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Military

The India-Pakistan War
Of 1971: A Modern War
CSC 1984
SUBJECT AREA History
                           ABSTRACT
Author:      KYLE, R.G., Major, Royal Canadian Artillery
Title:       Indian-Pakistan War of 1971:  A Modern War
Publisher:   Marine Corps Command and Staff College
Date:        14 March 1964
     This paper examines the origins, conduct and results of
the war  between  India  and Pakistan of 1971 from which the
nation of  Bangla  Desh  emerged.  The  study  compares  the
development of religion, culture and  economy  in  East  and
West Pakistan  which  led  to  the  frustration  of  Bengali
nationalism  within  the  "Islamic Nation" founded in  1947.
The role of the  military  government  from  1958 to 1971 is
also examined  to  show how its activities further alienated
the  people  of  East Pakistan and contributed to  both  the
rebellion  there  and  the weakening  of  its  own  military
capability.
     The  second  part of the study examines the development
of guerrilla war in East Pakistan between March and December
1971.  The  Political  and  Military   organization  of  the
insurgents  is analysed along  with  the  counter-insurgency
actions of the government forces.  The effects of the war on
India and the policies that nation developed to deal with it
are also analyzed.  The roles played by the United States,
China,  the  Soviet  Union,  and the United Nations  in  the
conflict are studied.
     The study goes on  the  analyze the military operations
of  India   and   Pakistan   during  the  fourteen  days  of
conventional war  between  them.  Finally,  conclusions  are
drawn  concerning  the  conditions  which  precipitated  the
conflict and the reasons  for the success of the Bengali and
Indian forces.
     No primary sources  of  information  were available for
this  study.  Therefore,  the   author   relied  heavily  on
articles in military journals  as  well  as several books on
the subject.
                            WAR SINCE 1945 SEMINAR
                        The India-Pakistan War of 1971
                                 A Modern War
                Major Rodney G. Kyle, Royal Canadian Artillery
                                 2 April 1984
                    Marine Corps Command and Staff College
                Marine Corps Development and Education Command
                           Quantico, Virginia  22134
                               TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction                                                 1
Chapter
       I.   Origins of the Conflict                          2
      II.   Rebellion and Repression                        18
     III.   The 14-Day War:  3-16 December 1971             38
      IV.   Conclusion                                      55
Appendices
       I.   Map of West Pakistan-India Frontier 1971        57
      II.   Map of East Pakistan 1971                       58
Bibliography                                                59
                        INTRODUCTION
     This study is concerned with  a guerrilla war fought by
two peoples who had joined together enthusiastically to form
the new  nation  of  Pakistan just twenty-five years before.
It  is also concerned with the short,  violent  conventional
war fought by India and Pakistan which resulted in the birth
of  the  new  nation  of   Bangla  Desh.  The  conflict  was
influenced by both the legacies  of  ancient  India  and the
contemporary interests  of  world  politics.  The  study may
interest the  reader concerned with the techniques of modern
guerrilla and conventional war,  but  the  study should also
lead the reader to conclude that we cannot understand modern
conflict without understanding the historical environment in
which it occurs.
     Unfortunately  no  primary  sources of information were
available  for  this  study.  Information  was gathered from
military journals and several books on the subject.
     I would like  to  thank  Lieutenant  Colonel  Donald F.
Bittner, USMCR,  staff historian of the Marine Corps Command
and Staff  College  for  his help in finding source material
and his many helpful  suggestions  to  improve  a very rough
first  draft.  A  special thanks also must go  to  Mrs.  Pam
Lohman who  had  to  transform this work to typescript.  Any
errors, however,  are  entirely  the  responsibility  of the
author.
                         CHAPTER I
                  ORIGINS OF THE CONFLICT
     When  Pakistan  was  formed in 1947, it was a result of
Islamic nationalism of the Moslems of India.  Islam had been
introduced to the Indian sub-continent following the Afghan-
Turkish conquest in  the  13th century.  A large part of the
native population in  the area of East Bengal was peacefully
coverted from Hindu to Islam in the following two centuries.
     In the 16th century the Moslem sultanate  of Bengal was
absorbed into  the  north  Indian Mughal empire.  The Moslem
rulers  of  the empire were non-Bengali.  Their culture  was
based  on   Arabic  and  Persian  influences,   and  the  Urdu
language.   Socially,    Bengal  was  divided  into  a Bengali
Moslem  peasantry  and  a  Persianized  Urdu speaking ruling
class. 1/
     In  1764  the  English East India Company succeeded the
Mughals  as  the  government of Bengal.   The  British  rule
encouraged the  rise of the Hindu commercial class in Bengal
while the former  Urdu-speaking Moslem rulers and landowners
were  displaced  from  their  positions of power.   In  this
climate Bengali culture during the 19th century developed in
a new direction led by the Hindu elite and influenced by the
emerging   middle-class  of  Bengali-speaking  Moslems.  The
Bengali-speaking  Moslems  became  increasingly conscious of
their  ethnic identity and nationalism throughout  the  19th
century.  For   their  part,  the  British  were   gradually
loosening restrictions on local institutions and government:
Hindu  dominated  schools  and  the  secular  university  of
Calcutta  played  their part in developing Bengali  identity
among  the   Bengali-speaking   Moslems.  To   counter   the
continuing  loss of position and status, in 1906  the  Urdu-
speaking  Moslems  established  the first  modern  political
movement  among the Moslems of India  called  the  All-India
Moslem League. 2/
     The  concept  of  a  separate state of Pakistan did not
develop until  the  1930's  when  India grew closer to self-
government.   By  1937  there  were two political parties in
Bengal which  formed a coalition provincial government.  The
first  was a radical peasants and tenants  party  backed  by
Bengali-speaking  Moslems,  while  the  other  was  the more
conservative  Moslem  League representing the  Urdu-speaking
Moslems.  This government proposed the "Pakistan Resolution"
calling for the regions of  Northwest  and  Eastern zones of
India where there was a Moslem majority  to  be grouped into
independent states that would be  autonomous  and sovereign.
A  federation  of  12  to  14  states  with   strong   local
governments was envisioned.
     Bengal became a war zone during World War II.  As well,
in 1943  a  famine  took  more  than two million lives.  The
destruction and  sacrifices  of these catastrophes increased
the nationalism and solidarity of the  Moslem  population in
Eastern India.  Support  for  the  "Pakistan Resolution" and
the Moslem  League  swelled.  On August 14, 1947, the nation
of Pakistan was  created  from the regions of India having a
Moslem majority.  Two states, Bengal in the  East and Punjab
in  the  West,  were  divided into Hindu and Moslem regions.
Only  the  Moslem  sections  were  included  into  Pakistan.
Pakistan itself had  two  wings  separated by 1,000 miles of
Indian land.
     The partition of Bengal led to the restoration of power
to the  traditional  Urdu-speaking  Moslems  who had led the
Moslem League.  However, this  elite could only be sustained
by  the  active  support of the Urdu-speakers who controlled
West Pakistan.  While the Moslem League had sustained Moslem
nationalism in  Bengal  during the previous decade, it could
not provide  a  focus  and support for the nationalism which
continued to be a potent force among Bengali Moslems. 3/
     In  East  Pakistan, the Bengali-speaking Moslem middle-
class was an important social  force.  This  class comprised
small  land owners, professionals and traders.  They  had  a
deep  loyalty   to   Bengali   culture,   and   respect  for
parliamentary  tradition  and  the  rule  of  law.  In  West
Pakistan, land  holdings were larger and concentrated in the
hands of  fewer  people.  Power  was essentially vested in a
plutocratic   and   feudal  system.  West  Pakistan  had   a
population of  42.9 million in an area six times larger than
East  Pakistan:  East  Pakistan  had  a  population  of 50.8
million (1961 census).   The  two  parts  of  Pakistan  were
separated by about 1,000 miles and, because  of  hostilities
with India,  it  was  impossible  to  maintain  land  or air
communications across the intervening Indian territory.  Air
and  sea communications routes were 3,000 miles  around  the
southern  tip  of  India.  The  two  wings of  Pakistan  had
a religious belief in Islam in common, but  the  significant
geographic and  social  differences increasingly divided the
two wings. 4/
     When Pakistan  was  formed  in  1947,  it  was to be an
Islamic nation.  However, the  political institutions of the
new  nation  and  the  way  they  would function  were  left
undefined.  The  East and West wings could not  agree  on  a
constitution defining the  political institutions before the
deadline date for independence.   The  constitution was left
to be sorted out by the new nation itself, but the different
political traditions and aspirations  of  the  East and West
wings were to be the source of serious, continuing friction.
     The British had ruled India (including the  territories
making up  Pakistan)  with a strong central government under
the Viceroy.  However,  the province of Bengal had developed
a  provincial  democratic  parliamentary  system  much  more
advanced  than  that  of the northwestern provinces.  For  a
viable  constitution   these   two   traditions  had  to  be
reconciled  within  the concept of the  Islamic  nation.  As
well, the British since 1905,  had  designed  the provincial
representative  institutions  on   the   basis  of  separate
electorates  for  members  of  the main religious groups  --
Moslem and Hindu.  West Pakistan had the majority of Moslems
(42.9 million) in  the  new  nation since about one fifth of
the population (10 million of 50.8 million) of East Pakistan
was  Hindu.  If  Pakistan was to continue the  tradition  of
separate  electorates,  then  West  Pakistan would dominate.
