Commands and the Regional Click here to view image Committees essentially constituted a "Regional Politburo." Below the Regional Commands (RECOs), were District Organizing Committees (DOCs) and Section Organizing Committees (SOCs) which provided political guidance to the barrio (village) mass organizaations.8 Each RECO had four to five Field Commands and an equal number of DOCs. There was at least one SOC for each squadron. The DOCs and SOCs were located in posts close to the towns and barrios.9 The RECO commanders were top party leaders and each organizational unit down to squadron level had at least one party menber.10 Like the squadron, the Field Commands (FCs) had no regular table of organization. While all FCs had a commander and deputy, staff organizations varied and only the larger FCs had G-3 and G-4 staff officers. The number of men in a Field Command varied between 100 and 700 men. The FC headquarters consisted of five to six officers, with a security force of 10 to 20 guerrillas. The FCs generally stayed in one vicinity and their headquarters often had had camps in remote areas.11 According to Huk leader Luis Taruc, the Huks in 1953 attempted to transform all units and cadre into large organizational brigades.12 The Mass Organization of the Huks Below the previously discussed echelon was the mass organization of the Huks-the Barrio United Defense Corps (BUDC). The BUDC of Buklod, like some other Huk organizations, was originally formulated during the Japanese occupation as a local government organization and provider of supplies for combat units. These organizations were run by a counil of 5 to 12 members. While in theory these councils were elected by barrio residents, they were closely controlled by the SOCs. The activities of the BUDC were a function of the Huk control over a given area. In areas where they exercised complete control, the BUDC council appointed public officials, established courts and schools, and collected taxes. In other areas, the BUDC limited itself to intelligence and supply activities.13 The BUDC was a clandestine civil administration in towns and barrios where the Huks operated. It also conducted recruit- ment and civil justice functions.14 The BUDC was the contact or- ganization for Huk guerrillas in the area, and operated in many of the same wartime Huikbalahap areas. BUDC personnel were sometimes referred to as "OD cadre" - shorthand for Organization Department cadre - or as barrio organizers."15 Non-Military Departments of the PKP The National Organization Department (NOD), National Education Department (NED), and National Finance Department (NFD) were also organized by echelons and geographical areas, similar to the NMD. Each of these departments had its own headquarters, Regional Committees which corresponded to the RECOs, District Committees which paralled the military Field Commands, and Section Committees at the same level as the military Squadrons.16 The National Organization Department (NOD), being the political department, had even more overlap (see Figure 10). For example, the Secretariat of a District Committee consisted of the district chairmen of the Organization, Education, and Finance Departments and the Field Commander from the Military Department. Click here to view image In addition to overseeing the organization of the mass base, the NOD governed the activities of front organizations such as the PKM and CLO. It also operated the courier service and was an important intelligence collection apparatus.17 The National Education Department (NED) was mainly concerned with political indoctrination (see Figure 11). The PKP had an elaborate educational system. Schools taught the illiterate to read and write, and also espoused Communist doctrine and tactics. The NED interfaced closely with the Military Department, and in many cases, conducted military training. It ran primary, secondary, and intermediate schools. The NED also performed research and translation functions, and was responsible for propaganda and publications. This department supplied the political commissars for all levels of the military, further enhancing the horizontal relationship between the two departments.18 The National Finance Department (NFD) was responsible for fiscal matters such as accounting, disbursements, procurement, and purchasing (see Figure 12). It also performed some logistical functions, such as overseeing Huk production bases. As evidenced by its organization, the NFD controlled finances through interconnections between finance committees and political committees at various echelons (see Figure 13).19 PKP-Huk fiscal activities will be covered in more detail in Chapter 7. The entire apparatus was organized to coordinate the work of the four national departments, while maintaining a close horizontal relationship between the departments. This enabled the Click here to view image leadership to control all aspects of the revolution. Because of the organizational interconnections, the entire organization had a paramilitary character. While only the members of the Military Department were technically HMB or Huks, members of the entire organization were called Huks.20 The Democratic Alliance To ally itself with the peasant movement in central Luzon, the PKP - composed primarily of the urban left - helped form the the Democratic Alliance, an attempt at another united front. Dur- ing the last months of the Japanese occupation, PKP leaders began to seriously ponder postwar plans. Doubting that the postwar government could satisfactorily address economic, agrarian, and reconstruction problems, the PKP decided at a September 1944 conference to focus on organizational efforts and to transform the anti-Japanese resistance movement into a broad-based politi- cal movement for political purposes. Several top Hukbalahap leaders attended this conference. Conference attendees agreed to form a postwar united front to work toward three overt, major goals: 1)to prevent Japanese collaborators from taking political office; 2)to campaign for postwar independence; 3)to push for economic reforms to benefit lower and middle-class Filipinos.21 In July 1945 PKP leaders and other anti-Japanese groups formed a new political party, the Democratic Alliance (DA). The DA formulated a moderate program for parliamentary reform that reflected the diversity of the allied groups. The top DA leader- ship was from the urban left; all six members of the DA's Na- tional Executive Committee were well-educated and from prominent families. The PKP's presence was represented on this committee by Vicente Lava, and Jesus Barrera - who was a Civil Liberties Union leader before the war - was its president. Among the diverse groups affiliated with the DA were the PKM, the Hukbalahap's Vet- erans League, the Philippine Lawyers' Guild, Democratic Youth League, Congress of Labor Organizations, Fishermen's Union, and the Rural Transit Employees Union.22 The DA nominated its own candidates for the parliamentary elections in April 1946 and assisted PKM and Hukbalahap veterans. According to Luis Taruc, the DA "was the best channel through which the people (in central Luzon) could flow away from the par- ties that were dominated by landlords and compradores." The DA was an attempt by the PKP/Huks to further their revolutionary cause. The government's refusal to seat six elected DA congressmen and subsequent events were covered in Chapter 2. As government repression intensified, the DA's alliance with the peasant movement fell apart. The repression caused the PKM to dissolve its chapters and move underground. PKM members, who had been the DA's main strength at the polls, were forced to forsake their DA membership. In addition, the overblown collaboration issue - a central pillar around which many diverse groups had rallied - faded, and the Democratic Alliance virtually collapsed by the time of the November 1947 elections.23 The PKP's overt emphasis on parliamentary struggle also alienated the more militant Huk veterans. The initially promising united front effort of the PKP survived for only a little over two years. The PKP-HUK Relationship Because of the significant interconnections between the party and military organizations, it is useful to examine the historical relationship between the PKP and the Huks. Professor Benedict Kerkvliet shows that while the PKP was intimately involved in the Huk rebellion, it did not provide effective control or coordination. The merging of the PKP and the Philippine Socialist Party in 1938 was mentioned earlier. Luis Taruc and many of his followers were Socialists and differed significantly from the PKP hardcore in terms of backgrounds, goals, and perspectives. Many of these differences would remain unresolved and cause subsequent party-military problems. The PKP, as an organization, vaccillated between alliance and nonalliance with the peasant movement in central Luzon.24 During much of the Japanese occupation, the PKP was allied with the Huk resistance. However, in 1944 when the PKP adopted its "retreat for defense" policy, the party leadership decided that the PKP and the Hukbalahap should maintain a low visibility. Most peasants in the Hukbalahap, however, ignored the party decision and continued to fight. After the occupation, the PKP aligned itself again with the Huks to form the Democratic Alliance. When the rebellion erupted in 1946, the PKP - while supporting Huk goals - publicly opposed an armed struggle and advocated a parliamentary struggle. The PKP allegedly felt that the labor movement did not support a rebellion and that the peasants were fighting for their personal survival.25 Up until 1948, the PKP leadership emphasized two tasks: the legal and parliamentary struggle; strengthening of the party apparatus. To accomplish the first, the PKP focused on united front efforts symbolized by the Democratic Alliance. For the second task, the party concentrated on recruitment and on the organization of a hierarchical apparatus from the Politburo down to cell level. Because the PKP believed that the urban working class would provide the leadership for a future revolution, it emphasized recruitment and organizational efforts among workers in metropolitan Manila. During this time the PKP was dis- organized, without unified tactics and strategies, and with no clear perspective for the future.26 Because the PKP expanded by pursuing a united front and emphasized a parliamentary struggle, its membership was not homo- geneous or disciplined. There were roughly three categories of PKP members: rank-and-file members of mass organizations; the party hardcore who were the top leaders; a cadre whose main in- terest was agrarian reform. The PKP members most likely to join the rebellion were those close to the agrarian movement; those least likely to join the fight were members of the urban labor movement.27 The PKP leadership used criteria they believed were in keeping with Marxist-Leninist theory to evaluate revolutionary conditions. However, in 1948 after a leadership change, the PKP determined that conditions were ripening and openly supported the rebellion. It decided that it could change the "revolutionary situation" into a "revolutionary crisis," and push workers into the revolution by taking charge of the peasant rebellion at all levels. Although some important Huk leaders were PKP members, the PKP felt that the "undisciplined" Huks needed party direction and the party's role was to lead the revolution for which the country was now ready.28 It was at this time that the Hukbalahap were renamed the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB) - the People's Liberation Army. Even after 1948, the PKP had only a limited influence on the rebel movement. The alliance remained tenuous as the PKP objectives differed from those of many of the Huk rank-and-file. In general, the party advocated changes that were more radical than what most peasants supported. The peasants wanted reforms of the tenancy system; the party wanted a Marxist-Leninist state and defeat of American "imperialism." This weakness proved significant later, and caused serious leadership rifts in the PKP and HMB.29 The PKP and HUK Leadership The leadership of the PKP and the Huks differed signifi- cantly in their backgrounds, contributing to further conflicts. As mentioned earlier, there were two trends of leadership. Many of the hardcore PKP Bolsheviks were from "bourgeois" families, with personal and social ties to the privileged Filipino clas- ses.30 Like most Huk leaders, many of these Communist party leaders were from central Luzon. For example, the three Lava brothers, all of whom served as General Secretaries of the PKP, were from Bulacan.31 These urban Bolsheviks used the peasant reformist and nationalist feelings and aspirations as a revolutionary tactic.32 The other trend was the peasant leaders for whom Socialism was the ultimate goal. These Huk leaders, such as Luis Taruc, hoped to achieve their Socialist state through a united front of "progressive forces."33 They were predominantly from central Lu- zon peasant backgrounds. Some had risen to leadership in peasant organizations, some were labor leaders, and others were educated men from poor families.34 They were about the same age (in their thirties at the time of the rebellion), were job-seekers at the time of the Great Depression, and were economically-motivated. Many of these HMB leaders were essentially agrarian reformers at heart, and Communists by circumstances. Luis Taruc, in his memoirs confesses to an error in associating with the PKP. The Huk guerrillas obeyed their peasant leaders more than the high councils of the PKP.35 Composition of the Huks As PKP membership was covered above, the composition of the Huks is worth examining. Many of the Huks and their sympathizers were not members of the PKP, and it is doubtful if the majority of Huks had more than a vague understanding of Communist doctrine. PKP membership overall probably never exceeded 10,000 and according to William Pomeroy - the American Communist who joined the Huks - many of the Huk unit commanders were not party members. The Huks were, however, a fairly homogeneous group of peasant farmers.36 Many were recruited from the barrios with little education and could not comprehend Marxism-Leninism. Luis Taruc reportedly stated, "There is not even one percent who have Communist mentality in them."37 The workers and intelligentsia of Manila, even if they supported the Huk cause, were not inclined to take to the hills as guerrilla soldiers. As Taruc put it, "They may have just been waiting to be 'liberated' by someone else."38 The Huk guerrillas, on the other hand, joined the movement for various reasons. Luis Taruc summarized some of these: "People in the barrios, the nonintellectual type of Huk, joined because they had causes - like agrarian reform, government reform, anti-repression, recognition of the Hukbalahap - and, frequently, because they simply had to defend themselves, their very lives against repression." Others joined for personal reasons. Some wanted revenge for the killing or abuses of relatives or friends.39 There were those who were so so deeply in debt that they felt they had nothing to lose by joining the movement, and there were criminals who joined to escape punishment.40 Wartime or other friendships caused some to become active in the movement. It is also significant that most (69 percent) ex-Huks, surveyed after the rebellion, were farmers before joining the movement.41 In one study involving 400 captured Huks, 95 percent claimed that their main reason for fighting was land reform.42 Another small study indicated that, in 1952, almost 60 percent of the Huks in combat units were under 30 years of age, and that only 11 percent were over 35 years old. Some of these may have also joined to escape the drudgery and boredom of rural barrio life.43 Many rebels sought longer-term objectives that were long common to the peasant movement. The immediate goal of many of the Huks, however, was to escape government repression.44 Taruc believes that most of the Huks did not see the insurgency as a "military rebellion," but as "resistance to the resurgent reaction."45 Government assessments of the movement categorized it as consisting of four layers: 1)the Huk regulars or hardcore. These were the full-time, armed guerrillas; 2)the combat support group. These were the "12-hour Huks," civilians by day and Huks by night. They provided security and executed punitive missions; 3)the service group or legal cadres. This group performed unarmed missions, and consisted of barrio captains and low-level officials, couriers, spies, tax collectors, and supply personnel; and 4)the mass base. These were civilians who materially supported the movement.46 The Huk membership can also be categorized by their degree of support for the HMB. First, some Huks participated directly in the underground government or the guerrilla army. These direct participants conducted the day-to-day Huk operations. A second type of supporter was those villagers who did not particpate di- rectly in the HMB, but provided assistance through the contribu- tion of food, supplies, and information. A final category was people who were unintentionally caught in the middle between the Huk guerrillas and the government forces. They tried to keep a balance between the two sides and provided assistance to both forces. The exact size of each of these categories is unknown. Huk regulars, combat support personnel, and legal cadres were obviously part of the first category. The mass base consisted of the second category. During the years of peak Huk strength, how- ever, many of the residents of central Luzon belonged to the first two categories.47 Huk Expansion and Strength Finally, this chapter will examine Huk expansion and strength. First to join the Huk movement in 1946 were the Hukba- lahap veterans. Taruc claims that the Huks soon had 10,000 fully- armed veterans, with 2,000 organizers, activists, and sympathi- zers.48 This is plausible, given that Hukbalahap wartime strength was in this vicinity (see Figure 14). Note that estimates vary widely, given the difficulties of categorizing Huk personnel and supporters, as well as the clandestine, decen- tralized nature of guerrilla warfare). Philippine officials esti- mated in 1946 that the Huk army numbered about 10,000.49 Colonel Napoleon Valeriano, a well-known army officer who successfully fought against the Huks, perhaps overestimated Huk strength at this time to be 18,000 to 20,000 full-time armed regulars and 250,000 supporters.50 Huklandia at this time was confined primarily to the four central Luzon provinces of Pampanga, Tarlac, Nueva Ecija, and Bulacan (see Figure 15 - "Huklandia" 1946). In his memoirs, Taruc estimated Huk strength in 1948 to also be 10,000. Leaders had difficulty estimating the number, partly because members went back and forth between underground barrio organizations and armed guerrilla groups.51 Various esti- mates of the Huk strength at this time generally agree that their active strength was about 19,000, of which some 10,000 were armed. The mass base probably did not exceed 55,000.52 Taruc may have initially overestimated the number of Huks under arms. Re- gardless, the Huk movement had grown significantly between 1946 and 1948. Click here to view image One estimate of Huk strength in 1949 claimed 12,000 armed regulars with the support of over 100,000 sympathizers.53 By 1950, Taruc claimed 25,000 full-time armed guerrillas with a mass base of 2 million.54 In his memoirs, Taruc later revised his fi- gure to 15,000 full-time, armed regulars.55 This figure is more realistic, as it coincides with the estimate of Edward Lansdale - who was Magsaysay's advisor.56 Magsaysay estimated that there were 1 million Huk supporters at this time.57 These estimates of 1950 probably represent peak Huk or HMB strength. By this time, Pomeroy claimed that the Huks had bases in 27 provinces.58 While Pomeroy's claim is probably overoptimistic, at their peak the Huks encompassed all of central Luzon, most of southern Luzon, and had enclaves on northeastern Luzon, Panay Island in the Visayas, and Mindanao (see Figure 16 - "Huklandia" 1950).59 By far, the strongest Regional Commands were RECOs 1, 2, 3 (central Luzon), and 4 (southern Luzon). The other RECOs, even at the peak of the rebellion, had just a few hundred armed guerrillas, many of whom had traveled to these areas from central Luzon on "expansion missions." These other RECOs depended on the central Luzon organizations for supplies and recruits; since the Huks in the peripheral RECOs were usually not indigenous to these areas, they never enjoyed strong support from local peasant organizations or within the barrios.60 The years 1949 to 1951 represented the peak of the Huk movement. By 1952, there were about 4,000 armed Huks.61 In May 1954, Huk leader Luis Taruc surrendered, and that year is generally considered to be the end of the Huk rebellion. While a few die-hard Huks remained after 1954, the movement essentially Click here to view image died. Of the overall 25,000 Filipinos who fought in the Huk ranks in the 1950 to 1955 period, Philippine Army records show that 6,874 were killed, 4,702 were captured, and 9,458 Huks surrendered. By 1965, less than 75 so-called Huks remained.62 The New People's Army Unified planning, centralized control and a single point of responsibility are the very minimum requirements for a unity of effort which will offer success against a unified revolutionary movement...Unity of effort is however extremely difficult to achieve because it represents the fusion of civil and military functions to fight battles which have primarily political objectives...All the political, economic, psychological and military means must be marshalled as weapons under centralized co-ordination and direction.... John McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War Organization of the CPP-NPA The organization of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) provided for in the party constitution, is typical of Communist party organizations. Like the old PKP, the CPP has a theoretical National Congress, an existing Central Committee, Political Bureau (Politburo), Executive Committee, and Secretari- at (see Figure 17), which depicts the CPP as it existed in 1980, with 13 Regional Party Committees or RPC's). The party organizational structure has been modified since the earlier days of the PKP in order to carry out functions more effectively.63 The Central (National) Committee, headed by Rodolfo Salas (alias Commander Bilog), functions for the non-existent National Congress and is the highest decisionmaking body. This committee directly supervises the Military Commission (MC) and the National Commission for Mindanao (NCM). The Executive Committee, probably smaller in size than the Central Committee, has been empowered to Click here to view image decide on major political policies and organizational plans when- ever the Central Committee is unable to meet as a body. The Poli- tical Bureau (Politburo) and the Secretariat are under the Execu- tive Committee. The Secretariat directly supervises five bureaus and commissions: National Commission for Organization (NCO); Na- tional Commission for Education (NCE); National Finance Bureau (NFB); National Liaison Bureau (NLB); and the International Liai- son Commission (ILC).64 These seven commissions and bureaus have some resemblance to the four or five departments of the PKP. The National Education Department and National Organization Department of the PKP have been elevated to CPP commissions. This has probably been done to distinguish them from regional organs and to project an image of growth. Two other CPP bodies under the Secretariat are bureaus: the National Finance Bureau and the National Liaison Bureau. The NFB probably has functions similar to the PKP's Na- tional Finance Department; the NLB may have taken over some of the functions of the PKP's National Organization Department, pos- sibly to oversee relations with front organizations or more like- ly with non-CPP Filipino organizations. The International Liaison Commission, also under the CPP Secretariat, probably oversees re- lations with non-Filipino organizations. Thus far, there is no evidence of significant external support for the New People's Ar- my (this aspect is detailed in Chapter 7). The ILC may be a latent body for future relations with foreign organizations. The placing of two CPP commissions under the direct con- trol of the Central Committee probably reflects a desire to more tightly control both bodies. The Military Commission probab- ly has functions similar to the PKP's National Military Depart- ment. The National Commission for Mindanao, a new body, reflects the importance that the CPP places on this southern island. The NCM probably oversees operations on Mindanao and relations with the Moro National Liberation Front. In 1980, the CPP had 13 Regional Party Committees (RPCs), similar to the 10 or so RECOs of the PKP. The following RPCs are depicted in Figure 17: Northeast Luzon (NELRPC); Northwest Luzon (NWLRPC); Eastern Central Luzon (CELRPC); Western Central Luzon (CWLRPC); Manila-Rizal (MRRPC); Southern Tagalog (STRPC); Bicol (BRPC); Eastern Visayas (EVRPC); Western Visayas (WVRPC); Northern Central Mindanao (NCMRPC); Western Mindanao (WMRPC); Eastern Mindanao (EMRPC); and Southern Mindanao (SMRPC).65 In 1977, the CPP-NPA had 8 RPCs and a main base on Lu- zon.66 Three years later, the number of RPCs increased to 13.67 According to Central Committee figures, the number of RPCs in- creased from 12 to 17 during the period 1980 to 1983.68 The 17-member CPP Central