Emergency In Kenya: Kikuyu And The Mau Mau Insurrection CSC 1984 SUBJECT AREA Strategic Issues Table of Contents Abstract ii Introduction 1 Historical and Cultural Background 6 The Religious Nationalists 42 Emergence of Mau Mau 46 Mau Mau Religion 57 Events Building to the Emergency 63 Operation Jock Scott 74 Jock Scott Aftermath 76 Security Forces 78 Command and Control Reorganization 82 Enemy Situation 86 Mau Mau Terrorism 88 Mau Mau Terrorism 88 Large Scale Mau Mau Operations 90 A New War, A New Choice 94 A New Command and An Offensive Strategy 97 Surrender Nepotiations-Operation Wedgewood 101 Operation Anvil 103 The FinalThrusts 106 Conclusion 110 Footnotes 113 Bibliography 126 ABSTRACT Author: HUGHES, Roger D., Major, U.S. Marine Corps Title: Emergency in Kenya: Kikuyu and the Mau Mau Insurrection Publisher: Marine Corps Command and Staff College Date: 2 April 1984 This text reviews the history, customs and religion of the Kikuyu tribe of East Africa, while tracing their social and political development, recession and resurgence under the impact of British colonialism from 1887 to 1952. During that 65 year period, the Kikuyu were intruded upon by an uninvited 20th Century European culture totally alien to their own; yet they quickly seized upon the key to that which they called the white man's magic, his educational opportunities, then thrust themselves headlong into the 20th Century and all the madness of the times. It was no smooth transition from the ancient culture into the new. Rather, it was initially like a mad, blind sprint by the younger generation into the future, leaving their recent past far behind them and forgotten, before they realized that the future was not prepared for their surge, and they were unprepared to maintain the pace. An attempt is made in this text to reveal the frustration and resentment which mounted within an eager and anxious people, as their expectations of a leading position in the new culture were unfulfilled. Those young men who initially raced forward the fastest became the most frustrated and sought revenge. The Mau Mau movement is usually viewed strictly as being politically motivated toward national independence. The less popular view is endorsed herein, that two separate, multi-facited movements existed, one motivated by nationalism, and the other by a blind, irrational quest for revenge. In the process of each attempting to exploit the other for self-serving purposes, they became uncontrollably intertwined, which resulted in near disaster for the Kikuyu tribe. Totally lacking in quality intelligence regarding the origins of Mau Mau at the outbreak of hostilities in 1952, colonial forces struck out blindly to suppress the violence and treated the movements as one. Thus, the Military resolution is traced through 1956, when the preponderance of hostilities were finally suppressed in what seemed at that time more like an intra-tribal civil war than a war of independence. WAR SINCE 1945 SEMINAR Emergency in Kenya Kikuyu and the Mau Mau Insurrection Major R. D. Hughes 2 April 1984 Marine Corps Command and Staff College Marine Corps Development and Education Command Quantico, Virginia 22134 Emergency In Kenya: Kikuyu and the Mau Mau Insurrection Introduction In 1948 the British Colonial Administration in Kenya began receiving, compiling and filing reports from African and European sources throughout the central region of Kenya, concerning a secret African movement called Mau Mau. That same year, the Director of Intelligence and Security submitted a report linking the Mau Mau movement to the Kikuyu Central Association1 (KCA), a tribal organization dedicated to political and labor activism, which had been declared illegal and banned in 1940. Rumors of secret oath taking ceremonies and associated rituals of black magic became more frequent as the year progressed, and reports of oaths being forcibly administered to unwilling subjects were abundant by year's end. In 1949 the Colonial Administration enacted Section 62 of the Penal Code,2 proscribing the administration of unlawful oaths. Nineteen defendants were convicted under Section 62 shortly after enactment, but released on appeal due to technical errors in the proceedings.3 In 1950, leading politicians of the Kikuyu tribe were reported to have taken the Mau Mau oath at a place known as Banana Hill,4 and the same year, KCA leaders were prosecuted for administering an unlawful KCA oath. Meanwhile, political clashes and labor disputes became highly evident in and around Nairobi, including various minor labor strikes and a major general strike by African workers, which brought Nairobi to a virtual standstill for its duration. On 4 August 1950, the Colonia Governor declared Mau Mau an illegal society and 141 arrests were made, mainly in the Central and Rift Valley Provinces. As a result thereof, 120 convictions were handed down on charges of Mau Mau membership.5 By 1951, the labor government in the United Kingdom acknowledged to some degree that a problem existed in the Kenya Colony, and Colonial Secretary James Griffiths went to Kenya to decide upon appropriate constitutional changes.6 Jomo Kenyatta, a former KCA senior official and current President of the Kenya African Union (KAU), presented Secretary Griffiths with a list of grievances, and a petition containing four KAU demands. The demands (paraphrased) were: (1) abolition of color bar, (2) government aid for African farmers, (3) free trade union activity, and (4) political representation for Africans, in terms of 12 elected African members on the Colonial Administration's Legislative Council (instead of the currently allowed four nominated African members who required approval by the Colonial Governor). All four demands were ignored.7 January 1952 was the first time that offical reports acknowledged Mau Mau oathing ceremonies taking place in Nairobi. Prosecutions for Mau Mau membership in Nairobi were first carried out in February. Ever since Mau Mau reports were first received from Province and District Commissioners in 1948, the central colonial administration in Nairobi had disregarded and discredited them as overstated, exaggerated and alarmist in nature.8 The Colonial Governor, Sir Philip Mitchell, was acknowleded throughout the colonial service as the foremost authority on African affairs and African people, both among his own administration and among the London service.9 It was his opinion, generally stated, the Africans were a primitive lot, who could be expected to dabble in oaths and black magic ceremonies, and nothing particularly out of the ordinary was taking place. During February there were many reports of European crops and grasslands being burned.10 Thereafter, an increasing number of reports cited Africans loyal to the British Colonial Administration being intimidated into taking Mau Mau oaths.11 May marked the opening of a campaign of terror. Government appointed Kikuyu "chiefs" who refused to take Mau Mau oaths had their houses burned, and many loyalist Africans were murdered, mainly in Nyeri District of the Central Province. By June, reports revealed that the May Mau oaths were changing in character and content: that is, the procedures were becoming more bizarre, and the commitment imposed no longer required more loyalty to causes, but now required specific violence and murder.12 Nevertheless, Governor Mitchell continued to maintain that no major problem existed as a threat to the colony's internal security. Dispite prodigious evidenceto the contrary, and near violent demands from the European settlers for government military action; the governor acknowledged no need for extraordinary security measures to be taken.13 He conducted business as usual, applying time worn colonial era bandaids to massive social, cultural and political hemorrhages right up to the time of his departure on 30 June 1952. On that date he left Kenya to begin two months of authorized terminal leave with pay, preceeding his retirement. Because the British Colonial Service at that time could not justify paying two men for the same job, the now governor did not arrive in Nairobi until 28 September. The colony was left without a Governor for nearly three months.14 Meanwhile, the colony's General Secretary filled the void, at least in name, as Acting Governor. There was a pronounced reluctance on his part to diviate from proceedings established by the outgoing governor, without first allowing the new governor to assess the situation and establish his own policy. In the event that the new governor might choose to continue in the ways of his predecssor, any drastic changes in the interim would have been highly disruptive administratively and bureaucratically.15 Sir Evelyn Baring was sworn in as the new governor on 30 September 1952. He conducted an immediate ten day tour of the colony, after which he submitted a report to London, recommending that a State of Emergency be declared in Kenya as soon as possible,16 and requesting additional military forces. In the meantime, the Legislative Council, "approved emergency measures restrcting the movement of Mau Mau members, controlling the press, requiring registration of societies with 10 or more members and increasing penalties for sedition."17 On 20 October, Governor Baring signed the order proclaiming a state of Emergency. That evening, twelve Royal Air Force Hastings aircraft began arriving in Nairobi under the cover of darkness, carrying the Lancashire Fusiliers in from the Suez Canal Zone.18 Shortly before midnight, police began a roundup of over 100 political agitators and suspected Mau Mau leaders, including KAU president Jomo Kenyatta and many other prominent KAU officials.19 Nairobi citizens awoke on the morning of 21 October to find a British Army battalion (Lancashire Fusiliers) patrolling the streets, especially the African sectors, in a show of force. The governor made a radio broadcast that day, announcing that a State of Emergency had been declared. The colony's Territorial Force (the Kenya Regiment) and the Kenya Police Reserve were ordered to report for duty, and nearly six battalions of the King's African Rifles (KAR) were placed on standby to support police operations.20 Thus began the government's campaign to suppress Mau Mau insurrection and terrorism, four years after the first official reports warning of Mau Mau were received. It is remarkable that after a ten day tour of the colony, Governor Baring recognized as being dangerous, the same situation that Governor Mitchell chose to regard as being overstated, even in the writing of his memoirs after the Emergency ended.21 The facts seem to testify that insurrection, even formation of the Mau Mau movement itself, might have been avoided altogether. At the very least, their mainfestations might have been tempered by degree, through simply acts of human sensetivity and justice during various periods in the colonial history of Kenya. Further, it appears that once the movement began, the colonial administrative government took far too long to recognize its existence, and longer still to acknowledge its significance. As a result, it appears that the government was ill prepared to deal with the situation, when, at the eleventh hour, insurection appeared imminent. Apparently, the military option was the only option available by the time, but intelligence did not exist in sufficient quantity or quality to support efficient military operations for nearly two years. The threat was poorly defined in terms of leadership, organization, size and intent. What began as an efort to suppress a general revolution of independence against the government ended as a police action to quell an intra-tribal civil war.22 Historical and Cultural Background It could be said with justification that the emergency, which was finally declared by the British Colonial Administration in the fall of 1952, actually reached emergency proportions much earlier. In fact, the emergency had roots as deep in time as the beginning of this century. The region now known as Kenya was colonized in the 8th century by Arabs, but not until late in the 19th century was European colonization introduced. In 1887, a fifty year concession to the territory was granted, by the Sultan of Zanzibar, to an entity which later became the Imperial British East Africa Company. Under the terms of the General Act of Brussels, Great Britain agreed to construct a railway in East Africa, leading from the coast toward the continent's interior, for strategic military purposes.23 The engineers who surveyed the right of way for the railroad were among the first Europeans to make contact with the interior tribes, and their presence was considered to be territorial encroachment. The Imperial British East Africa Company established a trading post in 1890 at a place called Dagoreti, in an area traditionally occupied by the Kikuyu tribe. That post was repeatedly attacked and twice destroyed by Kikuyu warriors during the following eighteen month period. In 1892, Fort Smith was built four miles deeper into Kikuyu territory. Fierce fighting ensued between the British and the Kikuyu tribe during the years 1892 and 1893, but treaties were made shortly thereafter, and peaceful relations developed for a while.24 The Kikuyu tribe were people of relatively peaceful nature. They were agriculturally oriented, and had possessive feelings toward the land that supported them. The various tribes of the area had long ago established claims upon rather specific land areas, and they understood that to invade another tribes's land was to invite war. The Kikuyu naturally saw the intrusion of the railway construction crews, the traders of the British East Africa Company and the soldiers of the British crown as an invasion of their territory and a threat to their existence. But after the initial differences were worked out, and it appeared that the railroad right of way would not impose significant threat to their life style, the Kikuyu resigned themselves to the British presence.25 The more warlike Masai, living in the vicinity of the Kikuyu, were another story altogether. Although they were well known for their love of battled they had no deep-seated attachment to their land. Unlike the sedentary Kikuyu, the Masai were herdsmen who migrated from one grazing area to another. The British were quickly successful in buying off the Masai, and transplanting them to another area, away from the railroad right of way.26 In 1895, the British government purchased the Imperial British East Africa Company's rights and established a protectorate in Kenya. The Protectorate included a coastal strip, ten miles wide, which existed under "suzerainty" of the Sultan of Zanzibar. For this coastal strip, the British government paid an annual fee to the Sultan, who was also under British protection. The Protectorate arrangements also included treaties with many African native tribes, as well as with Germany, which had extensive neighboring colonial interests in eastern Africa. Many of the native treaties have been compared to that negotiated by Stuyvesant in his Manhatten acquisition.27 The British Foreign Office appointed Sir Charles Eliot as the first High Commissioner of the Protectorate. He has been characterized as a scholar-diplomat, who spoke several languages fluently, and who had published books on the subject of Finnish grammar and the history and philosophy of the Ottoman Empire. He was known as an opponent of big game hunting (a popular attraction to that area among rich Europeans), and in fact, opposed violence in any form. More significant to the history of Kenya than his academic credits or humane attitude toward animals, was his inflexible doctrine for administration of the protectorate. He set an enduring precedent for the future colony as, "a white man's country in which the interests of the European must always be paramount."28 His attitude was typical of his time, still living in an imperial era, characterized by a, "basic Victorian conviction of moral duty to civilize the resident population." This duty was fashionably referred to as, "the white man's burden." In Eliot's words, "The uncivilized natives should be civilized by the proximity and example of the settlers; by conversion to Christianity; by being taught to know their place and accept the status of a docile and compliant wording class."29 Lest this writing be interpreted as merely a crude, retrospective indictment of British policy, it should be pointed but that such attitudes were prevalent among many colonial nations, world-wide. Africans, Asians and Indians of both North and South America have been hapless recipients of similar doctrine. Furthermore, the long-term, adverse effects continue to manifest themselves today in various degrees, feeding the roots of insurrection in many parts of the world. The following is a quote relating to Sir Charles Eliot, taken from the diary of Colonel Meinertzhagen, then a Captain in the Kings African Rifles, dated 1902: "He amazed me with his views on the future of East Africa, He envisaged a thriving colony of thousands of Europeans... He intends to confine the natives to reserves and use them as cheap labor on farms. I suggested that the country belonged to Africans, that their interests must prevail over the interests of strangers. He would not have it; he kept on using the word 'paramount' with reference to the claims of Europeans. I said that some day the Africans would be educated and armed; that would lead to a clash. Eliot thought that that day was so distant as not to matter...but I am convinced that in the end the Africans will win, and that Eliot's policy can lead only to trouble and disappointment. " Britain's railway to the continent's interior came to be known as the Uganda Railway. It took five years to build, at a cost of five and one half million pounds, and stretched from Mombasa on the coast to Lake Victoria in Uganda.30 The construction cost was a burden which the British hoped could be recouped by the railway itself, but it was clear that the primitive economy of the natives would not be sufficient alone. Europeans were encouraged to settle in the protectorate, with promises of inexpensive, fertile land and government support for economic growth. The British government had other reasons for opening East Africa to settlement, not the least of which were the desire to deny Germany absolute control of the area, and the desire to stamp out the slave trade which flourished there. From 1900 to 1910, there was significant immigration of white settlers into the Kenya potectorate, especially around Kabete, Limuru, Kiambu and Nairobi.31 Because of the mobility provided by the Uganda Railway, many of the European settled adjacent to it, especially in the fertile central highlands, later to become known as the White Highlands. Some of the unoccupied land, which they claimed, belonged to Kikuyu tribesmen, who had temporarily evacuated the area. A series of disasters had beset them, including locust infestation, famine, rinderpest invasion and a smallpox epidemic. Few Kikuyu remained in the area throughout the disasters, and vast areas of previously cultivated land were quickly reclaimed by the equatorial vegetation. The occupied lands which the settlers desired, was paid for according to European custom; however, Kikuyu customs differed considerably from those of the Europeans. The settlers thought they had purchased the land. The Kikuyu intended only to lease it; their religion prohibited its sale to non-tribe members. When the Kikuyu attempted to move back onto their land in later years, the first major conflict between blacks and whites occurred, and continued as an issue of contention and distrust for decades thereafter.32 During the first decade of the 20th Century, the mass immigration of European settlers was vertually unchallenged by the African people. As mentioned, disease and pestilence had nearly decimated or driven off the major populations of Kikuyu and Masai in the central highland region, and the remainder were brought off under less than satisfactory terms.33 The major battle during that period was waged between the settlers and the land itself. The land offered vast potential in terms of space, climate and soil fertility, but it also presented to the Europeans the same disease and pestilence which drove out the native population. The settlers fought this battle largely by trial and error, at tremendous investment cost, as crops and animal stock died off and had to be replaced. Wild animals foraged in the cultivated fields at night, and often destroyed acres of grain in one night's feeding. Insects and draught sometimes wiped out entire harvests. Pedigree breeding cattle, imported from Europe at great expense, were attacked by fever. Worms contracted from wild animals, foot rot and unidentifiable grubs which attacked the eyes killed off sheep by the hundreds. The lives of the settlers were plagued by continual heartbreak and ever increasing debt.34 But, consistent with the dauntless spirit of pioneers throughout history, the settlers hung on and won the long-term war eventually, though many battles were lost in the process. Early in the decade, these pioneers established a Settler's Association, a quasi-political organization. Partly dedicated to cooperatie farming methods and the sharing of lessons learned in the war with the environment, the Settler's Association was most significant as a political lobby, representing settler interests to the administrators of the protectorate, as well as to the Foreign Office and Parliament in Great Britain. Many of the early wettlers were of aristocratic heritage, and had influential connections in London. One such aristocrat was Hugh Cholmondeley, the Third Baron Delamere. He had made several big game hunting expeditions to the protectorate and fell in love with the land as a result. Bored with his official duties in Cheshire and London, Lord Delemere decided to settle in the Highlands. He and his wife lived in grass huts for several years, before his farming venture afforded him sufficient profits to erect a European style farmhouse. Reputed in England for his eccentric outbursts, Lord Delemere's sudden decision to pioneer in Kenya surprised few, and his continued eccentricity in the frontier made him one of the most colorful, as well as influential, of the early settlers. His profits grew handsomely after many setbacks, and he became the owner of numerous small businesses, as well as the only hotel in Nairobi prior to World War I. He played an important role in making the voice of the Settler's Association heard, and together with High Commissioner Sir Charles Eliot, he was instrumental in molding the protectorate into a society where "white supremacy" prevailed over all, and the European settlers' interests were "paramount."35 As usual in European colonization scenarios, the settlers were accompanied by well-intentioned missionaries. dedicated to converting the backward people of the world to Christianity. But their good intentions created many problems, especially among the Kikuyu people, who were not nearly so backward as the missionaries presumed. In fact, the Kikuyu were a highly advanced civilization within their native environment. The British were so preoccupied with their colonial, economic self-interests, their doctrine of white supremacy and their 20th century, European standards of morality, that they failed to recognize "civilization," except in the terms of their own, parochial definition. The Kikuyu tribe was organized into a number of autonomous clans, which traced from common male ancestors. Additionally, they were organized in a matrix fashion by age sets, which cut across the clan. Age sets were defined by the year in which adolescents were initiated into adulthood; as such, they organized people into initiation year groups. Rather than being grouped strictly by age, the sets were based more upon physical and emotional maturity. Age sets progressed together through a series of phased or levels in he Kikuyu social order, taking on new