El Salvador After 1979: Forces In The Conflict CSC 1984 SUBJECT AREA History WAR SINCE1945 SEMINAR El Salvador After 1979: Forces in the Conflict Major Charles O. Skipper, USMC 2 April 1984 Marine Corps Command and Staff College Marine Corps Development and Education Command Quantico, Virginia 22134 Abstract EL SALVADOR AFTER 1979--FORCES IN THE CONFLICT, by Major Charles Olan Skipper, United States Marine Corps, April 1, 1984. El Salvador is a Central American country with a political history every bit as interrupted with violence as the landscape is marked by volcanoes. The history of the country is one of periods of uneasy stability infrequently interrupted by acts of incredible repression and violence. Today El Salvador again is undergoing a period of unrest and turmoil. There are several opposing views of the situation: one that it is a genuine revolution of the populace, the second that El Salvador is a victim of communist exploitation, and the third that it is a combination of both. This study examines the causes of the conflict and attempts to analyze the motivations and behavior of each of the major participating groups. In this manner it is hoped the study will conclude what is the exact nature of the present conflict and offer some recommendations for its resolution. Though the recorded history of El Salvador goes back hundreds of years, this paper only examines the events which have transpired since October 15, 1979 when a bloodless coup ended 50 years of military dictatorship. The major participating forces in the conflict are analyzed as to how they impact on the conflict as a whole: * The left--Organization, motivation, and objectives. * The church--Its changing role and position between the left and right. * The government--The members, policies and trends of the government, to-include the performance of the armed forces. * The right--Stated objectives, effectiveness, and supporters. * External Influences--The impact on the conflict of pressures on, and support for, the various forces by Western Europe, the CONTADORA Group, Communist Countries, and the United States. The years since the coup have seen El Salvador struggle to maintain an orderly society while fighting a prolonged guerilla war. Approximately 35,000 Salvadoreans have died in this conflict over the past four years, a high percentage for a nation of only five million People. Sadly, the conflict is no closer to resolution now than it was when it began. The guerillas claim elections are fraudulent and want to negotiate power sharing. The government claims elections are honest and power must come from the ballot box. There is no simple solution to the Salvadorean fighting. There are so many complicating forces that solutions will come slowly, if at all. The outcome of the Presidential Election, scheduled for March 25, 1984, most certainly will not end the fighting. This paper does offer some recommendations for the United States Government, as it seeks a role in this conflict. Forward This paper was prepared under the auspices of the Marine Corps Command and Staff Colleges "War Since 1945" seminar The topic was selected by the author and research conducted independently. Accordingly, the opinions and interpretations are flavored based on previous duty assignments and personal experience. The views and opinions expressed are those of the authors and make no attempt to reflect official policy of the Department of Defense or U.S. Government. Due to the limitations of the word processor which was utilized, accent marks for Spanish words were not used. Also, footnotes are shown enclosed in ( ) rather than their normal raised position. One of the difficulties in a project such as this is the continuation of the conflict. Newspapers and magazines continue to publish stories of the significant events as they unfold, often without taking time to ensure absolute accuracy. This being the situation, this paper should only be viewed as a snapshot which was taken in the early spring of 1984. Other "experts" will have to provide the final conclusions after the conflict ends, at some undetermined date in the future. Dedication This paper is dedicated to Gabrielle, Genevieve, and Nathaniel who saw very little of their daddy during the many months he devoted to its completion. Table of Contents Page Abstract i Forward iii Dedication iv Table of Contents v Chapter I: Background 1 Geography 1 Indian Heritage 2 Spanish Rule 3 King Coffee 6 The Matanza 8 The Soccer War 10 Polarization 15 The Coup of 1979 21 Chapter II: The Left 26 Formation of the CRM 26 Evolution of the FDR, DRU, FMLN 29 The Final Offensive 33 Economic and Military Disruption 36 The 1982 Elections 38 Fight or Negotiate 39 Continuing the Fight 41 Chapter III: The Church 44 The Medellin Conference 44 Christian Base Communities 46 The War of the Romeros 47 Assasination of the Archbishop 51 In Search of Unity 53 Chapter IV: The Government 56 The First Junta The Second Junta 61 The Third Junta 64 Provisional President Duarte The Constituent Assembly 75 Problems Within the Military Hierarchy 79 The National Campaign Plan 81 Preparing For Elections 82 Chapter V: The Fight 86 ORDEN 86 FALANGE and UGB 88 FDN 89 ESA 91 The Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez Brigade 92 A Role in Government 93 Pressure From The United States 96 Chapter VI: External Influences 100 Western Europe 100 The CONTADORA Group 101 Communist Countries 105 United States 108 Chapter VII: Conclusions and Recommendations 119 Conclusions 119 Recommendations 121 Notes 124 Bibliography 134 Appendix A: Abbreviations and Acronyms 139 Appendix B: Map of El Salvador 142 "Coffee growers should not anguish over the situation in El Salvador today; there was a similar one in 1932, and if it was solved then it can be now." - Representative of the Frente Unido Cafetalero (coffee plantation owners), March 1980 Chapter I: Background Geography El Salvador is the smallest inland area yet the most densely populated of the Central American Republics. Its area is approximately 82.60 square miles, about the size of the state of Massachusettes. Its population is approximateiy 5 million. The country is bounded on the west by Guatemala, on the north and east by Honduras and on the South by the Pacific Ocean and Nicaragua.(1) El Salvador is the only country in Central America without direct access to the Caribbean Sea. El Salvador is relatively mountainous, with the terrain studded by geologically young volcanoes. These volcanoes, some of which still infrequently erupt, provide the volcanic soil which is so important for the growing of the country's most significant crop--coffee. The climate is generally semitropical and the area is not known to possess significant quantaties of minerals.(2) Most of the population lives in the broad central region of the country which is made up of valleys and plateaus. Almost all the arable land is under cultivation, with the very important coffee crop planted on the mountain slopes.(3) Indian Heritage Prior to the discovery of the new world by Columbus, the land of El Salvador was shared by two distinct peoples. Their domains were separated by the Lempa River, which runs generally from north to south and splits the country in half. In the mountainous western portion of the country lived the Pipil Indians, who were related to the Aztecs of Mexico. To the east lived the Mayans. Both of these peoples had a relatively advanced degree of civilization.(4) In fact, the Pipils were one of the few Indian groups to abolish human sacrifice early in their history.(5) The early indian inhabitants of El Salvador had a well organized agricultural life. They grew maize, beans, squash and other crops for subsistence, and for trade used cocoa. No one owned the land, which was redistributed by the local village chiefs as needed. Public granaries were used to ensure that both shortages and abundance were shared on an equal basis. The early indian residents did not just live on and farm the land. Rather, their entire lifestyle was tied to the land. Corn was regarded as a god, cocoa was considered sacred, and the land was a goddess. Ritual and magic were totally integrated into each step of the agricultural cycle.(6) Labor was well divided so that the land was not just worked, but respected. Spanish Rule In 1524 the famous conquistador Pedro de Alvarado was sent from Mexico by Hernan Cortes to conquer the area. He was forced to retreat by the Pipil forces, but he returned in 1525 and was successful after many bloody battles. He succeeded in bringing the district under control of the Captaincy General of Guatemala, where it remained until 1821.(7) The conquistadors subjugated, exploited, and nearly killed off the indians because of the diseases they introduced into the region and their system of exploitation. Indians were forced to leave their native villages and move to the haciendas of their Spanish masters. They were given a milpa, or garden plot, and a house. There they worked in fields that belonged to the hacienda, rented their house, and purchased food and clothing from their masters. By making the indians increasingly indebted, the landowners soon transformed these once proud people into virtual slaves. As more and more of the indian villages were absorbed into nearby haciendas, the native population declined such that not until the 1890's did it return to its early 16th century level.(8) These efforts to fit the indians into the Spanish economy did appear to have some benefits. Indians were Christianized, made to conform to Spanish laws and customs, and received some degree of protection from the Spanish colonists by the laws. However, there were also tremendous negative effects. The indian peasants were economically exploited. Their society, which was united by common religious cultural and ethnic traits, was replaced by a totally alien Spanish culture.(9) With intermarriage and interbreeding, eventually a conglomerate race evolved known in Spanish as the mestizos: part Indian, part European. In Central America mestizos are known as Ladinos. Today in El Salvador Ladinos make up over 90% of the population. In reality the difference between Ladino and Indian is not a racial one. Those who take up European ways are Ladinos, those who take up native indian ways are Indians.(10) Within the Spanish Empire was the kingdom of Guatemala. This kingdom was comprised of six provinces which now make up the nations of Central America and part of Mexico. Each province had a governor who was subordinate to the Captain General, who ruled from the City of Guatemala. The Captain General was subordinate to the Viceroy of New Spain, who ruled from Mexico City. In 1821 El Salvador and the other Central American nations declared their independence from Spain. This action was based on the fact that Mexico had become a republic, and the Central American nations wanted to duplicate this event. It was natural for the newly independent Mexico to attempt to bring Central America under its control. In an attempt to resist this El Salvador's congress sent an appeal to the United States and on November 22, 1822, in the Act of Annexation, formally declared itself a state of the United States. The Emperor of Mexico, Austin de Iturbide, resisted this action however, and the United States Congress rejected the petition. While El Salvador continued to fight Mexican military forces sent to enforce its membership in Mexico's Central American Union, a revolution in Mexico ousted Emperor Iturbide in February 1823. The new Mexican Congress soon voted to allow the Central American provinces self determination, and in 1823 the "United Provinces of Central America" was formed. Consisting of Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaraqua, and Costa Rica, Guatemala City was made the capital and in 1825 Manuel Jose Arce was the first president.(11) Due to selfishness, ideological differences, and despotic rule the Central American state was dissolved in 1838 and El Salvador became an independent Republic. Between 1842 and 1862 there were at least eight attempts for reunification, but rivalries and jealosies blocked any chance at success. Even to this day, organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS) have failed to solve most problems that exist between these countries.(12) King Coffee Whereas Indigo was the chief crop during colonial times, Gerardo Barrios, President of El Salvador from 1859-1863, estabiished the coffee industry.(13) As coffee became more popular, the situation developed which created the social and economic elite. As the noted Central American historian Harald Jung says: Betweeen 1880 and 1912, the common lands of the villages in the hilly volcanic regions were for the most part sold to urban middle and uppper class families at giveaway prices, a small portion alone being distributed among the villagers. Since the coffee tree needs five years growth before its first harvest, its cultivation is only possible for persons with a certain amount of capital, and hardly at all for small farmers, for whom the land has to provide their basic foodstuffs. Right from the beginning, therefore, coffee was concentrated pre-eminently in the hands of a small and realatively rich coffee bourgeoisie owning large estates.(14) The patterns of life which evolved for the campesinos was to farm a small plot of land, either as squatters or colonos (on the hacienda). These small plots were insufficient for the most basic food, clothing and medicine needs of the peasant's family so the men became migratory. They would follow the harvest, first working coffee during its reason and later sugarcane or cotton during its season. Meanwhile they hoped their corn was ripening back on their milpa. This migratory life style created social havoc. The women and children lived alone in cardboard cartons and other makeshift shelters. There they waited each year for their men to return. If not their own man, then any man who could support them. Each year, with the same regularity as the agricultural cycle, men came and went--leaving behind pregnant women. Increasingly, the men changed masters or drifted off to cities in search of work so that by the 1930's the family structure of the campesinos was ruined. Numerous documented studies in the 1920's and 1930's reported that between 50-60% of all births in El Salvador were illegitimate.