Committee, probably located somewhere on Luzon, directs insurgent efforts throughout the country.69 A pyramid of hierarchical CPP-NPA organizations implements its policies. The committee prides itself on maintaining centralized control without sacrificing flexibility and local initiative. Captured documents indicate that subordinate Region, District, Section, and Branch committees correspond to the government's administrative subdivisions of Region, Province, Municipality, and Barangay (see Figure 18 - The Party (CPP) and Army (NPA) Relationship, and Figure 19 - Click here to view image Organization of the Philippine Government). A Front, an echelon between Region and District, is more like an operational military command and has no government counterpart.70 The Front, or newest echelon, may reflect the CPPs desire for better coordinated mass organization activities. From 1980 to 1983, the number of fronts increased from 28 to 45.71 At each echelon, the real power resides with the party Executive Commit- tee. The Executive Committee commands all civilian party and military activities within its area. The corresponding NPA operational commands implement party decisions and control the combat units assigned to their area.72 The CPP-NPA interconnections are even more complex than those of the PKP, providing more effective party control of the movement. Mass Organizations of the CPP-NPA Other organizations are created when new barangays (villages) are organized. After the CPP-NPA has surveyed and targeted a new barangay, it begins a geometric recruitment of new members, whereby each new member is required to recruit three more members in a "cell reproduction" process. After more than 20 members have been recruited, a Barrio Organizing Committee (BOC) is constituted. These BOCs serve as a vehicle for indoctrination. After about one month of indoctrination, a more formal People's Organizing Group (POG) evolves and replaces the BOC (see Figure 20 - People's Organizing Group).73 The POG has four functional branches: Defense; Education; Livelihood; and Health. The Defense Branch consists of the arm- ed regulars and combat elements; the Education Branch oversees Click here to view image educational and political activities. Normal subsistance and daily living functions are overseen by the Livelihood Branch, which organizes members by vocation - with the exception of me dical personnel. The medical personnel of the Health Branch ful- fill the health needs of the barangay.74 The POG serves as the backbone of the Communist organiza- tion at the barangay level. It is the infrastructure that provides food, funds, communications, and intelligence to the NPA. As an underground mass organization, it seeks to supplant the local government in the barangay.75 NPA Forces The CPP-NPA organizational structure is theoretically based on the concept of democratic centralism, but communications between widely-dispersed units is difficult and local leaders often have considerable discretion. The NPA appears to distinguish the areas in which it operates according to their safety. The safest areas, controlled and organized by the NPA, are called "guerrilla bases." Zones around guerrilla bases are called "fronts," and less secure areas are called "preparation zones."76 The NPA divides its armed units into two broad categories - regular forces and local forces. The regular forces normally operate in larger company and battalion size formations, are equipped with the NPA's best weapons, and undergo the most comprehensive training. These forces are controlled by the Regional and Front Commands. They serve as the commands' maneuver elements, to be deployed freely throughout their assigned zones. A Main Regional Guerrilla Unit is assigned to each region for these missions, while the Fronts have Secondary Guerrilla Units.77 Local forces, called Local Guerrilla Units, are maintained by each District and Section. These forces are full-time, armed units employed primarily for the defense of the locale in which they are located. They would not normally be employed in opera- tions outside the boundaries of their administrative areas. The NPA also classifies the Militia units established by the barangay (barrio) party branches as local forces, but these personnel serve only as part-time soldiers (see Figure 21 - Guerrilla Formations in Relation to Territorial Jurisdiction).78 The CPP-NPA'S United Front Although the NPA is the dominant element in the CPP strategy for promoting revolution, the National Democratic Front (NDF) is also used as a united front organization for winning popular support. The NDF is essentially an umbrella organization with no firm organizational structure. It includes underground associations of peasants, youths, workers, teachers, and other professionals.79 A classic Communist front organization under the control of the CPP, the NDF is a coordinating committee for protest activities by the various sectoral groups. Not all of these groups are led or organized by Communist cadres. Some, however, are infiltrated and can be influenced by the CPP. The CPP has attempted, with some success, to conceal some of its activities within the NDF. As a result, many Filipinos view the NDF leadership as independent, united only by a common struggle Click here to view image against the "U.S.-Marcos dictatorship." Non-Communist protest groups have found it advantageous to operate under the NDF umbrella, particularly in recent years when large demonstrations have been staged by numerous groups. Increased political activity among the middle and professional classes has provided the NDF with an opportunity to broaden its mass base and increase acceptability. The NDF has become an integral part of the opposition movement and has strengthened CPP legal activities. This development has complicated government security efforts.80 The large majority of CPP-NPA cadres are not armed. These work in barrios, poor urban communities, plantations, factories, hospitals, churches, schools, and even government agencies. The NDF coordinates their efforts. In areas where guerrilla fronts are well-established, such as Isabela and Cagayan provinces in northeastern Luzon, the NDF operates as a de facto government. It implements land reform programs, collects taxes, organizes public works and schools, and administers Communist "justice." NDF opposition movement activities are concentrated primarily in urban areas. Even before the Aquino assassination, the NDF was able to mobilize thousands of Filipinos for strikes and demonstrations.81 The NDF was established by the CPP on 24 April 1973, when a Preparatory Commission for the NDF announced a 10-Point Program. Constituent organizations of the NDF include the May First Movement, Christians for National Liberation, Nationalist Youth (KM), League of Filipino Students, Association of Nationalist Teachers, Nationalist Health Association, and Youth for Nationalism and Democracy. While the first three groups existed before the NDF and conduct some activities independently of it, little is known about the other organizations or the internal decisionmaking process within the NDF.82 Recently the NDF has modified its 10-Point Program to establish a broader organizational framework to integrate more diverse opposition groups. Unifying themes continue to be resistance to the Marcos government and opposition to American connection. This broadened united front strategy manifested itself in a strong boycott of the 1981 presidential elections. In February of that year, the NDF and other groups formed the People's Opposition to the Plebiscite-Election (PEOPLE). PEOPLE quickly joined forces with the United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO), the main coalition of the moderate, pre-martial law political opposition. This new grouping, which called itself the People's Movement for Nationalism and Democracy (MIND), advocated a boycott of the election, elimination of U.S. bases, and implementation of tighter controls on multinational corporations. The boycott greatly reduced voter turnout and revealed that the NDF could mobilize thousands of Filipinos. More significant were the working relationships that the NDF achieved with other anti-Marcos groups. "Liberation," the official NDF publication, claimed that "almost all moderate groups and personages now maintain links with the NDF."83 The NDF also helped organize the boycott against the National Assembly elections in May 1984. It appears to be well-positioned to take advantage of the popular disenchantment with the Marcos regime. Having begun a campaign to capitalize on the situation, the NDF now claims to have over 50,000 full-time organizers in two-thirds of the provinces. It purports to have a membership in constituent mass organizations of 1 million Filipinos, with a mass base of 10 million Filipinos. While the NDF lately has placed a greater emphasis on military operations, it appears to recognize that more preparation is needed before assuming a strategic offensive. The September 1983 issue of "Liberation" stated that "it would be foolhardy at this point to encourage widespread armed confrontations."84 Links with the Moros Among the Communist movement's potential allies, the NDF's founding document gives special attention to Muslim groups in the southern Philippines. The Communists realize that similar goals and a common enemy make a good basis for cooperation. There are also important personal ties betweem the CPP and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). Nur Misuari, founder and General Secretary of the MNLF, and Jose Maria Sison, founder of the CPP, were acquaintances at the University of the Philippines and were active members of the KM youth organization.85 There is evidence of some limited cooperation between the NPA and the MNLF. While Mindanao was a busy Muslim stomping ground in the 1970's, it has only recently been viewed as an NPA location. Military sources report some connections between the two groups, with the Muslim rebels contracting to supply weapons to the Communists in return for NPA training. In 1972 provincial governors reported NPA agitation of the Muslim insurgents; NPA documents, literature, and arms were discovered in Moro training camps in several Mindanao provinces. On 21 June 1981, a force reportedly made up of both NPA and MNLF guerrillas fought a day-long battle with government troops near Mount Apo on Mindanao - the first battlefield evidence of NPA-MNLF links. CPP chief Sison, when captured, claimed to have established communications with the MNLF. Philippine Defense Minister Enrile and President Marcos are more skeptical. They concede that the NPA has attempted to link up with the Moros and that, in some cases on Mindanao, some NPA units have operated with the tolerance if not the participation of the MNLF. The government believes that beyond a simple exchange of correspondence, there is little evidence of an understanding or cooperation between the two guerrilla groups.86 One of the few opposition groups that MNLF leader Misuari has identified as supporters of his group's demands is the Na- tional Democratic Front. For years the NPA has been anxious to link up with the MNLF. Though the Muslims view Communism as a godless ideology, the common goals and enemy of the two groups have enabled some limited cooperation. However, Misuari recently appears to be worried about growing NPA operations on Mindanao.87 Misuari, speaking at a press conference during the Islamic Con- ference Organization foreign ministers' meeting in December 1983, stated that whatever cooperation there had been with the NPA in the past was now over due to Communist encroachment on MNLF areas.88 The Moro insurgency, which began in the early 1970s, tied down 70 to 80 percent of the country's armed forces at its peak. In the mid-1970s the Muslim separatist rebellion on western Min- danao and Sulu was the only serious security threat to the coun- try. As many as 50,000 soldiers, rebels, and civilians died dur- ing that decade of fighting. The armed Muslim rebels, once offi- cially estimated at 20,000 men, eventually opted for rehabilita- tion within the government fold.89 Unofficial estimates now place Moro armed strength at 10,000 men.90 The MNLF recently has been weakened by internal factionalism, by significant government concessions, and by the threat of renewed government repression. It has largely been a dormant force for several years. If hopes for secession dis- sipate, pressure within the Muslim community could lead to a working alliance with the NDF and the NPA.91 Links with the Catholic Church Perhaps a more likely ally of the NDF and the Communists are radical elements within the Catholic community. One of the most important factors behind the rapid growth of the NDF is the spread of radical views among Filipino clergy. Historically, the Catholic Church has been a conservative institution. Its anticommunist views figured prominently in the government's counterinsurgency campaigns of the 1950s. The PKP in its early days was correspondingly atheistic and anticlerical. The Huks sought to organize church clergy and laity, but met some resistance and were not totally successful. However, significant departures commenced in the mid-1960s.92 A new Vatican constitution approved in 1965 stressed a church commitment to social justice and human rights.93 In the new spirit of ecumenism, Catholics started dialogues not only with Protestants, but also with Communists. Young seminarians and students formed several religious organizations to pursue economic and social reforms. These included the Young Christian Socialists, the Christian Social Movement, and the Laymen's Association for Post-Vatican II Reforms. In the early 1970s, government crackdowns on demonstrators - which included religious activists - unified and radicalized the various opposition groups. As a result, some priests and nuns joined the CPP and fully embraced Communist thought. Others were willing to work with the Communists, but were unwilling to accept anti-Christian ideo- logy.94 One of the radical Christian organizations, the Christians for National Liberation (CNL), was a founding member of the NDF. The CNL provides important services to the NDF. This includes care for wounded NPA guerrillas, assistance in the transporta- tion of cadres, participation in the underground communica- tions system, and organizational, educational, and propaganda work.95 Eight members of the "Christian Left" were listed in docu- ments found when CPP founder Sison was captured in 1977.96 Fa- ther Conrado Balweg, a Catholic priest who joined the NPA in 1979, has become a folk hero of the Philippine opposition. How- ever, only a small number of Philippine clergy have followed Bal- weg. In late 1982, Marcos accused 20 priests and nuns of being members of subversive organizations like the NDF. He singled out 97 other clergy members for assisting the CPP and NPA. Even if accurate, this would represent less than 1 percent of the more than 13,000 priests and nuns in the country.97 However, people of many political persuasions agree that the Catholic Church - especially the younger clergy - is becoming more radical. This is significant in a country where over 80 percent of the population is Catholic. Some clergy members are influenced by the Communist-inspired "liberation theology", devised by Latin American revolutionaries. Interestingly, some other comparisons are drawn to Latin America. There is the same mixture of Spanish Catholic and native cultures, a similar history of large landowners and oppressed peasants, a parallelism of military abuses, resentment of U.S. influence, and rebellions growing in the mountains.98 Despite these similarities, the future course of events could differ significantly from Latin America. Both conservative and progressive clergy in the Filipino church are reportedly less dogmatic than their Latin American counterparts and embrace social justice more strongly than Communist ideology. The Philippines also has a tradition of religious dissidence. While elements of the Filipino church are drifting towards the left, it can still be an important moderating force in the future. It is difficult, however, to generalize as the Filipino church is as varied as Filipino culture and geography.99 While the Catholic church is not united in its attitude towards the Marcos regime, there currently exists significant antagonism between the church and the government. The church has emerged as the main defender of the people against military abuses and is a leading critic of Marcos cronyism. It is an exponent of greater popular participation in the political process, which the Marco regime interprets as oppositionist activity. As the church becomes more activist, the government becomes more hostile. Several priests have been organizing "Basic Christian Communities," social organizations which emphasize local authority and individual decisionmaking. To the government, these communities resemble the communes advocated by the NPA. These activities are further evidence of the polarization that seems to characterize the Philippines today.100 The church-NPA links, while not pervasive, will grow in scope and significance unless the Filipino political, economic, and military systems are significantly reformed. CPP-NPA Membership and Leadership In 1970, Senator Benigno Aquino Jr. described the Huk membership as being composed of five groups of people: 1)the un- employed; 2)the fugitives from the law; 3)those with grievances against Philippine authorities; 4)relatives of former and present Huks; 5)Pampangans. A large number of Huks were in the "tradi- tional" fourth category, following in the footsteps of family and friends, or in the "emotional-affectual" third category with ven- geance motives. Very few Huks were members with a full under- standing and conviction of Communist doctrine.101 This membership classification probably holds true today in the countryside and in the remote areas. However, as detailed earlier in this chapter, the CPP-NPA movement has also grown sig- nificantly in the urban areas during the late 1970s and early 1980s. As journalist Eduardo Lachica points out, the old Huk influence has now spread to upper and middle classes.102 A few priests and nuns are now members of the NPA. Some parish priests (including foreign priests in the Philippines) and lay workers, are also considered by the government to be NPA agents.103 Members of various professions, labor union members, government employees, factory workers, and others are CPP-NPA members or supporters. These are in addition to tribal members and peasant farmers, the traditional Filipino insurgents. As General Lansdale points out, the CPP-NPA, unlike the Huks, are a significant mass movement.104 Today's crop of Communist leaders are younger, more politicized, and even more singleminded in their determination to seize power. Rudolfo Salas, alias Commander Bilog - the Chairman of the CPP Central Committee - is a consistently hardline dissident who wrested the party's leadership from Rafael Baylosis, Sison's immediate successor. Vice-Chairman Juanito Rivera (Commander Juaning) is also chief of the NPA. Baylosis is the CPP's third ranking official.105 Generals Lansdale and Moore, both of whom operated against the Huks, emphasize that the current Communist leadership are better educated and more ideological than the old PKP-Huk leaders.106 The Communist leadership has also shown staying power. As numerous CPP Central Committee members have been captured or killed, they have been replaced either formally or with unnamed cadres being assigned to the job vacancies. There are also be- lieved to be a number of powerful party men not named as Cen- tral Committee members, but wielding power from the shadows.107 There is no shortage of capable Communist leaders. Expansion and Strength Beginning with its formation in 1969, the New People's Army has grown significantly. In 1969, the U.S. Chief of Mission in the Philippines estimated that the various Huk remnant groups consisted of approximately 400 armed regulars, 500 armed combat support personnel, between 3,000 and 40,000 unarmed general sup- port personnel (a wide range), and a mass base as high as 80,000. As illustrated above, guerrilla strength is difficult to estimate and mass bases are even harder to appraise. In addition, calcula- tions of guerrilla strength are deceptive as this strength is often dormant until activated for given situations.108 Regardless, NPA strength around 1969 was relatively weak. Shortly after its formation, the NPA expanded into north- eastern Luzon. There may have been several reasons for this. As Lachica points out, the traditional insurgent region of central Luzon did not meet some of Regis Debray's favorable conditions for a reenactment of the successful Chinese Communist experience. In the days of the Huk movement, the inaccessible Candaba Swamp and mountain ranges of central Luzon provided safe havens for guerrilla warfare. But, beginning after World War Two, central Luzon was shrunk by feeder roads to the remote barrios and by the expansion of the farm population. The Maoist countryside of central Luzon became too small for the establishment of secure guerrilla bases. In addition, the rapid migrational growth of Manila, close to the traditional guerrilla area, decreased the density of the rural population. Meanwhile, the Philippine archipelago of over 7,000 islands, offered ample room elsewhere for guerrilla movement.109 After suffering some reverses in central Luzon, the NPA in 1971 sprang up in the Cagayan Valley of northeastern Luzon. It rapidly organized a force capable of executing ambushes and raids. The region became a major operational area of the NPA, mainly because of the lush mountain ranges straddling a large portion of this region. Government attention focused on this new NPA area and the first AFP unified command against the NPA was set up in the Cagayan Valley.110 In 1971, President Marcos es- timated that the NPA had a combat force of 1,000 to 2,000 backed by 5,000 support personnel and perhaps 50,000 sympathizers.111 After a major Philippine government drive in this region and declaration of martial law in September 1972, the NPA simply withdrew into the vastness of the Sierra Madre mountains. Military abuses, mass arrests and detentions during the govern- ment campaign increased popular support for the NPA in this region.112 Huk chief Commander Dante, after his capture, stated that before martial law, the NPA was active only in central Luzon and the Cagayan Valley in northeastern Luzon.113 In the early 1970s, the NPA began expanding into remoter areas of the Philippines. Government neglect of these hinterlands left many of these areas extremely depressed. All featured a striking income gap between the rich and the poor. Most farmers in these regions are also tenants, with landowners receiving at least 50 percent of all crops. With local health facilities rare, illness was also frequent - driving peasants further into debt due to high interest rates charged by landlords. The CPP-NPA has taken advantage of these conditions and used cadre who are frequently farmers. The cadres have organized peasants against landlords, administered their own breed of local "justice" for criminals, and protected the peasants from military abuse. These efforts have helped the NPA gain local support.114 During this time, the CPP-NPA also turned its attention to Samar Island in the eastern Visayas. NPA activity in northern Samar began in 1970 through a youth organization called the "Movement for a Democratic Philippines." The movement grew to include disgruntled local politicians and clergy. After many of their leaders were imprisoned during Marcos' declared martial law, dissidents regrouped in the fertile Catubig Valley of northern Samar - the food basket of Samar. NPA groups in eastern Samar then crossed the mountain ranges to the north in an effort to control this food-producing region.115 The NPA guerrillas found their way to Samar from Cebu Island in the central Visayas, which the NPA had found unsuitable for guerrilla warfare. Between 1974 and 1975, the NPA penetrated nearly half of Samar. The NPA conducted teach-ins - the guerrillas called the area their "university belt" - with a systematic educational process using audio-visuals, to depict class exploitation.116 The CPP-NPA found the Samar population to be receptive. Samar is an island of lush forests and untapped mineral reserves, with a population of over 1 million people.117 According to a 1975 census, 89 percent of the Samar population live in rural areas and only 10 to 15 percent have attended high school. The majority of the population are farmers or fishermen. Economic and social conditions were ripe for NPA exploitation. Due to a poor road network, NPA teams were able to move into remote population areas with impunity, to spread propaganda and obtain supplies. They could then withdraw into forests and hills - a perfect guerrilla warfare setting.118 By 1979, the CPP-NPA controlled 85 percent of eastern Samar, 40 percent of northern Samar, and 60 percent of western Samar.119 The NPA had an effective shadow government on Samar by 1982, and about 1,000 armed regulars on the island.120 A government pacification drive achieved limited success, but Samar soon was considered to be the NPA's strongest base. The NPA presence gradually became more acceptable to the people of Samar than that of the military.121 At the time of a 10 May 1984 opposition rally in western Samar, NPA leaders claimed that they had enough arms closeby to defend the gathering if government forces attempted to interfere.122 