The Somali Dispute: Kenya Beware
SUBJECT AREA Strategic Issues
The Somali Dispute: Kenya Beware
Rudoph V. Wiggins, PhD
In Partial Fulfillment of Requirements
for Written Communications
The Marine Corps Command and Staff College
Major Tom L. Wanambisi
April 6, 1984
The Somali Dispute: Kenya Beware
On June 26, 1960, hardly four days after the British Government granted
the former British Somaliland her independence to become the Somalia
Republic, the new government declared her desires to unite all the Somali
speaking people in the Horn of Africa.
As the Somalis see it, writes Mr. John Drysdale:
"Their frontier dispute is not essentially about land alone
but the people."1
The nomadic Somali speaking people who by colonial boundary "arrange-
ments" found themselves dismembered. About two-thirds of them live under
the national flag of the Somalia Republic and the remainder are divided
between Djibouti (former French Somaliland), Ethiopia and Kenya. This
historical error prompted the first Somalis President, Dr. Abdirashid Ali
Sharmarky to say this:
"No! Our misfortune is that our neighboring countries, with
whom we seek to promote constructive and harmonious relations
are not our neighbors but our Somali kinsmen whose citizen-
ship has been falsified by indiscriminate boundary "arrangements".
They have to move across artificial frontiers to their pasture
lands. They occupy the same terrain and pursue the same
pastoral economy as overselves. We speak the same language.
We sare the same God, the same culture and the same traditions.
How can we regard our brothers as foreigners?"2
On the other hand, both the Ethopian and the Kenyan Governments consider
their Somali population as just one of the minority communities living
within our borders and are, therefore, bonafide citizens. The governments
regard any external pressure as infringement in internal matters of a
sovereign state. They further consider any desire by the Somali people to
break away and possibly unite with Somalia as seditious. The support,
material or moral given to the Somalis to enable them to fight by the Somalia
Government is viewed as infringement of territorial integrity. And, in the
words of President Kenyatta: "Kenya will never surrender any inch of her
territory to anyone.3
The Portion Under Dispute
One, Robert Paul Jordan, an American journalist once wrote:
"The Horn of Africa is a most inhospitable place. A harsh
land this is. Not a desert, but close. High arid country
mostly--a Savannah of acacias, patches of grass, thorny
shrubs, tall ant-hills and rocks. When the scanty rains
fall, it runs cruel. Then, sheep and goats slowly die.
The barrens are strewn with their carcasses."4
This portion of land is, no doubt, desolate but strategically located. The
area consists of a large triangular land mass which juts eastwards into the
Indian Ocean to the south of the Arabian peninsula. One side of the
triangle extends westward from the "Horn" along the Gulf of Aden to
Djibouti. The second leg runs in a southerly direction from Djibouti over
the Eastern Highlands of the Great Rift Valley (Ogaden Province of Ethiopia)
to the mouth of the River Tana on the Kenyan East Coast. See Map.
By way of comparison, this vast land is about three times the size of
New Mexico. It is virtually isolated from the rest of Africa by the high
mountains in the west of the Great Rift Vally. These inland mountains are
similar to California's Sierra Nevada range in that they obstruct the
prevailing westerly winds. Precipitation occurs as the moisture-ladden air
mass rises over the mountains but very little rain falls on the eastern
slopes including the Ogaden plains. Consequently, most of the region is
nearly as dry as the Great Amerian Desert. The only two rivers, the
Shebele and Juba,flow from the high mountains southeastward into the Indian
Ocean near the Port of Kismayu. They are perennial rivers. Although part
of the River Juba is navigable, Shebele is not. It terminates in marshland
near the town of Jowhari before reaching the ocean.
The portion between the two rivers is the best farmland in the area
producing sugar cane, vegetables, bananas, sorgum and millet. However,
sometimes the rains do not come, such was the case--a prolonged drought in
1980 in which both the rivers ran dry for the first time in memory.5 Drought
is even more prevalent to the north along the coast. It averages only two
inches of rain a year.
Although similar dry weather prevails throughout the area resulting in a
parched landscape, the few ancient wells and occasional rains do provide
some relief. This brings life to the hardy patches of grass which support
the herds of sheep, goats, and camels.