(15) Although the coffee economy benefited the economic elite and was disruptive to the cultural and economic existence of the indians and ladinos, there can be little doubt the coffee also provided many jobs. It also earned foreign exchange for the country, provided revenue for central and local government, and financed the construction of roads, bridges, and railroads.(16) This period gave rise to the Los Catorce (Fourteen Families), who owned most of the land and controlled political power. Even today the perception continues of the Fourteen Families as the El Salvador oligarchy that controls the export crops, in particular coffee. (Experts now estimate there is actually 200-300 families in this oligarchy, but there can be little doubt that traditionally the wealth of the land in El Salvador has been controlled by the few.) As coffee prices increased, through the 1920's, there was generally political stability and the presidency changed hands peacefully with regular 4-5 year terms.(17) The Matanza This relatively stable period in El Salvador's history ended in the 1930's with the economic disaster of the depression in the industrialized world which caused coffee prices to drop by 50%. Fueled by years of social and economic exploitation, in 1930 farm workers formed a communist organization, the Federacion Regional de Trabajadores. (FRTS--Regional Federation of Salvadoran Workers). In April 1930 they collected 50,000 signatures to a petition demanding a "worker's law" that would guarantee farm contracts and minimum wage. On May Day 1930, 80,000 workers and peasants marched into San Salvador demanding minimum wages for farm workers ahd relief centers for the unemployed. President Don Pio Romero Bosque tried to take steps to reduce discontent, but he was unsuccessful. Alarmed by the success of the Marxist FRTS, the government on August 12, 1930 passed a decree prohibiting worker's rallies and the printing or circulation of Marxist propaganda. Through August and September the government backed its words by fining and jailing many campesinos, including communist chief Augustin Farabundo Marti. In an attempt to regain his popularity, Don Pio made the unprecedented decision to open up the electoral campaign to all parties. The Labor Movement ran Don Arturo Araujo, a well educated engineer who was a leader of popular discontent. Declared the winner on February 12, 1931 he had many problems to solve due to the demands of the workers, the military, the oligarchy, and the depression. He selected General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez as vice president and minister of war. Araujo was a failure, and on December 2, 1931 the military took over by a coup d'etat. Since Martinez had been the previous vice-president, apparent pressure from Washington had him installed as provisional chief of state until elections were held. After taking office on December 10, 1931 Martinez immediately used the police, guardia, army, and judges in an attempt to crush the labor movement.(18) The municipal and legislative elections which were held in early January 1932 were characterized by fraud, violence, and manipulation. The military government then refused to allow the marxist candidates who won in the election to assume their seats in the government. The marxist leaders then called for simultaneous uprisings in the cities, countryside, and military garrisons. Three days before the uprising Augustin Farabundo Marti and other marxist leaders were arrested, but the uprising continued on schedule.(19) On January 22, 1932, just as El Salvador's major volcano Izalco erupted, several thousand peasants in many regions of the country attacked villages and cities. Their targets were local oligarchs, military outposts, and telegraph stations. Although there were some initial successes by the machete wielding peasants, they were no match for rifles and machine guns. By January 25 the fighting was virtually over. According to Thomas P. Anderson in Matanza, although there was and still is a persistent belief that hundreds of the burgeoisie were murdered, in fact only 35 were killed. He also states that less than 100 people were killed by the rebels even when military casualties are included. With the rebellion stopped, the matanza or massacre subsequently occurred. Suspects were rounded up. Anyone carrying a machete or with strong Indian features was assumed guilty. Many were executed by firing squad after digging their own grave. Estimates very, but at least 10,000 and perhaps 30,000 rebels were massacred. Marti ahd two other leaders were tried by the military and executed on February 1, 1932 even though they were in jail during the uprising.(20) It is because of the matanza that today in El Salvador even the most modest reform movement is referenced to 1932 and labeled as communist inspired by the land owners and other members of the establishment. The Soccer War Under General Hernandez Martinez the big landowners forfeited some political power to the military although they maintained their wealth and prestige. There was little improvement for the rural poor and he ruled with repression and toughness. After 13 years in which the country failed to attempt to industrialize, General Hernandez Martinez was forced to resign when he tried to have his term extended for another five years. He was replaced by General Salvador Castaneda Castro who ruled over a stable yet repressed country until 1950; again no social or economic improvement developed for the rural poor. Castro was replaced by Colonel Oscar Osorio in 1950 after more fraudulent elections.(21) During his six year administration as President, the country finally started to move forward. Public housing, legalized labor unions, industries, social security, and an electric power network were started. Studies were also begun that lead to the creation of new manufacturing industries. Osorio was replaced after another fraudulent election by Jose Maria Lemus, who continued the programs and ruled until 1960.(22) Both Osorio and Lemus were members of Partido Revolucionario de Unificacion Democratica (PRUD-- Revolutionary Party of Democratic Unification). Although the poor were repressed and elections were fraudulent under PRUD, their policies did bring some growth and modernization to the Salvadorean economy. These policies also brought about the initial development of small middle and working classes in the cities. In 1961 the Central American Common Market was formed with support from the United States. This free trade zone for El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica provided some positive economic benefits to the middle American countries as well as spurring United States investment. By 1962 the PRUD party was no longer in favor due to election frauds, continuing repression, and lack of improvement in living conditions. Out of its ashes arose the Partido de Conciliacion Nacional (PCN---Party of National Conciliation).(23) Although the PCN was supported by the same military and oligarchy interests, there were some changes. The party would run the official candidate every five years and would ensure that it won the election by continuing the fraud. However, opposition parties were allowed to exist and to hold mayoralities and seats in the national assembly. Backed by the PCN, Colonel Julio Adalberto Rivera ruled from 1962 to 1967. He was followed in the PCN chain of succession by Colonel Fidel Sanchez Hernandez, who ruled until 1972. The 1960's saw the birth of opposition parties to the PCN. The Partido Democrata Cristiano (PDC--Christian Democratic Party) was supported by European Christian Democrats and local professionals; it soon became the largest opposition party. It was lead by Jose Napoleon Duarte, an engineer and mayor of San Salvador. The Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR--National Revolutionary Movement) was founded by moderate socialists associated with the National University of El Salvador and headed by Guillermo Manuel Ungo. The Union Democratica Nacionalista (UDN--National Democratic Union) was formed as a surrogate party for the Salvadorean Communist Party (PCS--Partido Comunista Salvadoreno), which had been illegal since 1932.(24) By 1969 the population of El Salvador had increased to 3.55 million from 1.44 million in 1930. This population explosion was caused by a very high growth rate of over 3% per year combined with the elimination of yellow fever and malaria.(25) With no land available for the increased population, the rural poor became increasingly desperate. While many drifted to urban areas in search of food and jobs, the lure of better economic conditions in nearby countries lead many to cross borders. By 1969 some 300,000 Salvadoreans were living and working in Honduras. Meanwhile Honduras was faced with their own economic and political problems and decided to institute a program of land reform. They decided to forcibly expel the highly visible 300,000 Salvadorean immigrants who had taken up residence over the years, representing some 12% of the Honduran population. By June 1969 some 25,000 Salvadoreans came streaming back across the border. At the same time a very bitterly fought World Cup soccer match was being played between the two countries.(26) As a result of some minor injuries to people of either country attending the soccer games in the other country, press agitation, and the Salvadorean refugee problem, on July 14, 1969 "The Soccer War" began. El Salvador began the war at 5:50 pm on July 14, 1969 with the Air Force making a surprise attack on Honduran targets. The raid was unsuccessful due to the inadequacy of the aircraft: 11 fighter planes (propeller driven aircraft from World War II) and 5 twin engine bombers (DC-3's fitted with external racks).(27) The ground forces were made up of some 9,000 poorly equipped troops, including the army and security forces. They fared somewhat better and at some points penetrated up to 18 miles into Honduras.(28) After four days a ceasefire was arranged under pressure from the Organization of American States and United States. El Salvador agreed to withdraw their troops and by August 2, 1969 all Salvadorean forces had been removed.(29) President Sanchez ordered a victory parade which was held on August 5 and witnessed by perhaps half a million cheering Salvadoreans. Nevertheless, the war was a disaster for the country. * Salvadoreans continued to be expelled from Honduras, until approximately 130,000 had been deported. * The refugees, who had lost everything, swelled the ranks of the unfed and unemployed. * The war shattered the Central American Common Market and El Salvador lost access to the profitable Honduran market. * The Army lost face over the crisis and a phony victory.(30) Polarization Electoral fraud in the March 1970 elections caused the PDC to lose most of its mayoralities and seats on the National assembly. Due to the continuing fraudulent elections and severe economic recession, the leftist opposition parties (PDC, MNR, UDN), united to form the Union Nacional Oppositora (UNO--National Opposition Union). They ran their best known figure, Jose Napoleon Duarte, for President in the February 1972 elections. Although it appeared that Duarte had defeated Colonel Molina, once again the election returns were manipulated and the PCN supported Molina was declared the winner.(31) A small faction within the Army then attempted a coup against the illegal government which failed after a few days. Duarte, who had been contacted by the rebels at the last moment, was arrested, tortured, and exiled.(32) The 1974 elections were again characterized by fraud and UNO failed to get the seats it had earned. Discouraged over the situation and shifting over to a strategy of demonstration and strikes, UNO decided to withdraw from the 1976 election. President Molina refused permission to withdraw, and with UNO urging nonparticipation the PCN took every seat in the legislature and every mayorality. After much discussion the UNO decided to participate in the 1977 presidential elections. They ran a hero of the Honduran War, Colonel Ernesto Claramount Rozeville. He did not have a tremendous political following, but was known to be honest and courageous. The PCN ran defense minister General Carlos Humberto Romero. Again there was widespread electoral fraud and Romero was declared the winner. A few days after the election, on February 28, 1977 Claramount and the UNO held a massive peaceful demonstration in Plaza de Libertad, where the National Cathedral and National Palace both face each other. National Police and other troops stormed the square as Claramount and other leaders sought sanctuary in the cathedral. Under machine gun fire some 200 people were believed to have been massacred, although the government would only admit to six deaths. (Fire hoses were used to wash the blood out of the streets.) Claramount and other key figures in UNO were arrested and sent, into exile. The left, seeing that their tactics of peaceful demonstration were unsucessful, soon turned to increased violence to achieve their aims. Government facilities were bombed, radio stations were seized and propaganda broadcast, and assassinations were carried out. Banks were robbed and kidnappings for ransom were conducted, supposedly to obtain cash to buy arms and explosives on the international arms market.(33) These violent acts were executed by radical elements and splinter groups from the numerous leftist groups that had sprung up in the early 1970's. To combat these actions President General Romero had a new law put into effect on November 24, 1977. The Ley de Orden, Law for the Defense and Guarantee of Public Order, gave the government sweeping powers to prevent dissent. It legally abolished much of the normal judicial protection allowed under Salvadorean law. During the period the law was in effect, Romero used his 8,000 man Army and 5,000 man security forces to repress dissent and revenge leftist successes. Disappearances were common and it was widely believed that the military police forces worked together with and supported the right wing death squads. The security forces (Guardia Nacional, the rural police force; Policia Nacional, Guardia's urban counterpart; Policia de Advana, customs police; and Policia de Hacienda, treasury police) either were involved with the extremist groups or absolutely incompetent, as arrests for even the most widely seen violent acts never occurred. In January 1979 General Romero went to Mexico to secure a contract for Mexican oil and to portray his government in a positive manner to the international community. Unfortu- nately, during his trip a report was leaked to the press on the status of human rights in El Salvador. The report had been a full year in the making and had been prepared by the human rights commission of the Organization of American States. It told how the committee members, acting on a tip while in El Salvador, had found the secret cells at the Guardia headquarters. They saw the torture apparatus and the secret cells where prisoners had scrawled their names on the walls. At a press conference in Mexico City Romero was unable to explain away the report and consequently the international community brought pressure to bear.