The Huks And The New People's Army: Comparing Two Postwar Filipino Insurgencies CSC 1985 SUBJECT AREA General Marine Corps Command and Staff College Marine Corps Development and Education Command Quantico, Virginia 22134 THE HUKS AND THE NEW PEOPLE'S ARMY: COMPARING TWO POSTWAR FILIPINO INSURGENCIES By Major Rodney S. Azama, U.S. Army War Since 1945 Seminar and Symposium 1 April 1985 ABSTRACT Author: Azama, Rodney S., Major, U.S. Army Title: The Huks and the New People's Army: Comparing Two Postwar Filipino Insurgencies Date: 1 April 1985 Insurgencies are a popular form of modern warfare, and the Philippine government's suppression of the Huk rebellion - between 1946 and 1954 - is often cited as a model of effective counterinsurgency policies. While that rebellion was defeated, the Huks came fairly close to achieving success in 1950. In 1969, the newly-established Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) joined forces with the remnants of the Huk movement to form a new military arm - the New People's Army (NPA). Expanding continuously since its formation, the NPA currently is an internal security threat to the Philippine Republic. While the Marcos administration has downplayed the NPA threat, this guerrilla army may upset the future stability of the government. The intent of this paper is to compare and contrast the NPA with the almost successful Huks in order to test a hypothesis - that the New People's Army potentially presents a more significant threat to the existing government than the Huk movement did to the three presidential administrations it fought. Moving from a general overview of the two Communist movements to specific aspects of these insurgencies, this paper examines two guerrilla "armies" and related Communist parties. After an introduction, the study is divided into three sections, with the first (Chapter 1) briefly describing the Philippine setting and the wartime Hukbalahap resistance movement - the predecessor of the Huk guerrillas. A subsequent section (Chapters 2 and 3) traces the general history of both insurgencies. The final section analyzes specific aspects of these guerrilla movements: the Filipino environment with its causes and conditions (Chapter 4); the organization, composition, expansion and strength of the insurgents (Chapter 5); their strategy, doctrine, and operations (Chapter 6); the movements' logistics, communications, and external support (Chapter 7). The two insurgencies had similar causes and faced problem-ridden government organizations and forces. However, the implementation of more rational counterinsurgency policies by Ramon Magsaysay (He became the defense secretary in 1950) turned the situation around. Magsaysay instituted significant internal defense and development programs. By 1954, the Huk rebellion was essentially suppressed. The current Marcos regime has not pursued such an effective counterinsurgency program. Although the present size of the Filipino military organization is much larger than during the time of the Huks, other government weaknesses persist. In addition, the recent Aquino assassination has resulted in a political polarization - moving "moderates" toward the radical left. There are significant differences in the insurgent organizations: the CPP-NPA organization is more sophisticated, having a united front notably stronger than that of the Huks aud their Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP); the CPP-NPA leadership is younger, sophisticated, and more radical; the CPP enjoys a much closer relationship with the NPA; and while both insurgent groups had large mass bases, the CPP-NPA mass organization has a more diverse membership. Although the number of armed NPA guerrillas now approximates the peak strength of the Huks, the NPA has expanded into almost all areas of the country while the Huks were essentially limited to Luzon island. In addition, the NPA appears to have some links with another Filipino insurgent organization - the Moro National Liberation Front. While both the Huks and the NPA followed a Maoist strategy, the NPA has adapted Communist doctrine to specific conditions in the Philippines. The Huks overestimated their military capabilities and sought an "early seizure of power in 1950"; NPA leaders are more patient and pragmatic. Although there are similarities in both groups' operations - as far as size of operations, types, target selectivity, training, and discipline - the NPA employs more sabotage and has displayed a deeper understanding of urban guerrilla warfare and psychological operations. Unlike the Huks, the NPA is formally employed as an organizing and propaganda force - in addition to being a fighting arm. Both groups were plagued with logistical difficulties, but the NPA possesses more firepower and employs more sophisticated methods of obtaining funds. The NPA also has better communication systems available. Neither the NPA nor the Huks received any significant external support, although the CPP-NPA has planned and organized for this future contingency. While it is difficult to compare separate organizations at different points in time, it appears that the New People's Army potentially presents a more significant threat to the existing Philippine government than the Huks did during the 1950 to 1954 period. There is still time, however, for the government to introduce much-needed reforms and programs to defeat this ongoing insurgency. This study utilized both published and unpublished sources. While there is no shortage of material on the Huk rebellion, much less information is available on the New People's Army. Although many have examined the Huks in retrospective, there were no detailed studies that drew parallels between the Huk and NPA insurgencies. Primary sources utilized consisted of personal interviews, speeches and books by participants, published memoirs, and other publications. Secondary sources consisted of research papers, government studies, books, journals, and other periodicals. "WE ARE PEASANTS" We are what they call mere peasants; Who were created by God in sincere love; We who live by our own toil, We are those peasants, always in poverty, always sacrificing; No rest from work, suffer more and more, While others depend on us. We are peasants who always wear shorts, We work in rain or shine without resting; We are the planters who show no fear, Who prepare the land with carabao, plow, and rake; We are those planting with bended bodies, Mud to our knees on rainy days. When we peasants quit working, All will go hungry and the nation will cry; Those who are selfish and usurpers, Only pretend they know poor people's feelings; That is why we peasants and all workers, All act together to DRAG DOWN THE DEMON! (A Filipino peasant song sung by Huk rebels) *Benedict Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 132. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Chapter LIST OF FIGURES vii A. INTRODUCTION 1 B. BACKGROUND 1. The Setting 8 C. THE INSURGENCIES 2. The PKP and the Huk Rebellion 18 3. The CPP and the New People's Army 26 D. AN ANALYSIS: COMPARING & CONTRASTING THE INSURGENCIES 4. The Environment: Insurgency Causes and Conditions 37 5. Organization, Composition, and Strength 59 6. Strategy, Doctrine, and Operations 127 7. Logistics, Communications and External Support 184 E. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 199 APPENDICES A. Chronology of Key Events 208 B. Glossary of Abbreviations 215 C. Map of the Philippine Provinces 218 D. By-Laws of the Hukbalahap, 1942 219 E. Constitution of the PKP, 1946 223 F. Constitution and By-Laws of the HMB, 1950 227 G. Programme for a People's Democratic Revolution 230 H. The New People's Army (document) 240 I. Basic Rules of the New People's Army 248 ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 254 LIST OF FIGURES Page Figure 1. Philippines in its Asian Setting 9 2. Geographic Setting of the Philippines 10 3. Cultural-Linguistic Groups 12 4. The Central Plain of Luzon 39 5. Percentage of Cultivated Land Farmed by Tenants 40 6. National Organization of the PKP 60 7. The Military Organization of the PKP 62 8. Hukbalahap Squadrons and Their General Locations 64 9. The Regional Commands of the Huks 65 10. The Organization Department of the PKP 68 11. The Education Department of the PKP 70 12. The Finance Department of the PKP 71 13. Party Control of Finances through Interconnections 72 14. Estimates of Huk Strength, 1942-1970 82 15. Huklandia, 1946 83 16. Huklandia, 1950 85 17. CPP-NPA Organizational Structure 87 18. The Party (CPP) and Army (NPA) Relationship 90 19. Organization of the Philippine Government 91 20. People's Organizing Group 93 21. NPA Guerrilla Formations and Territorial Jurisdiction 96 22. Agricultural Activity 113 23. Guerrilla Activity, 1980 114 24. Guerrilla Activity, 1983 117 25. Estimates of NPA Strength, 1984 118 26. Curriculum for Huk Schools 145 27. Huk Incidences, 1962-1969 154 28. Growth of the New People's Army, 1969-1979 161 29. Chart of NPA Strategy 165 30. NPA Propaganda Themes as Defined by the NPA 172 INTRODUCTION I know now from experience that the nationalism of the Communists is indeed opportunism, and that they use it for their own ends. Any nationalist who makes an ally of the Communist is going for a ride on a tiger. We must learn from our lessons in the past, and this is one that nationalists need to remember today, when once again the Communists are trying to use them. Former Huk leader Luis Taruc in He Who Rides the the Tiger: The Story of an Asian Guerilla Leader You do not kill Communism with the sword and gun alone. Communism is an idea. When a man in a rice paddy with a hungry belly, working on land which is not his - in debt, and his children hungry too - when a man in that position hears somebody say: 'The land belongs to the man who works it - come with us and we will give it to you!' then my friend, something happens. To that man, it is a cool wind blowing through a hell on earth. Ramon Magsaysay in 1953 Revolutionary Warfare Sir Robert Thompson in Revolutionary War in World Strategy, 1945-1969, defines this form of warfare as one "which enables a small ruthless minority to gain control by force over the people of a country and thereby to seize power by violent and unconstitutional means." He characterizes modern revolutionary war as being three-phased, consisting of an initial defensive phase, a second phase that seeks to obtain a point of equilibrium or stalemate with the government, and a final offensive phase. Thompson also differentiates revolutionary war from conventional warfare, partisan warfare, coups d'etat, and other forms of warfare.1 The Huk Rebellion of 1946-1954 and the ongoing New People's Army insurgency in the Philippines could be categorized as two cases of revolutionary warfare. Both illustrate a form of warfare that is growing increasingly prevalent in modern times. While numerous instances of revolutionary warfare have occurred in southeast Asia, the Philippine insurgencies may be instructive due to the characteristics of that country. Unique Characteristics of the Philippines As Professor David Rosenberg points out, the Philippines has long been regarded as an exceptional case in southeast Asia. It never had a monarchy or any extensive, centralized city- states. It was not noticeably affected by Hindu or Confucian ideas. The Philippines were colonized twice - by Spain and the United States - over three and a half centuries. The Spanish legacy made the Philippines the only predominately Christian country in Asia, and American influence left English as a first national language. Political independence was accepted, essentially without violence, by an established indigenous elite that emerged under a paternalistic American rule.2 In addition, the Philippines is the only independent nation that is a former American colony.3 On the other hand, the country shares several basic characteristics with the rest of southeast Asia. The kinship group is the basic unit of society and the overwhelming majority of the population lives in relatively isolated rural areas. The Philippines remained a diverse collection of ethnolinguistic regions until colonial rule imposed uniform authority within territorial boundaries. There was frequent resistance to colonial rule in the country, and Filipino nationalists were the first in Asia to declare their independence from Western colonial rule.4 Pertinence of the Filipino Insurgency Experience The success of the Philippine government in suppressing the Huk rebellion - between 1946 and 1954 - is often cited as a model of effective counterinsurgency policies. While that rebellion was defeated, the Huks came fairly closely to achieving success in 1950. In 1969, the newly-established Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) joined forces with the remnants of the Huk movement to form a new military arm - the New People's Army (NPA). Expanding continuously since its formation, the NPA currently is an internal security threat to the Philippine Republic. Because of national security-related links and a longstanding historical relationship with the Philippines, U.S. officials are obviously concerned with the recent trend of events in that country. While the Marcos administration has downplayed the NPA threat, this guerrilla army may upset the future stability of the Philippine government. The intent of this paper is to compare and contrast the NPA with the almost successful Huks in order to test a hypothesis - that the New People's army potentially presents a more significant threat to the existing government than the Huk movement did to the three presidential administrations that it fought. In this context, the term "Huks," while originally applied to the World War Two Hukbalahap (Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon or People's Army against the Japanese) resistance movement, has evolved as a generic term that is also applied to the postwar Hukbalahap and HMB movement (In 1948, the Hukbalahap were renamed the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB) or People's Liberation Army). Scope of the Study While the purpose of this study is to examine the two guerrilla armies, it must necessarily also examine their related Communist parties and mass organizations. Especially with Communist organizations, one cannot simply examine one organ in isolation. Although this paper does not focus on Filipino counterinsurgency operations, the evolution of Filipino Communism, or political, economic, and social factors in the Philippines, these will be briefly discussed due to their pertinence. Moving from