The Falkland Islands Conflict, 1982: Air Defense Of The Fleet CSC 1984 SUBJECT AREA Aviation ABSTRACT Author: Haggart, James A. Lieutenant Commander U.S. Navy Title: The Falkland Islands Conflict Air Defense of the Fleet Publisher: Marine Corps Command and Staff College Date: 1 May 1984 The object of this paper is to examine the air defense aspects of the 1982 Falkland Islands Conflict and by a discussion of "lessons learned", identify future directions for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. The paper begins with a brief historical insight into the centuries old dispute over control of these isolated South Atlantic islands. The chronicle is followed by a summary of the British and Argentine theater naval and air forces. Special attention in this description is given to the French built Super Etendard and its Exocet missile as well as the Royal Navy's shipboard antiair defenses and the Harrier V/STOL aircraft. The paper describes the inhospitable weather and identifies the electronic warfare shortfalls of each country. The primary emphasis begins with an examination of the Argentine air tactics and a description of the valor of its flight crews. This is followed by an evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the various British antiair defenses and a study of the Harrier tactics. Also included is mention of their attempts with Vulcan bomber and commando raid to deny Argentine use of the runways on the Falkland Islands. Finally, the paper identifies many of the lessons of the conflict, including the need for quality troops and realis- tic training, shipboard point defense systems, and expedi- tionary air fields which will have future impacts on the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. WAR SINCE 1945 SEMINAR The Falkland Islands Conflict, 1982 Air Defense of the Fleet Lieutenant Commander James A. Haggart, USN 2 April 1984 Marine Corps Command and Staff College Marine Corps Development and Education Command Quantico, Virginia 22134 TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page INTRODUCTION 1 1 SUMMARY OF EVENTS LEADING TO WAR 1 2 SUMMARY OF OPPOSING FORCES 1O 3 THE SUPER ETENDARD 18 4 THE EXOCET MISSILE 20 5 WEATHER 22 6 ELECTRONIC WARFARE 24 7 BRITISH LAND BASED AIRCRAFT 28 8 THE HARRIER 35 9 SHIPBOARD AIR DEFENSES 52 10 ARGENTINE AIR FORCE TACTICS 69 11 SHORE BASED ANTI-AIR DEFENSES 72 12 ARGENTINE AIR ATTACKS 75 13 DESTRUCTION OF AIRCRAFT ON GROUND 82 14 LESSONS LEARNED 83 15 CONCLUSION 95 APPENDIX A-1,2,3,4 B-1,2 FOOTNOTES 98 BIBLIOGRAPHY 107 INTRODUCTION When God placed the Falklands 380 nautical miles off the Argentinean coast, He must have wanted to make the South Atlantic conflict as interesting as possible. Given another hundred miles, the Argentine Air Force could not have challenged the British Task Force. Given a hundred miles less, the British would have had to take out the air bases on the Argentinean mainland. RADM W. C. Abhau in a memorandum for LtGen Shutler, January 14, 1983. Because of the large volume of material that could be written concerning this conflict, the primary focus will be on fleet air defense aspects. This paper will examine the forces the British and Argentines had available, how they used them and what lessons can be learned. Because official data from Argentine sources is limited, much of the discus- sion must necessarily be developed from a British point of view. CHAPTER ONE SUMMARY OF EVENTS LEADING TO WAR Although the Falklands/Malvinas conflict was fought only a short time ago (1982), the issue of ownership of the small group of South Atlantic islands has been contentious for centuries. No one knows who saw the islands first but the first man to set foot on the islands was Captain John Strong. However, in 1690, Strong did no more than chart the sound between the two main islands and name it after the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Falkland. He then sailed away.1 Under the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) Spain's control of extensive territories in the Americas--including the Falk- lands--was formally confirmed. But while this served to strengthen Spain's claim to the area it did not dissuade the interests of France and England. The first European to actually settle on the islands was a French nobleman, Antoine de Bouqainville, eager for revenge against Britain for his country's loss of Quebec. In 1764 he claimed the islands in the name of Louis XV and built a small fort and settlement just north of Port Stanley on the eastern is- land.2 The British countered in the following year by sending Commodore John Byron to survey the islands and make claim the territory for the crown. He landed on West Falkland and, unaware of the French on the other island, hoisted his country's flag. The commodore named the spot Point Egmont, planted a vegetable patch and sailed away. The next year Captain John McBride arrived to consoli- date the British claim, build a fort, and eject any other settlers on the islands who might argue Britain's claim. The British encountered the French settlement, numbering, at the time, about 250 people on East Falkland. The French pointed out that their's was a properly constituted colony and it was the British who should leave. Neither did so.3 This pattern of claim, counterclaim, marked the entry of the Falkland Islands into world politics. As France was an ally of Spain, an agreement was reached in 1767 by which the French settlement on East Falkland was ceded to Spain in exchange for financial compensation to de Bouganville.4 The English remained nonetheless. Two years later, in 1769, the Buenos Aires Captain General, Francisco Bucarelli was instructed by Madrid to drive the stubborne British from the islands. His five ships and 1400 men greatly outnumbered the British com- mander and his small land of marines who promptly evacuated Port Egmont. This was actually the first Argentine invasion of the Falklands--a premonition of their aborted conquest more than two centuries later. In 1790 Britain and Spain signed the Nootka Sound Convention by which Britain formally renounced any colonial interest in South America as well as the nations adjacent.5 The Falklands then reverted to a Spanish colony until the collapse of that empire in the early nineteenth century. In 1811, the Spanish removed settlers from the islands be- cause of the stirring independence movement in Buenos Aires. The islands were essentially ungoverned until 1820 when the new state of the Union Provinces of Rio de la Plata, a fore- runner of the present day Argentina sent a frigate to estab- lish claim to the island as part of Argentina's colonial legacy from Spain. Successive governors followed. In 1829 Governor Louis Vernet attempted to develop farming and trading interests on the islands. He also established restrictions on the indiscriminate slaughter of the island seal population which was in danger of extinction. Vernet sought to enforce his control by seizing the American ship Harriet for engaging in what he considered illegal sealing. He brought the ship and captain to Buenos Aires for trial. The American consul in the city, with encougagement from the British consul, protested the arrest claiming that American ships were free to do as they wished since America had never recognized Argentina's presence on the islands. Fortunately for the consul and unfortunately for the Argentines, the American warship USS Lexington was in port. The American consul ordered the ship to the