The Iran-Iraq War: Struggle Without End CSC 1984 SUBJECT AREA Warfighting WAR SINCE 1945 SEMINAR The Iran-Iraq War: Struggle Without End Major Martin J. Martinson, USMC 2 April 1984 Marine Corps Command and Staff College Marine Corps Development and Education Command Quantico, Virginia 22134 ABSTRACT Author : MARTINSON, Martin J., Major, U. S. Marine Corps Title : The Iran-Iraq War: Struggle Without End Publisher: Marine Corps Command and Staff College Date : 1 April 1984 The purpose of this paper is to describe the war between Iran and Iraq which commenced in earnest on September 22, 1980. Its theme is that the war is a continuation of struggle which has occurred between the peoples of these two countries for centuries. The war has settled into an immobile style of trench warfare but it still has the capability to rapidly escalate and to involve the super-powers. The first chapter describes the religious, geo-political, historical, and personal factors that have contributed to this present war. Religious friction between the Shiite and Sunni Moslems; ethnic friction between the Persians and the Arabs; personal enmity between the Ayatollah Khomeini and President Saddam Hussein; and disputed borders are just a few examples of some of the contributing factors. The second chapter compares the armed forces of the two nations; describes the main area of operations; and lists the apparent reasons for Iraq's attack in 1980. The latter part of the chapter recounts the air, sea and ground attacks of the initial Iraqi invasion until January 5, 1981. The third chapter recounts the Iranian counter-offensive from January 1981 until the Spring of 1982. The latter part of this chapter analyzes some of the successes and failures of the two antagonists using the framework of the nine principles of war. The fourth chapter begins with the Iranian offensive of July 1982 and continues through mid-1983. Events of the past year-and-a-half have been very similar to the trench warfare of World War I. The major portion of this chapter is devoted to a discussion of the support that different countries are providing to the adversaries and the reasons behind this support. Chapter 5 discusses some of the developments that have come out of the war. The nature of infantry, armor and artillery tactics has been modified by the environment of this war. The Iranians and Iraqis have resorted to the 19th century employment of 20th century weapon systems. As an example, tank engagements are now generally conducted at ranges of 200-300 meters because the tank crews don't understand the sighting systems or because the systems are inoperable. The final chapter proposes two scenarios that could develop from the war and speculates how each could involve the super-powers. The conclusion is made that this struggle will continue to have potential international ramifications unless drastic measures are taken by the West to reduce the open hostility. Most of the sources for this paper were articles in books, magazines and newspapers. There has been a decided lack of any primary sources and published press reports have often been speculative because of reporters' lack of access to the battlefield. As the war is still very much in progress, there have been few final works published on the subject. CONTENTS Page Introduction 1 Chapter 1. Causes of the Iranian-Iraqi War 3 Demographics 4 Religion 4 Personalities 8 Geo-politics 12 Chapter 2. The War: The Iraqi: Attack 19 Rationale 19 Force Strengths 23 Theater of Operations 32 The Ground Attack 35 The Naval Battle 37 Air Operations 38 Chapter 3. The Iranian Response 41 Chapter 4. The Modern Western Front 56 Chapter 5. Developments From the War 69 Manpower 69 Equipment 71 Ground Tactics 74 Air Forces 76 Conclusion 79 Chapter 6. Impact on International Relations 80 Chronology of Significant Events 90 Endnotes 93 Annotated Bibliography 100 LIST OF MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS Figure Page 1. Disputed Border Areas 14 2. 1980 Iranian Armed Forces 24 3. 1980 Iraqi Armed Forces 25 4. Theater of Operations 33 5. Iraqi Ground Attack - September 1980 40 6. Iranian Offensive - September 1981 43 7. Iranian Offensive - November-December 1981 45 8. Iranian Offensive - March-April 1982 49 9. Iranian Offensive - September-October 1982 58 10. Iranian Offensive - November 1982, February and April 1983 61 11. Iranian Offensive - July 1983 63 12. Iranian Offensive - October 1983 64 INTRODUCTION This research paper is titled "Struggle Without End" to underscore the fact that the causes of the present struggle between Iran and Iraq have existed for centuries and will likely continue for as long. A comment made recently to the author by a member of an Arabic, Persian Gulf country provides further insight into the conflict. The individual stated that it was not until the Ayatollah Khomeini came to power that Arabs generally became aware of the Shiite-Sunni Muslim conflict. The possibility exists that forces within the Gulf have used the schism between the two sects as a vehicle to further their political and economic efforts. A similar situation exists in Northern Ireland where religious, economic and political causes have become intermingled. The Middle East Journal was a most valuable source in the conduct of the research. In addition to providing a day-by-day chronology of the war, it referenced other possible sources such as newspapers and Foreign Broadcast Information Service reports. The single most valuable individual was Mr. Anthony Cordesman who in writing for Armed Forces Journal International not only analyzed the conduct of the war but also proved very accurate in his predictions of the war's course. The forty-two month old war between Iran and Iraq has caused hundreds of thousands of casualties and it has reduced the economy of Iraq to a shambles. It has also threatened the oil supply that the West so desperately needs for survival. However, because the war is deeply-rooted in religious belief, it promises to be bitterly fought and to continue for an indeterminate length of time. The super-powers had little or no hand in the start of the war and have had less effect on its continuance. The two adversaries, Iran and Iraq, are being supplied by third countries who have their own reasons for seeing the conflict continue. Unless and until the United States takes a greater part in the attempt to get the two parties to the negotiating table, the war will continue, and the chances of an international conflict will increase. Author's Note: This topic is a contemporary one; events occur daily which, if included in this paper, would ensure that it could never be completed. Hence, the research ended with February 1984. This was necessary to enable me to organize my material, analyze it, and write the final draft. I recognize that this time limitation results in my not addressing the March 1984 battles with their reports of 500,000 men engaged in deadly conflict, the recent charges of the use of chemical weapons by Iraq, and Baghdag's claims of assaults on shipping in the Persian Gulf. This is unfortunate, but time constraints forced this limitation. I also note that the events of Spring 1984 are in themselves another effort; perhaps in the 1984-85 Academic Year, and officer in the War Since 1945 Seminar will work on them and produce a companion paper to mine. Chapter 1 Causes of the Iranian-Iraqi War The current struggle between neighboring Iran and Iraq, which began in earnest on 22 September 1980, is a contemporary resurfacing of tension that has existed between these two countries for over sixty years. The conflict between the peoples of these two states dates back to the death of Mohammed and, before that, to the rise of the Arab, Persian and Turkish Empires. The purpose of this research effort is to highlight some of the causes, old and new, of the present conflict; to recount the general course of the war; to discuss the development of tactics and weapons; and to discuss some of the implications of the war on international relations. In this first chapter,I shall discuss: the demographics of the two nations; some religious aspects of the area of conflict; the personalities of the two leaders; and the geo-political situation of the two countries as it bears on this war. Information contained herein is from many sources, all of which are unclassified and most of which were written within the past three years. As the conflict is still occurring, much of what has been written is speculative and cannot be absolutely confirmed. Estimates, such as casualty figures, are based on reports by the two adversaries, reports from observers other than from the two warring nations, or on the analyses conducted by sources in the United States. Multiple sources are used where the accounts differ greatly and the opinions of United States analysts are mentioned when they are available. Demographics The majority of present-day Iranians are descendants of the Persian Empire. The language of the approximately 35,000,000 Iranians is Farsi (Persian), an Indo-European tongue. There are, however, sizable portions of the population in the Khuzistan Province and along the Persian Gulf Coast who are not Persians; who speak a language dissimilar from Farsi; and who are descendants of the Arabs. The population of Iraq was about 11,500,000 in 1976 and is composed primarily of an Arabic-speaking, semitic people. There are, as in Iran, sizable portions of the population that do not fit into the general mold. Large communities of Persians or their descendants live in Iraq. Between forty and seventy thousand of these Persians were expelled in 1980 by Saddam Hussein.1 The capital cities of both states are the most heavily populated and economically the most important in the two countries. Baghdad, the capital of Iraq, is home to over 2.8 million Iraqis and is the location of over half of the country's industry. Tehran, the capital of Iran, is inhabited by almost 4.5 million Iranians and is economically significant but not nearly so much as is Baghdad. Religion The Persian Gulf (or as it is known, the Arabian Gulf), as the land of Abraham, Moses, and Mohammed can be described, is the home for three great monotheistic religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam. However, one of these, Islam, has been clearly dominant in this region. Islam is the youngest of the three religions and dates back to Mohammed's call in 610 A.D. to preach the truth concerning God, Allah. Mohammed may not have intended to found a new religion but rather, may have only been trying to call Arabs back to the worship of the God of Abraham. Regardless of his motives, Mohammed was the founder of an entirely new religion. However, just as there are many variations of Christianity, so there are many variations of Islam, many of which can be attributed to different interpretations of Mohammed's words. Two of the great sects of Islam that are of particular importance in this region, and therefore to this study, are the Shiite Moslems and the Sunni Moslems. There is not enough space available to fully explore the origins of these two sects but some highlights of the major differences--differences that have led to various violent conflicts since the 7th century A.D., will be given. One major cause of religious conflict is the dispute over the rightful successor to Mohammed after his death in 632 A.D. This disagreement has grown into theological, legal and cultural differences between the Shiites and the Sunnis in the centuries since then. The Shiites believe that the successors to Mohammed, the Imams, are descended from Ali, Mohammed's son-in-law. The Imams are regarded as infallible teachers and the only source of religious instruction and guidance. This reliance on the Imams for instruction and guidance is carried from the Shiites' religious life into their daily life, such as governmental institutions. In fact, for the Shiites there really isn't any aspect of their lives that doesn't come under their belief that the Imams are the infallible source of guidance. There were twelve Imams following Mohammed's death. The last Imam, the Twelth Imam, disappeared in 878 A.D. without leaving an heir. While awaiting the return of the Twelth Imam, the early Shiites decided to carry on the line by designating intermediate Imams. Thus, the Shiites have developed a succession of Imams, in a descent from Ali. The Shiites teach also that the faithful must believe in all of the Imams, especially the Imam of their time. The Sunnis, the orthodox followers of Mohammed, believe that the line from Mohammed passed to his daughter, Fatima, who married Ali. The Sunnis discount the combined temporal and religious leadership of the Imam. They believe that the caliph, the ruler and leader of the Sunnis, must protect and maintain the faith and territory of Islam, but he is not a religious leader. Thus, the Sunnis are loyal to the duly-empowered caliph while the Shiites are loyal to the Imam since his wisdom is believed to be inherited from Mohammed. This is similar to the controversy between the Catholics who believe that the Pope is infallible in matters of religion and the other Christian beliefs that the Pope is not infallible. The similarity can be extended in that there have been many wars fought in the name of religion, but which have also really had economic and political differences as the main causes and objectives of the states engaged in them. The concept of "jihad" or "holy war" waged in the "Way of God" is also important to our understanding of the current conflict. The original concept of "jihad" required believers in Islam to continue to spread the teachings of Mohammed in the name of their religion, but only to carry the struggle into the camps of the pagans (or those who did not worship a god). In other words, followers of Islam were to wage the "jihad" but not with each other, nor with Christians or Jews, since these peoples were "of the BOOK" and were exempt from the teachings of or conversion to Islam.2 However, if a "jihad" were declared, and it could be declared by a caliph, the responsibility to wage the "jihad" fell upon the entire community and not just upon a few individual Muslims. For all intents and purposes, both sides have declared the present war to be a "holy" one. President Hussein made the declaration on November 9, 1980 saying that the purpose of the war was to "defend the ideals of the message of Islam".3 Although the Iranians have not apparently made an outright declaration that a holy war is in effect, there are numerous references to the Iraqis as being infidels. Thus, it would seem that the Iraqis are not considered by the Iranians to be the "people of the Book", and that the struggle to spread the true Islamic faith should be taken into Iraq. One other significant aspect of the "jihad" is that many Muslims believe that they are guaranteed paradise if they were to die during their fight in such a struggle. From this understanding of "jihad" and its demand upon and rewards offered to the individual, we are better able to understand why so many Iranians and Iraqis give-up their lives so freely. About 80% of the world's Muslims adhere to the Sunni faith, but most of the Persian Gulf Muslims are Shiites. This disparity is due to the fact that between 93 to 98% of the Muslims in Iran, the most-populous Persian Gulf state, and a little more than half of the Muslims in Iraq, the second most-populous state, are Shiites. Excluding Iran and Iraq, Sunni Muslims are in the majority in the Persian Gulf states.4 The religious dispute is personified in the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini who is the political and religious leader of Iran and Saddam Hussein who is the Sunni-Muslim leader of a country with a Shiite Muslim majority. The leaders of the other Arabic, Sunni-Muslim Gulf states fear the regime of the Ayatollah Khomeini. The Iranian Revolution and the following Iranian-Iraqi War have provided the example for a conflict between sophisticated, secular, modern ideas and states and puritanical, religious, traditional, zealous regimes and societies. Seen here, also, is the conflict between those interested in continued industrialization and a secular state and those committed to reducing Western influence and returning to traditional values. It was also feared that Shiite-inspired nationalism would cause pro-Western monarchs and shaikhs to come under increasing pressure. Of considerable irony is the fact that the Ayatollah's successful,fourteen-year struggle against the Shah was conducted partly from Iraq and that the Ayatollah now threatens Iraq from his base in Iran. Personalities Just as the tone of American politics can take on the personality of the President or of the dominant leaders, so, too, can that of foreign governments assume the personalities of their leaders. Strong, charismatic men who arrive on the scene at a precipitous time are able to exhort tens of millions of people into doing their bidding. Who can deny the power of Hitler, or Stalin or F.D.R., or any one of the dozens of men and women who have caused the seemingly impossible to happen? Such is the case in Iraq and much more so in Iran. To more fully understand the conflict that exists between these two nations, we must more fully understand the characters of the two protagonists leading each state. President Saddam Hussein al-Takriti was born in Tikrit, Iraq on April 28, 1937 into a less-than-wealthy peasant family. From the time that he was still in Tikrit, a number of significant events took place which would have an indelible impact on his future career. Among these occurrences were some that caused Hussein to participate in nationalist activities which had as their goal the elimination of foreign influence, not only in Iraq, but from all Arab lands. An important milestone in Saddam Hussein's life was his decision to continue his studies in Baghdad. Staying in Baghdad for his education, he became involved in the activities of the Ba'ath Socialist Party and participated in the abortive coup of 1956. He escaped arrest and later became a full-fledged member of the Ba'ath Party. 