a general overview of the two Communist movements to specific aspects of these insurgencies, this study is divided into three sections. The first (Chapter 1) briefly describes the Philippine setting and the wartime Hukbalahap resistance movement - the predecessor of the Huk guerrillas. A subsequent section (Chapters 2 and 3) traces the general history of both insurgencies. The final section analyzes specific aspects of these guerrilla movements: the Filipino environment with its causes and conditions (Chapter 4); the organization, composition, expansion and strength of the insurgents (Chapter 5); their strategy, doctrine and operations (Chapter 6); the movements' logistics, communications, and external support (Chapter 7). Lastly, a summary and conclusions are presented. Sources Used in the Study This study utilized both unpublished and published sources. While there is no shortage of material on the Huk rebellion, much less information is available on the New People's Army - a clandestine and security-conscious organization. Significant information gaps exist on the current, internal workings of the NPA and its related Communist organizations. Although many have examined the Huks in retrospective, there were no detailed studies that drew parallels between the Huk and NPA insurgencies. Hopefully, this study is a first step in that direction. Primary sources used consisted of personal interviews, speeches by participants, official publications, and published books and memoirs. Secondary sources consisted of research papers, government studies, books, periodicals, and journals. An annotated bibliography is included at the end of this study. Useful Appendices Several appendices are included that may prove valuable to the reader. A general chronology of significant events is included as Appendix 1 and may prove useful in placing the numerous events in chronological perspective. With the proliferation of Filipino government, Communist, and related organizations, various abbreviations and acronyms are necessary; these are listed in Appendix 2. As one examines the significant expansion of the New People's Army and geographical locations are referred to, Appendix 3 - a map of the Philippine provinces - may prove useful. In addition, several Huk, NPA, and party documents are included as appendices. NOTES 1Robert Thompson, Revolutionary War in World Strategy, 1945-1969 (New York: Taplinger Publishing Company, 1970), pp. 4, 15-17. 2David Rosenberg, ed., Marcos and Martial Law in the Philippines (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1979), p. 14. 3Ross Munro, "Dateline Manila: Moscow's Next Win?" Foreign Policy, No. 56 (Fall 1984), 187. 4Rosenberg, pp. 14-15. BACKGROUND CHAPTER 1 THE SETTING The United States occupation of the Philippines was a half century of compromise. It was a compromise between claims of jingoistic American imperialism at the turn of the century, and the ideals of Filipino nationalism..." Onofre D. Corpuz in The Philippines Some Huks were recognized despite the official anti-Huk attitude of the American Army...In the main, however, recognition was never extended as a policy to the Hukbalahap." Huk leader Luis Taruc in Born of the People Geography and Topography The Republic of the Philippines comprises some 7,100 islands extending about 1,100 miles from north to south, separating the South China Sea from the Philippine Sea (see Figure 1 - Philippines in Its Asian Setting). These islands cover a total land area of about 16,000 square miles. The two largest islands - Luzon and Mindanao - comprise about 65 per cent of the total land area. The large Philippine archipelago embraces some 520,700 square miles of land and sea (see Figure 2 - Geographic Setting).1 Over 95 percent of the population is concentrated on 11 larger islands. Seven large islands and over 3,000 islets form the central Visayan Group - between Luzon and Mindanao - which comprises 19 percent of the Philippine's total land area.2 Manila, the largest city, is also the capital. The topography of the Philippines is largely mountainous, creating narrow coastal plains and interior valleys and plains. Major plains include those of central Luzon, the Cagayan valley of Click here to view image northeastern Luzon, the Agusan Basin on the southern island of Mindanao, and the coastal plains of Cebu. These are the most densely settled regions. Much of the country is covered with lush tropical forests and jungles that benefit from heavy rains. About 38 percent of the land has been cleared for cultivation and another 7 percent is used for pasturage.3 The Philippines lie entirely in the tropics. The tropical climate is governed by the northeast and the southwest monsoons, with three main seasons: the wet, typhoon season from June through October; the cool,dry season from November through February; and the hot, dry season from March through May. Seasonal variations in temperature are relatively minor. The country's rivers, which are generally short and shallow, are prone to seasonal flooding.4 Demographics of the Philippines The population of over fifty-three million includes numerous cultural and linguistic groups (Filipino tribal groups are depicted in Figure 3) Filipinos are principally a blend of Malay, Chinese, Spanish, Negrito, and American stock. Social cleavages are based mainly on religious (Muslims versus lowland Christians), sociocultural (upland tribes versus lowlanders), and urban-rural differences rather than ethnic or racial ones. The overwhelming majority of Filipinos are descendants of Malayo-Polynesian peoples who migrated from the southeast Asian mainland and Indonesia. Christian Malays make up 91.5 percent of the population, and Muslim Moros comprise the remaining 4.5 percent of ethnic Malayans. Those of Chinese descent make up Click here to view image one-third of the non-Malayan minority, and about 20,000 aboriginal Negritos live in the remote interior of the country.5 Growing at a recent average rate of 2.5 percent a year, the population has an average density of 421 inhabitants per square mile. Over 60 percent of the population lives in rural areas, although migration to the cities continues. More than half of the population (54.4 percent) is found on the island of Luzon. Approximately 43 percent of all Filipinos are less than 14 years old.6 Pilipino, a variant of the Tagalog people of southern Luzon and Mindoro, is the official language. English, the second official language, is widely understood. Other diverse languages, such as Ilocano and Cebuano, are spoken. Among some elements of the populations, knowledge of Spanish and Arabic is significant. About 85 percent of the population is Roman Catholic, but a strong Filipino Muslim minority (Moros) makes Islam important in the southern part of the archipelago. Literacy is estimated at over 89 percent.7 Origins of the Huk Rebellion Before examining post-World War Two Communist insurgency movements in the Philippines, it is useful to examine the roots of insurgency. The events which led to the Huk insurgency can be traced to activities of Communist organizers in the Philippines during the 1920s and 1930s. The Communist movement began during this period as an urban political party inspired by the Comintern. The Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) was founded on 7 November 1930 by Crisanto Evangelista. The PKP focused on organizing Filipino industrial workers, and on 7 November 1938, it merged with the Philippine Socialist Party. For about thirty years after this merger, the PKP was, virtually, the only radical party in the country.8 However, this merger was not a "complete" one. The emphasis was on the formulation of a united front, and ignored doctrinal and ideological differences. Both original parties retained some structural integrity, with the "complete" organizational merger planned to take place gradually. Two fundamentally different trends of thought would remain among the leadership, a factor that proved important later.9 With the onset of World War Two and the almost immediate Japanese invasion of the Philippines, the PKP joined forces with an agrarian protest movement in central Luzon to form a military branch of the PKP. This military organization was formally launched on 29 March 1942 as the Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon (People's Army Against Japan), whose abbreviation was "Hukbalahap." The Huks, as they were popularly known, emerged as a large resistance movement against the Japanese. Luis Taruc was selected to lead the Huks. Initially organized as five squadrons of 100 men each, the Huks - using mountain bases - operated in rice paddies and sugarcane fields north of Manila. Successful in recruiting and in extending operations into other areas of Luzon, the Huks increased their strength to about 10,000 men by March of 1943.10 The Huks' partial success was due to political and military factors. Politically, the Communists created a clandestine civil administration in the barrios (hamlets) and towns of provinces where their forces operated. Its base structure was the Barrio United Defense Corps (BUDC) with a membership of 5 to 12 persons in each barrio. The BUDC carried out recruiting, intelligence, logistics, and civil justice functions. Initial guerrilla training was conducted at training camps, known as "Stalin's University," by veterans of the Chinese Communist 8th Route Army. Later, the Chinese became disenchanted with the Huks and formed an all-Chinese force of their own, operating close to Manila. Huk forces attacked Japanese garrisons, patrols, and convoys, and waged a war of attrition against the "puppet" Filipino Constabulary. The Japanese Imperial Army retaliated in the spring of 1943, beseiging the Huk stronghold of Mount Arayat for ten days, capturing or killing many of the Huk leaders. The remaining Huks went underground and reorganized, focusing on political control of main Huk areas. Many clashes with other Filipino guerrilla forces ensued. It is estimated that of the 25,000 killed by the Huks during that war, only about 5,000 were Japanese.11 NOTES 1Frederica Bunge, ed., Philippines: A Country Study (Washington: The American University, 1984), p. xiv. 2"Republic of the Philippines," Journal of Defense and Diplomacy, February 1984, p. 28. 3Bunge, p. xiv; "Republic of the Philippines," p.29. 4Ibid. 5Bunge, p. xiv; "Republic of the Philippines," p. 30. 6Ibid. 7Bunge, p. xiv. 8U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The Situation in the Philippines, Staff Report by Frederick Brown and Carl Ford, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess., October, 1984 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 22; David Rosenberg, "Communism in the Philippines," Problems of Communism, XXXIII (September/October 1984), 30. 9Luis Taruc, He Who Rides the Tiger: The Story of an Asian Guerrilla Leader (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), pp. 17-19. 10Edward Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 6-7. 11Lansdale, pp. 7-8. THE INSURGENCIES CHAPTER 2 THE PKP AND THE HUK REBELLION The situation here is critical, it does not at this moment seem possible for the Filipino people, ravaged and demoralized by the cruellest and most destructive of wars, politically split between the loyalists and enemy collabo- rators, with several sizeable well-armed dissident groups still at large, to cope with the coincidence of political independence and the tremendous economic demands of re- habilitation. Paul V. McNutt, U.S. High Commissioner to the Philippines, January 1946. Any democratic government is neither of necessity nor automatically better in the eyes of comman man than a Communistic government. In order to stamp out Communism, the local government must clean its own house. A status quo that has bred virulent Communism cannot remain un- changed. Communism seldom flourishes where the people are content and prosperous basically." Ramon Magsaysay The Rebellion Begins The PKP and the Hukbalahap began the postwar period with much greater strength than they had possessed in the 1930s. Both organizations had greatly enlarged memberships and had attained full legal status. The association of Huk veterans had about 16,000 fully-armed members. The PKP-associated peasant union, the Pambansang Kaisahan ng Magbubukid (PKM) had local branches in almost every town and barrio in southern and central Luzon. The allied Congress of Labor Organiations (CLO) controlled unions in all the major industries in Panay and Manila, representing most of the organized labor force in Manila. PKP influence was also strong in other labor organizations, such as the Philippine Government Employees Association (PGEA). The PKP-led political party, the Democratic Alliance, won six congressional seats in the 1946 elections. One of these seats was won by Luis Taruc, leader of the Huks. These elected candidates were not allowed to take office, however, due to evidence of Huk terrorism to influence the electorate.1 The Democratic Alliance candidates and the central Luzon farmers they represented were also partly targets of a campaign by local landlords to overcome wartime agrarian policies implemented by the Huks. When many landlords abandoned their lands physically during the war, their tenants took over the abandoned farms and defended them. Jose Lava, Secretary of Organization for the PKP, advocated armed struggle to resist efforts by the landlords and their armed guards to reimpose the status quo ante. The peasants, who constituted the bulk of the wartime Huk movement, were organized, well-armed, and experienced in battle. The new government of the Philippine Republic was weak and discredited by overblown charges of collaboration with the Japanese. Pedro Castro, head of the PKP, and most other members of the PKP's Central Committee publicly favored fighting for control via a parliamentary struggle. However, by the time that the Central Committee had met to resolve this issue, many peasants and PKP members were taking up arms and disappearing underground.2 The Early Huks In 1946, the wartime Hukbalahap organization was reacti- vated. Luis Taruc, the Huk leader, stated later in his memoirs that most of the Huk rank-and-file initially did not view the insurgency as a "military rebellion," but as "resistance to the resurgent reaction" of the government. First to rejoin the fight were the Hukbalahap veterans and the Huk force soon had 10,000 fully-armed fighters, with 2,000 organizers, activists, and sympathizers. The insurgent forces were on the defensive initially, executing limited attacks occasionally to