Falk- lands to recover the confiscated cargo of the Harriet. The Lexington's commander, Captain Silas Duncan ex- ceeded his orders and not only recovered the confiscated sealskins but also sacked the settlement building and arrested most of the inhabitants. He then declared the islands "free of all government" and sailed away.6 By forcing the Argentines from the Falklands as he did, he may have provided distant provocation for events leading to the 1982 war. The British took advantage of the situation. In 1833 two ships under Captain James Onslow captured the islands. Outgunned, the few remaining Argentines were forced to leave the islands. With the exception of several months during 1982, the British firmly controlled the Falklands ever since. But the Argentines never abandoned their claim in the Falk- lands and pressed for decades to regain the islands through negotiation. A few stubborn attempts at settlement were mounted in the interim. In 1842, Buenos Aires objected when Britain declared a colonial administration over the Falklands. In the 1880s when the borders between Argentina and Chile were being established, Argentina again asked for the islands back. In 1908 Britain declared sovereignty over uninhabited territory south of the Falklands to include South Georgia and the Orkney and Shetland Island under the Falkland Islands Dependency. Argentina protested, claiming the islands were hers and initiated a further half century of triangular squabbling between Britain, Argentina and Chile. Each country would sail south, put down plaques, build sheds and retreat in the face of difficult weather.7 Juan Peron came to power in 1945. He stimulated feelings of nationalism. Although he considered the Falk- lands to have no economic and only minimal strategic value, the Argentine schools were instructed to teach "The Malvinas are Argentine" which was even set to music. Thus, an entire generation grew up believing the British "occupation" was an affront to national pride. It is no surprise that recon- quest of the islands was not a political objective but was perceived as a challenge to national honor. Invasion seemed inevitable. Juan Peron was succeeded in power by a series of offi- cials including Lieutenant General Jorge Videla, General Roberto Viola and finally, in December 1981, General Leopoldo Galtieri. Just prior to assuming power Galtieri met with the commander of the naval forces, Admiral Jorge Anaya. The two reportedly reached an understanding that the recovery of the Falklands should be achieved within the two years of Galtieri's term as president, ideally before January 1983, the 150th anniversary of the British seizure. The majority of the glory would go to the navy in whose sphere of responsibility the Falklands lay. So thought Anaya.8 Galtieri had good reason to believe in the chances for success. The British treasury had shown not the slightest interest in development of the islands. The Antarctic supply ship HMS Endurance was due to be withdrawn from the Falklands. The islanders had been denied full British nationality and the British Antarctic survey station on South Georgia Island was about to be closed for lack of funds. If ever a country appeared tired of its colonial responsibilities, Britain was one.9 It has been suggested that General Galtieri envisioned the invasion of the Falklands as a distraction to divert people's minds from both political repression and economic calamity.10 This may be at least part of the reason, the Argentinians did have much to complain about. At that time, the country was experiencing an annual inflation rate of nearly 150% and an unemployment rate of 13%.11 The invasion certainly improved (however temporarily) his popularity. But it is likely the timing was more nearly contingent on international conditions that looked especially favorable to an invasion. The conquest of the Falklands and the ineffective defense against the British counterattack followed three political miscalculations. The first (British)--that Argentina would not seek to take by force what had been denied by negotiation, the second and third (Argentine)-- that Britain would not react with force and that in any event, America would not support such a move. These mis- judgments represented stark political and diplomatical failures.12 It has been stated the Galtieri administration based their assumptions on their observations of British actions in South Atlantic. The minimal size of the Royal Marine detachments on South Georgia Island and at Stanley and the perceived lack of British will to project power over such great distances gave the Argentine leaders a false impression that Britain was neither capable nor committed to protecting her interests in the area. Had the British initially kept a creditable forward deployed presence in the islands or even periodically demonstrated some "presence" in the South Atlantic, her commitment to the islands might have been more evident and Argentina might have been more cautious before initiating military action to gain control of the Falklands.13 However, Britain cannot take all the "blame" for having failed to establish an effective deterrent to Argentine action. One must also consider the nature of the Argentine males. From the time they are schoolboys, they are brought up in a male dominated society. Argentine officials felt safe in invading the islands because the reasoned that since no woman would want a war, no woman would politically direct a war, and Mrs. Thatcher was therefore the weak cog in the British military machine. Once the islands were invaded and she quickly assumed command, the Argentines were startled. They had underestimated Margaret Thatcher!14 The Argentine assumption that the United States would not become involved in the conflict was also off base but rational from their point of view. Argentina was gaining increasing favor with the Reagan administration. Galtieri had personally met with Defense Secretary Weinberger and National Security Adviser Richard Allen. They had parted on friendly terms. The United States, early on, assiduously attempted to avoid becoming involved in the conflict in the favor of either side. Secretary of State Haig went to con- siderable trouble to get a peaceful settlement. Forced to pick sides, the United States had to support its most trusted ally and sided against the aggressor. Argentina was again caught off guard. The Argentines began the attack to regain control of the Falklands on 2 April 1982. At 0300 the Argentine sub- marine Sante Fe landed twenty commandos to secure a beach- head at Port Stanley. These were followed by eighty com- mandos from the guided missile destroyer Santissima Trinidad who assaulted the Royal Marine barracks. At 0630 the main force of Argentine Marines and twenty LVTs were disembarked from the landing ship Cabo San Antonio to secure the airport and harbor area while the aircraft carrier Vienticino De Mayo with 1500 army troops aboard waited just outside the Stanley harbor.15 Apparently aircraft were not used during the assault. The following day, Argentine troops landed by heli- copter on South Georgia Island. In both cases, the Royal Marines were waiting for the Argentines and gave good account of themselves before being overwhelmed by superior numbers. Thus closed the short first chapter of the Falk- lands war. To help line up events for the ensuing actions, a full chronology is provided in Appendix (A). The Falklands/Malvinas conflict provided a number of combat