5 At the age of 22 he experienced another great event in his life. he participated in the attempted assassination of Abd al-Karim Qasim. Wounded in the attempt, Hussein fled the country and took refuge in Syria. A year later he moved to Cairo where he completed his education and became involved in Egyptian Ba'ath Party politics. He returned to Baghdad in 1963 when the Iraqi Ba'ath Party seized power and was imprisoned in late 1964 when the Ba'ath Party was removed from power. He was later released and became a key Ba'ath Party figure when the Ba'athists seized power again in 1968. Hussein ascended to the presidency in August 1979 when his long-time mentor, President al-Bakr, stepped down. While he lived in Egypt, Hussein had become an admirer of President Nasser and a proponent of Nasser's attempt to promote Pan-Arabism. Now as President of Iraq, Hussein has attempted to develop his own brand of Pan-Arabism and he has surrounded himself with loyal family members and supporters. To keep internal dissent manageable, he has attempted to enlist the support of his two main sources of trouble. Hussein has partially placated the Kurds by promising them an autonomous state and he has gained the backing of the Imam of Naja. The Imam of Naja is the highest ranking Shiite in the world and his support was essential in any attempt by Hussein to quiet the Iraqi Shiites. More importantly, President Hussein has attempted to establish a personality cult with himself as the center. This action has put him in direct conflict with another cult-leader, the Ayatollah Khomeini. The Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was born on May 17, 1900 and, until the time of the Iranian Revolution, he had spent all but four years of his life in theological study and religious teaching. A long time opponent of the Shah, Khomeini in 1944 contributed to a book which denounced the monarchy and in 1963 he publicly opposed the Shah's White Revolution. The White Revolution, an attempt by the Shah to modernize Iran, included laws that granted immunity to United States military personnel and which redistributed land, much of which was in the hands of Khomeini and other mullahs. In 1964 Khomeini was expelled because of his opposition to the government. He first went to Turkey and later moved to Iraq where, until 1978, he led the exiled opposition to the Shah. In October 1978, under pressure from the Shah, the Iraqis forced Khomeini to leave. This time he settled near Paris where he again established his opposition-in-exile. One of many ironic notes is the belief that it was not until he was forced to leave Iraq and move to Paris that Khomeini received the press coverage that has become his trademark. Were he to have remained in Iraq, he might have just withered on the vine or continued without initial Western publicity. Upon the Shah's departure from Iran in February 1979, Khomeini returned to a tumultuous welcome and immediately set about to establish his idea of the Islamic state. A national referendum was held, an Islamic constitution was written and the executions of hundreds of the former-Shah's supporters began. Khomeini attempted to model Revolutionary Iran after an Islamic state that ended in 661 A.D., calling for rule of the country by Islamic theologians.6 Therefore, Khomeini set out to establish the religious leaders as the sources of power in Iran. The mullahs were voted into office and the country of Iran and all of its resources were soon devoted to carrying-out the will of its religious zealot leader, the Ayatollah Khomeini. The leaders of Iran and Iraq have grievances against the other state. The 1975 Algiers Accord was forced upon President Hussein by the Shah and in 1980 Tehran attempted to establish the Al Dawa Party in Iraq. The ultimate goal of the Shiite Al Dawa Party was the overthrow of the Ba'athist government of Iraq. The result of this action by the Al Dawa Party was the ousting of between 40,000 and 70,000 Al Dawa Party members from Iraq. There is some suggestion that President Hussein used the attempted subversion by the Al Dawa as an excuse for doing some early spring cleaning before the war began. Khomeini too has his grievances. First, in 1978, President Hussein was coerced into exiling Khomeini to France from the holy city of Najaf, Iraq. Secondly, the Ayatollah has been unable to have the spiritual headquarters of the Shiite sect moved from Najaf to Qom in Iran.7 Najaf, the holiest of Shiite cities, is the location of the governing religious board of the Najaf college, the burial place of Ali, and the location of the Imam Khou'i, the highest authority in the Shiite world. The Imam opposed the movement of the religious board because he saw it as an attempt by Khomeini to assume overall leadership of the Shiite world. There is some support for the Imam's suspicions. Shortly after Khomeini's return to Iran, there was an effort to have him proclaimed as the "Hidden Imam"--the Imam who had disappeared in 878 A.D.8 To have Khomeini proclaimed as the long-awaited Mahdi, the Imam Khou'i would have had to make the declaration to that effect. Declaring that the Ayatollah Khomeini was the "Hidden Imam" would have been tantamount to declaring that Khomeini was a divine being. The Imam Khou'i refused to make the declaration for several reasons. First, a "divine" Khomeini would have drastically reduced the power and prestige of the Imam Khou'i who, as mentioned earlier, is presently the highest-ranking Shiite. Secondly, such a declaration might have set off intra-Muslim clashes between Khomeini supporters and his detractors. Thirdly, the Imam Khou'i is an Arab and with President Hussein's constant support and guidance he has been able to resist the Ayatollah Khomeini's efforts to move the Shiite headquarters to Iran.9 Geo-politics Iran and Iraq, as modern countries, are fairly recent additions to the international scene, but their territorial struggles date back at least to the sixteenth century. To fully understand the present conflict the significance of the Shatt-al-Arab River and the geo-politics of the region must be understood. Figure 1. The Shatt-al-Arab is the estuary of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers and it forms the Iranian-Iraqi boundary from its mouth on the Persian Gulf to a point almost halfway between Khorramshahr and Basra, a distance of about fifty-five miles. Before 1847, the Shatt-al-Arab was an inland river under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire. In 1847, the weakening Ottoman Empire, under the Treaty of Ezerum, formally ceded to the Persian Empire the city of Khorramshahr, the island of Abadan and the anchorage and land on the eastern shore of the Shatt. Also, freedom of navigation throughout the Shatt was guaranteed to Persian vessels.10 This was, however, not the final decision on the boundary between the two countries. Joint Commissions studied the issue and protocols were signed in 1911 and again in 1914. The Constantinople Protocol of 1913-14 fixed the border on the eastern bank of the river and gave some islands in the river to Iran, which was the name given by the Shah to the Persian Empire. Iran, after World War I, claimed that the 1913-14 Protocol was no longer valid because one of the signatories, the Ottoman Empire, no longer existed. Iraq, which had evolved from the defeated Ottoman Empire, felt that the Protocol of 1913-14 was still valid. So many border clashes occurred between the two nations that the issue was brought before the League of Nations for resolution. In the resultant Treaty of 1937, Iraq lost control of the eastern shore when the boundary was moved to the "thalweg" or middle of the river. Iran also gained sovereignty over the five miles of the Shatt that flowed in front of Abadan. The city and port of Khorramshahr, Abadan and the land and anchorage on the east bank, all of Click here to view image which had been part of the Ottoman Empire before 1847, went to Iran. Both parties claimed that they had been forced into signing the treaty by the British. These claims had some basis in fact but they were also to become convenient excuses for later violations of the treaty. Conflict erupted again in 1965 over whether the boundary should be established at the "thalweg" or at the eastern shore. At that time Iraq was beset with internal problems and in 1969 Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the then Shah of Iran, abrogated the Treaty of 1937 through a show of force. Iraq, as it was militarily inferior and was occupied with internal strife, could not counter the Iranian moves. Border conflict occurred again in 1975. Iran, which had been supporting Kurdish insurgents in Iraq for many years agreed to withdraw its support for the insurgents and to settle its other disagreements with Iraq. The underlying reasons for Iran withdrawing its support from the Iraqi Kurds were quite selfish and, yet, very understandable. First, were the Iraqi Kurds to gain autonomy, they could very easily incite their brother Kurds in Iran to renew the struggle for their own independence and lead to the creation of the new state of Kurdestan. Such an internal struggle would have been as costly for Iran as it had been for Iraq. Secondly, were the Iraqis to declare war on Iran because of the latter's support for the Iraqi Kurds, it could only have damaged both countries. However, the Iraqis, having lost over 60,000 casualties during the Kurdish Insurgency and being faced with a stronger potential adversary were forced to agree to the re-demarcation of the boundary, again on Iranian terms.11 The resultant agreement, the Algiers Accord of March 6, 1975 benefitted both parties. Iran received Iraq's acceptance that the common boundary was at the thalweg of the river and that Iraq would no longer support Iranian dissidents and Arab and Baluch secessionists. Iraq received Iranian agreement to withdraw support of the Iraqi Kurds and agreement by Iran to uphold the status quo of the frontier lands.12 This status quo agreement centered around the mutual exchange of territory that each side felt was necessary for defense. Although the agreement benefitted both parties, it was Iraq that lost control of the whole Shatt-al-Arab which is considered by them to be an inland river. However, 1979 was to see a major turn of events. Saddam Hussein had been one of the early supporters of the exiled Ayatollah Khomeini and his attempts to overthrow the Shah, but Iraq had been forced to accept several unfavorable treaties because of their inferior military strength. President Hussein reasoned that were the Ayatollah to overthrow the Shah and were the Iranian military thrown into disarray, then Iraq would have a chance to dictate the terms of a new border treaty. So in 1979, Saddam Hussein publicly welcomed the Iranian Revolution, but privately he maintained his interest on the boundary dispute between the two nations. A second factor leading to the present conflict was the geo-political friction between the two countries. Iran occupies a strategic position in the Middle East. It is a large country of some 1,648,000 square kilometers. Blessed with coastlines on the Caspian Sea, Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman, Iran is also a potential land-bridge between the Soviet Union and warm water ports. Furthermore, Iran can potentially control the important waterways of the Straits of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf. Iraq, however, is a country of about 438,000 square kilometers and is almost completely land-locked. With only about fifty miles of coastline, almost all of which is unsuitable for shipping, Iraq must depend primarily on its main port of Basra which is almost one hundred miles up the Shatt-al-Arab River. The Iraqi naval base of Umm Qasar is on the border with Kuwait and is only accessible to the sea through a narrow channel. The mouth of the Shatt-al-Arab and any oil that Iraq wishes to move to the Gulf are under the guns of Iranian naval bases and artillery. Thus, the Shatt-al-Arab has become an issue between the two states. The Iraqis are dependent upon the free, unrestricted use of the Shatt-al-Arab and view the Shatt as an interior river. They feel that the boundary line should be on the east bank of the Shatt, thereby placing all of the water of the river in Iraqi territory. The Iraqis claim further that any vessel that travels on the Shatt-al-Arab can do so only with Iraqi permission and that they must sail under the Iraqi flag. It was this issue of requesting permission and flying the Iraqi flag that the Iranians chose to contest in 1969. Iranian ships under their own flag and escorted by Iranian naval vessels and aircraft sailed throughout the Shatt, daring the Iraqis to respond. Iraq could not answer the challenge and it was then that President Hussein was forced to accept the de facto international status of the Shatt. Finally, the conflict's origins in economic terms must be discussed. The source of power in the Persian (or Arabian) Gulf area is oil. The oil has been underneath the surface for a very long time, but it has gained its importance only within this century. In 1972, Iraq had only about 36 billion barrels of oil in reserve as compared to about 55 billion barrels for Iran.13 Compounding this reliance on oil was the fact that Iraq's economy was not nearly as widely diversified as was that of Iran. Thus, Iran with greater oil reserves and with a more diversified economy, was not as reliant on petroleum for its national survival as was Iraq. The addition of another fact will help to explain Iraq's actions in September of 1980. Most of Iran's oil production and reserves are located in the province of Khuzistan. The inhabitants of Khuzistan are Arabs, although they are of Iranian citizenship. As an excuse to move into Khuzistan and seize the Iranian oil reserves which he needed badly, President Hussein was to claim that he was attempting to reunite these Iranian-controlled Arabs under an Arab nation.14 Therefore, we can see that there are several causes for the present conflict. The Persian-Arab friction is centuries old, while the Shiite-Sunni religious struggle is one that has flared for over 1300 years. Of more recent vintage are the disputes over the national boundaries and control of the petroleum reserves. Most recently, personal bitterness (along with ambitions) between the two leaders has developed. Any one of these causes or none of them may be behind the war. Whatever the reason, any chance of success in ending the war and of preventing future bloodshed must have as its basis the simultaneous addressal of all the causes. However, one must realize that any such agreement may be temporary and not a final resolution of the issues. Chapter 2 The War: The Iraqi Attack The present conflict, which began in earnest on September 22, 1980, was not the first and it surely will not be the last struggle between these two countries. The current conflict continues a tradition of war between the Iranians and the Iraqis, or the Shiites and the Sunnis,people who have been at odds with each other for centuries. Now elevated to a "jihad" or holy war, there seems little likelihood that the struggle will end unless there are some major changes made in the region. The struggle between these two countries becomes especially important with the possibility that it might actively involve the United States and the Soviet Union in a greatly expanded conflict. This chapter will discuss the first phase of the war covering the period September 22, 1980 until January 5, 1981. It will follow the development of the war and in doing so concentrate on the following areas: why the Iraqis chose to open actual hostilities; the force strengths of the two nations; the theater of operations; and the reasons behind some of the tactical and strategic decisions. Rationale The West will never really be certain of the motives or reasons behind Iraq's decision to invade Iran. Observers and scholars can draw inferences or speculate as to the thought processes but until the war is ended and the records are studied in detail no one will know for sure why they attacked. We can, however, read, study and learn from the successes and failures of the two countries, states which might just be future adversaries or allies of the United States. On September 28, 1980, six days after the heavy fighting started, President Hussein outlined Iraq's initial war aims. He demanded that Iran: "recognize Iraq's legitimate and sovereign rights over its land and waters" (the Shatt-al-Arab); "refrain from interfering in Iraq's internal affairs" (as well as those of other Arab states); "adhere to the principle of good neighborly relations, and return to the United Arab Emirates the Iranian-occupied islands in the Persian Gulf."1 These were the stated reasons for the attack. As the "friction of war" increased and as the tide of battle changed, the Iraqis modified their stated purpose for attacking; Baghdad later claimed that Iraq had moved to check Iranian expansionism. Mr. Anthony Cordesman, in his article in Armed Forces Journal deduced that there were several reasons or objectives behind Iraq's decision to move when it did. First, the Iraqis attacked to secure the secular Ba'ath regime in Iraq from the Ayatollah's declared intent to overthrow it and to prevent the Iranians from resurrecting the Kurdish Insurgency.2 It should be remembered that Saddam Hussein, as a Sunni Muslim, is a member of a minority religious sect in his own country. The majority of Iraqis are Shiites, the religion of the overwhelming majority of Iranians. Hussein feared that the revolutionary zeal of Iran could spill or be forced across the border and lead to his overthrow. President Hussein had sufficient cause to be concerned about Iranian attempts to oust the Ba'athist Party. Inspired by his own revolution, the Ayatollah Khomeini had called for an Islamic Revolution in Iraq and had attempted to subvert the Shiite population. To foment this revolution, Tehran radio treated the Iraqi population to Iranian rhetoric on a daily basis and exhorted the Shiite Iraqis to overthrow the Ba'ath Party and to fight for a voice in their own government. A second reason for the Iraqi attack was to secure Iraq's borders from a long series of military incidents and to claim the 200-300 square kilometer of territory near Qasr-e-Shirin and Mehran.3 These towns, which cover the main Iranian approach into Iraq, were promised to Iraq by the Shah in the Treaty of 1975. The Iraqis were not sure that the present Iranian government would live up to the promises of its predecessor. One must keep in mind that the back and forth attempts to demarcate the boundary began in the early 19th century and that the moves were generally made by the party that saw itself able to arbitrate from a position of strength. A third reason for Iraq's attack was to redress the Algiers Accord of 1975 and to give Iraq total control of the waters of the Shatt-al-Arab.4 Since the Shatt is Iraq's lifeline, any force that could interdict the Shatt would be analagous to someone putting pressure on a person's carotid artery. Loss of blood through the carotid will result in unconsciousness of an individual--and loss of the Shatt could result in economic unconsciousness for Iraq. Iraq also wanted to demonstrate that it and not Iran was the dominant power in the Gulf area and to enhance Iraq's position at a meeting of