maintain morale. By 1948, the Huks were getting stronger. A government amnesty declared by President Quirino that year proved unsuccessful and the insurgency continued.3 The Peak of the Huk Rebellion By 1949, the Huks had an army of 12,000 to 13,000 regulars, with the support of over 100,000 peasants in central Luzon. While the Huk stronghold was central Luzon, there were Huk supporters in the Cagayan Valley, and in the Visayas. The Filipino government had responded to the Huks with a "mailed fist" policy of suppression, scorched earth tactics, cordon and search operations, and heavy reliance on mortars and artillery. Massacres of peasants, theft, rape, burning and looting by government forces helped to expand Huk membership during this period. Government forces were relatively undisclined and inept. The Communist leadership of the insurgency began to assert the initiative.4 When the PKP publicly announced its support for the Huks in 1948, the Huks were renamed the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB) or the People's Liberation Army. Government graft and corruption was so widespread that national elections held in 1949 were declared scandalous and conceded to be fraudalent. By this time also, a leadership split became evident between the more ideological "Communists" and some of their more "socialist" brothers in the PKP. "Nationalism" versus "Communism" became an issue. The expulsion of Yugoslavia's President Josef Broz Tito at the this time resulted in the labelling of Luis Taruc and other "nationalists" as "Titoists."5 By 1950, PKP leader Jose Lava declared that a revolutionary situation existed and the PKP should plan for an "early seizure of power." By this time, the HMB consisted of three types of forces: 1)mobile striking units operating as a regular military force; 2)seven regional commands; 3)a local self-defense corps. In January 1950, the PKP adopted a series of policies based on its overly-optimistic view of the situation. The Politburo decided to avoid tactical alliances with other groups opposed to the unpopular government of President Elpidio Quirino, essentially abandoning its legal mass organizations and efforts at parliamentary struggle. The PKP also began a very rapid, over- ambitious membership drive in a "geometric expansion" program. PKP leader Jose Lava directed all PKP and HMB members to recruit at least three other members every three months, starting in July 1950 and continuing until September 1951. According to this, the PKP would increase in size from 3,500 to 50,000 members and the HMB would increase to over 170,000. As a consequence, the PKP and HMB were opened to various opportunistic and disgruntled elements of Philippine society. Poorly-motivated and poorly- trained recruits entered the organizations and some recruits were sent to regions where they had few local ties. These developments weakened PKP and HMB discipline, and caused the organizations to lose popular support. Some HMB leaders, such as Luis Taruc, disagreed with Lava's 1950 Politburo Resolutions.7 As part of the PKP plan for an early seizure of power, the small, mobile guerrilla units of the HMB were reorganized into larger units. The HMB thus greatly increased its logistical requirements and could no longer rely heavily on local peasant support for material needs. Special food production and procurement units became necessary. The improved effectiveness of Philippine Army intelligence, largely due to JUSMAG assistance, also made it easier for the government to locate HMB units. To demonstrate HMB power, a number of raids on major cities and constabulary camps were conducted to commemorate important dates in the revolutionary movement. Jose Lava, the PKP leader called these "dress rehearsals of greater things to come."8 The Beginning of the Decline By mid-1950, the HMB controlled central and southern Luzon. It was on the Manila outskirts, anxious for the expected urban uprising. But the HMB was still not strong enough. Poor coordination between the HMB and the PKP organizations existed within the city. This was exacerbated by the leadership schism, but the PKP Politburo went ahead with plans. However, on 18 October 1950, Jose Lava and several other Politburo members were arrested in Manila - along with numerous plans and documents - while planning major "dress rehearsal" raids on the city.9 Based on American advice, Quirino had appointed on 31 August 1950 a Congressman from Zambales, Ramon Magsaysay, to be Secretary of National Defense. With the assistance of two U.S. intelligence advisors, Colonel Edward Lansdale and Major Charles Bohannan, Magsaysay had implemented numerous intelligence reforms and had a personal role in the Politburo capture. The two officers were part of the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG). One of President Quirino's earlier acts - following JUSMAG advice - was a reorganization of the entire armed forces of the country. The Constabulary was placed under the Defense Department, with many of its members transferred to the regular army. Quirino also formed twenty-six battalion combat teams (BCT's) - totalling about 26,000 men - as the core of the new counterinsurgency force. Total government fighting strength (regular army and Constabulary) was about 30,000 men.11 Magsaysay dismissed incompetent and corrupt army officers, and made provisions to ensure honest elections. Resettlement areas for surrendered and captured Huks were established under the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR) program. Habeas corpus was suspended in order to detain government officials suspected of corruption, as well as suspected Communists and sympathizers. Magsaysay expanded the counter- insurgency program even further after his election to the Presidency in 1953. In 1954, Huk leader Luis Taruc surrendered and the rebellion essentially came to an end.12 The End of the Rebellion By 1954, the HMB had suffered defeats on the battlefield and the erosion of popular support after Magsaysay's successful counterinsurgency programs. Dr. Jesus Lava, who had succeeded his brother as PKP Secretary General after his capture in 1950, finally acknowledged the futility of his plan for an early seizure of power and proclaimed a strategic return to the format of parliamentary struggle. At this time, there were very few party members left for the pursuit of open, legal activities. Many had abandoned mass organizations in 1950, when Jose Lava first declared his plan for an early seizure of power. The shift to parliamentary struggle was blocked, however, by the Anti-Subversion Law, which declared the communist party and its affiliates illegal and imposed stiff penalties on party mem- bers.13 The Anti-Subversion Law contained a one-month grace period during which PKP and HMB members were encouraged to surrender in exchange for amnesty. Recognizing defeat, Lava urged party members to "return to civilian life" during the grace period. He also effectively disbanded the PKP party structure by ending the collective, or cell-unit, membership requirement. Thereafter, party members were expected to use their own initiatives. Jesus Lava was only able to exercise his leadership by issuing ineffective "political transmissions," occasional statements analyzing the political situation and prescribing courses of action. Under the new "single file policy," political transmissions were passed verbally from one party member to another, one at a time. Lava's actions ended almost all political activity by the PKP and party organizations essentially ceased to function. For all practical purposes, the PKP had succeeded in self-liquidation.14 NOTES 1David Rosenberg, "Communism in the Philippines," Problems of Communism, XXXIII (September/October 1984), 31; letter from General Edward Lansdale, formerly of JUSMAG, Philippines, 28 March 1985. 2Ibid. 3Luis Taruc, He Who Rides the Tiger: The Story of an Asian Guerrilla Leader (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), pp. 27-29. 4Taruc, pp. 36-38, 43, 45; Eduardo Lachica, The Huks: Philippine Agrarian Society in Revolt (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 5. 5Taruc, pp. 58-60. 6Adrian Jones and Andrew Molnar, "Internal Defense Against Insurgency: Six Cases" (Report prepared by the Center of Research in Social Systems of The American University for the Department of the Army, 1966), p. 40. 7Taruc, p. 73; Rosenberg, p. 31. 8Rosenberg, p. 31; Lansdale letter. 9Taruc, p. 67; Rosenberg, p. 31, 10Rosenberg, p. 32; Lansdale letter. 11Andrew Molnar and others, "Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare" (Report prepared by the Special Operations Research Office of The American University for the Department of the Army, 1963), pp. 314-315; Lansdale letter. 12Molnar and others, p. 315. 13Rosenberg, p. 32. 14Ibid. CHAPTER 3 THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES (CPP) AND THE NEW PEOPLE'S ARMY (NPA) We would be far from wise if we thought, as many would like to think today, that our Communist problem here had ended with the surrender of Taruc or will end with the cap- ture, death, or surrender of the other Communist leaders. Communists are Communists. They have a way of shifting with ease from surface activities to underground movement, depend- ing on the exigencies of the situation they are in...They will seek to associate with worthy causes. They will adopt misleading party names and alliances. They will maintain the 'hardcore' of membership. They will enhance hatred and promote strikes and violence. They will resort to sabotage. They will seek to divide us. Above all, they will infiltrate into the government, universities, civic organizations, even churches. That is the usual Communist pattern..." Major General Jesus Vargas, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines The people are to the army (guerrillas) what water is to fish. General Vo Nguyen Giap in People's War, People's Army The Beginning of the CPP By the 1960s, the PKP was largely inactive except for a few renegade units degenerating into criminal bands. These practiced extortion and banditry, mainly in the hills of central Luzon. Most notable among them was the Sumulong Gang, a group of Huk remnants led by Commander Sumulong. Sumulong broke away from the PKP and set up prostitution, gambling, and other criminal activities in Angeles City, nearby Clark Air Base.1 During the 1960s, many of the HMB members returned to the central Luzon countryside from whence they had come. By 1968, most of the original Huk leaders had been captured or made their own peace with the government. The insurgency, without leader- ship, seemed on the brink of extinction. Instead, a new genera- tion of leaders was emerging among the Communists.2 This movement had roots in Filipino college campuses in the late 1950s, when students supported Senator Claro Recto, an unsuccessful 1957 Presidential candidate who had espoused a more militant nationalism criticizing the "subservient" policy of the Philippines towards the United States. U.S. "imperialism" continued to be a campus rallying cry in the 1960s, and this was influenced by other events of the time: the Cuban revolution; the assassination of Patrice Lumumba; the escalation of the war in Vietnam, and the rise of the Sukarno government in Indonesia. This new generation of Filipinos had little or no recollection of the painful Japanese occupation nor fond memories of U.S. assistance during the war or in the immediate postwar period.3 Indignation in the academic community over an investi- gation by the Philippine House of Representatives into accusations of Communist subversion on the campus of the University of the Philippines led to the establishment of the Students' Cultural Association of the University of the Philippines (SCAUP) in the early 1960's. An English literature instructor at the University of the Philippines, Jose Maria Sison, was one of the leaders. In November 1964, a new youth movement, the Kabataan Makabayan (Nationalist Youth) or KM was organized, with Sison as national chairman. Other organizations were formed, including some with PKP leadership. These included a peasant federation (MASAKA), a labor organization (Lapiang Manggagawa), and a Philippine chapter of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation. In February 1967, the Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism (MAN) was organized as a coalition of opposition nationalist groups. Old and new members circulated at PKP meetings, where sharp generational differences emerged among the political activists. The older leaders, mostly of peasant background, had tasted defeat in the 1950s and tended to be more cautious and bureaucratic. The younger members, primarily intellectuals and urban workers, were more daring and were inspired by revolutionary successes in China, Cuba, and Vietnam.4 Jose Sison was commissioned to prepare a draft PKP study to guide future policy. He wrote, criticizing Jose Lava for the "early seizure of power" strategy, and exoriating Jesus Lava for the "single-file" policy. PKP followers of Lava, suspicious of Sison and other junior PKP members, expelled them from the PKP in April 1967. Sison formed his own provisional Politburo and issued his first public statement on May Day, 1967. On December 26, 1968, Sison formally established the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). Citing the "death" of the PKP in 1957, the CPP felt that it was necessary to "re-establish" the Communist Party. Sison naturally became chairman of the CPP.5 CPP leaders, unlike their pro-Moscow predecessors in the PKP, looked to China and Mao Tse-tung for a model agrarian revolution to inspire and guide. A 1969 CPP document entitled, "Programme of a People's Democratic Revolution" (See Appendix G) stated: The Communist Party of the Philippines is now re-estab- lished and rebuilt as a party of Mao Tse-tung's thought. It is the most advanced detachment of the Filipino working class leading the Philippine revolution forward. It strives to be a well-disciplined Party armed with the theory of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought, using the methods of criticism and self-criticism and linked with the masses of the people. It wields the two weapons of armed struggle and the national united front to deal death blows to U.S. imperialism and feudalism. These leaders were primarily teachers, students, and other intellectuals involved in protest activities in and around metropolitan Manila. Their educational achievements and middle- class backgrounds differed from the majority of the traditional Huks from peasant