The NPA also expanded into the southern island of Mindanao in the early 1970's. The first NPA presence in the region was detected in Zamboanga del Sur on western Mindanao in 1973. In the mid-1970's, the Communists became active in the Davao area of southern Mindanao. Since late 1982, the NPA has appeared in the previously quiet areas of northeastern Mindanao. Communist guerrillas and cadre apparently moved into the area by crossing the Surigao Strait from their bastion on Samar. This mountainous, mining region offers good terrain for the guerrillas.123 Mindanao's hydroelectric potential, thick forests, mineral wealth, and relatively small population made an attractive target for the CPP-NPA. The links between Mindanao's Moros and the NPA were probably also useful. Inequitable economic growth, lawlessness, and military abuses made the local populace receptive to NPA propaganda.124 Government relocation programs further alienated the population. By 1982, NPA strength in southern Mindanao consisted of 1,400 armed regulars, 1,800 active support personnel, and a mass base of 18,400 Other estimates of the mass base have been much higher. Philippine Solicitor-General Estelito Mendoza stated that the concentration of NPA strength in the region was greater than that contained in any central Luzon area of the same size when martial law was proclaimed.125 In 1984, Filipino military intelligence reported an NPA presence on Muslim Basilan Island off western Mindanao. Although the Muslim rebellion has been dormant since about 1980, the NPA continues to expand on Mindanao. Nearly 80 percent of the AFP Mindanao garrison - 50 percent of the country's armed forces - is now based in Christian areas of Mindanao. The government considers the CPP-NPA problem in Mindanao to have intensified more than in any other part of the country.126 There are now at least 16 Communist guerrilla fronts in Mindanao, although NPA mobility makes it difficult to estimate their strength. Eight of these fronts are believed to be in north and northeastern Mindanao, currently the most serious zone of Communist influence in the country. Under these eight fronts are approximately 1,000 armed regulars with a support base of 20,000 to 25,000. This region of timber and coconut plantations has several characteristics that make it a fertile CPP-NPA recruiting ground: high unemployment; remoteness of the area; and high illiteracy.127 The CPP-NPA has not ignored other regions of Mindanao. Davao City, one of the country's most prosperous cities and its third largest port, suffers from almost daily attacks by NPA "sparrow units" - three-men liquidation squads who attack security forces even in broad daylight. This southern Mindanao city, with a vast land area making it physically one of the largest cities in the world, is extremely difficult for government forces to secure. The Communist campaign here appears aimed at disrupting the previously thriving, export-oriented, plantation economy.128 The CPP-NPA also expanded into northern Luzon by taking advantage of friction between the government and the Kalinga headhunting tribe in Kalinga-Apayao province. A 1974 announcement by Manila to press forward with its development plans for the Chico River region intensified opposition by the Kalingas, who have historically resisted encroachment. The dispute, which centers around the construction of giant dams in this unspoiled area, made the Kalingas more amenable to CPP-NPA entreaties than in the past. NPA cadres and guerrillas began drifting heavily into this region beginning in 1976.129 Since then, NPA operations in Kalinga have been expanding rapidly. The NPA penetrated the closely-knit tribal system and - through a patient process of persuasion and education - gained the support of many of the tribespeople. While early efforts here centered on political mobilization, military operations intensified around 1980.130 By 1978, the Philippine government was experiencing frequent armed encounters with NPA guerrillas in central Luzon, the Cagayan Valley in northeastern Luzon, the eastern Visayas (especially Samar and Leyte), Panay and Negros in the western Visayas, and in northern and northeastern Mindanao.131 NPA guerrillas appeared to number between 2,000 and 3,000 during this period.132 In 1979, CPP-NPA recruitment again seemed on the increase, with some 3,000 guerrillas thought to be engaged in active operations.133 This upsurge began in the wake of the second oil shock of 1979. The rise in urban joblessness drove Filipinos back to the countryside and created serious rural unemployment. Shortly thereafter, the price of coconuts - on which an estimated 40 percent of rural Filipino families depend for at least a portion of their livelihood - plunged. The stifling of political expression during this martial law period, government corruption, military abuses, and the economic decline combined to fuel the NPA movement. A map of NPA zones shows that it is strongest in the coconut-growing areas (see Figure 22 - Agricultural Activity, 1982 and Figure 23 - Guerrilla Activity, 1980). U.S. officials, however, attribute NPA expansion more to the weakness and corruption of the Philippine military than to NPA military capabilities.135 Philippine Defense Minister Enrile in 1979 stated that the NPA was still strongest, however, in central and northeastern Luzon, and Samar.136 By 1980, the NPA claimed to be operational in 46 of the country's 73 provinces and was undoubtedly more effective organizationally than the Moros in the south.137 Enrile estimated NPA strength in early 1981 at 3,000 to 5,500 regulars, controlling a population of 130,000 to 165,000.138 Click here to view image Captured NPA leader Commander Dante, in a 1981 interview, noted NPA expansion into western and southern Mindanao, the Cagayan Valley of northeastern Luzon, the Ilocos region of northern Luzon, the Tagalog and Bicol regions of southern Luzon, and in all of the Visayas.139 The next year, Philippine Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Fabian Ver estimated that the NPA had 5,000 armed regulars.140 By this time, estimates of NPA strength began to vary widely, even among key Philippine government officials. During this period, foreign analysts estimated that the NPA had 5,000 to 10,000 armed guerrillas. An NDF official, however, estimated NPA armed strength at 12,000 to 14,000.141 James A. Kelly of the U.S. Defense Department, testifying before Congress that year, stated that the NPA - with an armed strength of about 7,500 - was active to varying degrees in nearly all areas of the country, with about one-fourth of all villages affected by guerrilla activity.142 Philippine government estimates tended to be low, while CPP-NPA claims were usually high. The low government estimates are in part due to exaggerated claims of captured NPA prisoners by army field commanders. In some areas, it has been standard practice to round up people in areas of known NPA operations, threaten them, and propagandize these personnel as "surrenderees" by photographing them taking an oath of allegiance to the government. In addition, CPP-NPA expansion cannot be noted until its presence becomes known through limited and cautiously- launched military operations.143 (Figure 24 is a map of guerrilla activity in 1983; note the increase since the previous figure for 1980). After remaining static for several years, the Filipino agricultural work force increased by 34 percent - or by 3 million people - between 1979 and 1984. Because farm output did not keep pace with the increase in the rural work force, rutal unemployment continued to rise and the NPA has taken advantage of this void.144 U.S. estimates in 1984 place NPA strength at some 10,000 to 12,500 full-time armed guerrillas, with an additional 10,000 part-time militia soldiers and an NPA presence in 62 of the country's 73 provinces.145 (See Figure 25 - Estimates of New People's Army Strength, 1984). Besides forming shadow governments in many of these areas, the NPA has also been able to intimidate local officials in strongholds such as Bicol province to reach working arangements with local NPA groups. Allegedly, some of Bicol's police have sworn oaths of allegiance to the Communists. Some provincial governors, furthermore, declare that there is no NPA presence in their areas in hopes of avoiding armed confrontations between the Communists and the military.146 The NPA itself claims some 20,000 guerrillas - with 10,000 of them armed - and a mass base of about 1 million.147 According to CPP Central Committee figures, between 1980 and 1983 party membership grew threefold - from 10,000 to 30,000. During this period, the guerrilla strength grew from a 1980 base of 8,000 guerrillas.148 Philippine government figures continue to vary widely, but have adjusted upwards recently. In 1984, Marcos and Defense Minister Enrile estimated NPA armed, regular force strength at 6,000 to 8,000. Acting Armed Forces Chief of Staff Click here to view image Fidel Ramos, respected for integrity and professionalism, estimated that the NPA armed regular force strength had increased from 6,000 in 1983 to between 10,000 and 12,000 in late 1984.149 This year, Philippine officials appear to be revising their estimates higher, more in line with U.S. estimates. Defense Minister Enrile now estimates the guerrilla strength at 11,000 to 12,000. Since last year, the rebellion has spread to another province - a total 63 of the country's 73 provinces.150 Richard Armitage, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, stated in recent testimony before Congress the the NPA armed strength could be as high as 15,000, with 33 percent of the Philippines' 42,000 villages or barangays "affect- ed in some measure" by the Communists.151 The Communist mass base strength is estimated between 500,000 and 1 million.152 Ex-Huk fighters Generals Lansdale and Moore emphasize three characteristics of the CPP-NPA growth that distinguish it from the Huks: 1)the NPA has a much greater geographical base than the Huks did. The HMB was concentrated on Luzon (primarily central Luzon) while the NPA has spread throughout the country; 2)the NPA has a much stronger mass movement than the Huks enjoyed. The CPP-NPA relationship is stronger and united front activities are more significant; 3)the existence of the Moro insurgents (although they are currently quiet) and some NPA-MNLF links increases the revolutionary potential for the country and complicates government security problems.153 While the CPP-NPA organization is strong and pervades the country, the movement has much further to go before it can undertake large-scale offensive operations against government forces. However, the CPP-NPA is patiently working towards the "strategic stalemate" and "strategic offensive" phases of its struggle. These organizations are steadily growing stronger. NOTES 1Benedict Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1977), p. 165. 2William Moore, "The Hukbalahap Insurgency, 1948-1954: An Analysis of the Roles, Missions, and Doctrine of the Philippine Military Forces" (Report of the Institute of Advanced Studies, U.S. Army War College, 1971), p. 14. 3Robert Smith, The Hukbalahap Insurgency: Economics, Political. and Military Factors (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Department of the Army, 1963), p. 87. 4Alvin Scaff, The Philippine Answer to Communism (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1955), p. 34. 5John Jameson, "The Philippine Constabulary as a Counterinsurgency Force, 1948-1954" (Report of the Institute of Advanced Studies, U.S. Army War College, 1971), p. 26; Kerkvliet, p. 175. 6William Pomeroy, The Forest: A Personal Record of the Huk Guerrilla Struggle in the Philippines (New York: International Publishers, 1963), p. 40. 7Pomeroy, p. 38. 8Jameson, pp. 27-28. 9Pomeroy, pp. 39-40; Kerkvliet, p. 212. 10 Scaff, p. 34. 11Pomeroy, pp. 40-41; Kerkvliet, pp. 211-212. 12Luis Taruc, He Who Rides the Tiger: The Story of an Asian Guerrilla Leader (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p. 133. 13Jameson, p. 28. 14Edward Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 7. 15Kerkvliet, p. 212. 16Moore, p. 16. 17Moore, pp. 16-17. 18Moore, p. 18. 19Moore, p. 19. 20Moore, pp. 20-21. 21Kerkvliet, pp. 138-139. 22Kerkvliet, pp. 140-141. 23Kerkvliet, pp. 141, 178. 24Kerkvliet, p. 264. 25Kerkvliet, pp 186-187, 264. 26Kerkvliet, pp. 179-180. 27Kerkvliet, pp. 181-184. 28Kerkvliet, pp. 218-219, 264-265. 29Kerkvliet, pp. xvi, 265. 30Taruc, p. 51. 31Pomeroy, p. 104. 32Taruc, p. 27. 33Ibid. 34Scaff, p. 5. 35Eduardo Lachica, The Huks: Philippine Agrarian Society in Revolt (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), pp. 21, 171. 36Jameson, p. 34, 37Lachica, p. 25. 38Taruc, p. 88. 39Kerkvliet, p. 170. 40Jameson, pp. 34-35. 41Scaff, pp. 60-61. 42Jameson, p. 35. 43Ibid. 44Jameson, p. 171. 45Taruc, p. 27. 46Lachica, p. 13. 47Kerkvliet, pp. 166-167. 48Taruc, p. 27. 49Kerkvliet, p. 192. 50Statement by Napoleon Valeriano, Philippine army officer, in a speech presented to the U.S. Army Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 2 October 1964, p. 5 of the speech's text. 51Kerkvliet, p. 174. 52Moore, p. 14. 53Lachica, p. 5. 54Valeriano, pp. 8-9. 55Taruc, p. 88. 56Lansdale, p. 64. 57Lansdale, p. 60. 58William Pomeroy, An American Made Tragedy: Neo-Colonialism and Dictatorship in the Philippines (New York: International Publishers, 1974), p. 137. 59Valeriano, p. 9. 60Kerkvliet, p. 213. 61Lachica, p. 14. 62Lachica, p. 15; Lansdale, pp. 50-51. 63Ramberto Saavedra, "The Role of Civil Affairs in Counterinsurgency in the Philippines" (Thesis of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1982), p. 61. 64Saavedra, pp. 61-63. 65Saavedra, pp. 62-63. 66Rodney Tasker, "A Lesson for the Teacher," Far Eastern Economic Review, 2 December 1977, p. 14. 67"Time to Get Tough," Asiaweek, 11 September 1981, p. 33. 68Guy Sacerdoti, "Red 'Army' on the March," Far Eastern 'Economic Review, 28 June 1984, p. 40. 69"Time to Get Tough," p. 33. 70U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The Situation in the Philippines, Staff Report prepared by Frederick Brown and Carl Ford, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess., October, 1984 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1984), pp. 30-32. 71Sacerdoti, "Red 'Army' on the March," p. 40. 72U.S., Congress, Senate, p. 31. 73Tirso Gador, "Insurgency and Subversion in a Developing Country: A Case Study in a Philippine Setting" (Thesis of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1970), pp. 29-30. 74Gador, p. 31. 75Gador, p. 32. 76Frederica Bunge, ed., Philippines: A Country Study (Washington: The American Univesity, 1984), p. 241. 77U.S., Congress, Senate, p. 33. 78Ibid. 79Bunge, p. 241. 80U.S., Congress, Senate, p. 17. 81David Rosenberg, "Communism in the Philippines," Problems of Communism, XXXIII (September/October 1984), 41-42. 82Rosenberg, p. 42. 83Rosenberg, p. 45. 84Ibid. 85Rosenberg, p. 42. 86James Turpin, "A New Society's Challenge in the Philippines," Conflict Studies No. 122, The Institute for the Study of Conflict (London: The Eastern Press, 1980), 8; "Time to Get Tough," p. 36. 87S. Kamaluddin and Rodney Tasker, "Pressing the Point," Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 December 1983, p. 26. 88Rodney Tasker, "Elusive Law and Order," Far Eastern Economic Review 5 July 1984, p. 12. 89Rodney Tasker, "Calm on the Moro Front, Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 August 1984, pp. 29-30. 90Kamaluddin and Tasker, p. 26. 91Rosenberg, p. 43. 92Rosenberg, p. 43; Lansdale, p. 80. 93Ian Buruma, "The Church Militant Takes On a New Meaning," Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 February 1985, p. 78. 94Rosenberg, p. 43. 95Rosenberg, p. 44. 96Tasker, "A Lesson for the Teacher," p. 17. 97Buruma, p. 77. 98Ibid. 99Ibid. 100U.S., Congress, Senate, pp. 17-18. 101Lachica, p. 24. 102Lachica, p. 29. 103 U.S., Congress, Senate, p. 18. 104Statement by Edward Lansdale, former JUSMAG advisor to Philippine Defense Secretary Ramon Magsaysay, in a personal interview, McLean, Virginia, 15 February 1985. 105"Time to Get Tough," p. 33. 106Statement by William Moore, Major General, U.S. Army, and formerly of JUSMAG, Philippines, in a personal interview, Arlington, Virginia, 15 February 1985; Lansdale, interview. 107Tasker, "A Lesson for the Teacher," p. 14. 108Lachica, pp. 15-16. 109Lachica, pp. 194-196. 110Sheilah Ocampo, "Philippines: The Seven-Year Itch," Far Eastern Economic Review, 29 June 1979, p. 25. 111"Time to Get Tough," pp. 28, 33. 112Sheilah Ocampo, "Forcing the Pace of Pacification," Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 October 1978, p. 14. 113"Time to Get Tough," p. 27. 114Sacerdoti, "Red 'Army' on the March," p. 41. 115Sheilah Ocampo, "An Island in Death's Shadow," Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 March 1981, p. 32. 116Ocampo, "Philippines: The Seven-Year Itch," p. 26. 117Ocampo, "An Island in Death's Shadow," p. 33. 118Rodney Tasker, "Where Guerrillas Call the Tune," p. 24. 119Ocampo, "Philippines: The Seven-Year Itch," p. 26. 120"The NPA at 13: Bolder and Brighter," Asiaweek, 19 March 1982, p. 17. 121Sheilah Ocampo, "The Samuroy Killings," Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 April 1982, p. 12. 122Guy Sacerdoti, "Marching to the Beat of an Opposition Drum," Far Eastern Economic Review 24 May 1984, p. 16. 123Tasker, "Elusive Law and Order," pp. 12-13. 124Richard Vokey and Sheilah Ocampo, "A Rising Tide of Violence," Far Eastern Economic Review., 16 March 1979, p. 21. 125Sheilah Ocampo, "A Little Vietnam," Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 March 1982, p. 40. 126Tasker, "Elusive Law and Order," p. 12. 127Tasker, "Elusive Law and Order," pp. 12-13. 128Ibid. 129Sheilah Ocampo, "The Battle for Chico River," Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 October 1978, pp. 32, 34. 130Sheilah Ocampo, "Breaching a Dam of Despair," Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 June 1980, p. 23; Richard Vokey, "Assault on the Peaks of Power," Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 June 1980, p. 27. 131Sheilah Ocampo, "Decimated - But It Won't Lie Down," Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 December 1978, p. 35. 132Tasker, "Where Guerrillas Call the Tune," p. 23. 133Turpin, p. 7. 134Ross Munro, "Dateline Manila: Moscow's Next Win?" Foreign Policy, No. 56 (Fall 1984), 181. 135Robert Manning, "The Philippines in Crisis,"Foreign Affairs, Volume 63, No. 2 (Winter 1984/1985), 403. 136Ocampo, "Philippines: The Seven-Year Itch," p. 25. 137Turpin, p. 7. 138"Time to Get Tough," p. 27. 139"Time to Get Tough, p. 36. 140"The NPA at 13: Bolder and Brighter," p. 17. 141David Jenkins, "All the President's Men," Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 March 1983, p. 18; Sheilah Ocampo, "Eastern Davao is the Hot Spot as NPA Ambushes Claim More Victims," Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 March 1983, p. 21. 142Rosenberg, pp. 39-40. 143Ocampo, "Decimated - But It Won't Lie Down," p. 35. 144Munro, p. 180. 145U.S., Congress, Senate, p. 25. 146Munro, p. 182. 147U.S., Department of State, "Recent Developments in the Philippines," Department of State Bulletin, Volume 84, No. 2092 (November, 1984), (Address of Paul Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 19 September 1984), 56. 148Sacerdoti, "Red 'Army' on the March," p. 40. 149"Generally On Course," Asiaweek, 9 November 1984, p. 38. 150William Branigan, "Marcos Seen as Increasingly Isolated," The Washington Post, 9 March 1985, p. A14. 151Lena Sun, "Philippine Crisis Grows, Top U.S. Officials Warn," The Washington Post, 13 March 1985, p. A19. 152"Philippine Insurgency Cited," The Washington Post, 9 February 1985, p. A13. 153Moore, interview; Lansdale, interview. CHAPTER SIX STRATEGY, DOCTRINE, AND OPERATIONS The Huks The relationship that should exist between the people and the troops...The former may be likened to water, and the latter to the fish who inhabit it. How may it be said that these two cannot exist together. Mao Tse-tung in Guerilla Warfare The uprising cannot assume the traditional form of a single blow, limited to a very short time and a very small area. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin Huk and PKP Objectives The circumstances under which the Huk rebellion began in 1946 were covered in detail in Chapters 2 and 4. In the pursuit of their long-term Communist goals, the Huks and the PKP embraced longstanding peasant causes such as agrarian reform, political representation, recognition of the Hukbalahap wartime resistance, and government reform.1 These rebel concerns were articulated by Luis Taruc to a journalist in February 1947. Taruc outlined five "minimum terms of peace": 1)immediate restoration of de- mocratic rights of the individual; 2)dismissal of all charges against Huks arising out of 1946 developments; 3)replacement of officials in the municipal and provincial governments and the police command in central Luzon; 4)restoration of the six Democratic Alliance congressmen elected in 1946 to their seats; 5)implementation of land reform, leading to the eventual abolition of tenancy. In short, the Huks grasped historical peasant objectives that were similar to the wartime Hukbalahap goals (see Appendix D - By- Laws of the Hukbalahap, 1942). However, because of the Philippine government's activities in 1945 and 1946, an armed rebellion erupted with the immediate goal of stopping the repression.2 The goals of the Communists went beyond the concerns of the peasants. The PKP Constitution of 1946 provides evidence of this; the PKP embraced agrarian reform in order to accomplish its goals, which included the establishment of a Communist gov- ernment (see Appendix E - The PKP Constitution of 1946). This document contains numerous phrases familiar to Communist plat- forms: "Marxist-Leninism; workers and peasants; capitalists; the party as the vanguard of working classes; fight for democratic rights; struggle against class exploitation and imperialism." Huk and PKP Strategy and Doctrine Communists typically employ a strategy of two struggle methods - armed struggle and parliamentary struggle. The first entails protracted guerrilla warfare; the second involves the sys- tematic infiltration of government organizations.3 At the start of the Huk rebellion and up until 1948, the PKP officially advo- cated a legal and parliamentary struggle. During this time, the PKP sought to infiltrate the various armed forces and government agencies, especially the executive offices. The press was also an infiltration target, as the media was generally sympathetic to them. Some of these attempts were successful, such as the infil- tration of the Department of Foreign Affairs. The PKP also infil- trated labor unions, student groups, and civic organizations; it usually began by disseminating leaflets, and then dispatched agitators. Agitators within the army emphasized the differences in the military treatment of officers and enlisted personnel.4 As evidence of its legal struggle emphasis, the PKP's 1946 Constitution (see Appendix E) required that all members belong to a peasants' or workers' organization, work to strengthen the party's relationship with the masses, and vote in all public elections. Beginning in 1946, Huk leaders agreed that the military policy of the reconstituted guerrilla army would be defensive rather than offensive. Taruc later said, "We decided that if assaults on the people continued, we would reassemble on a purely defensive basis, avoid encounters and fight only when cornered and attacked or when the people were being persecuted to the point where they would ask protection from the squadrons."5 Occasionally, to raise morale, Huk leaders used the principle that "aggression is the best form of defense." The Huks organized a few surprise raids on military units preparing for raids or in the attack.6 For over two years, the Huks laid low and had a wait-and- see outlook, primarily seeking their military survival. There was no overall plan or strategy regarding military action during this period. The Communists continued to use legal channels. Huk leaders also continued to query government officials about peace proposals, and sought to build the movement, to increase its strength so it could better bargain with the government. Luis Taruc stated, "We wanted to be on the offense politically, but also have a military defense in order to protect ourselves while doing political organizing."7 During this early period of the rebellion, the Huks generally confined their operations to small hit-and-run raids and ambushes directed mainly against small government garrisons, convoys and patrols. Contact was avoided with large bodies of government troops. The guerrillas attempted to have their small-scale operations cover as wide an area of central Luzon as possible. Later, when the Huks became better organized for guerrilla warfare, they increased the frequency of these operations. These tactics improved the guerrilla morale, impressed the peasantry, demoralized government forces, reduced Huk combat casualties, and kept their forces intact. The Huk leaders realized that, at this stage, military survival was a problem. While small scale guerrilla operations whittled away at government strength, the guerrillas concentrated on reorganizing, recruiting, rearming, and training.8 Perhaps, their leaders also remembered that the 1943 Japanese attack on Mount Arayat was largely successful because Hukbalahap forces had attempted to hold terrain.9 The PKP Supports the Rebellion Shortly after Taruc returned from negotiations during the abortive 1948 truce, the PKP leadership issued a public state- ment that was a call for open, armed revolution. The party now publicly supported the Huk rebellion and this resulted in the renaming of the Hukbalahap to the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (People's Liberation Army) or HMB. The PKP statement said that the Filipino people could not hope to secure democracy and peace through parliamentary struggle alone as long as the country re- mained under "American imperialism and domestic feudalism."10 The PKP took advantage of President Quirino's declared truce and exploited it by reorganizing and shifting tactics and strategy.11 As it had done during World War Two with the Huk- balahap, the PKP was conducting an armed campaign to establish itself in power. In both cases, the cause was designed to appeal to a wider section of the community, as Communism had little appeal to the peasants or guerrillas. In 1948, its "army's" name was more along Communist lines (People's Liberation Army) although its cause was still presented as agrarian reform.12 The PKP stated that it should lead the HMB at all levels - national, provincial, municipal, and village. Its leaders, however, realized that this was not an easy task as the PKP never had a strong peasant base.13 In August 1948, Taruc did not feel that the Huks were ready for large-scale military operations. He felt that the Huks needed to expand their support base, convince their potential supporters that an armed revolution provided the only solutions, continue to defend themselves against government forces, and strengthen their military organization through training, arms procurement, and recruitment.14 Although the PKP decided that a military struggle pro- vided the only means to its goals, it intended to wage both po- litical and military campaigns with equal emphasis. Its leaders envisioned two stages for the campaign: 1)the military overthrow of established legal authority in the Philippines; 2)a period of consolidation during which the Communists would estab- lish a "people's democracy" that would evolve into a socialist state. To overthrow the government, the HMB planned to conduct a three-step "strategic defensive" phase: retreat or withdrawal; expansion; a limited offensive leading towards the establishment of a revolutionary government. The second phase was a "strategic offensive," an all-out military effort to destroy government forces and overthrow the government.15 This two-phase strategy essentially combined the first two stages of Mao's three-stage guerrilla war (strategic defensive, strategic stalemate, strategic offensive). Although the HMB grew stronger, long-term Huk goals were not clearly defined until late 1949.16 During the 1949 presi- dential campaign, the Huks did not strongly support either of the two opposing political parties. To the Communists, the Liberal Party represented the existing regime and the Nacionalista Party was collaborationist. These elections were overtly corrupt and provided the Huks with further public support.17 The PKP's strategy was laid out in a late 1949 memorandum from the PKP Secretariat to the Central Committee. The memo's main points were: Goal: to establish the "new democracy (people's democratic republic) by overthrowing American imperialism. Direction of the Main Blow: Isolation of the national bour- geoisie and other elements who compromise with imperial- ism, and the winning over of the masses. Main Force: The proletarians and landless peasants. Reserves: The middle class and rice peasants, the Soviet Union, and other "new democracies" (other Communist states). Disposition of the Main Forces and Reserves: Alliance of the working class and peasantry. Revolution: 1)Period of preparation - the battle for reserves or strategic defensive. 