non-aligned nations. For many years, Iran under the Shah had been the Gulf's police force and regional policy-maker. It was Iran, with American support and its own tremendous oil wealth, which controlled and directed actions in and around the Gulf. But by 1980 the Shah was gone, along with United States support for Iran, and it seemed like the opportune time for Iraq to make its move. Iraq had long claimed that Iran had illegally occupied Arab territory, namely the east bank of the Shatt, the province of Khuzistan (called Arabestan by the Iraqis), and three Gulf islands (Abu Moussa, Big Tumb and Little Tumb). To gain support from its Arab neighbors in the fight against Iran, Iraq put on the cloak of Arab protector and claimed that its movement into Iran was to "protect Iraqi territory and gain recognition of Iraq's right to Iraqi land and waters". Saddam Hussein had been pressing the issue of the Shatt since before the Shah's Fall in December 1978, but must have felt that the time was best in September 1980 for aggressive action. A fourth objective of Iraq's attack was to destroy Iranian military power while it was still weakened by the purges associated with its revolution and while Tehran was still cut-off from supplies and support from the United States.5 At the time of the attack in 1980, the American hostages were still being held by the Pasdaran and the outcome of this situation was uncertain. Iraq was not sure whether Washington would exchange money, supplies and equipment for the safe return of the captive Americans. The United States had a great interest in seeing an anti-Soviet power, not necessarily a pro-Western power, be in the position of the Gulf's policeman. Then, as today, the Americans and Iraqis were suspicious of each other's intentions in the Gulf. In 1980, Iraq was viewed by Washington as very much a Soviet client-state and Baghdad was uncertain whether or not the United States would resume diplomatic relations and low-key but important support of Iran. The Iraqis, as did many other,could not help but believe that the leadership of Iran was in a shambles. The Iranian military was in a period of transition. It was converting from a conventional armed force to that of the Pasdaran or Revolutionary Guard and much of the senior leadership had been purged. Also, the Iranian maintenance and supply systems were computerized (they were,after all,American systems) and the Iraqis did not think that the systems would be functional were the Iraqis to move quickly enough. A fifth objective, closely associated with protecting Saddam Hussein's regime, was the desire to overthrow the Ayatollah Khomeini and his fellow mullahs and replace them with a moderate, secular government.6 Were Iraq to replace Iran as the policeman of the region, Baghdad would need the acquiessence of Tehran even if it were obtained through coercion. Iran and Iraq could not both hold the position of regional leader and any disagreement between the two would only result in weakening the victor of the struggle. As mentioned earlier, Iraq is the only Organization of Petroleum Exporting Country (OPEC) whose exports must either cross another country (Syria or Turkey) or pass under the guns of a potentially or actually unfriendly neighbor (Iran). Iraq, as a country, needed freedom of movement on the Shatt-al-Arab and unrestricted access to and out of the Persian Gulf. Thus, the final objective, the seizure of the Province of Khuzistan would provide some measure of the security that Iraq sought.7 Force Strengths (Figures 2 and 3) The war with Iran was the first major involvement in military hostilities for the Soviet-equipped and organized Iraqi troops. The Iraqis Click here to view image had fought Kurdish Insurgents and had provided limited support against Israel in 1973 but the attack on Iran was to be their first real test in a conventional operation. Air Forces The Iraqi Air Force consisted of about 28,000 personnel and was supplied, predominantly, with an assortment of Soviet and French aircraft. The airforce was divided into squadrons of light bombers (IL-28's and TU-22's); interceptors (115 MiG-21's); fighter/ground attack (F-1 Mirages, MiG-17/23's and British Jet Provosts); transports (IL-14's, AN -2/12/24/26's): and helicopters (Alouwttes, Gazelles, Pumas, Super Frelons, Augustas). The Iraqi aircraft, for the most part, had less-than-adequate avionics and could not carry advanced munitions. Most of the attack squadrons and all of the bomber squadrons had been retained under President Hussein's control to "protect the palace" and, therefore, had had very little training with the ground forces. Iraqi pilots had received very limited training in the Soviet Union and had received no modern air-to-air training in Iraq. Iraq, generally speaking, lacked both reconnaissance and target analysis capabilities. The Iraqis also lacked a viable command and control system for either close air support or for an integrated air defense. Finally, Iraqi air-intelligence officers had underestimated the strength and resilience of the Iranian Air Force and the operations officers had overestimated Iraq's ability to conduct an air war. The Iranian Air Force, based on its United States training, was an offensive arm. This was also evidenced by the types and numbers of aircraft of which it was composed--188 F-4D/E's, 166 F-5E/F's and 77 F-14's.9 In contrast to the Iraqis'115 air defense aircraft the Iranians had only about 77 aircraft dedicated to that mission. The Iranians did have about fourteen dedicated reconnaissance aircraft while the Iraqis had none.10 The Iranians had other distinct advantages: their aircraft had advanced avionics and could carry "smart bombs"/precision-guided munitions, and they had American- trained pilots to fly them. Thus, a few Iranian aircraft could achieve results that many more lesser-equipped Iraqi aircraft could not. In addition, the Iranian aircraft had much shorter distanced to fly to hit strategic targets than did the Iraqis. For example, Baghdad and Tehran are about 450 miles apart, but Baghdad is about 100 miles from the border while Tehran is about 350 miles from the same boundary. Based on just the distance and air defense assets between the border and the capitals, the Iranians would have an easier time reaching their targets. One final comparison of the two air forces can be made in the area of operational readiness. The Iranian Air Force was estimated to be about fifty percent operational while the Iraqis, knowing that they were about to attack were at maximum operational readiness.11 Naval Forces The Iraqi Navy numbered about 4,000 men and consisted of submarine-chasers, patrol boats, missile boats, torpedo boats and mine- sweepers of Soviet, British and Yugoslavian origin. The two main naval bases were at Basra and Um Qasr, neither of which is in a secure position militarily. The Iraqi Navy was largely ineffective due to a poor state of training and inadequate Soviet weaponry. Most of the OSA-I's and II's would best be described as "low C-4" in training and readiness for operations. Realizing this, the Iraq is reportedly requested Western assistance in 1978 and 1979.12 The Navy could count on little support from the Air Force which had received no anti-ship training and which could not reach the Iranian naval bases. As with their air force counterparts, the Iraqi naval officers seem to have made some serious oversights in evaluating relative strengths and weaknesses or they chose to overlook some obviously-glaring discrepancies. The Iranian Navy, although beset with many problems as a result of the revolution and subsequent religious purges, was still a potent force vis-a'-vis the Iraqis. The Iranians could man three missile destroyers, four missile frigates and four corvettes. The Iraqis had no ships of these types. More importantly, the Iranians had six P-3 Orion aircraft, each armed with U.S.-made Harpoon anti-ship missiles. Iran's possession of the Harpoon concerned other countries besides Iraq. The United States, with its carrier battle groups in and near the Gulf, had to devise equipment and tactics to counter its own weapon when faced with the possibility of its use against the American ships. The Iranian Navy could interdict not only Iraq's lines of supply and communication, but it could attack ships of other nations anywhere in the Gulf. Ground Forces The Iraqi Army had about 200,000 men under arms in September 1980, with another quarter-million in the reserves. It was equipped with almost three thousand Soviet-built tanks, including about 100 T-72's, approximately 2,500 armored fighting vehicles (AFV's), and about 1,000 tubes of artillery. The tank force was a mixture of T-34/55/62's and PT-76's of Soviet origin and some 100 French AMX-30's, of which more were on order. Mechanized forces included Soviet BTR 50/60/152's, and BMP's, French Panhards and British Ferrets.13 Across the border in Iran were approximately 150,000 men in the active army and another 400,000 in the reserves. Iranian tanks, primarily U.S.-made M-60's and British Chieftains numbered about 2,000 with almost 1,000 tubes of artillery. American-made M-113 Armored Personnel Carriers (APC's) numbered about 250.14 There are several qualitative factors that can be used to contrast the two armed forces. Because of the disarray that existed in the post- revolutionary era, Iranian military, the edge in leadershlp, one of several qualitative factors, must be given to the Iraqis. Although, the Iraqi staff system was not without its troubles, it was an in-place and functioning system. In contrast, the Iranian army staff had essentially ceased to exist above the brigade level. One possible reason that the brigade staffs survived the purges was that the Iraqis attacked before she purges could get down that far. The edge in combat experience must also be given to the Iraqis at the time of their attack. Elements of the Iranian Air Force, Navy, and six Army bridgades had been involved in the Dhofar Rebellion in the 1970's, but many of the veterans had been purged. The Iraqi Army saw some combat in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, as well as in the almost decade-long counterinsurgency campaign against the Kurds (who were supported by the Iranians and other agencies). The Kurdish campaign had resulted in almost 60,000 Iraqi casualties and it had led the Iraqis into adopting a style of fighting that would hinder them in the present conventional conflict. Unable to suppress the small Kurdish guerrilla units in combat, the Iraqis resorted to Soviet siege tactics. The Iraqis would surround a suspected village, seal it off from support and then, through methodical use of air, artillery and dug-in tanks, reduce the village to rubble. Given ample time and a poorly-equipped foe this technique might work, but it had no place in the high-speed thrust that Iraq needed to conduct in 1980. Command and control of the army proved difficult for the Iranians. The struggle between the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, Bani Sadr, and the Ayatollah Khomeini led to a split in the armed forces. The Pasdaran, the Revolutionary Guard Militia which had been formed to protect the Ayatollah and his revolution, was viewed as the keeper of the Shiite faith. The regular army, as a carry-over from the Shah's reign, was viewed as unreliable. The regular army's performance during the first days of the war cleared it of any charges of unreliability but it was still not the Ayatollah's favorite force. The Pasdaran was in the forefront of the fighting, at least as seen by Iranian news sources. The Revolutionary Guard had been given the responsibility of defending the cities and villages and it was there that one could find the TV cameras of Iran. The regular army, at least until January 1981, was used in a limited, counterattack role which was designed to relieve some of the pressure that the Iraqis were putting on the border cities. Although giving the external appearance of having a viable command, control and communications (C3)system, the Iraqis also had serious problems. Saddam Hussein, as Commander-in-Chief, directed the war through the Revolutionary Command Council which had representation from the armed services. However, there were several flaws in this body. First many key military officials had been purged in 1978. The vacuum that was created by their deaths was filled by personnel who were loyal to Hussein and who had seen what happened to those who performed in a manner that did not meet with his approval. Secondly, some of the potentially most-effective fighting units were kept to the rear to protect the government from opponents of the Ba'ath Party. Offensive aircraft, T-72's and loyal combat units were held around Baghdad and kept under the control of internal security forces. Thirdly, the Ba'ath Party has a history of distrusting the military and Hussein as the leader of the Ba'athists may be the most distrustful. Several sources have indicated that it was Hussein who selected the military's objectives over the objections of some of the members of the Revolutionary Command Council. Finally, the politicized military leaders who were leary of being the "messenger who brought bad news" did not accurately report the condition of the Iraqi Armed Forces. Thus, we can see one of the reasons for Hussein's overly-optimistic estimate of his own country's fighting capability. Finally, the morale of the opposing force must be considered. Many Iranians, embued with religious fanaticism, were apparently willing to suffer great losses to protect their land from the "infidel" invaders. Iraq, on the other hand, was trying to maintain a "guns and butter" policy to limit casualties and to isolate the civilian population from the war. The Iraqis had another reason for keeping the casualty figures low. The Iraqi officer corps is composed mainly of Sunni Muslins while the enlisted ranks are, for the most part, from the Shiite community. The Iraqis, fearing a flare-up of the Sunni-Kurdish-Shiite conflict of the early 1970's, did not want it to appear as if the Sunni officers were wantonly sacrificing the lives of the Shiite troops. Additionally, it would not be easy to convince the populace that the war was going well if ever-increasing numbers of Iraqi soldiers were being brought home in boxes. Theater of Operations (Figure 4) There are several key points which need to be addressed in order to understand the actions of the two adversaries. From the Iraqi point of view, Baghdad, the capital of Iraq and the industrial center of the country, is uncomfortably near the Iranian border. President Hussein had to maintain sufficient forces between the capital and the Iranians to keep it from being seized, a situation analogous to the plights of Washington, D.C. and Richmond during the American Civil War. Secondly, there are three strategic areas in each of the two countries. In Iran, these are Tehran, the oil-rich coastal plain of Khuzistan, and the Bandar Abbas area which guards the Straits of Hormuz. In Iraq the areas of major importance are Baghdad a strategic, political and economic target; the rich oil field of Kiruk, in the north; and the Basra area on the Shatt-al-Arab.14 As the offensive force, Iraq had little chance of seriously affecting either Tehran or the Bandar Abbas areas, because of the distances from Iraq. Rather, the Iraqis chose to concentrate on securing the Iranian oil fields in Khuzistan and Abadan Island. There were several very lucrative targets in Khuzistan. Khorramshahr, Iran's main port, and Abadan, the world's largest oil refinery with a 1978-estimated capacity of 600,000 barrels per Click here to view image day, were both located In the province.15 Futhermore, Dezful and Ahvaz are key points on the Iranian pipeline and both were important military bases. On the defensive and ever-mindful of potential Iranian counterattacks, the Iraqis had a much more difficult problem. First, Iraq had to secure the northern border to limit the chances of an Iranian invasion and to keep the Kurds from resurrecting their fierce guerrilla war. Secondly, Baghdad does not enjoy the natural protection that is the good fortune of Tehran. From the Iranian post of Qasr-e-Shirin there is a straight shot into the heart of Iraq,at Baghdad,and Hussein had to be concerned with securing the center portion of the border. In the south, any chances of securing the Iranian oil fields, protecting the Shatt-al-Arab, and creating the Arabestan province rested on seizing Dezful, Ahvaz, Khorramshahr and the Island of Abadan. This was where the main attack would occur. The northern and central fronts were to be economy-of-force defensive operations. Five divisions were committed to the northern highlands; two divisions were sent against the center to protect Baghdad; and five divisions (three armored and two mechanized) were poised opposite the Khuzistan Province.16 Iran, on the other hand, could not afford to concentrate its forces along one border, but rather had to deploy to meet several perceived threats. First, the Soviets threatened them from Afghanistan in the east and from across the Transcaucases in the north. There was unrest in Baluchistan on the border with Pakistan. Finally, the Iranians still saw the possibility of another attempt by the United States to rescue the hostages; hence, forces were deployed in and around Tehran and along the Persian Gulf. Iran's remaining four understrength divisions were deployed as follows: one infantry division near Urumiyeh, in the far north; one infantry division at Sanadaj to keep and eye on the Iranian Kurds; an armored division at Kermanshah and a brigade at Qasr-e-Shirin; and an armored division at Ahvaz which protected the air base at Dezful.17 The Time of Attack The Iraqi attack was timed to occur before the rainy season, which runs from November through April, began. The northern and central fronts are subject to rain, which is not critical if the ground units are meant to be defensive and stationary as were the Iraqi forces. However, dry, maeuverable terrain was an absolute necessity in the south, where during the rainy season the ground can easily become a quagmire. The Iraqis had to make great advances in the south before the rains came and then hope that the rain would hinder any chances of the Iranias regrouping. Secondly, the Iraqis had had limited resupply from the Soviets ever since a falling out between the two in the late 1970's. The Iraqis had reportedly arranged for shipments of Western supplies and for Western advisers but they could not expect the former until the Fall of 1981 or early 1982.18 The delay might have proven too late in light of the unpredictable threat from Iran and from increasingly-hostile, Shiite-ruled Syria on its western border. Iraq