Before I take the reader to a historical background, let me focus a
little on the specific contested portions. As I mentioned earlier, the
Somalia Government considers the Ogaden Province of Ethiopia and the North-
eastern Province of Kenya as forming part of the "Greater Somalia" domain.6
The idea of "Greater Somalia" was conceived in the mind of Mr. Bevin, then
Britain's Foreign Secretary after World War II, who in 1946 proposed to the
House of Commons in London to consider lumping together the British
Somaliland, Italian Somaliland and adjacent parts of Ethiopia into a trust
territory.7 So that, in Mr. Bevin's won words:
"The nomads should live their frugal existence with the least
possible hinderance. They could have a chance to live a decent
Ten days after Mr. Bevin introduced this proposal in the House of Commons,
the British administrators in Somaliland organized meetings to inform the
people the "good news" about their future.9 As it will be learned later,
this pre-emptive move would embarrass the British Government and create a
living but volatile problem in the Horn of Africa.
An Ancient Heritage
The Somalis are a Hamitic people whose ancestors are believed to have
immigrated from the Arabian peninsula long age. They came to settle on the
biblical land of "Punt", the ancient "Aromatic Kingdom" renowned for its
frankincense and myrrh.10 Their traditional geneologies trace the ancestry to
Arab forebears who belonged to the Quraysh tribe of the Prophet Mohamed, and
ultimately they claim belong to a common ancestor.11 The Somali Prime
Minister, Dr. Abdirashid Sharmarky once said:
"Our misfortunes do not stem from the unproductiveness of the
soil, nor from a lack of mineral wealth. These limitations
on our material well-being were accepted and compensated for
by our forefathers from whom we inherited, among other things,
a spiritual and cultural prosperity of inestimable value. The
teaching of Islam on the one hand and lyric poetry on the
At least 65% of the population live a nomadic life style. Moving from place
to place within their homeland in search of water and grazing areas for
their livestock is their way of life. Professor Mesfin Wolde Mariam, Head
of the Geography Department of Ehtiopia's Haile Selassie I University,
described the Somalis as exhibiting:
"External individualism and utter lack of discipline. The
acute struggle for existence in this harsh environment often
expresses itself in group conflicts over wells or grazing
Although largely illiterate and poor, Somalis regard themselves as
superior to adjacent groups. This arrogance stems from the ethnic
homogeneity shared by all Muslims in the Horn.14 Although dispersed in the
four different countries (the Somalia Democratic Republic, Ethiopia, Kenya
and Djibout) the Somalis common language, religion, and cultural heritage
provide a strong sense of unity which is truly rare and, therefore, gives
them an advantage.
The Colonial Legacy
Prior to the European colonization of the Horn in the second half of
the nineteenth century, the region had been ruled by indigenous tribal
chiefs. The Sheiks and Sultans whose relatively small, semi-autonomons
dominions paid grudging difference to Ethiopian hegemony. For over three
centuries, despite periods of neglect and frequent uprisings, Ehthiopia had
maintained its independence and authority over most parts of the Horn.15 The
Ethiopian influence, however, varied over years as the Somalis resented
their domination. This resentment was consequently exploited by several
European nations to gain their initial control in the Horn.
The initial British interest in the Horn was on the Somalia Coast for
strategic and logistical reasons. After the British had annexed Aden in
1840, treaties were signed with local chiefs to guarantee the continuous
supply of cattle from inland to feed the garrisons. The opening of the Suez
Canal in 1869 increased the strategic importance of the area and;
consequently, the British entered other long term agreements which gave them
possession of the port of Berbera and several other offshore inlands.
Britain immediately assigned consuls at Berbera, Seylec and Bulhar to
protect her interests.16 She gaines automatic control of the area and
especially the sea links between India and the Suez. These accomplishments
were achieved by exploiting local grievances such as one described in 1892
confidential British diplomatic dispatch to London which read:
"Sheikh Sufi states - The Abysinians read, "Ethiopians" are
always on one side of us, the English on the other. We
(Ogaden tribes) are with the English, and we wish for
English rule. We are your children.