situations that are worthy of analysis. This report however, focuses only on those aspects related to air defense of the fleet. In some respects the Falklands conflict re- affirmed old operational and tactical lessons from World War II and Korea, but there were several "firsts" which may impact on U.S. Navy or USMC combat operational concepts, weapons procurement or training. Some of these include: The first use of modern air launched cruise missiles against warships of a major navy. The first use of helicopters in an anti- shipping role employing guided missiles. The first time since World War II a major navy has fought an opponent that employed air, surface, and sub-surface forces against it. The first time since World War II that sustained air attacks were made against naval forces. The first combat employment of shipboard surface-to-air guided missiles to defend surface naval forces against sustained air attacks. The first use of nuclear attack submarines in combat. The first use of high performance V/STOL aircraft in combat. The first use of passive night vision goggles by helicopter crews for the movement of troops in combat. This paper will discuss many of these firsts and describe the methods used by Argentine and Britain to initiate or counter them. CHAPTER TWO SUMMARY OF OPPOSING FORCES The Falklands/Malvinas conflict was fought between two very different countries possessing remarkably different skills and capabilities. At the strategic level Argentina, a continental power with maritime leanings, challenged a maritime power that had almost persuaded itself to adopt a continental strategy.1 At the onset British forces were essentially unprepared to conduct such an operation so far from home ports and bases. Prior to and until the early 1960s Britain had a global defense strategy to protect overseas territories. During the late 60s and early 70s this policy faltered. Reduction of overseas defense commitments, increased per- ceptions of Soviet threats and public demands for smaller defense budgets caused the country (and therefore the de- fense forces) to assume a more regional posture. It was generally believed that future conflicts involving Great Britain would be fought in Europe. For that reason the requirement for an opposed landing capability had been deleted.2 A transition to helicopter carriers away from the angled-deck conventional takeoff carriers was a reflection of this new regional emphasis. Helicopter carriers would henceforth be antisubmarine warfare oriented. The few Sea Harriers onboard were intended to deal with shadowing enemy aircraft, but were never intended to wrest air superiority over a beachhead.3 The requirements of British NATO obli- gations required the nation to station both a large army and a tactical air force in Europe. The navy concentrated its efforts on the North Atlantic to guard reinforcement and resupply shipping in wartime. Because the primary potential aggressor was considered to be the Soviet Union, British forces were designed for a high level threat inside a narrowly defined area. Weapons were becoming both expensive and highly specialized. For example: the army needed a main battle tank; the air force had concentrated on the very expensive Tornado aircraft; and the navy was specializing in ASW, relying heavily on air cover from both shore based air- craft and the American carrier fleet.4 As we in the U.S. have experienced in our own defense budget, high priced items absorbed so much money there was little left for smaller items. The Royal Air Force Harrier remained in inventory but was now limited to a ground attack role; the airborne forces were reduced as was much of the air trans- port fleet. The Falklands conflict exposed the disadvantages of limited and highly specialized forces. The land forces used were the few available mobile, uncommitted forces--Paratroops, Royal Marines, and Gurkhas--not the main battle tank. The primary aircraft was the Harrier, a subsonic, vertical take off and landing airplane, not the high tech Toronado. Ships which had become specialists in ASW found themselves dangerously exposed with too few fighters, no early warning radar, not enough close range guns, and in many cases, obsolete anti-air missiles.5 The British Ministry of Defense had no contingency plans for military operations in the Falklands--the entire operation was an example of rapid mobilization and extensive, imaginative improvisation. The Task Force was assembled and began departing the United Kingdom just three days after the Argentines occupied the Falklands. Eventually the Task Force counted more than 120 ships. Only two capital ships sailed--the small aircraft carriers HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible. The remainder of the force included 43 warships, 22 Royal Fleet Auxiliaries and 62 merchant ships taken up from trade. Nineteen of these ships were fitted to operate helicopters (two also delivered Harriers). A small number of ships were fitted with 20mm or 40mm antiaircraft guns.6 A summary of the major Royal Navy warships is provided below.7 Click here to view image Rapid formation of the Task Force was facilitated by the availability of merchant ships due to the depressed economic conditions of the shipping industry and the laws of the United Kingdom which enabled hasty inclusion of these vessels. For antiair defense, the British surface ships were armed with varying combinations of Sea Wolf, Sea Cat, Sea Dart or Sea Slug missiles, 4.5 inch guns and 40mm and 20mm machine guns. Great Britain operated helicopters from two aircraft carriers as well as all destroyers, frigates, amphibious ships and most auxiliary ships. Helicopter types included the lightweight Lynx and Wasp, the versatile Sea King (equal to the U.S. Navy H3) and the heavy lift Chinook.8 Although a few long-range Vulcan bombers did make single aircraft attacks on the islands, the only ship based fixed wing aircraft was the Harrier. Two models were in- volved: The Navy Sea Harrier carrying the AIM-9L side- winder missile was better equipped to fight in an air-to-air or air intercept role. The total number of Sea Harriers in the Atlantic never exceeded twenty-two. The Royal Air Force GR MK3 was primarily used as a close air support and recon- naissance aircraft. The Argentine surface forces could have presented a formidable challenge to the British task force. The largest Argentine surface vessel was the aircraft carrier Veinticinco De Mayo. Originally constructed by the British during World War II, the ship was operated by the Dutch between 1948 through 1968 before being sold to the Argentines. Dis- placing 19,896 tons, it has an angled deck, a single steam catapult, a normal complement of 8-10 Skyhawks; 5 S-2A ASW aircraft and up to 4 helicopters. When first built, it was capable of 24.5 knots but 22-23 knots is now a more reason- able figure. The ship got underway only once following the initial invasion. According to Argentine sources the task group encountered near-calm conditions in its operating area northwest of the Falklands (verified by the Royal Navy) and was simply unable to move fast enough to generate adequate wind over the deck for launching A-4 aircraft mounting a weapons load of two 500 pound bombs each.9 Consequently, the Argentine task group commander refused to risk the air- craft. Although the ship had had a history of propulsion problems dating back to service with the Dutch Navy10 the loss of the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano may have made the navy reluctant to risk the only remaining capital ship. Ship's aircraft, however, did operate against British forces from land based airfields. Modifications to the ship to permit its operation of the new Super Etendard aircraft were incomplete and there was no shipboard employment during the war. As with the Argentine Navy A-4 aircraft, the Etendards operated from land. The other large Argentine vessel was the ill-fated light cruiser--General Belgrano. A World War II veteran, the ship was formerly operated by the United States Navy. While it is true the ship was quite old, its fifteen six inch guns nevertheless posed a significant threat to the British fleet. Although the Argentine Navy lost several other vessels in the South Atlantic conflict, the sinking of the Belgrano early in the war was the only significant loss. Belgrano was sunk by a British submarine before it was able to fire a shot, and it may be said (tongue-in- cheek) that the ship did save the remainder of the Argentine fleet. After the sinking of the Belgrano, the Argentines were so concerned with the British submarine threat that most surface vessels spent the remainder of the war in port. The Argentines had a single amphibious landing ship, a moderate number of patrol craft and auxiliaries and six Exocet missile equipped destroyers. These operated in the area of the Falklands during the early days of the conflict. The only vessels, however, which actually operated against British forces after the first assault at Stanley were Argentine submarines. The Argentine Navy began the conflict with four diesel submarines.11 Two were former U.S. "GUPPY" class vessels, one of which was so plagued with maintenance problems it was stripped of spare parts and used to keep the other vessel of the class operational. This second "Guppy", the Sante Fe, had been used as a troop transport and not an attack vessel. For example, the Sante Fe delivered twenty commandos in the predawn landing that began the assault on Stanley on April 2, 1983. After delivering forty Argentine Marines to help fortify the island of South Georgia on 25 April, the Sante Fe was spotted on the surface leaving Grytviken harbor by a British Wessex helicopter. The crew of the helicopter dropped two depth charges which damaged the submarine, preventing it from diving. A Lynx helicopter next attacked the submarine with a torpedo which failed to detonate but caused the vessel to return to the harbor. A WASP helicopter then attacked the submarine with an air-to- surface missile which punched a hole in the conning tower, convincing the beleagured commander to beach the vessel where it was finally captured by British forces.12 The other two submarines were West German "Type 209" vessels built in 1974--Salta and San Luis. The Salta saw no action but the San Luis, also suffering from maintenance problems, did operate against the Royal Navy. Foreign technicians returning from Argentina reported that the San Luis deployed in mid-April with one of its four diesel engines inoperative the main torpedo fire control system inoperative and a crew which had experienced a fifty percent turnover only a week earlier. The fatal blow in the ship's performance, however, was a reversal of two wires in the target angle synchro in the emergency fire control panel. The problem was compounded by an apparent failure on the part of the operators to realize that the panel then had no provision for feedback from the wire-guided torpedos after they were launched.13 They, therefore, couldn't give the torpedo command guidance enroute to its target. The San Luis reportedly did manage to conduct an attack. The submarine fired three MK 37 and three or four West German SST-4 torpedoes at surface ship targets. All were reportedly fired at ranges of 8000 yards with the submarine at maximum operating depth. No hits were achieved. The submarine subsequently returned to its base. Apparently that submarine spent the remainder of the war in port while technicians attempted to repair the fire control computers.14 The Argentines had a formidable Air Force which in- cluded U.S. built A-4B Skyhawks, Lear jets, and C-130s, British built Canberra bombers, Israeli M5 Daggers and French built M3 Mirages and Super Etendards. Most of these aircraft were of very old design. For example, the A-4 first flew in 1954, the Mirage III and V prototypes in 1956.15 While these aircraft were operated out of airfields on the Argentine mainland, the Argentines flew their own turbo-prop ground attack aircraft, the Pucara, from several Falkland airfields.16 A discussion of tactics may be found later in this analysis. CHAPTER THREE THE SUPER ETENDARD The most capable, most modern aircraft in the Argentine Navy inventory was the French built Dassault Breguet Super Etendard tactical jet. Primarily a subsonic attack aircraft (maximum speed 640 knots), the Etendard carries two 30mm cannon and can be loaded with bombs, rockets, or additional fuel tanks. The aircraft can also be fitted with the Matra Magic air-to-air missile for a limited anti-air role. The Etendard's primary mission in the Argentine Navy, however, involves the launching of the Exocet AM-39 missile.1 The Argentines ordered fourteen of the Super Etendard aircraft from France in 1979. Plans called for a ten plane squadron with four aircraft in reserve. To insure the highest level of training for the pilots, they added a Super Etendard flight simulator. This simulator had not arrived prior to the South Atlantic conflict. By the start of the South Atlantic conflict in early April, the pilots had accumulated an average of only 90 flight hours each. None had received any training in the delivery of the Exocet missile. French technicians were to have made the missile operational in April of 1982 but had been recalled to France once the war erupted.2 Thus the Navy's Super Etendard squadron actually began the war with just five aircraft, five Exocet missiles, and no training in the employment of the missile. To top it off, the necessary modifications to the carrier Vienticino De Mayo had not been completed in time for the aircraft to be deployed aboard ship. The pilots improvised their own training and tactics, however, and did get limited assets combat ready. Flying from shore bases they conducted a total of ten sorties, launched all five missiles, and scored two or three hits, destroying two ships and shocking the world with the lethal- ity of the advanced weapon system. It is interesting to speculate as to the impact the aircraft might have made on the British fleet were more Exocet missiles available at the time of hostilities. CHAPTER FOUR THE EXOCET MISSILE Probably no other weapon of the South Atlantic conflict captured more attention than the Esocet missile. To be sure, it did not mark the first sinking of a ship by a sea-skimming missile. The Israeli destroyer Eliat had been sunk by Soviet missiles fired by Egyptians in the 1967 war. There were other reports of the use of anti-shipping missiles during the Iran-Iraq war which had begun in 1980.1 Nonetheless, those instances were generally ignored, probably because they were fights among vessels belonging to third rate navies. The sinking of HMS Sheffield, a ship belonging to a major seagoing nation, took the whole world by surprise. The fact that a $50 million vessel could be sunk by a single hit with a relatively inexpensive ($250,000) missile was shocking to say the least. The French designed Exocet AM-39 