roles and responsibilities at each level. The male age sets moved through a series of ranks, from junior warrior to senior elder. Tribal leadership was provided by the elders, exercising their power through councils of elders, and as the oldest set died off, they were replaced by the next eldest set without reference to family lineage.36 Similar organization existed among other African tribes of the area, without any overall, unifying authority over them, beyond the tribal leadership. Nevertheless, inter-tribal marriage and trade existed among the tribes, and for the most part, inter-tribal relations were peaceful. The exceptions were armed raids for cattle and other economic goods.37 predominantly during hard times brought on by environmental conditions. Kikuyu clans were further subdivided into subclans, or Mbari, which were again subdivided into polygamous families. While the Mbari were regulated by concensus among the members of the councils of elders, families were ruled indisputably by the fathers. "These lineage groups (clans, subclans, and families) were the custodians of the Kikuyu land, religion and law. Traditionally, there were no other institutions for these purposes."38 The Mbari councils of elders regulated the allocation of land within their territory, which was occupied by constituent families. The Mbari councils were required to approve all land transactions. Ownership of land could not be transferred to anyone outside the clan. Only after a ceremony of mutual adoption into the clan, a religious ceremony marking out the boundaries in the presence of witnesses, and the express sanction by all members of the owning family could ownership be transferred.39 The warrior age sets were the guardians of law and order.40 The most solemn event in the life of a Kikuyu was the ceremony of initiation into adulthood. Selection took place shortly after puberty, and the selected members of an initiation group formed a sort of "club for life." A week of ritual preparation preceded the formal ceremony of group circumcision, including women as well as men.41 Sex education of Kikuyu young adults was thorough. Copulation and even kissing on the lips were prohibited before marriage, although unmarried couples were permitted to spend the night together, under very rigid rules of procedure. Birth control was taught early and strictly enforced after marriage. Circumcision of the clitoris greatly reduced female pleasure during copulation, and partial penetration techniques, as well as observation of monthly cycles, kept pregnancies under control. Women were forbidden to become pregnant before they finished weaning the previous child; therefore, a "one child every three years," maximum was imposed.42 Polygamy was the norm in Kikuyu society, and provided many benefits. Men were allowed to have only as many wives as they could efficiently support, and each wife rated her own hut. Polygamy enabled a family to have more children than otherwise would have been possible under the one child per three years rule, especially given the high rate of infant mortality. Polygamy ensured that there were no surplus spinsters, unable to support themselves, and ensured there were no neglected widows. The wives of deceased men were taken in by the next senior brother of the deceased. There were no uncared for children, because the other wives took up the responsibilities when a mother died or became incapacitated. There was no prostitution, no adultery, there were few of the emotional and physical maladjustments commonly suffered by more "civilized" people.43 Kikuyu religion developed in three layers. The first layer centered aound Ngai, the all highest father figure, the anthropomorphic god. Ngai lived on the mountain tops, expecially Mount Kenya. Ngai created the land, and he created the tribe itself through the creation of Gikuyu and Mumbi, the Kikuyu equivalents of Adam and Eve. Ngai gave the land to Gikuyu and Mumbi, and to all their descendants, a belief which tied the people irrevocably to the land. This steadfast belief disavowed European claims of land ownership, and caused those claims to remain a contested issue for decades. Ngai was an ubiquitous, invisible spirit from which there could be no hiding, and angry god requiring sacrifices and elaborate rituals. There was an amazing similarity between this level and Old Testiment Hebrew theology. The second layer of Kikuyu religion relates to the spirits of deceased ancestors. While they, too, were considered ubiquitous, their official domain was the hearth of the home, beneath which they were buried, and from which their permanent presence eminated. The third and final layer of the Kikuyu religion deals with worship of the spirits of the forest. The Kikuyu associated these spirits with waterfalls, streams, isolated rocks and strangely shaped trees; e.g. the wild fig tree presented a much favored sacred place. In effect, this level represented an integration of themselves with the forest, long recognized as their protector in times of trouble.44 As briefly mentioned previously, the Kikuyu were not a warlike people, yet were not always able to avoid war. They were periodically raided for economic goods by the Masai, Kamb and Samburu tribes. For generations, it was their practice to live in or close to the forest,to which they could withdraw in self-defense. There they had learned to fight smart, using stealth and cunning to evade and defeat a stronger enemy. This ability was an early indication of their intelligence, and their application of wit over power, militarily.45 Deeply ingained in the practice of their religion, especially in the third layer, was the use of magic and the ritual of oath administration. Magic was commonly employed to heal the sick, or to induce love or purification. Medicine men often demanded an oath of secrecy from their subjects, to prevent disclosure of the magical procedures the subject may have witnessed. Oaths were commonly used in more routine practices as well, including judicial proceedings, land transactions, purification rites and initiation ceremonies. The taking and upholding of oaths had strong religious reinforcement. Significantly, the entire body of religious belief and practice, which encompassed virtually all of their traditions and cultural law, required collective, rather than individual, action and responsibility.46 To break an oath could mean death at the hands or the will of Ngai, or ancestral spirits, or the spirits of the forest. To break ancient tradition would invite punishment or censure by one's entire age set, because it reflected badly upon them all, and likewise upon the family and the Mbari, and the clan. Collective peer pressure was a powerful influence in their lives, which kept their society in order. The traditional value system of the Kikuyu placed strong emphasis upon collective loyalty to family, clan and age set, and subordination of the individual. As suggested previously, there was a strong relationship between the extended family (the Mbari, or subclan) and their land, which was simultaneously a source and symbol of spiritual and material support. The age set progression system ensured that no Kikuyu would remain always in a subordinate status, but would rise with his peers. Likewise, no age set could maintain its superior status indefinitely, and no single family lineage could rise to power.47 In total, the Kikuyu tribal organization was extremely well suited to their environment, highly developed structurally to support complex interrelationships on multiple social levels, and strictly disciplined to maintain order and stability within the system. Though illiterate, and primitive by European standards, the Kikuyu were highly intelligent, and advanced by African standards. After having their social system totally disrupted by the European intrusion, and thereafter having an irrelevent and incomplete replacement system too rapidly thrust upon them, it is small wonder that the Kikuyu tribe eventually became the reactionary core of insurrection.48 The early missionaries found it difficult to dispell the complex, well-ordered religious beliefs of the Kikuyu. The Church of Scotland established a mission at Thogoto, the Church Missionary Society set up at Kabete, and the Catholic White Fathers founded Saint Austin's, near the future site of Nairobi.49 Although the Kikuyu were highly suspicious of any stranger, "they were impressed by these red men, as they called them, from British lands. One of their ancient prophets fortold the advent of red men, who would bring them a great iron snake." To their way of thinking, the iron locomotive, pulling a string of cars up the long hills through Kikuyu territory, represented something too similar to fulfillment of the prophecy to be ignored. They witnessed many manifestations of the red man's technological "magic," and their desire to learn the associated skills drew them to the missions. Initially, they had no desire to replace Ngai with the God of the missionaries, but the mission schools offered much that they did desire. The Kikuyu took the lead among the African tribes, in the realization that education was the secret behind the "magic," and that medical facilities and hygiene services were equally valuable.50 Once drawn into the mission schools, many were truly persuaded of the goodness of the Christian faith, and a large number were actually converted to Christianity. A number of others only nominally professed a faith in Christ, in order to reap the educational benefits, even though they did not truly believe in, or approve of, the religious teachings and proscriptions.51 For instance, the missionaries taught that it was wrong to be naked, to wear dyes and oils, to perform tribal danced and to fight other tribes. All these things were acceptable under the precepts of the Kikuyu religion, and were common practices throughout their history. Futhermore, the missionaries declared that female circumcision, polygamy and birth control (all of which were fundamental to the Kikuyu religion and the very existence of their culture) were mortal sins. Eventually, atendance at the mission schools became conditional upon the students' promises not to participate in these practices, as well as other acts deemed repugnant by the missionaries. Yet the Africans were encouraged by the missionaries to wear stylish European clothes, and were taught that it was virtuous to work for Europeans, to earn money, to pursue profits and to accumulate personal wealth. These concepts placed emphasis on individual achievement and distinction, concepts in direct conflict with deep-seated Kikuyu religious beliefs and social practices.52 The conflict between tradition and the new teachings of the missionaries caused more severe social upheaval among the Kikuyu than among other tribes. For example, many Kikuyu religious ceremonies, including worship and sacrifice to ancestral spirits, required the presence of all male family members. Absence of even one son or brother invalidated the ceremony. But once a youth professed Christianity, the missionaries would not permit him to participate in what they termed, "heathen sacrifices." Therefore, hostile fathers, shunned by their convert off spring, often disinherited and disowned their sons, after which their absence from ceremonies did not matter.53 Thus began the breakdown of the most basic unit of their society, the family, and the eventual decay of their culture. The following is another prophetic exerpt from the diary of Captain Meinertzhagan of the Kings African Rifles, dated 1904: I am sorry to leave the Kikuyu... they are the most intelligent of the African tribes I have met; therefore, they will be the most progressive under European guidance and will be more suseptible to subversion activities. They will be one of the first tribes to demand freedom from European influence and in the end cause a lot of trouble.54 The second decade of the twentieth century saw European settlers turning the tide in their battle with the environment. The hardiest settlers' efforts were rewarded by profits, while the weaker ones quit, sold out and departed. The sons of the survivors stood to inherit large estates, for which their fathers and they had labored hard and long. They developed a vehement possessiveness toward the land that they had converted by hand from wilderness into bountiful farmland. The same period saw the Africans of the Kenya Protectorate adjusting as best they could under British influence. Some would say they benefited greatly from the medical and hygienic services and education they received from the British. Perhaps this was so. Many Africans learned to speak English and to perform rudimentary mathematics. Hopes were raised for them to eventually take part in the European prosperity that was beginning to blossom. Some found employment on European farms and in European settlements as laborers, servants, cooks and occasionally as clerks. Others would argue that the African reaped few benefits and suffered many ills of cultural breakdown at the hands of the self-serving British settlers and administrators. Their religious beliefs and traditional values were brought into question, and families became divided among themselves. Several tribes, especially the Kikuyu, Embu and Meru had been alienated from an undetermined portion of their traditional lands. Native lands that remained uncontested by white settler claims were designated as native Reserves for tribal habitation. The British administration of law and order proscribed the traditional occupation of the African male as a warrior; therefore, traditional division of labor between men and women resulted in the men being either unemployed or relegated to doing "women's work." Settler demands for farm labor grew larger as their homesteads grew, but their demands remained largely unfilled, because routine agricultural work fell into tha African category of "women's work." Clerical and commercial jobs were unavailable to Africans, because those trades were dominated by the better educated and long-time established Asian population. Suddenly all colonial progress and prosperity halted. World War I pitted British against Germans even in Africa. Farmers and merchants were called away from their vocations, and Africans, too, were enlisted in the Armed Forces, mainly in the Carrier Corps. African casualties during the war totalled 1,700 killed in action, and 45,000 killed by disease.55 Aside from the casualties, the most significant impact of the war upon Africans was that for the first time, Africans saw Europeans killing each other. That was contrary to the teachings of the European Missionaries, and surfaced many questions in the minds of the Africans, such as the value of the "white man's magic" and the whole idea of "white supremacy." Additionally, there was resentment over the fact that the African men were primarily employed as carriers, and denied the traditional warrior role. The primary focus of African resentment after World War I were the labor registration system and the taxation policies instituted by the protectorate administration. These were urged upon the administration by the Settlers' Association, in an attempt to mobilize the unemployed male African population into a productive work force.56 The tax policy included both a head tax and a hut tax. The hut tax served a dual purpose, intending not fly to force men into the wage labor market in order to pay the tax, but also to discourage polygamy. The policies gradually forced movement into towns and onto European estates, and in turn, stimulated African demand for consumer goods, such as European clothing. African men were forced to abandon their families and strike out alone, because they had insufficient money to move their entire family. Eventually, mass movement to the towns created a severe housing shortage, and even those who were able to save enough money to move their families, were unable to secure adequate accommodations. The towns and young cities began to develop slum areas at an alarming race, rural family life degenerated due to increased paternal absence, and traditional socialization processes, customs and beliefs further deteriorated.57 In 1920, the East African Protectorate of Kenya was formally upgraded to the status and title of Kenya Colony. That same year, Kenya's Africans established their first political voice. The language it spoke was Kikuyu, and the first words uttered were, "Give us back our stolen lands."58 This was the slogan of the Young Kikuyu Association, YKU, founded by Harry Thuku. The young Kikuyu political activists found their existence in Nairobi nearly intolerable, and recognized that conditions could be significantly altered only through political action. In 1922, while Thuku was leading "a relatively innocuous protest against African wage reductions, a trigger happy policeman opened fire on a crowd at Nairobi Station..."59 A riot resulted, and an undetermined number of Africans were killed. Thuku was deported and imprisoned on charges of conducting activities dangerous to peace and good order, and the Young Kikuyu Association was outlawed.60 Eugene H. Miller, Ph.D., author of "Political Parties and Interest Group," published as Section II of Chapter 2 of Preconflict Case Study 5, Kenya, presents a different account of Thuku and the YKA on pages 100-101 of that study: ...the Kikuyu Association (formed) in 1920...was concerned primarily with the defense of the Kikuyu land. . .The second African interest group, the YKA...was concerned with the grievances of the laborers...Harry Thuku attacked two changes...introduced in 1920: the requirement...to carry a...registration card...and the doubling of the hut tax and poll tax...On the ground that a prayer issued for Thuku introduced an element of religion which might lead to a dangerous situation, the Chief Native Commissioner ordered Thuku's arrest in March 1922 and deported him as 'dangerous to peace and order. ... His organization was proscribed and went underground. While Thuku was temporarily held in a Nairobi prison, thousands of his supporters gathered outside the jail and threatened to free him by force. The British fired on the crowd, 25 Kikuyu were killed, and Kenya had its first nationalist martyrs." It was around this same time that Jomo Kenyatta began his political career, which was to have far reaching, long-term impact on Kenya's political evolution. Kamau Wa Ngengi was born in 1890 in the vicinity of what later became known as the Kiambu District of the Kikuyu Reserve. He was educated at the Church of Scotland Mission, near the settlement named Kikuyu, and baptized with the Christian name Johnstone Kaman. In the early 1920's he changed his name to Johntone Kenyata when he became an active member in Harry Thuku's political party, the YKA. "Kenyatta" in the Kikuyu language, literally translates to "beaded belt," but it is believed that he chose that name principally because of its similarity to his country's name. He did not asume the name "Jomo" Kenyatta until 1938, when he published his book entitiled Facing Mount Kenya. The book was produced from his anthropological thesis, written while he was a student at the London School of Economics.61 Soon after the YKA was oulawed in 1922, it was replaced by the Kenya Central Association, founded by Joseph Kangethe. Most of the YKA activists joined the ranks of the KCA, including Kenyatta, who became a KCA officer in 1925, and its General Secretary in 1928.62 Meanwhile, the KCA held public meetings and rallies, seeking to organize all politically minded Africans establish an influential political voice, and bring about improved social, economic and labor conditions for Africans. At the same time, the colony's Asian community, numbering approximately 40,000, organized themselves and made their own bid for political representation in the administration's legislative council. The Asians had already achieved dominance in the mercantile affairs of the colony, and their economic influence carried enough impact to win them limited representation. In 1923, the British government issued a landmark restatement of colonial policy, which became known as the 1923 White Paper. Following is an exerpt from that document, which identifies its main thrust: Primarily, Kenya is an African territory, and Her Majesty's Government think it necessary definitely to record their considered opinion that the interests of the Afican natives must be paramount, and if and when those interests and the interests of the immigrant races should conflict, the former should prevail.63 Nearly a quarter of a century after Sir Charles Eliot and Lord Delamere proclaimed the doctrine of white supremacy and paramount European interests in Kenya, the British Colonial Office reversed their proclamation. But the 1923 White Paper could not reverse the precedent they had set in the minds and attitudes of the settler population. Early in the second decade (circa 1911), the Settler's Association had established the Convention of Associates, nicknamed the Settlers' Parliament, which thereafter represented their united interests in the Legislative Council.64 Since its inception, the settlers' political aim was to gain full control of the administration of the territory. Although full control was never achieved, the settlers did achieve significant administrative control, did preserve their interests in all areas relative to the land and labor issues, and did successfully oppose the native development issues which were supported by the colonial adminstrative officials and missionaries.65 Those trends were not visibly changed by the 1923 White Paper. Not until 1944 did the Africans achieve representation of any kind in the legislature--one nominee, whose nomination could be rejected by the Governor--two decades after the Asians were granted represntation. The African political activities of the 1920's did succeed in gaining the attention of the administration, but the Africans made no substantial political gains. Instead, their activities stimulated further pressure on the administration, by the European settlers, to control the African disturbance. In 1925, the administration suppressed the Kikuyu elders's replacement cycle.66 In an effort to gain better control over the native tribes, and to maintain continuity of that control, the administration appointed native chiefs to rule the tribes. The appointed chiefs were usually chosen from among the tribal elders, but were always chosen on the basis of loyal cooperation with administration policies. Once appointed, they could not be periodically replaced by the age set progression system, and replacement was allowed only upon administrative approval. 