(34) The pressure from human rights groups and U.S. Embassy finally caused Romero to lift the Ley de Orden in March 1979. However, by then damage had been done. The decade of the 70's had seen the left become more convinced to fight the government and the guerilla groups had become much stronger and more determined. The right, in return, had also become more and more willing to use its terror tactics. Campesino unions had been officially banned since 1932, although the government had formed its own peasant association in 1970, the Union Comunal Salvadorena (UCS--Salvadorean Communal Union), in an attempt to stave off rural discontent. Nevertheless two real peasant organizations came into existance in the early 1970s: the Union de Trabajadores del Campo (UTC---Farm Workers Union), and the Catholic Church sponsored Federacion Cristiana de Campesinos Salvadorenos (FECCAS-Christian Federation of Salvadorean Campesinos) In 1974 the Frente de Accion Popular Unida (FAPU--United Popular Action Front) was formed, composed of some small peasant organizations, labor organizations, and assorted students and teachers groups. This was the first of the popular movements and it brought together people from several walks of life with the common interest of bringing down the government and changing the social order. In 1975 FECCAS and UTC founded the Bloque Popular Revolucionario (BPR--Popular Revolutionary Bloc), bringing into the fold the Asociacion Nacional de Educadores Salvadorenos (ANDES--National Association of Salvadorean Educators), the country's most powerful teachers organization. 1978 saw the formation of Ligas Populares, 28 de Febrero (LP-28--Popular Leagues of 28 February) named after the 1977 massacre. The Union Democratica Nacionalista (UDN--National Democratic Union), continued to function as a legal front for the illegal PCS. Each of these major popular groups; BPR, FAPU, LP-28, and UDN, had an armed guerilla wing to defend and protect their movement from right wing and other repressive forces. BPR had the Fuerzas Populares de Liberacion (FPL--Popular Forces of Liberation). FAPU had the Fuerzas Armadas de Resistencia Nacional (FARN--Armed Forces of National Resistence). The LP-28 had the Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP--Peoples Revolutionary Army). The UDN had the PCS. The right wing groups had also been strengthened during this period. In 1964-65 the government attempted to win over sectors of peasants in the countryside by creating a paramilitary anti-revolutionary organization. It got members by giving special privileges in employment, hospitals, and schools, and in return members supervised the villages where they lived and reported attempts at subversion. By the early 1970's the Organizacion Democratica Nacionalista (ORDEN--National Democratic Organization) covered virtually every village and town with a dense network of informers and collaborators. They specialized in aiding security forces and other organizations in attempting to put down rural discontent. In 1976, in response to a mild attempt at land reform by the government, the businessmen and land owners quickly intervened. The outcry from the Asociacion Nacional de Empresa Privada (ANEP--National Association of Private Enterprise) and Frente Agraria Region Oriental (FARO--Eastern Region Agrarian Front) brought on a government crisis that blocked the attempt. The right was not content to leave all repression up to the security forces however, and the death squad known as the Union Guerrera Blanca (UGB--White Warrior Union) soon made its presence known in the assassination of any one known or thought to be connected with the guerilla movement. The UGB was staunchly anti-communist, anti-guerilla, and rumored to work closely with the security forces. The Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Anticomunista- Guerra de Eliminacion (FALANGE--Anti-Communist Armed Forces of Liberation-War of Elimination) was another right wing death squad believed to consist of active, retired, or off duty members of the security forces. The Coup of 1979 By 1978 it was clear that Romero was losing control of his country. There was continuing violent conflict between the extreme right and the extreme left. Because of this violence the economy worsened. Some 300 million dollars left the country in 1978 due to capital flight and the once significant Japanese business community declined from 2400 to 200 individuals. Falling prices for coffee in the world market casued high inflation and a corresponding drop in real wages for the rural workers.(35) Violence became a daily occurence. Between 1977 and 1979 seven priests were assasinated by the security forces or death squads because of their suspected support of the leftists. President Romeros Government was strongly criticized by Archbishop Romero of El Salvador for these and other deaths. The spring of 1979 saw massive strikes and demonstrations against the government. Both BPR and FAPU occupied foreign embassies and government offices. The government struck back by conducting sweeps of suspected guerilla areas, with the Army killing peasants and raping women.(36) Then in 1979 a major and well publicized crisis occurred on May 9, 1979 when a CBS cameraman stood in front of the Metropolitan Cathedral in San Salvador watching 300 peaceful protestors. They were decked out with red and yellow flowers, the colors of the BPR. They carried signs demanding the release of five BPR leaders who had "disappeared" that week. Suddenly two olive green trucks appeared in the square and deposited armed troops who opened fire on the demonstrators. The camera recorded bodies being hit by bullets, dying people rolling down steps, and sharp shooters picking off protestors from behind parked cars. Twenty-three people died in the massacre, and El Salvador was revealed to the world as a country where the government killed unarmed demonstrators. The incident brought on further actions which deepened the crisis. Ten members of the BPR occupied the Venezuelan Embassy to protest the killings. The military then cordoned off the building and cut of food, electricity, and water to those inside. On May 23 the security forces opened fire on a BPR march which was bringing food and water to those inside the embassy. Althought the marchers were unarmed women and children, the security force opened fire--killing 14. The climate worsened with many strikes, work stoppages, and murders, and by September of 1980 most walls in downtown San Salvador were covered with graffiti proclaiming the need for liberation of El Salvador.(37) Many younger officers in the El Salvador Army had watched the events of 1979 closely. They saw the need for change in their country to improve social conditions and stop the repression. A small group started in March 1979 meeting with influential civilians, the United States Embassy, and members of the Catholic Church to encourage Romero to resign. On July 17, 1979 the Sandinistas succeeeded in driving Anastasio Somoza out of Nicaragua and his National Guard collapsed. Many members of the National Guard fled through El Salvador and the members of the Salvadorean Army saw fellow officers who had lost everything. They had lost their homes, families, and country, and the Salvadorean officers saw a similar fate in their future if they didn't do something.(38) On October 15, 1979 the young officers, average age 32, carried out a virtually bloodless coup. The commander of each of the fourteen army barracks was awakened at 0600 by one of the junior officers, informed a coup was taking place, and that he was confined to quarters. The security forces did not resist and by 1700 President Romero was flown into exile in Guatemala.(39) On October 18, 1979 the five members of the new governing junta were presented to the nation at a well attended press conference at the Casa Presidencial. The junta was made up of the following two military officers and three civilians: * Colonel Adolfo Majano--an offficer who saw the need for reform and was respected by the young military officers. He was commander of the military arsenal and had studied at Texas A&M and Ft. Benning. * Colonel Jaime Abdul Guitierrez--He supported the coup because of the drastic situation of the country, but he was less inclined to make needed reforms. He was head of the escuela militar (military school). * Roman Mayorga Quiroz--This 37 year old progressive was head of the Jesuit University in El Salvador. * Guillermo Ungo--A soft spoker intellectual who was head of MNR (National Revolutionary Movement). * Mario Andino--The manager of Phelps Dodge subsidiary, he was the representative of private business and supported moderate reform. (40) The cabinet included many representatives of opposition parties, including the PDC and the PCS. Since the junta had publicly proclaimed its support for ending violence and corruption, disolving ORDEN, respecting human rights, and improving the economy, it was generally accepted by the international community as a positive step toward reform and stability. By including the many different factions within the government it was hoped that El Salvador could work out its problems and avoid civil war. El Salvador's history up to the 1979 coup saw increased economic and political repression of the vast majority of its populace. As the poor organized and attempted to counter the repression, the right simply became more intransigent. With no improvement in living conditions or social justice for the poor the left became more violent. This violence was matched or exceeded by the right. The failure of the repression to achieve submission of the masses can only be seen as demonstrating the strength of the revolution The coup of 1979 offered to both the left and the right a chance to avoid civil war if all the Salvadoreans could work together to begin solving the country's many problems. "There can be no surrender on our side because the guerillas are not losing the war." - Statement by FDR Secretary General Guillermo Ungo over Radio Venceremos in October, 1982. Chapter II: The Left Formation of the CRM In late October 1979 the popular organizations of the left began to test the new junta and in its commitment to change. FAPU, BRP, and LP-28 occupied the metropolitan cathedral, labor and education ministries, and 40 radio stations. They occupied estates in the countryside and refused to move off. They demanded higher wages, lower prices for consumer goods, immediate land reform, an investigation into the whereabouts of the disappeared, and public trials of the officers guilty of crimes against the people.(1) Although the junta did take some actions to meet these demands, the 30% increase in the minimum wage and plans for agarian reform were not deemed adequate. Additionally, the Army and security forces continued their policies of surrounding villages and slaughtering any villagers they suspected of being guerillas or guerilla sympathizers.(2) By the end of October more than 100 demonstrators were shot by the security forces. The junta itself declared that these murders were the acts of groups in the security forces that were not under its control.(3) This statement was a clear confession of weakness by the junta. The left now realized that neither they nor the right nor the armed forces were taking the junta seriously, and consequently further actions were required. On January 9, 1980 a secret press conference was conducted, with most of the nonjournalists' faces covered with hoods to disguise their identity. Five of El Salvadors most wanted and "most dangerous" guerillas announced their groups unification into a coordinated command structure, the Coordinadora Politico Militar (CPM--Political Military Coordinating Committee). The FPL, FARN, and PCS would coordinate their actions and end their differences that had limited their effectiveness in the past. Although the ERP was still not unified under the central command, unification talks would continue.(4) By January 11, 1980 the popular organizations of El Salvador settled their differences and called a press conference at the auditorium of the law school at the National University in San Salvador. Starting the ceremony by singing the national anthem in front of the El Salvador flag, the left then announced their new structure.(5) The Coordinadora Revolucionaria de las Masas (CRM-- Revolutionary Coordinating Committee of the Masses) was a unification of the popular forces of the BPR, FAPU, UDN, and LP-28. The CRM then established the "Duties and Objectives of the Revolution." * To overthrow the reactionary military dictatorship and yankee imperialism * To end dominance of the landed oligarchy and nationalize the land and industry * To assure the democratic rights of the people * To raise cultural standards, stimulate the popular organizations, and create a new revolutionary armed forces(6) To demonstrate their new unity the popular forces called for a mass demonstration on January 22, 1980--the 48th anniversary of the 1932 Matanza. Between 80,000 to 200,000 people showed up in a march that took several hours.(7) The start at 11 a.m. was indicative of future problems as the marchers were sprayed with insecticde by a crop duster. At 1 p.m. as the column reached the Plaza de la Libertad shots rang out, reportedly from the windows of the National Place. The Salvadorean Human Rights Commission estimated the death toll at 67 killed and 250 wounded. Despite the carnage, the demonstration had proven the CRM did have diversified support. The demonstrators had consisted of state employees, factory workers, electricians, farm workers, and peasants.