backgrounds in central Luzon.6 The Establishment of the New People's Army CPP leaders now faced a fundamental problem - they advocated a peasant-based revolutionary strategy, but had no peasant base. While well-schooled in Maoist theory, the leadership had no experience in guerrilla warfare. Within a few months, however, the CPP was able to obtain the support of a group of peasant guerrillas under the command of Bernabe Buscayno - alias Commander Dante - an HMB cadre who had rebelled from the increasingly criminal activities of Commander Sumulong. Together Sison and Dante formed the New People's Army (NPA) on March 29, 1969.7 Better educated than most Huks, the ambitious Dante per- ceived the union as a means of consolidating and expanding his influence at the expense of older leaders in the HMB. Dante also appeared to be impressed with the ideological fervor and persuasiveness of CPP leadership. He accepted NPA subordination to CPP control and allowed the civilian cadre to dominate the CPP-NPA Central Committee. Dante and his commanders were outnumbered on the committee and occupied lesser positions. Beginning with just several hundred men in 1969, the NPA grew to several thousand by the early 1970s, and shifted activities from Tarlac and Pampanga provinces in central Luzon to Isabela province in northeastern Luzon and remote Quezon province in southeastern Luzon. NPA efforts in central Luzon had focused primarily on pursuing agrarian reform.8 Government forces learned of these operations in mid-1972, upon discovery of a grounded fishing vessel, the Karagatan, off Quezon province. The boat, from a still-unknown source abroad, was fully loaded with arms and ammunition intended for the NPA. The discovery led to a major counterinsurgency effort in the region, that cost heavy losses of NPA forces.9 President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law in 1972, justifying this action by the need to suppress the "state of rebellion" led by the NPA. By 1972, the NPA was estimated to have approximately 1,000 to 2,000 armed personnel, 7,000 to 8,000 cadres, and 100,000 sympathizers. Over the 1973-74 period, the government's counterinsurgency campaigns forced the NPA out of most villages and into more remote, mountainous regions. After substantially reducing the size of the NPA support base, the Filipino government eliminated many front organizations, and arrested many of the leaders.10 The Expansion of the NPA Subsequently, the NPA reorganized into more self-contained units for security and began to concentrate efforts in remote rural areas where the government presence was minimal. On the island of Luzon, NPA activity centered in the Sierra Madre Mountains and the Cagayan Valley in the northeastern part of the island. Samar in the Visaya Islands and the southern island of Mindanao also became major NPA target areas. In each of these remote, impoverished areas, the NPA supported local residents in disputes with the central government, local military forces, civilian officials, or landlords. For example, the NPA in 1976 became involved in the Chico River Dam dispute, siding with tribal minorities resisting development and desecration of their land. In many areas, the Communists were able to utilize peasant unrest over the loss of land to corporate enterprises and embrace issues related to land reform. During this period of the early 1970s, the government's attention was also turned southward to Mindanao, where a Moro Muslim insurgency erupted. Large numbers of Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) troops were redeployed to the threatened areas on Mindanao, and mopping-up of the NPA became a second priority.11 Government initiatives did little to check the NPA, although over a dozen top CPP and NPA leaders were captured or killed during 1976-77, including CPP Chairman Jose Maria Sison and the NPA chief Commander Dante. The government also undertook major anti-NPA campaigns on northern Luzon, Samar, and other areas during the late 1970's. Assassinations and ambushes increased, however, and CPP cadres continued to expand the geographical base of their mass movement. Largely responsible for NPA success were the NPA's decentralized organization that allowed local commanders wide autonomy, the rugged and dispersed Philippine geography, the AFP's preoccupation with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) insurgency, and popular discontent and frustration with social, economic, and political conditions.12 Beginning about 1975 and continuing after the 1976-77 capture of top CPP and NPA leaders, the NPA focused primarily on political and organizational activities. The number of NPA clashes with government troops declined, resulting in a false impression of NPA weakness. When AFP troops were reassigned to Mindanao, the NPA gained several years of valuable time to pursue political and clandestine activities. This included the establishment of local guerrilla fronts and infrastructures. In 1980, on the 11th anniversary of the NPA, the CPP through its "Ang Bayan" newspaper declared that conditions were right for resuming military operations. In this statement, the NPA proclaimed 26 guerrilla fronts in Luzon, the Visayas, and Mindanao.13 By early 1983, the NPA claimed to have units in the majority of the nation's provinces. A paper prepared in 1982 by a private Manila business organization estimated that the NPA "has penetrated if not controlled 20 percent of the barangays (hamlets) nationwide and can count on the sympathy if not the support of some 180,000 civilians." Government figures, understandably, estimated a lower NPA strength. Notwithstanding the disagreement over the strength of the NPA and its support base, the government and most sources agreed that the Communists were entrenched in the mountainous provinces of northern Luzon, southern Quezon province, peninsular southeastern Luzon, Samar, and eastern Mindanao.14 Despite the NPA's impressive growth, Communist leaders have admitted that they will not be in a position to topple the government for many years. The NPA has continued a "strategic defensive" phase of struggle, working in small units and avoiding large-scale confrontations with the armed forces. In late 1982, however, larger NPA units, sometimes 200 or 300 strong, began to be reported on Mindanao, where a major NPA expansion program was underway.15 By the end of 1983, according to CPP figures, party membership had increased threefold from 10,000 to 30,000, and the number of NPA soldiers (full or part-time) had increased from 8,000 to 20,000. With this increase in membership, the CPP was able to expand into new territories. The number of guerrilla fronts increased to 45. On Mindanao - economically and militarily important due to its rich resources and deepwater ports - Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile acknowledged that the NPA had most intensified its efforts with at least 16 guerrilla fronts.16 In addition to assassination of informers, policemen, and officials whom the NPA considers corrupt, the NPA has also conducted hit-and-run ambushes and raids. Many of these attacks have been to acquire arms, ammunition, and equipment. There have also been NPA attacks on fixed government installations, government projects, and short-term occupations of municipalities in areas where the guerrillas have strong local support. Large- scale ambushes, involving company and battalion-sized units, have also become more common. On September 29, 1983, about 70 NPA ambushed a patrol northwest of Zamboanga on Mindanao. Government forces suffered 46 KIA, the highest death toll suffered by government forces since NPA operations began in 1969. Almost every day in 1983 saw at least one NPA action against government authority somewhere in the vast country.17 By 1984, the NPA's forces were operating in 62 of the Philippines' 73 provinces. Armed NPA units now challenge the AFP across virtually the entire Philippines archipelago. Estimating NPA strength is understandably difficult. Until recently, the Filipino government downplayed the NPA insurgent threat, at least in part to defend its original rationale for martial law, which was lifted in 1981. Government officials suggested that a few thousand NPA guerrillas existed at most, and were constantly on the run due to the effectiveness of AFP operations.18 The official government line changed in May 1984, when President Marcos stated publicly that there were at least 6,800 armed guerrillas. Many observers believe that the true figure is closer to the NPA claim of 20,000 (part and full-time guerrillas) at the end of 1983. The NPA probably can now field some 10,000 to 12,500 full-time, armed guerrillas, and an additional 10,000 part-time militia soldiers. Until early 1984, reports of AFP operations consistently equaled or outnumbered the NPA-inspired incidents. But during 1984, that trend has changed; the level of NPA activity now exceeds the number of operations mounted by the AFP.19 NOTES 1David Rosenberg, "Communism in the Philippines," Problems of Communism, XXXIII (September/October 1984), 32. 2U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The Situation in the Philippines, Staff Report prepared by Frederick Brown and Carl Ford, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess., October, 1984 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 22. 3Rosenberg, p. 33. 4Rosenberg, p. 34. 5Ibid. 6U.S., Congress, Senate, p.22. 7U.S., Congress, Senate, p.23; Rosenberg, 36. 8U.S., Congress, Senate, p. 28. 9Rosenberg, p. 37. 10Frederica Bunge, ed., Philippines: A Country Study (Washington: The American University, 1984), p. 238. 11Bunge, p. 239; U.S., Congress, Senate, p. 24. 12Bunge, p. 239. 13Rosenberg, p. 38. 14Bunge, p. 239. 15Bunge, pp. 41, 239. 16Rosenberg, p. 38. 17Rosenberg, pp. 38-39. 18U.S., Congress, Senate, pp. 24-25. 19U.S., Congress, Senate, p. 25. AN ANALYSIS: COMPARING AND CONTRASTING THE INSURGENCIES CHAPTER 4 THE ENVIRONMENT: INSURGENCY CAUSES AND CONDITIONS The way of the reformer is hard...his problems are more difficult than those of the revolutionary...he necessarily fights a two-front war against both con- servative and revolutionary...The reformer, consequently, requires a much higher order of political skill than does the revolutionary. Reform is rare if only because the political talents necessary to make it a reality are rare. A successful revolutionary need not be a master politician; a successful reformer always is." Samuel P. Huntington in Political Order in Changing Societies It is not necessary to wait for the fulfillment of of all conditions for a revolution because the focus of insurrection can create them. Che Guevara The next five chapters will attempt to compare and contrast the postwar Huk rebellion and the ongoing insurgency of the New People's Army. Chapter five will examine the organization, composition and strength of the two insurgencies; chapter six will examine strategy, doctrine, and operations. Logistics, communications, and support will be the focus of chapter seven. This chapter will examine the environment of the two insurgencies, their causes and conditions. While the Philippines is the setting for both of these in surgencies, any environment will obviously not be identical at different points in time. We will examine the Philippines of the 1940s and 1950s, and contrast a revolution within that country occuring during the more recent years - 1970s and 1980s. A comparison of both environments is useful to analyze the two insurgencies fought against the same backdrop. The Huk Environment (1945 - 1954) The Wartime Legacy of the Huks The Philippines in the late 1940s was a country of about 20 million people. About 3/4 of these people lived on farms in rural areas. More than half of these farms were small - less than 5 acres in size. Manila in 1950 had a population of approxi- mately 1 million. The agrarian nature of the economy is a continuing key factor, with much of the best farmland located in the central plain of Luzon (see Figure 4 - The Central Plain of Luzon). A large portion of this farmland was farmed by tenants - about 2/3 of the cultivated land in "Huklandia" (see Figure 5 - Percentage of Cultivated Land Farmed by Tenants in Central and Southern Luzon). This fact underscores the agrarian quality of the Huk rebellion.1 When the wartime Hukbalahap resistance movement was formed in March 1942, it drew cadre and organizational bases directly from existing confederations of peasants and labor such as the KPMP (National Society of Peasants of the Philippines), PKM (National Peasants Union), AMT (General Workers' Union), and CLM (Collective Labor Movement), as well as the PKP (Communist party). Although predominately a rural-base movement, the Hukbalahap recruited somewhat beyond the peasantry. Many labor leaders joined the movement, including Luis Taruc, the Huk "supremo," who was a leader of Pampangan sugar workers and a member of the National Commission of Labor. Manila groups including the PKP, carried out communications, intelligence, and support activities.2 It was easy to recruit in Manila, due to Click here to view image the large numbers of disillusioned students and intellectuals, unemployed, discontented, and labor organizations.3 The Hukbalahap had strong peasant support because it was viewed in the light of its earlier and favorable resistance to landlords and constabulary, having successfully protected civilians from the Japanese invaders with guerrilla tactics, and having provided a shadow government with local peacekeeping forces through the infiltration of Japanese-created neighborhood associations. The stature of the Huks also increased because some Filipinos, including many absentee or self-exiled landlords and political figures, were collaborators during the war. In the absence of the exploiting landlords and thanks to bountiful harvests, the wartime economic situation of the peasants actually improved.4 The war produced a legacy: "The Huks fought the Japanese while at the same time righting some of the economic inequities of the past. While attacking the enemy, the Huks also put toge- ther the rudiments of a new social organization with its own leadership, customs, and institutions based on a rough form of socialist democracy."5 After the war ended, the Filipino government and economy were damaged and disorganized. The Huks appointed civilian leaders in their strongholds and hoped to use these to increase their political influence - a start towards their dictatorship of the proletariat. The Filipino government disallowed these Huk claims and appointed its