2)Seizure of national power - the strategic offensive.18 The PKP strategy was essentially Maoist, although there was no evidence of direct Chinese Communist involvement. By this time, however, the HMB was well into the "strategic defensive" phase. The Huks were well organized, with a recognized cause and experienced guerrillas.19 The "Early Seizure of Power" A PKP and HMB grand strategy was formulated at the Politburo meeting held in the Sierra Madre mountains from late December 1949 to mid-January 1950. A list of objectives was adopted which included intensive preparations for an armed struggle to seize power within two years. This was the "early seizure of power" policy referred to in Chapter 2. PKP leader Jose Lava's policy ended alliances with other oppositionist groups and called for an overambitious "geometric expansion" of PKP and HMB membership.20 The 1950 Constitution and By-Laws of the HMB cited the objective of establishing a new "democratic" government (see Appendix F - 1950 Constitution and By-Laws of the HMB). The PKP envisioned a relatively short strategic offensive, with the seizure of power climaxing a combination of guerrilla, insurrectionary, and even "regular warfare in which HMB forces would meet imperialist-puppet forces in positional warfare."21 As part of the plan, the small mobile squads of the HMB would be re organized into larger units capable of encountering government troops in positional warfare. By doing this, the HMB sacrificed mobility and increased its logistical requirements.22 Perhaps influenced by the recent successes of Mao and Ho Chi Minh, the PKP and HMB appeared to forget their lessons of the second workd war. Almost overnight, the character of the insurgency changed. Although the HMB was only moderately equipped, it increased its operational tempo and from late 1949 to late 1950 conducted numerous coordinated raids on major villages, cities, and constabulary camps to commemorate important dates in the revolutionary movement. In the short run, these larger operations were successful.23 During this time, some of the PKP Secretariat were even sent to RECO's in the field. These included - besides Luis Taruc - Jesus Lava, Casto Alejandrino, Mateo del Castillo, and Mariano Balgos. Taruc later stated that, unlike the government, the Huks fought less intelligently as time went on.24 HMB military activity during this period increased tenfold or more. Raids and ambushes throughout the central Luzon plain were more than daily occurrences. Besides raiding army and con- stabulary posts, the Huks ambushed convoys and patrols, seeking to seize equipment and demoralize the government forces. Gov- ernment officials, plantations, and landowners were targets; the Huks also increased their use of intimidation to recruit more members and work towards their "geometric expansion."25 As 1950 passed and the HMB achieved military successes, the Huks became bolder. In addition to the attacks on army and constabulary bases, the Huk objectives soon included the temporary capture of district and provincial capitals. To complement the success of their raids, the Huks laid ambushes on reinforcing government troops, and ambushes on primary roads became commonplace. Heartened by these successes, the HMB soon envisioned the seizure of Manila before the end of 1950. Huk squadrons successfully conducted large-scale raids in the Manila suburbs and virtually isolated the city. The PKP Secretariat then issued new instructions entititled "Strategic Political and Military Guidance." This memorandum contained detailed instructions for RECO's on conducting the final offensive, supervising liberated areas, and handling enemy prisoners and defectors. The PKP and the HMB had their timetable for the final phase of the revolution.26 PKP-HUK Strategy and Doctrine During the Decline The capture of PKP Politburo members by increasingly effective government forces in October 1950, however, disrupted the Communists' plans. In December, the PKP held a conference to determine future plans in the context of the Politburo capture and the government counteroffensive. The remaining leaders decided to continue their plans for expansion and strengthening of their military forces as material conditions in the country remained the same. However, the Huks decided to avoid armed encounters and moved to the mountains for refuge.27 The period beginning in 1951 marked the decline of the Huks. The Huks' murder of President Quezon's widow in April 1949 and their increased in timidation of the populace caused a significant decline in popular support. The capture of Politburo members and documents in 1950 and the significant political, military, and economic reforms of Defense Minister Ramon Magsaysay were further setbacks. Leadership rifts were also weakening the movement. In 1952, Huks were reduced to propaganda attempts trying to convince the populace that the Huk organization would survive and remain intact.28 In October 1954, the popular Huk leader Luis Taruc surren- dered to government forces. By that time, the HMB had suffered defeats on the battlefield and a substantial loss of popular sup- port. Jesus Lava, who had succeeded his brother as PKP general secretary, finally acknowleged the futility of the plan for an armed struggle and proclaimed a shift to parliamentary struggle. Lava disbanded the cellular structure of the organiza- tion and proclaimed his "single file" policy of individual ini- tiatives.29 This essentially marked the end of the Huk rebel- lion. During the insurgency, the PKP vaccillated between non- alliance and alliance with the Huks and armed struggle. It had overestimated its popular support base and military capabili- ties, and underestimated government strength. Modus Operandi of the Huks Huk tactics included raids on army and police bases, ambushes of government forces, murder and kidnapping of government officials and landowners, and robberies to secure money and supplies. In typical guerrilla fashion, they conducted most of their operations at night and - up until 1949 - sought to avoid contact with government security forces except on their own terms. The Huks were especially proficient in small-scale hit-and-run operations, but sometimes massed as many as 500 troops if the targets were worthwhile. Unlike most guerrilla units, however, the Huks did not engage in widespread sabotage.30 The HMB was very selective in selecting its targets and operations, and was relatively careful to avoid alienating its popular support base. An exception to this was the 1949 murder of Aurora Quezon, in which the Huks may claim to have mistaken her convoy for that of an incumbent government official. Huk raids generally fell into three categories: 1)attacks against army and police bases and posts; 2)raids on cities and villages to liquidate government officials; 3)harassment raids aimed at impressing or intimidating the local populace. Usually, the Huks were successful in concealing their raid preparations, and in timing and planning their raids to achieve the maximum surprise. Often, these operations were conducted during holidays and religious fiestas, when security forces were usual- ly lax. In assembling for their operations, the Huks were often able to infiltrate into villages and mingle with the local popu- lace. The guerrillas usually avoided daylight operations, unless they had a significant military advantage or were provided cover by natural phenomena such as typhoons and rainstorms.31 Huk liquidation operations also included unsuccessful attempts to assassinate Ramon Magsaysay and his advisor Edward Lansdale, as well as the Armed Forces Chief of Staff.32 Ambushes were another favorite Huk tactic. The HMB usually chose favorable hilly terrain with natural cover. Ambushes were set up along roads and trails habitually used by government for- ces. While usually ambushing small units and convoys, the guerril- las were not averse to ambushing larger units if the situation provided good routes of egress. Some ambushes were aimed at the destruction of government forces, and others sought the procure- ment of equipment or money. The latter were by far the most common. The Huks also operated road checkpoints for psychological effect on the populace. Hit-and-run techniques were used for both ambushes and raids, and served to preserve guerrilla strength and keep government forces off-balance.33 The Huks' "strategic defensive" strategy dictated that sabotage was to be avoided unless the sabotaged installation could be occupied and defended by force - a force not readily attainable by the guerrillas. In addition, the Huks apparently lacked trained saboteurs and equipment such as demolitions. Major public utilities were well-guarded by government security forces, and transportation systems were not sabotaged due to the danger of injuring civilians. As communications were a Huk weakness, HMB tactics also precluded the destruction of telephone or telegraph lines.34 The Huks, however, did attempt the sabotage of the suc- cessful EDCOR projects and burned some buildings and fuel dumps on government installations that they attacked.35 With good planning and execution, HMB operations empha- sized deception and surprise. The armed guerrillas frequently posed as civilians. On occasion, the Huks attacked in Philip- pine army uniforms - such as the Makabulos attack of August 1950. Men and women were utilized in operations. Huk withdrawals almost always demonstrated good order and discipline, and the guerrillas exhibited special skill at establishing strategically located roadblocks to delay the advance of army forces.36 The elusive and mobile Huks usually did not seek to hold physical objectives; they sought to disrupt, disorganize, or destroy government forces. The HMB fought a war of detachment and when trapped by government forces, guerrillas disappeared among the populace. Operating in squad-sized bands, the Huks performed combat, foraging, recruitment, and subversion missions. They were familiar with the terrain, and were generally proficient in military tactics due to their wartime experience. From their mountain bases, the guerrillas had good observation.37 The Huk Intelligence System During Japanese occupation, the Hukbalahap built up an elaborate and efficient intelligence organization in the barrios. Following these past methods, the HMB established procedures to gather, report, and disseminate intelligence information. Barrio and municipality organizations collected information on govern- ment forces and civilian guards through channels that sometimes reached into the offices of mayors and police chiefs. Some offi- cials and security personnel who were not Huk sympathizers were, nonetheless, susceptible to either bribery or female flirtation. However, the peasants themselves provided the best information regarding troop movement. The courier and supply systems were used to pass intelligence information.39 Until Magsaysay became the Defense Minister in 1954, Huk agent recruitment efforts were directed at government officials who had access to pertinent information. Especially in Huk-con- trolled areas, municipal officials were often in the service of the Huks.40 Using captured military radios, the Huks also moni- tored communications. For example, the ambush of Aurora Quezon in 1949 was executed with route and arrival information gained through radio-monitoring.41 Huk intelligence up till 1950, while good, was not as extraordinary as it sometimes seemed to government forces. Government operations security was poor, and movements of units and officials often received advance publicity in newspapers. In addition, army and police morale was so low that many of these individuals became Huk sympathizers, passing information voluntarily. The Huks also had numerous sympathizers among the peasantry. These advantages, however, were reduced by the significant reforms instituted by Magsaysay beginning in 1950.42 Huk Security For security, the Huks had "enforcing units" which undertook violent reprisals against local government informers. Among the guerrillas themselves, treason or desertion could lead to execution. To obtain safer locations, the Huks also used the offices of infiltrated labor unions and student groups for meeting places and document storage areas. Guerrillas were usually instructed not to operate militarily in zones where underground headquarters were located.43 Huk headquarters and committees were usually in remote, mountainous areas when the terrain and situation permitted. Squadron and lower level units were usually quite mobile, and even higher echelons were forced to move periodically. The most important Huk leaders often operated out of remote areas such as Mount Arayat or the nearby Candaba Swamp.44 At Huk base camps, security huts covered approaches, and blocking positions were es- tablished at camp entrances. An inner network of trails connected camps and production bases in the mountains, while an outer set of trails closer to the villages were used by armed Huk guer- rillas.45 The guerrilla forces that remained in or circulated to the barrios were also responsible for policing their mass base areas and protecting residents as best they could against government and civilian guard units. These forces were distinct from the "regular forces" that were used in expansion activities.46 Huk couriers also only knew point-to-point destinations, and incon- spicuous women and children were used as couriers.47 In addi- tion, Huk leaders used aliases and codenames.48 In general, Huk operations security was good. Psychological Operations Up until the arrival of Ramon Magsaysay, the Huks clearly outmatched the government in the use of psychological operations (PSYOPS). The HMB and PKP recognized the value of psychological warfare (PSYWAR) and made it a major weapon. Their predecessors - the Hukbalahaps of the second world war realized the importance of PSYWAR and even had a "Fundamental Spirit" manual which served as a public relations guide. They followed the Communist practice of building their PSYOPS campaigns around slogans, which were produced by the Politburo after lengthy deliberation. Since the Huk movement's earliest recruiting efforts were among the peasants, its main slogan in the early years was "Land for the Landless." When the 1949 presidential election evoked accusations of fraud among the electorate, the Huks took up the slogan of "Bullets, not Ballots." There were lesser slogans used as well for tactical purposes.49 Other slogans used were "Equal Justice for All," and "Yan- kee, Go Home." Huk propaganda decried "feudal landlordism" and "government inefficiency and corruption."50 Huk leaflets, pam- phlets, and posters followed the party line, as expected. The JUSMAG-government relationship after 1950 was labeled as "Jus- magsaysay," and EDCOR settlements were characterized as concen- tration camps. The Huks attempted to portray their organization as stable and efficient, and tried to involve citizens in decisions affecting popular welfare. The guerrillas also took credit for government-sponsored projects in the barrios.51 Although each individual had responsibilities for psycho- logical work, the PKP and HMB had a detailed organizational PSYOPS structure. Each HMB military unit had a political of- ficer who was in charge of PSYOPS and unit morale. The Huks also had civilian agitation-and-propaganda units, called "agitprop cells", which operated clandestinely among the populace by producing and disseminating propaganda material.52 The key agitprop organization was the PEIRA (Political, Economic, Intelligence, and Research Association), the body respon- sible for the dissemination of Huk propaganda. Huk literature was widely distributed thoughout central Luzon by PEIRA courier agents.53 Regular Huk publications included: "Titus (Spark)," a biweekly newspaper; "Mapagpalaya (Liberation)," a lengthy, monthly dealing with some major aspect of the struggle; "Kalayaan (Freedom)," a periodic cultural magazine with stories, poems, and essays; and "Ang Kommunista," a monthly theoretical magazine primarily for movement cadres. Two self-study booklets - one for Huk soldiers and one for political workers - were also written each month.54 Huk and PKP propaganda, while attacking the national government, did not criticize municipal employees as this group was potentially useful to the movement. Except for the anti-U.S. themes, Communist propaganda was fairly effective.55 Huk Recruitment Operations Chapters 4 and 5 illustrated that reasons and circum- stances for joining the Communist movement varied greatly. Huk recruitment efforts during the early portion of the rebellion were facilitated by the existence of numerous wartime Hukbalahap veterans. These veterans were the nucleus of the Huk organiza- tion.56 Huk recruitment of new members ideally followed an established sequence: motivation, content, and indoctrina- tion.57 After determining feasible motives, the Huks formulated their approach method, and attempted to indoctrinate the potential recruit. Using a flexible recruitment strategy, the HMB sometimes promised salaries and free land, and often did not even mention fighting.58 Huks operating in remote mountainous areas made contact with native tribes (such as the Dumagots of central and southern Luzon) and had limited success in recruiting natives as guides, couriers, and supply carriers. As the Communist movement grew, some criminals and malcontents were inevitably brought into the organization and Huk leaders later attempted to recruit more selectively.60 Recruit selectivity, however, deteriorated after 1949 during the movement's decline, as the Huks increased coercive recruitment and desperately accepted newcomers. The Huk Training Program The overall picture of the Huk training program is sketchy. In his memoirs, Huk leader Taruc spoke of recruit basic training and "schools for intelligence officers and medical workers." William Pomeroy, on the other hand, indicated that the recruits had little or no basic training and learned military skills during "on-the-job training."61 Theoretically, the Huks had an elaborate educational system. Short courses were established for illiterates, and curriculum were established for primary, intermediate, high school, and more advanced schools. All curriculum was approved by the PKP's National Educational Department.62 Some of the subjects taught included Philippine history, political economy, strategy and tactics, and Communist doctrine (see Figure 26 - Curriculum for Huk Schools). Taruc also claimed that the Huks conducted daily physical training and organized athletics sessions. Theoretically, after recruits were trained, new units were formed and equipped, and then sent out to operational areas.63 A lot of emphasis was placed on the indoctrination of recruits, and the Communists appeared to have a well-developed indoctrination program.64 However, many of these schools - Click here to view image such as the Stalin University - appeared to be located in the Sierra Madres near the HMB General Headquarters.65 While the HMB training and educational system was theore- tically good, the Huks appeared to have some training problems. Former Huk leaders and documents cited weaknesses in military training. In part, this was due to insufficient funds, equipment, and supplies. Commanders had to convene training sessions that were smaller than desired, and had problems obtaining weapons for new recruits. There were shortages of skilled personnel, such as trained couriers. One former Huk commander felt that the Huks were always weak in military training, due to operational diffi- culties and deficient leadership attitudes.66 Political training was sometimes overemphasized and military training not taken seriously enough. Huk Discipline Finally, it is useful to examine Huk discipline. The By-Laws of the wartime Hukbalahaps (Appendix D) gave soldiers equal political rights as their officers, and mentioned three "fundamental disciplines": 1)obey orders; 2)obey the war of resistance; 3)love and protect the people. Members were to respect their political Communist leaders, and torture and bodily punishment were prohibited except for "specific cases in regulations." The PKP's 1946 Constitution (Appendix E) warned against "financial opportunism," "harmful attitudes and actions," and "violations of the Party Constitution and decisions," which would result in warnings, punishment, or removal. The Communists had a strict moral code. However, it is important to emphasize, that this "code" was based on their Communist perspective. What is "freedom fighting" to some is often "terrorism" to others. In the eyes of the Huks and their supporters, their acts were viewed as "moral", as violence against the "state" was viewed as a political - and not a criminal - act.67 The individual was submissive to the party, and this policy was strictly enforced. For example, Military Commission member Felipa Culala was executed in 1943 for pursuing her personal enrichment and power.68 Deserters who betrayed the Huks were killed immediately. Those who surrendered but did not betray Huk secrets were later tried by court-martial; if they rejoined the movement, they were sentenced to hard labor. If they did not, they were executed. Rape was a capital offense and also alienated the populace.69 To maintain discipline and also win popular support, the Huks caught, tried, and punished common thieves, rapists, and murderers. The HMB also liquidated local officials, landlords, and civilian guards. By administering their own brand of just- ice, the Huks gained an image of being just protectors of the people.71 With a judicial backlog of agrarian cases and cor- ruption rampant in the government, Huk justice was faster and more efficient.72 Because of military abuses, there were also numerous atroci- ties and counteratrocities. One example is the 25 November 1950 Aglao village massacre in Zambales province. About 100 