(8) Evolution of the FDR, DRU,FMLN Although there were many rumors of the so called "Final Offensive" modeled after the successful model of the Sandanistas of Nicaragua, the guerillas did not move in mass. Perhaps they lacked the training and equipment for a large scale conventional attack; however a better reason may be that the military forces had them off balance. (9) On April 18, 1980 the popular forces challenged the perception of El Salvador having a clear left, center, and right. Some 5000 people crowded into the auditorium at the National University to see the formation of the Frente Democratico Revolucionario (FDR---Democratic Revolutionary Front). Joining the four Popular Organizations (UDN, LP-28, BPR, FAPU) in the CRM was the Movimiento Liberacion del Pueblo (MPL--Peoples Liberation Movement). Joining the CRM in the FDR was the Democratic Front or FD. It was made up of most of the remaining democratic forces remaining in El Salvador, including many men the U.S. State Department had praised as being moderate when they served in the 1st and 2nd juntas. * The MNR (Social Democrats), headed by Guillermo Ungo, who had been Duarte's running mate in 1972 and had served on the 1st Junta * Dissident Christian Democrats (20% of the PDC), who were dissatisfied by the progress of the juntas and were headed by Ruben Zamora who had served on the 2d junta. They formed the Partido Social Cristiana (PSC--Social Christian Party) * A union coalition representing 80% of the trade unions, church people, professionals, students, small business people and the universities.(10) The FDR was headed by Secretary General Enrique Alvarez, who was actually a "renegade" member of the 14 families who had served in three governments (including the 1st junta--as minister of agriculture). The newly formed FDR had brought together virtually every democratic and revolutionary organization in El Salvador, with the exception of the PDC. Their platform was opposed to the oligarchy and imperialism while supporting human rights, a mixed economy and political pluralism. The FDR had become the largest political movement in El Salvador's history. (11) On May 22, 1980 the guerilla forces announced a new command structure called the Direccion Revolucionaria Unificada (DRU--Unified Revolutionary Directorate). The DRU would coordinate the strategy and oversee the activities of the four guerilla groups (FPL, FARN, ERP, PCS). The DRU was recognized by the FDR as the vanguard of the Salvadorean revolution. In return, the FDR was recognized as legitimate representatives of the broad forces participating in the revolution who would be the foundation of the future government. The summer saw the fledgling FDR venturing overseas to win support for its cause. They traveled to the United States, Europe, the Caribbean and South America. They found support in Europe from the countries with strong socialist movements, but their biggest supporter was Mexico. The government of President Lopez Portillo allowed the FDR to set up its main offices abroad in Mexico City. (12) Meanwhile the guerilla forces also found supporters in Mexico and nearby Central American countries. This period probably also saw the beginning of arms deliveries to the guerillas from countries like Cuba, the Soviet Union, Libya, East Germany, and Vietnam.(13) Although discouraging the traditional May Day demonstration because of Government threats, the popular forces flexed their muscles by calling for a two day strike on June 25 and 26, 1980. The junta was caught completely by surprise by the broad popular support for the FDR. Workers occupied their factories and closed them, campesinos refused to work on the farms, and 90% of the businesses didn't open. Buses did not run and the streets were deserted.(14) The government struck back however on June 27 and attacked the National University with amored cars and 900 troops. The University was shut down and at least 50 students were killed. The government also took actions to neutralize further strikes by passing decrees which forbade participation by public sector unions and amending the criminal code to make occupation of churches a "terrorist crime."(15) For these and other reasons the next strike of August 13-15 was generally regarded as a failure, although it caused the militarization of all electric, water, and telephone plants, as well as the port authority.(16) On November 27, 1980 the popular forces suffered a tremendous setback. Some 200 armed and uniformed men surrounded the Jesuit high school in El Salvador where key members of the FDR were meeting.(17) Approximately 20 armed men in civilian clothes entered the building and took away at gunpoint the secretary general of the FDR and a dozen or so other people. Included were the leaders of the UDN, MNR, MLP, and BPR. The government and military denied any knowledge of the incident, and credit was soon claimed by a right wing death squad, the Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez Brigade.(18) The five bodies were found in a few hours near Lake Ilopango seven miles from the capital. All had been tortured and strangled.(19) Although new leaders were quickly elected, these and other actions convinced the FDR and the DRU that they had to tighten security and work closer together. The guerilla groups decided to unite under a single command known as the Frente Farabundo Marti de Liberacion Nacional (FMLN--Farbundo Marti National Liberation Front). The FMLN was named after the communist leader-martyr of the 1932 uprising, and was made up by the FPL, ERP, FARN, PCS, and the newly formed Central American Revolutionary Workers Party (PRTC).(20) The month of December, 1980 saw renewed action by the FMLN. Towns were occupied, government troops were ambushed, and military posts were attacked. Rumors again began to circulate about the long awaited "final offensive." The Final Offensive By the end of 1980 the left had evolved into an organized, disciplined force. Made up of Popular Forces (the FDR) and Guerilla Forces (the FMLN), they had clear military and political objectives. They would bring increasing military pressure on the government until it fell and was replaced by one they supported or controlled. Click here to view image On January 10, 1981 the FMLN launched their "final offensive." (21) Additionally, the FDR called for a general strike on January 13. Ten days into the offensive they had had significant successes which were acknowledged by the international press. The capitals of the departments of Chalatenango (San Francisco) and Morazan (Gotera) were captured.(22) The garrison of Santa Ana, the nation's second largest city, defected under the leadership of Captain Francisco Mena Sandoval who had been one of the leaders of the young officers coup of October 1979.(23) The Salvadorean Air Force installation was attacked and much of its equipment destroyed. Over two-thirds of the country was the scene of military conflict. On January 14, 1981 the FDR and FMLN called a press conference in Mexico City to announce the formation of a Political Diplomatic Commission (government in exile). The commission was made up of seven members from the popular forces and was headed by Guillermo Ungo. They would travel the world seeking support from governments, political parties, and international organizations. They also shortly announced their willingness to negotiate a political solution to the conflict to avoid further bloodshed. They proposed dialogue directly with the United States, not with the El Salvador junta.(24) By the end of January it was apparent that the "final offensive" was a failure. Although the guerillas had around 5000 soldiers, they could not match the 20,000 men of the Salvadorean Army and security forces. Their weapons were insufficient in numbers and the conversion from small commando units to large scale conventional battles proved to be beyond their ability. The towns and cities that had been seized could not be held without heavy civilian casualties caused by Air Force and artillery bombardment. Perhaps their biggest failure was in not carrying the attack to the capital city of San Salvador. Without this diversionary maneuver, unarmed workers in the capital who went along with the strike took the chance of virtually commiting suicide. Nevertheless, some 26 factories struck, half the businesses closed, and 20,000 public employees walked out on January 15.(25) By February the general feeling in the capital was that the war was over and the guerillas had been beaten. Many international reporters however, left the capital and traveled into the countryside. In contrast, there they found many areas totally in control of the FMLN. They saw underground hospitals and primitive munitions factories. Probably most telling was that they saw the army stick very near its garrisons in the towns and cities. Perhaps the biggest gain of the "final offensive" was that certain areas of the country had passed from political control by the left to military control by the left. They now had secure areas in which they could train, care for their wounded, and plan future attacks.(26) During the spring and summer the FDR/FMLN's repre- sentatives traveled to 33 countries.(27) In many of the countries the FDR/FMLN established missions which served their functions similar to an embassy. These international efforts achieved real success on August 28, 1981 when the French and Mexican Governments recognized the FDR/FMLN as a representative political force that should be involved in any political settlement.(28) Economic and Military Disruption In late July, 1981 after several months of analysis, re-equiping, and re-organization, the FMLN again went on the offensive. On August 10 they captured Perguin Morazan, 200 kilometers northeast of San Salvador. They destroyed the National Guard garrison killed six and for the first time took prisoners of war. They announced they would adhere to the Geneva Convention and asked the International Red Cross to assume responsibility for the 40 prisoners. Twelve of the prisoners joined the insurgents and the rest were turned over. In addition to the potitical and moral victory of the action, the guerillas also acquired rifles, machine guns, and ammunition. During the fall of 1981 the FMLN kept the pressure on the army, especially in the eastern portion of El Salvador. By blowing up telephone centers, electric towers, and bridges they steadily isolated the region, consolidating their strength and making it virtually inaccessible except by air. On October 15, 1981 they destroyed the Puente de Oro (Golden Bridge). The fact that they were able to evacuate the 1000 people living under each end of the bridge without alerting the nearby garrisons was an indication of their improvements in coordination and the growing support of the population.(29) By the end of 1981 the FMLN claimed to have destroyed 25 major bridges.(30) They continued to disrupt electric power and telecommunications. Apparently the guerillas' strategy was to steadily isolate the country, cause economic chaos, and keep the army at bay. Eventually this would cause the El Salvador government and the United States to either negotiate power with the left or simply collapse. Repeated attempts by the army to dislodge the guerillas from their base camps failed, and the guerillas continued their disruption with some degree of success. During January 1982 the FMLN started another offensive. On the night of January 27, FMLN commandos slipped into the Ilopango AFB on the east side of San Salvador. Using explosives, they destroyed a significant portion of El Salvador's Air Force, including six of the fourteen UH-1H helicopters.(31) They also attacked El Salvador's fourth largest city, Usulutan. After one week they withdrew, unable to defeat the army who withdrew into their garrison. Nevertheless, the FMLN had succeeded again in carrying the fight to the government's army. They had caused such economic problems that only the United States kept the government in power. The 1982 Elections During January and February the FMLN continued its actions on a broad basis throughout the country. They urged the peasants not to vote in the upcoming scheduled election and forced the army to react to their continued attacks. The FMLN general command sent a letter to President Reagan on January 18, 1982 that said: To pretend that the solution to the Salvadorean conflict is the March elections is... outside reality. How can a democractic process be guaranteed in the context of indiscriminate repression. If you can decide the destiny of the United States, it is because you hold your office by virtue of free elections.(32) The left chose not to participate in the March 28 elections, believing the elections would be corrupt. They saw the election apparatus as being in the hands of their enemy and swore to continue their efforts before, during, and after the balloting. Many international observers reported the elections as being "fair though not free of diffi- culties... no allegations of fraud or serious intimidation could be entertained."(33) Nevertheless, the left failed to accept its result as significant; especially since the extreme rightist ARENA party had made such a strong showing by gathering 30% of the vote after vowing to exterminate the leftists in 30 days. As 1982 wore on the left consolidated its control cover zones in the countryside. They established guerilla councils to care for the civil, economic, religious, and defense needs of the people in the zones. They established collective farms, compulsary education and medical care. Although they were not pleased with the outcome of the election, they were far from beaten.(34) Fight or Negotiate During the latter part of 1982 and early 1983 the left maintained their positions in the departments of Chalatenango, Morazan, San Vicente, and Usulutan. They continued to sabotage military posts and key economic and communications facilities such as bridges and powerlines. The pattern was clear and repetive. The FMLN would seize or occupy a town or settlement, the armed forces would recapture the town and then withdraw, and the guerillas would later return. Although the guerillas had only 5000 fighters to oppose the growing government forces of 30,000 troops, they kept the initiave and constantly had the army off balance. Their major offensive in January 1983 led to the rapture of the provincial capital of San Francisco Gotera, the capture of the strategic town of Berlin in Usulutan, and a seige on the San Carlos army barracks in San Salvador. Nevertheless, their limited strength and lack of heavy weapons meant they could not resist a determined counterattack by the army. In October, 1982 Manuel Ungo, head of the FDR, called for a negotiated political settlement, asserting "there can be no surrender because the guerrillas are not losing the war."