1928 was a significant year in Johnstone Kenyatta's political career. As previously mentioned, he became General Secretary of the Kikuyu Central Association. That same year he founded his political newspaper entitled Mwigwithania, through which he did much to awaken the political consciousness of his fellow Africans. Still and again, the central issue to which the people could be rallied was that of the stolen lands. The third major event of the year was the mandate urged upon him by the KCA to represent the Association in London. Early the following year, he arrived there (at KCA expense) to present a petition of Kikuyu grievances to the Colonial Office. The major complaints listed therein included land alienation, government interference with tribal customs, and lack of representation on the Legislative Council. The proper approach, from the Colonial Office's point of view, would have been for the KCA to present the petition to the colonial administration in Kenya. Instead, it was Kenyatta's intention to present the petition, in person, to Secretary of State for the Colonies Whitehall. He "got little further than the outer office."67 Kenyatta's first stay in Europe lasted eighteen months, during which time he traveled extensively, was invited into many social circles as a popular cocktail circuit attraction, and consequently became well known and well connected with influential political figures. He wrote several political articles, including a letter published in the London Times, joined the Communist Party, and twice traveled to Russia. He was forced to borrow money for his trip home when the KCA money ran out in 1930.68 Around the time of Kenyatta's first return to the colony, the issue of religion was coming to a head among the Kikuyu converts. The missionaries' condemnations of female circumcision and polygamy were the chief causes of dissention. The missionaries had gone so far as to require their converts to sign a pledge, to not permit their daughters to be initiated, as a condition to maintaining full membership in the mission churches. By Kikuyu custom, women were not eligible for marriage unless they had been initiated. Likewise, converts were required to abandon all their wives but one, and breakdown of the traditional family system became progressively more severe in consequence. By this time, educated Kikuyu were dedicating themselves to the study of the bible--from cover to cover. Nowhere, therein, could they find any written prohibition of polygamy or female circumcision. Futhermore, they found numerous references to principal Old Testiment characters having multiple wives and endorsing circumcision, though no specific reference to female circumcision was found. Even Saint Paul was quoted, "circumcision is nothing, and uncircumcision is nothing." They questioned, therefore, why prohibition of these ancient customs should be imposed as preconditions to full membership in the Christian church. As a result, many Kikuyu enlisted in a movement to establish independent Christian churches. outside the influence of the European missionaries. The major establishments were the Kikuyu African Orthodox Church and the Kikuyu independent Pentacostal Church, although many smaller churches were founded as well. These independent churches were initially founded upon the basic precepts of Christ, as interpreted by the Kikuyu scholars.69 Those precepts appealed to their sense of morality and presented few significant contradictions to their fundamental way of life. Many missionaries, and Europeans in general, naively interpreted the split as merely a rebellion by a primitive, pagan race against the goodness of Christianity, and the schizophrenic rejection of all things modern and European.70 It was, in fact, more fundamental than that. It was rebellion by the people of a complex and highly developed (though economically and technologically unsophisticated) culture, against arbitrary imposition of twentieth century European moral and economic standards, at too rapid a rate and too early a time in their social evolution.71 The prohibition against participation in the ancient customs applied also to teachers and students in the mission schools. Establishment of independent churches was soon followed by establishment of independent schools. The major early schools were the Kikuyu Karinga Schools Association and the Kikuyu Independent Schools Association, which were directly associated with the independent Orthodox and Pentecostal churches. These schools started out on the same basis of educational standards as the mission schools they replaced. Employing many African teachers who were formerly employed by the mission, they educated many thousands of children who would have received no education opportunity otherwise.72 The education system overall, including both the mission schools and the independent schools, inadvertantly created further detriment to the moral fiber of the African culture. Traditional education, before the coming of the Europeans, was conducted by parents and elders in the family and Mbari setting. The major thrust of that education included lessons in morality, religion, marriage and sexaulity. As children became able to read and write, they developed an attitude of disrespect for their illiterate parents and elders, and eventually refused fo accept their guidance and advise on any matters, most destructively, on matters of discipline and morality. While the school system provided rather adequate academic education, it had little time to dedicate to moral guidance, certainly far less than the family proviously provided.73 This was especially true of the independent schools, wherein most of the teachers were only marginally educated themselves, and had no accredited teachers to supervise them. Thus, over several decades, there grew up more than one generation of adults, who had abandoned or lost their traditional moral principles, without having received a suitable substitute to fill the void.74 Even those who received the benefits, if you will, of the missions' guidance were rather incomplete citizens of the new society, primarily because they were disowned by their families. They had no roots in the old traditions, and they were not accepted in the new European environment of white supremacy. More and more, the independent schools became breeding grounds for anti-white sentiments and nationalism. The KCA recognized the void, and quickly stepped in to fill it with politicized moral guidance of their own brand. They infiltrated the schools' supervisory councils, where they could influence the curriculum and the hiring and training of teachers. The independent schools refused government financial aid, because to accept it would have meant government control of curriculum.75 The early 1930's were also the time when the land issue came to a head. To digress a bit, the land claimed by settlers in the first decade was vacant, for the most part, because the natives had temporarily vacated the disease and pest-ridden areas. The second decade saw many natives returning to their lands, finding them occupied by settlers, and accepting cash or payment in kind under questionable circumstances. The natives understood the payments to be for temporary cultivation rights, while the Europeans understood the payments to be for transfer of ownership. The third decade of the twentieth century was wrought with turmoil as Europeans and Africans realized the severity of the misunderstood transactions. By that time the settler population had grown considerably in size, and the natives were beginning to feel the effects of reduced land availability. The contested land was primarily that owned by Kikuyu, who by that time had become partially educated and culturally frustrated. The land represented the only real object of permanence to which they could cling, as every other aspect of their traditional existence was being fragmented and stripped away. The political activists of the Young Kikuyu Association, followed by those of the Kikuyu Central Association, recognized the land issue as being the fundamental issue around which all the Kikuyu could be called to rally. During the late 1920's, a study of the land problem was conducted by the Kikuyu Land Inquiry Committee, of which L.S.B. Leakey, author of Mau Mau and the Kikuyu, 1952, and Defeating Mau Mau, 1954, was a member. Leakey was born and raised in Kenya, among the Kikuyu, and was one of the Europeans who gained intimate familiarity with the people and their customs first hand. when the results of the committee's study were presented in 1929, the majority of government officials were wholly unaware, and found it hard to believe even then, that the Kikuyu system of land tenure was based upon ownership of estates with well defined boundaries. In years passed, when the Kikuyu first realized the white settlers' beliefs and claims of ownership, educated Kikuyu discovered the white man's system of land title deeds. At that time, Kikuyu began demanding "tidleydee," as they called the documents, from the administration for lands to which the settlers had not yet laid claims. These demands were made because the Kikuyu feared that more settlers would arrive, and more land would be wrongfully claimed. The colonial administration refused to issue title deeds to the Kikuyu, "on the grounds that all Kikuyu land ranked as Crown Land under the Crown Lands Ordinance, and that the Kikuyu were, in effect, only tenants at the will of the Crown." Such lands were declared Native Reserves, as administrative protection against private claims to ownership by settlers. Europeans still believed, even after the Kikuyu Land Inquiry Committee's results were published to the contrary in 1929,..."that the land was held communally by all members of the tribe, and that any person could build huts and cultivate any piece of land, wherever he chose, provided it was not already being used by someone else.76 There were further complications to the land issue. First, the more wealthy Kikuyu enticed less fortunate Kikuyu, who encountered unfamiliar, government-induced economic problems, to sell their land holdings for substantial sums money. These sales among tribe members further increased the number of landless Kikuyu. Second, there was no transfer of title deeds; therefore, the administration had no formal record of such transactions. Third, it was suspected that an undetermined number of dishonest natives filed claims with the administration for lands they had no right to, in hopes that in the confusion of trying to settle the complicated land issue, the administration might compensate them for their alleged losses. Fourth, there were many newly educated young Kikuyu, who wanted to improve their standard of living by building more sanitary, European style homes for their families. But those who were landless, living as tenants on European claimed land that had once belonged to their ancestors, were not permitted to build such permanent structures.77 Their situation was such that they had been introduced to a new culture, fostered hopes for a better life style within that culture, but then were denied opportunity to fulfill their expectations. In 1931, Johnstone Kenyatta returned to England, along with Parmenas Mukeri, to represent the KCA in testimony before a Joint Parliamentary Committee investigation of the Kenya Colony land issue. Kenyatta'S stay in England continued untill 1946. It has been claimed that throughout this fifteen year absence from Kenya, the KCA "never made any major decision without consulting him first."78 The mounting accumulation of African frustrations, further antagonized by the rally calls of the political activists, convinced the colonial administration by the fourth decade that bona fide grievances existed, especially among the Kikkuyu. A Royal Commission was appointed in 1932 to take affimative action on the land issue. The Carter Land Commission, as it became known, recommended both cash compensation and provision of "certain new land" for Kikuyu settlement. Most of the recommendations published in the 1933 Kenya Land Commission Report were implemented; however, some dishonest Kikuyu presented outrageous false claims to the Commission, which clouded the issue and caused many just claims to be set aside in the process. Additionally, a portion of the "new lands" designated for compensation, though not included in the Kikuyu Reserve as defined by the government at that time, were actually lands which the Kikuyu originally claimed as their own. The final outcome of the government's land settlement effort was self-satisfaction on the administration's behalf; they believed that justice was fully served, with perhaps an extra portion to the natives than deserved. The Kikuyu were far from satisfied. After the settlement they remained overcrowded, they remained barely able to raise enough food for basic subsistence, and they remained frustrated by their continued inability to raise their standard of living79 to a level in anyway comparable to that of the Europeans, or even the Asians, who were dominating their African land. During the land settlement investigations and debates, Harry Thuku, founder of the banned Young Kikuyu Association, was released from detention. He immediately returned to political life as an active member of the KCA, but his moderate brand of politics was incompatible with the growing radicalism he found among its memership. By 1933, KCA radicals became even more extremist as a result of their dissatisfaction with the government's land settlement solution. Consequently, the KCA became split by opposing factions, with Thuku at the head of the moderate wing. Thuku was elected president of the KCA in 1935, defeating Jesse Kariuki and Joseph Kangethe. Kangethe, the KCA founder and incumbent president, refused to give up his office. As a result, Thuku and his moderate followers departed and founded the Kikuyu Provincial Association (KPA), dedicated to cooperation with the government, in terms of opposition by constitutional means. Unfortunately, the KPA could not muster sufficient popular support to successfully compete with the more radical KCA.80 From 1935 onward, the KCA became the most powerful and influential political group among the Africans. Many other moderate African groups including the Kikuyu Loyal Patriots, and the Progressive Kikuyu Party were drowned out by the voice of KCA, and groups with similar radical views became KCA affiliates. The advent of World War II marked the legal termination of the KCA. In May 1940, the colonial administration arrested the leaders of KCA on charges fasedition and outlawed the organization. Homemade weapons were found in the Reserves, and allegations were made concerning use of the weapons to resist conscription and to assist Italian invasion from Ethiopia in the north. Consequently, the KCA was accused of collaboration with the Italians. Harry Thuku's KPA, which supported the British was movement, remained in existence,81 and Thuku continued to be a major political opponent of the outlawed Johnstone (by then, Jomo) Kenyatta for many years. Kenneth Ingham, in his book A History of East Africa, accused the colonial administration of exercising poor judgement in their failure to recognize the activities of these political groups as representative of constituent African feeling. They chose to measure popular sentiment as reflected by loyal words and actions of the government appointed chiefs, and regarded all other groups, "as consisting solely of dissident elements."82 In 1944, the administration appointed Eliud Mathu, a political moderate, as the first African representative to the Legilative Council. The Kenya Farmers' and Traders' Association, which allegedly took up the KCA banner when it was outlawed and forced underground, nominated Peter Koinange to the Legislative Council, but that nomination was rejected by the Governor in favor of Mathu.83 Koinange had previously founded the Githunguri Teachers' Training College, in 1939, for the purpose of providing qualified teachers for the independent school systems throughout Kenya. The teachers' college allegedly became infiltrated by the KCA, and eventually came under its total control as both a propaganda tool and a cover organization for the KCA.84 In 1944, Mathu founded the Kenya African Study Union (KASU) with British support and the assistance of a British scholar. AS a moderate political party, it never gained enough popular support to become a representative voice of the people.85 In terms of economic prosperity, World War II was beneficial to Kenya. The global character of the war made Kenya's location strategically important. The Royal Air Force estalished training bases there, and the Royal Navy used the port of Mombasa as an intermediate base from which it supported the war effort in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Likewise, the British Army used Kenya as a staging base in reasonable proximity to the Far East. The colony's agricultural output was greatly in demand to feed British forces throughout those regions. The age of air travel reached maturity during the war, and even thereafter, Nairobi continued as a major international airport. As such it provided easy access to a developing land, and became the "commercial capital for all East African territories." Investment capital poured in from airlines and oil companies, soon followed by large banks and insurance companies. The new settlers in Kenya were businessmen, far removed from the basic problems of the African population. Nairobi and its surrounding areas boomed, and its complexion changed drastically. There appeared broader, paved streets, tall buildings and increased automobile traffic. Concurrently, the slums grew worse in size and condition, as serious housing shortages became critical. The economic boom attracted further immigration, including South Africans, Rhodesians, and more Europeans-not just British. The immigrants came from many backgrounds, seeking economic success in the boom, or peaceful security in retirement. Significantly, there were many ex-soldiers who had no civilian skills, as well as retired civilians with fixed retirement incomes.86 These immigrants created a wide array of socio-economic problems for the colony, the negative impact of which fell hardest upon the black African population. A newer and larger privileged population reasseted the old doctrine of white supremacy. This time around, the doctrine was not officially sanctioned, but it persisted and dominated the attitudes of the white population, nevertheless, The difference in 1945 was that the Africans no longer accepted it. Once again the Asian merchant community prospered, forming the wealthy middle class, numbering about 150,000.87 As for the black African population, the soldiers who served the British Crown in World War II were more educated than their fathers of World War I. Consequently, they were more influenced by what hey experienced.88 This time they served as combat soldiers in the King's African Rifles (KAR), and they were treated more as equals by their white comrades in arms. They enjoyed responsibility, good pay, nutritious food and the concerned leadership which was afforded them by their white officers. The officers were less aloof and more tolerant than the "bwanas" the black men had been accustomed to in their old civilian jobs. After the war's emancipating experience, the Africans did not want to go back to the old life in the Reserves. Instead they settled in Nairobi and other boom towns, in hopes of establishing a future in the new society and sharing the benefits.89 Many tried to start small business or invest in various enterprises, but most such attempts failed.90 They experienced widespread prejudicial treatment in their own country, which had not existed during the war in foreign lands (e.g. Southern Italy). The same old "bwanas" controlled the labor market, and blacks could not break into the Asian-dominated trades. During the period 1946 to 1952, employment increased 70% among Europeans, 43% among Asians, and only 15% among black Africans.91 The slums swelled with frustrated, unemployed natives, who spent much of their idle time listening to political speeches by educated Africans. The speeches were filled with concepts not fully understood by the uneducated masses, but the sounds of which were quite appealing, words such as independence, labor organization and African nationalism. As frustration mounted and bellies became more empty, crime increased to epidemic proportions, and a Nairobi underworld developed. Most significant to the conflict of the coming decade, was the strange mixture of crime and politics, from which the post war underworld was organized.92 Herein lay the core and the instruments of Mau Mau. The KCA leaders, who were imprisoned in 1940, were released in 1944. They immediately resumed their political activities, and quickly reestablished a massive following, though in a more covert manner than before. They established fronts to obscure their activities from the colonial administration, and efficiently targeted the victims of social injustice to spread their propaganda. The frustrated residents of city slums were obvious targets, as were labor unions and ex-servicemen's associations. As previously mentioned, they had established a firm hold on the independent school systems, and exerted a limited amount of influence on the supporting independent churches as well.93 Many of the former KCA leaders joined the KASU, "in order to enjoy the freedom and organization of a legal body; from the outset they constituted the radical wing...prepared to capitalize on popular frustrations if the moderate majority failed to make headway with the colonial administration."94 Other organizations, ostensibly formed fro purely social purposes, were used extensively to conceal political activity. Examples of some were the Kikuyu General Union, the Kikuyu Club, and the Kikuyu Musical Society. These organizations were among many later used for Mau Mau meeting and initiation ceremonies.95 By 1945, the outlawed KCA members had collected enough money for Kenyatta's return trip from England. The foregoing discussion of conditions in Nairobi may have suggested that economic deprivation was the key issue in the post war political arena. In fact, that issue was key, in that it provided a dissident population which was receptive to political catalysts. But once again, the recurring theme of stolen lands and European exploitation provided the rally point. Not only had the British failed to compensate African troops for war service in the way that "the Kikuyu had some reason to anticipate, but 3.3 million acres were offered to the Zionists. At the same time, Kenyan land was offered to British ex-servicemen." An additional factor worth mentioning is that recent attainment of independence by India and Burman gave politically minded Kenyans similar ideas.96 The Kenya African Study Union (KASU) was originally a moderate, colony-wide African organization established to provide Eliud Mathu with advise concerning the needs of the African people. As it became infiltrated by political activists carrying the nationalist banner, the word "Study" was found to be inappropriate and dropped from its title. Thus, in 1946, the Kenya African Union (KAU) was born. The union's original constitution included such aims as the unity of all Kenya Africans, preparation for the introduction of democracy, advancement of African interests, opposition to racial barriers, and acquisition of legislative representation, voting rights, freedom of assembly, press and movement. Nowhere among its constitutional aims were the nationalist aims of the old KCA; i.e. return of alienated lands and national independence.97 But that same year Jomo Kenyatta returned to Kenya as the nationalist movement leader. In June of 1947, the moderate president of the former KASU stepped down, and Kenyatta was overwhelmingly elected president of the KAU.98 As had occurred within the KCA in the 1930's, a power struggle between moderates and radicals took place within the KAU during the late 1940's. The radicals this time around were chiefly the same players as in the earlier game, bound together by their KCA oaths of loyalty and secrecy, but experiences since the 1930's made them more militant. By 1947, the militant wing had gained key leadership positions, but there occurred no major party split, unlike the KCA/KPA split in the late 1930's. It is generally accepted that the militant wing of the KCA was closely linked to, if not synomomous with, the movement later called Mau Mau. Likewise, it is generally agreed that the Nairobi underworld eventually comprised the hardcore Mau Mau elements. Yet there is widespread divergence of opinion, among authors on the subject, as to any direct relationship between Jomo Kenyatta and the Mau Mau movement.99a The militant wing pressed the old land issue harder than ever in 1947. The Kikuyu Reserve, which was the closest of the native reserves to Nairobi, was increasingly pressed by both the post-war immigration growth and their own "natural" population increase. (The missionaries' success, in terms of discouraging the practice of traditional birth control methods early in the century, was manifesting itself prodigiously by 1947.) The Kikuyu apparently