I say that, as a sheep quivers under the blow of a knife,
we, the Ogaden, are quivering under the oppressions of the
Abysinians, who have every year, for the last nine years,
visited us and levied large numbers of sheep, goats, horse,
camels and taken what they liked from us. We have no guns
and are not powerful enough to fight and must submit.
Last season the Abysinians (drove) off all livestock; 990
men, women and children perished. We are Mullahs and we like
to tell the truth."17
The British made use of similar circumstances to gain influence in the area,
including the colonization of the region to the south into the present day
Kenya and Uganda. This expansion had been sanctioned by the Berlin
Conference of 1884/85.18
By the same token, the French and Italians had also established
colonies. The French acquired a colonial foothold in the northwest along
the coast of Aden in 1885 (present day Djibout) which they initially called
French Somaliland. This colony was strategically placed. Its port City of
Djibout was the terminus of Ethiopia's only rail link to the sea. Thus, the
French could easily cut off this access if the need arose and Ethiopia would
The Italians would have appreciated that kind of leverage in their own
dealings with Ethiopians. Italian efforts to subdue Ethiopians were
frustrated when Ethiopian Emperor Menelik II dealt a humiliating blow at the
Italian Army at Odawa in 1896.19 However, the Italians contented with
establishing colonies in Eritrea and Italian Somaliland.
It took many years before the European colonial powers finally gave up
their influence on the Horn. The French agreed to grant Djibout
independence in 1977 (although they still garrison troops there). The
former British and Italian Somaliland joined to form the present day Somalia
Republic in July 1960.
As it stood, the government was not happy. It had inherited
colonial boundaries which were not compatible with the ethnic Somali
peoples' ideals for "Greater Somalia". That is probably the most important
legacy of the colonial era. An era that has created the present day tension
and conflict in the Horn. This situation regretably may continue as long as
the Somali people seek to unite at the expense of their neighbors.
Arms Build Up
At her independence, Somalia had a weak Army of 5,000 men. This force
was inferior to meet her political objectives. She approached the Soviet
Government in 1963 for assistance. The Soviet Government responded by
lending her equivalent to the United States dollars 32 million. By 1969
Somalia had trained about 800 officers in the Soviet military schools. She
had recruited, trained and equipped 23,000 regular men.20 By 1976 she had
acquired the following equipment in her military inventory.
Click here to view image
With a total force of 23,000 men in the Army, 1,000 in the Air Force
(Aeronautical) about 550 in the Navy, 8,000 in the Police and 10,000 Victory
Pioneers of popularly known as Peoples' Militia, Somalia declared a silent
war against Ethiopia in June 1977.22 Why? To annex "Ogaden" as part of her
The Ogaden War
As the new military government in Ethiopia (after the overthrow of
Emperor Haile Selassie) was sorting out the mess at home, including
suppression of Eritreans who wanted to breakaway to the north, the Western
Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF) also stepped up its attacks to the south
against the overstretched Ethiopian Army outpost in the Ogaden Province. In
July 1977 these guerrilla forces were joined by the Soviet equipped and
trained Regular Somalia Army. This surprise attack was highly successful in
the initial stages. The highly taxed Ethiopian Army had been pushed back to
Dire Dawa within three months.
It was at this point in time that the desperate Ethiopians requested
help from the Soviet Union to counter both the Samalis and Eritrean rebal
forces. The Soviets responded quickly by airlifting in a huge amount of
supplies and Cuban troops. In March 1978 with the assistance of East
Germany, Soviet advisors and Cuban troop, the besieged Ethiopians regained
the offensive and drove the Somalia forces all the way back to their border.
Somalia losses were significant. It is estimated that Somalia lost about
8,000 troops--at least one-third of the prewar army strength, 75% of its
tank force and nearly half of its combat aircrafts.23
Although the Somalia National Army was defeated decisively in the Ogaden
War, recent events have indicated a stepped up guerrilla activity by the
Western Somalia Liberation Front with the backing of the military
government. Thus, the fighting still goes on. What would have happened if
Somalia decided to attack Kenya first?