But  if  a  single  electorate was  constituted,  then  East
Pakistan would dominate while owing its control to its Hindu
minority.   Thus,  from  the  beginning,  the Islamic nation
concept involved   friction between the nationalism and power
of  different  cultural  and  social  communities within the
state. 5/
     For the next seven  years,  the  National  Assembly  in
Karachi  wrestled  with  the  drafting  of  a  constitution.
However, by 1952 Bengali  nationalism was reasserting itself
in a number of political parties, the  most  important being
the Awami League led by Sheikh Mujib-ur Rahman.
     In provincial elections in 1954 the conservative Moslem
League  was swept from power in East Pakistan by a coalition
of Bengali  nationalist  parties.  When  the  new government
leader,  Fazlul   Haq,   of  East  Pakistan  made  a  speech
supporting the reunification of the old province  of Bengal,
the national government in  Karachi dismissed the provincial
cabinet and  imposed Governor's rule.  Any large increase of
non-Moslem population in East Pakistan (such as that of West
Bengal) would have further unbalanced the power between East
and  West  Pakistan as well as brought a real threat of  war
with India.  With  the  endless  constitutional  debate  and
steady  deterioration  of  the  cohesion  of  Pakistan,  the
President  of  Pakistan  dismissed  the  National  Assembly.
Under threat of imposition of military  rule  a cabinet with
members drawn from various sections of political opinion was
appointed and tasked to frame a constitution.
     By 1956 a constitution had been drafted which  included
the concept  of  parity  and  equal  status  between the two
communities of East and West Pakistan.  This concept had the
support  of  most  leaders  in  East  Pakistan.  While   the
arrangement did  not go as far as the original resolution of
1937 which called for "autonomous and  sovereign" states, it
did  maintain  a  political balance between East  and  West.
However, West Pakistan comprised fourteen  states of the old
India of  which the Punjab was the largest it would dominate
the affairs of West Pakistan:  the politicians in  the  West
could  not  agree to accept this arrangement.  Although  the
constitution was proclaimed law, elections were never  held.
In  1958  the  President,  Islamabad  Mirza,  abrogated   the
constitution, and  he  was soon deposed by the Army Chief of
Staff,  General  Ayub Khan, who proclaimed martial law.  The
army had moved to fill the power vacuum created by  the lack
of workable political institutions. 6/
     The  military  government of General Ayub  concentrated
power   toward   a  central  executive  government.  A   new
constitution was proclaimed in 1962 replacing sovereignty of
the  people  with  the  sovereignty   of   Allah.  Effective
electoral power  was  given to an equal number of nobilities
from  both  wings  of  the  nation,  but  the  national  and
provincial legislatures were given  only minor powers.  Most
powers  were  concentrated  in  the  presidential  executive
located in  Karachi.  General Ayub had created an autocratic
government  in  the  tradition of the Urdu-speaking Moslems.
The Bengali movement  for autonomy of East Pakistan was left
virtually without influence or power.
     In  the period 1960-1970, the Bengali's felt  dominated
economically as  well as politically by West Pakistan.  East
Bengal  lacked natural resources, was remote from main trade
routes,  and  was  limited  by  a large expanding population
which was difficult to feed.  The main exports were jute and
tea.  Traditionally,  these  crops  were  exported  to  West
Bengal in  exchange  of manufactured goods.  After partition
in 1947, the economic dependence on West Bengal was  shifted
to West Pakistan.  Here the  central managers controlled the
foreign exchange earned by  the  exports  as well as foreign
aid  and  foreign  investment.  In  West  Pakistan, the  per
capita income  was  61%  higher  than in East Pakistan.  The
Bengalis resented  the  faster  growth and higher incomes of
the West.  They tended  to  blame the much higher proportion
of West  Pakistanis in the civil and armed services and many
of  the  professions for diverting wealth to the West  which
was generated in the East.
     As  resentment was growing, India and Pakistan went  to
war over Kashmir in  1965.  This conflict ended in stalemate
but it demonstrated the vulnerability of East Pakistan.  The
complete cessation of economic activity with India hurt East
Pakistan and  reinforced  the  Bengalis  sense  of  economic
domination from West Pakistan. 7/
     The resentment toward West Pakistan fed growing support
for the Awami League.  By 1967 the League had adopted a six-
point manifesto aimed at economic and political autonomy for
East  Pakistan.  According  to  the  manifesto  the  central
government should only retain control of foreign affairs and
defense  while  the  provincial  government  should  control
economic, taxation, trade and foreign aid policies.
     The  economic  expansion  in  West  Pakistan  was  also
producing social strains there.  Radical socialists competed
with  the  traditional   land-owning  elites  on  which  the
government and army were based.  By 1968, strong support for
Ali Bhutto's radical Peoples Party emerged in the West wing.
The party's  support  was  based  on  social justice for the
"common  man"  and  hostility  toward  India.  It  was  also
opposed  to  any action which would reduce the political and
economic status of West Pakistan.
     In  the  rising  tide  of opposition to  his  policies,
General  Ayub called a conference of  political  leaders  to
resolve the most pressing conflicts.  However, no settlement
was  reached.  General  Ayub resigned on 26 March 1969 to be
replaced  by General Yahya Khan, Commander-in-Chief  of  the
army.  The  constitution  was again suspended.  Pakistan had
reverted back to the position it was at in 1958.
    General Yahya  quickly  promulgated  a set of decisions
aimed at  reducing  political  tensions in both wings of the
country.  The first  addressed  the  major grievance of East
Pakistan:  national elections would be held by December 1970
based  on  a  common  electorate in both wings to give  East
Pakistan a majority of seats.  The second  regrouped  the 14
political regions of West Pakistan into  four provinces more
equal in political power to the Punjab.  Later General Yahya
expanded on these decisions with an outline for the transfer
of  power   from   military   government  to  constitutional
institutions.
        a.   A  new  constitution had to be prepared by
     the national  assembly within 120 days after being
     called into session.
        b.   The  constitution had to conform to certain
     principles which  included:  a  provision that the
     territorial integrity  and  national solidarity of
     Pakistan should  be  respected;  and  a federation
     should  be  established  in  which provinces would
     have  maximum autonomy but, the federal government
     would  have  adequate  powers  to  carry  out  its
     responsibilities for external and internal affairs
     and to preserve the  independence  and territorial
     integrity of the country.
        c.   To  ensure  that the constitution conformed
     to the principles, it had to be  approved  by  the
     President.
     With these decisions, General  Yahya  probably intended
to  achieve  some  popular  support  for the military regime
after  the   long period of confusion of General Ayub's rule.
The guidelines for  the constitution also gave protection to
the central  power of armed forces.  With the cooperation of
the  Bengali  members,  the army could thwart  Mr.  Bhutto's
radical Peoples Party in West Pakistan. 8/
     These  guidelines  were  generally  acceptable  to  the
civilian political  leaders  in  both the East and West.  As
the election approached, the two most  active  parties  were
Sheikh Mijib's Awami League and Ali Bhutto's People's Party.
The  results  of  the  election,  however,  sent shock waves
through the nation.  Of the 313 total seats in the assembly,
the Awami  League  took  167, a solid majority, all from the
East.  Mr. Bhutto's party took 85 seats, all in the west. 9/
The  Islamic  parties  of  the  old  elite  were  decisively
defeated  in both wings, and with this defeat went any hopes
the old elite and the army had of influencing the actions of
the  assembly.  With  a  parliamentary  majority  the  Awami
League  did not need the army or the old traditional parties
to win   support  for   a  draft  constitution  reflecting the
Bengali   concept  of   autonomy within Pakistani  federation.
Admittedly, President Yahya would have final approval of the
constitution,  but  the  results  of  the  election  clearly
reflected an overwhelming demand  for reform.  The President
could draw little comfort from the  opposition of Ali Bhutto
in the Assembly.  The Peoples Party was  equally  anxious to
draft a constitution which limited the traditional powers of
the army  and  the  Moslem  elites.  Again  power  was split
between the two geographic regions of the nation. 10/
     The strong position of  the Awami League persuaded many
supporters that there need be no retreat from the  manifesto
adopted  four   years  earlier  demanding  virtual  economic
sovereignty for  East Pakistan.  This degree of autonomy was
unacceptable to  the  military  government  as  well  as Ali
Bhutto's party.  There was stalemate again.
     The military government of  General  Yahya was  highly
centralized but not particularly sensitive to  the political
currents of the civil population.  Senior officers  held key
positions  in  both  the  civil  and military administrative
systems.   These  systems  were  largely  parallel and often
competitive for  power.  At  the top, Yahya held the offices
of Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, Chief Martial Law
Administrator, President  and Supreme Commander, Minister of
Defense   and    Minister    of    foreign   Affairs.  Yahya
theoritically had  enormous  scope  for  initiative, but the
elite of  the army had considerable power which Yahya had to
take into account along with the political factions  of  the
country.  Within the army, opinion generally belonged in one
of three  positions:  the  center, including Yahya, hoped to
transfer power  to a civil government headed by Sheikh Mujib
(Awami League) while  retaining  a  special position for the
armed forces;  the  right,  including  many senior officers,
hoped to retain the power of the armed  forces  and  opposed
any move  toward  more  autonomy  of  the  provinces and the
social policies of Mr. Bhutto's People's Party; finally, the
left, including  many  junior  officers,  combined  a strong
nationalist feeling with  social  opinion leaning toward Mr.