did not have a complete understanding of the boundaries imposed by the various reserves (e.g. the Forest Reserve, which bordered the Kikuyu Reserve, etc.), and they were constantly spilling ovvr into bordering areas, including European settlements. This spillover was necessary mainly for agricultural reasons. There simply was not enough land alloted to them for subsistence food production--at least not so far as they believed. Their agricultural methods were still very primitive: yield per acre was very low, soil erosion and mineral depletion took a rapid toll, and draught, pests and plant diseases destroyed much of their harvest potential. The colonial administration's logical answer to their agricultural problems, was to teach them modern techniques which could improve crop yield. The Kikuyu women were enraged by the amount of extra work required by the new techniques, especially the cultivation and soil conservation methods. For as many centuries as their verbal history revealed, their ancestors had simply farmed more land when more food was needed, and moved to more fertile ground when the soil wore out. In their view, the Europeans were forcing more changes upon them, this time requiring difficult labor, when a simpler solution existed in tradition. The militant wing of the KAU seized the opportunity to point out that the Europeans had "stolen" the prime farm land from the Africans, and because they had done so, they were forcing the Africans to make do with the left overs. The militants presented exerpts from the Carter Land Commission report of the mid-1930's, as "proof" that, "at least some of the Kikuyu lands had been illegally taken without recompence." In the most radical arguments presented to the people, the "stolen" lands applied to all European held lands. Thus, the soil conservation issue, specifically the government's land terracing program, became the focal point of Kikuyu resentment toward Europeans in general in 1947. The administration decreed the program mandatory, aggravated the situation by consolidating fractionated Kikuyu land holdings,99b and undertook strenuous enforcement measures. The Kikuyu women refused to comply. Public demonstrations and riots resulted, and the administration's police force had its hands full. Finally, the administration backed down on the terracing issue, and Jomo Kenyatta agreed to join the District Commissioner on a tour of the Central District to calm the disturbances.100 By this time, Kenyatta was becoming concerned that the radical militancy of the nationalists might be betting out of control. He, himself, was a nationalist, but apparently not a radical, certainly not a militant on the surface. Beneath the surface, no one seems to know for certain what he was, with one exception: the literature researched is consistent in describing him as an intelligent, well-organized, politically astute leader, who was effectively capable of inspiring the African people. Aside from that, he has been accused of being the originator and executive leader of the Mau Mau movement, while other authors acquit him of any connection, whatever, to Mau Mau, its origin or its evolution. The evidence does not convincingly support either of these extreme views. James E. Trinnamen has built a strong case to support the assertions of D.H. Rawcliffe's 1954publication, The Struggle for Kenya, which place Kenyatta somewhere between the extremes. As a devout nationalist, "Kenyatta was intent on reorganizing KAU into an effective and disciplined national movement...Kenyatta believed that the use of passive resistence and political sabotage of government measures would force the colonial administration to deal with the African leadership. In addition, the activities of the extremist nationalists would help in this process by encouraging the administration to seek reasonable and moderate Africans, that is Kenyatta, through which to work to reachieve some form of political balance."101 Behind the scenes, Kenyatta probably encouraged controlled violence, to suit his aims, and almost certainly did not discourage it. Too often, his leadership of the KAU was demonstrated to be uncontested. His influence over the KAU could not have survived so totally, if he had actively opposed the powerful militant wing. Publicly he never spoke for or against Mau Mau. Therefore, at the very least, he encouraged the Mau Mau movement by his tacit approach to the issue. Kenyatta'S joint tour of the Central Province with the administrative Commissioner was the first major indicator that his political scheme of maneuver was tactically sound. The violent refusal of the Kikuyu to comply with administrative decree (i.e. the mandatory program) served his purpose. The administration acknowledged his representaion of reasonable African leadership capable of controlling the violent situation and calming the people. Kenyatta's real concern over uncontrolled violence did not relate to this instance, which was probably carefully orchestrated behind the scenes. His concern related to militant extremists who lay outside his sphere of control; i.e. outside of the KAU. The "Religious" Nationalists It was pointed out earlier in this text, that the religious issue came to a head among Kikuyu converts in the early 1930's. The two major Kikuyu independent churches were founded as a result. But as early as 1907, the first breakaway church was founded by John Awalo. Owalo was one of Kenyatta's teachers at the Church Missionary Society school in Nairobi. Among religious revisionists in Kenya, he would be classified as a moderate, simply declaring that, "God had sent a new word through him for the African people." His church closely followed the precepts of the Old Testiment, which he interpreted as being consistent with the fundamental precepts of the Kikuyu religion, including polygamy and circumcision of both sexes, according to James Trinneman.102 It should be pointed out at this point, that tribes other than the Kikuyu formed their own churches or religious cults, called "dinis," as rejections of missionary prohibitions. Some of these were more than simply rejections. A number of them openly advocated expulsion of European missionaries from the country, while others advocated expulsion of Europeans in general. Trinneman writes that dinis founded after World War I were more radical in their anti-European aims and more secretive in their organization and activity. Dinis founded after World War II were more radical still. Following World War II, the five most powerful dinis were the "Dini ya Msambwa" (Cult of the Spirits of the Dead), formed by the Suk tribe; "Dini ya Roho" (Cult of the Holy Ghost), formed by the Luo tribe; "Dini ya Mboja" (Cult of Prayer), formed by the Kipsigi; and two Kikuyu dinis, "Watsu wa Mungu" (The People of God) and "Dini ya Yesu Kristo" (Cult of Jesus Christ).103 While it seems clear that Kenyatta was able to exercise some degree of influence upon the main separatist Kikuyu churches in the 1930's (as a result of KCA infiltration of their associated achool systems), it is quistionable how much control he had over the activities of the post World War II cults, if any. These cults, vehemently opposed European presence or influence of any kind, practiced rites and ceremonies steeped in magic and mystical oaths, and Trinneman credited them with contributing religious fanaticism to the character of the Mau Mau movement. At least three of their leaders shared commonality of background. They were products of European mission schools, who rejected the missions, founded their own cults under claims of supernatural powers, intermixed some precepts of Christianity with those of ancient tribal religions, and preached that, "the white man should be driven from Kenya."104 Elijah Masindi was a member of the Suk tribe, who founded the Dine ya Msamba. On he grounds that he was answerable only to God, he refused to pay his poll taxes, and in 1944 was imprisoned when he refused to sign a pledge to keep the peace. While in prison, he was declared insane and committed to a mental hospital. Upon his release in May of 1947, he immediately recognized his cult. He held mass rallies in July and September, calling his followers to arms and calling upon the spirits of the dead, "to aid them in the coming battle," to drive the Europeans out of their lands. Symbolically, the Septemter rally of 5000 or more participants was held at the site of the last major battle waged against British incursion into Kenya at the turn of the century. Masindi was captured and deported in 1948 after several clashes between members of his cult and British forces. Though declared illegal, the cult continued to expand under the leedership of Lucas Pkiech.105 Pkiech, who also belonged to the Suk Tribe, joined Masindi's cult in 1946. His role at that time was to recruit new converts, which resulted in his being arrested several times in the ensuing two years. Finally, in August 1948, he was again arrested and sentenced to prison for 25 years, on charges of "holding a prohibited meeting." Within the first year of imprisonment, he escaped to take Masindi's place as leader of the Dini ya Msambwa. His promises to the membership included, "eternal life, no European control, no sickness, relief from blindness, immunity from gunfire and capture,...fertility in the men and no sterility in the women." His threats to doubters included, "the possibility that their animals would sicken and die." Pkiech was killed in April 1950 in a short, bloody battle between British forces and "several hundred" members of the Dini ya Msambwa. No total casualty figures regarding this battle were found in the sources available. This cult was credited by Trinneman with establishing the basic behavior pattern of Mau Mau, though it was "officially" disbanded in 1950.106 Ruben Kihiko was a member of the Kikuyu tribe who led the Dini ya Jesu Kristo. This was a new militant Kikuyu cult, which developed after World War II. According to Trinneman, Kihiko was characterized as a real horror, brutal, fanatical and spiteful; his movement was regarded as rabid 'Kikuyuism,' to which was added Old Testiment bloodthirstiness." Kihiko's most identifiable contribution to Mau Nau, aside from his "bloodthirsty" character, was his prohibition against the use of any European thing or procedure. Included in his proscriptions were the use of European clothing and the practice of shaving, which made his followers easily identifiable in the early days.107 The radical, militant, post-war dinis and their leaders were the probable main source of Kenyatta's concern. If he could not control their violence, he would be of little use to the British as, "the rational African leadership through which they could work," to reachieve political balance. Emergence of Mau Mau According to Raymond Glazier, the first rumors of Mau Mau and secret oaths reached segments of the European community in 1948.108 The exact date is unknown, because Europeans paid little attention to it initially; they did not know what it was and did not seem to care. There is still very little known about the name's origin. None of the Kenya tribes have admitted to a direct translation of the word in their native language.109 Raymond Glazier, in his 1967 study entitled Kenya: The Termination of Mau Mau, alleges that an African clergyman (tribe not stated) first gave Mau Mau its name while denouncing it from his pulpit in 1948. Glazier's source is unknown.110 Then, the Mau Mau mystic began. Europeans in general knew nothing about it, where it came from, what it meant, why it existed or who was behind it. By 1952 they did learn to fear it, but not to understand it. Even today, the literature is such a jumble of contrasting theories and parochial interpretations of event, that it is difficult to determine which, if any, are correct. It is referred to in this text simply as a movement. Some authors call it a political organization, others a religious organization, still others a purely criminal organization, and finally there are those who call it total disorganization--a manifestation of irrational hysteria by a primitive people whose culture was shattered and never suitably replaced. It is this author's belief that Mau Mau was, in fact, a mixture of all those things, in various proportions, during extended and overlapping periods of time. Much attention was paid to speculation during the 1950's, that Mau Mau was communist inspired, or at least communist supported.111 This was so mainly because Kenyatta joined the communist party and visited Russia during his 1928-1930 stay in Europe; however, research has revealed no evidence to support such speculation and most authors flatly deny any possibility of truth to it. The cultural problems at the root of Mau Mau have been painfully laid out in the foregoing pages, but the problems were infinitely more complex than can be adequately presented in a study of this scope. What should be made apparent, however, is that all sources researched unanimously agree, that the Kikuyu were the tribe most heavily impacted by the arrival, administration and growth of British influence, and thereafter comprised the majority of Mau Mau (though not all Kikuyu were Mau Mau). The politics found at the root of Mau Mau were nationalistic, in that the activist leadership discussed in the foregoing pages, stated their aims as eviction of Europeans and/or unification of all the African tribes of Kenya. It appears that the political activists and Mau Mau never worked out collectively, the problem of which aim should be achieved first, or by what means, despite the fact that most of the political leaders, as well as the rank and file activists, were Kikuyu. The religious fanaticism which characterised Mau Mau sprang from the post-war cults, as noted. Although the cults were not exclusively Kikuyu, the format and symbolism employed in the Mau Msu initiation rites and oathing ceremonies were district adaptation of traditional Kikuyu rituals. Researched sources did not specify what percentage of the criminal element comprising the Nairobi underworld were Kikuyu. However, the previously cited sources regarding the induced migrations of Kikuyu to Nairobi, followed by unemployment, frustration and lawlessness, lead one to believe that the percentage was significantly large. Majdalany refers to this element In State of Emergency, as being recruited into KAU employment as a kind of strongarm enforcement group, numbering 2000 men. "Conspicuous in this element," writes Majdalany, "was the self-styled 'Forty Group' of young thugs." He goes on to describe their origin and make up: The fraternal solidarity that bound together members of the same circumcision groups (of Kikuyu) after the initiations which occur every two or three years. The Forty Group were ostensibly the initiates of 1940 and had been most involved (as non-combatants) in the war. They had attracted to themselves others of a similar type.112 Majdalany describes 1948 as being a rather quiet year compared to the mass rallies and violence of 1947: The suggestion that Kenyatta was now restraining his hot heads from racing too fast and thereby disrupting his master plan is supported by the fact that...1948...was an uneasy lull rater than the beginning of a peaceful era.113 If the premise is accepted that Kenyatta did not have all of Kenya's violent elements under control in 1947, it could be inferred that he used the "Forty Group" during 1948 in an effort to gain that control. Majdalany goes on to discuss increased reports of "a secret society called Mau Mau" and oathing ceremonies: An itelligence report linked the oathing ceremonies with "the people of three letters." A report by an African clergyman (passed on to the Chief Native Commissioner) stated that the KCA was enticing the ignorant to take its oath by suggesting that only those who had been oathed would benefit from the large new land redistribution which Jomo Kenyatta was planning...Then in September...Special Branch recorded that "a new movement, the Mau Mau, believed to be a branch of KCA, had appeared in Naivasha."...Now for the first time Mau Mau had been named in an official report.114 The single common thread running through the constituent elements contributing to Mau Mau, was the predominance of Kikuyu membership. During interviews with many Kikuyu tribesmen, with whom he grew up, L.S.B. Leakey found that the so-called loyalist Kikuyu (those who opposed Mau Mau) credited the old militant wing of the KCA with being the core element of Mau Mau. But Leakey also reasons that many former KCA members, "had come to realize that the organization had done more harm than good to their cause...and...no longer gave their support to such movements.115 Raymond Glazier asserts, in Kenya: The Termination of Mau Mau, that it became obvious by 1950, that two types of conflict were taking place simultaneously in Kenya: One a political nationalist movement which petitioed both the British Governor and the Secretary of State for the Colonies in London and bitterly attacked white settler institutions and land "theft" in speeches and pamphlets, and another which pitted those who had taken a magical oath to restore Kikuyu land in violent conflict against those who refused to take the oath. People were often forced to take the Mau Mau oath, and the first reports of violence (by Mau Mau) were threats, terrorism and murders of Kikuyu who refused to participate.116 The first set of oaths employed were mainly composed of prohibitions, rather than requiring specific action. The sources researched had various version of the oaths, which were gathered from many sources, second hand, but all versions contain the same basic ingredients. Following is the first set as presented by Majdalany: (a) If I ever reveal the secrets of this organization, may this oath kill me. (b) If I ever sell or dispose of any Kikuyu land to a foreigner, may this oath kill me. (c) If I ever jail to follow our great leader, Kenyatta, may this oath kill me. (d) If I ever inform against any member of this organization or against any member of this organization or against any member who steals from the European, may this oath kill me. (e) If I ever fail to pay the fees of this organization, may this oath kill me.117 There is much confusion in the literature as to who was really responsible far the early oaths. It has been said in the available literature that they were KCA oaths, that they were Mau Mau oaths, and that KCA was the same thing as Mau Mau. It has been pretty well established that although the KCA was outlawed and disbanded in 1940, the militant members thereof remained banded together by their initiation age groups, joined the KAU and formed its militant wing. Kikuyu tribesmen, apparently of a younger initiation age group, became part of the Nairobi underworld, and eventually formed the Mau Mau hardcore. Perhaps they were brought under the influence of the militant wing at an early stage. However, the literature implies that the militant religious cults were founded and led by men who have not been proven to have been KCA members at all. While a portion of their followers could have been part of the old KCA militant wing, certainly not all of them were--many were not even Kikuyu. The point to be made here is that any one of several factions could have initiated the original Mau Mau movement in the late 1947 to early 1948 time frame. The apparent intent of initiating the Mau Mau movement was to unify the Kikuyu, and then perhaps the other Kenyan tribes later on. From a rational militant stand point, a unified African population would be essential in order to expel the Europeans by force. The nationalist politicians were divided into militant and moderate factions. The religious community was split into several factions, including Christians still loyal to the European missions; Christians who established independent, African-based churches; non-christians who continued to cling to the true religion of the ancients; and the new cultists who developed radical religions of their own. The criminal element apparently consisted of an underworld organization of unknown factions, whose loyalties could be shifted wherever the opportunities for power and profit seemed most promising. There were many Kikuyu who initially had no political interests one way or another, classified as British loyalists. Most authors are inclined to credit the old KCA militants with initiating the Mau Mau movement, and logic would dictate that to be the most probable case. But any of the factions interested in ridding Kenya of the British could have been responsible. The important unanswered question is whether Jomo Kenyatta was the real catalyst, or whether one or more of the factions initiated the movement in his name without his consent. If Kenyatta was the catalyst, then the theory advanced by most British authorities on the subject is valid; i.e., that the Mau Mau movement stemmed from a single seat of power, from which a complex organization was operated through a formal chain of command to achieve a single set of objectives. Majdalany even goes so far as to suggest in State of Emergency, that Kenyatta had a master strategy, which he put into effect from the moment of his arrival back in Kenya in 1946. Allegedly, Mau Mau was a part of that strategy, intended to effect the unification of the Kikuyu tribe, "into a dominating united entity wholly submissive to his leadership." Such extreme measures were required, according to Majdalany, because the Kikuyu were becoming too well adapted to conditions under administration of the British, and could not be motivated to a national liberation movement through political means alone. He further charges that Kenyatta's strategy called for an especially perverted form of religion (a mixture of desecrated ancient Kikuyu religion and Christianity, with Kenyatta replacing Christ), as the motive force of unification. At this point in his thesis, Majdalany's racial prejudices, or those of his sources, begin to show through. As he explains the cleverness of the plan, he declares that, "The need for religion is ingrained (in the Kikuyu people) and with it a high susceptibility to superstition, black and white magic, the supernatural, the effect of ritual."118 It is hard to imagine Kenyatta, himself a Kikuyu, applying such reasoning in a long term strategy. The logic is much more in keeping with that of the white settlers, the administration personnel or Governor Mitchell, himself. After two years of unimpeded growth through coercive recruitment, Mau Mau was finally declared illegal in 1950. In August of that year, the colonial governor appointed the Internal Security Working Committee, to evaluate the severity of Kenya Colony's internal security risk, and to make appropriate recommendations in response to the risk. Not until November of the following year did the committee complete its report. The excerpt relating to Mau Mau in that report, which took 15 months to complete, is presented below as extracted from Kenya, by A.M. MacPhee: This is a Kikuyu secret society which is probably another manifestation of the suppressed Kikuyu Central Association. Its objects are anti-European and its intention is to disposssess Europeans of the White Highlands. Its members take an oath not to give information to the police, and may also swear not to obey certain orders of the Government. It is suspected that some members employed on European farms indulge in a "go-slow" policy, and that they may also have committed minor acts of sabotage on farms. Successful prosecutions against the society are believed to have checked its growth; or at least to have curbed the forceful recruitment of adherents. The potency of the organization depends on the extent to which it possesses the power, latent in all secret societies, of being more feared than the forces of law and order. It is possible that as soon as the Sh.60 entrance fees are no longer forthcoming little more will be heard of Mau Mau; but in the meantime, this society, like the