missile used by the Argentines is the aircraft launched version of the widely used Exocet anti-shipping missile.2 The AM-39 has a two stage solid fuel rocket motor with a burn time of approxi- mately 150 seconds. This gives the missile a high cruising speed of Mach .93 at a height of only 6-10 feet and a range of approximately thirty miles. The missile is 15 feet long, has a warhead of 360 pounds and a total weight of 1430 pounds.3 The AM-39 version receives target range and direction data from an I-Band radar in the Super Etendard aircraft prior to launch. The guidance system consists of inertial guidance followed by active radar homing when the missile approaches five miles from the target.4 A total of five AM-39 missiles, the entire Argentine inventory at the start of the conflict, were fired.5 One missile struck HMS Sheffield and one, possible two, struck the container ship Atlantic Conveyor. Curiously, it is believed that neither (or none) of the warheads exploded. Rather, the ships were destroyed by fires which were started by the still burning rocket motors. Authorities are reluc- tant to speculate why the warheads failed to detonate. Be- cause the two vessels sank, no missile parts could be re- covered for analysis. None of the AM-38 missiles (the ship launched version of the Exocet) installed aboard Argentine Navy ships were fired from their vessels. Several AM-38s, however, were removed from the ships and fastened to truck trailers for use as land-based mobile anti-ship batteries. At least two missiles were fired from these shore based launchers. One struck HMS Glamorgan and exploded, destroying the ship's helicopter and hanger, but did not sink the ship.6 CHAPTER FIVE WEATHER One of the key factors in the South Atlantic conflict was harsh weather. The climate is marked by low temperatures and high winds. The mean daily temperatures vary between 57OF in summer and 20oF in winter. The average rainfall is about 27 inches annually, spread evenly throughout the year. Snow falls about fifty days in a year.1 The strength and persis- tence of the wind is the most notorious feature of the Falklands. Visitors to the islands as far back as the 17th century complained about the difficult weather. A passenger with Captain John Davis wrote, The 14th wee were driven in among certain Isles never before discovered...in which place unlesse it had pleased God of His wonderfull mercie to have ceased the wind, wee must of necessitie have perished.2 The winds blow at more than 20 knots 64% of the time through- out the year. This means steep seas and regular gale force winds for ships operating offshore, particularly in winter which was the period for most of the South Atlantic conflict. Weather experienced by the RN Task Force generally followed a nine day cycle. Strong gale force winds would rapidly build and the sea state would deteriorate. The blow would last for about three days during which operations were very difficult followed by three days of relatively calm seas and winds with low ceilings and poor visibility. This was generally followed by three days of unlimited visibility and calm seas.3 The weather worked to the advantage of both sides. It permitted the British to put their forces ashore at San Carlos during poor flying weather, but cleared shortly thereafter, allowing Argentine air attacks which resulted in severe damage to the British forces. In addition to the harsh weather, the latitude of the islands and the season of the year combine to limit the amount of daylight available. One British Harrier pilot wrote in a letter that "daylight begins at 1100 and darkens at 1730."4 The Argentine aviation units did not have an all weather day-night capability and therefore avoided adverse weather, limiting attacks to daylight hours. Their ground forces had superior night vision equipment but they did not capitalize on the advantage. In contrast, the British were able to use darkness to protect themselves from Argentine air attack as well as to launch infantry attacks against the Argentine Army. CHAPTER SIX ELECTRONIC WARFARE Both Argentine and British forces made minimal use of electronic warfare techniques, due primarily to the limited equipment available to the engaged forces. The British lack of airborne early warning (AEW) capa- bility has been well documented. Surely this was one of the most serious deficiencies of the Royal Navy in the war. What has been overlooked by many is that passive electronic warfare SIGINT (signals intelligence), and communications receivers could have provided much of the warning against the aircraft and Exocet missile attacks despite the lack of AEW aircraft. However, as evidenced by the success of three of the four Exocet attacks, British SIGINT provided the ships with little warning of the missiles. Analysts have stated that these results are unrealistic and more emphasis needs to be placed on equipment and readiness factors to ensure that SIGINT is used more effectively.1 They state that shipboard SIGINT existed at the time but problems of coordination prevented timely utilization of vital infor- mation. A discrepancy in the British task force was the lack of an aircraft carrier with conventional takeoff and landing facilities for the Gannet AEW aircraft and the lack of long- range, shore based AEW Nimrod aircraft (similar in capability to the USAF AWACS aircraft). Had either Gannet or Nimrod been available, better air raid warning would have allowed more effective use of Sea Harriers in meeting the Argentine air attacks. Additionally, shipboard surface to air missiles would have been better alerted prior to each attack. It is unlikely that a fixed wing military V/STOL AEW aircraft will ever be built, but an AEW helicopter has already been developed by the British. The necessary equip- ment fits onto the SEA King helicopter airframe. This air- craft has the flexibility of operating from ships other than aircraft carriers.2 Tactics used by the Argentine air force against the British fleet made the aircraft difficult to defend against. In addition to problems of detecting low flying, high speed aircraft, the weapons employed by the Argentines were impos- sible to defend against once released. The Argentine Air Force did not use "smart" weapons, and relied instead upon iron bombs or unguided rockets. (The Exocet missiles operated by the Argentine Navy are exceptions) While it is technically possible, although difficult, to decoy some guided weapons, it is impossible to divert an unguided bomb after low altitude release. The Royal Navy was fortunate that many of the bombs simply failed to explode. On the other hand, because basic bombs are unguided, Argentine pilots were forced to fly closer to targets and were there- fore more exposed to withering British missile defenses. The Argentine aircraft did not use any electronic counter- measures to degrade Royal Navy missiles. The typical Argentine tactic was to delay facing the missiles by flying low or using the nearby land mass for terrain masking. When possible, multiple aircraft formations were also used. (Some Royal Navy fire control computers had difficulty separating two closely spaced targets.) In contrast, the British did use active ECM aboard certain aircraft. Vulcan bombers which attacked the Falk- lands on several occasions carried active ECM equipment which may have blocked out the Fledermaus radar used by the Argentines for directing Roland surface to air missiles based at Stanley. It is significant that no