Bhutto's party.  The  left  and  the  right  grew  toward  a
consensus  opposed  to any concession to  the  Awami  League
which would weaken the power of the central government. 11/
     General  Yahya appears to have been unable to reconcile
the  widely  differing  views both within the armed services
and   the    various  political  factions.  Although  Sheikhs
Mujib's party had decisively won  the election and therefore
felt it  had  the  right to form the national government, it
could  do  nothing until the President called  the  assembly
into  session.  This  Yahya  refused  to do until the Sheikh
softened  his  stand  on autonomy as  stated  in  the  Awami
Leaguer's manifesto.  The League,  sensing  power, refused to
give any  concession.  Talks between President Yahya, Bhutto
and  the  Sheikh  continued  through  January  1971, but  no
agreement was reached.  Finally, on February 13, 1971  Yahya
summoned  the  Assembly  to  meet on  March 3, 1971.  Bhutto
immediately  announced  his  party,  with  85  seats,  would
boycott the  session  unless all parties reached a consensus
on  an  outline  constitution  before  the Assembly met.  On
March 1, 1971, President Yahya agreed with  Mr.  Bhutto  and
announced   that   the   Assembly   session   was  postponed
indefinitely. 12/
     The postponement of  the  Assembly session was followed
by  widescale  rioting    and demonstrations  throughout  East
Pakistan.  Sheikh Mujib   called  a series of general strikes
to demonstrate  that  East  Pakistan  would  be ungovernable
unless  the  Assembly  was  called into session. 13/  It  is
unlikely that the civil  disorder  came as a surprise to the
government   for  it  had  been  reinforcing  the   military
garrisons  in  East  Pakistan since  mid-February.  However,
throughout March, Yahya  and  Mujib engaged in a complicated
series of negotiations in which some  concessions were made.
But on March 25, 1971, Yahya  suddenly  broke  off talks and
left for  Islamabad.  At  the  same time the army, which had
been brought up  to  strength  of  40,000 in the East, moved
against  the Bengali police, Bengali-manned army  units  and
other paramilitary forces.  Sheikh Mujib  was arrested along
with  many  other  Awami League leaders.  Newspaper  offices
were seized and university halls attacked and  occupied.  It
seemed that Yahya had used the last session of  negotiations
as pretext  to  allow  time for the army to be brought up to
sufficient strength to overwhelm Bengali opposition. 14/
     The drive for political and  economic  autonomy  of the
Bengali people  entered  a  new  phase.  The  efforts to win
power through the  election process and parliamentary system
were a complete failure.   The  central  military government
was incapable of reconciling the aspirations of the Bengalis
with social reform pressures of the West Pakistanis  and the
traditional elitism  of the Urdu-speaking Moslems.  Military
repression of the Bengali nationalist movement followed.
     The Bengali Moslems had a common religion with the Urdu-
speaking  Moslems  of  the  West,  but  social and political
traditions, as  well  as  language  and  economic base, were
quite  different.  When Pakistan was formed  as  an  Islamic
nation  in  1947, there was no consensus  on  the  form  its
political institutions  should  take.  The  Moslem states in
the   West   were   governed  by  traditional  elitists  who
considered strong  federal  government essential to preserve
Islamic ideals.  The Bengali Moslems' aspirations  for  more
democratic  institutions  responsive  to  regional  politics
would not be accommodated by those in the West.  At the same
time, demands for social reform in the West by lower-classes
went unheeded.
     After more  than  ten years of political stalemate, the
armed forces,  in particular the army, seized power to break
the  political deadlock.  The  officers  of  the  army  were
largely drawn from the traditional Moslem elite of the West.
Their  administration  was highly centralized and emphasized
the economic development as well as the  social  welfare  of
the  West  and the Urdu-speaking traditional Moslems.   This
administration only added to the frustration of the Bengalis
who  increasingly saw  East  Pakistan  as  an  economic  and
cultural colony of the West.  Indeed,  the poorer classes of
people of  the  West also became increasingly disaffected as
they received  little  benefit  from the economic and social
policies  of  the army administration.  By  1971,  after  12
years of  military  rule,  Pakistan  was  even  further from
political unity than it was in 1958.
     The years of  military  rule  also  had  a  deleterious
effect  on  military  capability.  Government administration
detracted from the professional education of the officers as
well  as  the  combat  training of  the  army  as  a  whole.
Political   factions appeared  in    the  army  which  probably
detracted   from  the  cooperation    and trust essential to an
effective military  force.  When  open  conflict  erupted in
March  1971,  the armed forces were  forced  to  disarm  and
remove Bengali officers and men.  These  actions  must  have
had  a  serious negative effect on  the  efficiency  of  the
services' war fighting capability.
     In  summary,  the common religion of  Islam  could  not
overcome   the  deep  divisions  of   geography,  culture   and
political   goals.  Pakistan  moved   toward insurrection   and
war.
                          ENDNOTES
                         (Chapter I)
     1/ Robert Jackson, South Asian Crisis:  India,
Pakistan and Bangla Desh.  (New York:  Praeger, 1975)
p. 9.
     2/ Ibid., p. 10.
     3/ Ibid., p. 14.
     4/ Ibid., p. 15.
     5/ Ibid., p. 16.
     6/ Ibid., p. 18.
     7/ John G. Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War, 3rd ed.,
(New York, St. Martin's Press, 1982), p.
     8/ Jackson, pp. 22-23.
     9/ Ibid., p. 24.
    10/ Robert LaPorte Jr.  "Pakistan 1971:  The Disinte-
gration of a nation," Asian Survey.  12, No. 2 (Feb 1972),
p. 100.
    11/ Jackson, pp. 25-27.
    12/ LaPorte, p. 100; Jackson, pp. 27-28.
    13/ Jackson, p. 28.
    14/ Ibid., p. 33.
                        CHAPTER II
                  REBELLION AND REPRESSION
     When Pakistan's army  struck  on the night of March 25,
1971, all Awami League leaders were arrested, killed or fled
into exile to India.  Sheikh Mujib was arrested and flown to
West   Pakistan  to  await  trial  on  unspecified  charges.
President  Yahya  stated in a radio broadcast the  next  day
that  the  Sheikh's  "action of starting his non-cooperation
movement is an act of  treason." 1/ Disorder and confusion
reigned in  Dacca  and  other  parts of East Pakistan.  Many
civilians were killed as  the army struck violently to clear
barricades in the cities.  The Dacca University  was shelled
and occupied; this resulted in many casualties.   Police and
Bengali soldiers  in  Dacca  were  disarmed and detained. 2/
The army became an army of West Pakistanis and was viewed by
Bengalis as an occupying force.
     Outside  Dacca  the  army attacked Bengali officers and
men of the armed forces.  The army  then moved against other
paramilitary   organizations  such  as  the  police,  border
security forces and the militia.  In some cases, the attacks
lasted several days but almost  everywhere  there were heavy
Bengali  casualties  and destruction.  The Bengali military
and police  units  were scattered throughout the country and
many members began to withdraw toward the borders sabotaging
bridges and  rail  links  where  possible.  The actions were
brutal  and  had  elements  of  a  cultural  war:  the  army
attacked Bengalis, while  Bengalis  murdered  members of the
Urdu-speaking minorities.   By  the  end  of April 1971, the
army  had  secured  the  major towns in  East  Pakistan  and
organized resistance ceased.  However,  the  nucleus  of  an
armed and trained guerrilla force had escaped into India and
to remote areas on the border.   At  the border Indian units
welcomed the  fleeing  Bengalis  but India played no part in
the resistance at that time. 4/  As  April  drew to a close,
the  attack  by  West  Pakistan  on  the  Eastern  wing  had
successfully stopped  the  immediate  possibility  of  armed
revolt.   However,  the population was subdued but remained
passively hostile.  The  army reacted to this hostility with
increasing brutality and   destruction  of  civilian property
continued.  Civilian refugees began to pour into India.
     As news of the uprising and repression in East Pakistan
spread in India, there  was  considerable public pressure on
the Indian Government to  intervene.  On March 29, 1971, the
Indian parliament  passed a resolution pledging sympathy and
support for the people of  East Bengal in their struggle for
the   transfer   of    power    to   their   legally-elected
representatives.   The  parliament expressed confidence that
"... the  historic  upsurge  of  75  million  people of East
Bengal  will  triumph." 5/  This  resolution  represented  a
change in Indian  policy toward Pakistan.  Previously, India
had respected the  unity of Pakistan in order to protect her
own unity,  which  had  been  also  threatened  by  regional
factions and demands for autonomy.
     Indian  support  to  the  rebels in the following weeks
consisted  of  assisting voluntary efforts to help the  East
Pakistan cause and of encouraging escaped Bengalis to form a
provisional  government.  India,  however,  withheld  formal
recognition  of  this  government-in-exile.  These  cautious
actions  were  probably  the  result of military advice that
India would not be prepared  for  military action till after
the monsoon season ended in September. 6/
     In  response  to  India's statement of support for the
Bengalis, Pakistan protested  that  India was interfering in
Pakistan's  internal affairs.  The apparent object  of  this
diplomatic effort  was  to  gain  international  support  to
oppose any  Indian  intervention.  But  on  April  2,  1971,
Russia publicly appealed  to  Yahya to quickly put an end to
the repression in East Pakistan.  Islamabad replied that the
situation  was  under  control  and normal routine was being
established.  Also on that date, the United States expressed
concern for  the  human  suffering  and  the need for multi-
national assistance.  President Nixon was probably concerned
that  the balance of power in Asia would be upset and he was
anxious not  to  jeopardize  the  effort  to  develop closer
relations with China.  7/  The U.S. needed a stable Asia and
support  of  China  to implement the planned withdrawal from
Vietnam.