The Shifta War in Kenya
The British Government on realizing that the would-be Kenya Government
would not accept the terms set by some British officials in the 1960's,
decided to take a different approach. Series of meetings were organized
including one in August 1963 in Rome to resolve the issue. The British
Government stand was spelled out by Mr. Peter Thomas as follows:
"Since the British Government would be responsible for Kenya
only a few more months (before her independence in December
1963), the British Government considers that it would be
wrong to take a unilateral decision about the frontiers of
Kenya without reference to the wishes of the government of
that country; and that agreement should be sought by the
African governments concerned working and negotiating within
an African framework."24
The Somalia delegation led by then, Prime Minister Dr. Abdirashid Sharmarky
were disappointed to learn at their first meeting that the British
Government had no intention of making any constructive proposals. He
"The British had only convened the meeting to explore the
position of the Somalia Republic, which was in any case well
known to them."25
In conclusion, the Somalia Government states:
"It was evident that the British Government has not only
deliberately misled the Somalia Government during the course
of the last eighteen months, but has also deceitfully
encouraged the people of North Eastern Province to believe
that their right to self-determination could be granted by
the British Government through peaceful and legal means. The
responsibility for the consequences that may follow this
suppression of a fundamental human right lies squarely on
the British Government."26
Shortly after this, the Somalia Government recalled her Ambassador from
Britain and severed diplomatic relations. The Somali people residing in the
North Eastern Province boycotted the elections, took arms, and demanded
For us Kenyans, the Somalis demand that we give up approximately 45,000
square miles of our territory (approximately a fifth of the land mass), not
only is it unacceptable but also violates our Constitution and the OAU
Charter. The Kenyan view was and continues to be similar to that expressed
by the majority of the Organization of African Unit member countries:
"Thus, in almost every country in Africa, there are minority
groups having racial, religious or tribal affinities with
The conference that met in Addis Ababa Ethiopia in 1963 to resolve the
boundary issue resloved:
"Countries with widely diverse populations would be quickly
dismembered if each ethnic group was allowed to go its own
way under the banner of self-determination. The resulting
partitioning would create a chaotic potpourri of tiny,
nonviable"Nations" toally incapable of providing even the
barest of government services."28
At the conclusion of the conference, the Somali President Osman had the
following to say:
"By becoming united, the Somali people feel that not only
would their welfare be secured, but that as a single entity
they would be able to contribute effectively to the ideals
of African unity. The people of the Republic cannot be
expected to remain indifferent to the appeal of its brethren.
If the Somalis in those areas are given the opportunity to
express their will freely, the government pledges itself to
accept the verdict."29
The Somalia Government was, to speak the least, "very dissastisfied" with the
result of the meeting. The North Eastern Region therefore became the site
for small but intensive skirmishes between the Somalia supported guerrillas
and the (independent)Kenyan Army. For four years the war continued with
neither side being able to gain political advantage. Diplomatic efforts to
end the fighting were unsuccessful as the Somalia Government ignored the
organization of African Unit (OAU) call to withdraw her support from the
guerrillas. This prompted the Kenyatta Government to sign a "Mutual Defense
Treaty" (MDT) with the Emperor Haile Selassie's Government in 1964. The
treaty still had little impact on the war as the Kenyan Army could not
effectiviely control the materiel supply routes from Somalia to the
Finally in 1967, the Kenyan Government decided to control the movement
of local inhabitants by constructing fourteen "Manyattas"--villages which
were guarded by troops. Fortunately, this action had tremendous effect on
the guerrilla activities and in October 1967 the Kenyan Government signed a
"Memorandum of Understanding" with the Somalia Government ending the Shifta
War. The ceasefire to me was not totally due to the "Manyatta" scheme but
rather to the high costs of the protracted conflict. The new Somalia
Government decided to terminate what had become a futile and expensive
national burden which they could not afford anymore.
Although the fighting had stopped, Somalia did not renounce its
territorial claims. Instead a low intensity campagin still continues and
the future may well see a resumption of a major conflit. Kenya beware.