had to strike while it perceived itself to be the stronger force. The Ground Attack The ground attack in the south by three armored and two mechanzied divisions swept aside the Irania border militia and quickly isolated Khorramshahr and Abadan from Ahvaz where the Iranian armor division was located. The attacks at Ahvaz and Dezful were stopped short, creating a salient at Susangerd, which had initially been bypassed. The attacks in the north and center, with their limited objectives were more successful. Mehran was seized as was the road network linking Dezful with northern Iran. Seizure of this area had a second important accomplishment in that it blocked access to Iraq from the east. Further in the north, Qasr-e-Shirin was seized, thereby protecting Baghdad from a ground attack from that direction. With seizure of the Musian area eight days after the war started, Iraq announced that its territorial objectives had been reached. The Iraqis had been able to maintain an advantage of about 5 or 6:1 in the south but did not achieve the tactical or strategic results that were necessary to throw Iran into turmoil.20 Khorramshahr and Abadan had been isolated but not secured because of the unexpectedly tenacious Iranian defense. The Iraqis had diluted their forces in the south by attacking several objectives simultaneously rather than capturing Ahvaz or neutralizing the airbase at Dezful. The Iraqi army also failed to employ the proper combat arm against its objectives. Rather than employing armor-supported infantry at Khorramshahr, the Iraqis relied on the tactics that they had used against the Kurdish villages in the north. However, the armor, air and artillery proved largely ineffective in the urban areas. With its armor stopped, the Iraqis called in a special forces brigade which was not prepared for urban combat and which suffered tremendous casualties. Iraq had let itself become involved in a style of combat that was very different from the blitzkrieg on which it had planned and for which it was organized and equipped. Gone too was the plan for keeping casualty figures low. Khorramshahr, now called "Khuninshahr"-"the city of blood", had cost the Iraqis 1500 lives. Khorramshahr eventually fell on October 24th, but it had gained time for the Iranians and it had cost the Iraqis the forces that should have been directed at Dezful and Ahvaz. In addition to seeing the Iraqis stopped short of their objectives in the south, October saw another positive event for Iran. On October 13th the Ayatollah Khomeini established the seven member Supreme Defense Council; this body was tasked with directing and coordinating the efforts of the Pasdaran and the regular forces. Bani Sadr was the titular head of the council but the hard-line mullahs who surrounded Khomeini still had access to the field commanders. Establishment of the Council helped streamline the chain of command; however, it was still very much politicized. The war seemed to have settled down for the winter until January 5, 1981 when the Iranians staged an ill-fated attempt to retake Susangerd which had been captured by the Iraqis in mid-November. In an effort to regain favor with the Ayatollah and to prove the worth of his regular forces, Bani Sadr ordered three understrength armor regiments to attack. The forces attacked through an area of very poor trafficability and without adequate infantry support. The Iraqis were ready for the Iranian attack and were successful not so much because of their defensive efforts but more because the Iranians were not prepared for the attack.. The Iranians could neither maneuver nor resupply in the mud and were forced to abandon their vehicles and the fight. The Naval Battle Information about naval operations is rather vague because there has not been much large-scale activity. A few small attacks were made by each party during the first phase with the forces spending most of their time in port. Iraq, with its limited port capability and small coastline is much more susceptible to interdiction of its Sea Lines of Communication than is Iran. The three engagements that took place on September 22 and 24 and November 29 and 30 were disastrous for Iraq. The Port of Basra was attacked, the installation at Fao was destroyed and several other facilities were damaged. Naval losses by both Iran and Iraq were extensive, probably about fifty percent for both sides. However, the larger Iranian naval vessels were not lost and Iran was able to establish a very effective blockade of Iraq's ports. The blockade has yet to be broken. Iran was not, however, able to blockade Aqaba or the Saudi Arabian Red Sea ports through which Iraq has received a substantial amount of its supplies. Air Operations The Iraqi Air Force was to conduct a per-emptive airstrike with the goal of inflicting a mortal blow on the already-weakened Iranian air arm. Flown against ten airfields, the attacks were not successful because of errors in planning as well as in execution. The Iraqis attempted to neutralize the Iranian Air Force by cratering the runways rather than going after the aircraft, some of which were in shelters and others which were in the open. The Iraqis did not possess the ordnance required to crater the runways and did not possess the skill or avionics required to hit the runways had they had the ordnance. Therefore, the Iranian Air Force emerged from the attack relatively unharmed. The Iraqi Air Force was then forced to disperse its aircraft to bases in Jordan and in other Arab states where they would probably not be hit by the retaliating Iranian F-4's. Flying in two- to-four ship formations and at low altitude, the Iranian F-4's flew almost unmolested over Iraq striking Baghdad and Iraqi airfields on the second day of the war. The third day of the war saw the F-4's striking at Iraq's vital oil refineries. Iran would retain control of the skies until the following year when attrition of aircrews and aircraft would cause it to limit flying to conserve the air force. By late October the air war had settled down. Iraq had gambled that it could execute a blitzkrieg attack into Khuzistan and that the Iranian Arabs living there would rise up and join their brother Arabs. However, the Arabs in Iran had become more Iranian (not Persian) and less Arabic. The Iraqis had underestimated the Iranians, overestimated themselves and somewhere in between had failed in the blitzkrieg. The coming of pring and the dry weather would prove most interesting. Click here to view image Chapter 3 The Iranian Response The second phase of the war began with Bani Sadr's unsuccessful attempt at retaking Susangerd in January 1981. The fact that the attack was unsuccessful can be misleading because it was the last major defeat for the Iranians thus far. In addition to the armor regiments (about 300 Chieftains and M-60's) that were committed by the Iranians, a parachute regiment was also used as a conventional ground force. However, the Iraqis foresaw the attack and prepared their defensive positions. Accordingly, as the Iranians attacked, the Iraqis pulled back a few kilometers toward the Kharek river and set up a three-sided ambush. The Iranians, thinking that the Iraq is were retreating, rushed in with their armor forces. Over the course of the next four days the two divisions fought each other by employing their helicopter gunships and tanks. The Iranians were caught in untrafficable terrain and had to leave about 100 to 150 tanks on the battlefield; the Iraqis then pursued the fleeing Iranians about sixty more kilometers into Iranian territory before halting. The Iraq is lost about 100 tanks themselves as well as many of their attack helo's. Moreover, the captured Iranian tanks were of little value to the Iraqis because they had no training on the American and British equipment. The Jordanians did have Western equipment, however, and became the real winners of this battle because they received the captured Iranian tanks without having participated in the fighting.1 The first successful, large scale Iranian counter-attack came almost exactly one year after Iraq had crossed the border. From September 26th until the 29th (Figure 6), two infantry divisions supported by armor and artillery attacked add seized the island of Abadan. The attack was worthy of note for several reasons. First, the Iranians conducted a number of small attacks north of Abadan which drew the Iraq is out of position and secondly, it was characterized by skillful use of the Pasdaran. The dismounted infantry operated at night pinpointing weaknesses and strongpoints in the Iraqi line. The Iranians were also able to react well and to redirect their combat power while the Iraqis seemed to be inflexible, of ten holding their positions until they were outflanked. Iranian casualties were about 3,000 killed, mostly Pasdaran who seemed more than billing to die in frontal assaults against the entrenched Iraqis. However, Iran with its much larger population base and religious fervor could temporarily more easily absorb these losses. The lraqis were still attempting to minimize their losses, although they did lose 4,500 men. The following months, until the Iranian Spring Offensive of 1982, seem to have provided time for both sides to recover from earlier fighting and to prepare for the fighting that was sure to come again with the warmer, drier weather. There was some fighting around Bustan and Qasr-e-Shirin which was distinguished for two reasons. First, the claims by both parties were completely contradictory. Tehran radio reported that 1,000 Iraqis had been killed and another 1,300 were captured, while Iraqi communiques reported 2,400 Iranians killed and many more wounded during the period November 29 Click here to view image through December 2, 1981. American analysts doubt the veracity of either report. The second point is that the Iraqis were unable to hold their positions. The December 9th New York Times reported that after a long-term Iranian offensive, President Hussein told Iraqi troops "it is very important that you not lose any more positions."2 Although the Iraqis had had a year to prepare their positions they found themselves being pushed back by the Iranians. (Figure 7) The aforementioned Spring Offensive commenced in March 1982 with the destruction of the three Iraqi divisions and three brigades. The Iranians through extensive recruitment and redeployment had amassed over 100,000 troops, including 30,000 Pasdaran. Again the Pasdaran would be employed most-successfully in a conventional role. The Iranian combat forces were organized into four divisions, apparently one more than the Iraqis thought was present. In their defensive positions were three Iraqi divisions and eight independent brigades witht he 10th Armored Division in reserve. At about 0300 on March 22, the Iranians surprised the Iraqis by attacking at an unexpected time, from an unexpected direction and with an extra division.3 The Iranians had been successful at combining the "eyes" of the infantry with the strength of their armor and were able to outflank the Iraqi positions and to attack the weak points. By this time the Iranians had begun to conserve their limited air assets, but they were able to inflict heavy losses on the Iraqis who were flying over the 150 fixed-wing sorties every day. The effectiveness of the Iraqi air was limited due to intense automatic weapons fire, anti-aircraft artillery, and Click here to view image extensive use of Syrian-supplied SA-7's. Iraqi losses, as at Abadan in September 1981, were tremendous. Western observers estimate that over 600 tanks and armored vehicles, 10,000 casualties and 15,000 POW's were lost. The 3rd and 10th Armored Divisions, the 1st Mechanized Division and three brigades were destroyed! Iranian casualties were placed at about 10,000 including 3,000 to 4,000 killed.4 The Iranian victory in the central front was the first of several to follow in the next three to four months. Iraq successfully counterattacked in several areas but it was very much on the defensive tactically against the Iranians as well as nationally against the Syrians. In April 1982 the Syrians performed a series of diplomatic, economic and military manuevers that weakened the Iraqi fighting posture while strengthening that of the Iranians. The Syrians had chosen to back the Iranians for several reasons. First, the Syrian government is drawn from the Alawite faction which is Shiite in its orientation and, therefore, is inclined towards Iran and away from Iraq. More importantly, President Assad of Syria had long spoken of a "Greater Syria." Were Iraq to be victorious, it would strengthen the Riyadh-Amman-Baghdad axis that President Hussein was attempting to maintain. This axis would effectively reduce Syria's ability to influence the Arab world and undermine Syria's claim to be the true leader of the Ba'ath movement.5 The Iraqis were condemned by the Syrians for starting the war and for diverting attention from the Arab-Israeli conflict. Syria, besides hoping to be seen as the Ba'ath Party leader, also wanted to be viewed as the Arab voice in the Arab-Israeli conflict. It will be shown later how the Israelis are supporting the Iranians, who ironically are receiving aid from both Syria and Israel. Israel is supporting Iran because the war is detracting from the Arab-Israeli conflict. the Syrians are supporting Tehran because Damascus wants to see the Iran-Iraq War end favorably for Iran and the Arab-Israeli conflict rekindled. To ensure that the Syrians attain the position of prominence in the Arab World, President Assad has taken strong measures to weaken his rival claimant in Iraq. In addition to providing moral support to Iran, the Syrians have cut-off the Iraqi oil pipeline that runs through Syria. It is also suggested that the Syrians provided fuel for Iranian fighters after a mission over Iraq. The Iranian aircraft flew over Iraq and disappeared from Iraqi radar over Syrian territory. Sometime later, the aircraft reappeared over Syria and made the return flight to Iran.6 While Iraq was recovering from the losses received near Shush and Dezful in March, the Iranians launched their most serious offensive up to that time. On April 29/30 "Operation Jerusalem" commenced along three axes in the Khuzistan Province. The first axis was in the vicinity of Susangerd which the Iranians had failed to recover in January 1981. The second axis was directed toward the railline and roads which ran from Khorramshahr to Ahvaz and the Iraqi garrison at Hoveyzeh. The third axis was designed to recover Khorramshahr, itself. The Iranian attack was a well-coordinated effort making effective use of the various combat arms. Infantry night attacks were followed by armor thrusts and fighter aircraft and helicopter support. Initial success was good but stiff resistance was met in the northern area and in front of Khorramshahr, where the Iraqis adopted a more flexible defense. Advice from French and Jordanian advisors apparently assisted the Iraqi regulars in performing better but the Iraqi volunteer units did not fare as well.7 The casualties sustained by both sides were again high, with the Iraqis losing about 7,500 and the Iranians losing about 2,500. Of the three axes, the two more successful ones were at Abadan and around Khorramshahr while the effort in the north was less than fruitful.8 On the 3rd and 4th of May both sides conducted a series of counterattacks. The Iraqis recovered some land around Khorramshahr and Hoveyzeh. The Iranians responded by increasing their efforts around Hamid, in order to sever the Iraqi supply route, and by attacking into Iraq near the town of Fuka. By May 14th, the Iranians were in positions that indicated that the counteroffensive had been very successful (Figure 8). The Iraqi main supply route through Hamid had been cut, forcing the Iraqis to give up their positions. The Iranians continued to the Shatt-al-Arab and were now well within striking range of the Port of Basra. They also threatened to isolate Iraqi forces in Khorramshahr. Iran was poised for movement into Iraq but stopped short of a major incursion. The Ayatollah Khomeini had sworn to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein but invading Iraq could have had the opposite effect. Iran would have preferred to see the Sunni-controlled government topple because of a Shiite-inspired peoples' revolution. Were Iran to invade Iraq, as it had Click here to view image itself been invaded, it could have caused the people, even the Shiite, to rally around the flag. Khomeini hoped that the pressure that Iran applied would be sufficient to cause Hussein's downfall. A Shiite-ruled Iraq would establish a corridor of Shiite countries that ran from Iran, through Iraq and Syria, straight into the Mediterranean Sea. And so the Iranians seemed to have turned the tide of the battle. in the span of about a year and half the Iranians had become more sophisticated and had transformed themselves from a nation that was reeling from the blow of a massive armored assault into one that was able to pick and choose the time and place that it wanted to attack. Iraq had changed from a confident fighter into one who was just hoping that the bell would ring to signal the end of the round. Iraq's only problem was that there was no referee in the ring to help it with a standing count. After the victories of the Iraqis from September 1980 through January 1981, what factors caused the startling turn-around that commenced in September 1981? As a basis for discussion, the nine principles of war that are generally taught in U.S. Marine Corps School will be used. The Iraqis failed to observe some of these principles and the Iranians capitalized on some others, possibly without even being aware that someone had articulated them as such. This list of principles is not all-inclusive, but is used simply as a convenient format for discussion. OBJECTIVE - The Iraqis failed to direct their operations toward a proper objective. If the Iraqi government had as its national objective the downfall of the Ayatollah Khomeini's regime, then it should have chosen intermediate (military) objectives that would lead to the national objective. But, the Iraqi national authority, and subsequently, the military did not clearly state their objectives. Being uncertain of what the objectives were, the military could not plan properly or execute properly. The Iranians also seem uncertain of their objectives. As a result of this uncertainty, thousands of Iranians have died. OFFENSIVE - Neither country has been able to maintain the offensive and, as a result, they have not been able to achieve decisive results. The Iraqis wanted to limit the number of troops exposed to combat, and thereby, keep casualty figures low. They, therefore, consistently failed to