religious sects, remains a possible instrument for mischief in the hands of agitators...The main underlying factors which condition the climate of anti-European feelings amongst the Africans are the disparity of wealth, land hunger, the urge to run their own affairs, a combination of the often rather nebulous elements that go to produce feelings of racial disc imination, and among the better educated and personally ambitious the fact that progress toward self-government in Kenya is apparently slower than in other territories where Europeans are not a permanent element in the community.119 The committee's naive prediction, that Mau Mau would cease to be heard from if the government could prevent collection of their entrance fees, prompted MacPhee to write, "...a statement of wishful thinking in an otherwise accurate assessment of the movement and the surrounding political conditions." However, neither the colonial administration, nor the British government took any decisive action to correct the problems, nor was any plan formulated to suppress, by force, the factions driving the movement. As to the official response, Governor Mitchell attached a letter to the report and circulated it under a secret cover. A segment of that letter, as presented by MacPhee, follows: ...it is well to bear in mind that although a sentiment such as nationalism may acquire great strength and momentum, quite apart from the existence of poverty or other causes of social discontent, the major problem in Kenya and East Africa generally is social and agrarian and not nationalistic. Moreover, we are at present at a stage when improvement in social conditions and such land reform as is practicable could bring about a marked betterment in the attitude to Government, and it is for that reason that we can regard such improvement and reform as a major security measure. In particular, improvements in wages, housing and education are within our power and of great importance, while the greatest importance attachee to everything that can be done to create better conditions on the land.120 Thus, Governor Mitchell acknowledged that the social problems, which had developed without significant relief for half a century, had finally arrived at a stage of great importance, the solution of which was apparently justifiable only "as a major security measure." However, he totally disregarded the nationalist aims of the movement, which were sought by the best educated and best organized leaders of the "risk" factions. Likewise, he disregarded the religious cults whose aims were to restore the old culture and traditions. Social reform, administered under colonial rule, did not in any way correlate with their objectives, which could be achieved only by driving out the foreigners. The Mau Mau Religion As briefly noted in earlier text, Louis Seymour Bazett Leakey was raised among the Kikuyu people. During his youth, he was intimate with the tribe on a daily basis as friend, playmate and fellow student, thereby becoming thoroughly fluent in their language and familiar with their customs. He is a member of the age-group called Mukanda, from which he regrets to say, "...Mau Mau leaders have sprung." He is also, "an initiated first grade elder (Muthuri wa mkuri imwe) of the tribe..." when the rumors of Mau Mau first began to circulate in the late 1940's, Leakey returned to the Kikuyu Reserve in order to work with the elders and members of his age-group, in an effort to sort out what was taking place, and to aid the Kenyan people (both African and European) in resolution of the conflicts. As a result of his work, he published two books, Mau Mau and the Kikuyu in 1952, and Defeating Mau Mau in 1954. Leakey's original hypothesis in Mau Mau and the Kikuyu: "Mau Mau was nothing more than a new expression of the old KCA...a political body that was banned...because it had become wholly subversive." Furthermore, "Mau Mau was synomomous with the new body called the Kenya African Union..."However, Leakey admits to a reversal of his original hypothesis in Defeating Mau Mau, and does on to say, "Mau Mau, while to some extent synonymous with these political organizations, was in fact a religion and owed its success to this fact more than to anything else at all."121 He then proceeds to attribute the origin of Mau Mau to an "ideology transfer," wherein the religious beliefs of the Kikuyu transitioned from their ancient tribal religion to Euro-Christianity to Mau Mau. The first transition took place artificially, as the missionaries stripped away the traditional beliefs and supplanted them with "20th Century Europe's concept of Christianity." The second transition was more natural and evolutionary than the first. A reactionary hybrid of the old and the new developed, because the supplanted concepts would not hold up in their society. There were too many contradictions between the old and the new, mainly due to the 2oth Century European "add-ons." Leakey, Majdalany and Baldwin all report Mau Mau use of Christian hymns and the Apostles Creed, wherein the words were adapted to their own purposes, and the name of Jomo Kenyatta or the KCA replaced Jesus Christ. These hymns were sung in their original tuned but in the Kikuyu language, at public gatherings as well as at Mau Mau meetings and ceremonies. William Baldwin, the only American to have participated as a combatant in the Kenya Police Reserve during the Emergency, reports finding written Mau Mau hymns in the possession of captives: Let the hypocrites among the tribe remember that the time will come when they will be like Judas. The time will come for all these hypocrites to be burned. Come all you Kikuyu and summon, too, all women and let us plan secretly now: We are full of sorrow because of our soil which has been taken from us without consent.122 Majdalany records other examples translated by Leakey: ...for God is the Conquerer. He told Kenyatta in a vision "You shall multiply as the stars of Heaven, nations will be blessed because of you." And Kenyatta believed him and God swore to it by his mighty power. Kenyatta will find happiness before God, for he is the foundation stone of the Kingdom. The Book of the Kikuyu is Holy, it helps me to be good, it is my guiding principle when I go to join the Kikuyu. The Book is Kenyatta, it is he who leads men, it is he who saved me by his blood. We see the love of Kenyatta in that Book. He gave his life to save us...I will achieve self-government through Jomo Kenyatta.123 Before declaration of the Emergency, Mau Mau recruitment and ceremonies were held in conjunction with public meetings of such organization as labor unions, school boards, churches, social organizations, etc. During the public portions, hymn books would be passed out, and many hymns would be sung, to raise the fervor of the attendees. Because very few Europeans could speak Kikuyu, the police who monitored such gatherings did not realize that the Mau Mau propaganda was being spread right under their noses. The Mau Mau ceremonies and initiation rites would be administered elsewhere, following the "cover" meeting.124 The Mau Mau ceremonies made extensive use of ancient symbols and procedures, especially those employed during the most solemn of ceremonies, such as the initiation into adulthood. Majdalany draws heavily from Leakey's Defeating Mau Mau, in his description that follows: ...It is guite dark and he (the initiate) is ordered to remove his clothes...In the darkness he is pushed forward and receives his first Shock when his naked body is...brushed by the outline of an arch. This is totally unexpected...but he knows it is the arch of sugar cane and banana leaves through which he had to pass during his initiation into manhood: at the time of his circumcision. Then suddenly the lights are turned up and...a necklet of grass is placed over his head, and this too takes him back to the same most solemn occasion of his life....his eye would now take in the paraphernalia assembled by the white-robed oath administrater----the blood-filled gourds, the sheep's eye, the thorns and the sodom apple, the hibiscus stick and the dripping flesh of the sacrificial animal...new terror for all of these symbols are related not to the solemnity of initiation and circumcision but to black magic. Now they would go to work on him quickly. He would be ordered to eat a piece of sacrificial flesh thrust against his lips. This would be done seven times and after each he would have to repeat the oath. Then the lips would be touched with blood seven times, the oath being repeated after each. Next a gourd of blood would be passed round his head seven times; he would be ordered to stick seven thorns into a sodom apple and pierce the eye of the sheep or get (usually removed while it was alive) seven times with a thorn. ...Dr. Leakey has shown how this blend, in Kikuyu terms, of sacred and profane took effect. The archway and the grass necklet evoked the solemnity of initiation to adulthood; the seven pieces of sacrificial meat and the blooding of the lips seven times were associated with legal oath ceremonies. But the other procedures "were linked most definitely with black magic and the casting of evil spells." Leakey adds that "seven is the number linked in Kikuyu minds with bad luck and with magic rites and with oath ceremonies of a very severe nature, so that the performance of various rites seven times added potency of its own to all the other aspects of what was done.125 Majdalany further explains that it was intended that the entire tribe should receive the first oath, in ceremonies such as described above, and most authorities on this subject estimate that between 70% and 80% of them eventually did. Donald Block reports in Chapter 4 of the U.S. Army's Preconflict Case Study 5: Kenya, that the Kikuyu population in 1948 totalled 1,026,341.126 By 1951, reports were being received concerning mass oathing ceremonies, which accounts to a degree for almost incredible high numbers of tribesmen who allegedly took the oath. In 1952 the complexion of the oaths changed, in that the second and subsequent oaths began to require violent action rather than mere loyalty and secrecy: (a) If I am sent to bring in the head of any enemy and I fail to do so, may this oath kill me. (b) If I fail to steal anything from the European, may this oath kill me. (c) If I know of any enemy to our organization and I fail to report him to my leader, may this oath kill me. (d) If I am even sent by a leader to do something big for the House of Kikuyu, and I refuse, may this oath kill me. (e) If I refuse to help in driving the Europeans from this country, may this oath kill me. (f) If I worship any leader but Jomo Kenyatta, may this oath kill me.127 Various administrators of the oath added other embellishments to subsequent versions: (a) If I am called upon to do so, with four others I will kill a European. (b) If I am called upon to do so, I will kill a Kikuyu who is against Mau Mau, even if it be my mother or father or brother or sister or wife or child. (c) If called upon to do so, I will help to dispose of the body of a murdered person so that it may not be found. (d) I will never disobey the orders of the leaders of this society.128 After declaration of the Emergency, the forest leaders conceived more perverted oaths and ceremonies, which were more demanding and traumatic. The following quote from Leakey's Defeating Mau Mau may help an outsider of the Kikuyu culture to better understand why such simple words, promised under duress, were so effectively binding: For a people who fifty years ago were so completely under the spell of witchcraft and magic; who can still die from the fear of a spell put upon them; or who can become ill and wilt away from the knowledge of having broken some rule which involves ceremonial uncleanliness, it is not surprising that the combination of elements used in Mau Mau oaths had a most terrible mental effect.129 Aside from their deep seated belief in the killing powers of an oath, they were further persuaded to obey by terrorist attacks upon those who disobeyed.130 Events Building to the Emergency Sometime early in 1950, word was circulated among the people that the monarch's brother, the Duke of Gloucester, was going to Nairobi in March, to formally bestow upon it the status of "city." This prompted agitators (presumably KCA militants) to stir up the population with warnings that city status would mean "further thefts of land from the Kikuyu by British authorities." Leakey records that an organized boycott of the city celebration was ordered, as a protest against the new status. A large rally was organized in the Kiamba district, "at which...a number of prominent Kikuyu took part in a solemn oath-taking ceremony, which included...clauses of the oath ceremony that has more recently been...associated with the Mau Mau."131 Tom Mbotela, the moderate vice-president of the KAU and major adversary of Jomo Kenyatta and the militant nationalists chose to disregard the boycott of the Nairobi celebration. He not only attended the festivities, he fulfilled his obligations as a member of the city council and participated in the ceremony. His defiance resulted in a Mau Mau assassination attempts, which marked the first blatant Mau Mau incident against a prominent figure.132 Around the same time, Fred Kubai (chairman of the Nairobi branch of KAU) and Makhan Singh (credited with attempting to reestablish the KCA after its proscription) were arrested organizing an illegal trade union, the East African Trade Union Congress. Their arrest prompted a ten day general strike in Nairobi, accompanied by massive civil violence. Ten days later, Kubai was again arrested for an assassination attempt upon Nairobi Councillor Muchohi Gikongo.133 In April 1950, a Kikuyu named Njehia in search of first aid, inadvertantly disclosed to a police reservist farmer that, "he had been forced to take a Mau Mau oath." He had been severly beaten and wounded because he refused to become an active Mau Mau member and, "his son had reported a Mau Mau oathing ceremony to a European." Majdalany reports that an investigation resulted in nineteen arrests and convictions, marking the first Mau Mau prosecution under the two year old Section 62 (I) of the Penal Code. Section 62 (I) was the strongest action the administration was willing to take against Mau Mau up to that time, legislation which made it illegal to administer "unlawful oaths." To the dismay of everyone by the assailants, the conviction was reversed on appeal, because of a minor clerical error on the charge sheet. This failure by the judiciary sent a message of encouragement to Mau Mau, and one of insecruity to potential victims of Mau Mau, Europeans and loyalist Kikuyu alike. 134 On 4 August 1950, Governor Mitchell finally declared Mau Mau an illegal society, and that same month appointed his Internal Security Working Committee, discussed in preceding pages. Before the year ended, Jomo Kenyatta and Mbiyu Koinage (son of Senior Chief Koinage and high ranking KAU official) negotiated with the administration, and representatives of the European and Asian Committees, to establish an interracial development program. Although the Kenya Citizens' Association was established as a product of those negotiations, the program recieved inadequate white settler support, and racial barriers remained unshaken.135 The outlaw of Mau Mau netted the administration 141 arrests and 120 convictions of rank and file Mau Mau, plus 27 convictions of KCA militants charged with administering unlawful oaths of allegiance to their outlawed organization by year's end.136 Majdalany identifies the year 1951 as being characterized by increasingly rowdy and threatening KAU meetings, by unheaded intelligence reports of Mau Mau activity, and by mounting police and District Commissioner frustrations with the ignorance and complacence of their Nairobi superiors. The Internal Security Working Committee's report was made in November, and the governor's attitude in response, "seemed like that of a man who told that his house was on fire, gives a dissertation on the importance of fire precautions when he should be telephoning for the fire brigade."137 Kenyatta continued to maintain his image of a moderate nationalist mediator between the governor's administration and militant factions. Adminsitration officials pressed him, "to denouce Mau Mau publicly at one of his KAU rallies," writes Majdalany, but "He had no difficulty in evading the issue by maintaining the pretense that he did not know what it was...This playing around with the suggestion that he did not know the word, that it had no meaning...generally provoked appreciative laughter from audience at his meetings."138 Mr. James Griffiths, Labor Secretary of State for the Colonies visited Kenya in May, 1951, with the stated intention of developing constitutional changes in the colony. Griffiths agreed to meet with Kenyatta, who, according to Glazier, presented four KAU demands: 1) 12 elected Africans on the legislative Council instead of 4 nominated members. 2) Abolition of the color bar. 3) Government aid for African farmers. 4) Free trade union activity. According to Glazier, all four were ignored.139 A Marshall MacPhee records that the following proposal was made as a result of Griffiths' visit: (1) Withing twelve months of the elecion of the next Legislative Council in May 1952, there should be a constitutional conference. (2)As interim measures: (a) An African would join the Governor's Executive Council; (b) The number of African seats increased in the Legislative Council from four to six; (c)An additional seat given to the Indians and to the Arabs; and (d) Three more seats given to the Europeans to preserve the principle of parity.140 According to MacPhee, Kenyatta achieved nearly total domination of the KAU b the close of 1951. Tom Mbotela, his moderate vice-president and chief adversary, was forced from office, and eight of the nine Central Committee members were Kikuyu.141 "1952 opened with a long-predicted campaign of intimidation against African officials--maintly chiefs and headmen," writes Majdalany. Twenty cases of arson were reported in two nights near the end of January. Mau Mau terrorists tied the officials' huts closed and set them afire; forty-eight such cases within a monthe in the Nyeri District, plus fifty-eight cases of gazing land and crop fires on settlers' farms in an overlapping five week period.142 MacPhee reports that, "on 23 February the District Commissioner for Nyeri...appealed to the authorities in Nairobi for the Collective Punishment Ordinance to be implemented..." Governor Mitchell's response , on 8 April, was to sign, "an order imposing a fine of 2500 pounds." Mitchell's delay in signing the order was caused by the week long visit in Kenya of Princess Elizabeth and the Duke of Edinburgh. Despite the advice of his Provincial Commissioners, Mitchell refused to cancel the Royal visit and admit that an emergency situation existed.143 Majdalany comments further on Mitchell's attempt to down play the significance of the February violence, noting that in the Colony Intelligence Report for February, which "gave three sentences to the forty-eight arson cases in Nyeri and three pages to routine trade union affairs in Nairobi." An extract from the Kenya Weekly News, written in March, was reprinted in State of Emergency: Speaking in London last month, His Excellency the Governor said that the general political feeling in Kenya was better than he had ever known it for many years, a statement which must have surprised many who read it. In truth, the political situation is now more disturbing and the prospect more anxious than it has been since 1936.144 As previously mentioned, it was discovered in June of 1952, that the complexion of the Mau Mau oath changed from one of secrecy and loyalty to the society, to one requiring specific action, violence and murder. Also previously mentioned, Governor Mitchell departed his post for retirement leave on 23 June, nine days after the newly restructured, interim Legislative Council (proposed during Colonial Secretary Griffiths' visit) convened. This left the Chief Secretary, Henry Potter, to cope with Kenya's problems as Acting Governor, until the new Governor took office three monthes later.145 On 10 July, Michael Blundell introduced a motion in the Legislative Council, calling for decisive action from the administration to control the organized subversion before it could become unmanageable. He predicted an attempt to overthrow the government within nine months. That same month the member for Law and Order (Attorney General) was informed by the Kenya Commissioner of Police, that indications clearly pointed to planned insurretion already in effect against the government and the European population. Yet no action was taken by the administration.146 Majdalany points out a major issue debated as a result of Blundell's motion. The colony's constituton provided for one man to act as both the Member for Law and Order (responsible for internal security), and the Attorney General, a situation which Majdalany describes as awkward. The position of the European representatives of the Legislature appears to have been that the Member for Law and Order should be dedicated to enactment of appropriate Legislation to ensure internal security, without the conflicting concerns and responsibilities as Attorney General, which lead to, in Blundell's words, "...tilting and lancing over legal niceties." Majdalany also states that Blundell revealed the Police Commissioner's unanswered request to the Member for Law and Order, for more power than currently possessed by the police.147 The following week Jomo Kenyatta applied for a permit to stage another KAU rally. According to Glazier, the police requested clearance from the Member for Law and Order to deny the KAU application, and further, to raid the KAU headquarters. The police requests were denied and Kenyatta'S permit was issued,"because of fear of an African General Strike."148 Majdalany and MacPhee agree that the administation issued the permit conditionally, their primary objective being to coerce Kenyatta into publicly denouncing Mau Mau at the rally. As with several such government attempts in the post, Kenyatta foiled this one with more word games. Both authors also report that Kenyatta appeared to be genuinely concerned about the violent temper of the crowd, (estimated at 20-25 thousand) which he could quiet only with great difficulty. The suggestion exists that he feared more than ever, perhaps a sudden realization, that the militant rank and file were approaching a stage in time, when he would not longer be capable of restraining them. His denounciation of violence was accompanied by,"an appeal for African unity and freedom: recovery of lost lands and equal rights with Europeans."149 The size, character and makeup of the crowd caused increased concern among the European population. The sugar cane symbol of Mau Mau was hoisted above the speaker's platform along with the flag of the KAU. Hoodlums from the Nairobi underworld, who called themselves askaris, were transported to the rally in forty buses decorated with Mau Mau symbols. These were "brought from Nairobi to mingle with the crowds and goad them to a fever pitch of emotional frenzy," according to Majdalany.150 The result of the blatant Mau Mau presence (and its violent effect) was government recognition of the threat, though legal evidence sufficient to justify enactment of emergency powers was still considered lacking. "It was understandable," writes MacPhee, "that the Acting Governor hesitated...especially as Mitchell had convinced the authorities in London, however wrongly, that the suggestion that there was serious unrest in Kenya was a fabrication of mischievous agitators and unscrupulous jounalists."151 On 17 August, Acting Governor Potter gave London its official notification that all was not well in Kenya. In a letter to an Under-Secretary in the Colonial Office, Potter identified Mau Mau as a covert organization intent upon insurrection, and without proof, he named the KAU and Jomo Kenyatta as the overt orgainzation and leadership controlling Mau Mau, "in so far as it is suseptible to control." Further, he advised that he would forward proposals for "drastic legislation...necessary...to deal with the situation," after consulting with his advisors.152 Another permit was granted in mid to late August for a KAU rally at Kiambu. This was the government's final attempt to elicite a Mau Mau denounciation from Kenyatta, which some Europeans considered successful. Although the East African Standard announced in "bold headlines that Kenyatta had cursed Mau Mau," Majdalany in convinced that, "his audience had been left in no doubt that his tongue was in his ceek." Regardless of what he said or how he said it, Mau Mau terror continued to spread. "Motorized oathing teams "conducted a fast-paced campaign, which included massive ceremonies, reportedly initiating groups as large as 800 people. Kikuyu suspected of informing the authorities were killed and mutilated. On 25 September, five European farms were attacked, buildings were burned, 140 cattle and 240 sheep were maimed or killed. Majdalany describes the method: The animals were not killed outright, but hamstrung or partly disembowelled, while others were deeply cut about the neck, or had one or more legs chopped off at the knee: but so that they remained alive. Senseless and insensate, this was the grin of the madness to come...153 Sir Evelyn Baring arrived in Nairobi on 29 September, was sworn into office on 30 September, and effected the Legislative Council's emergency measures on 1 October. After a quick tour of the colony to discuss the current situation with Provincial and District Commissioners, Governor Baring informed the Secretary of State for Colonies by top secret telegram, that a State of Emergency should be declared. Majdalany provides exerpts from a letter of explanation that followed his cable: I have just returned from a tour and the position is very serious...now abundantly clear that we are facing a planned revolutionary movement. If the movement cannot be stopped, there will be an administrative breakdown followed by bloodshed amounting to civil war... ... 