Even after Somalia's defeat in the Ogaden War, she still retains one of
the largest armed forces in the Horn; comprising of about 50,000 men in the
National Army, 1,000 in the Air Force (Aeronautical Corps) and 550 in the
Navy. She restructured her major commands in 1981 into three regionally
defined corps: seven infantry divisions each composed of three
armored/mechanized brigades, sixteen infantry brigades, three comando
brigades and twenty-three artillery battalions. As Air Force (Aeronautical
Corps) of four tactical strike squadrons and one transport squadron. A Navy
of twenty vessels including ten fast attack crafts (FAC).30
Although most of the Soviet supplied and serviced equipment is claimed
to be in poor serviceable state, Somalia still husbands a formidable force
in the Horn capable of being reactivated upon receipt of resources.
Supposing Somalia decided to go offensive once more, who are likely to
support her or who are likely to be her allies?
Somalia still has a number of wealthy friendly nations who would
come to her aid. Egypt has had long historical ties with Somalia dating
back into the 18th century. During the Ogaden War and precisely the North
Eastern Region skirmishes, Egypt supplied certain combat items to sustain
the war. Even after Somalia cut diplomatic relations with Russia, Egypt
undertook to supply some spare parts from her own Soviet stockpiles.
Somalia joined the Arab League nations in 1974. Being a predominantly
Moslem state, she attracts sympthy from wealthy Arab countries. Saudi
Arabia has become increasingly interested in the Somalia's affair not only
for political reasons but also strategic and economic. Kuwait has invested
heavily in power stations in Mogadishu and Iraq has been supplying her with
crude oil.31 Somalia also maintains cordial relationship with the Sudan.
Although Somalia broke relations with Russia, she still maintains good
relations with Rumania for ecomomic aid.32 China has maintained cordial
relations with Somalia since 1961. She receives both economic aid and
military. For instance in 1978, after severing diplomatic relations with
Moscow and suffering defeat in the Ogaden War, Siad Barre desperately
visited China to seek emergency military and economic help. China responded
with a token shipment of light arms, spare parts and materiel equivalent to
American dollars 18 million.33 Accordingly, she supplied her with thirty
Chinese F-6 fighter bombers in 1981.34 North Korea has also remainded on good
terms with Somalia providing a cement plant, iron foundry, vegetable oil
factory and a technical college.35 Although Italy discontinued assisting
Somalia, she resumed economic and military aid in 1977. Perhaps, one single
but major supplier of the needed economic and military aid now is the United
States. With the increased tension in the Persian Gulf area and the Soviet
presence in both Alghanistan and Ethiopia, the United States was compelled
to reinforce its presence in the Indian Ocean to safeguard her strategic
national interests. To do so, she sought access to military facilities at
Berbera and adjacent airfields. Agreement was reached in 1980 covering the
use of the facilities, refurbishing of the port and in exchange the United
States agreed to provide economic aid and military credits over two years
for the purchase of twelve M-167 (towed) Vulcan 20mm AD gunds, three TPS-43
long range AD radars and associated communication equipment. These were
supplied in 1981.36 For Kenyans, who is likely to come to our aid when we
Potential for Conflict
Although the large scale fighting in the Horn has gone down, guerrilla
(can not read word)continue unabated. The underlying cause of conflict remain
unsolved and are most likely to provoke further fighting in the future.
Recently, the two Heads of State pleaded for mutual cooperation and
understanding to enhance development for the good of all the people in the
area. But, nothing was said about Somalia's expansion ambitions. Somalia
has not renounced her territorial aggression. Who knows the exact answer?
It is my opinion that the Somalia officials are buying time. Time to
rebuilt their shattered economy, restructure, retrain, rearm their huge
armed forces and obtain economic support from whatever source, and as soon
as they are ready, they may declare war, this time probably against Kenya.