Huks at- tacked this barrio, which the guerrillas believed to harbor an armed, anti-Huk unit, and massacred many civilians. The HMB dis- armed the leaders of the attack and sentenced them to hard labor.73 Some abuses were attributed to the HMB as some Filipino crimi- nals passed themselves off as Huks.74 However, although there were some Huk abuses, Taruc felt that the HMB was "a well-discip- lined fighting force."75 This is probably an accurate statement as the Huks did not want to alienate their mass base and were very selective in choosing their operations and targets. The New People's Army The seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of the issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution. Mao Tse-tung If Communism as a political or economic solution has little appeal, it is likely that united front tactics and subversion will be used to promote and exploit in- ternal conflicts and contradictions as the opportunity arises." Sir Robert Thompson in Revolutionary War in World Strategy, 1945-1969 Objectives of the CPP-NPA In 1968, shortly after the CPP was established, its propaganda stated that the party's primary mission was the destruction of feudal oppression and of U.S. imperialism in the Philippines. This statement was almost verbatimly lifted from the Chinese Communist Party's "General Line of the International Communist Movement" published in 1963. A Mao-directed internationalism, not the "narrow nationalism" of the past, was the key to the whole movement. The CPP sought the "great unity of all nationalist people" under the "invincible thought of Mao Tse-tung."76 These statements conformed with CPP-founder Jose Maria Sison's identification, in his 1967 Struggle for National Democracy work, of "American imperialism and landlord feudalism" as the main obstacles to national "freedom" and development. In this treatise, Sison emphasized the importance of a united front effort.77 Also in 1968, the CPP released its "Programme for a Democratic Revolution" (see Appendix G). In this platform document, the CPP identified American "imperialists," the "bourgeoisie," "bureaucratic capitlists," and landlords as its enemies. The CPP called for a new type of "national democratic revolution" - with the revolutionary leadership of the working class, instead of the "bourgeoisie" - for liberation from "U.S. imperialism and domestic feudalism. This "programme" contained ten guideline: 1)destruction of U.S. "imperialism and feudal oppression" in the Philippines: 2)establishment of a "people's democratice state" and a "coalition" or united front government; 3)a fight for "national unity and democratic rights"; 4)use of the principle of "democratic centralism"; 5)establishment of a "people's libertion army"; 6)agrarian reform; 7)growth of national industry; 8)educational reforms; 9)the involvement of national minorities such as the Moros, mountain tribes, and those of Chinese ancestry; 10)foreign policy reform. Within these ten guidelines, the "programme" also listed ten specific objectives each for the political, economic, military, cultural, and foreign policy fields. The current conditions for revolution were appraised as "excellent," and the CPP's central task was to seize political power through armed revolution. Sison's Philippine Society and Revolution - a primer for CPP activities written in 1970 under Sison's pen name of Amado Guerrero - reaffirmed the above objectives and declared the purpose of the new party to be "the overthrow of U.S. imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism, the seizure of political power and its consolidation."78 When the CPP "programme" is examined in detail it shows some accomodation with the more popular and not particularly ideological desire to "provied every citizen with a decent livelihood." This program is more "liberal" than a strictly Maoist doctrine would allow, a concession to a short-range program that would also appeal to "liberals" and "progressives".79 The objecives of the New People's Army, according to its basic 1969 document (see Appendix H), are to engage in party building to carry out an agrarian revolution, build rural bases, help construct the united front, and to advance the armed struggle. Unlike the PKP-HMB relationship, the CPP designed the NPA to be an organizing and propaganda force as well as a fighting force.80 Another 1969 document, "The Basic Rules of the New People's Army," (see Appendix I) listed ten functions for the NPA: 1)wage a protracted people's war; 2)help organize revolutionary barrio committees; 3)serve the polulace in ways besides combat duties; 4)engage in propaganda and mass mobilization; 5)help local party organizations: 6)engage in constructions, productive and economic work for itself, the party, and the people; 7)help keep public order; 8)conduct staff, training, intelligence, communications, medical care, and logistical activities; 9)use short rest periods to recuperate, indoctrinate and train. The NPA was clearly founded with the Chinese People's Liberation Army as a model. Strategy and Doctrine of the CPP-NPA When CPP founder Sison wrote "Rectify Errors and Rebuild the Party" in 1968, he advocated an armed struggle but criticized past PKP strategy. PKP and HMB leaders had relied on U.S. Army field manuals and more or less conventional tactics to defeat government forces. According to Sison, the PKP and HMB failed to combine political struggle with armed struggle. They did not see the armed struggle as a "protracted people's war in which the revolutionary forces would gradually strangle the enemy- controlled cities from stable bases in the countryside." This founding CPP document also criticised the PKP leadership for concentrating its efforts in central and southern Luzon, ignoring the rural mass base. The document divided two traditions in Philippine Communism.81 The 1968 "Programme for a People's Democratice Revolution" (Appendix G) re-established the CPP as a party of Maoism. The armed revolution would be led by the working class, using the peasantry as the "main force" with some support from elements of the "bourgeoisie." Using a Maoist strategy of encircling the cities from the countryside, the CPP would use land reform as the main "content" of the revolution. A strategy of patience would emphasize united front efforts. The immediate program was a "people's democratic revolution"; the long-term program was the establishment of a socialist state. While CPP founder Sison was a PKP member in the early 1960's, he had traveled gone to Indonesia to learn from the Communist party there. As this party changed its ideology from pro-Moscow to pro-Peking, so did Sison. The Maoist model had more relevance to the Philippines in Sison's eyes.82 The 1969 founding document of the NPA (Appendix H) emphasized "learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones." It stressed the NPA's heritage from the World War Two Hukbalahap, the armed struggle as the main form of struggle, and the NPA as the main organization in the "people's democratic revolution." The NPA's main tasks were party rebuilding, the building of rural bases and advancement of armed struggle, and the building of a national united front. The revolution would follow Chinese and Vietnamese models, and be based on the theory of a people's war. A Three-Phased Strategy The "Basic Rules of the New People's Army" (Appendix I) proclaimed a revolution that would follow Mao's three phases: 1)strategic defensive - with the aim of maintaining the tactical initiative; 2)strategic stalemate - to obtain parity with government forces; 3)strategic offensive - to attack the isolated "enemy" forces. Unlike the Huk revolution whose leaders deviated from people's war theory and conducted a "strategic counteroffensive" after 1949, the CPP-NPA revolution woould closely follow Maoist theory. The early NPA focused its energy on establishing and consolidating sparsely-populated areas where its members could move with relative safety and secure food and shelter. These hinterland areas were distinguished less by relative poverty than by the lack of any viable government presence. At the center of this vacuum was a lack of law and order, which the NPA exploited through its own brand of local justice.83 However, the newly-established NPA did not neglect its military operations as Figure 27 shows. The CPP-NPA wasted no time in executing its strategy. In January 1970, the "First Quarter Storm" of street demonstrations was organized to protest broken campaign promises of the recently re-elected President Marcos. These demonstrations became increasingly violent as the CPP was able to mobilize party members, workers, students, and Christian Left militants.84 When CPP chief Sison evaluated the situation in December 1971, he stated, "The problem is no longer how to start a revolution. It is how to extend and intensify it."85 After the 1971 suspension of the writ of habeas corpus by Marcos, many CPP members made plans to go underground. When martial law was declared the following year, the CPP was relatively well-prepared. Although many opposition members were detained at the onset of martial law, almost all CPP cadres in Manila managed to escape. In October 1972, the CPP Central Committee made its first major post-martial law statement viewing "the present situation as far more favorable to the revolutionary movement than ever before...."86 While some CPP cadre remained in urban areas, others were sent to work with NPA units forming in rural regions. The CPP continued to orgainze militant protest actions based on political and economic issues, but used more caution.87 Click here to view image Modification of the Strategy In 1973, the CPP established the National Democratic Front. The NDF's "Ten-Point Program" closely resembled the ten "guidelines" of the CPP's "Programme for a People's Democratic Revolution."88 The 1972 Karagatan affair and the imposition of martial law forced the CPP to re-examine the relevance of the Maoist model to the Philippine case. The result was Sison's 1974 work, "Specific Characteristics of Our People's War." In this treatise, Sison modified Mao's principles to fit the specific conditions in the Philippines.89 Sison stated that party strategy would have to be guided by three geographic conditions: "First, our countryside is shredded into so many islands. Second, our biggest islands, Luzon and Mindanao, are separated by such a clutter of islands as the Visayas. Third, our small country is separated by seas from other countries."90 In the scattered islands of the Philippines, it was not possible to establish a large liberated base as the Chinese Communists had done at Yenan. Instead, Sison argued, the CPP should create guerrilla fronts in a few major islands first, and then in the other islands. Well-trained cadres would be developed first, and then sent into remote areas using decentralized operations.91 Sison emphasized the conversion of geographic constraints into advantages, the use of mountain ranges to exercise political and military influence simultaneously on a number of lowland areas, the organizational principle of "decentralized operations under centralized political leadership," and the establishment of numerous self-reliant guerilla fronts to disperse the AFP.92 In addition, the urban resistance movement would continue.93 The best cadres were often sent to the regional committees and guerrilla fronts, rather than concentrated at party headquarters. The CPP Central Committee limited its role to the formulation of general policies and guidelines. This new strategy allowed party flexibility. The smaller units were better able to tailor their operations to the local environment, and had the autonomy and initiative to experiment with different tactics.94 In areas such as Samar, for example, the CPP-NPA adopted a creed that was more economic than ideological - one that was more attractive to the depressed people of this region.95 Although this strategy was tested during 1976-1977 when Sison and other top leaders were captured, the CPP-NPA continued to increase in strength. Although the decentralized operations strategy carries the risk of deteriorating into separate fiefdoms, there has been no evidence of such a trend. During this period, the CPP-NPA focused on political work, taking advantage of the government's preoccupation with the Moro insurgency. The number of clashes with government forces decreased, giving the false impression of an CPP-NPA decline.96 By 1978, the CPP-NPA had progressed to more advanced stages of the "strategic defensive" phase. This meant that the NPA had moved into a more conventional type of warfare. While the emphasis was still on armed propaganda units, the number of armed regulars had stepped up. Although these armed regulars were used only when necessary in the past, they were now seeking engagements to obtain weapons and to keep government forces off-balance. Once wide areas in the countryside were controlled, the CPP-NPA would then be in its "strategic stalemate" situation with the government. Around this time, the NPA also introduced the "tiklos" system, an mutual-aid arrangement in which peasants were encouraged to look for their own fields to farm rather than work for landlords. Besides gaining popular support, this also provided food and supplies for the NPA. The Communists also continued their united front activities in urban areas, gaining further support and working toward their goal of a coalition government - to include the Christian Left and liberal politicians.97 To infiltrate student and labor organizations, the CPP initially focused on "legitimate" issues such as student fees and the sponsoring of strikes - and then gradually increased its influence.98 A Broader United Front In 1980, on the eleventh anniversary of the NPA, the CPP declared that conditions were right for the NPA to resume offensive military operations.99 Also around this time, the National Democratic Front revised its "Ten-Point Program." This revised strategy sought to establish a broader organizational framework to intregrate more diverse opposition groups, using the unifying themes of resistance to the Marcos government and its American connections. This broadened united front strategy manifested itself in a successful 1981 election boycott that used newly-established opposition groups.100 This new strategy was apparently part of a three-year plan for the CPP-NPA to expand its mass base.101 Taking advantage of the lifting of martial law in 1981, the CPP-NPA continued its organizational and operational base expansion. Limited guerrilla and terroristic actions were also conducted to secure firearms and as a show of force. Organizational efforts were reportedly active along the boundaries of party regional and provincial borders, apparently to establish nationwide links to facilitate control and coordination.102 A captured NPA leader revealed the following plans and programs for 1981: 1)preparation for movement into the "advanced sub-stage" of the strategic defensive; 2)inclusion of all opposition elements in the National Democratic Front; 3)establishment of a political-military school and intensified training for party cadres; 4)publication of an "army magazine" to project the NPA image; 5)expansion of mass organizations; 6)maintenance of fraternal relations with the Chinese Communist Party and the exploration of relationships with other Communist movements in Vietnam, Europe, and the Mideast; 7)implementation of the CPP's three-year expansion program and use of the Basic and Intermediate Party Courses to improve political education.103 A New Sub-Stage of the Strategy On its thirteenth anniversary in 1981, the CPP declared that its people's war had entered the "advanced sub-stage of the strategic defensive." Despite its expansion, the CPP-NPA continues to be patient. The September 1983 isue of the CPP's "Liberation" magazine, stated, While there is a need for anti-dictatorship forces to persevere in militant struggle in Metro-Manila, it would be foolhardy at this point to encourage widespread armed confrontation...Not until the people's armed forces in the countryside have gained enough strength to lay a siege around the capital, and the city's population is sufficiently prepared, will the outbreak of an armed uprising lead to a decisive victory for the people.105 In 1983, a U.S. Defense Department official testifying before Congress, stated that "the upsurge of the NPA is not a result of the Aquino assassination, which apparently had not caused Communist leaders to alter their basic anti-government strategy. Political developments remain secondary to the pursuit of rural-based armed struggle...."106 A captured NPA leader in 1984 revealed that the Communists were still active in their united front efforts. The CPP-NPA allegedly infiltrated numerous student and opposition organizations and planned to stir labor strikes and rallies.107 Pro-NPA posters also proliferated on urban walls for the first time. In December 1984, about 200 insurgents in commandeered logging trucks attacked an army company's base on Mindanao. Defense Minister Enrile called this attack "their first effort at conventional- type warfare," instead of the usual ambushes. Acting Armed Forces Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Fidel Ramos, estimated that for the first ten months of 1984, the NPA had killed 2,650 persons - including 800 troops and 65 civilian officials - and caused about $10 million of property damage during 3,500 ambushes, raids, and other operations. 895 guerrillas were killed during this period.108 A New Strategy of Urban Violence and External Support? The political, economic, and military situation in the Philippines continued to deteriorate so rapidly that CPP leaders are allegedly debating whether or not to adopt aggressive new tactics to hasten the system's collapse. Recent NPA decisions to form larger fighting units and to attack high-visibility targets suggest that some of these tactics have already been adopted. In the spring of 1984, a CPP publication revealed that the party has decided to lessen its emphasis on its rural warfare and launch a campaign of urban violence. The only remaining controversy is over the timing of the urban campaign. CPP publications have also dropped their pro-Chinese stance and seem to be supporting some Soviet positions. There are suspicions that the CPP may change its policy of self-reliance and seek Soviet bloc help. The CPP has allegedly established contacts with Soviet bloc parties and at least one shipment of arms from Eastern Europe was made through South Yemen to the NPA.109 Should the CPP-NPA receive significant external support or undertake an armed urban campaign, these would be in contrast to the PKP and the Huks. The PKP-HMB never received any significant external support and did not surface into an urban threat. A Successful Strategy, So Far The NPA has applied Sison's principles in almost textbook fashion. The movement has expanded from the two largest islands in the archipelago - Luzon and Mindanao - to others such as Samar, Negros, and Leyte (see Figure 28 - Expansion of the New People's Army). The population and the terrain suitable for guerrilla warfare appear to have been the primary consideration Click here to view image There are reports that Cebu - one of the islands that Sison recommended be put off until last - is a primary NPA target for 1985. As it has progressed, the NPA has somehow solved the problem that limited the growth of previous Filipino insurgencies - divisive linguistic and regional loyalties.110 The Communists have been successful for several reasons, some of which were outlined above. Captured NPA leader Commander Dante, when interviewed in 1981, stated that, "We are not Maoists. If ever we would have Communism, it must be a Filipino Communist system. Although we can learn from the experiences of China, Russia, and other socialist countries, we must consider only those specifics which apply to us."111 In rural areas, most of the people could not understand the intricacies of Communist ideology; the NPA did not focus on ideology but on "injustices" of the Filipino system. The NPA's laws were also easy to understand and obey; "justice" was carried out against local criminals and informers.112 Pragmatism was a key and successful element in the Communist strategy. Intimidation has also played an important role in the process.113 Armed NPA action has often been aimed at drawing attention away from other peaceful areas where political work is in the early stages. The Communists have also been flexible; when the government has the initiative in certain areas, the NPA leaders feel that it is no defeat to move regular units to other regions.114 As the Philippine government searches for a successful counterinsurgency strategy, the NPA has been very careful to avoid getting caught as the HMB did. The guerrillas have remained in the countryside in areas where they are more insured of popular support. The NPA has maintained mobility with small, self-sufficient units, avoiding positional combat. While unable to claim major military victories, the guerrillas have been able to avoid defeat. This "no win, no lose" military strategy may help the Communist movement gain as a whole. As Professor David Rosenberg states, All the NPA has to do is to survive, and to maintain its credibility as a fighting force with occasional ambushes, in order to keep its revolutionary prospects alive, while causing considerable harm to the public image of the regime. Progress in this kind of conflict is measured not in terms of the military balance, but, more important, in terms of the impact on mobilization of a mass opposition throughout the country. This is the task of the political coalition organized by the CPP, the National Democratic Front.115 A Different Model? This possible inapplicability of the three-phase Maoist model is a theme emphasized by Major General Moore, a former Huk-fighter. Perhaps, a two-stage model (strategic defensive, strategic stalemate and eventual government collapse) may be all that is needed. In this case, the insurgency may be even further along than currently envisioned.116 In any case, Richard Armitage, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs recently stated that the insurgents could reach a strategic stalemate within three to four years" in that they "will have attained enough military muscle to prevent their defeat on the battlefield."117 The CPP-NPA'S Long-term Strategy The key element in the NPA's strategy of protracted people's war is time. The insurgents need time to expand and strengthen their forces; time for party building; time for organizing a broad united front to isolate the government; time for establishing, expanding, and consolidating nation-wide bases; and time for politicizing and mobilizing mass support.118 The CPP-NPA long-term strategy is illustrated in Figure 29. The longer an insurgency exists, the greater the effort required by the government to quell it; the NPA insurgency has been growing since 1969. Modus Operandi of the CPP-NPA NPA operations are committed to the "long march," whereby rural areas will be secured and the cities encircled before the seizure of power.119 Like its predecessor the HMB, the NPA has conducted numerous raids and ambushes, especially ambushes of government convoys or ambuscades. These military operations are in addition to the Communist activities of subversion, demonstrations, and strikes in the cities.120 Other political activities of the NPA have included supporting operations for election boycotts, such as the snatching of ballot boxes during the 1984 elections.121 The NPA probably also used intimidation to deter voters and to support opposition candidates.122 The NPA has displayed a solid knowledge of tactical principles and effective planning in its military operations. For example, blocking positions have been utilized during or after ambush operations to deter reinforcing troops or to inflict casualties on patrols sent to retrieve bodies from the scenes of ambushes.123 The NPA has also straddled AFP boundaries, allowing it the flexibility to move quickly while preventing government Click here to view image troops from pursuing beyond their areas of jurisdiction. NPA Target Selection Local Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF) or paramilitary units patrolling isolated villages have been popular targets.125 These units are not particularly well-trained and are sources of weapons and ammunition. The NPA targets are very carefully selected, however, in order to minimize collateral damage. The NPA, like the HMB, tries to avoid any indiscriminate damage that might alienate the populace. This selective use of violence is reminiscent of the Giap strategy, and is a similarity between the two insurgent groups that General Moore emphasized.126 In addition to hit-and-run ambushes and raids, there have been NPA attacks on fixed government installations and short-term takeovers and occupations of municipalities in areas where the guerrillas have strong local support. These operations, besides providing arms and demoralizing government forces, are a show-of- force and provide psychological benefits on the populace. Recently, larger-scale operations have become more commonplace.127 Larger-Sized NPA Operations In the early 1970s, the typical NPA armed unit was squad or platoon-sized, with some ten to twenty men. As late as 1980, reports of clashes with company-sized units of eighty to one-hundred men were still rare and confined mainly to northeastern Luzon.128 On 29 September 1983, about 70 NPA guerrillas ambushed and killed thirty-nine soldiers and