11 indications are that there will be a planned assassination of Europeans. Reprisals will then be absolutely inevitable...Absolute unanimity of opinion that the instigators of Mau Mau are the leaders of KAU although some of the leaders of the latter may not be implicated... We are faced with a formidable organization of violence and if we wait the trouble will become much worse... Colonial Office approval reached Nairobi five days later.154 Around the middle of the year, a prominent group of loyalist Kikuyu undertook a program intended to counteract the psychological effects of the MAU MAU oath upon Kikuyu who had taken it against their will. In this book, Mau Mau and the Kikuyu, L.S.B. Leakey gives us some insight as to how this could be done: Under certain circumstances...a person could be "cleansed" from the effects of the oath by an act of ceremonial purification...More particularly this is true where the oath in question was taken in some manner contrary to established law and custom and native practices, which in fact is the case with every, or nearly every, Mau Mau oath.155 Senior Chief Waruhiu was one of the organizers of such cleansing or purification cermonies, which provided opportunity for Mau Mau initiates to "get off the hook," so to speak, if they wished to evade the obligations of the oath without fear of supernatural retribution. On his way home from a meeting on 7 October, a passing car forced his car to a halt, and he was shot four times at close range. Warushiu was the first of three Kikuyu Senior Chiefs to be executed for resisting the Mau Mau movement.156 Governor Baring took charge of the embattled colony in the character of a Commander-in-Chief. His first ten days in office were spent analysing the enmey and friendly situation, analysing his mission, and developing courses of action. Having made his decision to declare a State of Emergency, he announced his concept of operations to his staff, and the next ten days were spent in secret, detailed planning. To augment the three battalions of King African Rifles (KAR) already garrisoned in Kenya, elements of three more were called in: the 4th Battlaion from Uganda, the 6th minus two companies from Tanganzika, and two companies of the 26th Battalion from Mauritius.157 On 20 October, Governor Baring officially declared a State of Emergency at 8:00 P.M., but did not inform the public. Operation Jock Scott Under the cover of darkness that evening, the Battalion Headquarters and one company of the 1st Battalion, Lancashire Fusiliers were flown into Nairobi from the Suez Canal Zone by twelve Hastings aircraft of the Royal Air Force.158 Operation Jock Scott commenced before midmight on 20 October. The operation consisted of an organized police roundup of all persons believed to be leaders of the Mau Mau movement, including Jomo Kenyatta and most of the top leadership of the Kenya African Union. Sources vary as to the number of arrests actually made that night, though Governor Baring had signed 183 arrest and detention warrants. By dawn somewhere between 83 and 112 arrests had been made quietly and without resistance. According to Majdalany, Jomo Kenyatta was taken directly to the airfield and flown, "to distant Kapenquria to await trial under heavy guard."159 On the morning of 21 October, Governor Baring announced over the radio that a State of Emergency had been declared. His announcement, combined with the sudden and conspicuous presence of Lancashire Fusiliers patroling the African sectors of Nairobi, did much to ease the minds of the European citizenry. All sources agree that the government was satisfied that Mau Mau had been rendered ineffective; nevertheless, the remainder of the 1st Battalion, Lancashire Fusiliers was flown in (during the following two days) and the Kenya Police Reserves as well as the Kenya Regiment, were ordered to active duty. The Kenya Regiment was a unit of the Territorial Army, established originally to provide a vehicle whereby young British citizens living in British East Africa could fulfill their military obligation to the Crown. Its membership was confined to Kenya-born Europeans, who provided a source of officers to the KAR during times of war.160 Operation Jock Scott was a police operation, which employed army forces only in a supporting role. The operation continued for several days, during which time eleven police raids were conducted and approximately two hundred suspects were arrested according to Lieutenant Colonel James Crow, U.S. Army, author of Insurgency: A Case for the Kenya Police.161 The British Royal Navy's cruiser, Kenya, arrived in Mombasa on 23 October with a detachment of Royal Marines. These forces served to reinforce the resolve, though no Mau Mau activity was ever recorded in Mombasa.162 The Lancashire Fusiliers were retained in Nairobi for approximately one month to maintain an aura of British military presence. Jock Scott Aftermath It did not take long to determine that the mass arrests failed to crush the Mau Mau movement. On 22 October, Kikuyu Senior Chief Nderi attempted to break up a Mau Mau oathing ceremony comprised of an estimated 500 persons. The crowd turned on him and hacked his body to pieces with pangas, machette-like swords used by Kikuyu tribesmen. About a week later, Mau Mau claimed its first white victim, Eric Bowyer, attacking him with pangas while he was bathing. Bowyer lived on an isolated farm with two African house servants, who are also killed.163 The problems facing the colonial administration in late 1952 centered around the question of how to proceed with follow-on operations. It is assumed from Majdalany's accounts of the situation (reinforced by all other available sources), that three broad problem areas existed: (1) lack of intelligence to indicate the enemy's organization, disposition, capabilities and intentions, all of which resulted in government inability to develop a strategy, define military objectives and plan appropriate military operations; (2) a force structure which consisted of a mixed bag of colonial and British military forces, paramilitary forces, a critically undermanned and thinly spread colonial police force, and poorly trained, unarmed local tribal police units; and (3) absence of an integrated command and control structure to organize and coordinate the overall effort. It was immediately decided that the colony's only intelligence agency, Special Branch of the Kenya Police, must be upgraded. For that purpose, the Director-General of the British Security Service, Sir Percy Sillitoe was dispatched to Nairobi in an advisory capacity.164 As to problems of force structure, the government had to employ currently available forces as best they could in the near term. Unable to determine at that stage how and where offensive action could be applied with any degree of success, the government chose to assume a defensive posture until intelligence could be upgraded and security forces properly organized. The Lancashire Fusiliers were deployed in November to trouble spots in the Rift Valley Province around Thomson's Falls, Naivasha and Nakuru. The King's African Rifiles Battalions were deployed mainly in the Native Reserves of the Central Province, but were also dispatched wherever trouble surfaced, including Nairobi itself. They army units were spread exceedingly thin, and continued to operate in a supporting role, with the Kenya Police in charge of localized peace keeping operations. Meanwhile, the severly understaffed Kenya Police waged an intensive recruiting and training program. A highly significant decision made during this period was that which resulted in the organization of loyalist Kikuyu tribesmen (loyal to the British administration) into a self-defense force, appropriately named the Home Guard.165 The third problem area, that relating to command and control of the overall body of security forces, can best be appreciated after analysis of the various forces themselves. Security Forces The colonial military forces in Kenya have already been briefly mentioned; i.e. the Kenya Regiment and the King's African Rifles. The Kenya Regiment, as its name implies, was resident only in Kenya as a paramilitary officer training battalion. The post-World War II King's African Rifles were manned by African troops and a mixture of African and British Non-Commissioned Officers, but supervised by British Officers exclusively.166 The African troops were recruited from throughout the British colonies, and the units were responsible to Headquarters, East African Command in Cairo.167 The Kenya Police comprised a single colonial force with its headquarters in Nairobi and a chain of command reaching down to the local station level. Lieutenant Colonel Crow writes that the force, "was headed by a Commissioner of Police who was assigned by the Colonial Office (in Great Britain)...(who was) initially responsible to the Member for Law and Order."168 As with the KAR, Kenya police constables were primarily Africans, while European Officers occupied the key billets.169 At the beginning of the emergency, the central headquarters in Nairobi was composed of a Criminal Investigation Department, and Inspection Department, a Training Department, a Department of Supply Services and Workshops (logistics), a Signals Branch and a Special Branch. The Special Branch was the intelligence gathering agency of the colony, which up until 1945 was a part of the Criminal Investigation Department. Upon establishment as a separate branch, it remained subordinate to the Commissioner of Police, but the Director of Special Branch was obligated to address all reports, "directly to the member for Law and Order with copies to the Commissioner and other interested agencies." In 1947 attempts were made to expand Special Branch so as to provide the provinces with an intelligence staff capability. That attempt failed due to insufficient operating funds, resulting only in minor staff expansion in Nairobi and assignment of two Specialist Officers outside of Nairobi.170 Subordinate to the Central Headquarters were the police elements responsible for security in Nairobi, as well as an Area Police Headquarters for each of seven Administrative Provinces, commanded by Assistant Commissioners of Police. The police organizational structure paralleled the colonial administrative structure, and can be more clearly illustrated graphically than described: Click here to view image The Kenya Police Reserve (KPR) mainly consisted of volunteers who had served during World War II as members of the Auxiliary Police Force. They were called to active duty at the start of the emergency and played a major role in the campaign against Mau Mau as they manned newly organized police units in remote, outlying areas.172 Prior to the emergency, the Kenya Police primarily occupied themselves with maintaining order in the towns, leaving security of the native reserve areas to the Tribal Police. Tribal Police were all-African forces of tribesmen employed by individual District Commissioners to provide local security within their own tribal areas. Though they were highly effective during peaceful times, they were subjected to severe intimidation and some degree of bribery during the Mau Mau period. Their effectiveness improved vastly after they became coordinated with the new Home Guard units and supported by the new special units of the KPR. 173 The white settlers in the outlying areas were frightened for their lives and the physical security of their property. They had been totally dissatisfied with the inadequate security they had received from the colonial administration from 1948 through 1952. Comprised of a mixture of retired military professionals, short term veterans of two world wars, semi-professional safari guides and experienced hunters in the African bush, many settlers organized paramilitary forces determined to hunt down Mau Mau themselves. MacPhee records a meeting in the White Highlands at which settlers demanded the immediate shooting of 50,000 Kikuyu until they were literally killed into submission.174 Such organizations were discouraged by the government, but it was not possible to either eliminate or control them totally. Organizations termed Farm Guards were actively supported by the government as self-defense forces. Eventually a system of signal flares and various other alarm devices were coordinated with special units of the Kenya Police Reserve, who would rush to the aid of the Farm Guards and/or settlers under attack.175 Majdalany records interesting accounts of aging retired military officers, aroused by the nostalgic atmosphere of battle, suddenly arriving uninvited upon the scene of firefights and attempting to assume tactical command of the action. One particular area was so heavily populated by retired generals, admirals and air marshalls, that the young police and military officers referred to it as "Blood-pressure Ridge," an area undesireable to operate in because of the frequent lectures on tactics and military conduct received there.176 Command and Control Reorganization October 1952-January 1953 Headquarters, East African Command was located in Cairo, a situation which separated the regular military forces from their administrative and logistical support by an unexceptable degree in terms of time and distance. Although the governor of Kenya apparently had some form of operational authority over the military forces, he had no professional military expertise on his staff, and the military staffs in Cairo were too far removed from the scene to be of any real operational worth. The Member for Law and Order was the primary responsible member of the governor's Executive Council for counter-insurgency and general peace keeping operations. As already mentioned, he was also the Attorney General, an unacceptable arrangement because he was simultaneouly in charge of the colony's police force and the colony's judicial system. The interests of the two responsibilities often conflicted, and as a trained lawyer without police training or experience, his judicial interests generally received precedence over the interests of operational law enforcement. Upon declaration of the State of Emergency the conflict became more serious, in that all forces, including the military, operated in support of the police under the authority of the Member for Law and Order. While the Kenya Police command structure paralleled the colonial government's organization of provinces, districts, divisions and locations, there was little close coordination actually conducted between government administrators and police officials outside of Nairobi prior to the emergency. In an effort to integrate operational efforts in the fall of 1952, Governor Baring instituted a triumvirate system of "Sitrep Committees" at all levels of government. Composed of administrative, police and military officials of equal rank, the Sitrep Committees were tasked with analysing the situation, formulating plans to counter the threat and directing opertions accordingly at each command level.177 In late January of 1953, Brigadier W.R.N. Hinde set aside his plans to retire in favor of a proffered assignment as Military Advisor to the Governor of Kenya, and an accompanying promotion to Major General. Hinde had established a distinctive tactical reputation during World War II as commander of the "Desert Rats," the armored brigade of the British Seventh Armoured Division. He later developed a reputation as a man of "great patience and diplomatic skill," both after the war in Berlin as the Deputy Director of Military Government, and as Chief Civil Affairs Advisor to the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Land Forces during evacuation of the Canal Zone Base in Egypt. The white settler community welcomed such a man to Kenya with tremendous relief. Majdalany writes that Major General Hinde's briefing from CINC Middle East Land Forces amounted to little more than, "You're chief staff officer to the Governor; your job is to jolly them along." Majdalany goes on to comment that the CINC's comment was, "a wry hint that getting a number of disparate elements to work smoothly together in this land of individualists was likely to be th main task in the early stages of the assignment, which, in effect, was to take charge of operations on the Governor's behalf..."178 Major General Hinde arrived in Kenya to find a bitter white settler population, who blamed the entire Mau Mau emergency on the ignorance of Governor Mitchell's administration, including the Members of the Executive Council currently serving Governor Baring. Because the government had not yet taken the offensive and Mau Mau terrorism was still on the rise, the settlers could not see that and forward strides had been made by the new Governor. In fact Governor Baring had taken decisive steps, as described in preceeding pages, but time was needed for the buildup of intelligence and internal security forces. It was Major General Hinde's job to pull the "disparate elements" together behind a unified operational effort, get a handle on the enemy situation, take away their initiative, and prepare to take the offensive. This job took longer than even he imagined.179 Major General Hinde's title was changed to Director of Operations within a few weeks of his arrival in Kenya. The Governor remained in the capacity of Commander-in-Chief, and the Kenya Police remained in charge of operations, with the military forces in support of the police. A major change effected was the shift of responsibility for internal sucurity from the Member for Law and Order to the Chief Secretary, who Paget described as the equivalent of a Prime Minister under the Governor. The Attorney General was then able to function soley as the judicial Member of the Executive Council, and the title "Member for Law and Order" was discarded. The Director of Operations and the Chief Secretary worked together to ensure thorough coordination of operational and administrative efforts. The Sitrep Committees were renamed Emergency committees, which were structured basically in the same way, but were more fully staffed with emphasis on controlling operations at every level from top to bottom.180 An additional measure worth mentioning is the establishment of Emergency Regulations during January which defined Prohibited Areas and Security Areas. Prohibited Areas were declared in the forested areas of Mount Kenya, the Aberdare Mountains and Eburru. Anyone sighted in a Prohibited Area was assumed to be a Mau Mau and shot without any questions asked. Security Areas were declared throughout the Kikuyu Reserve. Anyone who failed to halt when challenged in a Security Area was assumed to be a Mau Mau and shot.181 A. Marshall MacPhee writes that, "the restrictive measures imposed on the Kikuyu precipitated the revolt the Government sought to prevent."182 Enemy Situation January-May 1953 By the time Major General Hinde became Director of Operations, it was apparent that the emergency was not a colony-wide situation; rather, it was confined to about one-sixteenth of the colony's area, including Nairobi, all districts of the Central Province ard three districts of the Rift Valley Province. The battle area amounted to approximately 14,000 square miles, described roughly by a square of 120 miles on each side. The participants, Mau Mau and victims of Mau Mau alike, were mainly Kikuyu and neighboring Meru and Embu tribesmen. The key terrain features were the Aberdare Mountain Range in the west central portion of the battle area and Mount Kenya in the northeast, both of which were heavily forested, and a forest belt extending south and east of the mountains. Consistent with ancient Kikuyu customs, the Mau Mau had withdrawn to the forested Mountains to organize for battle. After Operation Jock Scott, the forest "gangs," as most authors refer to them, grew in number as Mau Mau fled Nairobi to avoid arrest. Intelligence by that time indicated that a Mau Mau Central Committee existed in Nairobi from which operations were directed. The rationale at the time was that the Central Committee established itself, "in place of the original leaders now in detention," referring to the arrest of Jomo Kenyatta and the KAU leadership rounded up during Operation Jock Scott. The intelligence estimate indicated that declaration of the emergency caught the Mau Mau off guard before they were ready for an organized revolution, and no large scale operations were planned for the near future. Meanwhile it was anticipated that isolated attacks upon European farms would continue, and major Mau Mau efforts would be directed toward intimidation of Kikuyu, Embu and Meru who refused to take the Mau Mau oath. MacPhee records that the initiative belonged to Mau Mau throughout 1953. Like most authors, he credits Dedan Kimathi and Stanley Methange with initially organizing and training the Mau Mau's "Land and Freedom Army" after fleeing Nairobi in 1952 to avoid arrest. Other authors allege that they were sent there by the Central Committee before the emergency was declared, with the express mission of organizing the army.184 Mau Mau Terrorism: 1953 The following accounts were obtained from State of Emergency. On 1 January, Charles Hamilton Ferguson and Richard Bingley sat down to late evening dinner at Ferguson's remote farm house in the Thomson Falls area. Before they could begin eating, the houseboy admitted a gang of Mau Mau. Ferguson's hand was chopped off before he could fire the pistol it held, and both men were slashed and dismembered.185 On the evening of 2January, Mau Mau attacked a farmhouse near Nyeri which was occupied by Mrs. Kitty Hesselberger and Mrs. Raynes Simpson. Mrs. Simpson was seated in a chair facing the door, with a pistol on the arm of her chair. When the houseboy entered the room in a suspicious manner, Mrs. Simpson