Vulcan was lost on any of the missions.3 The British also made wide use of chaff to confuse enemy radar. Lacking automatic dispensors, chaff was packed between aircraft and bomb cases so that when weapons were released a chaff cloud was created to automatically protect the aircraft. The British believe this was effective against Argentine radar controlled defenses. Many of the surface ships also employed chaff to defend against the Exocet missile, but it is unknown whether the chaff success- fully countered an Exocet missile. It is interesting to note, however, that the Atlantic conveyour had no chaff, nor did Sheffield dispense the chaff it had.4 It has also been speculated that the Atlantic Conveyor was hit by a missile that was deflected from its intended target, a nearby air- craft carrier.5 The Atlantic Conveyor, in effect, became a superb decoy, albeit a very expensive one. We will never know if that was the case. It does highlight the require- ment for antiair protection for assets such as the non- combatant Atlantic Conveyor. One possible solution would be a roll on-roll off EW van with ESM, ECM and chaff launchers which could be fitted aboard commercial shipping during times of crisis.6 There have also been several questions raised concerning the use of helicopters in an Exocet decoy role.7 Although no details have been released by official British sources it is possible that some helicopters towed a radar corner reflector similar to the manner in which a surface ship might do with an acoustic torpedo decoy. Since neither the carriers reportedly being protected nor the decoys themselves were attacked by Exocet missiles, it was not possible to judge the effectiveness of such a surmised decoy. CHAPTER SEVEN BRITISH LAND BASED AIRCRAFT The British aviation forces were at a severe disadvan- tage when the fleet arrived in the Falklands. In addition to being greatly outnumbered, the Royal Navy had no land based aviation assets nor any airfields in that portion of the South Atlantic that could apply pressure against the Argentines. To make matters worse, the opponents possessed not only good land based airfields in Argentina but they held a vital runway at Stanley as well. Although the Stanley runway was too short for use by high performance aircraft, the British were concerned that the runway might be somehow lengthened to permit tactical jet strikes against the British fleet. In its original condition the field could be well used by C-130's or Pucara close air support aircraft. The Royal Air Force attempted to even the score. At 4:23 A.M. on May 1st, a single long-range Vulcan bomber dropped twenty-one 1,000 pound bombs onto the airport at Stanley. One bomb punched a twenty foot hole squarely in the runway, another damaged the edge of the runway and the remaining nineteen were marched across the airport damaging equipment and destroying several aircraft.1 The significance of the bombing mission is not that one bomb struck the runway but that such an attack could be carried out at all. The nearest land based airfield available to the British was Wideawake Airport on Ascension Island. Located just south of the equator near the western coast of Africa, Ascension Island is 3,400 nautical miles from the Falklands. There were far too few long-range aircraft in the British inventory, and none could fly that far on internal fuel alone. Great Britain's recent restructure of its forces to concentrate against the Soviet threat in the NATO area in- cluded the phase out of strategic bombing missions within the Royal Air Force. Most long-range bombers and refueling aircraft were decommissioned. Only a few Vulcan squadrons remained. The Vulcan is a very large aircraft. Its wide delta wings span 111 feet and the aircraft maximum gross weight exceeds 200,000 pounds. These aging aircraft, which first flew during the 1950s, had the longest range of any RAF aircraft but still lacked the reach to fly out to the Falk- lands and return. Although originally designed to deliver a nuclear warhead, the airplane could carry up to 22,000 pounds of conventional ordnance over a much reduced distance.2 As with any aircraft, as required range increases, available bomb load decreases. When equipped with auxiliary fuel tanks the range could be increased to 4,600 miles but a smaller bomb load was featured. The British recognized that inflight refueling would be necessary but that this would not be the only problem. Vulcan aircrews who had previously concentrated on the delivery of nuclear weapons suddenly had to be re- qualified in conventional ordnance as well as inflight re- fueling techniques. Since no air to air refuelings of the Vulcan had been carried out since 1967, many of the fuel probes of the aircraft had deteriorated. In fact, some spare parts had to be retrieved from museum aircraft throughout the world. Each aircraft also received essential inertial navigation equipment and a Westinghouse AN/ALQ 101 electronic countermeasures pod. A total of five aircraft were so readied.3 The successful flight of the single Vulcan on May 1 was a marvel of coordination. A total of ten tanker air- craft were required, some refueling the Vulcan, some ex- tending the range of the other tankers and some refueling the Vulcan on its return flight. Because of the limited number of RAF tanker assets and the cramped facilities at Wideawake airfield only one Vulcan could be supported for each mission. These aircraft flew at altitudes between 27,000 and 32,000 feet for most of the mission. In order to avoid detection by Argentine radar at Stanley, the aircraft descended to 250 feet during the final 300 miles to the target.4 The bomber then climbed to 10,000 feet just prior to weapon release to enhance ordnance penetration potential. The aircraft returned to Ascension after flying a total of fifteen hours. These flights were the longest bombing mission in the history of air warfare. Although only one bomb of the first stick struck the runway with two subse- quent raids on 4 May and 11 June failing to hit the runway, the operations proved to the Argentines that the "British were coming". The attacks also convinced the Argentines that basing of Argentine tactical jet aircraft in the Falk- lands was impractical. The single bomb hit damaged the run- way sufficiently to prevent its use by the high performance Super Etendard or Skyhawk aircraft. The threat of future attacks added to the fear of losing valuable jet aircraft at Stanley. Finally, the bombing raids caused the Argentines to fear an air attack on the mainland, causing them to retain some Mirage aircraft and Roland missiles for defense. Un- fortunately the British Secretary of State for Defense announced sometime later that Britain would not bomb targets on the Argentine mainland.5 This statement was undoubtedly welcomed by the Argentine military command because it per- mitted the very limited number of Roland SAM's to be deployed around the airfield at Stanley. The Vulcan bombing raids against Port Stanley airfield highlighted the difficulty of interdicting a runway, espe- cially one built on solid rock. The British, therefore, shifted their emphasis to the Argentine surveillance radar on Mount Tumbledown in East Falkland. This system was important to the Argentine defense of the island, and a threat to both British aircraft and fleet. It was apparent that the Argentines were using the radar to locate British ships by both observing the ships on the radar screens or by tracking British