allow for sufficient forces in the follow-on echelons to conduct mop-up operations. Therefore, the assault forces were forced to stop and clear out pockets of resistance that should have been bypassed and left to units better suited for that type of operation. Similarly, the Iranians have not been able to maintain the offensive because they have had to rely almost exclusively on infantry to attack the Iraqi fortified positions. The Pasdaran has been used effectively to probe the Iraqi lines, but it can't hope to always succeed in frontal assaults against Iraqi air, armor and artillery. MASS - The Iraqis devoted their entire army of twelve divisions to the attack in September 1980. This would lead one to conclude that the Iraqis observed the principle of mass. However, the twelve divisions were divided along three axes composed of five divisions in the north, two divisions in the center and five divisions in the south. To further dilute their combat power, the Iraqis subdivided the southern axis by simultaneously attacking several key objectives, rather than concentrating their forces at Ahvaz, Dezful and Susangerd. The Iranians have not been able to employ mass because the massing of infantry has just not been enough to overcome the Iraqi defensive positions. The Iranians have been able to succeed on a small-scale but the Iraqis are able to regroup and push the Iranians back to the local starting positions. ECONOMY OF FORCE - The Iraq is observed this principle when they employed their mountain-trained divisions in the north to contain the Kurds while attempting to mass their armor forces in the south. The Iranians used the Pasdaran it an economy-of-force role in late 1980. The Pasdaran were employed to tie-up the Iraqi armor in the cities while the Iranians redeployed the regular army to the bitterly-contested Khuzistan Province. The Pasdaran, as the expendable component of the armed forces, are used to soften-up the Iraqi lines for later penetration by the limited armor forces. MANEUVER - The Iraqis have been on the defensive for most of the war. However, a defensive force can make maneuver as much a part of its plan as the attacking force can make it part of its plan. The Iraq is employed manuever at Susangerd when they redeployed their forces into a three-sided ambush that destroyed an Iranian armor division. Unfortunately for the Iraqis, Susangerd was one of the few times that they seem to have considered manuever. During the remainder of the first Iranian offensive, the Iraqis would remain in their defensive positions until they were bypassed, surrounded and cut-off from their lines of withdrawal. The Iranians have generally been unable to maneuver on a large scale because the infantry does not have the ability to move its divisions undetected over the open terrain and because the command and control was insufficient for anything except frontal assaults. With rare exception, as in the attack on Dezful in March 1982, the Iranians have relied on frontal attacks by the Pasdaran. The apparent intent of these attacks is to wear down the Iraqi will to fight by causing unbearable casualties to their numerically inferior army. UNITY OF COMMAND - Both of the warring countries enjoy unity of command, at least superficially, because each of the two armed forces; responds to a single commander. However, this apparent adherence to unity of command can be misleading in the cases of Iran and Iraq. The Revolutionary Command Council of Iraq is under the control of President Saddam Hussein who, as a member of the Ba'athist Party is suspicious of the military. Therefore, the armed forces of Iraq are under direct, unified command of a political party that distrusts and misunderstands the military. The Supreme Defense Council of Iran is also under the control of one man, the Ayatollah Khomeini. In this case, the armed forces are under the command of a religious fanatic who has visions of his own divinity. The Ayatollah seems to view and use the military as a means to the end of spreading the Iranian Revolution. As with Iraq, there is unity of command in Iran, but it is destructive for the armed forces. If left to his own way, the Ayatollah may destroy the military which seeks to protect him. SECURITY and SURPRISE - The principles of security and surprise are addressed at the same time because they are opposite sides of the same coin. These principles were observed more during the early stages of the war when the battle was more fluid. Now that the war has settled down to trench warfare there is little chance of achieving strategic surprise. One example of security and surprise as employed by Iran and Iraq will suffice to demonstrate this point. The Iranians, although aware of the movement of Iraqi forces prior to September 22, 1980, were taken by surprise by the extent of the Iraqi invasion. The Iranians made use of the principles of surprise and security when they attacked Dezful with four divisions instead of three. They were able to mass the extra division by moving it at night and disguising its activity once it was at the front. Presently, the abundance of reconnaissance assets and the nature of the tactics have greatly reduced opportunities to maintain secrecy and to exploit surprise. SIMPLICITY- Both nations have designed fairly simple schemes of maneuver but for greatly different reasons. The Iraqi plans to attack were simple because they were modeled after the tactics of the Soviets. The offensive tactics of the Soviets are well-rehearsed, aggressive and tactically sound but they are also simple and predictable. If employed improperly, as the Iraqis have occasionally done, they can be very costly for the attacker. As was mentioned earlier, the Iraqis employed their armor and mechanized divisions in the first blitzkrieg and bypassed pockets of resistance. However, the Iraqis failed to use adequate forces in the mopping-up echelons so the attacks bogged down. The Iranians have developed simple plans for a different reason. Very simply, the Iranians to longer possess the military resources that allow them to develop and execute complex plans. By early 1981, the Iranians had very little armor, air or artillery. However, they did have an abundance of men who were willing to die for their Revolution. Realizing this, the Iranian military developed plans that were by Western standards simply brutal;conduct frontal assaults until you bled the enemy white. Thus, both types of plans were predictable. This has led to the adoption of the trench warfare where it is not the strength and cunning of the military hierarchy that is important, but rather the courage and will of the individual to endure that determines the outcome of the battles. From a western point of view, many of the principles of war seem to have been observed but with no apparent consistency. To pay lip-service to any one of the principles is to do an injustice to those who must execute the plan. To develop plans that are simple and generally predictable is to sacrifice the lives of the soldiers who must carryout the order. To put one's forces under the command of a fanatic who views the military as grist for the mill is to sacrifice thousands of lives. This what both Iran and Iraq have done and this is partly why victory on the battlefield has been so costly in human lives. Chapter 4 The Modern Western Front This chapter is titled the "Modern Western Front" because this war now possesses many of the characteristics of the European battlefields of World War I. Neither side has been able to gather the strength necessary to deal a decisive penetrating blow, so the two forces involved face each other exchanging casualties. Additionally, neither side has the mobility or ability to find and exploit exposed flanks. The battles that occurred during the 1982 Spring Offensive and the casualties that resulted from them brought the Iranians to the border and returned several key towns and positions to their control. For the Iraqis, the tremendous number of casualties that they suffered bought little more than time in what has become a war of attrition. Tens of thousands would die, be injured or captured in the next few weeks in exchange for a little more terrain and a little more time. The following months would see the two adversaries resort to using some of their earlier tactics--the tactics that had proven so costly--and see them turn to new suppliers for desperately needed equipment. After the successes in March, April and May of 1982, the Iranians appeared to lose the initiative. They stopped at the border stating that they had no reason to enter Iraqi territory. However, it appears that the real reason for this halt was to give Iran time to count its losses and to resupply its armed forces. As with the SA-7's that it had received from Syria, Iran was becoming more reliant on Soviet equipment and third-world sources. To compound problems, a rift had reappeared between the moderates and the religiously fervent clerics in the Iranian Ruling Council. After several assassinations and associated power-plays, the more radical clerics won out. The Summer Offensive opened up on July 13, 1982 with Iranian forces penetrating to within ten miles of Basra before being halted. A second attack began on the 21st and a third attack followed on the 28th. These three attacks produced little except to kill about 27,000 soliders and raise the total for less than two years of combat to at least 80,000 Iranian and Iraqi killed, 200,000 wounded and 45,000 captured.1 The new offensive also confirmed that the Iraqi forces would fight more determinedly when they were defending their own land and that the Iraqi Shiites would not necessarily rise up to topple President Hussein. Stymied in combat on the ground, the Iranians reopened the war of words. Charges and counter-charges were exchanged between Iran and its Arab neighbors. Some of the claims were true. Teenagers, "boy soldiers", were being brought into combat by the Iranians and POW's were being treated less than humanely, but these seem to be just two of the side effects in what had become a "jihad". Two years after the shooting officially started, the Iranians launched yet another attempt to regain their lost territory and to strike a blow against the "Satan" Hussein. This time the attacks were directed at Iraqi forces near Qasr-e-Shirin and at Baghdad. Fifty to one hundred thousand troops were involved in this most bitter struggle which raged until October 10th. Without the benefit of air or armor, the Iranians resorted to human wave assaults against the well-prepared Iraqi positions (Figure 9). Losses in one engagement alone were over 4,000 Iranians and 300 Iraqis killed.2 Click here to view image Untrained Pasdaran were being fed into a meat grinder but the Iranians, even after two years of fighting, could absorb these losses. October also saw the Iraqis attempt to strike back at Iran's real source of strength, its oil. Kharg Island was attacked several times, as were other facilities and cities; but as before, the Iraqis could not carry enough of the right ordnance far enough to do any significant damage. Early November saw yet another Iranian attack aimed at severing the roads from Basra to Baghdad. As before, there were limited advances made and more Iraqi territory was captured before the Iraqis committed their reserves to stop the drive. The numerically inferior Iraqis made better use of their combined arms, but they lost several aircraft to the Iranian "curtain of fire" and SA-7's. The Iraqis had superior combat power in equipment: tanks 3-4:1; AFV's 5:3; artillery 2:1, and in fighter aircraft 6:1.3 The Iranians, however, still had masses of men and boys who were willing to sacrifice themselves for the Revolution. The Iranian Navy still had a strangle-hold on the Straits of Hormuz and Iran still had its oil reserves. November 1982 ended with Iraq again seeking unity among the Arbas and making more peace proposals. Iran could not be appeased even by Iraqi declarations of unilateral truce. Iran's preconditions for negotiations were impossible to meet. These preconditions were: the fall of the government of Saddam Hussein; Iraq's admission of its responsibility for starting the war; the withdrawal of all Iraqi troops from and the return of all Iranian territory; the payment of from $50 to $150 BILLION in war reparations; and the return to Iraq of the Persian Shiites who had been expelled by President Hussein in 1980.4 It is evident that these terms are non-starters. January 1983 revealed a situation similar to that which existed just prior to the ill-fated attack on Susangerd. The Iraqis were improving their defense and awaiting the next Iranian onslaught. The Iranians continued to rebuild their only viable combat arm, the Army. Having rebuiltto over 200,000 soldiers, the Iranians attacked in February 1983 with six divisions in one of the largest efforts thus far. This offensive was meant to be the decisive drive of the war. Again, the target was the Basra-Baghdad road. As before, the Iranians made some gains but were unable to attain their objectives. As in the January 1981 attack, the Iranians went against prepared positions through open wetlands that restricted their movement and limited their cover. In addition, over 200 sorties a day were flown by the improving Iraqi Air Force, which could take credit for some of the nearly 6,000 Iranians who were killed.5 The February Offensive was stopped. The Iraqis still held some 350 square miles of Iranian territory; more Iranians and Iraqis were dead; and the war of attrition continued. Two months later, on April 10, the Iranians mounted their second offensive of the year. But, as in February, the drive was stopped (Figure 10). Needless-to-say, with over 300,000 casualties; with their border cities in ruins; and considering the economic nightmare that both countries were facing, many people began to question how much longer the war could last. Summer and Fall of 1983 would see two more Iranian offensives. In July, Iranian forces penetrated Iraq in a drive toward Haj Umran in the Click here to view image mountainous northeast region. The purported reason for the attack was to interdict Iraqi-supported Kurdish forces. As so many times before, the claims made by the opposing forces differed greatly. Tehran reported that it had killed 3,800 Iraqi troops, captured 77 square miles of territory and seized 35 military bases. Baghdad's account of the battle showed that the Iranians had been turned back and that they had lost over 700 attackers in 48 hours of fighting. Early August saw heavy fighting around Mehran in the central front area (Figure 11). Although Baghdad claimed to have defeated the Iranian attack, they did admit to staging a "strategic withdrawal". Relying on the adage that the best defense is a good offense, Iran attacked again in October 1983. Again, the fighting was in northeast Iraq, this time around the garrison towns of Penjwin and Garmak (Figure 12). Iranian forces claimed they were attempting to defend the towns of Baneh and Marivan from Iraqi artillery fire but they succeeded in driving to within 100 miles of Kirkuk, the site of Iraq's oil fields. Feeling that its oil fields were threatened, Baghdad responded with long-range missile attacks on Dezful and other cities in southwest Iran. This offensive was very similar to those of the past. The Iranians charged headlong into prepared Iraqi positions losing thousands of men in the attacks, but eventually overcoming the defensive positions. This style of fighting was able to make some tactical gains but it was still incapable of achieving strategic success necessary to end the war. The ebb and flow of battle continued on the three fronts without any significant effect on either side. The war is believed to be costing Iraq about $1 billion a month.6 To meet these costs, Baghdad is being subsidized by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Click here to view image Iraq owes approximately $5 billion to France, Yugoslavia, South Korea and Rumania for arms purchases and construction projects. In addition, hundreds of millions of dollars are owed to banks and private companies. Iraq has refused to pay the companies in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates because their governments have not assisted Iraq as was once pledged. To reduce expenses at home, as the guns and butter policy of 1980 has changed, the Iraqis banned the import of luxury goods. Iraq is pumping only about 650,000 to 700,000 barrels of oil per day through Turkey. This amount contrasts to 3 million barrels per day prior to the war and against the 1.7 million barrels that Iran is still able to export everyday. Because Iraq is almost completely dependent on petroleum sales for its revenue, it has had to find alternate export routes to compensate for the loss of the Shatt-al-Arab. Iraq is no longer transporting petroleum through Syria to the Mediterranean because of Syrian hostility. Instead, Saudi Arabia has agreed to finance a new pipeline that will take the Iraqi oil to the Red Sea Port of Yanbu.8 Iraq is also attempting to rebuild its main oil facilities at Fao which were destroyed in 1980 and Turkey has recently agreed to increase the movement of Iraqi oil moved through Turkish territory. In addition to increasing its own export capability, Baghdad has sought to restrict the freedom of economic action that Iran has thus far enjoyed. With the recent purchase of French Super Etendard fighter-bombers the Iraqis may be able to interdict the Iranian Sea Lines of Communication. The Super Etendard, with a speed of 730 m.p.h., an unrefueled range of 530 miles and equipped with the Exocet missile, is felt to be a serious threat by the Iranians.9 The Iranians issued warnings that if their oil installations were seriously damaged they would prevent any ship from entering or leaving the Gulf. This threat is yet another attempt by the Iranians to keep other countries from resupplying the Iraqis. The Iranians fully realize that it is only Iraq's edge in equipment that has kept Iran's forces from being victorious. Thus, one can see that the Ayatollah has a reason in trying to isolate Iraq (but failed) and that the threat of closure of the Gulf is worrisome to the West.Twenty percent of the non-Communist world's oil supplies pass through the 40 to 60 mile wide Straits of Hormuz. More than 50% of Western Europe's oil imports and 13% of the petroleum used by the United States comes from the Gulf. Japan is much more dependent, importing over 60% of its oil from this region. Several of France's allies attempted to dissuade her from supplying the Super Etendards to Iraq. The French Foreign Minister's reply to this, apparently, was "Five planes, more or less. What does that change?"10 Support for Iraq is consistent with French policy and a resumption of Iraqi exports may enable Iraq to repay its debt to France. France is not the only country supplying aircraft to the antagonists. Aviation Week and Space Technology reported in April 1983 that the Chinese were providing Chinese-built, Soviet MiG-19's and 21's to the Iraqis. These aircraft, designated F-6 and F-7, respectively, by the Chinese were being assembled in Egypt and staged in Egypt and Jordan. Egypt was also providing instructor pilots to Iraq and some Egyptains have flown combat missions, accompanying Soviet reconnaissance pilots.11 This mixture of advisers and supporters becomes very interesting considering the past and present relations of the parties involved. The Iraqis and Soviets had a falling out in 1978-79 and it is rumored that Soviet freighter carrying Iraqi-bound T-72's turned back to the Soviet Union when the war started.12 The Egyptians, who had also had a cooling of relations with the Soviets, are now, more or less, aligned with Washington and are providing support to Iraq alongside the Soviets. The saying that politics and alliances makes for strange bedfellows is carried one step further when supporters of Iran are considered. Aviation Week and Space Technology reported further that, in addition to the Syrians and Libyans providing support to Iran, the North Koreans are providing Chinese-built F-6's. Iranian pilots are apparently receiving their training on the new aircraft in East Germany.13 Support for the two sides is not restricted to Soviet products or Soviet-style advice. Israel is backing Iran with parts and spares to keep the U.S.