intuitively picked up the pistol only seconds before a Mau Mau gang came through the door. Her first shot killed the leader who was charging her with a raised panga, and her second shot distracted another whose panga was about to fall upon Mrs. Hesselberger. Mrs. Simpson continued to fire methodically at the attacker, giving Mrs. Hesselberger time to pick up a nearby shotgun, which prompted the gang's hasty retreat. Hearing noises in the adjoining bathroom, both womem fired through the wall. A blood trail through the open bathroom window indicated they at least wounded one; three dead Mau Mau were left behind.186 Two days later Chief Hinga was murdered while recuperating in a government hospital from wounds he received in an earlier clash with Mau Mau. An additional thirty-four Africans were murdered during the first two weeks of 1953.187 On the night of 24 January, Mau Mau captured headlines around the world with an attack upin the Ruck farm. The pattern was basically the same, the attack occurring in the evening around 9:00 P.M. with the aid of African employees. Mr. Ruck was summoned from the dinner table by one of his farm hands, who said he had caught an intruder outside. He was struck down as he went outside to investigate. His shouts prompted his wife to grab a shotgun before going to the door, but she was seized before she could fire. Their mutilated bodies were found close together outside. Before leaving, the Mau Mau ransacked the house and found six year old Michael Ruck in bed. Majdalany comments that the police photograph of the boy's body, "is something unlikely to be surpassed in grievous nauseating horror."188 Large Scale Mau Mau Operations The only two large scale operations carried out by Mau Mau were executed on the same night, 26 March 1953. This seems strange when considered in light of the fact that many authors characterize Mau Mau as a complex, nationalist political organization, having, a Central Committee to direct operations, an Active Wing and a Passive Wing built upon a classical cell structure system, a multi-division Land and Freedom Army, and a master plan to achieve Kenyan independence. Apparently every author who addresses the Mau Mau emergency includes a description of the Lari Massacre and the Raid on Naivasha Police Station. Every source researched had differing accounts of the operations, with differences in detail ranging from minor to incredibly major. Only three available sources are reasonably consistent in detail (e.g. dates, times, number of attackers and victims, etc.), though each offers a different degree of discussion concerning specific aspects. Therefore the following accounts are drawn primarily from the works of Majdalany, and supported by MacPhee and Paget. The Raid on Naivasha Police Station broke the tactical pattern that Mau Mau had established over more than a year. Previously their targets had been restricted to isolated farms or villages having limited defenses and offering minimal risks. Generally they employed small units of five to fifteen men and were aided by an "inside man." The settlement of Naivasha, on the other hand, was defended in the sense that military and police posts had existed near there for quite some time. The area was a significant communications node where a major road junction and the railway came together. The police station itself was not heavily defended or fortified. Its compound was surrounded by a low wall of mud and stone, with firing posts at each corner of the square enclosure. Recently the wall had been reinforced in thickness and height and agumented with barbed wire. An inspecting officer thereafter ordered that the barbed wire should be reconstructed for better protection, but the job was not yet complete on 26 March. At 2130 approximately 85 Mau Mau crept close to the wall and found two vulnerable places in the barbed wire. The watchtower sentry was shot and raiders poured through the wire in two groups, followed by a truck. One group charged the office and killed the duty clerk. Four guards in an adjacent room escaped through the window unharmed. Why they were inside instead of patrolling the compound, and why they put up no defense is not stated in the references. However, it was noted that nearly all the men in the compound were new recruits with little or no training, and combat experience whatever. The second group that breached the wire went for the armory and seized as many weapons and as much ammunition as they could carry. These were loaded into the truck they had brought with them as well as another truck found inside the compound. Meanwhile other raiders breached the nearby detention camp and released 173 prisoners. The firing awakened the ramainder of the police in their barracks, who ran to draw their weapons from the armory, but too late. Like the four guards in the station house, they fled unharmed when they saw the overwhelming number of Mau Mau. Upon withdrawl from the compound, the raiders could not start the truck they had found there, and it had to be abandoned. Neverthless, the hauled away twenty-nine rifles, eighteen automatic weapons and an undetermined amount of ammunition, a major acquisition for Mau Mau. The operation was completed within twenty minutes without any Mau Mau casualties; only two policeman were killed.189 Just about the time that the raiders were withdrawing from the police compound, another Mau Mau force was moving into attack positions 30 miles south-southeast of Naivasha and 25 miles northwest of Nairobi. There, not far from the railway, was the administrative location or Lari, which consisted of a 7 mile stretch of elongated fingers separated by shallow draws. Withn these fingers and draws were scattered many Kikuyu homesteads, each consisting of three to five family huts enclosed by fences. Police intelligence sources revealed on 18 March that the Lari homesteads would be attacked, because the population there was predominantly anti-Mau Mau, and a majority of the men were members of the Kikuyu Home Guard. Consequently a detailed defense plan was developed, which included a KAR company assigned to critical defensive positions. However, the company received orders from Nairobi to redeploy on 26 March, in order to avert anticipated trouble at the Athi River prison,approximately forty miles to the south. The local Home Guard detachment of 150 men were out on patrol in the forest, rather than guarding the perimeter, when the Mau Mau force estimated at 1000 men moved into attack positions. The positions had been spaced along the entire even mile stretch, enabling all homesteads to be attacked simultaneously. The force was subdivided into attack units, each of which was assigned a specific homestead. Each attack unit was composed of three subunits with specific tasks: one subunit bound the huts with cable to prevent the doors from opening, another subunit soaked the huts with fuel and ignited them, and the third subunit attacked fleeing victims who managed to escape the flames. The official count of Kikuyu dead was 84, but many corpses were so completely hacked apart and scattered around that the count was questionable. There were only 31 survivors, all of whom were wounded and described by Majdalany as, "horribly wounded and scarred for life." Because many of the male inhabitants were out on patrol with the Home Guard, two-thirds of the victims were women and children. Over 200 huts were burned and approximately 1000 cattle were maimed in the attack.190 A New War, A New Choice Mid 1953 The reactions to the Naivasha and Lari operations let to the strengthening of both the government forces and those of Mau Mau. The uncontested success of the raid on Naivasha police station made it clear that the rapid buildup of the police force left much to be desired in terms of quality. More reinforcement by experienced military forces was undoubtedly required. The horror of the Lari massacre resulted in a maximum effort to rout out Mau Mau wherever and whoever they might be--intelligence still had not provided a clear picture of the enemy. Joint forces of police, military and civilian African loyalists began conducting massive blind sweeps through the forests in search of Mau Mau forces, which resulted in very few sightings and fewer kills.191 Massive roundups and screenings were conducted in the reserves and in Nairobi. The 1953 volume of Facts On File--World News Digest with Index reports, "6000 Africans in the shanty villiage of Kariobangi (near Nairobi) were rounded up for questioning April 24 and their village was ordered destroyed by bulldozers. 7000 natives in tow villages northeast of Nairobi were evicted April 17 and their homes were leveled similarly April 19. The area was called Nairobi's Mau Mau headquarters."192 The Kikuyu Reserves began to swell with displaced families in midyear, largely due to the above-stated action as well as two further causes recorded by MacPhee. The Kikuyu Registration Ordnance was enacted, which required all Kikuyu living outside the reserves to carry government issued identification papers which bore photographs. Word was passed among the people by Mau Mau activists, to resist the government order to be photographed. Rater than invite retribution from Mau Mau, Kikuyu returned to the reserves from all over the colony. Additionally, European farmers who now feared personal attack more than ever dismissed their farm labor force, which accounted for thousands more returning to the reserves.193 The sudden overcrowding of the reserves by tens of thousands of homeless Kikuyu created major administrative problems for the governemt, and a new source of bitter, frustrated recruits for Mau Mau. This situation is probably the major reason why the Land and Freedom Army reached its estimated peak force of 15,000 members in 1953. According to most authors, the most significant results of the Lari massacre were the realizations which the brutal, indescriminate slaughter created in the minds of the African people. First of all the realization dawned that Mau Mau was directing its predominent forces of terror not against the Europeans who administered colonial rule, nor against any of the major colonial economic assets or political institutions. Mau Mau was at war with African people, Kikuyu, who would not participate in or support violent revolution. Secondly the realization was awakened that Kikuyu, and Africans in general, could not continue to sit on the political fence with their sympathies dangling on both sides. Mid 1953 became a year of commitment--either to join Mau Mau or to fight against it. Regardless of how desireable the rather fuzzy concept of independence from colonial rule may have been for most Kikuyu, independence was no longer the critical issue of choice in choosing sides. The choice was wheather to join the brutal, irrational force which terrorized its own people, or to fight for survivial against that maniacal force. As a result, the Home Guard units grew in size and resolve at probably a faster rate than did the Land and Freedom Army. MacPhee's words may best express the situation: "Whatever use the Government made in publicising the Lari Massacre to the world, the fact remains that it was the turning point against Mau Mau; many more rallied to the Kikuyu Guard and from this time on Mau Mau would meet increasing reisitance from the people they sought to liberate.194 The decision was made at that point by Major General Hinde to issue government firearms to the Kikuyu Home Guard and to assign a Colonel to formally train, organize and command them. The issuance of firearms had always been considered too much of a securtiy risk, because it was feared that they would fall into the hands of Mau Mau. Major General Hinde's decision in this regard turned out to be one of the most profitable decisions of the conflict period.195 A New Command and An Offensive Strategy On 7 June 1953 The War Office in London established a new and independent command, appointing General Sir George Erskine as Commander-in-Chief East Africa. In so doing, all ties were broken between the froces in Kenya and Headquarters Middle East Command in Cairo, Egypt. From that time forward CINC East Africa reported directly to the War Office. As CINC East Africa, General Erskine's authority included command of "all Colonial, Auxiliary, Police and Securtiy Forces," but excluded authority over civil administration, which remained under the authority of Governor Baring. The significance of this action was that a single commander could exercise direct operational control of a joint force, and thus could better ensure unity of effort than was possible under the trimumvirate system. General Erskine determined that even though his intelligence was still deficient in both quantity and quality of information, the time was right to take the initiative. He established an offensive plan with rather hazy objectives, but an offensive plan, nevertheless.196 The plan called for the KAR battalions, by then designated 70 East Africa Brigade, to continue operating with the Kikuyu Reserves. They would assist the Home Guard with their defensive buildup as well as conduct offensive operations as the opportunities arose. The remainder of his forces were formed into three striking forces: (1) 39 Infantry Brigade, composed of the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers and the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers who arrived in April, were deployed to the forested Prohibited Area of Mount Kenya and the Aberdares; (2) one East Africa Independent Armoured Car (EAAC) Squadron and the 156 HAA Battery, East African Artillery were imployed as a mobile force in the open country of the Central Province; and (3) a Royal Air Force flight of Harvard aircraft were mainly used to conduct H&I bombing and aerial surveillance in the forested areas.197 It is generally expressed by all sources researched that Erskine's initial offensive attempts were not very productive in terms of killed or captured Mau Mau. The British troops were unaccustomed to the mountainous forest terrain which they encountered; the intelligence provided no hint as to the location of the Mau Mau forces in 1500 square miles of dense foliage, and the military formations were much too large, slow and noisy as they labored their way through the undergrowth to ever hope to "discover" occupied Mau Mau camps. The random bombing of the forests was condemned by many naturalists as being fruitlessly distructive to vegetation and wildlife, and in truth there was a practical side to their complaints. Majdalany suggests that wounded and frightened elephants, rhinos and buffalo inflicted more casualties on the European soldiers during thier first weeks in the mountains than did Mau Mau.199 Yet the move to the offensive was productive in the sense that it not only gained valuable experience for the troops involved, but it kept the Mau Mau busy with escape and evasion rather than allowing them a chance to become better organized and conduct raids at will. Furthermore, the offensive operations provide the government forces with an opportunity to throw off the stigma of impotence that the administration had developed in the eyes of the settler population, through years of neglect and inaction during the rise of Mau Mau. In March of 1954, the command structure within Kenya underwent a change whereby the Emergency Committee at the Colony level was replaced by a War Cabinet, which streamlined the top level decision making process. The War Cabinet was composed of only the Governor, Deputy Governor, the Commander-in-Chief, and a representative of the European community, Michael Blundell (described by MacPhee as the Minister without Portfolio) who had become one of the most powerful men in Kenya as the voice of the settler interests.200 Paget notes that the War Cabinet was supported by other working groups, including a Secretariet of civil and military officers, and an Emergency Joint Staff which performed the planning and coordinaton functions on behalf of the War Cabinet. The Emergency Committees, as reinforced and overhauled by Major General Hinde, continued in effect at the Province and District level. Around the same time the "Lyttelton Plan" for restructuring the colonial constitution was introduced to provide government representation for all the major racial groups. MultI-racial representation created great fervor in all colonial constituencies. The following excerpt from Kenya sheds some light on the problems encourtered: Although the Lyttelton constitution had the initial support of the European Elected Members' Association, it later caused a split among the settlers which was never to be healed: there were the liberal multi-racists under Blundell who saw in the new constitution a national Government of all races; and the independently minded who considered it the thin edge of the wedge and the end of the European supremacy. The European elected members had accepted the Lyttelton constitution reluctaintly and only as means of divorcing Kenya from Colonial Office control...The African members for their part, while promised that ways and means of initiating direct elections for Africans would be studied, refused to accept the Lyttelton constitution on the grounds that it treated them as third class citizens. MacPhee asserts that despite the turmoil created initially, a political truce was declared, and the government emerged in a much stronger position, better prepared to oppose the Mau Mau movement.201 Surrender Negotiations-Operation Wedgewood Early in 1954 Waruhiu Itote was wounded and captured in a skirmish southwest of Mount Kenya, near Karatina. Itote was the renowned "General China," leader of the Land and Freedom Army forces long known to be dominating the area around Mount Kenya. After intensive interrogation and psychological manipulation by Assistant Superintendant Ian Henderson of Special Branch, Itote was persuaded to attempt to negotiate a mass surrender of the Mount Kenya forces. Nearly two months were spent in contacting local passive wing contacts and passing messages back and forth by courier, but a summit meeting was finally arranged for 20 March at the forest edge. General China was taken to the meeting in an armoured car, which scared off the Mau Mau representatives when they sighted it. Not long after, "General" Kaleba and "General" Tanganyika, Mau Mau leaders subordinate to China were captures and subsequently convinced to aid in surrender negotiations. Kaleba went back into the forest to assure the meeting delegates that no trap had been intended, and arranged another meeting for 30 March. This time there was no armoured car, and five Mau Mau delegates were transported to Nyeri by Ian Hendersin, unarmed, in two Land Rovers. The meeting was held in the Provincial Commissioner's office, attended by Ian Henderson representing Special Branch, the Chief Native Commissioner representing the Governor, and the ARmy Chief of Staff. The government'S surrender terms were simple and not particularly beneficent: those who surrendered would not be executed, leaders would be imprisoned indefinitely, rank and file not proven to be hard core terrorists would be "grandually repatriated." A ten day cease fire within the Mount Kenya Prohibited Area was declared in order to allow time for the leaders to make their decision and gather in their followers. Those who chose to surrender had until 10 April to do so. On 5 April it was learned that the Mau Mau delegates who attended the Nyeri meeting had been apprehended by another Mau Mau "General" named Gatamuki, who opposed the idea of surrender. Ian Henderson and Bernard Ruck, another Special Branch Officer entered the Prohibited Area unarmed to contact leaders they had learned about in the course of Negotiations with China, kaleba and Tanganyika. Before they had clarified whether the delegates had made any contracts before their capture, "Murphy" struck. A "large gang was sighted in the Reserves, two miles from the forest." This was outside the Prohibited Area where the cease fire had been declared, and security forces were ordered to attack. Twenty-five Mau Mau were killed and nine captured, including Gatamuki. Under interrogation, Gatamuki revealed that the captured delegates had convinced him of the wisdom of surrendering. Conditions in the forest were becoming difficult, morale was low, supplies and munitions were becoming more difficult to acquire, the Home Guard were becoming effecive in preventing access to the Reserves for resupply, and information flow between Mau Mau forces had become extremely poor (General China himself was initially surprised to learn the Kimathi's forces were intact and still operating in the Aberdares). Gatamuki claimed that he was unaware that he had been outside of the cease fire area, and further claimed that approximately 2800 Mau Mau, in two separate groups, were assembling to surrender when they were fired upon. There were many who suspected that Gatamuki's story was contrived and he had no intention of surrender. In any case, no Mau Mau did surrender by 10 April, and it can be assumed that the attack on Gatamuki's forces was a major reason for the failure of Operation Wedgewood. Why more discretion was not exercised by the security forces before attacking is open to speculaion. In truth they were outside of the Cease Fire Area as defined, but it would seem reasonable under those circumstances, that responsible men would have made some sort of inquiry before initiating an attack, if indeed the government's surrender offer were legitimate. Operation Anvil Late in 1953 it became apparent to General Erskine and the War Cabinet that Nairobi was still as much a breeding ground of Mau Mau as it had ever been. Intelligence sources continually pointed to the city as the location of a Central Committee, as well as the headquarters and logistics source of the Land and Freedom Army. Though the Mau Mau forces had chosen the forested mountains as their battleground, General Erskine was determined that he should take the battle to Nairobi with the objective being to wipe out the headquarters and further isolate the battlefield. By the end of January 1954, and outline plan for Operation Anvil had been prepared, which scheduled April for execution. The original plan called for a roundup of all Kikuyu. This plan was abandoned for several reasons, the main ones being lack of sufficient resources in terms of manpower and detention camps, and more significant was the fact that there were still so many legitimately employed Kikuyu in Nairobi. It was feared by the administration that the city would be ground to a halt by such extreme measures.203 On 24 April five British battalions and elements of the KAR cordoned off the exits tot he entire city of Nairobi to prevent entry or exit. Police then conducted methodical house to house searches of the city, block by block, section by section. As each sector search was completed, military forces moved in to cordon off the complete sector. All Kikuyu, Embu and Meru identification papers were checked for authenticity, employment references were checked, and buildings were ransacked in search of concealed weapons and ammunition. All suspicious persons were packed off of a reception camp at Langata, five miles from Nairobi; where they were more thoroughly screened.204 As part of the screening process, suspects were paraded past lines of hooded government informers, who pointed out "know Mau Mau." The readily apparent weakness in such a system is the possibility of an informer pointing out persons against whom some personal grudge was held.205 Nevertheless, approximately 30,000 suspects were so screened in the first two weeks, and Paget reports that just over half of the number were sent off to detention camps at Machinnon Road or Manyani. Approximately 2500 dependents of detainees were shipped off to the already overcrowded Reserves.206 Follow up operations continued for a second two week period, during which time sectors judged to be particularly suspicious were researched, and