(35) In March 1983 Rubin Zamora, head of the PSC, stated that the solution to El Salvador's problems must be reached through political negotiations to end the war.(36) Statements like this were not supported by every member of the left and the differences soon became public. On April 6, 1983 Ana Maria, a member of the FMLN high command and second in command of the FPL, was murdered at her home in Managua. Nicaragua. Her assasins, who stabbed her 8 times with an ice pick, were later apprehended by the Nicaraguan authorities and found to also be members of the FPL. They had used ice picks to make the murder resemble a brutal act of the Salvadorean right wing. This extreme action was caused by a deep division which had developed within the FPL. The hard line faction, which opposed negotiation with the government and supported a prolonged war, was led by Rogelio Bazzaglio who confessed to the murder. The conciliatory faction, which favored negotiation, was lead by Ana Maria and Salvador Cayetano Carpio. Emotionally depressed over the death of his soul mate, Carpio committed suicide on April 12.(37) The overall effect of the two deaths in the FMLN hierarchy apparently weakened the hard line position in favor of the conciliatory-negotiation position. In August 1983 Rebel leaders held talks with the El Salvador Peace Commission in Bogota, Columbia.(38) Although the results of the talks were not released, it continued to indicate the willingness of the left to negotiate. In October, Guillermo Ungo, head of the FDR, met with former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and his Central American Study Commission. Ungo reiterated the left's desire to negotiate a political settlement between all parties in the conflict.(39) Regardless of the extent of his sincerety, no serious support for negotiations was given by the governments of El Salvador or the United States. Continuing the Fight The FMLN started off 1984 with two major successes. On December 30, 1983 they captured and held for twelve hours El Salvador's fourth largest army base at El Paraiso in the province of Chalatenango. Some 100 soldiers were killed in the mortar barrage and assault and 135 prisoners were taken. Ater carrying off weapons and ammunition, detroying armored vehicles and trucks, they set fire to the buildings and blew up remaining supplies. Several days later the guerillas released the prisoners to the representatives of the international Red Cross. Two days later on January 1, 1984 the guerillas succeeded in capturing and destroying the Cuscatlan Bridge. The army troops guarding the bridge fled under the attack and the 1600 foot suspension bridge was demolished. Since the FMLN had already demolished the Golden Bridge in October 1981, they had successfully destroyed the only two bridges linking the eastern third of El Salvador with the rest of the country.(40) The five years since the coup of 1979 have seen the left grow in strength. The numbers of guerillas have increased and the areas of the country they control are larger. They have been able to keep the army off balance and appear to have the acceptance, if not the approval , of many of the people in the countryside. Although they undoubtedly receive significant portions of their arms and equipment from Cuba and other marxist countries, there can be no doubt that their strength comes from the dire social, political, and economic conditions in El Salvador. Improvement by the government in these areas can only weaken the left, regardless of their supporters and suppliers. A significant question is the issue of negotiations. The left has supported negotiations continuously while both the Salvadorean and United States governments are opposed. Although there is mistrust on both sides, it should be remembered that many leaders of the left are former members of the 1st and 2nd juntas, people Washington accepted as being representative of the Salvadorean people. At this point the strategy of the left appears to be twofold: * Keep up the pressure by causing economic, communications, and military disruption. * Pursue a negotiated settlement, separate from the elections to be held in March 1984. They appear to be maintaining their strength (5,000 to 10,000 combatants) and morale while wearing down the strength and morale of the Salvadorean government, military, and economy. Only United States support has prevented the victory of the left, thus far, and the left shows no sign of weakening. "When you hear the words of a man telling you to kill, remember instead the words of God, 'Thou shalt not kill.' God's law must prevail." - Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero y Galdamez, March 23, 1980 Chapter III: The Church The Medellin Conference Dating back to the 16th century the Roman Catholic Church in Latin America had been closely aligned with political power. The Church was a wealthy landowner, which gave it economic influence and political power. In the countryside, this enabled the priest to exert a considerable degree of influence over the peasants, in many cases more than the government. In the cities, the clergy cared for the educational and religious needs of the wealthy and powerful, ensuring that their position of power was recognized and respected. However, the 1950's and 60's shook up this status quo. As the numbers of the poor increased, and their plight worsened, their belief in and need for the church decreased. Churches were empty and fewer young men entered the priesthood. Those that did believed the church was out of touch and wanted it to be more responsive to the needs of the poor. Additionally, the bishops were forced to import priests from Ireland, Spain, and the United States who had different ideas of the proper role of the church.(1) In addition to these ongoing evolutions, the heirarchy of the church began to make some changes. Pope John XXIII convened the Second Vatican Council (Vatican II) in 1962. It closed three years later under Pope Paul VI. The closing document specified two new principles that were to have lasting impact on Latin America. 1. The Church is in and of the world with concerns well beyond the purely spiritual. 2. The Church is a community of equals by Baptism. It did not condemn communism per se but rather condemned certain of its practices with equally strong critiques of capitalism abuses.(2) In 1968 bishops from all over Latin America gathered in Medellin, Columbia for the second Latin-American Episcopal Conference (CELAM II). There the bishops proclaimed a "theology of liberation" focused on social justice for the poor and oppressed.(3) Specifically, the bishops called upon the church to: * Defend the rights of the oppressed. * Promote grass roots organizations for change. * Denounce unjust actions of world powers that works against the self determination of weaker nations. * Exercise a preferential option for the poor.(4) Christian Base Communities In El Salvador the objectives of CELAM II were implemented by the establishment of Christian Base Communities. Between 1970 and 1976 seven centers were established for the training of lay preachers and delegates. Over the course of the decade some 15,000 of these leaders were trained by the priests and nuns in Bible study, the liturgy, agriculture, health, and leadership. These community leders then went forth to speak the word of God as well as encourage the masses to take responsibility for the important aspects of their lives. As these lay leaders went out into the countryside, a pattern for change in the community began to slowly evolve over a period of months. There was renewed interest in religion and the members of the community began to talk to and work with each other to resolve their problems. The people felt more pride, confidence, and self worth. Most importantly, they began to realize that their problems were not the result of an uncaring God, and that they had to take control of their own destiny.(5) These feelings were soon manifested by organizations of the workers, campaigns for change, and strikes. These efforts were undoubtedly aided by the clergy who were following the dictates of CELAM II by making a "preferential option for the poor." In the parish of Aguilares, for example, these efforts resulted in the organization by the Jesuits of the first strike ever in a local sugar mill. They also encouraged the peasants to join FECCAS, which by the end of the 1970's was one of the key opposition groups.(6) Although to the priests their work was pastoral in nature, to the government it was political. Increasingly, the military governments of the 1970's became alarmed at the impact of the church in creating opposition to the continuance of the status quo. The War of the Romeros By late 1976 and early 1977 the Salvadorean government and right wing increasingly began to blame the church for "inciting the people to revolt." During this period five priests were arrested and eighteen expelled from the country. As momentum gathered, between February 1977 and May 1977, eight more priests were expelled and ten were exiled. In May 1977 it was common to see fliers circulated in the capital that read, "Be a Patriot! Kill a Priest."(7) In the midst of this increasing hostility between the church and the government, there was a significant change in the leadership of the Salvadorean church. The aging arch bishop of El Salvador was retired and replaced by Rome during the spririg of 1977. The locals in El Salvador wanted the auxiliary bishop Arturo Rivera Damas selected since he was an outspoken leader who opposed the government's repression. However, Rome selected Monsenor Oscar Arnulfo Romero y Galdamez. Romero had lived most of his priestly life in the eastern section of the country, and he was considered by the church establishment to be quiet and noncontroversial. Many of the priests even felt he would reverse many of the religious programs that had been started during the past years. Three key events, however, probably led to Archbishop Romero deciding to firmly articulate his favor of social justice and human rights. The day before Romero was installed as archbiship, Father Rafael Barahona was picked up and incarcerated by the government. The day after his installation, Romero went to the Casa Presidencial and requested President Molina to release the priest. Molina's response was, I will release Barahona, but you cannot ask us to treat them any differently until they go back to their basic business which is religion. These priests of yours have become politicians and I hold you responsible for their behavior. (To this Romero replied, 'With all due respect, Mr. President, we take our orders from someone higher'.)(8) Also significant in the creation of Archbishop Romero's change in attitude was the assasination of two priests by the right wing death squad, the UGB (White Warrior Union). Father Rutilio Grande, a Jesuit working with FECCAS in the Aguilares region, was shot on March 12, 1977. Father Alfonso Navarro, a parish priest, was shot on May 11, 1977 on the outskirts of San Salvador. These three events, in addition to the continuing violence against the people, probably caused the conversion of the Archbishop to a more active role. One of Archbishop Romero's first visible acts was his failure to attend the inauguration of President Romero (no relation) on July 1, 1977. He stated it was preferential to risk increasing the hostilities between the church and state rather than to attend and appear to support a system characterized by fraud, corruption, and repression.(9) Because of this atmosphere of hostility, the UGB issued a manifesto that gave all the Jesuits in El Salvador until July 20, 1977 to leave the country or be killed. The approximately 40 Jesuits in the country were very powerful in that they ran the University of Central America, and were very active in promoting change. Since most of the Jesuits in the country were North Americans, this threat angered the United States Embassy. Diplomatic pressure was put on President Romero, and the date passed without an incident.(10) The fact that pressure on the Salvadorean government resulted in inaction by the UGB supported the claim by the left that the government controlled and was responsible for the death squads. Archbishop Romero soon began to use his sermons from the cathedral every Sunday to denounce right wing terrorism and support the popular movements; however, he also denounced the use of violence by anyone. The entire 8 a.m. mass was broadcast over YSAX, the church owned radio station. This weekly mass soon became the most listened to program in the nation, and was broadcast three times in order to reach the largest possible audience. In fact, the mass became more than just a religious event. In addition to Archbishop Romero's homily he also read the events of the past week, which included every documented case of persons killed, arrested, or tortured whether by the right or the left. Since the excesses by the government and the right were consistently greater than the left, the Archbishop was seen as actively promoting the cause of the left. The effectiveness of these "oral newspapers" and sermons is evidenced by the fact that between 1977 and 1980 the YSAX transmitter or antenna was bombed 10 times.(11) In November 1978 a priest was killed in combat alongside guerillas of the FPL. The archbishop was shocked, and the incident caused him to consider the question of revolutionary violence. Archbishop Romero attended the funeral of Father Ernesto Barrera and later said: When a dictatorship seriously violates human rights and attacks the common good of the nation, when it becomes unbearable and closes all channels of dialogue, of understanding, of rationality, when this happens, the church speaks of the legitimate right of insurrectional violence.