     Although slow  in  coming,  on April 13 China expressed
support for President Yahya's efforts.   Chou  En-lai stated
that should India attack Pakistan, China would fully support
the  Pakistani  people  and government to  safeguard  "State
Sovereignty"  and national independence.  The  phrasing  was
important as it did not state full support for the unity and
integrity  of  the  nation as Pakistan wanted.   From  April
onwards, China  provided  economic  and military assistance
appropriate  to   their    statement  of  support;  that  is,
sufficient to  guarantee   only  that in a war with India the
Western wing would survive, but not necessarily the  Eastern
wing.  Both  India  and the Soviet Union had  long  standing
disputes  with  China.  China's interests would be served by
continuing to  have Pakistan interposed between the U.S.S.R.
and India.  Should West Pakistan cease  to exist, then China
would be surrounded  by  unfriendly neighbors.  On the other
hand, continuing rivalry  between  Pakistan  and  India over
East Pakistan would divert India's attention  away  from her
border  with  China.  Thus  survival of  West  Pakistan  was
important to China, while the dispute in East Pakistan would
add to the rivalry between India and West Pakistan to ensure
that  India's  attention would be diverted from her Northern
border with China.
     At the United Nations, Secretary General U. Thant asked
Pakistan to allow  United  Nations relief agencies to act in
East Pakistan while  recognizing  that  the situation was an
internal matter of Pakistan.  President Yahya firmly refused
any outside  intervention. 9/  He probably believed that his
policy of counter-insurgency was  sufficient  to reestablish
control.
     By May 1971, organized resistance in  East Pakistan had
been  crushed.  Pakistan  diplomacy  appeared successful  as
most  countries  viewed  the affair as an internal  problem.
However, the flow of refugees into  India  had  turned  to a
flood.  India  claimed  that  the  refugees  (mostly Bengali
Moslems)  were  arriving  at  a  rate  of 60,000 per day and
now  totaled  1.5 million.  These people moved  mostly  into
West Bengal and were costly to  India  in food and clothing;
furthermore, they were causing a severe economic dislocation
in  a  province  already  impoverished.  In  this situation,
India could do little more than provide indirect  support to
the   Bengali  government-in-exile  and  provide  sanctuary,
training and arms for the guerrilla forces.  Diplomatically,
India stressed that  whether  or  not  the  problem  was  an
internal one  for  Pakistan,  the  refugees were becoming an
internal problem for India:   Pakistan  must  be responsible
for  developing  conditions  for  the  safe  return  of  the
refugees. 10/
     India's   diplomatic  efforts  began  to  get  results.
Britain and  the  United States declared no new aid would be
extended  to  Pakistan until  the  government  in  Islamabad
cooperated  with  international  relief  agencies;  however,
United   States   aid   already  approved  would   continue.
Pakistan's  economy  was  weak.  There  was  a  shortage  of
foreign exchange  and  exports from East Pakistan had slowed
significantly. 11/  Pakistan  needed  aid  and  needed  the
return of the economic base of East Pakistan.
     Thus in mid-May Pakistan informed the United Nations of
its willingness to  accept  relief  aid  if the activity was
coordinated  by Pakistani officials.  Within  a  week  Yahya
appealed to  the  refugees  to return and announced he would
soon reveal a plan for the  orderly transfer of power to the
representatives  of  the people.  Refugee reception  centres
were set  up  and  a  general amnesty announced on June 10,
1971.   The shift  in Pakistani policy eased tensions in East
Pakistan.   Many  influential  members  of  the Awami League
signed a declaration accepting the concept of national unity
and supporting the reintroduction  of  separate  electorates
for Hindus  and  Moslems.  To gain support of the right-wing
factions of the army, Yahya proposed that a new constitution
be  drafted  by  a  committee  of experts  rather  than  the
National  Assembly.  Although  India now reported more  than
six million refugees, the flow slowed considerably  and  she
was being pressured to  accept  international assistance for
the repatriation of refugees. 12/
     By   June,  India  had  become  distrustful  of  United
Nations'  actions  to  repatriate  refugees.  When  Pakistan
shifted ground to accommodate United Nations' actions, India
rejected the proposal for  posting  United Nations observers
on  her border. 13/  India was probably concerned that  East
Pakistan would  return  to  the  pre-crisis  situation  with
little or  no gain toward self-determination of East Bengal.
Public opinion  in  India's turbulent eastern provinces also
favored severing  Pakistan's  link  with  East  Bengal as an
opportunity to weaken  a dangerous enemy.  India, therefore,
insisted that Pakistan must come to a political solution  of
the  crisis  founded  on  self-determination for East Bengal
before  social  and economic aid should be extended.  On the
other hand,  the  United Nations' approach was to put social
and economic recovery in place before a  political  solution
should be  attempted.  The  United  States clearly supported
the U.N. approach which would return the South Asian balance
of power to the pre-crisis condition.
     During May  and  June,  leaders of the Awami League who
had  fled  to  India  continued  to  develop the Bangla Desh
movement  (as they now called East Pakistan) politically and
militarily.  The government-in-exile was nominally headed by
Sheikh  Mujib,  but because he  was  under  arrest  in  West
Pakistan,  the  real  head  was  Tajuddin  Ahmid,  the prime
minister. 14/
     The stated goal  of  the  movement was the independence
of  East  Pakistan; its unannounced objective  was  to  gain
political power for the Awami League. 15/  To this end,  the
government-in-exile  tried  to exclude Bengalis representing
left-wing and communist movements.   The government-in-exile
remained composed principally  of  Awami  League members but
its  military  arm,  the Mukti Fanj, eventually incorporated
armed groups organized by other political factions. 16/
     The  government-in-exile  pursued three broad strategic
programs to achieve its goal.  These were:
     (a)  organizing  the support of the population of  East
Pakistan;
     (b) gaining favorable international support; and,
     (c)  disrupting  the  economic  strength  of   Pakistan
through  attacks  on  the  lines  of  communication  in East
Pakistan.
     To  translate  the  disaffection  of  the Bengalis into
supportive  action   for   the   Bangla  Desh  movement,  an
underground was organized to publicize its goals.  Insurgent
propaganda emphasized  the  atrocities of the Pakistani army
and described the  army as an occupation force restoring the
colonial  rule of West Pakistan.  This program succeeded  to
get  support   in   the   form  of  volunteers  as  well  as
information,  supplies  and concealment in the rural  areas.
In  the urban areas, the Bengalis were encouraged to boycott
schools,  offices  and  factories   to    further  disrupt  the
economy.  The  insurgents  also    used    terror   tactics  to
intimidate civil servants and factory managers to keep their
facilities closed.  Furthermore, Bengali leaders  who openly
supported Pakistan unity or collaborated with  the army were
assassinated selectively to discourage others. 17/
     To  influence  the  international  community,  the main
effort emphasized recognition for the Bangla Desh government-
in-exile.  Many  Bengalis  who    were  with Pakistani foreign
missions defected and set about    publicizing  the legitimacy
of  the   Bangla  Desh     movement.  Although  not  initially
successful in  obtaining formal recognition, these diplomats
developed popular sympathy for the Bangla Desh movement.
     The Mukti Fanj was used  primarily in an offensive role
to attack the lines of  communication  and  to  disrupt  the
military and  economic   strength  of  East  Pakistan.   The
monsoon season of  June  to  September  favored   guerrilla
tactics.  Two-thirds   of  the  country  was  water  soaked
limiting mobility  to  roads, railways and river craft.  The
roads  and railways ran close to the border,  crossing  many
bridges  vulnerable    to  attack.  The  India-East  Pakistan
border itself was  1,400  miles  long  with  no    natural
obstacles.  The interior of  East  Pakistan could be reached
easily by guerrillas from the border area by river and delta
channels. 18/
     The Mukti  Fanj  mounted  small,  deep raids from their
sanctuaries   in   India   and   remote   border   enclaves.
Detachments of  the  Pakistani  army  were  attacked causing
casualties  which  were  duly reported by the foreign press.
These reports conflicted with Pakistani claims that the area
was under control and thus tended to undermine international
support for Pakistan.  However, the attack on communications
was   much   more  successful  and  had  immediate  effects.
Railways were largely inoperable beyond 30  to 50 miles from
Dacca.  Roads  were  cut  isolating the principal towns  and
ports.  The Pakistani army was left  isolated  in  the urban
areas while the major export crops of jute and tea could not
be moved from the rural areas to markets. 19/
     As  July   closed,   the  military  situation  in  East
Pakistan was  worsening.  The  monsoon  was restricting army
mobility while  the  Mukti  Fanj  (renamed the Mukti Bahini)
mounted  an  increasing  number  of  small  raids  aimed  at
sabotage  and  terror.  The   army  was  forced  to  conduct
viscious  counter-insurgent  tactics  which   increased  the
hostility of the disaffected population.
     After  a  lull in June, refugees in large numbers again
poured into India.  President Yahya continued  to  press for
the United Nations to force India to withdraw her support to
the Bangla  Desh  rebels  and  to decrease border tension to
induce more refugees to return home.  He also stated that if
India  tried  to seize a base in  East  Pakistan  for  rebel
operations there would be general war.  This was followed by
reports  of  Pakistani  military  build-up  along  the  West
Pakistan border with India. 20/
     Pakistani diplomacy at the United Nations, supported by
the U.S.  was having an effect.  U Thant recommended raising
substantial relief  aid  for  East  Pakistan.  The resources
would be  allocated  for the refurbishment of transportation
systems   as  well  as  food  and clothing.   India  remained
opposed   to  this  plan  as  well  as  the U.N. proposal for
representatives  on  the  border  to  facilitate passage  of
refugees back  to East Pakistan.  It is now clear that India
was determined  to  see East Pakistan independence and would
not  agree to any measures which increased  West  Pakistan's
strength there.  By  continuing  to  support the Bangla Desh
movement, India  was  becoming  increasingly isolated at the
U.N.  Her  policy  also  implied  eventual  direct  military
intervention since she could not support the enormous number
of refugees  and  ignore  public  support  for  intervention
indefinitely. 21/
     Up to the end of  July,  the  Soviet Union had tried to
maintain a  balanced  approach  to  India and Pakistan in an
effort  to  increase  her  influence  on the  sub-continent.