-built F-4 Phantoms aloft and with maintenance and cannibalization for the F-14's and Phoenix missiles.14 The Israelis hope that the struggle between Persian Iran and Arabic Iraq and their respective supporters will prevent the Arabic nations from uniting and putting pressure on Israel. There are other Western sources of supply. Hughes Aviation was reported to be providing Iraq with about 60 argiculture- configured helicopters.15 Members of Congress may have been successful in blocking this sale, although the aircraft were not to be used for combat. It matters little, though, if the Hughes aircraft were to be used as trainers, thereby, freeing-up helicopters that can be used in combat. The sale of these aircraft has improved the airstrengths of both countries. It is difficult to accurately determine current strengths but, based on sources from within Iraq, Iraq's estimated strength is: MiG-23's (85), MiG-25's (18), ten of which are interceptors, MiG-19/F-6's (about 40), MiG17's (30), Su-20's (80), Su-7/17's (20), Mirage F-1's (40) and, maybe, 5 Super Etendards, more or less. The bomber and transport force still includes the TU-16's, 22's, I-76's and AN-12/24/26's, although some of all of these aircraft have been lost in the air war.16 While adoption of Western-style close air support tactics has improved the effectiveness of the Iraqi air arm, it is also certain that Iran has improved its air force, particularly in the anti-air role. Sources do conflict, but there is general agreement that the Phoenix-equipped F-14's and the AIM-7-equipped F-4's have taken their toll of Iraqi aircraft. The Israeli-supplied parts, equipment and training have had the desired effect of prolonging the war. The Iranian Air Force is thought to consist of about 100 fighter aircraft including about 8-10 operational F-14's and about an equal number of F-4's and F-5's making up the remainder.17 The Chinese-built aircraft have not been included because they are not yet operational. The two warring nations have turned to arms suppliers who provide a less-sophisticated product and who do not seem to be concerned with the morality of the war. The business of supplying arms is a very big one and if the super-powers choose to not be a part of it, then there are many other countries who will improve their own economies at the cost of regional and world stability. Conclusion The two warring states have continued to deplete their own coffers in an attempt to outlast the other. As of late 1983, Iran with its control of the Straits of Hormuz and its more diversified economy was in a better position in this war of attrition. Once again, as in the three previous years, the two nations awaited the coming of Spring and the fighting that was certain to come. Chapter 5 Developments from the War There have been many interesting developments uncovered during analysis of the war. For purposes of discussion, the developments or points of interest will be categorized into: manpower, ground equipment, ground tactics, and aviation. Manpower One of the first items of note is that the value and utility of the individual fighting man has increased, at least in this war. The armed man has entered into a rennaissance where he has come to be valued as much as expensive hardware. The Iraqis, in spite of their numerically superior equipment, were stopped not so much by Iranian equipment, but by Iranian soldiers with hand-held weapons. Due to a paucity of information, we are unable to make a final analysis, but preliminary indications are that the Iraqis were "tank mad".1 For the Iraqis, the tank was the answer to all of their tactical problems. Tanks were used to reduce small villages to rubble; as fixed artillery; in maneuver warfare; and in built-up areas. However, as the previous chapter indicated, they were only effectively used when the Iraqis made the optimum use of the shock effect and mobility of the tanks. The mobility of the tank was compromised when it was used as stationary artillery or when employed in cleaning-up small pockets of resistance. The armor and armament were compromised when the tanks were employed in built-up areas or in an area where hand-held ATGM's were fired at very short ranges. The Iranians, on the other hand, made effective use of their forces, especially in the urban areas or in short-range fighting. The individual members of the Pasdaran were as effective in stopping a T-62 in Khorramshahr as an M-60 or Chieftain were in stopping a T-62 in the desert. The planners and operators of the United Stated Central Command would do well to develop tactics and weapons for military operations in urban terrain as much as they do for mobile desert warfare. A second item of interest concerning manpower was the wide use of reserve forces and volunteers. Both countries started the war with reserves numbering in the hundreds of thousands. Since cross-border shooting had been in progress for several months, the Iranians were not completely surprised. In a feat similar to the 1914 mobilization of the taxi-drivers of Paris, the Iranians were able to put about 200,000 men on the front by late November 1980.2 This rapid mobilization and movement of both reserves and regulars in late September 1980, reduced the Iraqi combat ratio from about 6:1 to about 3:1 by late October. These 200,000 Iranians were only a small part of the "Army of 20 Million" that was to be raised to repel the Iraqi invaders. The untrained reserves and Pasdaran were effectively employed to blunt the nose of the Iraqi armor and to provide the majority of the urban defensive forces. The Iraqis also called on the reserves to aid in the war effort. From the estimated 35,000 men of the popular militia who were employed in September 1980, the activated reserve force grew to over 400,000 in early 1982. Suffering more and more casualties, the Iraqis strove to mobilize a people's army of over 2.5 million.3 It also sought to enlist the aid, coerced or otherwise, of its Arab neighbors in the struggle to regain "lost Arab lands". The reserve forces of both countries proved very effective in defending their homelands, probably because they were more familiar with the lay of the land and because they were defending their own soil. This effective use of lightly armed forces against armored forces offers hope for the employment of the home defense forces of Western and Northern European countries. These reserve forces, which are defending their own familiar land, may prove effective in slowing the Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces and allows the heavier regular forces time to regroup and redeploy. The final point concerning manpower is made at a time when some American armed services are becoming more equipment heavy and personnel light. With the emphasis on more weapons of increased lethality but fewer personnel to man these weapons, there will be fewer infantrymen available to hold terrain. Weapons are excellent for covering more terrain, where the terrain permits, but it still takes men with their own weapons to hold difficult terrain or to operate in mountainous or urban terrain. As the Iraqi losses at Abadan and Khorramshahr and the victories in the mountains in the north showed, infantrymen cannot always be replaced by tanks or AFV's. There are situations where numbers of trained men are more important than lethality and numbers of weapon systems. As the Iranians have also shown, skillfully employed infantrymen, without adequate air or armor support can stop, if not turn back, armor heavy forces--in the right environment on the right terrain and with an obliging enemy. Equipment The second area of general interest concerns the equipment employed in the war. Chapter 2 listed some of the equipment that was present at the beginning of the conflict. This section will address the employment of some of the equipment; its relative strengths and weaknesses; and recent acquisitions of replacements. Each side had several thousand tanks of differing origins at the start of the war, many of which were involved in several armor versus armor engagements. The victories achieved by either side were attributable not so much to the effectiveness of the armor and armament of the vehicles, but more to the proper selection of terrain and tactics. Analysts report that neither side has been able to maintain their sophisticated gun-sights and fire-control systems. Therefore, most of the engagements have been at ranges of only 200-300 meters instead of the expected 1200-1500 meters. At these distances, the armor is well-within the effective range of hand-held and ground-mounted anti-armor assets. The Iraqi problems with the T-62's were mainly with the lead-computing sights while the M-60's and Chieftains of the Iranian Army were prone to maintenance problems. David Rosser-Owen in his article "Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War" reported that the Iraqis were more impressed by the Chieftains than they were the M-60's, but that their Soviet equipment was best, especially the T-72's.4 Neither force was able to consistently employ its sophisticated ground-based systems. The Iraqis surface-to-surface missiles, SCUD-B's, and FROG-7's, have only been employed on a few occasions and then, only to hit large targets such as cities or military bases. On the Iranian side, it was not until the 1982 Spring Offensive that they were able to effectively employ their TOW and DRAGON anti-tank guided missiles.5 This has not been a tank-versus-tank war. With the exceptions of the initial Iraqi attack, the Iranian counterattack at Susangerd, and a few other battles, most of the engagements involving armored vehicles have been between light armored vehicles. Due to the unsuitable terrain in Khuzistan, which is marshy ground criss-crossed by canals and rivers, and the difficulty that the adversaries have had in maintaining their main battle tanks,Iran and Iraq have come to rely more heavily on armored fighting vehicles.6 Iraq has a variety of these vehicles but relies most heavily on the Brazilian Engessa EE-9 Cascavels. Baghdad was apparently pleased with this vehicle's performance because it signed a contract in November 1981, worth $250 million. Brazilian officials reported that up to 2,000 Cascavels, EE-11 Urutu armored personnel carriers and EE-3 Jaracara armored cars had seen action in the war. In addition to providing the vehicles, the contract provides at least five year's worth of parts.7 Iran has relied most heavily on British-made Model 220 Alvis Scorpion light tanks. However, the Iranians also have the Cascavels since Libya, which purchased the Cascavels from Brazil has provided them to Iran.8 The initial hesitancy of the two super-powers to provide equipment and thereby prolong the war has caused Iran and Iraq to seek other third-country arms merchants such as the Chinese. Therefore, a war that was not begun under the auspices of the United States and Soviet Union is now even more out of their control. As this is not an armor-heavy war and since neither side has been able to maintain air superiority, artillery, particularly heavy, long-range gun fire has played an important role. Both sides have made extensive use of their larger calibre guns to shell cities, ports and oil facilities. It was Iran's ability to deliver heavy indirect fire that was so effective in helping to stop the Iraqi drives on Dezful and Ahvaz. It was also the artillery, this time Iraqi, that destroyed the oil refinery at Abadan.9 However, when used in a purely harrassing role, it seemed to have little effect on the civilian populace or on the troops. As current television footage of the shelling of Beirut indicates, day-to-day life seems to go on once the public gets used to the shock effect of the falling shells. The important characteristic of the artillery is its ability to destroy and every meter of range increases its destructive value. Thus, it appears that the Marine Corps' purchase of the M198 howitzer, with its extended range, has been validated by the struggle between these two Persian Gulf states. Ground Tactics The development of ground tactics has been very interesting. One of the first points is the value of a well-prepared defense. As the Iraqis have generally shown, a good defensive position can inflict heavy casualties on an attacking force that lacks proper training, morale, and mobility. The attacker must ensure that he has sufficient combat power to achieve his objective and he must have adequate training , elan, and the ability to maneuver to discover the enemy's weak points. The Iraqis showed themselves to be less than adept while on the offensive, but these same forces have been able to stand-up well against the attacks of the Pasdaran. The proper selection of terrain or its improper selection, as in the attack on Susangerd, is critical. Both sides have displayed a fatal inability to analyze the terrain and have, therefore, suffered the consequences. Iraq lost large numbers of men in urban terrain which it should have bypassed and Iran lost large numbers of tanks because it attacked through poorly trafficable terrain. In close association with the employment of the defense and the proper selection of terrain is the use of obstacles as a "force multiplier". The Iranians made excellent use of obstacles such as urban areas and waterways to impede the progress of the Iraqis in September 1980. Similarly, the Iraqis made extensive use of obstacles to delay the attacks of the Iranians during the 1982 Spring Offensive. Unfortunately, the Iraqis dug-in even when they weren't on the defensive. Rather than risking the loss of their tanks to ATGM's, the Iraqis would advance very slowly, using bulldozers to prepare hull-down positions, ahead of the armor, into which the tanks could drive. Thus, the tanks survived fairly well, but the Iraqis needed quite a few replacements for their bulldozers and operators. Although the Iraqis did not maneuver their tanks and armored fighting vehicles well in combat, they did move them better behind the lines. Large numbers of transporters were used to redeploy the tracked vehicles from one area of the front to another, thereby, reducing wear and tear on the vehicles and allowing their crews to rest when they would otherwise be driving. Neither side has performed well at integrating its combat arms. The Iraqis attempted to seize Khorramshahr with armored forces rather than with dismounted infantry and it used tanks as armored self-propelled artillery rather than as mobile armored cannon. Similarly, the Iranians sacrificed many tanks and AFV's at Susangerd partly because they failed to integrate mechanized infantry into the armor thrust. This inability to integrate their arms may be due to the jealousy that often exists between the different branches of the armed forces. The armed services in the two countries are not willing to cooperate fully in combined arms operations because they would rather see the credit heaped upon themselves as a single service. Both Iran and Iraq have made effective use of special units or basic units that have received specialized training. Unconventional forces of Iran or Syria cut the Iraqi oil pipeline in several places and on several occasions. Iraqi special brigades ware required to secure Khorramshahr and mountain-trained Iraqi forces performed very well at Mehran and Qasr-e-Shirin. The special units may have been employed because they were the best unit for the operation or they may have been employed because the adversaries were unable to integrate their conventional forces. Being unable to coordinate their conventional forces, the two adversaries might have had no chance for success unless they did commit their special units. However, this is not the preferred reason for employing special trained forces. Air Forces Neither side has made consistently effective use of its airpower. Coincidentally, both sides have tended to husband their aircraft which may partly account for its generally ineffective use. After the initial airstrike and subsequent dispersal, the Iraqis kept most of their fighters back to "protect the palace", i.e. Baghdad. The Air Force did, however, occasionally venture forth, to keep the Iraqi ground forces from being routed. The 1982 Spring Offensive saw the Iraqis fly up to 150 sorties a day but again the aircraft were not used effectively. Lack of confidence in Soviet training, ordnance, equipment and the mediocre quality of avionics have caused the Iraqis to depend more extensively on other assets, such as their artillery. The Iranian aircraft and pilots performed better than expected against tactical ground targets during the initial stages of the war. This may have been largely due to the fact that the Iranians were presented with a truly "target rich environment" and because the Iraqi air defense was not very effective. The Iranians were also successful in attacking strategic targets which may be attributed to the following factors: better planning; greater range versus payload of the Iranian aircraft; use of smart/precision-guided munitions; and U.S. versus Soviet training. Two examples of Iranian missions may illustrate the point. One Iranian