(12) Archbishop Romero's actions increasingly put him at odds with President Romero and the government; this period has been called "The War of the Romero's." The church paid the price for their opposition as a total of 7 priests were killed between 1977 and 1979 by either the security forces or the UGB.(13) Asssasination of the Archbishop On October 15, 1979 a bloodless coup overthrough President Romero and his government. In its place a Revolutionary Governing Junta was formed consisting of representatives from the left, middle, and right. That Archbishop Romero was seen as a powerful force in the country is evidenced by the fact that several liberals consulted him before agreeing to join the new government.(14) The archbishop agreed with reservations to support the junta, but he expressed the doubts of many when he said: We recognize the junta's good will, but this government can only deserve the confidence and collaboration of the people when it shows that its beautiful promises are not dead letters, but rather real hope that a new era has begun for our country.(15) The credibility of the new government failed quickly as government forces continued to shoot demonstrators and repress the peasants. On January 6, 1980 the Archbishop called on the people to "preserve the liberation process" by backing the popular organizations. On January 9 a second junta replaced the failed first one, with many of the left resigning.(16) By February, the second junta was failing and on February 17 Romero denounced the "unscrupulous military" and called on the Christian Democrats to resign from the junta, claiming their "presence simply covered the repressive character of this government, especially abroad."(17) He also wrote a letter to U.S. President Carter opposing aid to the junta, especially military aid. He said that the government had resorted to repression and violence, causing increased deaths than the previous regimes.(18) On March 3, 1980 the second junta failed and a third was created, but with no change in repressive policies. On Sunday, March 23, 1980 the Archbishop said his regular Sunday mass which was carried over YSAX for the first time since the radio station had been bombed on February 18. after his sermon he told about the events of the week, finishing with a special message to the soldiers, national guardsmen, and police, whom he referred to as "peasants in uniform:" The campesinos you kill are your own brothers and sisters...When you hear the words of a man telling you to kill, remember instead the words of God, 'Thou shalt not kill.' God's law must prevail. No soldier is obliged to obey an order contrary to the law of God.(19) The next day at daily mass, after giving the sermon, the Archbishop raised his hands and said, "Let us pray." He then collapsed, shot down by a gun with a silencer. He died instantly. The junta ordered three days national mourning and vowed to track down the killers. However, the judge put in charge of the investigation was soon the victim of an assasination attempt himself, and he fled the country. The killers have not been named.(20) Although no group claimed responsihility for the assasination of the Archbishop, it was widely believed that a right wing death squad such as the UGB was responsible. On March 30 approximately 30 more people were killed at the funeral service for Romero.(21) During the service, thousands of Salvadoreans were outside the cathedral due to lack of space inside. After bombs went off and shots were fired many fled into the cathedral. Although the government denied any involvement by the security forces, many foreign delegates to the funeral claimed the bombs and shots had come from the National Palace.(22) In Search of Unity In the period immediately following Archbishop Romero's death the church continued to be a target of the security forces and right wing groups. In November of 1980 uniformed troops ransacked the offices of Orientacion, the archdiocese newspaper. They also destroyed the equipment and offices of YSAX next door.(23) On December 2, 1980 three Roman Catholic nuns and one female lay missionary were raped and executed by national guardsmen as the women drove from the airport to San Salvador.(24) By June 1981, ten priests and one seminarian had been killied and 60 priests expelled or exiled over the period of the previous four years. The Jesuits' house in San Salvador had been sprayed with bullets or bombed on three occasions.(25) Yet in the midst of this violence the church began to seek unity and move toward a more centrist position. When the Vatican appointed Bishop Rivera y Damas as Apostolic Delegate and acting archbishop after Romero's death, it was viewed as a signal for him to seek unification in the church. Although he had a reputation for being very progressive. Damas moved to a more centrist position and criticized excesses of both sides.(26) In December of 1980 Acting Archbishop Damas denounced U.S. military aid for facilitating "repression against the people and persecution of the church."(27) In May 1981 in a regular Sunday sermon he stated the left, the right, the government junta, and the army are all struggling for power and attempting to implement their ideology. "While these parties fight," he said, "the people are suffering and shedding their blood." Even handed criticisms of both the left and the right seemed to be working as the government agreed to the reopening of Orientacion and radio YSAX and attacks against the clergy diminished. Further evidence of his centrist position was evidenced by the FMLN's Radio Venceremos criticizing the Acting Archbishop for turning away from his predecessor's polices.(28) During 1982 Acting Archbishop Damas continued his even handed treatment of the left and right. He continually pressed the government to bring the murderers of the four churchwomen to trial, while at the same time condeming all acts of political violence. He urged all the parties concerned to negotiate a settlement to end the violence. This approach apparently was what the Vatican desired because in March 1983 the Pope announced that Damas would be elevated to the position of Archbishop of El Salvador. After assuming his duties the archbishop asked all the Salvadorean people to listen to Pope John Paul II who had urged them to consider political reconciliation and peace. The centrist position of Archbishop Damas appears to be the one supported at many levels in the church. In addition to the Vatican, the United States Catholic Conference has urged President Reagan to undertake a significant policy shift on El Salvador that would lead to a negotiated settlement. The church has historically been a powerful force in El Salvador and it will continue to be so in the future. Although it has adopted a centrist position publically, there can be little doubt that the priests, nuns, and missionaires will continue to press to improve the plight of the poor. They will pursue the betterment of the poor by putting political pressure on the government for land reform, literacy, and better health care. Unless the government and the oligarchy make a commitment to improve the plight of the poor, actions by the clergy will inevitably build up pressures that again portray the church as being aligned with the left in opposition to the government and the right. "We are a government elected by the people, I don't have the right to discuss power sharing." - Statement by El Salvaodr Provisional President Magana to the U.S. Press on June 18, 1983 Chapter IV: The Government The First Junta After the October 15, 1979 bloodless coup, there was optimism in El Salvador because of the broad political representation on the five man junta. * Roman Mayorga Quiroz--the progressive director of the Jesuit University, UCA. * Guillermo Ungo--the intellectual head of MNR who would represent the interests of the popular forces (BPR, FAPU, LP-28) * Mario Andino--the manager of the Phelps Dodge subsidiary, who would represent ANEP and private enterprise * Colonel Adolfo Majano--the reform minded Colonel with a conscience; he represented the young officers who had conducted the coup. * Colonel Jaime Abdul Gutierrez--the head of the Salvadorean military school, who represented the more conservative elements of the armed forces. There was also broad political representation in the cabinet * Luis Nelson Segouia--the minister of justice, represented ANEP * Manuel Hinds--the economics minister, represented ANEP * Hector Dada Hirezi--the foreign minister, represented PDC * Salvador Samoyoa--the minister of education, represented the PDC * Ruben Zamora Rivas--the minister of the presidency, represented the PDC * Mario Zamora Rivas--the attorney general, represented the PDC * Gabriel Gallegos Valdes--the minister of labor, represented the communist UDN * Enrique Alvarez Cordova--the minister of agriculture, was not politically aligned, but supported land reform. Cordova was a millionaire dairy farmer who had served as minister of agriculture for Presidents Rivera and Molina, only to resign at their failure to enact reforms. His acceptance to this post again caused him to be denounced by the oligarchy as a traitor to his class.(1) The young military officers who had precipitated the coup created a permanent independent body to ensure the junta acted properly in the direction of needed reforms. Known as the Permanent Council of the Armed Forces (COPEFA), it served as the watchdog of the reform movement. Quickly however, the strength of the junta was tested. The BPR had occupied five factories in San Salvador several weeks before the coup in order to push for wage increases. On October 16, 1979--the day after the coup--security forces and army troops attacked the factories. Eighteen people were killed and 78 people were arrested. Colonel Majano went to police headquarters and ordered the release of the prisoners, but the credibility of the new government had already been damaged. The following day the Army attacked a suburb of San Salvador that was held by Popular Forces. Armored vehicles and straffing helicopters soon left 24 dead. Then in a published report, Amnesty International estimated more than 100 people were killed the first week of the new junta.(2) It had quickly become apparent that both the popular forces and the armed forces were intransigent and did not trust each other. This attitude continued to cause problems for the junta. Meanwhile the junta was trying to enact some reforms. A commission was established to investigate the whereabouts of "the disappeared." Although a few were found alive many mass graves were found with bodies marked by torture.(3) Several weeks later the government was announced that all of the names on a list of 276 people should be presumed to have died in custody of the security forces. No legal steps were taken to punish those responsible for the torture and murders, and this brought on demonstrations by the Popular Forces.(4) It had quickly become apparent that the junta would not follow through on the reforms planned by the young officers who had enacted the coup. The junta ordered a 30% increase in minimum wages for field workers, but many of the landowners ignored this. The campesinos then struck, which brought on repression from the security forces. Each step the junta took seemed to fail before being implemented. Some 60 members of the Army and Security Forces were retired because of believed connections to the right wing death squads and because they were not controllable by the Army. ORDEN was formally prohibited by law, but soon reappeared as the Frente Democratico Nacionalista (FDN---National Democratic Front). No arms were confiscated from the thousands of members of ORDEN, and they continued to represent the right in acts of repression against the left. Perhaps the action that sealed the fate of the first junta was the act of Colonel Gutierrez unilaterally appointing Colonel Jose Guillermo Garcia, the commander of the garrison at San Vicente, as minister of defense.(5) Garcia had been General Romero's chief of communications at ANTEL (National Telecommunications Agency), a post that was widely believed to be both the center for clandestine intelligence services, and connected with the death squads.(6) Although the young officers opposed this nomination, they were unable to block it. The fact that the junta accepted this action demonstrated its inability to deal with the intransigence of the military. The popular forces continued to demonstrate and the security forces continued to retaliate. By the end of 1979 approximately 350 people had been killed by the armed forces since the junta took over.(7) The economy was in shambles. The GNP had fallen 3.5% in 1979, there was massive capital flight, and the balance of payments was severely out of balance. On December 26 Garcia arrived uninvited at a cabinet meeting. A screaming match ensued with Garcia telling the ministers their reforms were going too far. To this the ministers told Garcia that it was none of his or the military high command's business. (In a country that had had military rule for 50 years this was strong language.)(8) On December 28 the justices of the Supreme Court, the heads of state agencies, and 11 of 12 cabinet members wrote a letter to COPEFA. The letter said the minister of defense and other military commanders were betraying the goals of the military youth movement. It asked for a dialogue between the government, COPEFA, and the popular forces to settle disputes.(9) By this time however, it had become apparent that the young military had been politically naive. They did not have any power over the junta short of the possibility of another coup. On the other hand, Colonel Gutierrez (who was very conservative and had not been supportive of the coup until he saw the opportunity to be on the junta) had a position of tremendous power. On December 29, the leftist members of the junta decided to force the issue. Hector Dada publicly read a list of demands over the radio, all related to the fact that the army must accept its orders, directions, and control from the junta.(10) Five government officials, including the ministers of education and agriculture, submitted their resignation.(11) On January 2, 1980 Archbishop Romero brought the military and civilian leaders together at his residence, the seminary of San Jose de la Montana. It was to be a final effort to save the junta. The meeting lasted all day and broke up with very grim faces.