seven civilians on an armored patrol. This was the highest death toll suffered by government forces since NPA operations began in 1969. Almost every day in 1983 saw at least one NPA action against government authority somewhere in the country.129 Today, company-sized units operate throughout the country in the major NPA areas, and the AFP occasionly has confronted three-hundred man NPA battalions with more firepower than the government troops. NPA activity has increased to the point where it exceeds the number of government search-and-destroy missions. The more aggressive NPA tactics have caused led the often- demoralized government troops to abandon remote outposts and consolidate in larger garrisons.130 Some of the recent NPA operations display ingenuity in overcoming some of their logistical limitations. A December 1984 attack by a company-sized NPA unit utilized dump trucks and guerrillas wearing fatigue uniforms. A battalion-sized NPA attack a month earlier used commandeered logging trucks, and the rebels cut nearby bridges to prevent reinforcements.131 In some instances, these battalion-sized units are formed by joining together several local companies for a particular operations, indicating good coordination by the NPA command.132 The NPA also dons constabulary and army uniforms occasionally during attacks in an attempt to deceive government forces.133 There are also limitations on NPA operations, but the NPA has displayed its flexibility in working around these. In some areas such as on Samar where there is an inability of the local populace to support company-sized NPA units, these formations have been reduced to squad-size. When local support expanded in these areas, the units were upgraded to company size.134 Some of the NPA firefights are also of short duration - even when the NPA enjoys numerical superiority - presumably due to a shortage of ammunition.135 Some of the larger battalion-sized operations have also displayed coordination problems.136 NPA Liquidation and Sabotage Operations The NPA, like the HMB, engages in liquidation operations. "Sparrow units" - well-trained urban guerrilla groups of three to four people - have attacked local police, and current CCP policy is to increase the frequency of these killings.137 The problem is so serious that many traffic policemen refuse to go on duty; this also has a destabilizing effect on city residents.138 In addition to police forces, the NPA also liquidates informers and local criminals - as the Huks did earlier.139 Unfortunately, these criminals are executed without benefit of a fair and legal trial. Many of the NPA's civilian casualties are informers. NPA units often make use of letters to issue warnings to civilians, soldiers, and government officials that they accuse of "crimes against the people." These warnings are used to persuade these individuals to stop their "crimes."140 Unlike the HMB, the NPA has undertaken numerous sabotage operations. These operations have targeted government development projects and factories, especially those identified with the Marcos regime. The NPA demolitions capability facilitates these operations.141 In May 1984, the NPA destroyed a multimillion- dollar experimental coconut and cacao plantation in the south, and in northern Luzon attacked facilities operated by the Cagayan Valley Development Authority, a pet project of Defense Minister Enrile - a native of that area.142 In cases such as the Cagayan Valley operation, the NPA also expands its support base among natives opposed to the development project. In its sabotage operations, the NPA's selection of targets reflects its efforts to use calculated violence for maximum political effect. Plantations, timber concessions, and public works projects - holdings of Marcos' "crony capitalists" - have been attacked and millions of dollars worth of buildings and equipment have been destroyed nationwide.143 NPA Intelligence and Security Due to their clandestine organizational and united front efforts, the CPP and NPA have a significant, potential intelligence apparatus. The effectiveness of this intelligence network displayed itself in NPA efforts to ferret out informers. The constabulary has reportedly been surprised at the NPA ability to penetrate confidential files on constabulary operatives in the countryside. The NPA also allegedly was able to obtain information on the movements of government officials and the activities of government forces.144 Part of this success may be due to the free and prolific Filipino press. The NPA also monitors AFP radio communications with captured equipment.145 Although the NPA has a good underground intelligence and communications network, it has placed more emphasis on security and counterintelligence.146 For this reason, there is relatively little information available on the inner workings of the Communist movement. The relative success of the Communist operations and expansion is further evidence of the security emphasis. CPP-NPA Psychological Operations While the ultimate objective of CPP-NPA psychological operations (PSYOPS) is to influence political behavior, the Communist use of propaganda appears to have three proximate objectives: 1)morale-building within the insurgent organization; 2)advertising of the Communist movement; 3)disorienting the populace by demonstrating the inability of the government to maintain stability.147 To accomplish these objectives, the CPP-NPA has pursued numerous PSYOP activities. Successes have been publicized. Since its inception, the NPA has carefully and effectively cultivated a "Robin Hood" image. Its assassination, sabotage, and other violent operations have been planned for maximum psychological impact on the people.148 The CPP-NPA has also concentrated its subversion activities on the conduct of agitation-propaganda. In urban centers, the front organizations have been used to promote political consciousness and mass mobilization. Teach-ins have been conducted in different sectors of the society. Urban and rural-based insurgents normally stay with target groups to ensure continuous contact.149 The CPP-NPA doctrine emphasizes that guerrillas also double as political agents. Mimeograph machines - some captured - are used to print leaflets. Front organizations are also used to print and distribute newspapers and periodicals. Thus far, there has been no CPP-NPA use of radio broadcasts. The NPA, however, has infiltrated government organizations to obtain supplies such as medicine, and distributed these illegally-obtained materials to obtain more popular support. It has also taken credit for government civic action projects.150 NPA personnel have also donned constabulary uniforms, stolen livestock at gunpoint, and then - without the uniforms - returned the stolen animals while claiming to have punished the government "offenders."151 CPP-NPP PSYOPS are also facilitated by the free and lively Filipino press. Opposition papers criticize the Marcos regime and run front-page interviews with underground Communist guerrilla leaders.152 During the 1984 election campaign, the NPA began a propaganda blitz that allowed Philippine-based foreign journalists to visit its mountain camps and used urban contacts to reach visiting media representatives.153 Some of the PSYOPS themes used by the CPP-NPA include military abuses, the inability of the government to deliver basic services in remote areas, and controversial development projects.154 Other propaganda themes and issues are depicted in Figure 30. Unfortunately, the government has not mounted much of a counter-PSYOP effort. Treating the insurgency as a military problem, the AFP resembles the army of the late 1940s - with similar maintenance, morale, equipment, and discipline problems.155 CPP-NPA Recruitment Activities The NPA predicates Communist expansion on its ability to move out of remote, mountainous areas to the lowlands in successive waves of activity. From its secure bases, the NPA Click here to view image sends out an advance party to a nearby barangay to make initial contact. The villages that are more remote from established government centers and services are usually the first ones penetrated. The NPA attempts to befriend village members by assisting with chores and farmwork alongside the peasants. Usually, the NPA cadres stay in the home of a local family and pay for everything they need.156 This first stage of initial contact is the most critical and dangerous for the cadres.157 Once the advance party penetrates a village, it seeks to recruit locals to the cause by exploiting grievances - particularly military abuses. At some point, an NPA armed unit visits to demonstrate the movement's strength and to expel any CHDF forces that may be present. Local criminals and any corrupt officials, if they are still present, are captured and given quick "people's trials."158 However, in many cases, the advance party may focus on solving community problems for as long as a year before trying to enlist new members.159 As the movement gains recruits, party branches are formed and a revolutionary council established. During this phase, the CPP emphasizes the organizing of mass groups of peasants, youth, and women. Once these groups are operational, other mass organizations - such as committees for defense, economy, and health - are formed. If sufficient weapons are available, the NPA establishes a local armed unit. The process culminates when the party revolutionary council replaces the legitimate barangay council as the political organ of the village.160 Once a village falls under NPA control, a new advance party is dispatched to the next targeted area and the process begins again. Each success widens the area of NPA influence and brings the waves of Communist activity closer to the cities. The NPA also couples its expansion with consolidation activities. CPP and NPA cadre regularly visit NPA areas to inspect progress and add intensive classes on Communist doctrine and theory. Although only a small number of the movement are hard-core Communists, these teach-ins are given high priority and appear to be fairly successful.161 In addition to this process of indoctrination and persuasion, the NPA also sometimes obtains recruits through coercion, intimidation, and kidnapping.162 CPP-NPA strategies differ greatly from region to region. Knowledge of local customs and language is considered important. Cadre members participate in local birthdays, funerals, weddings, and fiestas; they attend local village meetings and functions. Although Communist cadre are often assigned to their "home" areas, the AFP usually avoids sending too many combat troops to their own ethnic or linguistic areas, so they are more apt to be firm with the local populace.163 NPA Training Not much is known about the CPP-NPA training system. Both organizations obviously have training systems and schools, such as the CPP courses referred to earlier in this chapter. Most camps have training activities and the NPA reportedly has formal training areas established in the countryside. The NPA allegedly has no formal, intensive training program for recruits, and conducts most of its training through actual operations. Recruits are sent on initiation missions and learn through experience.164 This training system is similar to that used by the Huks in the 1940s and 1950s. NPA Discipline The "Basic Rules of the New People's Army" (see Appendix I), largely copied from the Chinese People's Liberation Army, contain three "main rules of discipline": 1)obey orders in all your actions; 2)do not take a single needle or thread from the masses; 3)turn in everything captured. They also contain "eight points of attention": 1)speak politely; 2)pay fairly for what you buy; 3)return everything you borrow; 4)pay for anything you damage; 5)do not hit or swear at people; 6)do not damage crops; 7)do not take liberties with women; 8)do not ill-treat captives. The CPP "programme" (see Appendix G) states that the economic and political rights of individuals will be protected and small private enterprise will be "respected, encouraged and assisted." The constitutional freedoms of religion, speech and assembly also will not be tampered with. However, all of these CPP and NPA guidelines are based on these organizations perspectives and are also adhered to "so long as it does not obstruct the revolution."165 This puritanical discipline appears to be enforced because the NPA has been rarely known to kill, injure, or rob civilians without "cause." The death penalty was imposed for the malversation of funds, adultery, rape, and other serious offenses. When Commander Dante headed the NPA in its early days, he had to personally approve any killings or executions.166 The NPA appears to be careful not to harm civilians when it carries out its pre-researched attacks on military forces.167 This discipline is similar to that of the Huks. NOTES 1Benedict Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1977), p. 164. 2Kerkvliet, p. 171. 3Statement by Napoleon Valeriano, Philippine army officer, in a speech presented to the U.S. Army Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North California, 2 October 1964, p. 4 of the speech's text. 4A. H. Peterson, ed., "Symposium on the Role of Airpower in Counterinsurgency and Unconventional Warfare: The Philippines Huk Campaign" (RAND Corporation Report for the U.S. Air Force, 1963), p. 9. 5Kerkvliet, p. 172. 6Luis Taruc, He Who Rides the Tiger: The Story of an Asian Guerrilla Leader (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 27. 7Kerkvliet, p. 172. 8Robert Smith, The Hukbalahap Insurgency: Economic, Political, and Military Factors (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Department of the Army, 1963), pp. 70-71. 9Napoleon Valeriano and Charles Bohannan, Counterguerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 23. 10Smith, pp. 79-80. 11Smith, p. 15. 12Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peacekeeping (Harrisburg, Penn.: Stackpole Books, 1971), pp. 30-31. 13Kerkvliet, p. 218. 14Smith, p. 80. 15Smith, pp. 90-91. 16John Jameson, "The Philippine Constabulary as a Counterinsurgency Force, 1948-1954" (Report of the Institute of Advanced Studies, U.S. Army War College, 1971), p. 32. 17Smith, pp. 82-84. 18William Moore, "The Hukbalahap Insurgency, 1948-1954: An Analysis of the Roles, Missions, and Doctrine of the Philippine Military Forces" (Report of the Institute of Advanced Studies, U.S. Army War College, 1971), pp. 21-22. 19Moore, p. 23. 20Jameson, p. 33. 21Kerkvliet, p. 220. 22David Rosenberg, "Communism in the Philippines," Problems of Communism, XXXIII (September/October 1984), 31. 23Ibid. 24Taruc, pp. 52,75. 25Smith, pp 84-85. 26Moore, pp. 28-29. 27William Pomeroy, The Forest: A Personal Record of the Huk Guerrilla Struggle in the Philippines (New York: International Publishers, 1963), p. 105. 28Peterson, p. 46. 29Rosenberg, p. 32. 30Jameson, p. 33. 31Smith, pp. 91-92. 32Edward Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 46; Peterson, p. 19. 33Valeriano and Bohannan, p. 193; Smith, pp. 92-93. 34Smith, pp. 93-94. 35Alvin Scaff, The Philippine Answer to Communism (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1955), p. 81; Uldarico Baclagon, Lessons from the Huk Campaign in the Philippines (Manila: M. Colcol and Company, 1956), p. 101. 36Luis Villa-Real, "Huk-Hunting," "Guerrilla Warfare Readings," ed. Franklin Osanka (Research memorandum of the Human Resources Research Office, George Washington University, prepared for the U.S. Department of the Army, 1962), p. 105; Baclagon, pp. 55, 101. 37Baclagon, pp. 55, 67, 133. 38Taruc, p. 54. 39Jameson, p. 31; Kerkvliet, pp. 174-175. 40Andrew Molnar and others, "Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare" (Report prepaed by the Special Operations Research Office of The American University for the U.S. Department of the Army, 1963), p. 324. 41Baclagon, p. 104. 42Smith, pp. 94-95. 43Molnar and others, p. 322. 44Smith, p. 96. 45Baclagon, p. 81; Pomeroy, pp. 15, 74. 46Kerkvliet, p. 176. 47Scaff, p. 33; Pomeroy, p. 56. 48Pomeroy, p. 45. 49Alfredo Saulo, Communism in the Philippines: An Introduction (Manila: Ateneo Publications Office, 1969), p. 40; Lansdale, p. 69. 50Valeriano and Bohannan, p. 47. 51Eduardo Lachica, The Huks: Philippine Agrarian Society in Revolt (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), pp. 133-134; Scaff, pp. 110-112. 52Lansdale, pp. 69-70. 53Molnar and others, pp. 322-323. 54Lachica, p. 184; Molnar and others, p. 323; Pomeroy, pp. 145-146. 55Molnar and others, p. 323. 56Molnar and others, p. 321. 57Scaff, p. 120. 58Scaff, p. 109. 59Antonio Nale, "Employment of Natives in Counterinsurgency Operations in the Philippines" (Thesis of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1983), pp. 59-60. 60Kerkvliet, p. 176. 61Jameson, pp. 31-32. 62Scaff, pp. 31-32. 63Taruc, p. 47; Pomeroy, pp. 16, 24. 64Molnar and others, p. 323. 65Lansdale, p. 98; Taruc, p. 47. 66Kerkvliet, pp. 177, 216-217. 67Scaff, p. 117. 68Smith, p. 27. 69Scaff, p. 34. 70Taruc, p. 30. 71Kerkvliet, p. 162. 72Lachica, p. 31. 73Taruc, p. 25. 74Taruc, p. 89. 75Kerkvliet, p. 177. 76Lachica, p. 184. 77Amado Guerrero, [Jose Maria Sison], Philippine Society and Revolution (Oakland, California: International Association of Filipino Patriots, 1979), pp. ii-iii. 78Rosenberg, p. 34. 79Lachica, p. 184. 80Rosenberg, p. 36. 81Rosenberg, p. 34. 82 Rodney Tasker, "A Lesson for the Teacher," Far Eastern, Economic Review, 2 December 1977, p. 17. 83Ross Munro, "Dateline Manila: Moscow's Next Win?" Foreign Policy, No. 56 (Fall 1984), 180. 84Rosenberg, p. 34. 85Guerrero, p. ix. 86Rosenberg, p. 35. 87Ibid. 88Rosenberg, p. 42. 89Rosenberg, p. 37. 90Guerrero, pp: 185-186. 91Robert Manning, "The Philippines in Crisis," Foreign Affairs, Volume 63, No. 2 (Winter 1984/1985), 401. 92U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The Situation in the Philippines, Staff Report prepared by Frederick Brown and Carl Ford, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess., October, 1984 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 29. 93Guerrero, p. xii. 94Rosenberg, p. 37. 95Rodney Tasker, "Where Guerrillas Call the Tune," Far Eastern Economic Review, 11 August 1978, p. 24. 96Rosenberg, p. 37-38. 97Sheilah Ocampo, "Philippines: The Seven-Year Itch," Far Eastern Economic Review, 29 June 1979, pp. 24-26. 98Statement by Narciso Abaya, Lieutenant Colonel, Armed Forces of the Philippines, Assistant Army Attache to the U.S., in a personal interview, Alexandria, Virginia, 15 February 1985. 99Rosenberg, p. 38. 100Rosenberg, p. 45. 101Sheilah Ocampo, "Hearts, Minds, and Guns," Far Eastern Economic Review, 24 April 1981, p. 20. 102Ramberto Saavedra, "The Role of Civil Affairs in Counterinsurgency in the Philippines: (Thesis of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1982), pp. 58-59. 103Saavedra, pp. 60-61. 104"The NPA at 13: Bolder and Brighter," Asiaweek, 19 March 1982, p. 17. 105Rosenberg, p. 45. 106Rosenberg, p. 40. 107"The Army Accuses," Asiaweek, 27 July 1984. 108William Branigan, "Rebel Filipinos Widen Scope of Drive on Army," The Washington Post, 3 December 1984, pp. Al, A28. 109Munro, pp. 185-186. 110U.S., Congress, Senate, pp. 29-30. 111"Time to Get Tough," Asiaweek, 11 September 1981, p. 27. 112Ocampo, "Philippines: The Seven-Year Itch," p. 29. 113U.S., Congress, Senate, p. 21. 114Richard Vokey, "Assault on the Peaks of Power," Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 June 1980, p. 27. 115Rosenberg, p. 41. 116Statement by William Moore, Major General, U.S. Army, and formerly of JUSMAG, Philippines, in a personal interview, Arlington, Virginia, 15 February 1985. 117Lena Sun, "Philippine Crisis Grows, Top U.S. Officials Warn," The Washington Post, 13 March 1985, p. A19. 118U.S., Congress, Senate, p. 35. 119James Turpin, "A New Society's Challenge in the Philippines," Conflict Studies No. 122, The Institute for the Study of Conflict (London: The Eastern Press, 1980), 7. 120Abaya, interview. 121Guy Sacerdoti, "Marching to the Beat of an Opposition Drum," Far Eastern Economic Review, 24 May 1984, pp. 16-17. 122U.S., Congress, Senate, p. 8. 123Tasker, "Where Guerrillas Call the Tune," p. 23. 124Sheilah Ocampo, "A Little Vietnam," Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 March 1982, p. 39. 125Ocampo, "Hearts, Minds, and Guns," p. 20. 126Moore, interview. 127Rosenberg, p. 38. 128U.S., Congress, Senate, p. 25. 129Rosenberg, pp. 38-39. 130Manning, pp. 402-403. 131Branigin, "Rebel Filipinos Widen Scope of Drive on Army," p. A28. 132U.S., Congress, Senate, p. 25. 133Tasker, "Where Guerrillas Call the Tune," p. 23. 134Guy Sacerdoti, "Red 'Army' on the March," Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 June 1984, p. 41. 135Rodney Tasker, "Elusive Law and Order," Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 July 1984, p. 14. 136Abaya, interview. 137Sacerdoti, "Red 'Army' on the March," p. 41. 138Tasker, "Elusive Law and Order," p. 13. 139Lachica, p. 168. 140Vokey, p. 27. 141Abaya, interview. 142 Munro, p. 181. 143U.S., Congress, Senate, p. 28. 144Lachica, pp. 168-169. 145U.S., Congress, Senate, p. 27. 146Abaya, interview. 147Tirso Gador, "Insurgency and Subversion in a Developing Country: A Case Study in a Philippine Setting" (Thesis of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1970), pp. 62-64. 148U.S., Congress, Senate, pp. 27-28. 149Saavedra, pp. 59-60. 150Abaya, interview. 151Tasker, "Where Guerrillas Call the Tune," p. 24. 152Munro, p. 177. 153Sacerdoti, "Marching to the Beat of an Opposition Drum," p. 16. 154Abaya, interview. 155Moore, interview. 156U.S., Congress, Senate, p. 38. 157Vokey, p. 24. 158U.S., Congress, Senate, p. 38. 159Steve Lohr, "Twilight of the Marcoe Era," New York Times Magazine, 6 January 1985, p. 36. 160U.S., Congress, Senate, p. 38. 161U.S., Congress, Senate, pp. 38, 40. 162Lachica, p. 167. 163Vokey, p. 26. 164Abaya, interview. 165Lachica, pp. 184-185. 166Lachica, p. 168. 