aircraft recovering aboard their carrier. Originally, the Vulcan was fitted to carry a Martel air to surface anti-radar missile but there was some concern over the missile's ability to withstand an eight hour flight at altitudes above 25,000 feet. It was, therefore, decided to switch to the U.S. built Shrike which had already been used in Vietnam.6 Two Vulcan missions to employ the missile were aborted on 13 and 28 May--the former due to adverse weather enroute, the latter when an inflight refueling probe was damaged. A third mission on the evening of 30 May did reach the Falklands but it was unsuccessful. A radar homing missile such as the Shrike is not passive but transmits a signal of its own as it homes on the transmission of its target. This energy can be detected even before the missile is launched. The enemy's most effective countermeasure is simply to shut the radar down, giving the missile nothing to home in on. This method was effectively used by the North Vietnamese when attacked with the missile years ago. Some missiles were launched, but no information has been released con- cerning the effectiveness of this attack nor the following raid on 3 June.7 It is likely, then, that the radar facil- ity was not put out of action. The Vulcan crew conducting the attack on 3 June had an anxious moment on the return flight to Ascension Island. When attempting to refuel from a waiting tanker the tip of the Vulcan's fuel probe was broken, preventing any further refueling. The flight crew had to divert to neutral Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. After being held by that country for a week, the flight crew and aircraft were released, but only after its payload including missiles had been removed.8 The final Vulcan flight of the war, indeed the final operational flight of the now-retired aircraft occurred on 11 June. Although twenty-one 1,000 pound bombs were again dropped on the Stanley airfield, none of the weapons actually hit the runway. Further flights were unnecessary. The Argentines surrendered at Stanley three days later. As an interesting sidelight, it has been reported that the Argen- tines sometimes bulldozed dummy bomb craters on the Stanley runway after an attack to make the British believe their raids were more successful than they really were. The British were not fooled.9 The question of why the Argentines did not attempt to lengthen the Stanley runway has been the topic of many discussions since the end of the war. The answer is probably a combination of three factors. First there were physical difficulties. The extension of the western end of the field would have required a major construction effort--more than the Argentines could accomplish in the time available. The eastern end could have been extended, however, by 2000 feet with metal matting. Secondly, the equipment needed to extend the runway would have had to run the British sea blockade. Thirdly, before construction equipment could be moved in, the attacks on the runway by the Vulcan and Harrier aircraft probably convinced the Argentines that it would be too dangerous to base tactical jet aircraft at Stanley. They, therefore, limited their use of the field to helicopters, Pucara turbo prop aircraft and an occasional C-130.10 CHAPTER EIGHT THE HARRIER IN THE AIR DEFENSE ROLE Sea Harriers went to the South Atlantic with three missions: 1. Support any amphibious assault that might be planned. 2. Gain absolute air superiority over the Falklands. 3. Protect the Task Force.1 The Harriers supported the amphibious assault at San Carlos and did attempt to protect the task force, but they never gained absolute air superiority. This chapter will discuss the many successes and the few shortcomings of the Royal Navy Sea Harrier and RAF-GR.3. Because the British Navy has been structured to be essentially an ASW force with reliance on land based air- craft for air defense, its anti-air capability in the South Atlantic was very limited. Lacking large conventional carriers, the Royal Navy was forced to go to war with only two short vertical takeoff and landing (V/STOL) ships and their V/STOL aircraft, the Harrier. However, despite their deficiencies, these units performed very well. It has been stated that had the British not had aircraft with the capabilities of the Harrier (V/STOL, high reliability, and high availability) and the two small ships to operate them, it is unlikely the United Kingdom would have committed itself to hostilities in the South Atlantic. Principally a tactical jet airplane, Harrier has the unique ability to rotate its exhaust nozzles forward to permit the aircraft to land and take off vertically or after a very short takeoff roll. Its chief advantage to the Royal Navy is its ability to operate from small aircraft carriers without the need for the bulky catapults or arresting cables found on the larger U.S. Navy carriers. In an era when the United Kingdom was reducing its global force projection navy to that of a NATO antisubmarine warfare force, the Harrier was an economical answer. Although the price paid for the V/STOL capability was a lack of supersonic speed with reduced payload and radius of action, the aircraft nevertheless performed admirably in combat. Perhaps its greatest feature was surprising flexi- bility. Some Harriers were flown by Royal Air Force pilots who had never seen an aircraft carrier, yet they deployed the aircraft to the ships and operated from them the next day. Other Harriers were ferried to the South Atlantic aboard the container ship Atlantic Conveyor and later flown to the carriers. After British forces landed in the Falk- lands, a temporary landing site was established ashore with metal matting to enhance the capability of the aircraft. On one occasion the temporary airfield was unavailable for two Harriers returning from a combat air patrol mission low on fuel. These aircraft were able to divert to helicopter landing pads on board the amiphibious landing ships HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid. Without vertical landing capability, the aircraft might have been lost. The Harrier achieved an unusually high aircraft avail- ability record despite the fact that hanger space aboard the small carriers was limited. Most of the maintenance per- sonnel performed repairs on the flight deck--often during darkness and harsh weather. Nonetheless, the Harriers suffered no losses due to aircraft malfunctions. Two models of the Harrier were operated during the South Atlantic conflict. The Harrier GR MK-3 was the Royal Air Force version, primarily intended as a ground attack aircraft. The Navy version was the Sea Harrier. Both air- craft had identical performance characteristics and were similar in appearance, the most noticeable difference being in the nose of the aircraft. Because the Royal Air Force Harrier lacked an air-to-air radar, it was normally reserved for ground attack missions. Most combat air patrols were performed by the Sea Harrier. This aircraft was equipped with the Blue Fox air intercept radar which is similar in most respects to pulse radars installed in certain U.S. Navy and Air Force F-4 Phantom fighter aircraft. These radars are best suited for intercept missions against medium or high altitude targets. Against low altitude targets over land or over moderate seas these aircraft (including the Harrier) have little more than visual, daylight capabilities to find enemy aircraft. An aircraft configured with an all weather, look-down, shoot down