In conclusion, I would like to make two fitting quotations from the
recent speech of President Ronald Reagan in November 1983 when he visited
the Republic of South Korea and addressed members of the United States Army
"For the United States, the military strength will never
be an end in itself; nor will military strength alone
give us the means to achieve our ends. The freedom and
prosperity we seek for ourselves...cannot be created or
imposed by force. If we lack sufficient force to deter
or counter the hostile use of force, then we would have no
chance of preserving the peace. And without peace we
cannot have freedom or prosperity. It is the paradox of
peace that to preserve it, we must be prepared to use force
and use it successfully. Only if we can convince any
potential adversary that the cost of aggression would be
far higher than any possible benefit can we be certain that
aggression will be deterred and the peace be preserved."37
The Kenya Defense Force Mission is defensive and the government
articulates it thus. Accordingly, may I quote President Reagan's address:
"Our policy is defensive. United States uses its military
force only in response to clear threats to stability and
peace. We pursue this policy knowing fully that our
defensive posture grants several military advantages to a
potential aggressor. He can choose when, where and how to
attack. He can formulate a detailed plan for his operations
to take maximum advantage of his strengths and exploit our
vulnerabilities. He can also mask his pre-attack mobiliza-
tion efforts under the guise of training exercise or
diplomatic crises so that any advance warning we might get
could be cloaked to ambiguity."38
I conclude that the Somalia border dispute requires a deliberate
solution and urgently. It cannot in my view be achieved by mere expressions
of brotherhood. Rather, it could be achieved by a more genuine and honest
approach by both governments without external influence. Kenya beware.
1. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964.
2. Drysdale, John., The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964,
Introduction, p. 8.
3. Presidential Address to the Nation on "Kenyatta Day, 20th October,
1965". The Standard Paper.
4. Jordan, Robert Paul. "Somalia's Hour of Need", National Geographic,
June 1981, p. 748.
5. Szaz, Z. Michael. "Somalia's Difficulties", The New York Times,
September 28, 1981, p. 14
6. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964.
7. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964. Capter 6,
8. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964. Capter 6,
9. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964. Capter 6,
10. Lewis, Ian M. The Modern History of Somaliland. New York: Praeger,
1965, Chapter 1.
11. Lewis, Ian M. The Modern History of Somaliland. New York: Praeger,
1965, Chapter 1.
12. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964, p. 8.
13. Mariam, Mesfim Wolde. The Background of the Ethio-Somalia Boundary
Dispute. Addis Ababa: Berhanena Selam, 1964.
14. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964.
15. Norden, Hermann. Africa's Lost Empire. Philadelphia, Macrae-Smith, 1930.
16. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, Chapter 2.
17. Bhasdwaj, Raman G. The Dilema of the Horn of Africa. New Delhi:
Sterling Publishers, 1979.
18. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964.
19. Tibbs, Thurlow. Strategic Appraisal of Sub-Saharan Africa. Air Command
and Staff College, Air University, 1981.
20. Harold D. Nelson. Somalia: A Country Study: Foreign Area Studies,
The American University, Chapter 5.
21. Harold D. Nelson. Somalia: A Country Study: Foreign Area Studies,
The American University, Tables 20, 21 and 22 (Major Army Weapons,
Air Force Weapons and Naval Weapons, 1981).
22. Harold D. Nelson. Somalia: A Country Study: Foreign Area Studies,
The American University, Chapter 5.
23. Harold D. Nelson. Somalia: A Country Study: Foreign Area Studies,
The American University, Chapter 5.
24. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964, Chapter 15.
25. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964, p. 155.
26. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964, Chapter 15,
27. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964, Chapter 14,
28. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964, Chapter 14,
29. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964, p. 148.
30. Harold D. Nelson. Somalia: A Country Study: Foreign Area Studies,
The American University, P. XVIII.
31. Harold D. Nelson. Somalia: A Country Study: Foreign Area Studies,
The American University,p. 219.
32. Harold D. Nelson. Somalia: A Country Study: Foreign Area Studies,
The American University, p. 220.
33. Harold D. Nelson. Somalia: A Country Study: Foreign Area Studies,
The American University, p. 222.
34. Harold D. Nelson. Somalia: A Country Study: Foreign Area Studies,
The American University, p. XVIII.
35. Harold D. Nelson. Somalia: A Country Study: Foreign Area Studies,
The American University, p. 223.
36. Harold D. Nelson. Somalia: A Country Study: Foreign Area Studies,
The American University, p. 262.
37. Casper W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense SecDef Annual Report; to
U.S. Congress of March, 1984.
38. Casper W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense SecDef Annual Report; to
U.S. Congress of March, 1984.
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list