raid was conducted over a distance of 800 kilometers from the nearest Iranian base and it involved aerial refueling. This is an accomplishment which the Iraqis have yet to match.11 The second example involves the air attack on the Tuwaitha Atomic Center, which was conducted on September 30, 1980.12 Initial reports indicated that the two Phantoms which conducted the attack were flown by Israelis. Later reports proved that pilots were Iranians and that the pilots may not have known that the target that they damaged was a nuclear reactor. Even today, the threat that Iran will attack ships in the Gulf or conduct other "accidental" bombings, such as the ones conducted against Kuwait, is sufficient to keep other Arab States out of the frey.13 Irainan use of fixed-wing aircraft has steadily declined for several reasons. First, the number of operational aircraft has dropped to about 100, primarily because of the lack of parts of the F-4's, F-5's, and F-14's. This is in spite of the Israeli's attempts to supply the parts for these aircraft. Secondly, the effectivenness of Iragi air defense has improved and the Iraqis are no longer presenting the lucrative massed targets that were apparent at the start of the war. The hesitancy by both parties to employ high-performance aircraft and the relatively high number of rotary-wing aircraft has led to an increased reliance on helicopters. Helicopters have proven very useful in a close-air-support role in addition to the more traditional roles such as troop-lift and resupply. Specifically, the Iranians and Iraqis have come to realize the advantages of using helos in a close-air-support role in the mountainous terrain of the north and in the areas surrounding the cities. It is in these areas that the helos are best able to make use of the available cover and concealment that are not available in the open desert. Air defense on both sides has evolved into a reliance on air defense artillery, SA-7's and the concentrated fire of automatic weapons. Because of poor training and improper maintenance the Iranians have not been able to effectively employ their HAWK, Rapier of Tigercat surface-to-air missile systems and have come to rely on the "curtain of fire", and Syrian - supplied SA-7's to stop the Iraqi helos.14 The "curtin office", which both sides employ, is the technique of the ground forces firing their weapons into the air in the hope that hte enemy aircraft will fly into this hail of bullets. This is obviously not a very efficient air defense means but if you have enough troops firing, it may be an effective means. At any rate, it has discouraged close air support by both sides. On the offense, the Iranians have developed tactics and/or equipment to counter the SA-2's and SA-3's but have not been able to counter the SA-6's which, fortunately, have not been present in great numbers.15 The air-to-air aspect of the war has been very poor. Since neither side has been able to consistently operate at the high and mid-levels, because of the SAM threat that is there, most of the flying has been at low altitudes. The combination of low altitude attack profiles, mountainous terrain and reliance on infrared-seeking missiles has tended to reduce reliance on aircraft in the air defense role and to reduce the effectiveness of those aircraft that are used. Conclusion The adversaries, although armed with some of the most-sophisticated weapons available from the West or East, have found themselves involved in a type of trench warfare reminiscent of World War I. The sophisticated weapons often sit idle because the armed forces cannot operate them due to lack of training or lack of parts. Those weapons that are used are not employed at their optimum range or effectiveness. Tanks engage tanks at 200-300 meters instead of at ranges in excess of 1200 meters because the gun-sights can't be used and highly sophisticated interceptor aircraft aren't flown because their missiles and gun systems don't work. Given enough time, however, both sides will be able to train and resupply. It will be when one side or the other feels that it has a distinct edge that we might see another offensive effort such as in September 1980 or in the Spring and Summer Offensives of 1982 and 1983. Chapter 6 Impact on International Relations The full impact that the Iran-Iraq War will have on international relations in general, and on Soviet-American relations in particular, is at present difficult to ascertain. Neither of the two super-powers had a hand in starting the conflict and neither has had any real measure of control over their former allies or clients. There is some question about whether either Washington or Moscow were even aware that Iran and Iraq were deploying forces. In "Implications of the Iraq-Iran War", Claudia Wright indicates that there was an unusual pattern of Soviet surveillance satellite launchings on August 26th and September 29, 1980.1 She also indicates that, although the Soviets may have seen some indications of impending attack, they were not willing or were unable to intervene. As explained earlier, the Persian Gulf is an area of vital interest to Western Europe, Japan and other allies of America. By implication, it is an area of great interest for the United States even though it is the source of only a small amount of our oil. In his State of the Union Address in January 1980, President Carter declared that "an attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."2 The first concern of the United States was the possible closing of the Straits of Hormuz by Iran, Iraq or, possibly by a third-party. There had been some reports that the Palestinian Liberation Organization possessed weapons that could sink a ship in the Straits and that they planned to use these weapons to fuel the fire of the war. To limit the chances of the Straits of Hormuz being closed, the United States and other Western nations increased their naval presence, being careful to not provoke either Iran or Iraq into unwarranted allegations or actions. The actual employment of naval forces has not been necessary. Since both Iran and Iraq realize that their wealth comes from the export of petroleum, they have left the Straits open. However, this does not preclude a third-party, such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization from taking actions that would cause the shippers of the world to refuse to sail through the Straits. Beyond the understanding of the needs of the world's oil users is the knowledge that the West would bring tremendous force, political as well as military, to bear should the oil supply be threatened. Both Iran and Iraq have conducted air and naval strikes into the Gulf and some ships have been sunk but the Straits have remained open. A second source of concern for Washington was the threat by and ability of the Iranians to conduct airstrikes against other Gulf nations with the intent of keeping these states from providing more aid to Iraq. Iraq is being subsidized by Saudi Arabia and other Arab nations not only financially but militarily and morally, as well. Just as the United States provided a naval presence to keep the seaways open, so an American presence was provided to keep the airways open. In late September 1980, Washington made available to the Saudi Arabian government four E-3 AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) aircraft. The purpose of these aircraft was to provide an airborne early warning system to guard against an Iranian air attack into Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. Taken together, these two American forces have helped to maintain the the status quo in the Persian Gulf Region. The United States does not want either country to decisively defeat the other. Were the Iranians to convincingly defeat Iraq and were the Sunni government then to collapse, it would present the world with a corridor of Shiite countries from Iran, through Iraq, into Syria. Fueled by their success, the Iranians might attempt to export their revolution to the other Arab Gulf States. This would present the possibility of a regional war involving several Arab allies. Choosing to aid its allies, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, et al., Washington could be drawn into the struggle. Similarly, the Soviets, because of their close association with certain Gulf client-states such as Syria, could also be drawn into the war. Any potential decisive Iranian victory could escalate into a regional war involving several of the Gulf States and some countries outside of the Gulf. The war could further expand into a confrontation between the United States which was honoring its stated commitments, and the Soviets who were protecting their interests. A similar scenario can be envisioned were the Iraqis able to decisively defeat the Iranians. The end for Iran could begin if the Ayatollah's forces are destroyed and the government collapses because of internal and external pressure. However, the Pasdaran and other large elements of the military and civilian populace might commence a guerrilla campaign against the Iraqi victors. The Iranian oil industry would probably be in a shambles since there would be no direction from the government and many of the refineries lay in ruins as a result of Iraqi airstrikes. Oil supplies would be cut off from the West because the Iranians closed-off the Straits of Hormuz with mines. At this juncture several courses of action exist. First, Syria, true to its commitment to support Iran could open up a second front against Iraq's western border. The Iraqis would then be faced with attempting to rebuild their own country, supress the guerrillas in Iran and the Iraqi Kurds in the north and fight the Syrians on the Iraqi-Syrian border. Iraq might ask for and receive the assistance of Jordan and again, the localized two-country war could become a regional conflict. The oil flow to the West would stop because now the refineries of both Iran and Iraq are destroyed. The West may decide that it must move in and take-over the Iranian oil fields and refineries to start the oil flowing again. The USCENTCOM (U.S. Central Command) having already been given the alert order would begin deployment. However, seeing that the time was ripe to gain control of the oil in Iran and the Persian Gulf, the Soviet could move first. Crossing the Iranian border from the Soviet Union and Afghanistan with several armored and mechanized divisions, the Soviets head straight for Tehran and other northern cities. Simultaneously, the Soviets seize Khorramshahr, Bandar Abbas and Abadan and the key facilities with their airborne divisions. As in the "Victorious Iran" scenario, this scenario could guickly expand into a Western-Soviet conflict. To limit the chances of either of these two scenarios developing, the Carter and Reagan Administrations attempted to maintain parity between the two warring nations and they sought to treat the two countries even-handedly. As discussed in Chapter 4, the Iranians and Iraqis are receiving support from Western and Soviet allies. As an example, the French are supporting the Iraqis and the Israelis are supporting the Iranians. Both the French and Israelis have their own reasons for conducting business as they do, but their actions have assisted Washington in maintaining the status quo. However, there is considerable doubt as to whether the United States has any real influence with the French of Israelis. There is also no certainty that France or Israel will continue to work to maintain parity in the war. Therefore, President Reagan has decided to take a more active role in the war. The present administration is no longer content with maintaining the status quo of death, destruction and the potential for escalation of the war into a regional or worldwide struggle. The White House has always publicly supported a peaceful resolution of the conflict as evidenced by its support of several resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. Resolution 479, adopted on September 26, 1980 called on Iran and Iraq to refrain immediately from any further use of force and to settle the dispute by peaceful means. Resolution 514 of July 12, 1982 called for a "ceasefire and immediate end to all military operations" and a "withdrawal of all forces to internationally recognized boundaries."3 Additionally, United Nation observers were dispatched to the war zone to "verify, confirm and supervise the cease-fire and withdrawal."4 Needless-to-say, there was no cease-fire and no mutual withdrawal. Resolution 522 of October 1982 reaffirmed the needs establishec in Resolution 514 and commended one of the parties, Iraq, for its willingness to implement Resolution 514 on a unilateral basis. In fact, Iraq had been calling for a cessation of hostilities since September 28, 1980 which, coincidentally, was about the time that it realized that the drive into Iran had been stopped. President Reagan reaffirmed the United States' policy toward the war which was that Washington would not "standby and allow anyone to close...oil traffic." The President also stated that "We (the United States) support U.N. Security Council Resolution 540, which calls for a cease-fire in the Gulf and urges all states, especially the two belligerents, to avoid action which would threaten freedom of navigation in the international waters of the Persian Gulf. We want a cease-fire and a negotiated settlement."5 As evidenced by these statements and by recent actions, Washington wants the fighting to stop and for the two parties to meet at the negotiating table. The White House was one of the behind-the-scene sponsors and backers of an October 30, 1983 United Nations Security Council Resolution that called for a cease-fire written in terms to be as acceptable as possible to Iran. Iran, however, showed no interest.6 The Regan Administration also proposed to the Baghdad leadership that Iraq should quietly begin, on a trial basis, efforts to export some of its oil in tankers through the Persian Gulf.7 Were the Iranians not to interfere, it would free-up some of the Iraqi tankers that had been contained in the Gulf since the war's start and it might signal a tacit cease-fire. This would surely open the road to negotiations. However, an Iranian reaction could cause the Iraqis to counterattack, thereby causing the escalation that the White House sought to avoid. These proposals had apparently hit a brick wall with Iran. Therefore, a new tact was initiated in late-1983. The President began to seek a "normalization" of relations with Iraq, sending a Special Mideast Envoy, Donald Rumsfeld, to visit Iraq in mid-December. Mr. Rumsfeld, the highest-ranking American official to visit Iraq in six years, met with The stronger stance against Iran is partly in response to Iranian support for the Shiite faction that may have been responsible for the bombings of the American Marine and French Headquarters of the Multi-national Peacekeeping Force in Beirut. The Shiite faction, Al Dawa (the Call), was expelled from Iraq in early 1980 by President Hussein. Drawing its support from the large Shiite population in southeastern Iraq, Al Dawa attempted to establish a fundamentalist Islamic state to replace the secular Ba'ath Socialist government of President Hussein. The present leader of Al Dawa, Hojatoleslam Mohammed Baqr Hakim, is operating from Tehran where he has directed terrorist attacks against targets throughout the Middle East.12 It is uncertain if Tehran is directly controlling the activities of Al Dawa abroad or if it is just giving tacit approval for Al Dawa's activities. In either case, Iran's support of Al Dawa is unacceptable and cessation of hostilities favorable to Iraq is now the preferred option for the White House. The Soviet Union has also followed a course of neutrality in the Gulf, at least superficially. The Eastern European nations are also dependent on oil imports. In the past, the primary source of their imported oil was the Soviet Union, but the Soviets have recently been trying to wean them from the Soviet oil supply. There are not many sources of oil open to these countries, but one such source could be the Persian Gulf. The Soviets, therefore, would like to be in a position where they would have a strong voice in the allocation of the Gulf's oil. Secondly the Soviets have demonstrated a propensity for establishing friendly buffer states on their President Hussein and delivered a letter to him from president Reagan. Mr. Rumsfeld, as reported in the Washington Post, is said to have repeated a willingness to resume full dimplomatic relations with Iraq at any time. Relations had been broken-off between the two countries since 1967, but interest sections have been maintained in both capitals since then.8 However, the Iraqs are still suspicious of American intentions in the Gulf. More recent proposals by the Reagan Administration indicate a willingness to do more than just normalize relations with Iraq and to take steps to impede the flow of support into Iran. The export of American military hardware to either Iran or Iraq is prohibited, but non-military supplies that can indirectly or even directly aid the Iranians have continued to flow. One such example was the proposed sale of the Hughes helicopters to Iran. There is some question as to whether the deal was ever concluded, but the intent to sell potential war supplies to Iran was present. American exports to Iran for the first ten months of 1983 totalled $161 million, nearly twice that the $87 million exported in 1982.9 Indirect trading, i.e. that done through third countries, can account for considerably more although figures are not available to substantiate this claim. Some of the trading is not only indirect but is illegal as well. One group in New York was charged with conspiring to sell $2 billion worth of weapons to federal agents who posed as representatives of Iran and the Irish Republican Army.10 The United States does more than export products to Iran. The first ten months of 1983 saw the import of 30 million barrels of Iranian oil, about 3.5 percent of American oil imports. This figure was up 10 million barrels or about one percent from 1982.11 borders. Afghanistan was the most recent example of this overt effort to establish another buffer state. A pro-Soviet Iran, as a Gulf nation with oil and which bordered on the Soviet Union, would meet both of the Soviet's needs: a supply of oil and a friendly buffer state. To achieve this goal of luring the Iranians into a false sense of security, the Soviets declared a policy of neutrality in the Gulf War. However, since the Soviets were linked to Iraq by treaty, this declaration of neutrality was, in effect, in favor of the Iranians. By ingratiating themselves with the mullahs, in that the U.S.S.R had not aligned itself with Iraq, the Soviets hoped that they would be the ones that the Iranians would call if they needed help. This hope of being Iran's friend was greatly diminished in May 1983 when the Iranians expelled eighteen Soviet diplomats and dissoved the Communist Tudeh Party. Although relations between the two countries were never particularly good, it was the Soviet Union's renewed sales of weapons to Iraq that caused the Ayatollah's reaction. Even with this apparent stain in relations, the Soviets and the Iranians continue to carry on. With Khorramshahr, its biggest port closed, the Iranians must make extensive use of the Soviet rail system for the movement of supplies. Additionally, Soviet-Iranian trade is estimated to be about $1 billion annually, and one-third of Irans imports travel through Soviet territory.13 It seems most likely that the expulsion of the Soviet diplomats and banning of the Communist Party was a "red herring" designed by the Ayatollah Khomeini to distract the attention of the Iranian populace. The Ayatollah's intent, apparently, was to blame Iran's internal problems on some entity outside of the borders, as they had done with the United States and the hostage situation. It appears that the Soviets are now less a friend of the Iranians than they were a year ago and that the Soviets are now more willng to support the Iraqis. However, in the eyes of the Soviets, Iran is the prize and not Iraq. Diplomatically and superficially, the Soviets will support the pan-Arabic movement of Iraq. Given a choice between Iran and Iraq, however, the Soviets will probably opt for Iran's location and its oil. Therefore, the potential for a Soviet-American conflict is still present. All of the Western states must ensure the safety of their vital oil supply but it is Washington that is most willing and able to commit forces. The Persian Gulf's oil is not currently vital to the welfare of the Eastern Bloc countries; nor is the existence of pro-Soviet Iran vital to the security of the Soviet Union. However, if the opportunity to move into Iran is presented to the Soviets, or if they create the opportunity, then scenarios that were described earlier are sure to develop. The West must bring the two warring nations to the negotiating table as equals, not as victor and vanquished. The fighting and the chance of escalation must be stopped. The negotiations can't solve the problems of Persian-Arab enmity nor can it close the Sunni-Shiite rift. The negotiations can, however, help keep the Soviets out of the Gulf and help ensure the continued flow of oil to the west. Click here to view image Endnotes Chapter 1 1Robert Bernard O'Donnell, "A New Arab Alliance System: Causes of the Iran-Iraq War and the Reaction of Various Arab States," Thesis, Naval Post Graduate School (Monterey, California, 1981), p. 34. 