own officials to hold office until elections could be held later, Luis Taruc and some of the other Hukbalahap leaders were imprisoned briefly, but released later in 1945.6 American haste in concluding its Pacific affairs resulted in poor government administration, corruption, and a failure to recognize and compensate some Filipino guerrillas. This crea- ted bitterness that the Huks exploited. Professor John Walton in his sociological analysis of the Huk rebellion emphasized four interrelated circumstances that were proximate causes of the postwar rebellion. The first, already alluded to above, was the conflict between Huks on one side, and U.S. occupation forces and other non-Communist Filipino groups. Even during the liberation struggle in 1945, this friction existed and government forces began arresting Hukbalahap members. Huks were asked to turn in weapons and membership lists, a request that was met with some resistance. Another minor factor was the issue of back pay given to the USAFFE (U.S. Armed Forces in the Far East) guerrillas, but denied to Huks who spent much of their time fighting other Filipinos. Some known or suspected collaborators of the Japanese were also elevated to positions in the new government - an issue that was overblown by the Huks.8 The Huks in September 1945 submitted numerous personnel rosters as requested by American administrators. Hukbalahap forces, although they had resisted the Japanese, had refused to serve under the complete authority of the USAFFE. The Huks also had extra-governmental political organizations in the villages and this also caused considerable resentment. Even during the resistance, several armed clashes erupted between Huks and USAFFE units. Many of these USAFFE veterans were integrated into the postwar Military Police Command (MPC) and this further alienated the Huks and the government.9 A second circumstance was the resurgence of popular democratic forces that the Huks captalized upon. Immediately after the war, the same popular front forces of the late 1930s were reorganized.10 As Huk leader Luis Taruc noted, "It was extremely easy to organize among the people after the work of the Hukbalahap."11 In the countryside, the PKM inherited the disbanded Huk followers and grew to half-million people, twice the size of the various prewar peasant organizations combined. In the labor movement, a Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO) was organized in 1945. It quickly became the dominant labor federation of the early postwar period, including though not dominated by the PKP. The CLO used activism to press labor demands.12 In anticipation of the 1946 election that would select the first government of the new Philippine republic, the PKP, the Hukbalahap Veterans' League, and various peasant and labor unions combined forces to form the Democratic Alliance (DA). The DA was successful in electing six Congressional candidates, all from central Luzon. Due to the Huk use of terrorism alluded to in Chapter 2, the DA was prevented from taking lesgislative seats.13 Thirdly, the Philippine Trade Act of 1946 (or the Bell Trade Act), a continuance of neocolonial policies, exacerbated historical conflicts. The act called for a twenty-eight year extension of free trade relations and parity for American investors along with Filipino nationals. This meant that the Philippines would continue to be a completely open, duty-free market for American goods. The arrangement, strongly backed by Filipino landlords, perpetuated the old colonial relationship. The parity agreement virtually prohibited the development of independent Filipino industries by placing them on the same footing with U.S. multinationals; it preserved the dominant position of American investment in the Filipino economy.14 The Bell Act also had important military arrangements, with ninety-nine year leases for twenty-three bases, including fertile agricultural land in central Luzon.15 Finally, there was some abuse of the Huks. Huk and peasant organizations were declared illegal, with members or sympathizers harassed, raided, jailed or killed. For the Huks, the murder of peasant leader Juan Feleo in August 1946 was a highpoint of this period. At that time, Huk resistance was reorganized out of the same constituents as the wartime resistance and was mobilized allegedly for "self-defense", but ostensibly for the furtherance of Huk political goals.16 The landlords had successfully resisted postwar reforms at a time of general political and economic chaos, leading to a ra- pid deterioration in the material conditions of the peasantry, especially when contrasted with the relatively prosperous years of the Japanese occupation. In the midst of some government abuse of the Hukbalahaps, and some historical, accelerating economic and political grievances, the Huk began their rebellion.17 How did the conditions under which the Huk insurgency operated affect it? The Huks thrived during the 1946 to 1949 period due to the inability of the Presidents Roxas and Quirino to effectively mount a counterinsurgency campaign. Just prior to inde- pendence, the Filipino military had to demobilize from a strength of 132,000 to about 37,000. This caused severe organizational problems. 24,000 of the 37,000 were in the Military Police Command (MPC) under the Department of the Interior, with the remainder in the armed forces under the Department of Defense. This large constabulary force was not suited to dealing with a revolutionary guerrilla force. The overblown collaborationist issue also complicated officer recruitment for the army. An officer had to be cleared of charges before assignment - a controversial, time-consuming, and often subjective process.18 The Roxas Regime In addition to the internal defense problems caused by the postwar state of government security forces, internal development was largely neglected. At the time, President-elect Roxas had promised to restore law and order and to eliminate the Huks within sixty days after his election. The MPC - though lacking competent leaders, equipment, and proper training - was given the mission of eliminating the Huks. To augment the MPC, provincial governors and landlords organized Civil Guard units and recruited private and local police to participate in internal defense operations. These various untrained forces presented coordination, control, and discipline problems.19 The Civil Guard units, one of the first paramilitary units, served as auxiliaries of the military units. Some indiscriminate destruction, pillaging, and massacres caused further resentment against government forces.20 After several months of armed confrontation proved ineffective, Roxas became convinced that police methods were insufficient to counter the rebellion. A new approach to Roxas' "mailed fist" policy of force, that of mediation and negotiation, was attempted. Roxas arranged a three-month truce and tried to persuade the rebels to lay down their arms. A new land tenancy act was proposed, but this failed. The Huks continued their propaganda efforts and the MPC used the truce period to reorganize and reequip. Both sides repeatedly violated the truce.21 As the truce period ended, the MPC reinforced the Civil Guards and local police, and the army began new offensive opera- tions in central Luzon. The "mailed fist" policy continued even more indiscriminately than before. Whole barrios (hamlets) and villages were burned, crops destroyed, and peasants innocent of Hukbalahap sympathies were sometimes killed or imprisoned. Popular disaffection increased and government forces failed to decisively engage the mainbody of Huks. In March 1948 Roxas, perhaps partly out of frustration, declared the Huks and their political arm to be illegal and seditious.22 The Quirino Administration The following month Roxas died of a heart attack. He was succeeded by Vice President Elpidio Quirino. Quirino believed that the Huks could be defeated through a coordinated policy of amnesty and grievance mediation. Quirino enacted a temporary amnesty in June 1948 and proposed a program of land reform, abrogation of the Bell Act, and other concessions attractive to the Communists. The Huks used the amnesty period for propaganda purposes and negotiations failed with the termination of the amnesty period on 15 August 1948.23 For the next two years, government operations were essentially ineffective against the growing Huk movement with Quirino later adopting a "mailed fist" policy like his predecessor. The fraudalent elections of 1949 furthered the Huk cause. Two exceptions to government ineffectiveness were the success of "Force X" - a pseudo-Huk unit of constabularies used to deceive and attack Huks, and a successful brigade-sized pursuit of Huks after the 28 April 1949 murders of the widow and daughter of ex-President Quezon in a Huk ambush.24 During the Roxas administration and the first year of Qui- rino's elected term, the Filipino government continued to be a government of the privileged few. Farmers were suffering econo- mically due to high rentals; decisions in the land courts often favored landlords; and the moneylenders charged peasants mounting interest on the originally small debts of their ancestors.25 There was corruption in the government and the arrogant behavior of the military caused fear and resentment.26 Things began to improve in 1950. In the spring of that year, the national police force was moved out of the Department of the Interior and became a part of the Armed Forces of the Philippines under the Department of Defense. This increased the strength of the armed forces to 50,000 men. Battalion Combat Teams (BCT's) were organized for actively engaging Huk units; these units had more manpower and firepower than the constabulary units that were being used.27 The constabulary forces had not been able to stem the growth of the Huk movement. Their company-sized units were inadequately equipped and not capable of conducting sustained antiguerrilla operations. The constabulary also frequently failed to obtain the cooperation of the populace. The regular army was not much better prepared for counterinsurgency. Promotions were awarded on the basis of political influence and corruption was prevalent. Morale was low and the army was also not organized for sustained operations. It consisted mainly of administrative, service, and training units, with only two infantry battalions ready for combat.28 The Arrival of Ramon Magsaysay On 1 September 1950 Ramon Magsaysay became the Secretary of National Defense under Quirino. As Edward Lansdale, personal advisor to Magsaysay in the JUSMAG, details in his memoirs, this marked the turning point in the insurgency. American advice and assistance through the JUSMAG was important, although the U.S. was strapped financially by the Korean War of the early 1950s. Magsaysay improved morale in the armed forces, organized Scout Ranger teams, emphasized small unit operations, and reduced corruption.29 As Filipino journalist Eduardo Lachica points out, Magsaysay was even more successful in his internal development programs.30 As the counterinsurgency efforts are not the primary focus of this paper, these efforts will not be examined in detail here. After 1951, once the government had significantly reduced military abuses of villagers and had begun agrarian reforms addressing the objectives of most rebels, the Huk insurgency withered. The government reforms had removed most of the revolutionary goale. By this time, many of the people were weary of fighting. Some decided to resume nonviolent efforts to obtain further agrarian reforms.31 The Environment of the New People's Army (1969-Present) The Social, Economic, and Political Legacy While demographic factors naturally changed from the mid- 1940's, many of the social, economic, and political factors changed relatively little. This was especially true in the remote areas. As mentioned in Chapter 3, at the end of the Huk rebellion, Huk survivivors simply melted into the countryside, more intent on survival than in continuing an active rebellion. After Magsaysay's death in 1957, President Garcia enacted an Anti-Subversion Law, outlawing the PKP, Huks, and other related organizations. President Macapagal, who was elected in November 1961, did relatively little toward agrarian reform. Although Macapagal was from Pampanga province in central Luzon and recognized that region's problems, he lacked political skills and his Agricultural Land Reform Code failed due to underfunding.32 Internal development efforts lagged, and by the 1960s, ex- ploitable conditions still existed to leverage the Communist cause. Illiteracy remained high in the remote provinces such as the mountain provinces, Cagayan, Samar and Mindanao. A wide social and economic gap still remained between the rich elite and the poor majority, reinforcing the belief that social justice belonged to the affluent. The economic growth of the nation could not cope with the needs of a rapidly increasing population, creating deficiencies in housing, public utilities, and social services. These deficiencies were especially acute in urban areas, such as Manila. The economy was still dependent on agriculture, but world commodity price fluctuations and technological advances caused disruptions to the Filipino economy. The initial stages of industrialization also produced uneven economic development in the country. Governmental graft, corruption, and inefficiency still prevailed. The majority of the people tend to equate economic opportunities with leadership, and the economic problems decreased government credibility.33 The Marcos Regime In contrast with the Huks, the NPA developed and has existed under the reign of only one administration - that of President Ferdinand Marcos. Marcos was elected in November 1965 and has retained power since. Initially Marcos' policies had a modernizing and reformist thrust. Marcos' pre-martial law administration, from 1965 to 1972, invested heavily in infra- structure projects - schools, irrigation, roads, bridges. Despite this improving environment, the Communist movement on Filipino campuses gained strength in the 196Os, attracting young and idealistic radicals who were inspired by the revolutionary experiences in China, Cuba, and Vietnam. The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) was formed in December 1969, and several months later joined with Huk remnants to form the New People's Army (NPA). By the early 1970s, Marcos had used his power to dismantle some provincial fiefdoms of the landholding oligarchy, enact a limited land reform in the rice and corn-growing regions