167Tasker, "Where Guerrillas Call the Tune," p. 24. CHAPTER 7 LOGISTICS, COMMUNICATIONS, AND EXTERNAL SUPPORT All guiding principles in military operations pro- ceed without exception from one basic principle, that is to strive as far as possible to preserve one's own strength and annihilate that of the enemy. Che Guevara No political front which is basically a deliberate body can assume leadership of a people's war; only a technically capable executive group, centralized and united on the basis of identifiable class interest can do so; in brief, only a revolutionary general staff. Regis Debray in Revolution in the Revolution? Supporting the Huks Huk Procurement and Supply The channeling of funds for the Huk movement was the responsibility of the National Finance Committee of the PKP "Politburo-in" located in Manila. The Huk high command levied "taxes" in rebel-controlled areas of central Luzon, while in other areas Communists presented themselves as government tax collectors. There were also cases of outright confiscation, which including raids, holdups, and train robberies.1 The Huks formed Economic Struggle (ES) units to obtain funds for their movement. These men were selected for their bravery and trustworthiness and wore uniforms similar to the Philippine Rangers. They executed robberies, extorted businessmen and manned checkpoints for the confiscation of bypassing vehicles. ES teams in civilian clothing were also used to levy taxes, especially on foreign enterprises in the Huk areas.2 Confiscation or coercive procurement produced the most dependable supplies of funds. Raids and robberies also provided large sums of money. For example, an October 1950 holdup of the Manila Railroad Company by an ES unit netted 76,000 pesos (about $19,000). Half of the money went to the HMB-PKP's national head- quarters which distributed it among the REC0s; the other half stayed within the procuring RECO.3 Per capita "tax" levies provi- ded some funds; peasants were "taxed" at harvest time and other workers were "taxed" at low daily rates.4 Voluntary contributions also provided some funds. Although there is no direct evidence that union funds were used to finance the movement, it is highly probable that members of CLO-control- led unions were solicited for donations. The PKM placed its fi- nancial resources at the disposal of the Huks. Many gifts were also received from the 20,000 Chinese in Manila, and the Huks apparently received some financial support from the 3,000 member Chinese Communist Party of the Philippines.5 Cash was only a portion of the Huks' needs. The Field Com- mands (FCs) survived on contributions of rice, clothing and ciga- rettes. At the FC level, there were few cash contributions - perhaps 1,000 pesos ($250) a year for an entire FC. Of this cash, only about twenty percent stayed with the FC (less than at the higher echelons) and the rest was sent up to the RECO.6 The RECOs, had bigger needs. For example, the cash account book of RECO Two for July 1951 (near the peak of Huk strength) had expenses of 10,047.25 pesos and 5,100 pesos in cash on hand.7 The Huks also obtained free services from the few professionals (doctors, lawyers, etc.) in their mass base.8 In areas under complete Huk control, food was supplied by the local populace and it was common Huk practice to take a certain percentage of the annual crop. In other areas, the BUDC was responsible far supplying the Huk combat units. Each combat squadron had a "balutan" or porter squad which had the mission of transporting the food collected by the BUDC to the squadron camp. The balutan squads supporting squadrons operating in the mountains or swamps often required several days to make the roundtrip.9 Beginning around 1948, the Huks also began using production bases in the mountains of central Luzon that were manned by non-combatant Huk supporters. Production base personnel grew sweet potatoes, cassava, squash, and other crops, retaining for themselves a small share of the crop. This food was supplemented by hunting wild animals. The production bases provided subsistence to Huks who were in the mountains or passing through to other areas. However, due to the mobile nature of Huk operations, production bases were often of limited logistical value. The guerrillas also operated a rationing system to conserve resources. As the Huks had to purchase some supplies (ammunition was purchased from corrupt government suppliers) through their supply units, the production bases helped alleviate financial strain.10 Most of the Huk weapons were obtained during World War Two. Weapons were small arms, consisting primarily of M1 Garands, with a few Browning automatic rifles. A few machineguns and 60mm mortars were captured from government forces, but were not used due to a lack of ammunition. The guerrillas had no artillery or anti-armor weapons. Hand grenades were used occasionally. The rebels had no land-mines, and lacked the knowledge or training to effectively use their few explosives.11 Besides having small arms acquired during the Japanese occupation, the Huks collected and repaired any available weapons. Civilian guards were another source of weapons. As landlords and local officials often underpaid their civilian guards, these guards sometimes defected with their weapons or sold them to the rebels. The rebels also obtained weapons and supplies from corrupt or sympathizing civilians and servicemen on military bases in central Luzon.12 The Huks mainly used human transportation systems, sup- plemented by a few captured vehicles. Stolen vehicles were used for raids or other special operations. The guerrillas maintained no vehicles for normal use, and did not extensively use animals for transport. When government forces approached Huk camps, heavy and bulky equipment was moved a short distance to hidden locations, and retrieved later.13 Huk financial and logistical situations provide an in- dication of the guerrillas' strength. Understandably, rebel leaders never felt that they had enough cash and supplies. Taruc, the Huk supremo, recalled that "we were financially better off between about the time amnesty collapsed (August 1948) and the (November) 1951 elections than we had been before then or when I came down to Manila (his surrender in May 1954)." Those Huk groups who were better-off shared with their weaker counterparts. RECOs 1 and 2 (in the heart of Huklandia) - considered self- sufficient - sent supplies and money to the PKP's National Fi- nance Department, which redistributed these to RECOs 3 and 4 and expansion forces. Insufficient funds and supplies were major problems of the rebellion and limited many Huk operations.14 The Huks' greatest logistical problems were with the expansion missions. Advance forces that travelled from central Luzon frequently had problems getting food and supplies from villagers in new, unorganized areas. Underground supply lines back to central Luzon bases were too long and tenuous. According to Taruc, the main problems afflicting the expansion forces in the 1946 to 1947 period were too little food and medicine - along with a deficient political understanding among the rank-and- file.15 Medicine was always in short supply because, unlike food, it could not be acquired from farmers or rural merchants.16 The Huks had such logistical and fiscal problems even with the minimal logistical requirements of the Huk soldier - a model for deriving maximum combat power from a minimal investment. The rebel normally carried everything that he owned on his back and performed with what he had. If he was lucky, the guerrilla had a poncho and shoes. His only continual requirement was for food. Even though this requirement was meager by most standards, a considerable portion of Huk energies went for the procurement of food.17 Huk Communications The Huks had serious communications problems. They attempted to employ shortwave radio communications between Huk headquarters and guerrilla units, between the guerrillas and barrio-supported groups, and between the Manila-based PKP headquarters and the Huk headquarters on Mount Arayat. These radio nets, used more heavily during the initial stage of the insurgency, appeared to be largely unsuccessful. Within each RECO, communications were the re- sponsibility of a "Director of Communications," who maintained contact with Huk headquarters. Additional communications were provided by a courier system under the direction of a Courier Division established within the Organizational Bureau of the PKP. Couriers operated under orders from the national headquarters or the RECO, and executed their missions alone or through a system of relays.18 The Huks had no field telephones, and female couriers were used extensively because they aroused less suspicion. The courier system worked well as long as the guerrillas remained amongst a supportive populace. When they were forced into the mountains or lost popular support in an area, the courier system and other signalling methods deteriorated.19 The Huks relied principally on the courier system for communications, and subdivided this system into "legal" and "illegal" systems. In the legal system, the couriers - usually young innocent-looking men and women - avoided roads and highways and moved cross-country on foot; in the illegal system, the couiers used the highways and public conveyances. The terms perhaps illustrate the Huk emphasis on security. The couriers generally knew only the location of two posts, their own and one other. Routes between Huk headquarters in the mountains and the nearest courier post in the lowlands were usually patrolled by Huk forces.20 Various, ingenious signalling methods were used for communications. Flags and flashlights were used for messages. In rural areas, Huks sometimes signaled by imitating animal calls and by banging two bamboo poles together.21 Although the Huk communications network was an impressive web of couriers and secret messages, it never had sufficient personnel to make it work as well as leaders wished. The Huks appeared to make no significant use of radios due to a shortage caused by funding problems. "Wireless communications equipment" purchased in Manila in 1948 and sent to the field, was either lost or captured by government forces before it could be effectively used.22 External Support for the Huks The topic of external support to the Huks, like other as- pects of the rebellion, is subject to many points of view. There was some Chinese participation in the Hukbalahap movement during World War Two, when an all-Chinese squadron was activated and assigned the number 48 - in honor of the Chinese Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies. There is no evidence that Squadron 48 was reactivated after that war, although Chinese were active in the PKP. The PKP Politburo had a special organization, called the "Chinese Bureau" (CB), to coordinate the activities of Chinese members. Luis Taruc, in his memoirs, indicated that the CB was rather independent of Politburo control.23 While the Huks were influenced by the struggle of Chinese guerrillas and used Edgar Snow's Red Star Over China as a text- book, Taruc claimed that they had no direct organizational links with either China or Russia. In the 1930s the PKP had a separate Chinese branch in Manila. This branch, however, existed independently and only vaguely informed the PKP of any connections with the Chinese Communist Party. During the 1930s and 1940s, the PKP received some periodic guidance from the American Commu- nist Party and had a few direct connections with the Comintern and the Soviet Communist Party. A few Chinese officials joined the Hukbalahap in the field during World War Two, and were attached to the PKP Politburo as advisors. Their advice was often self-serving and was largely ignored by the Hukbalahap. After liberation, these advisors returned to China and were never replaced.24 In 1951, the U.S. House Special Committee on Un-Filipino Activities found evidence indicating that the PKP was regularly receiving funds from abroad till as late as 1946 - the year the Huk rebellion started. Although the committee also found indications of some correspondence between the PKP and the U.S. Communist Party as late as 1950, there was no evidence of funding. There were also some reports that Chinese were involved in supplying and funding the Huks, but these may not be especially significant as Chinese are widely engaged in Filipino commerce and banking. Some Chinese probably contributed to the Huk cause under duress, as did many Filipinos.25 Some scholars have reported that China provided funds, a limited number of weapons, propaganda material, a few advisors, and some training abroad. Most of these agree, however, that most of this limited external support was in the form of money, and no significant amount of military equipment was provided.26 It seems doubtful that either China or Russia provided any significant external support to the Huks. The guerrillas with war experience - did not need advisors, and the transportation of significant amounts of supplies would have exceeded Huk logistical capabilities. Furthermore, the Communist Chinese were occupied with their own struggle till 1949, and Communists were concerned with the Korean conflict in the early 1950s. Supporting the New People's Army NPA Procurement, Logistics, and Communications Much less information is available on the New People's Army. The NPA is believed to obtain the majority of its funds through the levying of taxes and extortion. For this, it has a fairly sophisticated apparatus, obtaining payments from local mining and logging firms in remote areas, and from local businesses - such as traders and cottage industries - in areas where NPA influence is substantial. Representatives of these enterprises have commented that it was necessary to "come to terms with the NPA" if one wished to pursue his business in peace. U.S. officials estimate that the NPA has strong influence or de facto control in about 20 percent of the barrios in the rural Philippines.28 Most of the businesses taxed and extorted by the NPA are plantations in remote areas. These operations are harder to conceal in urban areas, and the NPA is strongest in the outlying areas. The NPA may also be involved in smuggling operations, especially in areas such as Isabela province in northeastern Luzon (where the Karagatan smuggling incident of Chapter 3 took place). There have also been reports that the NPA is involved in the profitable sale of illegal drugs, such as marijuana, grown in remote areas.29 The NPA, like its Huk predecessors, obtains food through "taxes", intimidation, purchase, and foraging. There is no evi- dence of production bases like those of the Huks, although the NPA may have these in remote areas.30 The bulk of NPA weapons has been captured in clashes with the military, attacks on wea- pons depots, or from the Civil Home Defense Forces (CHDF) - the poorly-trained and sometimes carelessly selected local govern- ment militia. Some weapons are purchased on the open market, and others are reportedly purchased clandestinely from army sol- diers.31 The NPA has reportedly purchased weapons from Moro insurgents and may have bought a small quantity of arms in the Middle East.32 Weapons have also been obtained via desertions - the most famous being the Lieutenant Victor Corpus incident at the Philippine Military Academy in Baguio City in December 1970. This single incident provided a large amount of arms and ammunition.33 In procurement raids, the NPA has targeted small AFP detachments and isolated units. Typical incidents involve NPA units surrounding a local garrison, demanding its surrender and often making off with all its weapons and ammunition without firing a shot. Medical supplies, office equipment and radios are also high-priority items on the NPA shopping list. M-16s and M-1s are relatively easily obtained from the vulnerable CHDF and private guard forces.34 Estimates of the number of weapons in the NPA inventory vary from 10,000 to 20,000 weapons. The guerrillas have captured several M-60 machineguns and a considerable number of M-79 grenade-launchers that are used effectively in encounters with the AFP. Its weapons include M-16s, World War Two rifles (M-1's, Browning automatic rifles), and homemade shotguns. There is no evidence that the NPA has any artillery, antiarmor or air defense weapons, or aircraft. The NPA armory has grown and there have been several recent firefights, where the guerrillas had firepower parity with or superiority over government forces. The heavy reliance on government supply sources, however, restricts the level and frequency of NPA-initiated incidents. The NPA apparently captures sufficient arms, ammunition, and equipment to sustain its current level of activity, but would probably be hardpressed to mount a sustained, major offensive.35 NPA transportation, while not elaborate, is sufficient. Cars, trucks, and boats are utilized. Like the Huks, the NPA has gone outside its normal transportation means for raids and speci- al operations - logging trucks, motorcycles, and cabs have been used in its raids.36 Like the Huks, the NPA relies heavily on messengers and couriers. Within the cities, telephone systems are probably used by the underground.37 The NPA also monitors AFP radio communica- tions with captured military radios.38 External Support for the NPA Significantly, the CPP and the NPA have developed with very little assistance from foreign supporters. The basic issues which led to the split of the CPP from the PKP were local; only afterwards did the CPP and the PKP become involved with the ideological struggle between the Soviets and the Chinese. China's Xinhua News Agency and Radio Beijing later carried the first statement of the provisional CPP Politburo, endorsing the breakaway group. The PKP, in contrast, openly attacked Mao and the CPP in 1970 and endorsed the Soviet line.39 In the early 1970s, China provided a little ideological and material support. PKP leaders traveled to China during this time and allegedly received some training in sabotage, guerrilla warfare, mass action techniques, and urban terrorism.40 Two original members of the CPP Central Committee still live in China, but no longer appear to play a role in directing party activities. China currently denies any association with the CPP or NPA, and informally advocates a policy of peaceful transition and stability based on a reform of the Philippine system.41 The CPP's last reported contact with China was in 1974. When the Philippine government established diplomatic ties with China in June 1975, the CPP and China apparently broke all ties. The rift was widened by subsequent ideological shifts away from Maoism in Beijing. The two communist entities are now operating at cross-purposes on a number of issues. For example, the CPP works for the removal of U.S. bases, while China supports their maintenance as a counterweight to Soviet expansion.42 As far as it is known, the Soviet Union provides no support for the CPP. Like China, it has pursued stronger bilateral ties with the Philippine government. The Soviet Union provides some support for the PKP leadership, which now operates with the official approval of the Marcos government. Perhaps the most important sources of external support for the CPP are the expatriate Filipino groups opposed to the Marcos government, such as the Union of Democratic Filipinos in the United States.43 Outside of the minor support from China in the early 1970s, the CPP-NPA has received no significant external support. Current CPP publications are critical of both China and the Soviet Union, but appear to straddle the Sino-Soviet split. The real focus of the CPP-NPA is internal.44 However, as explained in Chapters 5 and 6, the CPP-NPA alread has the apparatus for international liaison and may be contemplating a move towards the expansion of external sources of support. NOTES 1Andrew Molnar and others, "Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare" (Report prepared by the Special Operations Research Office of The American University for the Department of the Army, 1963), p. 321. 2William Pomeroy, The Forest: A Personal Record of the Huk Guerrilla Struggle in the Philippines (New York: International Publishers, 1963), p. 163. 3Benedict Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Phillipines (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1977), p. 215. 4Eduardo Lachica, The Huks: Philippine Agrarian Society in Revolt (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 29. 5Molnar and others, pp. 321-322. 6Kerkvliet, p. 215. 7Alvin Scaff, The Philippine Answer to Communism (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1955), p. 34. 8Lachica, p. 29. 9John Jameson, "The Philippine Constabulary as a Counterinsurgency Force, 1948-1954" (Report of the Institute of Advanced Studies, U.S. Army War College, 1971), p. 29; Molnar and others, p. 322. 10Jameson, p. 30; Pomeroy, p. 24-26. 11Pomeroy, pp. 100, 159; Jameson, p. 30. 12Kerkvliet, p. 176. 13Jameson, p. 30; Pomeroy, p. 57. 14Kerkvliet, pp. 214, 216. 15Kerkvliet, p. 177. 16Jameson, p. 30. 17Jameson, p. 29. 18Napoleon Valeriano and Charles Bohannan, Counterguerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 151; Molnar and others, p. 320. 19Jameson, pp. 30-31; Pomeroy, p. 17. 20Luis Villa-Real, "Huk-Hunting," "Guerrilla Warfare Readings," ed. Franklin Osanka (Research Memorandum of the Human Resources Research Office, George Washington University, prepared for the U.S. Department of the Army, 1962), p. 105. 21Molnar and others, p. 320. 22Kerkvliet, p. 216. 23Jameson, p. 55. 24 Luis Taruc, He Who Rides the Tiger: The Story of an Asian Guerrilla Leader (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), pp. 21, 33-34. 25Jameson, pp. 55-56. 26Jameson, p. 56. 27Jameson, p. 57. 28Robert Manning, "The Philippines in Crisis," Foreign Affairs, Volume 63, No. 2 (Winter 1984/1985), 403; Frederica Bunge, Philippines: A Country Study (Washington: The American University, 1984), p. 242. 29Statement by Narciso Abaya, Lieutenant Colonel, Armed Forces of the Philippines, Assistant Army Attache to the U.S., in a personal interview, Alexandria, Virginia, 15 February 1985. 30Ibid. 31Manning, p. 403. 32Bunge, p. 242. 33 William Scott, "The Philippines: A Matter of Concern" (Report of the U.S. Air War College, 1972), p. 33. 34U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The Situation in the Philippines, Staff Report prepared by Frederick Brown and Carl Ford, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess., October, 1984 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 27. 35Abaya, interview; U.S., Congress, Senate, p. 27. 36Abaya, interview. 37Ibid. 38U.S., Congress, Senate, p. 27. 39David Rosenberg, "Communism in the Philippines," Problems of Communism, XXXIII (September/October 1984), 35. 40Lachica, pp. 181-182. 41U.S., Congress, Senate, p. 23. 42Rosenberg, pp. 35-36. 43Rosenberg, p. 36. 44Manning, pp. 401-402. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION Campaigns of this kind (subversion and insurgency) are the more likely to continue because it is the only kind of war that fits the conditions of the modern age, while being at the same time well suited to take advantage of social discontent, racial ferment and nationalist fervours. B.H. Liddell Hart If we do not reform our society, if we do not make government more responsive to the needs of our people, if we do not narrow the cleavage between rich and poor, there will be no need for the Communists to mount a rebellion. They will just take over. Ferdinand Marcos, President of the Republic of the Philippines, April, 1971. Summary The Environment: Causes and Conditions The underlying causes of the Huk and the New People's Army insurgencies are similar. Both movements sought to overthrow the existing government in order to establish their own Communist system. To accomplish this, the two groups exploited the following "causes": the land tenancy system and a peasant desire for agrarian reform; unemployment and economic conditions, including an extremely inequitable income distribution; and a lack of government credibility due to corruption and military abuses. Both insurgency movements faced distracted governments and inept military forces. The Huks attempted to portray the pre-Magsaysay administrations with a collaborationist and corrupt image. The Marcos administration - the only regime the NPA has confronted - has an image of cronyism. The pre-Magsaysay and the Marcos regimes were unable to pursue effective counterinsurgency operations and were unable to implement effective internal development programs. Marcos faces additional problems caused recently by the increasing political polarization of Filipino society - resulting in significant "moderate" support for the Communists - in the aftermath of the Aquino assassination. Military forces under Marcos suffer from many of the same weaknesses of the pre-1950 government forces that the Huks faced - underfunding, corruption, and discipline and morale problems resulting in continuing military abuses of the populace. The size of the military establishment under Marcos, however, is about five times as large as the approximately 30,000 troops and constabulary that the Huks encountered. Organization, Composition, and Strength While the PKP are similarly organized - with party echelons stretching from the national to the barrio level - the CPP organization has been modified to include a new "Front" echelon, designed to serve as an operational military command immediately subordinate to the Region. The national-level departments have also been expanded to reflect CPP emphasis on liaison with non-CPP organizations, including the Moro National Liberation Front. The HMB and NPA military arms have a common heritage and their flexible organizations below the regional level reflect this. Both military bodies utilize full-time armed regulars, combat personnel, and cadres. In both cases, the numerous interconnections between the party and military organizations give the Communist organizations a paramilitary character. The PKP played a smaller role in the formation of the postwar Huks and did not publicly support an armed struggle until two years after the initiation of the Huk rebellion. On the other hand, the CPP had a pivotal role in the NPA's formation and has always supported armed revolution. Because of this and the CCP's deep involvement in NPA field activities, the CPP has a closer relationship with, and provides more effective leadership to its military arm than the PKP did. While both Communist parties sought a strong united front, they met with differing success. The PKP's Democratic Alliance collapsed a few years after its formation; the CPP's National Democratic Front has grown significantly since its formation in 1973. The NDF has a more diverse membership and the CPP has attained the Philippine's first strong urban Communist infrastructure. Although both parties had large mass movements engaged in similar activities - shadow governments, supply, intelligence, and recruiting - the CPP uses a new People's Organizing Group operating below the barrio level. Both the PKP and the CPP are led by urban intelligentsia who got their subversive initiation while on university campuses. The CPP-NPA leadership, however, is younger, more sophisticated and more radical than the PKP-HMB leadership. The CPP-NPA leadership also appears to be more cohesive, unlike the PKP and Huks who suffered numerous leadership rifts. These two Communist movements started in central Luzon, but the growth of the CPP-NPA is far more impressive. The Huks grew from a much larger initial "base" - about 10,000 Hukbalahap veterans - while the NPA has grown from an initial membership of about 400. While HMB expansion was primarily limited to Luzon, the NPA has spread into all areas of the country (63 of 77 provinces). The CPP-NPA emphasis on local customs and use of local personnel in operation areas has been most successful. The CPP-NPA has also established links with the Moros and has been able to recruit some clergy members into the movement. Current NPA armed strength approximates the peak Huk strength, but the NPA and CPP appear to have a larger mass base. Strategy, Doctrine, and Operations Both parties sought to overthrow "U.S. imperialism and domestic feudalism" and to establish a "democratic" government. Following the revolutionary models of China, Vietnam, and Cuba, these parties sought to conduct a protracted people's war using a strategy of encircling the cities from the countryside. The PKP essentially had a Soviet orientation; the CPP has adapted Marxism-Leninism and Maoism to the specific conditions of the country. Also, the CPP formally employs the NPA as an organizing and propaganda force - in addition to being a fighting arm - unlike the Huks. The CPP-NPA also appears fully prepared for a long struggle, unlike the architects of the PKP-HMB 1950 decision who opted for "early seizure of power." Besides its tactical flexibility, the CPP-NPA has also demonstrated a deeper knowledge of urban warfare than the PKP-HMB. The PKP-HMB essentially entered the "strategic offensive" in 1950 with its plan to seize total power in two years, while the CPP-NPA has acknowledged that it is in the "advanced sub-stage of the strategic defensive." Both Communist organizations have used battalion-sized units in similar operations - raids, ambushes, assassinations - and both have featured PSYOPS emphasizing current Filipino problems over Communist indoctrination. They have also demonstrated sensitivity to the effects of their operations on the populace with careful selection of targets, operations, and methods. CPP-NPA PSYOPS are more sophisticated, however, and the NPA used more sabotage than the Huks. Emphasizing security and counterintelligence, both the Huk and NPA organizations had good human intelligence networks. The NPA, however, has a far superior communications intelligence capability due to the capture of AFP radios. Both organizations maintain relatively strict discipline among members, and emphasize on-the-job training over formal schooling. Logistics, Communications, and External Support In the areas of finance and logistics, there are numerous similarities between the Huks and the NPA: 1)both had financial and logistic limitations; 2)both used extortion, robberies, and "taxation" to obtain funds; 3)raids, purchases, confiscation, an taxes were used to obtain weapons and supplies. The NPA, however, has more sophisticated weapons - more machineguns and grenade launchers - and uses more sophisticated methods for raising funds such as marijuana farms and the "taxation" of multinational firms. Both insurgent organizations have a shortage of communications gear, depend heavily on courier networks, and emphasize communications security. While neither has received any significant external support, the CPP has planned and organized for this contingency. It has a department dedicated to international liaison for future use. Conclusion There are numerous reasons for the failure of the Huk rebellion: effective counterinsurgency policies and reforms under Magsaysay; PKP and Huk leadership rifts; strategy and analysis failures by the Communists; and sound U.S. advice coupled with active support. Professor Alvin Scaff in The Philippine Answer to Communism (pages 122-123) showcases some of the reasons given by Huks who surrendered: 1)the hardship of guerrilla life on the insurgent and his or her family; 2)failures of the Huk organization to accelerate the progress of the revolution and disciplinary problems during the decline of the Huks; 3)opportunities offered by the government such as amnesty, and promises of land and employment. However, the main reason for the Huk decline is the effective internal defense and development program initiated by Ramon Magsaysay; by living up to its democratic principles, the government - at least temporarily - eliminated the "causes" that the Huks emploited. Despite these shortcomings, the Huks were almost successful in seizing national power in 1950. For the numerous reasons outlined previously, the original hypothesis holds true - the New People's Army potentially presents a more significant threat to the existing government than the Huk movement did to the three presidential administrations it fought. Outlook for the Future The CPP-NPA has acknowledged that it is not capable of toppling Marcos in the immediate future. The Philippine society has strong democratic values, but there are uncertainties over Marcos' succession. Professor David Rosenberg in his Problems of Communism article, summarizes this situation well: This combination of radical and popular insurgency comes at a particularly perilous time in Philippine politics. Few opportunities remain for moderate oppos- ition groups to play a major role in national politics. Marcos has dominated Philippine politics for so long that no single person or party has the stature to form an alternative, legitimate government. In the economic sphere, the austerity measures adopted in mid-1984 have not yet taken full effect. It is likely that economic growth will continue to be sluggish or even negative, leading to rising unemployment, greater hardship among the poor, declining living standards for the middle class, and bankruptcies and expatriation of resources by the wealthy. According to many economic analysts, the worst is yet to come. Therefore, when President Marcos does leave power, most likely in the next few years, it can be expected that the conflicts already evident will intensify. In that case, the major bene- ficiaries are likely to be the newly politicized mili- tary on the right and the newly strengthene CPP-NPA- NDF on the left. This could bring a sharp polarization of Philippine politics and, quite possibly, an escalat- ing spiral of political violence, with no clear solu- tion anywhere on the horizon. Problems of Communism, September/October 1984, pg.46. Economic issues, political and social reform will determine the future course of events. While the Philippine army has a legacy of successful counterinsurgency actions against the Huks, it must yet deal with severe structural and morale problems. The true strength of the NPA and its supporters will not be known until they are suppressed or win the final offensive. Regardless, the CPP and the NPA will afflict the future of the Philippines. Does the Filipino national anthem describe the "land of the morning, child of the sun returning," with prescience or hope? APPENDICES Click here to view image BIBLIOGRAPHY ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY A. PRIMARY SOURCES Abaya, Narciso, Lieutenant Colonel, Armed Forces of the Philippines, Assistant Army Attache to the United States. Personal interview. Arlington, Virginia, 15 February 1985. Baclagon, Uldarico S. Lessons from the Huk Campaign in the Philippines. Manila: M. Colcol and Company, 1956. An analysis by the faculty and students of the Philippine Army's Infantry School of counterinsurgency operations against the Huks. Guerrero, Amado, [Jose Maria Sison]. Philippine Society and Revolution. Oakland, California: International Association of Filipino Patriots, 1979. Third edition of Jose Maria Sison's views, written using his alias, of the Filipino "revolution" from the CPP Chairman's perspective in 1970. Also included is "Guerrero's" 1974 document, "Specific Characteristics of Our People's War." Lansdale, Edward G. In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia. New York: Harper and Row, 1972. A soldier-statesman's memoirs of his experiences in Southeast Asia, including his role as a military advisor in the Philippines during the Huk insurgency. Major General, U.S. Air Force (Ret.), former JUSMAG advisor to Philippine Defense Secretary Ramon Magsaysay. Personal interview. McLean, Virginia, 15 February 1985. Personal correspondence between General Lansdale and the writer. 28 March 1985. Moore, William C., Major General, U.S. Army, currently Director of Operations, Readiness, and Mobilization, and formerly of JUSMAG, Philippines. Personal interview. Arlington, Virginia, 15 February 1985. Osanka, Franklin M., ed. "Guerrilla Warfare Readings." Research memorandum of the Human Resources Research Office, George Washington University, prepared for the U.S. Department of the Army, 1962. A compendium of guerrilla warfare readings, containing an article on combatting the Huk insurgency by Luis A. Villa-Real. Pomeroy, William J. An American Made Tragedy: Neo-Colonialism and Dictatorship in the Philippines. New York: International Publishers, 1974. The former Huk, whose views are evident by the wording of the title, describes the communist liberation movement in the "neo-colonial settings in which a dictatorship has emerged in the Philippines." The Forest: A Personal Record of the Huk Guerrilla Struggle in the Philippines. New York: International Publishers, 1963. An American Communist who joined the Huks writes of his experiences with the movement from 1950-1952. Saulo, Alfredo B. Communism in the Philippines: An Introduction. Manila: Ateneo Publications Office, 1969. A primer on Communism in the Philippines written by a former labor union leader who joined the Huks from 1950 to 1958. Taruc, Luis. Born of the People. New York: International Publishers, 1953. Thoughts of the Huk leader during the insurgency. Generously edited by the Communist leadership with ideological insertions, this work is considered to be less representative of Taruc's true feelings than the following book. He Who Rides the Tiger: The Story of an Asian Guerrilla Leader. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. The autobiography of the leader of the Huk movement that describes the dynamics, organization and tactics of the Huks' guerrilla warfare and the factionalization among rebel leaders that contributed to the movement's downfall. Valeriano, Napoleon D. Text of a speech presented to the U.S. Army Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 2 October 1964. Interesting summary of the AFP experience against the Huks. and Charles T. R. Bohannan. Counterguerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962. A comprehensive analysis of counterguerrilla operations based on personal experiences in the Philippines. Willoughby, Charles A. The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines: 1941-1945. New York: Vantage Press, 1972. First of ten volumes in the Southwest Pacific Area Intelligence Services series by MacArthur's G-2. Detailed information on the wartime guerrilla movements. B. SECONDARY SOURCES "The Army Accuses," Asiaweek, 27 July 1984. The AFP claims that the Communists have infiltrated student and opposition organizations. Barrens, Clarence G. "I Promise: Magsaysay's Unique PSYOP 'Defeats' Huks." Thesis of the US Army Command & General Staff College, 1982. Examines Magsaysay's PSYWAR campaign against the Huks and asserts that this was the key to the counterinsurgency's success. Branigin, William. "Marcos Seen as Increasingly Isolated." The Washington Post, 9 March 1985. Marcos' current political crisis with the New People's Army and the Aquino assassination are this article's focus. "Rebel Filipinos Widen Scope of Drive on Army." The Washington Post, 3 December 1984. Looks at the increased New People's Army activity. Bunge, Frederica M., ed. Philippines: A Country Study. Washington: The American University, 1984. Area handbook on the Philippines, prepared under the Country Studies/Area Handbook Program. Contains useful background information on the Philippines and the insurgency. Buruma, Ian. "The Church Militant Takes On a New Meaning."Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 February 1985, pp. 77-79. A look at the growing radicalization of the Catholic Church in the Philippines. Chanda, Nayan. "A Gloomy View of Reform and Rebellion from the U.S." Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 August 1984, pp. 28-30. Article examining U.S. concern over the growth of the NPA insurgency. Comish, Leo S. Jr. "The United States and the Philippine Hukbalahap Insurgency: 1946-1954." Research paper of the U.S. Army War College, 1971. A review of U.S. policies and programs towards the Philippines during the Huk insurgency. Gador, Tirso H. "Insurgency and Subversion in a Developing Country: A Case Study in a Philippine Setting." Thesis of the U.S. Army Command & General Staff College, 1970. Surveys historical and present conditions in the Philippines to determine factors which gave rise to the Communist insurgency. "Generally On Course." Asiaweek, 9 November 1984, pp. 30-38. An approving view of recent political and military actions by the Philippine government. Gurr, Ted R. Why Men Rebel. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970. A historical study of the causes of rebellion. Jameson, John G. Jr. "The Philippine Constabulary as a Counterinsurgency Force, 1948-1954." Report of the Institute of Advanced Studies, U.S. Army War College, 1971. A study of the effectiveness of the Philippine Constabulary as a counterinsurgency force. Jenkins, David. "All the President's Men." Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 March 1983, pp. 15-21. Article examining the state of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Jones, Adrian H. and Andrew R. Molnar. "Internal Defense Against Insurgency: Six Cases." Report prepared by the Center of Research in Social Systems, The American University, for the U.S. Department of the Army, 1966. A review of the use of internal security forces (police, paramilitary, and military) in six counterinsurgency cases, including the Philippines. Kamaluddin, S. and Rodney Tasker. "Pressing the Point." Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 December 1983, p. 26. Article on the Moro insurgents that touches on the NPA. Kerkvliet, Benedict J. The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1977. A study of the Huk rebellion that seeks to understand the movement from the perspective of its participants and sympathizers. Kitson, Frank. Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peacekeeping. Harrisburg, Penn.: Stackpole Books, 1971. A military professional provides a framework for reviewing counterinsurgency operations. Lachica, Eduardo. The Huks: Philippine Agrarian Society in Revolt. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971. A journalist's investigation of the formation of the New People's Army in the Philippines in the late 1960's. Laqueur, Walter. Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1976. A respected scholar's critical interpretation of guerrilla theory and practice. Larkin, John A. The Pampangans: Colonial Society in a Philippine Province. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1972. A historical and sociological examination of the Philippine province of Pampanga. Lohr, Steve. "Twilight of the Marcos Era." New York Times Magazine, 6 January 1985, pp. 30-53. A Manila-based journalist's pessimistic view of the current economic and political crisis in the Philippines. Manning, Robert A. "The Philippines in Crisis." Foreign Affairs, Volume 63, No. 2 (Winter 1984/1985), 392-410. A journalist on international affairs, who visited the Philippines in April and May 1984, examines the economic, internal security, and political aspects of the Philippine crisis. Molnar, Andrew R., and others. "Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare. Report prepared by the Special Operations Research Office, The American University, for the U.S. Department of the Army, 1963. An examination of the roles, functions, and techniques of the underground in the Philippines and in other historical contexts. Moore, William C. "The Hukbalahap Insurgency, 1948-1954: An Analysis of the Roles, Missions, and Doctrine of the Philippine Military Forces." Report of the Institute of Advanced Studies, U.S. Army War College, 1971. A study of the actions of the adversaries to determine their strategies, doctrine, policies, and programs which contributed significantly to the outcome of the insurgency. Munro, Ross H. "Dateline Manila: Moscow's Next Win?" Foreign Policy, No. 56 (Fall 1984), 173-190. Pessimistic view of the current Philippine crisis by a frequent visitor to that country. "The NPA at 13: Bolder and Brighter." Asiaweek, 19 March 1982, p. 17. Short article examining the growth of the NPA. Nale, Antonio S. "Employment of Natives in Counterinsurgency Operations in the Philippines." Thesis of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1983. An investigation of the use of native forces in counterinsurgency operations in the Philippines in order to determine effective and ineffective employment roles. Nations, Richard. "The Consul's File." Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 August 1982, pp. 10-11. Alleged contents of a U.S. State Department assessment of the insurgency on Mindanao. Ocampo, Sheilah. "Angels of Death." Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 March 1982, pp. 21-22. Article on an unofficial, paramilitary unit conducting its own counterinsurgency effort against the Communists. "The Battle for Chico River." Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 October 1978, pp. 32-34. A government development project alienates locals, whom the New People's Army is attempting to recruit. "Breaching a Dam of Despair." Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 June 1980, pp. 23-24. Violence caused by the Philippine government's Chico River Dam project is the topic of this article. "Decimated - But It Won't Lie Down." Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 December 1978, p. 35. The New People's Army continues to spread its influence. "Eastern Davao is the Hot Spot as NPA Ambushes Claim More Victims." Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 March 1983, pp. 20-22. A region of Mindanao heats up with NPA activity. "Forcing the Pace of Pacification." Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 October 1978, pp. 14-15. Government forces focus on the New People's Army in the mountains of northeastern Luzon. "The Gun and the Crucifix." Far Eastern Economic Review 10 December 1982, pp. 38-39. Article on dissident clergy with insurgent connections. "Hearts, Minds, and Guns." Far Eastern Economic Review, 24 April 1981, pp. 20-23. The battle between government forces and the New People's Army continues on Mindanao. "An Island in Death's Shadow." Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 March 1981, pp. 30-33. The conflict between the NPA and government forces on Samar island is the subject of this article. "A Little Vietnam." Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 March 1982, pp. 38-40. Manila's efforts at combatting the NPA insurgency on Mindanao. "A New Role for the Forces." Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 October 1978, pp. 37-38. Marcos looks at changing the image of the armed forces. "Philippines: The Seven-Year Itch." Far Eastern Economic Review, 29 June 1979, pp. 24-27. A look at NPA expansion, especially on Samar. "Renewed Opposition." Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 May 1982, pp. 11-12. Marcos faces headaches, including the NPA insurgency. "The Samuroy Killings." Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 April 1982, p. 12. Article on the AFP shelling of a Samar village mistaken for an NPA camp. Peterson, A. H., ed. "Symposium on the Role of Airpower in Counterinsurgency and Unconventional Warfare: The Philippines Huk Campaign." RAND Corporation Report for the U.S. Air Force, 1963. A condensation of a RAND symposium on the role of airpower in counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare," conducted 16-18 January 1963. Discussion was led by Colonel Napoleon Valeriano, Philippine Army veteran of the Huk campaign. "Philippines Insurgency Cited." The Washington Post, 9 February 1985. An unidentified U.S. official comments on the NPA insurgency. "Republic of the Philippines." Journal of Defense and Diplomacy, February 1984, pp. 28-37. Profiles Philippine geography, history, demographics, government, internal security, armed forces, and economy. Rosenberg, David A., ed. Marcos and Martial Law in the Philippines. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1979. A collection of essays that examine the decline of constitutional democracy and the rise of authoritarian government in the Philippines under the martial law administration of President Ferdinand E. Marcos. "Communism in the Philippines." Problems of Communism, XXXIII (September/October 1984), 24-46. An informative article by a Philippine-follower that traces the Communist movement in the Philippines. Focuses on the avowedly Communist parties, insurgent groups, and front organizations. Saavedra, Ramberto B. "The Role of Civil Affairs in Counterinsurgency in the Philippines." Thesis of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1982. Study of the dangers posed by a Communist insurgency to the stability of the Philippines. Sacerdoti, Guy. "Marching to the Beat of an Opposition Drum."Far Eastern Economic Review, 24 May 1984, pp. 16-17. NPA activities at the time of the May 1984 elections. "Red 'Army' on the March." Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 June 1984, pp. 40-41. The New People's Army steps up its guerrilla war. Scaff, Alvin H. The Philippine Answer to Communism. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1955. Using interviews with ex-Huks, a description of how the young Philippine republic used "friendship and force" to defeat the Hukbalahap rebellion. Special emphasis on the army's EDCOR (Economic Development Corps) project. Scott, William H., III. "The Philippines: A Matter of Concern." Report of the U.S. Air War College, 1972. Examines the Philippine experience in dealing with the Huk insurgency and the renewal of a Communist insurgency in the 1960's and the early 1970's. Sens, Andrew D. "A Summary of the U.S. Role in Insurgency Situations in the Philippine Islands, 1899-1955." Report of the Special Operations Research Office, The American University, 1964. A contract report, in outline form, of US objectives, military experience, and lessons learned from Philippine insurgencies during 1899 to 1955. Prepared with the assistance of Charles Bohannan, who was an advisor to Philippine Defense Secretary Magsaysay. Smith, Robert A. Philippine Freedom: 1946-1958. New York: Columbia University Press, 1958. An examination of the first decade of Philippine independence, focusing on the origins of the Filipino concepts of independence and freedom and subsequent attempts to attain and maintain these concepts. Smith, Robert R. The Hukbalahap Insurgency: Economic, Political, and Military Factors. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Department of the Army, 1963. A detailed look at the counterinsurgency campaign against the Huks. Sun, Lena H. "Philippine Crisis Grows, Top U.S. Officials Warn." The Washington Post, 13 March 1985. Comments of U.S. officials before a foreign affairs subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives. Swarbrick, Reginald J. and James L Clark "The Evolution of Communist Insurgency in the Philippines." Report of the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1983. Traces the evolution of the Communist insurgencies in the Philippines from the 1920's to 1983. Tan, Abby. "Philippine Rebels Raise 'Taxes' on Business." The Washington Post, 9 March 1985. Recent fundraising efforts by the NPA intensify. Tasker, Rodney. "Calm on the Moro Front." Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 August 1984, pp. 29-30. Muslim insurgents, active in the mid-1970's, are now passive. "Elusive Law and Order." Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 July 1984, pp. 12-14. Article examining the expansion of the New People's Army on Mindanao. "A Lesson for the Teacher." Far Eastern Economic Review, 2 December 1977, pp. 14-17. Jose Maria Sison, Communist party chairman and former teacher, is captured by government forces. "Where Guerrillas Call the Tune." Far Eastern Economic Review, 11 August 1978, pp. 22-24. Communist insurgent gains on Mindanao are examined. "Words of Peace 'Futile.'" Far Eastern Economic Review, 25 November 1977, pp. 27-29. Short article on possible New People's Army-Moro National Liberation Front efforts at cooperation. Thompson, Robert. Revolutionary War in World Strategy. 1945-1969. New York: Taplinger Publishing Company, 1970. Final volume in Thompson's trilogy, that examines the use of revolutionary war as an instrument of policy in the world strategy of the USSR and China during the period of 1945- 1969. "Time to Get Tough." Asiaweek, 11 September 1981, pp. 26-37. Examines the growth of Philippine Communism, and includes an interview with captured NPA leader Commander Dante. Turpin, James A. "New Society's Challenge in the Philippines." Conflict Studies No. 122, The Institute for the Study of Conflict. London: The Eastern Press, 1980. The British Ambassador to the Philippines from 1972 to 1976 examines challenges to the Marcos regime, including the New People's Army and the Moros. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. The Situation in the Philippines. Staff report prepared by Frederick Z. Brown and Carl Ford, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess., October, 1984. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1984. Staff study prepared from 19 days of extensive interviews and travel in the Philippines during May-July 1984. Informative study, focusing on the current political crisis and the Communist insurgency. U.S. Department of State. "Recent Developments in the Philippines." Address of Paul Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 18 September 1984. Department of State Bulletin, Volume 84, No. 2092 (November 1984), 54-56. A diplomat's assessment of recent developments in the Philippines. Van Praagh, David. "After Marcos: Why the Military Could March In." Business Week, 17 January 1985, p. 48. The political problems of Marcos and the potential for a military succession. Vokey, Richard. "Assault on the Peaks of Power." Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 June 1980, pp. 24-29. The NPA's effective use of political education, integration, and guerrilla operations in pursuing its goals. "The People Who Said 'No.'" Far Eastern Economic Review, 24 April 1981, p. 24. The small, young Mindanao Alliance emerges against Marcos. and Sheilah Ocampo. "A Rising Tide of Violence."Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 March 1979, pp. 21-28. The NPA expands in northern Mindanao. Walton, John. Reluctant Rebels: Comparative Studies of Revolution and Underdevelopment. New York: Columbia University Press, 1984. A sociologist's historical analysis of the relationship between rebellion and underdevelopment in the Philippines, Colombia, and Kenya. Wurfel, David. "Martial Law in the Philippines: The Methods of Regime Survival." Pacific Affairs, Volume 50, No. 1 (Spring 1977), 5-30. Examines Marcos' efforts at maintaining regime stability since declaring martial law in 1972.