2Alvin J. Cottrell, The Persian Gulf States (Baltimore and London; The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), p. 289. 3Drew Middleton, "Iraqi Tactics Stress Shelling," New York Times, 9 November 1980. p. Al.Col.1. 4Cottrell, The Persian Gulf States, p. 305. 5O'Donnell, "A New Arab Alliance System," p. 39. 6Bruce Van Voorst and Roland Flamini, "Man of the Year," Time, January 1980, pp. 8-21. 7O'Donnell, "A New Arab Alliance System," p. 46. 8Ibid., p. 47. 9Ibid. 10Ibid., p. 10. 11Ibid., p. 17. 12American Foreign Policy Institute, The Impact of the Iranian Events Upon Persian Gulf and U.S. Security (Washington, D.C., 1979), pp. 39-64. 13Robert F. Kieser, "The Persian Gulf: An Area of Potential Conflict," Air University, (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 1974), p. 48. 14David Rosser-Owen, "Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War," Armada International, March 1982 pp. 40-47. Chapter 2 1Stephen R. Grummon, "The Iran-Iraq War; Islam Embattled," The Center for Strategic and International Studies, (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, 1982), p. 15. 2Anthony H. Cordesman, "Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War: The First Round," Armed Forces Journal International, April 1982, p. 32. 3Ibid. 4Ibid. 5Ibid. 6Ibid. 7Ibid. 8The Military Balance, 1981-1982, ed., The International Institute for Strategic Studies, (London, 1982). 9Cordesman, "Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War," p. 38. 10The Military Balance, 1981-1982, ed. 11William O. Staudenmaier, "A Strategic Analysis of the Gulf War," (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1982), p. 6. 12Cordesman, "Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War," p. 40. 13Military Balance, loc. cit. 14Staudenmaier, "A Strategic Analysis of the Gulf War," pp. 8-9. 15Cottrell, The Persian Gull States, p. 631. 16Cordesman, "Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War," p. 44. 17Staudenmaier, "A Strategic Analysis of the Gulf War," p. 10. 18Cordesman, "Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War," p. 44. 19Tanner, Henry, "Iraq's Leaders Call for Talks with Iran to Settle Conflict," New York Times, September 29, 1980. 20Staudenmaier, "A Strategic Analysis of the Gulf War," p. 16. Chapter 3 1Gary C. Demack, "Perception and Misperception in the Persian Gulf: The Iran-Iraq War," Parameters, June 1983, p. 26. 2"Chronology," The Middle East Journal, Spring 1983, pp. 242- 243. 3Anthony H. Cordesman, "Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War: Part Two," Armed Forces Journal International, June 1982, p. 73. 4"Iran, Iraq Report Victories Along the Southern Front," Washington Post, March 23, 1982. 5Grummon, "The Iran-Iraq War," p. 46. 6Staudenmaier, "A Strategic Analysis of the Gulf War," p. 21. 7Cordesman, "Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War: Part Two,", p. 74. 8"Iran Launches New Offensive Against Iraqis," Washington Post, May 1, 1982. Chapter 4 1Michael Getter, "Iran Seen Widening Invasion," Washington Post, July 16, 1982. 2Anthony H. Cordesman, "The Iran-Iraq War: Attrition Now, Chaos Later," Armed Forces Journal International, May 1983, p. 38. 3Ibid., p. 40. 4Christine Moss Helms, "The Iraqi Dilemma: Political Objectives versus Military Strategy," The Brooking Institution, 1983, p. 84. 5Joseph Panossian, "Iran Starts Offensive, Claims Major Gains," Washington Post, February 8, 1983. 6Helms, "The Iraqi Dilemma," p. 82. 7"Costly War (II)," Time, June 27,1983, p. 45. 8James Kelly, "Battling for the Advantage," Time, October 24, 1983, p. 35. 9Ibid., p. 34. 10Ibid., p. 35. 11Charles A. Robinson, "Iran, Iraq Acquiring Chinese- Built Fighters," Aviation Week and Space Technology, April 11, 1983 p. 16. 12Dr. Michael C. Dunn, "There's a New Armored War Being Fought," Defense and Foreign Affairs, January/February 1982, p. 26. 13Robinson, "Iran, Iraq Acquiring Chinese-Built Fighter," p. 16 14Ibid. 15Ibid. 16Ibid., p. 17. 17Ibid., p. 16. Chapter 5 1Rosser-Owen, "Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War," p. 42. 2Cordesman, "Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War: Part Two," p. 76. 3Ibid. 4Rosser-Owen, "Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War," p. 44. 5Staudenmaier, "A Strategic Analysis of the Gulf War," p. 17. 6Dunn, "There's a New Armored War Being Fought," p. 26. 7Ibid. 8Ibid. 9Cordesman, "Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War: Part Two," p. 78. 10Ibid., p. 73. 11Ibid., p. 84. 12Jed C. Snyder, "The Road to Osirag: Baghdad's Quest for the Bomb," The Middle East Journal, Autumn 1983, p. 580. 13Cordesman, "Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War: Part Two," p. 84. 14Ibid., p. 80. 15Ibid. Chapter 6 1Claudia Wright, "Implications of the Iraq-Iran War," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1980/81, p. 289. 2President Jimmy Carter, "State of the Union Address," January 1980. 3"Call Renewed for End to Iran-Iraq War," UN Chronicle, December 1982, p. 86. 4Ibid. 5Juan Williams, "Reagan Warns Iran-Iraq War Could Escalate," Washington Post, January 8, 1984. 6Dan Oberdorfer, "U.S. Moves to Avert Iraqi Loss," Washington Post, January 1, 1984. 7Ibid. 8Ibid. 9Ibid. 10"Counterthreats: Iran's Diversionary Tactics," Time, August 8, 1983, p. 42. 11Oberdorfer, "U.S. Moves to Avert Iraqi Loss" 12David B. Ottaway, "Beirut Bomber Seen Front for Iranian Supported Shiite Faction," Washington Post, January 4, 1984. 13Pico Iyer, "Hatred Without Discrimination," Time, May 16, 1983, p. 27. Annotated Bibliography A. Primary Cordesman, Anthony H., He has written several articles for the Armed Forces Journal, three of which were used as sources for this paper. B. Secondary Books Cottrell, Alvin J., General Editor, The Persian Gulf States. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980. A compre- hensive compilation of essays on the states of the Persian Gulf. It provides a wealth of detailed information on the militaries, cultures, economies, politics and histories of the states. Grummon, Stephen R., The Iran-Iraq War, Georgetown University, 1982. The Iran-Iraq War caught much of the world by surprise, yet its antecedents reach back more than a thousand years. Mr. Grummon accurately recounts the causes of the war, traces its course, and makes some estimates as to its possible effect on the world. Theses and Research Papers Kieser, Robert F., "The Persian Gulf: An Area of Potential Conflict," Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, Air University, 1974. Before the recent energy crisis, the focal point of the Middle East was the Arab-Israeli Conflict. The Persian Gulf States were largely ignored until the present war. The author describes the ways in which the Persian Gulf countries could become embroiled in war and the ways in which they can involve the other nations of the world. McLaurin, R.D., "Military Operations in the Gulf War: The Battle of Khorramshahr," Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, U.S. Army Human Engineering Laboratory, 1982. This study deals with the largest single urban battle of the Iran-Iraq War. There is much more information contained in this document besides that pertaining to MOUT. O"Donnell, Robert Bernard, "A New Arab Alliance System: Causes of the Iraq-Iran War and the Reaction of Various Arab States," Monterey, California, Naval Post Graduate School, 1981. This thesis examines the current conflict and Looks at the causes, both stated and unstated, offering an opinion as to the real causes of the war. Staudenmaier, William O., "A Strategic Analysis of the Gulf War," Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, U. S. Army War College, 1982. This memoran- dum examines the war from a strategic perspective to determine its causes; to analyze the military strategy and events of the war in order to shed light on significant tactical and logistical develop- ments and to derive tentative conclusions. Journals and Periodicals Bill, James A., "Power and Religion in Revolutionary Iran," The Middle East Journal, Winter 1982, pp. 22-47. The article is an excellent glossary of the vocabulary of the religions of the Persian Gulf. It provides an excellent background of the politics of religion. Christie, John, "The Tinder-box of War," Pacific Defense Review, December 1982/January 1983, pp. 26-30. The author maintains that concern for the safety of the world should be centered about the Arab-Persian War more than with the Arab-Israeli War. Cottrell, Alvin J., "Islam Embattled," National Defense, July - August 1983, pp. 36-39. The article is a very rudimentary summary of the war,but it is a good primer written by a very knowledgeable man. Dawisha, Karen, "The USSR and the Middle East," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1982/1983, pp. 438-452. The article traces the development of Soviet relations with the states of the Middle East. The 1978-79 cooling of relations between the Soviets and Iraqis and recent attempts by the Soviets to warm things up is covered in detail. Dunn, Michael F., "There's a new Armored War Being Fought," Defense and Foreign Affairs, January/February 1982, pp. 9+. The theme of the article is that the emphasis of armored warfare is shifting from reliance on heavy tanks to reliance on lighter, more reliable armored fighting vehicles and Light tanks. Cordesman, Anthony H., "Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War; Parts One, Two and Three," Armed Forced Journal International, April 1982, June 1982 and May 1983, pp. 32-47, 68-85, and 36-43, respectively. In this series of three articles, Mr. Cordesman has fully described the causes of the war, traced its development, analyzed the tactics and weapons and drawn conclusions. An excellent source of information. Helms, Christine Moss, "The Iraqi Dilemma: Political Objectives Versus Military Strategy," The Brookings Institution, 1983. As the title indicates, Iraq is faced with the problem of developing military strategies to accomplish vague and undefined political objectives. Jawdat, Nameer AIi, "Reflections on the Gulf War," 1983, pp. 86-98. This article is an excellent discussion of the regional and international problems that could occur from the escalation of the war and subse- quent defeat of either combatant. Miller, Marshall Lee, "Will Iran or Iraq Close the Straits of Honmuz?," Armed Forces Journal International, December 1983, pp. 24-27. An up-to-date discussion of the political and economic situation surrounding and complicating the war in the Persian Gulf. Milton, T.R., "Where the Cauldron Boiled Over," Air Force Magazine, January 1981, pp. 98-102. Employment of airpower in the war has been more haphazard and episodic than according to any doctrine. The reasons are as murky as the battlfield communiques but the outcome affects U.S. and allied interests in the Middle East. O"Ballance, Edgar, "The Iraqi-Iranian War: The First round," Parameters, Vol. XI, No. 1, pp. 54-59. A preliminary discussion of the causes, progress and future of the war. O'Ballance, Edgar, "The Iran-Iraq War," The Marine Corps Gazette, February 1982, pp. 44-50. An updated version of his earlier work, it provided some of the background for Cordesman's early article. Owen, Fran E. and Ronendra K. Mukherjee, "lessons of the Postscript War," Army, August, 1983, pp. 31-36. A presentation of the "Lessons learned" from a war that has moved from the front pages to the back pages. The conclusions are that this type of warfare can be as much a precursor of future wars as the mobile Arab-Israeli War was for our present thinking. Robinson, Charles A., Jr., "Iran-Iraq Acquiring Chinese-Built Fighters," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 11 April 1983, pp. 16-18. A description of how the two adversaries have sought the assistance of many nations to help them continue the war. Rogal, Kim and Ron Moreau, "The Youngest Martyrs," Newsweek, 21 March 1983, p. 51. A brief description of the religious fervor that grips Iran and Iraq. Rosser-Owen, David, "Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War," Armada International, March 1982, pp. 40-47. A recapitulation of the course of the war. It provides a good recipe of the successes and failures of the two sides. Sciolino, Elaine, "A War Without End," Newsweek, August 15, 1983, pp. 33-34. Fueled by many outside agencies and fired by the zeal of religion, this war promises to continue for a long time even if one government should collapse. Staudenmaier, William O., "Military Policy and Strategy in the Gulf War," Parameters, Vol. XIII, No. 2, pp. 25-25. A condensed version of Col. Staudenmaier's "Analysis" for the U.S. Army War College. Excellent coverage of the early part of the war. Wright, Claudia, "Implications of the Iraq-Iran War," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1980/1981. The article describes the basic causes of the war and thoroughly describes the actions of the other Gulf Nations. The latter part of the article discusses the implications for the U.S. and USSR. Kelly, James, "Battling for the Advantage," Time, October 25, 1983, pp. 34-36. After three years of fighting, both countries are suffering economically and are seeking the assistance of other countries militarily, morally and economically. C. Lesser-used Secondary Sources Books Jacobson, Jay C., "Military Arsenals: The Persian Gulf," War Data, 1979. Nyrop, Richard F., Iran a Country Study (1978) and Iraq a Country Study (1979), Area Handbook Series, Washington, D.C.: American University. The Military Balance, 1981-1982 ed. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1982. Theses and Research Documents Helmlinger, Robert B., Jr., "Iranian-Iraqi Antagonisms: Source for US-USSR Confrontation," Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, U.S. Army War College, 1974. Radwan, Ann B., "Iraq-Iran and the Gulf: The Regional Dynamic," U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 1982. Journals and Periodicals Batatu, Hanna, "Iraq's Undergound Shi'a Movement: Characteristics, Causes and Prospects," The Middle East Journal, Autumn 1981, pp. 578-594. Demack, Gary C., "Perception and Misperception in the Persian Gulf: The Iran-Iraq War," Parameters, Vol. XII, No. 2. pp. 65-73. Iyer, Pico, "Hatred Without Discrimination," Time, May 18 1983, p. 27. Snyder, Jed C., "The Road to Oslraq: Baghdad's Quest for the Bomb," The Middle East Journal, Autumn 1983, p. 590. Swearingen, Will D., "Sources of conflict over Oil in the Persian/ Arabian Gulf," The Middle East Journal, Summer 1981, pp. 315-330. Van Voorst, Bruce and Roland Flamini, "Man of the Year," Time, January 1980. "F-5E/F Fighters Provide Defense on Iraqi Border, " Aviation Week and Space Technology," June 27, 1983, pp. 79-80. "Chronology," The Middle East Journal, Winter, Spring, Summer and Fall of 1981, 1982, 1983 and Winter 1984. "Iran, Iraq Still Far Apart on Central Issues," UN Chronicle, May 1982, p. 3. "Call Renewed for End to Iran-Iraq War," UN Chronicle, December 1982, p. 85-87. "President's Statement," UN Chronicle, April 1983, p. 9-10. "The Persian Gulf on Fire," Military Enthusiast, Vol. 1, No. 2. Newspapers Getter, Michael, "Iran Seen Widening invasion," Washington Post, July 16, 1982. Middleton, Drew, "Iraqi Tactics Stress Shelling," New York Times, November 9, 1980, p. Al, Col. 1. Oberdorfer, Dan, "U.S. Moves to Avert Iraqi Loss," Washington Post, January 1, 1984. Ottaway, David B., "Beirut Bomber Seen Front for Iranian Supported Shitte Faction," Washington Post, January 4, 1984. Panossian, Joseph, "Iran Starts Offensive, Claims Major Gains," Washington Post, February 8, 1983. Tanner, Henry, "Iraq's Leaders Call for Talks with Iran to Settle Conflict," New York Time. September 29, 1980. Williams, Juan, "Reagan Warns Iran-Iraq Could Escalate," Washington Post, January 8, 1984, p. 1. "Counterthreats: Iran's Diversionary Tactics," Time, August 8, 1983, p. 42. "Nowhere to Hide," Time, November 7, 1983. Other Carter, Jimmy, "State of the Union Address," January 1980.