However, when  the  United  States  and  China  moved toward
closer  mutual  relations  and  both supported the Pakistani
position, Moscow  concluded  Treaty of Peace, Friendship and
Cooperation with  New  Delhi  on  August  9.  The Treaty had
little effect  on  India militarily, but it gave support for
her position  at  the  United Nations Security Council.  The
Soviet  Union  opposed  every  proposal  for  any   kind  of
intervention which might allow  Pakistan  to get a political
settlement  unacceptable   to   India,  i.e.,  denial  self-
determination for the people of East Pakistan.  22/
     During August,  President Yahya continued to try to win
some support  within the population of East Pakistan as well
as satisfy the "hard-liners" in West Pakistan.  On August 9,
Yahya announced that Awami  League members who would support
Pakistani unity  would be allowed to take their seats in the
National Assembly, while the remainder of the unfilled seats
would be filled by by-elections to  be held at end-November.
About half  the  Awami  League delegates elected in December
1970  signed  a document agreeing to this move.  Yahya  also
announced that Sheikh Mujib would be tried by military court
on charges  of  "waging  war  against  Pakistan."  These two
proposals were a key compromise of the political factions of
Pakistan. 23/
     In  September  more  positive  aspects  of Yahya's plan
emerged.  General Tikka Khan,  who  was  the prime proponent
for military repression, was replaced  as  Governor  of East
Pakistan by a civilian, and  press censorship was officially
lifted.  On September 5, a  general  amnesty  was granted to
all  civilians and members of the armed  forces  alleged  to
have committed crimes since March 1.  A number of detainees,
mostly  politicians  aligned  with  the  Awami  League  were
released. 24/  These moves were countered by the government-
in-exile which remained committed to complete  independence.
the Mukti  Bahini  intensified  its  propaganda aimed at the
Bengali population.  As  well,  assassinations of candidates
standing for election were increased.  For  her  part, India
would not provide assistance for refugees wanting to  return
to East Pakistan.  These actions  were largely successful in
discouraging any popular Bengali support for the authorities
in Dacca and Islamabad.   Candidates  failed to stand for 18
out of 78 seats of the Assembly available and no significant
number of refugees returned from India. 25/
     India also increased its support to  the  Mukti  Bahini
military  operations by providing artillery fire across  the
border for  the  guerrillas  and stopping the Pakistani army
from pursuing  them into Indian territory.  With their lines
of withdrawal more secure  the  guerrillas  undertook deeper
raids into East Pakistan  to destroy bridges, roads and army
posts.  The increased military activity put further pressure
on the army to repress the actions and divereted effort from
rebuilding the economy and reestablishing civil order.
     On October 12, Pakistan proposed to  India mutual troop
withdrawals and posting of  United  Nations observers in the
border areas.  Although India  refused,  Pakistan went ahead
and  withdrew its army to  stronger  positions  10-12  miles
behind the  border.  26/  This  action was indicative of the
success  of  the guerrillas in  their  attacks  against  the
isolated Pakistani outposts.
     At  the  same  time Pakistani diplomacy emphasized  the
requirement for United Nations action to restrain India from
supporting the rebels  of East Pakistan.  Pakistan continued
to argue that India was interfering in her internal affairs.
New Delhi's position was that the problem was not an "India-
Pakistan"  problem,   but   strictly  a  Pakistani  one  for
Islamabad to correct.  Therefore, United Nations' action was
inappropriate   Pakistan had only  to  create  conditions in
East Pakistan of  peace  and  security  for  the refugees to
return   home.  27/  While  New  Dehli's  argument   had   a
legalistic logic,  it  must  have  been  clear that Pakistan
could  not  create  conditions  of   peace   while  fighting
guerrillas  armed and trained in India.  India obviously had
little desire to see East Pakistan survive  as a province of
her rival in Islamabad.
     While the Soviet  Union  consistently  supported Indian
positions at the United Nations, in October Moscow pressured
New Delhi to soften her policy on  Bangla Desh independence.
As  a  result,  the  Indian Foreign Minister announced  that
India was committed only to  a political solution acceptable
to  the  already  elected  representative  of East Pakistan.
With  many  of these representatives in exile, their leader,
Sheikh Mujib,  under  arrest  in West Pakistan it would have
been unreasonable that  these  representatives  would demand
anything less than political automony for East Pakistan.  In
any case,  President  Yahya  refused to negotiate with them.
India returned to her previous position of  demanding  self-
determination  for  Bangla  Desh.  New  Delhi  had   won   a
propaganda  victory   and  persuaded  the  Soviet  Union  to
continue  to  support  her,  all  without  any  material  or
political cost.
     While  Pakistan  probably  could  have  restored  order
eventually in East Pakistan, President Yahya realized he had
little hope  of  prevailing  without  outside  help if India
invaded there.   He,  therefore,  tried  to persuade China to
increase  her  commitment to the security of  all  Pakistan:
this the  Chinese  refused to do.  Peking remained committed
to support  Pakistan  only  to the extent required to ensure
the  survival  of West Pakistan as a nation.  Despite public
pronouncements  from  Islamabad  that China would supply all
the weapons  Pakistan  would  need in a future conflict with
India, the Indians never appeared to be in  any  doubt as to
the  true nature of China's commitment.  When  war  came  in
December, several  Indian  divisions were withdrawn from the
Sino-Indian border and moved into East Pakistan. 28/
     As  November  drew to a close, Pakistan could no longer
tolerate  Indian   military  actions  in  the  border  area.
Shelling  and  tank fire from the Indian army  continued  to
inflict casualties  on  Pakistani  posts and provide support
guerrilla operations.   Islamabad  viewed  the  conflict  as
India's  responsibility  and this was endorsed by the United
States  who, on November 30,  suspended  licenses  for  arms
exports to India. 29/   On December 3, 1971, Pakistan struck
India with  air  and  ground  attacks across the border from
West Pakistan.
     The period from  March  to  September was marked by the
rapid deterioration  of  the  political  situation  in  East
Pakistan.  When    confronted  by  demands   of  the   elected
representatives   of  the  Awani   League   for  economic  and
political  automony,  the  central  military  government  in
Islamabad reacted  with  a  ruthless  and  brutal repression
which  ultimately   failed.  Islamabad   appears   to   have
seriously underestimated the  strength  and the organization
of  the   Bengali  nationalist movement embodied in the Awami
League.   Faced with the arrest of over half  its leadership,
the remaining Awami  League leaders went into exile in India
with  even  firmer resolve to win independence.  From  there
they were able  to  quickly transform the party organization
into  a credible government-in-exile with a military arm  to
prosecute guerrilla warfare.  The  actions  of the Islamabad
government worked to the advantage of the Bengali resistance
by providing the elements of a successful revolution.
     By  arresting and detaining Bengali  leaders  Islamabad
indicated  to  the  world  at  large  and the  Bengalis,  in
particular, that no political compromise was  possible.  The
ruthless and brutal purge of Bengalis from  the armed forces
succeeded  in   sending  a   trained and  dedicated  cadre  of
soldiers into   exile  in    India where they were available to
the  Bangla  Desh government-in-exile as  a  cadre  for  the
guerrilla  force.  At  the  same  time,  Pakistani  military
operations  caused  such  destruction  and  intimidation  of
civilians that  millions  also fled to India where they were
available  and  willing to support the Bangla Desh movement.
Little  attempt   was  made  by    the  Pakistan government  to
encourage these   refugees   to   return  home.  It is possible
that the Islamabad government consciously  followed a policy
of forcing large numbers of civilians out  of  East Pakistan
in  order  to  reduce the population to below that  of  West
Pakistan.  This would ensure that in future governments West
Pakistan  would  hold  a majority of seats in  the  National
Assembly and could protect its  privileged  position  in the
nation.  In any case, these  destitute  refugees  provided a
large   pool   of   manpower  opposing  the  West  Pakistani
government.
     India saw the conflict as an opportunity to  weaken her
major rival in South Asia.  Pakistan had humiliated India in
the war over Kashmir in 1965.  India at that time had had to
divide her  forces  between  East and West while maintaining
considerable forces  on her northern border with China.  New
Delhi was determined to  not  be defeated again by Pakistan.
Breaking  East Pakistan from the  remainder  of  the  nation
would   greatly   simplify  her   defense   problem.  India,
therefore, adopted  the policy of supporting the Bangla Desh
movement while preparing her own armed forces for  war  with
Pakistan should intervention be necessary.  The independence
of  East  Pakistan was pursued consistently and  with  skill
throughout the period.
     Indian  public  opinion largely supported  New  Delhi's
policy.   The burden of millions of refugees in India's most
populous and  impoverished  region  was  costly  and  caused
social unrest.  Furthermore,  most Indians saw Pakistan as a
threat which would lead to war eventually in any case.