of central and northern Luzon, partially modernize the economic infrastructure and the military, and lessen energy dependency. Economic growth rates were respectable, in the range of six percent per year.34 These successes were, however, overtaken by a combination of underlying structural problems and a cumulative abuse of power. There was always a clear bias towards large-scale urban industrial projects, a failure to integrate manufacturing with the rest of the economy, and a neglect of the agricultural base. By the mid-1970s, Marcos had replaced the old elite with a new system of "Marcos socialism." Through subsidies, credits, and other supports, the government increased its role in the economy, distorted the private sector by granting certain monopolies to Marcos associates, and engaged in often wasteful public projects. A recent report by the University of the Philippines lists 688 presidential decrees and 283 letters of instruction listed since 1972 that represent various forms of government intervention in the economy.35 Furthermore, many of Marcos' development programs were un- derfunded, like those of his predecessors. National roads, sani- tation, and employment were often neglected. Government programs, even more importantly, did not demonstrate government sincerity. While the development projects provided some economic benefits, they had little social impact where they were needed the most. Hospitals, camps, and courts were built in provincial capitals and in the major towns; the urban dwellers (such as the rich and middle class) benefited, but not the peasants.36 Some of Marcos' military reforms during the 1960s were commendable. A non-combatant Army Civic Action Force (ACAF) was created out of the Philippine Civic Action Group recalled from Vietnam, and included engineer, medical and support units. The ACAF unit was utilized to provide health care, improve roads, perform flood control work, and build schools, bridges, and buildings. The Philippine Constabulary (PC) Rangers were created, and the curriculum at military schools expanded to include more engineering, social science, and humanities topics. Constabulary forces were strengthened, and by 1970 the PC was the largest organization (21,000) in the 50,000 man AFP.37 Despite its strengthening, the basic failing of the military in the late 1960s may be that it did not have a clear idea of its enemy. Situational assessments were made at high levels and were rarely questioned by tactical units. The military appeared to have no clear concept of the enemy, except that it was fighting against "ideologues;" there was little sense of the social circumstances of the insurgency. The AFP viewed the Huks as an instrument of a global Communist conspiracy. Although barrio self-defense units were formed, the AFP was not perceptive to the distinction between the peasant rebels and the urban Communists. The insurgency provided the AFP with a reason for a strong military force and emphasis was placed on the quantitative aspects of troops and guns. The initial overuse of PSYWAR techniques also contributed to the government's credibility gap.38 In his export-growth development strategy to emulate the Japanese, Marcos attempted to create a stratum of aggressive Phi lippine entrepreneurs heading large holding companies. The result, however, has been a serious distortion of the Filipino economy that has exacerbated the unequal distribution of wealth, created a debt-ridden public sector, and caused economic problems. From the mid-197Os to 1983, the composition of government spending shifted, with less going to infrastructure projects and the majority being spent on corporate equity investment and other capital outlays.39 Like the government, the armed forces are affected by much corruption, mismanagement, and diversion of equipment and funds from the intended end-user - especially at the higher echelons. The military is underequipped with some serious morale, maintenance, and discipline problems like the army of the 1940s. Due to the economic problems, the army is also woefully underfunded.40 While the AFP has recently changed its military equipment procurement priorities to meet the NPA threat, it remains in dire need of upgrading in many respects.41 Economic strains, political violence and social frictions have continued to exist since independence and have deep roots in the colonial period. Despite these historical roots, many Filipinos hold the Marcos regime responsible for a political and economic deterioration that has grown steadily worse. There has been a profound loss of confidence in Marcos and in his ability to govern. Marcos' practice of saying one thing and doing the opposite has damaged his credibility, and there appears to be little expectation that the leadership will act for the national good as opposed to its own narrow interests.42 Marcos has appeared confused and often deliberately misleading in representing the insurgent threat. He has often changed strength estimates of the NPA, sometimes dramatizing the insurgent threat and sometimes claiming that the NPA posed no threat to state security. Some doubt that the administration understands or can effectively cope with the NPA threat. This situation is worsened by growing popular resentment of the gross corruption and rampant cronyism in the administration. The corruption by the leadership spawns corruption at other levels - the diversion of resources at ministerial levels, graft at the provincial level, bribes and extortion in the barangays by police and officials. Military involvement in business ventures in the provinces has increased rapidly in recent years and official positions are often used for personal gain. While, obviously, not all officials and officers are corrupt, corruption is pervasive enough to engender popular resentment.43 In addition to the corruption, military abuses have caused further resentment. The Philippine Constabulary (PC) and the Ci- vilian Home Defense Force (CHDF) are often criticized for deficient levels of training, lack of discipline, and habitual mistreatment of the populace. Local police, who are under the unified military command structure, and regular army units have also been cited for abuses. The AFP has tended to treat the people as if they were the enemy and not the object of protection from the insurgents. Unlike the NPA, the AFP has the reputation among many villagers for indiscriminately using violence, utilizing excessive force against suspected NPA sympathizers, and relying on the use of massive firepower to influence the populace.44 Until the 1970s, the Catholic Church in the Philippines was not very active in the political process due to older, conservative leaders who believed in the separation of church and state.45 Recently, the church has emerged as a main defender of the people against military abuses. The church is now a leading critic of government corruption and an exponent of greater citizen participation in the political process. There is some antagonism between the government and the church.46 This development will be explored in more detail in Chapter 5. The government has responded to the NPA threat as it had in the late 1940's to the Huk rebellion. The AFP concentrated superior force in the affected regions and conducted conventional search-and-destroy missions to locate and defeat the NPA. Much emphasis was placed on capturing or killing the movement's leadership, with rewards offered for Communist cadre.47 Beneficiaries of the Marcos Regime Besides Marcos and his cronies, two groups have increased power since the declaration of martial law in 1972. One is the military, which has grown from 60,000 to 155,000 men with a substantial increase in budget. The AFP, PC, the Presidential Security Command, the National Intelligence and Security Authori- ty (NISA), and the various paramilitary units may have become essential to the continuity of the Marcos govenment. The other major, but intended, beneficiary has been the CPP-NPA movement. In addition to the Communist insurgency, the government has also had to contend with the Moro Muslim insurgency in the southern Philippines.48 The NPA insurgency's greatest strengths have been the abuses, inefficiencies, corruption, and complacency of a self-satisfied nineteen-year old regime. The recent Aquino assassination has been a further blow to the regime's credibility. While the Filipino political spectrum is a continuum that does not divide neatly into "moderates" and "liberals," that assassination galvanized the political center into active opposition - evidenced by the strong opposition showing during the May 1984 parliamentary elections. The "silent majority" of middle-class professionals, non-crony business elite, and the Catholic Church has become more vocal. The assassination provided a rallying point for the Left and deepened the economic crisis by spurring capital flight abroad.49 Thus, the Aquino assassination quickly rallied a wide range of opposition groups and marked an important turning point from passive compliance to active protest against government policy. It forced the political polarization of the country further than it has moved in recent years. The CPP was quick to align itself with the popular outrage over the assassination. It remains to be seen whether the "moderate" opposition will be able to overcome its own divisions and government dominance to build a coherent political force. If not, the CPP and the NPA will be ready to take advantage of the political ferment, economic stagnation, and government mismanagement.50 NOTES 1Napoleon Valeriano and Charles Bohannan, Counterguerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 31; Edward Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 17. 2John Walton, Reluctant Rebels: Comparative Studies of Revolution and Underdevelopment (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), p. 58. 3Valeriano and Bohannan, p. 33. 4Walton, p. 58. 5John Larkin, The Pampangans: Colonial Society in a Philippine Province (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1972), p. 311. 6Alvin Scaff, The Philippine Answer to Communism (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1955), pp. 25-26. 7Scaff, p. 26. 8Walton, pp. 58-59. 9Benedict Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 114-116. 10Walton, p. 59. 11Luis Taruc, Born of the People (New York: International Publishers, 1953), p. 218. 12Walton, p. 59. 13Walton, pp. 59-60. 14Walton, pp. 60-61. 15Walton, p. 61. 16Walton, pp. 61-62. 17Walton, p. 62. 18Scaff, p. 27. 19William Moore, "The Hukbalahap Insurgency, 1948-1954: An Analysis of the Roles, Missions, and Doctrine of the Philippine Military Forces" (Report of the Institute of Advanced Studies, US Army War College, 1971), p. 11. 20Eduardo Lachica, The Huks: Philippine Agrarian Society in Revolt (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), pp. 205-207. 21Moore, p. 9. 22Moore, pp. 9-11. 23Moore, pp. 11-12. 24Reginald Swarbrick and James Clark, "The Evolution of Communist Insurgency in the Philippines" (Report of the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1983), pp. 16-18. 25Edward Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 28. 26Lansdale, p. 25. 27Lansdale, p. 20. 28Andrew Molnar and others, "Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare" (Report prepared by the Special Operations Research Office of The American University for the Department of the Army, 1963), p. 325. 29Lansdale, pp. 42-48. 30Lachica, p. 250. 31Kerkvliet, p. xvi. 32Lachica, p. 251. 33Ramberto Saavedra, "The Role of Civil Affairs in Counterinsurgency in the Philippines" (Thesis of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1982), pp. 43-47. 34Robert Manning, "The Philippines in Crisis,"Foreign Affairs, Volume 63, No. 2 (Winter 1984/1985), 394. 35Ibid. 36Lachica, pp. 252-255. 37Lachica, pp. 245-248. 38Lachica, pp. 236-238, 241-244. 39Manning, pp. 393, 395. 40Statement by William Moore, Major General, U.S. Army, formerly of JUSMAG, Philippines, in a personal interview, Arlington, Virginia, 15 February 1985. 41U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The Situation in the Philippines, Staff Report prepared by Frederick Brown and Carl Ford, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess., October, 1984 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 5. 42U.S., Congress, Senate, pp. 12-13. 43U.S., Congress, Senate, pp. 13-15. 44U.S., Congress, Senate, p. 16. 45Lachica, p. 254. 46 U.S., Congress, Senate, p. 17. 47U.S., Congress, Senate, p. 24. 48Rosenberg, p. 25. 49Manning, p. 399; U.S., Congress, Senate, p. 4. 