(12) On January 3, 1980 the two leftists on the junta, Ungo and Mayorga, both resigned. All the remaining members of the cabinet, with the exception of minister of the presidency Zamora and minister of defense Garcia, also resigned. The first junta and the government had collapsed.(13) The Second Junta Shortly after the collapse of the first junta, the Christian Democrats stepped in to stabilize the government. On January 4, 1980 Rubin Zamora, who had refused to resign as minister of the presidency, spoke on the radio. He claimed that the crisis was normal and that the government couldn't change overnight. He stated that the army had agreed to work with the PDC toward implementing reforms.(14) In fact, Jose Napoleon Duarte, the long exiled PDC leader, had returned from Caracas on October 26, 1979. Although he was met at the airport by 30,000 cheering followers, there was at least that many demonstrators against Duarte from the popular forces. Many foreign observers had assumed Duarte and the PDC represented the majority of Salvadoreans in their struggle against economic oppression and military dictators. It soon became clear that Duarte and the PDC had waited too long to bring about change. Many people had turned to the popular organizations to change the government and improve their plight. The speed with which Zamora made his radio broadcast left little doubt that the PDC had been maneuvering behind the scenes with the army to negotiate themselves into power. The resignations of the PDC members from the first junta were then seen as purely a political maneuver. Many Salvadoreans viewed Duarte and the PDC as selling out their principals and tricking Ungo and Mayorga into resigning. Others saw the actions by the PDC during this governmental crisis as a sincere effort to bring about stability by returning the army and security forces to their previous position of being unchallenged.(15) On January 9, a second junta was announced. It had the same two military members, Colonels Majano and Gutierrez, plus three civilians. * Jose Ramon Avalos Navarrette--a politically nonaligned San Salvador Physician * Antonio Morales Erlich--the secretary general of the PDC * Hector Dada--the PDC member from the previous junta(16) Although it is inconceivable that Duarte was not key in the effort by the PDC to achieve a greater share of power, he did not join the junta. Instead Duarte flew to Guatemala where he was very visible and gave many interviews. He stated that the first junta had failed because it had tried to undertake reforms before restoring political democracy and holding elections. He also said the PDC was the only means left to unify the country and rally the people because 20 years of work by the party had built up trust by the people. Most observers felt Duarte was simply waiting for presidential elections to be held because he did not want to be tainted by the manipulations which formed the second junta.(17) Although the PDC did receive encouragement from its sister parties in Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Europe, and the Carter Administration in Washington, problems worsened at home.(18) Former Major Roberto D'Aubuissan tried to form a coup, but this failed. The army and security forces con- tinued to use violence and murder to break up demonstrations by the popular forces. The violence came to a head on February 22, 1980 when PDC leader Mario Zamora (attorney general during the first junta) was meeting at his house with Napoleon Duarte and Hector Dada. They were raided by masked members of the UGB who singeled out Zamora, took him into the bathroom, and shot him. As a result Ruben Zamora, brother of Mario, and Hector Dada resigned from the PDC and the government. They criticized the government for being unable to even protect its members. They also criticized the government for failing to arrest former Major D'Aubuissan who had publicly declared on TV that Mario Zamora was working for the FPL.(19) By March 3, 1980 the second junta had fallen. The Third Junta The loss of Hector Dada was a crushing blow to the PDC and the government. He was a leading intellectual, a resilient leader, and was very respected. This chaos in the government caused Duarte to change his plans and he took Dada's place on the junta on March 3, 1980.(20) The third junta, seeing the continuing violence, growing opposition by the popular forces, and hearing rumors of another coup, quickly began the long awaited reform. On March 6, 1980 they announced a three phased land reform program under the direction of the U.S. State Department and the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), an affiliate of the AFL-CIO.(21) They announced that phase I was the seizure of 25% of all arable land, some 376 plantations belonging to 244 owners; a total of almost half a million acres. All plots of land greater than 1235 acres were subject to the seizure. Phase II was the seizure of medium sized plots of land between 370 and 1235 acres. Phase III was to turn over to each of those peasants renting land, 2.25 acres.(22) The seized land was to be paid for with 25% cash and the remainder in government bonds maturing over 25 years. The estates seized were to be maintained as agricultural units by peasant organizations. Peasant families would receive individual lots, but would be encouraged to farm in cooperation with other families, sharing farm equipment and machinery that had been seized. The government also nationalized all Salvadorean owned banks. The government would own 51% of stock and encourage the granting of industrial development and agricultural loans. The agency tasked with managing the land reform program was the Instituto Salvadoreno de Transfomacion Agraria (ISTA). It was headed by peasant leader Rodolfo Viera and ISTA general manager Leonel Gomez Vides.(23) On March 7, 1980 the junta declared a state of seiqe to implement phase I of the reform. The armed forces were sent into the countryside to occupy estates, handle land lord resistance, and assist in the transfer of the land. This state of seige allowed the police to arrest people and search premises without warrants. It also prohibited street rallies and demonstrations and imposed strict press censorship. As usual there was corruption, with the security forces rewarding their ORDEN supporters and punishing the opposition. Ten days after the reform went into effect so much violence had occurred in the countryside that BPR called a strike and many lands were seized. ISTA then became more active, tried to do a better job, and the army was withdrawn. Due to the problems in implementing phase I, the junta on April 29 announced it was skipping phase II and beginning phase III. Known as "land to the tiller," 10% of all the farm land would be turned over to tenant farmers and sharecroppers. Each renter would receive 2.25 acres. Although it had been estimated that each peasant family of six people required a minimum of 17 acres in order to be selfsufficient, it was hoped that phase III would fulfill an age old dream. Each peasant would own his own plot of land. Implementing phase III appeared to be a smart move by the junta. * It avoided a confrontation with the powerful coffee growers who owned most of the medium sized estates * They had few liabilities since phase III lands were of marginal value or they wouldn't have been rented.(24) In June 1980 Duarte announced the start of a massive emergency public works project that would cost $900 million and create 50,000 jobs. It was to be financed by loans and credits from the United States, Venezuela, the International Monetary Fund, and the Inter-American Development Bank.(25) Despite these efforts by Duarte and others to move ahead with land reform and improved industrialization, increasing violence overshadowed any progress. The PDC's failure to attempt to restrain the armed forces allowed them to continue and increase repression. On March 24, 1980 Archbishop Romero was assasinated and one week later 30 people were killed at his funeral.(26) On March 26 undersecretary of agriculture Jorge Alberto Villacorta resigned his position after witnessing uniformed members of the security forces shoot the directors of an ISTA sponsored self management group. On April 30 there was a second coup attempt by Major D'Aubuissan. Colonel Majano ordered his arrest and on May 8 D'Abuissan was captured 10 miles from the capital along with several co-conspirators. He had in his position a briefcase full of incriminating documents concerning the coup attempt and other right wing activities.(27) The very next day the entire officer corps of the armed forces gathered, some 700 people, and voted to demote Majano from his position as commander-in-chief. In his place they elected Colonel Gutierrez. This was an unprecedented action because the position was not an elective post. This having been accomplished, the armed forces were freed from any moderating or restraining influence. On May 13, Major D'Aubuissan and his co-conspirators were released due to lack of evidence, and no charges were ever brought. On September 1, the military "orders of the month" were published and all of Majano's supporters from the 1979 coup were tranferred to insignificant posts or out of the country.(28) After each of the February and April coup attempts by D'Aubuissan, the PDC threatened to resign from the junta and the cabinet if the army didn't take action against him. However, in both cases the army refused to take action and the PDC did not resign. Actions like this gave a clear signal to the military that they could do whatever they wanted and the PDC would not intervene. May 14, 1980 saw the Sumpul River Massacre. The Army, joined by ORDEN, launched a sweep in the mountains of Chalatenango Province. Every one in the area was assumed to be a guerilla, and they were driven to the Sumpul River which borders Honduras. With the Honduran soldiers refusing to allow peasants to exit the river on Honduran soil, the Salvadorean soldiers stood on the river banks and fired. Women were tortured and children were thrown in the air for target practice. Althouqh both governments denied the action, eyewitnesses claimed at least 600 people were massacred.(29) On June 26 the army invaded the campus of National University with helicopters, tanks, and 900 troops. In two hours they took over the campus and killed 50 students. Although the government had claimed it was a training ground and arsenal for leftist guerillas, no weapons were found.(30) The University was closed, and has not been reopened. November 27 saw 200 soldiers and police surround the Jesuit high school in San Salvador where key leaders of the FDR were meeting. Several dozen people were taken away at gun point and a few hours later five key leaders of the left showed up dead after being tortured. The junta denied all knowledge, but it is hard to imagine that number of armed, uniformed rightists being involved without the government or armed forces having some knowledge.(31) All this violence placed increased international attention on the junta and its inability to control the military and security forces. The biggest blow came on December 3, 1980 when three nuns and one female Catholic lay worker were brutally raped, tortured, and murdered. On December 7 Colonel Majano resigned from the junta because of the lack of restraint of the military forces. He was offered the attache post in Madrid, which was basically political exile. He declined and went into hiding. The third junta had collapsed.(32) Provisional President Duarte Colonel Majano's resignation brougnt increased pressure to bring the military under civilian control. After several days of negotiations between the Army and Christian Democrats, a new government was announced on December 13, 1980. The army had agreed there should be a civilian provisional president. Under the terms of the compromise a four member junta would be formed, with Duarte as Provisional President. Colonel Gutierrez would be the Vice-President and Commander-in-Chief of Military Forces. Colonel Garcia would continue to serve as Defense Minister. Morales Ehrlich remained as the fourth member of the junta and Duartes second. Duarte was sworn in on December 21, 1980 in a formal ceremony full of the requisite degree of pomp. Although he was the first civilian president in 50 years, he had no real power. Gutierrez and Garcia still controlled the army, and they were the most powerful force in the country.(33) The year of 1981 saw increased violence by both sides of the political spectrum. On January 3, 1981 while dining at the San Salvador Sheraton, Rodolfo Viera, the director of ISTA and two North American Advisors, Mark Pearlman and Michael Hammer of AIFLD, were assasinated. Viera was a very charismatic leader who had brought great credibility to the land reform program. These deaths were attributed to the right, even by Provisional President Duarte. The general manager of ISTA, Gomez Vides, was to have attended the dinner, but failed to receive the invitation. On the 14th he was arrested, accused of being a guerilla, and released. Shortly after his release two trucks with death squads came to his house, but he miraculously escaped. He went into exile and the land reform program came to a halt.(34) Meanwhile, the Left launched their "final offensive." Although the Army finally succeeded in beating back the offensive, the guerillas succeeded in keeping the army off balance virtually the entire year. Without United States military and economic assistance, however, the issue might have been in doubt. In March Duarte named an electoral committee to prepare for free elections in 1982. He promised that independent observers could monitor the voting and that the results of the elections would be respected. In July, registration was opened up for political parties to participate in the upcoming elections. In September, the president of the Central Electons Council, Jorge Bustamante, publicly recognized the FDR as a representative political force and invited them to participate. However, he refused to recognize the FMLN, stating it was a group that "sowed terrorism, hatred, and violence." When that failed, the MNR and PSC were invited to leave the FDR and take part in the elections. They were told they could campaign by long distance from Guatemala using radio or TV if they were afraid to enter El Salvador. The left chose not to campaign for several reasons. In addition to the new found organization and unity of the left was the threat of rightist violence. Over 60 Christian Democrat mayors and other office holders had been assasinated during the previous year. If the government could not guarantee the safety of the parties in the government, it surely could not guarantee the safety of a party in opposition.