new identification papers believed to be less susceptible to forgery were issued to those target tribesmen who were permitted to remain in the city.207 Further screenings of the same sort were conducted in the native reserves, in an effort to further isolate the enemy. More suspects were detained, and more Africans fearing detention fled to the forest to join the Mau Mau forces. By that time the Home Guard had become well enough organized to take over the responsibility of self-defense, and after screenings were completed, government troops were withdrawn for offensive operations in the forest. Convinced that the enemy forces were finally isolated in the forest, two further programs were instituted. The first was an organized effort to deny the Mau Mau access to food. For this purpose a fifty mile long trench was excavated along the edge of the forest, which was booby trapped, lined with barbed wire and guarded by police posts at half mile intervals. Additionally, the government required farmers to keep their cattle enclosed a night and to stop growing crops within three miles of the forest. The second program required the relocation of Kikuyu homesteads that were scattered among the foothills, such as those described at Lari. Relocation was necessary in order to group the people closer together in villages, which could be more effectively protected by the Home Guard. The older and more traditional Kikuyu were the most resistant to relocation. AS in the background history of the Kikuyu, the bones and spirits of ancestors rested under the hearths of the traditional Kikuyu homes.208 The Final Thrusts 1955-56 The final large scale operations of the emergency took place during the first quarter of the 1953 calendar year. The strategy at that point was based on the premise that the enemy had been effectively isolated, and the time had come to run him ground. The tactics employed were a return to the sweep operations which had been less that successful in the past. The difference in 1955 was the isolation trenches and police forces at the forest edge were waiting to ambush the elusive enemy. Operation Hammer was conducted during the month of January. A division sized force swept through the Aberdare Mountain Range on line at relatively close interval. The obvious problems encountered were the rugged terrain, the dense foliage, the wide expanse of space required to be covered and the government forces' relative lack of familiarity with the terrain, as compared to the Mau Mau who lived there. The sweeps passed over concealed and camouflaged Mau Mau, who were then able to strike from behind and escape, or simply remain undetected altogether. The operation succeeded in netting only 161 Mau Mau killed, captured or surrendered.209 Operation First Flute took place during the months of February, March and early April in the forest of Mount Kenya. Recognizing the problems experienced in Hammer, Assistant Deputy for Operations, Major General Hinde proposed a new approach, which divided the division-sized force into component units of various sizes. Units were assigned specific areas of operation in which they lived, and with which they became intimately familiar. Majdalany remarks that the soldiers came to refer to their daily routine of patrols as "flogging the forest," presumably because their efforts over a two month period produced only 277 Mau Mau killed, captured or surrendered. The total was almost twice that of Hammer, but four times as many days were spent to achive it. Paget reports that, "it was estimated that every dead Mau Mau cost L 10,000!"210 The failure of these large scale operations to ferret out the Mau Mau was hard on troop morale and perhaps even more depressing to the planners. The only great success achieved was the breakup of Mau Mau forces into small elusive gangs of fugitives who became more concerned with survival than anything else. Those gangs could be easily defeated in a fire fight by a small assault force, if only they could be found. Special Branch came up with the answer. Ian Henderson and Frank Kitson had been using captures Mau Mau to advantage for quite some time. The manipulation of General China and his subordinates had revealed many contaacts in the reserves, who were exploited for further names and information, which led to more captures in a sort of pyramid game. They began employing Mau Mau defectors in more and more activeroles, to the point where they were using the defectors of specific gangs as patrol guides to hunt the gangs down. Out of this evolved small tactical groups which they referred to as "pseudo gangs." These were composed of only a few special force officers and rounded out with captured or surrendered Mau Mau who were willing to not only betray their former comrades in arms, but to shoot them down on sight. MacPhee makes the following comment regarding their effectiveness: It was the most successful and, in terms of manpower and effort, the most economical way of eliminating the remnants of the Mau Mau militant wing from the forests: by the end of the year, twenty-four out of the fifty-one listed forest leaders had been captured and the total strength of the Land and Freedom Armies reduced to about 2,000.211 Conventional military forces were then dedicated to small unit operations amounting to limited patrols and ambushes. Police units continued to patrol the forest edges to prevent Mau Mau from emerging to seek food or refuge in the reserves, and Home Guard units built formidable defensive barriers around the newly completed relocation villages. Paget reports a final addition to the emergency's taactical methods--the population sweep. In his words, "The local population was now no longer passive and the end of the revolt was near." Tens of thousands of Africans would turn out at well advertised times and places to conduct shoulder-to-shoulder on-line sweeps of the forest, with panags in hand. The women were the most enthusiastic supporters of this technique, and Paget claims they would go laughing and singing through the bush until a fugitive was flushed, whereupon the police supervisors had to move with great haste if they desired to recover the victim before he was chopped into very small pieces.212 By the fall of 1956, the mau Mau terrorists still at large numbered only 500. The final chapter of the emergency is the story of the campaign to hunt down Dedan Kimathi, the infamous commander of the Aberdare forces. The government tasked Ian Henderson with that specific task, which took nine months to complete. Majdalany's description of the end is most appropriate: On 17 October 1956 Kimathi was wounded by Henderson's men but succeeded in escaping through the forest, and after travelling non-stop for just under twenty-eight hours and covering nearly eighty miles, he collapsed near the forest fringe. There he remained for three days, hiding in the day time, foraging for food at night. Early on the 21st he was found and challenged by a tribal policeman who fired three times at his hitting him with the third shot. He was then captured, in his leopard skin coat, and in due course brought to trial and sentenced to death.213 Summary The insurrection against the government, which was the major fear expressed in 1952, never materialized. The participants in the violence were almost exclusively Kikuyu, Embu and Meru, tribes which sharead a kinship of territorial proximity, characteristic and traditional similarity, and cultural impact by the presence of the Europeans. The violence never took on a national charater: Only one-fifth of the population of Kenya were involved. It does not appear that the Mau Mau ever targeted colonial government officials or installations, which would be expected ot them if overthrow of the government was their ultimate ojective. Except for the raid for weapons at the police station in Nairobi, no government installations were attacked, no public utilities were disrupted, no railways or other communications systems were destroyed. Statistics available from all sources agree that during the entire emergency period (up to the end of 1956), European civilian casualties totaled only 32 killed and 26 wounded. It could be argued that the government forces so successfully isolated the enemy, that no chance was afforded to strike out against government installations and the general population of Europeans. However, the opportunity surely existed, had the will been there, to cripple Nairobi severly before Operation Anvil took place. Statistics also agree that 1817 African civilians were killed and 910 were wounded during the same period. Certainly the African population received the bulk of the Mau Mau wrath, and in the end, the Africans themselves played a highly significant role in ending the hostilities. The Home Guard and Tribal Police units cleaned out the Native Reserves, and once properly relocated and organized they successfully defended against attack and passive support. The statistics indicate that among the security forces, Africans were the ones who bore the brunt of battle against the Mau Mau in the field, with 524 killed and 465 wounded, as opposed to European casualities of 63 killed and 102 wounded.214 It is not intended to attempt presentation of conclusive evidence that a war of national revolution was never planned by the political nationalists in 1952. To do so is probably not possible, and in any case would serve no purpose in this text. What is intended is to point harshly to the fact that the colonial government did not know what was going on around it, or did not care, or both. Having no functional intelligence system prevented them from being able to distinguish between legitimate grievances and contrived instigations, between bona fide moderate nationalists and radical subversive militants. When hostilities finally erupted, the government could not identify the enemy, and the security forces had to make broad brush sweeps in the dark until they could develop an intelligence system. On the positive side, it appears to have been a wise decision to permit the Kenya Police to direct operations in the early stages and use the military forces in support. The hostilities were clearly an internal problem, which properly should by handled by internal security forces. The fact that hostilities were permitted to rise to a level requiring military intervention does not so much warrant condemnation of the administratiions's failure to permit the police to act at an earlier time, with more force in the proper places. Tactically the Kenya experience illustrates the folly of employing large bodies of general purpose forces to conduct blind sweeps through unfamiliar terrain. The small unit operations, conducted by Africans who knew how to maneuver the terrain, led by special force police officers, supported by specific intelligence and directed against specific objectives were the ideal combination of tactical elements for success. Strategically the formation of a joint security force command structure provided a much needed capability to achieve unity if effort, in terms of both planning and executing the campaign. It is noteworhy to repeat the fact that although the Commander-in-Chief gained operational control over the police he did not subordinate them to the military commanders in the field, but continued the cooperative triumvirate rationship at the working levels, and employed the police in roles appropriate to their training, expertise and mission. NOTES 1 Fred Majdalany, State of Emergency: The Full Story of Mau Mau (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1963), p.62. 2 Raymond E. Glazier,"Kenya: The Termination of Mau Mau" in Case Studies in the Termination of Internal Revolutionary Conflict, comp. Advance Research Projects Agency, XII (Cambridge, Mass.: ABT Associates Inc., 1957), p. 69. Hereafter cited as TIRC. 3 Majdalany, pp. 66-68. 4 Jeremy Murray-Brown, Kenyatta (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1973), p. 278. 5 Majdalany, pp. 69, 79. 6 A. Marshall MacPhee, Kenya (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1968), p. 107. 7 Glazier, TIRC, p. 53. 8 Majdalany, p. 93; Glazier, TIRC, p.53. 9 Majdalany, pp. 97-99. 10 MacPhee, pp. 112-113. 11 Glazier, TIRC, p. 69. 12 Majalany,p. 87. 13 MacPhee, pp. 111-114. 14 Majdalany, pp. 87-88. 15 Majdalany, p.88 16 Julian Paget, Counter-Insurgency Operations: Techniques of Guerilla Warfare (New York: Walker and Company, 1967), p.88. 17 Fact on File: World News Digest with Index, 1952, P. 321. Hereafter cited as FOF. 18 Majdalany, p. 104. 19 FOF, p.338. 20 Majdalany, pp. 104-105. 21 Majdalany, pp. 36-97. 22 James E. Crow, "Insurgency: A Case for the Kenya Police," Disc. U.S. Army War College 1971, p. 163. 23 USACDCIAS Study Team et al., "Preconflict Case Study 5: Kenya," in Army Roles, Missions and Doctrine in Low Intensity Conflict, comp. U.S. Army Combat Developments Command (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Carlisle Research Office, 1970), p.4. Hereafter cited as ARMLIC. 24 Louis Seymour Bazet Leakey, Mau Mau and the Kikuyu, 1st Amer. ed. (1952; rpt. New York: The John Day Company, 1952), p.57. 25 Leakey, p. 57. 26 Macdonald, ARMLIC, p.43. 27 Macdonald, ARMLIC, p. 44. 28 Majdalany, pp. 8-9. 29 Majdalany, p. 15. 30 Majdalany, p. 8. 31 William W. Baldwin, Mau Mau Man-Hunt (New York: E.P. Dutton & Company, Inc., 1957), p.54. 32 Baldwin, pp. 54-55. 33 Madonald, ARMLIC, p. 43. 34 Majdalany, p. 12. 35 Majdalany, pp. 9-13. 36 ARMLIC, p. 26. 37 ARMLIC, p. 26. 38 ARMLIC, p. 31. 39 Leakey, p. 65. 40 ARMLIC, p. 31. 41 Majdalany, p. 3 42 Majdalany, pp. 33-34. 43 Majdalany, pp. 34-35. 44 Majdalany, pp. 32-33. 45 Majdalany, pp. 31-32. 46 ARMLIC, p. 28. 47 ARMLIC, p. 34. 48 Majdalany, pp. 35. 49 Leakey, pp. 57-58. 50 Majdalany, p. 35. 51 Leakey, p. 59. 52 Majdalany, p. 36. 53 Lenkey, pp. 58-59. 54 Majdalany, p. 15. 55 ARMLC, p. 37. 56 ARMLIC, p. 19. 57 ARMLIC, pp. 32-33. 58 Majdalany, pp. 18-19. 59 Majdalany, p. 46. 60 Majdalany, p. 46. 61 Majdalany, pp. 46-48. 62 Majdalany, pp. 46-48. 63 Majdalany, p. 19. 64 Miller, 'Political Parties and Interest Groups," ARMLIC, p. 96. 65 ARMLIC, pp.11-12. 66 ARMLIC,p. x. 67 Majdalany, pp. 46-47. 68 Majdalany. pp. 47-48. 69 Leakey, pp. 89-90. 70 Trinnamen, ARMLIC, p. 107. 71 Louis Seymour Bazett Leakey, Defeating Mau Mau, 1st Amer, ed (1954; rpt. New York: AMS Press, Inc., 1977), pp. 128-131. 72 Leakey, Mau Mau and the Kikuyu, p. 91. 73 Leakey, Defeating Mau Mau, pp. 131-133. 74 Baldwin, pp. 111-112. 75 KLeakey, Mau Mau and the Kikuyu, pp. 91-92. 76 Leakey, Mau Mau and the Kikuyu, pp. 68-69. 77 Leakey, Mau Mau and the Kikuyu, pp. 70-71. 78 Majdalany, pp. 47-48. 79 Leakey, Mau Mau and the Kikuyu, pp. 71-72. 80 Miller, ARMLIC, p. 102. 81 Miller, ARMLIC, p. 103. 82 Miller, ARMLIC, p. 103. 83 Miller, ARMLIC, p. 104. 84 Majdalany, p. 75. 85 Miller, ARMLIC, p. 104. 86 Majdalany, p. 20-23. 87 Majdalany, pp. 20-23. 88 ARML C, p. 38. 89 Majdalany, p. 23. 90 ARMLIC, p. 39. 91 Majdalany, p. 23. 92 Majdalany, p. 23. 93 Majdalany, p. 75. 94 Trinnaman, ARMLIC, p. 120. 95 Leakey, Defeating MAU MAU, p. 34. 96 Miller, ARMLIC, pro. 104-105. 97 Trinnaman, ARMLIC, p. 120. 98 Trinnaman, ARMLIC, pp. 120-121. 99A Trinnaman, ARMLIC,p. 121. 99B Majdalany, pp. 18-19. 100 Glazier, p. 69. 101 Trinnaman, ARMLIC, pp. 121-122. 102 Trinnaman, ARMLIC, pp. 110-111. 103 Trinneman, ARMLIC, P. 112. 104 Trinnerman, ARMLIC, p. 112. 105 Trinneman, ARMLIC, p. 113. 106 Trinneman, ARMLIC, p. 113-114. 107 Trinneman, ARMLIC, p. 114. 108 Glazier, p.69. 109 Leakey, Mau Mau and the Kikuyu, p. 95. 110 Glazier, p. 7. 111 Majdalany, p. 47; Trinneman, ARMLIC, pp. 129-130, p.310. 112 Majdalany, p. 59. 113 Majdalany, p. 62. 114 Majdalany, p. 62. 115 Leakey, Mau Mau and the Kikuyu, pp. 96-97. 116 Glazier, p. 7. 117 Majdalany, pp. 76-77. 118 Majdalany, pp. 70-71. 119 MacPhee, pp. 110-111. 120 MacPhee, pp. 111-112. 121 Leakey, Defeating Mau Mau, p. 41. 122 Baldwin, pp. 113-114. 123 Majdalany, pp. 72-73. 124 Majdalany, pp. 73-75. 125 Majdalany, 77-78. 126 Roberts. ARMLIC, p. 163. 127 Majdalany, p. 80. 128 Majdalany, p. 81. 129 Majdalany, p. 81. 130 Leakey, Mau Mau and the Kikuyu, p. 103. 131 Leakey, Mau Mau and the Kikuyu, p.95. 132 MacPhee, p. 102; Glazier, p. 69. 133 Trinneman, ARMLIC, p. 133. 134 Majdalany, pp. 65-68. 135 Trinneman, ARMLIC, p.122. 136 Majdalany, p. 69. 137 Majdalany, pp. 83-85. 138 Majdalany, p. 85. 139 Glazier, p. 69. 140 MacPhee, p. 107. 141 MacPhee, p. 108. 142 Majdalany, p. 86. 143MacPhee, p. 113. 144 Majdalany, pp. 88-89. 145 MacPhee, pp.113-114. 146 MacPhee, pp. 113-114. 147 Majdalany, pp 88-89. 148 Glazier, p. 70. 149 MacPhee, pp. 114-115; Majdalany, p. 89-91. 150 Majdalany, p . 89-90. 151 MacPhee, p. 16. 152 MacPhee, p. 116. 153 Majdalany, pp. 93-93. 154 Majdalany, pp. 94-95. 155 Leakey, Mau Mau the Kikuyu, pp. 45-46. 156 Majdalany, pp. 94-95; MacPhee, p. 117. 157 Paget, p. 88. 158 Majdalany, p. 104. 159 Majdalany, p. 176. 160 Majdalany, p. 176. 161 Crow, p. 129. 162 Majdalany, p. 106. 164 Majdalany, p. 111. 165 Mears, ARMLIC, pp. 300-302. 167 Majdalany, p. 111. 168 Crow, p. 44. 169 Mears, ARMLIC, p. 303. 170 Crow, pp. 50-52. 171 Frank Kitson, Gangs and Counter-gangs (London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1960), p. 12. 172 Crow, pp. 73-75. 173 Crow, pp. 75-77; Majdalany, p. 98; Paget, p. 91. 174 MacPhee, p. 129. 175 Paget, p. 89; Majdalany p. 135. 176 Majdalany, p. 135. 177 Paget, p. 91; Majdalany, p. 134. 178 Majdalany, pp. 129-130. 179 Majdalany, pp. 131-133. 180 Paget, pp. 92-93. 181 Glazier, p. 71. 182 MacPhee, p. 129. 183 Majdalany, pp. 132-133. 184 MacPhee, p. 129. 185 Majdalany, pp. 117-118. 186 Majdalany, pp. 118-119. 187 Majdalany, pp. 120-121. 188 Majdalany, pp. 123-124. 189 MacPhee, pp. 131-132; Majdalany, pp. 137-147. 190 MacPhee, p. 131; Majdalany, pp. 137-142; Paget, p. 93. 191 Glazzer, p. 72. 192 FOF, 1953, p. 134. 193 MacPhee, p. 132. 194 MacPhee, p. 132. 195 Majdalany, p. 152; Paget, pp. 93-94. 196 Paget, pp. 94-95. 197 Paget, pp. 94-95; Majdalany, pp. 156-157. 198 Majdalany, p. 157. 199 Majdalany, pp. 182-184. 200 MacPhee, pp. 135-139. 201 MacPhee, pp. 139-140. 202 Majdalany, pp. 193-201; Glazier, pp. 14-18. 203 Majdalany, pp. 190-192. 204 Paget, p. 98. 205 Baldwin, pp. 39-40. 206 Paget, p. 98. 207 Majdalany, pp. 204-205. 208 Paget, pp. 99-100. 209 Majdalany, pp. 212-213. 210 Paget, p. 101; Majdalany, p. 213. 211 MacPhee, p. 143. 212 Paget, p. 103. 213 Majdalany, p.220. 214 Paget, p.104. Bibliography BALDWIN, William W. Mau Mau Manhunt. New Y ork: E. P. Dutton & Company, Inc., 1957. Personal account written by the only known American to have participated in the fight against Mau Mau. Baldwin joined the Kenya Police Reserve in 1954, and served with a General Service Unit in Kangema (14 Platoon) for 15 months. Provides interesting insights of the deployed policemen's views of the conflict. BARNETT, Donald L. and NJAMA, Karari. Mau Mau from Within. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966. Autobiography of Njama and analysis by Barnett presenting the peasants' perspective of the revolt by a man who took part in it as a voluntary oath taker but reluctant terrorist. Especially good insights of the causal factors of revolt, frustrations, lack of coordinated effort and communications flow, but intense belief in a cause, which may not have been the same cause s shared by others. CROW, James E. Insurgency: A Case for the Kenya Police. Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U. S. Army War College, 1971. Provides a detailed analysis of the Kenya Police and their participa- tion in the emergency. Especially useful section describing the various departments of the force. FARSON, Negley. Last Chance in Africa. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1950. Provides interesting reading about problems of the people of Kenya prior to the emergency. Based on four months of personal interviews with a wide var- iety of people from all levels--from unknown peasants to Jomo Kenyatta. GLAZIER, Raymond E. Jr. Kenya: The Termination of Mau Mau. Case Studies in the Termination of Internal Revolutionary Conflict, vol. 12. Cambridge, Mass: ABT Association Inc., 1967. Proffers the theis that British military forces in Kenya did not actually deploy against Mau Mau, but provided strategic quick reaction force for Mid-East contingencies. Provides good chronology of events and interesting analyses of British defense priorities and contingency obligations. KALLAN, Irving. Area Handbook for Kenya. 2nd ed. American University Foreign Area Studies "DA PAM 550-56." Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1976. Provides excellent orientation regarding basic information on poltical and economic conditions surrounding the emergency, as well as basic data of limited use to this study concerning Kenya following the emergency. KITSON, Frank. Gangs and Counter-gangs. London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1960. Provides a personal account of one of the founders of the pseudo-gang concept. Depicts in detail the difficulties experienced in entering the emergency blind and trying to piece together an intelligence system from scratch. Excellent reference to special operations employed. Wish this could have been acquired earlier in the research process before focusing on pre-emergency. LEAKEY, Louis Seymour Bazett. Defeating Mau Mau. New York: AMS Press, Inc., 1977. Second ofhis books on subject of Mau Mau from an insider's vantagepoint. Provides interesting suggestions addressed to the colonial government and security forces as to how to cope with the phenomenon of Mau Mau as he interprets it. Mau Mau and the Kikuyu. new York: The John Day Company, 1952. Leakey is the son of missionaries, who lived among the Kikuyu throughout his youth. He provides excellent cultural background of Kikuyu and provides sharp insight on how Mau Mau emerged as a result of the European impact upon the African culture. MAJDALANY, Fred, State of Emergency: The Full Story of Mau Mau. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1963. Perhaps the best available overview of the major events which took place during the emergency, but the author spends excessive time building a case against Jomo Kenyatta as the genius behind a Master Plan which eventually succeeded; i.e. Kenya inde- pendence with Kenyatta in control. MACPHEE, A. Marshall. Kenya. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1968. Straig to forward historical account of Kenya's evolution from the bush to independent nation. Good compan- ion reference to Majdalany's work, but without the same level of colorful detail. MURRAY-BROWN, Jeremy. Kenyatta. New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, Inc., 1973. Provides detailed biography of Kenyatta. Because Kenyatsa spent the emergency period in prison, this source has limited information concerning the emergency events, but provides an interesting perspective of the man. PAGET, Julian. Counter-Insurgency Operations: Techniques of Guerrilla Warfare. New York: Walker and Company, 1967. Paget Presents a brief but excellent account of the emergency in military terms. Following the establishment of his thesis of counter-insurgency in three phases, he demonstrates that thesis by application to the Malaya. Kenya and Cyprus events. ROSS, W. McGreggor. Kenya from Within: A Short Political History. London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1968. Having worded in Kenya as a Civil Engineer from 1900 (including the Uganda Railway Construction) until 1923, Ross provides interesting observa- tions on the early settlement days. Not a major contributing source. USACDCIAS Study Team, et al. "Preconflict Case Study 5: Kenya." Army Roles, Missions and Doctrine in Low Intensity Conflict (ARMLIC). Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Carlisle Research Office, 1970. Provides outstanding detailed analysis of background data, including political, economic, sociological and military factors contributing to the emergency. Used this source extensively.
|Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list|