     When India's goal appeared in danger  of being thwarted
by United Nations' intervention, New Delhi quickly found the
necessary Security  Council veto by concluding a treaty with
the  Soviet  Union.  This  treaty did not place any military
obligation on  either  party,  but only pledged cooperation.
For  the Soviet Union the treaty demonstrated to  the  world
its increasing influence in South Asia while  for  India the
treaty gave her what she needed most --  an  ally  with veto
power in the Security Council.
     The  Awami  League  which formed the leadership of  the
Bangla  Desh movement was thus provided  all  the  essential
elements to prosecute its guerrilla war for the independence
of East  Pakistan.  The league had safe havens in India from
which to organize politically  and  militarily.  The  arrest
and detention of the popular leader,  Sheikh Mujib, provided
tangible and symbolic evidence of  the  persecution  of  the
Bengalis by the West Pakistani.  The widespread destruction
of personal  property and the economic deterioration in East
Pakistan gave the Bangla Desh  movement  an enormous pool of
manpower  willing to resist the Pakistani authorities.   The
Bengali  soldiers  who  had  escaped  formed  a  trained and
dedicated  nucleus  for  a  guerrilla  force.  Finally,  the
support of India in  form  of arms and  training allowed the
guerrillas to move to the offensive quickly and effectively.
     By  December,  it  became apparent to Islamabad that it
was not  regaining control of East Pakistan.  The guerrillas
were striking deeply into East Pakistan in greater strength.
India was  deploying  raids  across  her  border  with  East
Pakistan to  support  the  guerrillas.  Pakistan, therefore,
mounted  an attack on December 3 aimed at destroying as much
Indian combat power  as  possible  before  she  herself  was
attacked by India.
                          ENDNOTES
                        (Chapter II)
     1/ "Presidents Broadcast," Pakistan Affairs, Special
Issue, (Washington), No. 18, March 31, 1971.
     2/ Robert Laporte Jr.  "Pakistan 1971:  The Disin-
tegration of a Nation," Asian Survey, 12, No. 2 (February
1972), p. 102.
     3/ Robert Jackson, South Asian Crisis:  India, Pakis-
tan and Bangla Desh, (New York, Praeger, 1975), pp. 34-35.
     4/ Ibid., p. 35.
     5/ Bangla Desh Documents, (New Dehli:  Government of
India, 1971), p. 672.
     6/ Jackson, p. 38.
     7/ Ibid., p. 42.
     8/ Ibid., p. 173.
     9/ Ibid., p. 43.
    10/ David H. Bayley, "India:  War and Political Asset-
tion,"  Asian Survey, Vol. 12, No. 2., February 1972, p. 91.
    11/ Jackson, p. 48.
    12/ Ibid., pp. 52-54.
    13/ Ibid., p. 61.
    14/ M. Rashiduzzaman, "Leadership, Organization, Stra-
tegies and Tactics of the Bangla Desh Movement," Asian
Survey, Vol. 12, No. 3, March 1972, p. 187.
    15/ Ibid, p. 193.
    16/ Jackson, p. 57.
    17/ Rashiduzzaman, p. 195.
    18/ Jackson, p. 59.
    19/ Rashiduzzaman, p. 196.  See also Chopra, p. 59
and Jackson, pp. 60-61.
    20/ Jackson, p. 68.
    21/ Ibid., p. 69.
    22/ Ibid., p. 73.
    23/ Ibid., p. 80.
    24/ Ibid., p. 81.
    25/ Rashiduzzaman, p. 198.
    26/ Jackson, p. 92.
    27/  Ibid., p. 82
    26/  Ibid., p. 96.
    29/  Stroessinger, Why Nations Go to War, 3d ed., St.
Martin's Press.  New York, 1982, p. 134.
                        CHAPTER III
             THE 14-DAY WAR:  3-16 DECEMBER 1971
     When  general  war  opened  on  December  3,  India and
Pakistan   had   unequal  military  capacities.  India   had
developed an   arms  industry  with aid from the Soviet Union
and the  West  which  was capable of producing major weapons
such  as tanks and aircraft.  India also  had  received  and
continued to have access to military equipment from  Moscow.
On  the  other  hand,  Pakistan's  industry  was  much  less
developed.   She had been unable to get arms when cut-off by
the  West  and Russia in  the  summer  of  1971.  China  had
provided  military supplies, but these could not redress the
imbalance. 1/
     The  relative  strengths of the armed forces of the two
countries are shown in Table 1.  It must be noted that India
maintained considerable  army  forces guarding the Himalayan
border with  China  which  reduced  the forces available for
combat with Pakistan. 2/
     Early in the counter-insurgency phase of  the conflict,
Pakistan  had purged Bangali units from  the  armed  forces.
Many  Bengalis  who belonged to predominantly West  Pakistan
units had defected:  those who remained were not trusted and
the combat  effectiveness  of  Pakistani units suffered as a
result.  The  Pakistan  Air  Force  (PAF)  was  particularly
affected because many of the ground crew had been Bengali.
Click here to view image
     The  officer  corps of all three Pakistani services had
been politicized,  especially  at the general officer level,
by  years  of  military  government.  The need for political
balance in  the  government  often overrode the requirements
for ability  in  many  senior  military  appointments.  This
resulted in poor leadership and incompetence as well as lack
of cohesion and trust.  By 1971,  the chiefs-of-staff system
had been modified so as to be almost unrecognizable.   Yahya
Khan  retained control of army operations in addition to his
duties  as  President  and  supreme  Commander  of  all  the
services.   The   structure   was   overly  centralized  and
dominated by the army.  Not surprisingly, communications and
cooperation  were  poor  between  General  Headquarters  co-
located  with the army at Rawalpindi, and the PAF  and  navy
located at Peshawar and Karachi respectively. 3/
     The  Indian  system emphasized the distinction  between
government and the armed services.  Each  service  had equal
status and was  controlled  by  a  civilian  minister of the
cabinet responsible  to parliament.  The service chiefs were
members  of a chief-of-staff committee.   A  joint  planning
staff provided coordination.  This system was well-suited to
respond to civilian management. 4/
     Pakistan's   strategy   tried  to  involve  the  United
Nations to  prevent  India from intervening militarily.  But
when it became apparent that this strategy could not prevent
war,  Pakistan   attacked  from  the  West.  Yahya  probably
considered East Pakistan indefensible  in  the long run, but
he  hoped  to  gain  sufficient Indian territory in the West
which  could  be  traded for East Pakistan territory in  the
negotiations following  the  cease-fire.  The land battle in
the West was thus crucial for Pakistan.
     Indian  strategy  was  to  act  quickly  in the East to
decisively  defeat  Pakistani forces there  while  defending
Indian territory  in  the  West.  This  strategy reduced the
danger of China intervening as  it  clearly did not threaten
the existence of West Pakistan. 5/  A quick decision  in the
East  would  ensure  an  independent  nation  in East Bengal
before international  action  could be mobilized to separate
the Indian and  Pakistani  armies  there  and  preclude  the
decision India sought.
     When the PAF struck at 1747  on  December  3,  Pakistan
attempted to  disable the superior Indian Air Force (IAF) by
a  preemptive  strike.  Airfields  at   Amritsar,  Srinagar,
Avantipur, Pathankot  and  Faridkot  were attacked; however,
the strike failed to  achieve  any significant success.  The
IAF had dispersed their aircraft to hardened  shelters  on a
large  number  of  airfields  where  only a direct hit could
damage them.  The  late  afternoon  forced  the attack to be
brief as  it  could  not be sustained in darkness.  Not only
were too few airfields struck for too short a time, but only
30  percent  of   the  available  aircraft  were  used.  The
aircraft may  have  had  a low serviceability or the PAF may
have  attempted  to save aircraft since they  could  not  be
easily replaced.  In any  case,  from this raid onwards, the
IAF dominated the air-war. 6/   On  December 4, the IAF flew
over  500  sorties  on  tactical  and strategic  targets  in
Pakistan.  In 14 days of war, the Western Air Command of IAF
alone  flew  over  4,000  sorties. 7/  The  IAF  claimed  94
aircraft,  while  the PAF  claimed 81.  This  air  campaign
demonstrated again  the value of mass and boldness:  the IAF
influenced  the  war  significantly  with  relatively  small
losses while  the  PAF  flew  far fewer sorties with greater
losses and less effect. 8/
     The  border between West Pakistan and India followed no
natural  topographical feature, but it had been inherited on
the basis  of  the  old  pre-1947  borders.  There  Pakistan
deployed ten infantry  divisions,  two  armoured  divisions,
various brigades and  almost  all  its combat aircraft.  The
general deployments  are  shown in Appendix I.  The order of
battle  of  the Indians has not been disclosed, but  it  was
probably comparable. 9/
     On  December  3,  the  Pakistani  26  Infantry  Brigade
attacked east  from Kahuta toward Punch in northern Kashmir.
They had made  virtually  no  progress against Indian ground
defenses  and  heavy  air  attacks  when the  offensive  was
terminated two days later.  On December 9,  a  second attack
toward Punch was again thwarted by IAF bombing.  The Indians
then  made a series of small attacks which  secured  several
Pakistani  posts  north and west of Punch.  Further north in
the area of Kargil, the Indians secured  all  the  Pakistani
outposts  which  overlooked the Zoji La Pass.  These actions
were conducted  at  night at elevations above 16,000 feet at
sub-zero temperatures. 10/
     To  the  south,  the  area of Chhamb was  an  important
communication link  to  all  parts of Kashmir.  The II (Pak)
corps attacked  on  December  3  with  four infantry and one
armored brigade  with  eight artillery regiments in support.