(35) All these efforts at reform met with mixed approval. The implementaton of land reform and promised elections seemed to take away one of th guerilla's main causes. In return, 1981 saw them change from a program of demonstrations and strikes to attacking economic targets that would destroy the country's economy. Meanwhile, the right claimed reform had gone too far and was resisting the land reform and stepping up its rhetoric. The right wing death squads continued to assasinate those who opposed the traditional role of the oligarchy. By July 1981 Duarte called conservative businessmen trying to roll back limited land reform and nationalization of banks the biggest threat to the government. He announced, "The private sector is in its final offensive."(36) By the fall of 1981 seven political parties had registered for the election. All were on the right side of the political spectrum. The four major ones were: * PDC--lead by Duarte, this was the closest party to a moderate middle * PCN--The Party of National Concilation was considered to be the PDC's leading competition. However, that perspective changed when on January 27, 1982 PCN Secretary General Rodriguez Gonzalez was assasinated in front of the PCN headquarters. The FMLN was never accused of the assasination, and it was assumed that right wing extremists were responsible. * AD--The Democratic Action Party was known as the Rotary Club of the oligarchy's lawyers. These were the owners of medium sized farms and businesses, middle class business managers, and professionals who had supported phase I of land reform. They opposed further reform and wanted nationalized banks and companies returned to the original owners. *ARENA--The National Republican Alliance was formed by Major D'Aubuissan. His campaign slogan was "El Salvador will be the tomb of the reds." He promised if his party won, the FMLN would be annihilated within three months.(37) While the country prepared for elections, there were continuing failures of the governing junta. In December 1981 the Salvadorean Communal Union (UCS--a peasant organization assisting with the government land reform program) completed a report which said the land reform effort was failing. Over 90 UCS officials, leaders, and beneficiaries of land reform had died at the hands of the security forces and land owners. Additionally, the security forces had assisted in the eviction of over 25,000 peasants from their property. Meanwhile the armed forces went on the offensive against the left in Morazan Province. In a large sweep of 4500 troops, the army attempted to trap the FMLN between Salvadorean troops moving up from the south and Honduran troops preventing any movement to the north. One of the government's major objectives was to destroy Radio Venceremos, the querilla radio station which had been broadcasting uninterrupted for a year. On December 14 the government announced that the radio station had been destroyed. On December 26, however, Radio Venceremos began regular broadcasts again. In addition to failing to destroy Radio Venceremos the army failed to trap the FMLN. Not only were they able to avoid capture, but they evacuated civilians who lived in the area. Many civilians stayed because they were politically neutral and they didn't think the army would harm them. The Army however, assumed all people in the area to be leftists, and over 500 bodies were found after the army withdrew.(38) This event clearly pointed out the two extremes in El Salvador. The guerillas' ability to outlast and outmaneuver the government's forces, and the government's use of excessive violence against anyone remotely suspected of supporting the left. The Constituent Assembly In March 1982 the Salvadoreans voted in unexpectedly large numbers. Approximately 1.5 million ballots were cast in what was praised by the United States and other international observers as a show of democracy. Some 80% of the eligible voters participated, giving the majority of their votes to Duarte's Christian Democrataic Party. It surprised both Washington and the international community that so many votes went to candidates of the right. It can only be surmised that many Salvadoreans preferred the right's brand of repression and stability over continued turmoil from the growing power of the left. The results of the election are shown below: Click here to view image Duarte was unable to form a majority coalition, and within a few days the other parties had united to form a right wing coalition. They elected D'Aubuissan President of the Constituent Assembly and sought to keep the PDC completely out of power. All the parties to the right of the PDC had pledged to de-nationalize the banks and either halt or reverse the partially implemented land reform program.(40) This was the impetus which D'Aubuissan now sought to give the Salvadorean government. He successfully kept the PDC from having any positions on the nine member Assembly directorate. Largely due to pressure from the Salvadorean military, who feared the cutoff of United States economic and military aid if D'Aubuissan became too powerful, a compromise choice was selected as new Provisional President. Doctor Alvaro Alfredo Magana Borja, a successful businessmen with no long term political aspirations, was sworn in on May 2, 1982. Although Magana was seen as a moderate and he gave equal repesentation in the new cabinet to the three major political parties, he constantly battled with the right wing coalition of the constitutent assembly. As the constituent assembly moved quickly to halt the land reform program, it came under increasing pressure from the United States and Provisional President Magana. This led D'Aubuissan to say publicly in June 1982 that his people should "work toward paying off the country's debt with dignity rather than submit to the continued demands of the United States Congress." On August 3, 1982 an agreement which had been drawn up by Magana was signed by representatives of the five parties holding seats in the constituent assembly. Known as the Apaneca pact, it was an agreement to work toward a cohesive political solution to El Salvador's problems. Three separate commissions were established: * A political commission to set a timetable for municipal and presidential elections, to oversee the post election transfer of power, and to oversee the continuation of refoms * A human rights commission * A peace commission to draft an amnesty proposal(41) Tension continued between Magana and D'Aubuissan on the implementing of the Apaneca Pact, manipulation of the judicial system, and the issue of government negotiations with the left. Tension also arose between D'Aubuissan and Defense Minister Garcia over the issue of control of the military. These tensions came to a head in January 1983 and lead to a significant shift in the orientation of the constituent assembly. On January 27 D'Aubuissan attempted to delay a vote ratifying the new Minister of Health. He left the chamber along with the other ARENA deputies and threatened to resign if the assembly took the vote in his absence. The remaining deputies ratified the appointment, 39 votes to none in the first session not called by the Assembly's president. They then adopted a procedural amendment which allowed the Assembly to convene if called by any two of the nine members of the Assembly's directorate. Under the lead of the Christian Democrats, the assembly then formed a moderate coalition holding a one vote majority. The government had swung to the right, but now returned to a more centrist position. During the second half of 1982 while the political parties jockeyed for position in their interpretation of the results of the elections, the Army went on the offense. Between May and December, the Army averaged three offensives per month against the insurgents, sending in from 1500 to 4500 troops in each effort. Although many of their efforts were in Chalatenango and Morazan Province, their main target was Guazapa Volcano, 26 km north of San Salvador. Guazapa had been an FMLN stronghold since 1980, and the army attempted eight times during 1982 to capture this vital target. They failed, however, and the biggest result of all these offensives were thousands of refugees and hundreds of dead peasants whom the army accused of being guerilla sympathizers. Whereas the army very seldom took any prisoners, the FMLN frequently took captives. Some were stripped of weapons, equipment, and clothing and then released. Others were turned over periodically to the International Committee of the Red Cross. Typically the prisoners were well treated. It can be surmised that the capture and release of prisoners, such as the 243 soldiers turned over in September, was an attempt to encourage government troops to surrender rather than risk death by continuing to fight.(42) Additionally, the return of these captured prisoners had a debilitating and demoralizing effect on their fellow soldiers. Problems in the Military Hierarchy Many members of the Salvadorean military had been critical of defense minister Garcia and his inability to take the required actions to defeat the FMLN. In response to these and other criticisms, on January 5, 1983 General Garcia issued orders transferring Lt. Colonel Sigifredo Ochoa Perez to military attache in Uruguay. Lt. Colonel Ochoa had been commander of the garrison at Sensuntepeque in Cabanas. Although his province bordered three war zones, he had been successful in keeping the war out of his province. He was seen by U.S. military advisors and international observers as one of the few really effective top military commanders in El Salvador.(43) In response to the transfer order Lt. Colonel Ochoa put his troops on full alert and refused the order. He stated that the Uruguay post was "diplomatic exile" and said Garcia's action was caused by "professional jealousy." Under pressure from Provisional President Magana, Lt. Colonel Ochoa resigned his command on January 12, 1983. Magana described the event as "a truely lamentable incident," and did not punish Lt. Colonel Ochoa or any of his men. In fact, the transfer order was subsequently voided and Lt. Colonel Ochoa was appointed defense attache at the embassy in Washington.(44) The result of the entire episode served to weaken Garcia's position as Defense Minister. The military continued to suffer a series of setbacks. In February the FMLN succeeded in seizing and occupying for three days the city of Berlin. This city of 35,000 was the largest city to date seized by the guerillas.(45) On March 30, elements of the "elite" Belloso Battalion were ambushed in Morazan Province, suffering over 100 casualties. This battalion was trained at Ft. Bragg and was supposed to be El Salvador's best.(46) Incidents such as these and the overall poor performance of the Salvadorean military caused increased criticism of Garcia both at home and abroad. On March 22, Commander of the Air Force Juan Rafael Bustillo called for Garcia's resignation. On April 14 he told President Magana that he and the Air Force would no longer obey Garcia's orders. As a result General Garcia finally resigned on April 18 and was replaced by General Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova, the director of the National Guard since 1979. These moves were seen as a move to the right by the military since Casanova was connected with the repressive National Guard and had allegedly been part of a cover up in the murder of the four church women.(47) The National Campaign Plan In an attempt to regain the initiative from the FMLN, in June the government launched a National Campaign Plan. Previously they had used large scale sweeps through guerilla controlled areas, which lost many lives. They now attempted a policy of rural pacification. In addition to military efforts to defeat the guerillas, there were instituted redevelopment plans which restored local economic and communications installations and protected agricultural production.(48) In June the Army moved against the guerrillas in San Vicente and as usual the FMLN withdrew and avoided direct confrontation. This time, however, the army stayed in the area. In July, the army attempted to repeat this procedure in Usulutan. This time, however, the guerillas did not entirely withdraw. They began a series of ambushes of recon platoons and some counterattacks. It appeared that the Nationial Campaign Plan would take a long time to implement, and at this point was less than a complete success. On August 11, 1983 Defense Minister Vides announced the Army's combat performance record during the 12 month period ending June 30, 1983. A total of 2,292 government troops were fatalities, with 4,195 wounded and 328 missing. Although these figures were double the previous year, he expressed confidence in the new campaign plan and the ability of the armed forces to combat subversion. In addition to efforts at home, the Salvadorean military attempted to get international support. On July 7, the United States sent a 25 member military medical team to El Salvador to train the soldiers in first aid and improve the Army's evacuation system for the wounded. On October 1 the Defense ministers of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador agreed to revive the Central American Defense Council. This council, which had previously included Nicaragua, was formed in 1965 but had been defunct since 1969 because of the "Soccer War." The ministers agreed to jointly use their armies for the "defense of democracy" against "Marxist-Leninist aggression."(49) Despite these moves, militarily the situation in El Salvador approached a stalemate. The total casualties of 6815 troops was 20% of the total 33,000 member military establishment (armed and security forces). While the guerillas succeeded in destroying important bridges and power stations, the army was seen as largely ineffective. Only its heavier equipment and aviation assets enabled the army to stalemate the military situation. Meanwhile, its morale continued to suffer and casualties continued to mount. Preparing For Elections On March 3 the constituent ass