50Rosenberg, pp. 25-28. CHAPTER 5 ORGANIZATION, COMPOSITION AND STRENGTH The Huks For ruthlessness and cruelty are alien to Christian thought, and when men in the Free World use such methods, they do so in defiance of their own morality and ideals. The atheist Communist, however, believes that the end justifies the means, or in Lenin's words, "Morality is subordinate to the class struggle." For this reason, the Communist can pursue a policy of terror and cruelty with a clear conscience. Former Huk leader Luis Taruc In order to examine the organization of the Huks, it is necessary to examine party, military, and mass organizations. The Huk organization was similar to the wartime Hukbalahap's; it was both an underground mass organization and a guerrilla army. The underground government included villagers responsible for logistical and intelligence support. The Huk organization was closely intertwined with that of the party.1 Organization of the PKP The organization of the PKP followed the normal Communist concept. A National Congress of the Partido Komunista ng Pilipi- nas presumably would have been the top-level organization, but this body was never formed. Party affairs were directed by a 31- member Central Committee, which presided over an 11-member Polit- buro (see Figure 6 - National Organization of the PKP). A 5-mem- ber Secretariat, consisting of the General Secretary and the chairmen of the four national departments, conducted the basic work of the party. The four departments were the National Mili- Click here to view image tary Department (the Hukbalahap organization, later renamed the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan or HMB), the National Organization Department, the National Finance Department, and the National Education Department. A Chinese Bureau (CB) of the Chinese Communist Party provided liaison with the PKP (the CB is covered in more detail in Chapter 7). While there is general agreement on the composition of the Central Committee, Politburo, and Secretariat, there are some inconsistencies as to the number of national departments. Robert Ross Smith, in The Hukbalahap Insurgency - Economic, Political, and Military Factors, asserts the existence of a fifth National Intelligence Department.3 Ostensibly, this department would have coordinated intelligence activities. Every party member belonged to a cell of 3 to 5 members.4 Military Organization of the Huks The military organization is depicted in Figure 7. This organization closely resembles the wartime organization of the Hukbalahap, mentioned in Chapter 1. Field operations were under the control of Regional Commands (RECOs), military headquarters directly below the National Military Department (NMD). The RECOs were further subdivided into Field Commands (FCs); these FCs were similar to regiments. Below the FCs were battalions and squadrons; the squadrons resembled companies. In practice, battalions were almost never formed, and squadrons often reported directly to the RECO. There was no fixed number of units below the RECO echelon, although each of these echelons had two or more subordinate elements. A squadron, the basic Huk combat unit, had Click here to view image 50 to 100 men and was further divided into platoons and squads (a partial listing of Huk squadrons is contained in Figure 8 - Hukbalahap Squadrons and Their General Locations). Many of the squadron numbers were carried over from the wartime Hukbalahap days. Occasionally, special platoons were organized to perform security functions for leaders, production base personnel, and other noncombatants.5 The NMD formed a General Headquarters in the field, supported by a staff of five primary staff sections (similar to U.S. Army staff organizations). At the height of their power, the Huks had a total of ten existing or planned RECOs and a Manila City Command. The geographical orientation of nine of these RECOs and the Manila Command are depicted in Figure 9. In addition to these RECOs, the Huks also activated a RECO 10 for further expansion into Batangas and Cavite provinces in southwestern Luzon. All but two of these RECOs were on Luzon; RECO 6 encompassed the Visayan Islands and RECO 7 was planned for Mindanao. The Mindanao RECO was never actually organized.6 In 1948, the RECO system was set up to improve command and control as the movement had grown beyond the wartime Hukbalahap units. Prior to that time, when the movement was more disorga- nized, the Huks were divided into two "central Luzon" and "south- ern Luzon" districts. While the RECOs were military organiza- tions with their own logistical and intelligence systems, these military area commands were intertwined with political organiza- tions. Each RECO was complemented by a Regional Committee under the National Organization Department (to be discussed shortly).7 Together, the Regional Commands and the Regional Click here to view image Committees essentially constituted a "Regional Politburo." Below the Regional Commands (RECOs), were District Organizing Committees (DOCs) and Section Organizing Committees (SOCs) which provided political guidance to the barrio (village) mass organizaations.8 Each RECO had four to five Field Commands and an equal number of DOCs. There was at least one SOC for each squadron. The DOCs and SOCs were located in posts close to the towns and barrios.9 The RECO commanders were top party leaders and each organizational unit down to squadron level had at least one party menber.10 Like the squadron, the Field Commands (FCs) had no regular table of organization. While all FCs had a commander and deputy, staff organizations varied and only the larger FCs had G-3 and G-4 staff officers. The number of men in a Field Command varied between 100 and 700 men. The FC headquarters consisted of five to six officers, with a security force of 10 to 20 guerrillas. The FCs generally stayed in one vicinity and their headquarters often had had camps in remote areas.11 According to Huk leader Luis Taruc, the Huks in 1953 attempted to transform all units and cadre into large organizational brigades.12 The Mass Organization of the Huks Below the previously discussed echelon was the mass organization of the Huks-the Barrio United Defense Corps (BUDC). The BUDC of Buklod, like some other Huk organizations, was originally formulated during the Japanese occupation as a local government organization and provider of supplies for combat units. These organizations were run by a counil of 5 to 12 members. While in theory these councils were elected by barrio residents, they were closely controlled by the SOCs. The activities of the BUDC were a function of the Huk control over a given area. In areas where they exercised complete control, the BUDC council appointed public officials, established courts and schools, and collected taxes. In other areas, the BUDC limited itself to intelligence and supply activities.13 The BUDC was a clandestine civil administration in towns and barrios where the Huks operated. It also conducted recruit- ment and civil justice functions.14 The BUDC was the contact or- ganization for Huk guerrillas in the area, and operated in many of the same wartime Huikbalahap areas. BUDC personnel were sometimes referred to as "OD cadre" - shorthand for Organization Department cadre - or as barrio organizers."15 Non-Military Departments of the PKP The National Organization Department (NOD), National Education Department (NED), and National Finance Department (NFD) were also organized by echelons and geographical areas, similar to the NMD. Each of these departments had its own headquarters, Regional Committees which corresponded to the RECOs, District Committees which paralled the military Field Commands, and Section Committees at the same level as the military Squadrons.16 The National Organization Department (NOD), being the political department, had even more overlap (see Figure 10). For example, the Secretariat of a District Committee consisted of the district chairmen of the Organization, Education, and Finance Departments and the Field Commander from the Military Department. Click here to view image In addition to overseeing the organization of the mass base, the NOD governed the activities of front organizations such as the PKM and CLO. It also operated the courier service and was an important intelligence collection apparatus.17 The National Education Department (NED) was mainly concerned with political indoctrination (see Figure 11). The PKP had an elaborate educational system. Schools taught the illiterate to read and write, and also espoused Communist doctrine and tactics. The NED interfaced closely with the Military Department, and in many cases, conducted military training. It ran primary, secondary, and intermediate schools. The NED also performed research and translation functions, and was responsible for propaganda and publications. This department supplied the political commissars for all levels of the military, further enhancing the horizontal relationship between the two departments.18 The National Finance Department (NFD) was responsible for fiscal matters such as accounting, disbursements, procurement, and purchasing (see Figure 12). It also performed some logistical functions, such as overseeing Huk production bases. As evidenced by its organization, the NFD controlled finances through interconnections between finance committees and political committees at various echelons (see Figure 13).19 PKP-Huk fiscal activities will be covered in more detail in Chapter 7. The entire apparatus was organized to coordinate the work of the four national departments, while maintaining a close horizontal relationship between the departments. This enabled the Click here to view image leadership to control all aspects of the revolution. Because of the organizational interconnections, the entire organization had a paramilitary character. While only the members of the Military Department were technically HMB or Huks, members of the entire organization were called Huks.20 The Democratic Alliance To ally itself with the peasant movement in central Luzon, the PKP - composed primarily of the urban left - helped form the the Democratic Alliance, an attempt at another united front. Dur- ing the last months of the Japanese occupation, PKP leaders began to seriously ponder postwar plans. Doubting that the postwar government could satisfactorily address economic, agrarian, and reconstruction problems, the PKP decided at a September 1944 conference to focus on organizational efforts and to transform the anti-Japanese resistance movement into a broad-based politi- cal movement for political purposes. Several top Hukbalahap leaders attended this conference. Conference attendees agreed to form a postwar united front to work toward three overt, major goals: 1)to prevent Japanese collaborators from taking political office; 2)to campaign for postwar independence; 3)to push for economic reforms to benefit lower and middle-class Filipinos.21 In July 1945 PKP leaders and other anti-Japanese groups formed a new political party, the Democratic Alliance (DA). The DA formulated a moderate program for parliamentary reform that reflected the diversity of the allied groups. The top DA leader- ship was from the urban left; all six members of the DA's Na- tional Executive Committee were well-educated and from prominent families. The PKP's presence was represented on this committee by Vicente Lava, and Jesus Barrera - who was a Civil Liberties Union leader before the war - was its president. Among the diverse groups affiliated with the DA were the PKM, the Hukbalahap's Vet- erans League, the Philippine Lawyers' Guild, Democratic Youth League, Congress of Labor Organizations, Fishermen's Union, and the Rural Transit Employees Union.22 The DA nominated its own candidates for the parliamentary elections in April 1946 and assisted PKM and Hukbalahap veterans. According to Luis Taruc, the DA "was the best channel through which the people (in central Luzon) could flow away from the par- ties that were dominated by landlords and compradores." The DA was an attempt by the PKP/Huks to further their revolutionary cause. The government's refusal to seat six elected DA congressmen and subsequent events were covered in Chapter 2. As government repression intensified, the DA's alliance with the peasant movement fell apart. The repression caused the PKM to dissolve its chapters and move underground. PKM members, who had been the DA's main strength at the polls, were forced to forsake their DA membership. In addition, the overblown collaboration issue - a central pillar around which many diverse groups had rallied - faded, and the Democratic Alliance virtually collapsed by the time of the November 1947 elections.23 The PKP's overt emphasis on parliamentary struggle also alienated the more militant Huk veterans. The initially promising united front effort of the PKP survived for only a little over two years. The PKP-HUK Relationship Because of the significant interconnections between the party and military organizations, it is useful to examine the historical relationship between the PKP and the Huks. Professor Benedict Kerkvliet shows that while the PKP was intimately involved in the Huk rebellion, it did not provide effective control or coordination. The merging of the PKP and the Philippine Socialist Party in 1938 was mentioned earlier. Luis Taruc and many of his followers were Socialists and differed significantly from the PKP hardcore in terms of backgrounds, goals, and perspectives. Many of these differences would remain unresolved and cause subsequent party-military problems. The PKP, as an organization, vaccillated between alliance and nonalliance with the peasant movement in central Luzon.24 During much of the Japanese occupation, the PKP was allied with the Huk resistance. However, in 1944 when the PKP adopted its "retreat for defense" policy, the party leadership decided that the PKP and the Hukbalahap should maintain a low visibility. Most peasants in the Hukbalahap, however, ignored the party decision and continued to fight. After the occupation, the PKP aligned itself again with the Huks to form the Democratic Alliance. When the rebellion erupted in 1946, the PKP - while supporting Huk goals - publicly opposed an armed struggle and advocated a parliamentary struggle. The PKP allegedly felt that the labor movement did not support a rebellion and that the peasants were fighting for their personal survival.25 Up until 1948, the PKP leadership emphasized two tasks: the legal and parliamentary struggle; strengthening of the party apparatus. To accomplish the first, the PKP focused on united front efforts symbolized by the Democratic Alliance. For the second task, the party concentrated on recruitment and on the organization of a hierarchical apparatus from the Politburo down to cell level. Because the PKP believed that the urban working class would provide the leadership for a future revolution, it emphasized recruitment and organizational efforts among workers in metropolitan Manila. During this time the PKP was dis- organized, without unified tactics and strategies, and with no clear perspective for the future.26 Because the PKP expanded by pursuing a united front and emphasized a parliamentary struggle, its membership was not homo- geneous or disciplined. There were roughly three categories of PKP members: rank-and-file members of mass organizations; the party hardcore who were the top leaders; a cadre whose main in- terest was agrarian reform. The PKP members most likely to join the rebellion were those close to the agrarian movement; those least likely to join the fight were members of the urban labor movement.27 The PKP leadership used criteria they believed were in keeping with Marxist-Leninist theory to evaluate revolutionary conditions. However, in 1948 after a leadership change, the PKP determined that conditions were ripening and openly supported the rebellion. It decided that it could change the "revolutionary situation" into a "revolutionary crisis," and push workers into the revolution by taking charge of the peasant rebellion at all levels. Although some important Huk leaders were PKP members, the PKP felt that the "undisciplined" Huks needed party direction and the party's role was to lead the revolution for which the country was now ready.28 It was at this time that the Hukbalahap were renamed the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB) - the People's Liberation Army. Even after 1948, the PKP had only a limited influence on the rebel movement. The alliance remained tenuous as the PKP objectives