After four  days,  they  had succeeded in driving two Indian
infantry  battalions   out  of  their  prepared  defense  to
positions  across  on  the east bank of  the  Munnawar  Tawi
River.   Two  days  later  the  Pakistanis  took the town of
Chhamb and  established a bridgehead on the east side of the
river.  On December 10 the Indians counter-attacked, sending
the Pakistanis back across the river.  In the next two days,
units of II (Pak) Corps recrossed the  river  two more times
only to be  forced  to  withdraw.  By  December 12, when the
sector stabilized, the Indians estimated they  had  lost  17
tanks  and  440 men killed while the Pakistanis had lost  36
tanks and 1350 men killed. 11/
     In the Punjab, the Sialkot-Shakargarh salient juts into
India.  The  Indians  launched  an attack there  to  relieve
pressure on  the  Chhamb area.  They attacked the salient on
two  axes:  one  from  the  north  to cut the  road  between
Shakargarh  and  Zafarwal,  the  other from  the  east  with
Shakargarh  as   the  objective.  Good  Pakistani  defensive
positions and extensive mining  made  progress  slow, but by
the  time of the cease-fire on December 16, the Indians  had
secured about 1000 square kilometers of the salient. 12/
     South  of  the  Shakargarh  salient in the area of Dera
Baba  Nanak  and  Fazilka,  the  Indians  expected  a  major
Pakistani offensive.  Both sides fought local engagements in
effort  to  gain  favorable  position.  However,   no  major
offensive was attempted.   Although  the  1  (Pak)  Armoured
Division was available to strike, lack of air cover probably
kept it from entering the battle. 13/
     Actions  in  the  Sind-Rajasthan  sector  were aimed  a
drawing strategic reserves of both sides down from the other
northern    sectors.  A  Pakistani  force   of  one infantry
brigade,   supported   by  a  reinforced  armoured regiment,
crossed the border near Ramgarh on December 4.  Without  air
cover, the Pakistanis were caught in the open  and  lost  an
estimated 34 tanks and 100 other vehicles  in one day before
withdrawing. 14/   On December 5, while Pakistani armour was
being destroyed north in the desert,  the  Indians  captured
Gadra and moved southwest on to Nagar Parkar and the Rann of
Kutch.  This  advance  had possibilities of cutting the main
north-south lines  of  communication  through  Hyderabad  to
Karachi.  Indian progress was  slow,  but by the time of the
cease-fire 11  days  later  they  had  advanced to Naya Chor
and  had  captured  4,700  square  kilometers  of  Pakistani
land. 15/  Its quite probable that the Indian advance in the
Rann  of  Kutch  was  deliberately  slow  in  order  not  to
threaten  seriously  West Pakistan and thus  arouse  Chinese
military intervention.
     At  the time  of  cease-fire  the  Pakistanis  had  not
achieved any of their objectives.   They had no large tracts
of  Indian territory to use as  bargaining  chips  for  East
Pakistan.  India  had  been  able to deploy similar military
strength to a battle which, for them, was defensive.  Indian
air superiority  allowed them flexibility while negating any
Pakistani local ground concentration.
     The  14-day  war  was the first full-scale Indian naval
war.  India's  fleet was much superior to that  of  Pakistan
and was well prepared  when  war  came  on  December 3.  The
Indian navy was  able  to  defend the coast while blockading
East Pakistan  and  attacking  shore  targets  in support of
ground operations. 16/
     Pakistan's  surface  fleet had neither  air  cover  nor
weapons to defend against India's missile boats.  Therefore,
it stayed in Karachi harbour while submarines were given the
task of destroying India's  aircraft  carrier  and  cruiser.
They   were  unsuccessful:   on   December   4,  Dafne-class
Pakistani submarine was sunk by a carrier escort  in the Bay
of Bengal while a second submarine was sunk off Visakhapatna
harbour.  The only Indian loss was the frigate Kukri sunk by
a sumbarine in the Arabian Sea on December 9.  17/
     India's  main  naval  support  effort was in the Bay of
Bengal  where   a  carrier  task  force  blockaded  the  sea
approaches  to  East   Pakistan.  Six  merchant  ships   and
"numerous"  small   craft   were   captured.  Carrier  based
aircraft struck assembly points of small boats in the Ganges
delta  area,  preventing  the  escape  or  reinforcement  of
Pakistani   army  elements.   The   establishment   of   air
superiority early in the war allowed  the  ships  freedom to
maneuver to attack shore targets at Chittagong, Cox's Bazar,
Chalna, Kulna and other economic and  military  targets. 18/
These actions had a  significant  effect  on the collapse of
East Pakistan.
     But the  decisive  theater of the war was East Pakistan
shown on  the  map  at  Appendix  2.  The area is divided by
three major river systems  into  four  parts with Dacca, the
capital,  at  the  center.  The Jamuna River runs  north  to
south cutting the country in  half.  West  of the Jamuna the
Padma (Ganges)  River  flows west to east to join the Jamuna
west  of Dacca.  South of the Padma lies  the  South-Western
Sector with the major towns of Kushtia, Jessore,  Khulna and
Chalna.  To the north of the  Padma the North-Western Sector
contains the towns of Rangpur, Dinajpur, Bogra and Rajshahi.
The Surma-Meghna  River  flows southwest from Sylhet joining
the Jamuna south east of Dacca and dividing the remainder of
the country into the Northern Sector and Eastern Sector.
     India  deployed  six  infantry  divisions  and  various
supporting troops on all sides of East Pakistan.  Supporting
the  Indian  force were eight battalions of Mukti-Bahini and
many  irregular  Bengali  soldiers.  19/  To  force a  quick
decision, India had to strike deep toward Dacca.  Since  the
trafficability of most of the  region  is  poor,  the combat
forces  were lightly equipped but they were well trained and
were reinforced with engineers to assist in river crossings.
The  Indian  forces  were  deployed  as follows:   II  Corps
comprising of  two  infantry divisions was tasked to advance
eastward  through the South-Western Sector  in  the  general
direction of Dacca;  XXXIII Corps with one infantry division
and two brigades was tasked  to  attack to the Bogra area in
the  Northwestern   Sector   and   then  on  to  Dacca;  101
Communications Zone  with  one  brigade  was to strike south
through the  Northern  Sector toward Dacca; and, IV Corps in
the  Eastern  Sector  had  three  divisions with missions to
advance westward to Dacca. 20/
     Opposing  the Indians, Pakistan deployed five divisions
with  two  armoured regiments and supporting artillery.  The
forces were deployed forward in strong points based on towns
near the border with light forces screening to the border.
     In the Southwestern Sector the Indian II Corps advanced
on three axes.  Nine (I) Division struck southeast bypassing
Jessore  to  the  south then moved on the Kulna, Chalna  and
Barisal.  A second element of 9 (I) Division passed north of
Jessore  on  December  5  and,  moving  cross-country,  took
Jheneida two days later.   A  third column composed of 4 (I)
Division  moved  eastward on the right bank of the Padma and
took  Kushtia  with its important railway bridge after heavy
fighting on December 11.   The  Pakistani  forces  based  in
Jessore withdrew  piecemeal  without a fight when they found
themselves  cut-off  by  the advancing  Indian  columns.  By
December   15,   the   resistance   in   this   sector   had
collapsed. 21/  The Indians had demonstrated that they could
move  rapidly across the marshy ground and numerous streams.
Good training and assistance of  Mukti-Bahini guides allowed
them  to  outflank  the   major  strong  points  which  then
crumbled.
     In the Northwestern Sector, XXXIII (I)  Corps  advanced
southeast on  three  axes, bypassing strongly defended areas
at  Hilli, Dinajpur and  Rangpur.  Bogra  was  capatured  on
December 13, cutting-off the defenders further to the north.
In  this  sector the Indians again proved  they  could  move
quickly  around   static  defenses  to  cut  the  routes  of
withdrawal and  reinforcement.  Even  though  the  Pakistani
army continued to fight from their strong points they  could
not stop or eject the Indians. 22/
     The  Northern  Sector  provided  the  best approach to
Dacca for  there are no major river obstacles.  However, the
Indians used only two brigades in this  sector.  This  force
took Jamalpur early, but was held  up  at  Mymensingh  until
December  11 before moving south to Tangail, 46  miles  from
Dacca.  The  Indians  dropped  a  parachute  battalion  into
Tangail on  December  11  to  cut  the  withdrawal  route of
Pakistani forces  to  the north.  On December 12, resistance
at Tangail crumbled and by December 16 Indian  units were in
the outskirts of Dacca. 23/
     In  the Eastern Sector three Indian divisions faced two
Pakistani divisions.   The 8 (I) Division advanced southwest
from Karimgan,  reaching  Maulvi  Bazar  on December 6.  The
Pakisani  garrison  at Mualvi Bazar withdrew to Sylhet where
the elements continued to  fight  for some days.  Meanwhile,
the main force of 8 (I) Division continued  to  Ashuganj  on
the Megna  River.  The  57  (I)  Division  struck  west from
Akhaura  reaching   Ashuganj  on  December  9.  The  23  (I)
Division  bypassed Comilla  with  one  column  moving  south
toward Chittagong while  the  main  body  proceeded  west to
reach  the  Megna  River.  Four days later the Indians  were
within 12  kilometers  of  Dacca.  24/  After  artillery had
fired  on Dacca on December 15, the Pakistanis  requested  a
cease-fire and,  on December 16, General Niazi, commander of
Pakistan's  forces   in   Dacca,   signed  an  unconditional
surrender.  The war ended and Bangla Desh was a reality.