differed from those of many of the Huk rank-and-file. In general, the party advocated changes that were more radical than what most peasants supported. The peasants wanted reforms of the tenancy system; the party wanted a Marxist-Leninist state and defeat of American "imperialism." This weakness proved significant later, and caused serious leadership rifts in the PKP and HMB.29 The PKP and HUK Leadership The leadership of the PKP and the Huks differed signifi- cantly in their backgrounds, contributing to further conflicts. As mentioned earlier, there were two trends of leadership. Many of the hardcore PKP Bolsheviks were from "bourgeois" families, with personal and social ties to the privileged Filipino clas- ses.30 Like most Huk leaders, many of these Communist party leaders were from central Luzon. For example, the three Lava brothers, all of whom served as General Secretaries of the PKP, were from Bulacan.31 These urban Bolsheviks used the peasant reformist and nationalist feelings and aspirations as a revolutionary tactic.32 The other trend was the peasant leaders for whom Socialism was the ultimate goal. These Huk leaders, such as Luis Taruc, hoped to achieve their Socialist state through a united front of "progressive forces."33 They were predominantly from central Lu- zon peasant backgrounds. Some had risen to leadership in peasant organizations, some were labor leaders, and others were educated men from poor families.34 They were about the same age (in their thirties at the time of the rebellion), were job-seekers at the time of the Great Depression, and were economically-motivated. Many of these HMB leaders were essentially agrarian reformers at heart, and Communists by circumstances. Luis Taruc, in his memoirs confesses to an error in associating with the PKP. The Huk guerrillas obeyed their peasant leaders more than the high councils of the PKP.35 Composition of the Huks As PKP membership was covered above, the composition of the Huks is worth examining. Many of the Huks and their sympathizers were not members of the PKP, and it is doubtful if the majority of Huks had more than a vague understanding of Communist doctrine. PKP membership overall probably never exceeded 10,000 and according to William Pomeroy - the American Communist who joined the Huks - many of the Huk unit commanders were not party members. The Huks were, however, a fairly homogeneous group of peasant farmers.36 Many were recruited from the barrios with little education and could not comprehend Marxism-Leninism. Luis Taruc reportedly stated, "There is not even one percent who have Communist mentality in them."37 The workers and intelligentsia of Manila, even if they supported the Huk cause, were not inclined to take to the hills as guerrilla soldiers. As Taruc put it, "They may have just been waiting to be 'liberated' by someone else."38 The Huk guerrillas, on the other hand, joined the movement for various reasons. Luis Taruc summarized some of these: "People in the barrios, the nonintellectual type of Huk, joined because they had causes - like agrarian reform, government reform, anti-repression, recognition of the Hukbalahap - and, frequently, because they simply had to defend themselves, their very lives against repression." Others joined for personal reasons. Some wanted revenge for the killing or abuses of relatives or friends.39 There were those who were so so deeply in debt that they felt they had nothing to lose by joining the movement, and there were criminals who joined to escape punishment.40 Wartime or other friendships caused some to become active in the movement. It is also significant that most (69 percent) ex-Huks, surveyed after the rebellion, were farmers before joining the movement.41 In one study involving 400 captured Huks, 95 percent claimed that their main reason for fighting was land reform.42 Another small study indicated that, in 1952, almost 60 percent of the Huks in combat units were under 30 years of age, and that only 11 percent were over 35 years old. Some of these may have also joined to escape the drudgery and boredom of rural barrio life.43 Many rebels sought longer-term objectives that were long common to the peasant movement. The immediate goal of many of the Huks, however, was to escape government repression.44 Taruc believes that most of the Huks did not see the insurgency as a "military rebellion," but as "resistance to the resurgent reaction."45 Government assessments of the movement categorized it as consisting of four layers: 1)the Huk regulars or hardcore. These were the full-time, armed guerrillas; 2)the combat support group. These were the "12-hour Huks," civilians by day and Huks by night. They provided security and executed punitive missions; 3)the service group or legal cadres. This group performed unarmed missions, and consisted of barrio captains and low-level officials, couriers, spies, tax collectors, and supply personnel; and 4)the mass base. These were civilians who materially supported the movement.46 The Huk membership can also be categorized by their degree of support for the HMB. First, some Huks participated directly in the underground government or the guerrilla army. These direct participants conducted the day-to-day Huk operations. A second type of supporter was those villagers who did not particpate di- rectly in the HMB, but provided assistance through the contribu- tion of food, supplies, and information. A final category was people who were unintentionally caught in the middle between the Huk guerrillas and the government forces. They tried to keep a balance between the two sides and provided assistance to both forces. The exact size of each of these categories is unknown. Huk regulars, combat support personnel, and legal cadres were obviously part of the first category. The mass base consisted of the second category. During the years of peak Huk strength, how- ever, many of the residents of central Luzon belonged to the first two categories.47 Huk Expansion and Strength Finally, this chapter will examine Huk expansion and strength. First to join the Huk movement in 1946 were the Hukba- lahap veterans. Taruc claims that the Huks soon had 10,000 fully- armed veterans, with 2,000 organizers, activists, and sympathi- zers.48 This is plausible, given that Hukbalahap wartime strength was in this vicinity (see Figure 14). Note that estimates vary widely, given the difficulties of categorizing Huk personnel and supporters, as well as the clandestine, decen- tralized nature of guerrilla warfare). Philippine officials esti- mated in 1946 that the Huk army numbered about 10,000.49 Colonel Napoleon Valeriano, a well-known army officer who successfully fought against the Huks, perhaps overestimated Huk strength at this time to be 18,000 to 20,000 full-time armed regulars and 250,000 supporters.50 Huklandia at this time was confined primarily to the four central Luzon provinces of Pampanga, Tarlac, Nueva Ecija, and Bulacan (see Figure 15 - "Huklandia" 1946). In his memoirs, Taruc estimated Huk strength in 1948 to also be 10,000. Leaders had difficulty estimating the number, partly because members went back and forth between underground barrio organizations and armed guerrilla groups.51 Various esti- mates of the Huk strength at this time generally agree that their active strength was about 19,000, of which some 10,000 were armed. The mass base probably did not exceed 55,000.52 Taruc may have initially overestimated the number of Huks under arms. Re- gardless, the Huk movement had grown significantly between 1946 and 1948. Click here to view image One estimate of Huk strength in 1949 claimed 12,000 armed regulars with the support of over 100,000 sympathizers.53 By 1950, Taruc claimed 25,000 full-time armed guerrillas with a mass base of 2 million.54 In his memoirs, Taruc later revised his fi- gure to 15,000 full-time, armed regulars.55 This figure is more realistic, as it coincides with the estimate of Edward Lansdale - who was Magsaysay's advisor.56 Magsaysay estimated that there were 1 million Huk supporters at this time.57 These estimates of 1950 probably represent peak Huk or HMB strength. By this time, Pomeroy claimed that the Huks had bases in 27 provinces.58 While Pomeroy's claim is probably overoptimistic, at their peak the Huks encompassed all of central Luzon, most of southern Luzon, and had enclaves on northeastern Luzon, Panay Island in the Visayas, and Mindanao (see Figure 16 - "Huklandia" 1950).59 By far, the strongest Regional Commands were RECOs 1, 2, 3 (central Luzon), and 4 (southern Luzon). The other RECOs, even at the peak of the rebellion, had just a few hundred armed guerrillas, many of whom had traveled to these areas from central Luzon on "expansion missions." These other RECOs depended on the central Luzon organizations for supplies and recruits; since the Huks in the peripheral RECOs were usually not indigenous to these areas, they never enjoyed strong support from local peasant organizations or within the barrios.60 The years 1949 to 1951 represented the peak of the Huk movement. By 1952, there were about 4,000 armed Huks.61 In May 1954, Huk leader Luis Taruc surrendered, and that year is generally considered to be the end of the Huk rebellion. While a few die-hard Huks remained after 1954, the movement essentially Click here to view image died. Of the overall 25,000 Filipinos who fought in the Huk ranks in the 1950 to 1955 period, Philippine Army records show that 6,874 were killed, 4,702 were captured, and 9,458 Huks surrendered. By 1965, less than 75 so-called Huks remained.62 The New People's Army Unified planning, centralized control and a single point of responsibility are the very minimum requirements for a unity of effort which will offer success against a unified revolutionary movement...Unity of effort is however extremely difficult to achieve because it represents the fusion of civil and military functions to fight battles which have primarily political objectives...All the political, economic, psychological and military means must be marshalled as weapons under centralized co-ordination and direction.... John McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War Organization of the CPP-NPA The organization of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) provided for in the party constitution, is typical of Communist party organizations. Like the old PKP, the CPP has a theoretical National Congress, an existing Central Committee, Political Bureau (Politburo), Executive Committee, and Secretari- at (see Figure 17), which depicts the CPP as it existed in 1980, with 13 Regional Party Committees or RPC's). The party organizational structure has been modified since the earlier days of the PKP in order to carry out functions more effectively.63 The Central (National) Committee, headed by Rodolfo Salas (alias Commander Bilog), functions for the non-existent National Congress and is the highest decisionmaking body. This committee directly supervises the Military Commission (MC) and the National Commission for Mindanao (NCM). The Executive Committee, probably smaller in size than the Central Committee, has been empowered to Click here to view image decide on major political policies and organizational plans when- ever the Central Committee is unable to meet as a body. The Poli- tical Bureau (Politburo) and the Secretariat are under the Execu- tive Committee. The Secretariat directly supervises five bureaus and commissions: National Commission for Organization (NCO); Na- tional Commission for Education (NCE); National Finance Bureau (NFB); National Liaison Bureau (NLB); and the International Liai- son Commission (ILC).64 These seven commissions and bureaus have some resemblance to the four or five departments of the PKP. The National Education Department and National Organization Department of the PKP have been elevated to CPP commissions. This has probably been done to distinguish them from regional organs and to project an image of growth. Two other CPP bodies under the Secretariat are bureaus: the National Finance Bureau and the National Liaison Bureau. The NFB probably has functions similar to the PKP's Na- tional Finance Department; the NLB may have taken over some of the functions of the PKP's National Organization Department, pos- sibly to oversee relations with front organizations or more like- ly with non-CPP Filipino organizations. The International Liaison Commission, also under the CPP Secretariat, probably oversees re- lations with non-Filipino organizations. Thus far, there is no evidence of significant external support for the New People's Ar- my (this aspect is detailed in Chapter 7). The ILC may be a latent body for future relations with foreign organizations. The placing of two CPP commissions under the direct con- trol of the Central Committee probably reflects a desire to more tightly control both bodies. The Military Commission probab- ly has functions similar to the PKP's National Military Depart- ment. The National Commission for Mindanao, a new body, reflects the importance that the CPP places on this southern island. The NCM probably oversees operations on Mindanao and relations with the Moro National Liberation Front. In 1980, the CPP had 13 Regional Party Committees (RPCs), similar to the 10 or so RECOs of the PKP. The following RPCs are depicted in Figure 17: Northeast Luzon (NELRPC); Northwest Luzon (NWLRPC); Eastern Central Luzon (CELRPC); Western Central Luzon (CWLRPC); Manila-Rizal (MRRPC); Southern Tagalog (STRPC); Bicol (BRPC); Eastern Visayas (EVRPC); Western Visayas (WVRPC); Northern Central Mindanao (NCMRPC); Western Mindanao (WMRPC); Eastern Mindanao (EMRPC); and Southern Mindanao (SMRPC).65 In 1977, the CPP-NPA had 8 RPCs and a main base on Lu- zon.66 Three years later, the number of RPCs increased to 13.67 According to Central Committee figures, the number of RPCs in- creased from 12 to 17 during the period 1980 to 1983.68 The 17-member CPP Central Committee, probably located somewhere on Luzon, directs insurgent efforts throughout the country.69 A pyramid of hierarchical CPP-NPA organizations implements its policies. The committee prides itself on maintaining centralized control without sacrificing flexibility and local initiative. Captured documents indicate that subordinate Region, District, Section, and Branch committees correspond to the government's administrative subdivisions of Region, Province, Municipality, and Barangay (see Figure 18 - The Party (CPP) and Army (NPA) Relationship, and Figure 19 - Click here to view image Organization of the Philippine Government). A Front, an echelon between Re