     At  the  beginning of December, Islamabad had  realized
that the Indians were massing to attack  into East Pakistan.
Although Pakistan  had  approximately 40,000 troops deployed
there, the  preceeding months of guerrilla war had taken its
toll.  The Pakistani army's morale  there  had been weakened
by terrorist  activity  and  the consistent hostility of the
civilian  population.  The  terrain itself reduced  mobility
and forced the  army  to  deploy  in  strong points near the
larger towns  where  they  would  control the major road and
railway networks.  These  strong  points  were  not mutually
supporting and there were insufficient forces  to  fill  the
gaps between them.  At best the Pakistani forces could delay
the  likely  Indian  attack to gain sufficient time  for  an
international intervention  to  pressure India to stop.  If,
as  was  entirely  possible, no  international  intervention
materialized,  then  Pakistan  would  need  to  take  Indian
territory elsewhere which  could  then  be  traded  for  the
return  of East Pakistan during cease-fire negotiations.  To
do this Yahya had  to  mount a swift, violent offensive into
India from West Pakistan.   In  the  14-day conventional war
Pakistan's  strategy  completely  failed  for  a  number  of
reasons.
     Firstly, the Pakistani  forces  needed  air superiority
and they failed to achieve it.  The PAF tried a surprise pre-
emptive attack on the Indian Air Force  (IAF),  but through
poor intelligence  and  planning  failed  to  strike  Indian
airfields in sufficient numbers  or  depth.  IAF  operations
were  never seriously challenged.  In the following days  of
the  war,  the PAF could not or would not provide sufficient
sorties to  gain  even  local air superiority to support the
ground forces even  though  aircraft  were available.  It is
probable that the  PAF command thought it necessary to avoid
loss  of  aircraft so they would be available to counter  an
Indian offensive  into  West  Pakistan  should it arise.  It
appears  that  the Pakistani high command were not aware  of
Yahya's objectives of  gaining Indian territory as a defense
for the integrity of Pakistan as a whole.
     Secondly,  the  Pakistani  army  attacked  along a very
broad front of the western Indian border.   But  nowhere did
they mass sufficient forces  to ensure a rapid breakthrough.
Generally, the points of attack were in terrain unsuited for
wide  maneuver  and hence mobility and speed  could  not  be
developed  to   gain  significant  amount  of  Indian  land.
Although battles  were  fiercely  contested at battalion and
brigade level, the attacks were only loosely coordinated  at
the corps and army level, and hence, lacked unity.
     Thirdly, the effect of the Indian naval blockage was to
completely isolate West from East  Pakistan.  Combined  with
Indian domination  of  the  air, there was no possibility of
reinforcing  or  withdrawing army forces in  East  Pakistan.
This could only  have further reduced morale and the will of
the soldiers there  to  resist.  As well the Indian navy was
able  to  carry  the  war  directly  to  Karachi  while  the
Pakistani  navy  could  not   venture  out  without  risking
irreplaceable losses.
     The Pakistani navy  was  simply not equipped to take on
the missiles and aircraft of the Indian fleet  in  order  to
protect its own or  commercial ships.  Thus, West as well as
East Pakistan was isolated from its major sea supply routes.
The state  of  the  navy  was  indicative of the neglect for
reality of the military government in Islamabad.
     Lastly,  the  Army  in East Pakistan underestimated the
ability  of  the  Indians  to move forces through the sodden
terrain of  Bengal.  The Pakistanis had deployed in strength
in  the  towns  while leaving  the  rural  areas  relatively
unprotected.  The Indian army, supported  by  Bengalis  with
local  knowledge,  quickly  outflanked  these strong points.
With  no strategic reserve available, the  Pakistanis  could
not block the Indian's advance.  When the strong points were
surrounded, there was simply no  place  for the defenders to
go and they surrendered in  thousands. 25/  The speed of the
Indian advance helped  relieve  Indian's  logistic effort of
improving roads,  bridges  and  railways  necessary  to move
large quantities of supplies  for  slower,  more  deliberate
operations.  Their  forces  were lightly  equipped  to  move
quickly through to Dacca.
     In summary, the conventional phase of the  war  was one
of   limited  objectives  by   both   sides.  However,   the
Pakistanis could not  properly  coordinate their strategy or
their forces  to  realize  success.  On  the other hand, the
Indians produced  a  simple  but  flexible  plan  which they
executed  with  determination and skill.  East Pakistan fell
much  more  quickly than Islamabad had anticipated and there
was no time for international intervention.  In the West the
Indians defended  successfully  while  making minor gains in
the South.  Their  actions  were  entirely  consistant  with
their objective of ejecting Pakistan from Bengal without
inviting intervention from other nations, particularly
China.
                           ENDNOTES
                         (Chapter III)
     1/ Jackson, p. 107.
     2/ Accounts  vary.  At  least eight mountain divisions
remained guarding  India's northern border.  See Jackson, p.
107; Chopra, pp.  53-54;  and  Ravi Kaul, "The Indo-Pakistan
War and  the Changing Balance of Power in the Indian Ocean,"
United States Naval  Institute  Proceedings, No. 14, May 73,
pp. 186-187.
     3/ Jackson, p. 108.
     4/ Ibid., p. 108.
     5/ Ravi Rikhye, "Why India Won:  The 14 Day War," Armed
Forces Journal, 109, April 1972, p. 39.
     6/ Sir Robert Thompson, ed.,  War  in Peace, (New York:
Harmony Books), 1982, p. 225.
     7/ Jackson, p. 122.
     8/ Thompson, p. 225.
     9/ Ibid., 226.
    10/ Jackson, pp. 116-119.
    11/ Rikhye, p. 40.
    12/ Ibid., p. 40.
    13/ Jackson, p. 120.
    14/ Thompson, p. 227.  See also Jackson, p. 120.
    15/ Jackson, p. 121.
    16/ Kaul, p. 188.
    17/ Ibid., p. 191.
    18/ Ibid., pp. 188-189.
    19/ Jackson, p. 133.
    20/ Ibid., p. 133.
    21/ Chopra, p. 56.
    22/ Ibid., p. 56.
    23/ Ibid., p. 58.
    24/ Jackson, p. 142.
    25/ Chopra, p. 58.
                         CHAPTER IV
                         CONCLUSIONS
     The  course of events which shaped the conflict between
India and Pakistan in 1971 had their origins in history made
many years before.  The concept of  a  single Islamic nation
on the  Indian sub-continent had brought the peoples of East
and West  Pakistan  together  in  the  aftermath  of British
colonial rule.   But  the concept was not powerful enough to
hold the  nation  in  the  face of differing race, language,
culture and geography.
     When  the  autocratic rulers in the western wing denied
the democratic  aspirations of the Bengalis while continuing
a policy  of  apparent  economic  domination, resentment was
inevitable.  The established rulers had fashioned a severely
centralized  government  which  was incapable of harmonizing
the political and  social  forces emerging in the western as
well  as  the  eastern  wing  of  the  nation.  Consequently
military repression  of the Bengalis was implemented without
a serious attempt to rectify the causes of the grievances.
     The  millions  of refugees who poured into India caused
serious economic and  social  problems  in  one  of her most
unstable slates, West Bengal.  The Indian  government,  with
considerable  support   from   the   public,   seized   this
opportunity to  decisively  weaken her most dangerous rival.
By  skillfully   managing   her  diplomatic  affairs,  while
encouraging the Bangla  Desh  movement,  India  won  time to
prepare  for military intervention  while  preventing  wider
international intervention damaging to her aim.  And clearly
her aim was to reduce the power of Pakistan by promoting the
autonomy of East Bengal.
     China considered Pakistan, in particular West Pakistan,
vital  to restricting Soviet influence on the sub-continent.
Should both  India  and  Pakistan  be  drawn into the Soviet
sphere, China's borders  would  be  threatened on all sides.
With  India  and  Pakistan rivals, the threat to China  from
India  would  be  much  reduced.  For  similar  reasons, the
Soviet Union was initially trying to steer an even course in
the India-Pakistan dispute.  However, when rebuffed by Yahya
in  July 1971, Moscow quickly saw the chance to increase her
influence with India.
     When   conventional   war  finally  came  in  December,
Pakistan  found  herself  unable  to   defend  the  east  or
successfully gain in the west.  Pakistan's  complete failure
in  the  air was most damaging.  Her armies and navy  lacked
information available from reconnaissance.   Both  the  army
and  navy  could  not maneuver  without  incurring  damaging
losses from the Indian Air Force.
     In the end,  India  prevailed  because  she was able to
maintain  the  initiative  both  politically and militarily,
guided by a simple but realistic and flexible strategy.
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   gies and Tactics of the Bangla Desh Movement."
   Asian Survey XII, No. 3 (March 1972):  pp. 185-200.
Rukhye, Ravi.  "Why India Won:  The 14-Day War."
   Armed Forces Journal, 109 (April 1972) pp. 38-41.
   An analysis of the success of India in war 3-16
   December 1971.  Gives force ratios and deployments
   of India and Pakistan.
Thompson, Sir Robert. ed.  War in Peace:  Conventional
   and Guerrilla Warfare Since 1945.  New York:  Harmony
   Books, 1982.
   Provides short summary of the background and conduct
   of the war.  Includes maps.
Stoessinger, John G.  Why Nations Go to War.  3d ed.
   New York:  St. Martin's Press, 1982.
Chapter 5 provides analysis of the political cur-
rents and leaders involved in the 1971 crisis.  In-
cludes bibliography.



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