capability with Sparrow semi- active radar missiles would have been more suitable during adverse weather conditions. The British carriers were much smaller than a typical U.S. Navy carrier. The larger of the two Royal Navy ships, Hermes, displaced 28,700 tons, approximately one-third of a typical U.S. Navy carrier. The Hermes was laid down in 1944 as a ship of the Centaur class and was commissioned as a fixed wing conventional takeoff and landing carrier, and was later equipped with two steam catapults, an angled deck and a deck edge elevator. In 1971-1973 the ship was converted to service as a commando carrier (LPH), abandoning all fixed wing aircraft facilities. The ship was further altered during 1976-1977 to serve as an ASW helicopter carrier with the capability of embarking 1500 marines. In 1980, the ship was again modified. This time it received a twelve degree, 150 foot by 45 foot "ski jump" to facilitate launching of Harrier.2 Use of the ski jump permitted the aircraft to double bomb loads or reduce takeoff rolls by one-half.3 The normal air- craft complement of the ship is five Sea Harriers and twelve Sea King ASW and troop lift helicopters. The second British carrier was HMS Invincible. Dis- placing only 19,960 tons, it is about the size of U.S. Navy LPH. It too is configured as an ASW/commando ship, having temporary berthing for 960 marines but a smaller complement of aircraft than Hermes. Certain design features make it particularly well suited for aircraft operations. The high freeboard (sides of the ship) and fin stabilization system make for a very dry and stable flight deck. There were reportedly periods during the conflict, however, when the amount of ordnance piled on deck plus the normal requirement to keep all aircraft on deck fully fueled placed the ship outside normal safe stability limitations. The Invincible also had a "ski jump" ramp at its bow but only seven degrees (instead of the twelve degree ramp used by Hermes). British sources have publically claimed that the bow ramps permitted Harriers to be operated from the small carriers in the South Atlantic under sea conditions which would have prevented conventional takeoff and landing aircraft from operating from HMS ARK Royal (the Royal Navy's last angle decked carrier).4 It is a remarkable claim. Harsh weather provided a special challenge to Harrier flight crews, especially inbound to the carriers. Both Hermes and Invincible are fitted with an optical night landing aid similar to the Visual Approach Slope Indicator (VASI) found at some United States airfields. Although their system provides adequate visual assistance for the initial phase of the Harrier night approach (prior to reaching one- half mile), the system was not effective in providing final glide slope guidance for the critical transition from forward flight to a hover. Because the Harrier was so difficult to land at night, only the most experienced pilots flew after darkness.5 Despite this caution, however, one Sea Harrier and pilot were lost on the night of 23/24 May.6 The Hermes and Invincible both lacked a precision approach system for controlling aircraft on the final portion of an approach. Despite this handicap, Harrier pilots made several unassisted recoveries during periods of poor visi- bility with ceilings below 100 feet.7 Only through superior airmanship and the aircraft's unique vertical landing ability were these kinds of recoveries possible. It should be noted the Sea Harrier (but not the RAF GR.3 nor the U.S. Marine Corps AV-8A) has a digital avionics system, improved heads up display, and more responsive hover reaction controls that eased the pilot's workload during transition to hover.8 A recent U.S. Navy study praised the Harrier's landing ability stating: The Harrier's unique vertical landing capability may prove decisive in nature giving U.S. forces the advantage over an enemy operating conventional aircraft. Aircraft design improvements which enhance all weather landing operations should be given high priority in present and future V/STOL programs.9 One of the best features of the Harrier was versatility in operating from a variety of platforms under actual combat conditions. In addition to the aircraft which were trans- ported to the Falklands by the carriers Hermes and Invinci- ble, other Harriers were ferried by the container ships, Atlantic Conveyor and Contender Berant. Fourteen more air- craft flew nonstop from their home field in Britain to Ascension and joined the carriers there. Finally, four RAF GR.3s were flown the entire 7,000 miles from Britain to the South Atlantic with only a single stop at Ascension Island.10 The Harrier aircraft performed a variety of missions in the South Atlantic, but the interceptor role gained the aircraft its acclaim. Accounts of the number of enemy air- craft destroyed vary between 20 and 31 but equally important is the large number of enemy sorties broken up before they reached British forces. It is safe to say the aircraft played a significant role in reducing the Argentine air threat to the battle group. The South Atlantic conflict did not have the long, swirling air-to-air combats conducted over Britain in 1939 and 1940. On most missions, the Argentine aircraft had barely enough fuel for a single pass at their target. Often the Harriers were attacking aircraft which were at the extreme limits of their operating range and which could not afford to engage the British aircraft if they expected to return home. Many times the mere presence of a Harrier was enough to make the enemy aircraft jettison ordnance and dash back to base. There was only one instance where the Argen- tines attempted a full-scale air-to-air battle. On 1 May, Harriers were challenged by four or five Mirages providing fighter escorts for an Argentine strike force. The faster Mirages executed forward hemisphere attacks with what the British believe were radar guided missiles (Matra R.350). The Harrier pilots reported that the Argentine flight crews, after launching their missiles, broke away from the engage- ments before the missiles could impact the Harriers. The turning away by the Mirages discontinued the radar illumi- nation of the British aircraft before the missiles had a chance to follow the relected radar energy to impact.11 Unguided, the missiles were avoided by the British pilots and no Harriers were damaged. After that attack, the Argen- tines used aircraft only to attack the British shipping and never again challenged Harriers. While the Argentines con- centrated on the antishipping role, there is evidence that some of the Argentines devoted all their attention to the attack and very little to their own defense. British pilots have claimed that some of the Argentines apparently did not notice approaching Harriers and often took no evasive action even after other aircraft in their formation were shot out of the sky. (It has been reported that the extreme low flight of the Argentine aircraft caused salt to accumulate, obscuring windshields). This may have prevented them from seeing approaching Harriers.12 The Argentine Mirage was much faster than the Harrier. The British recognized they would be at a decided disadvan- tage if they tried to combat the Mirage on its own terms (high speed-high altitude). The British plan, therefore, was to initially evade combat, using the capability of their nimble aircraft to rotate its exhaust nozzles in flight so as to rapidly turn, accelerate or decelerate for several minutes or so before the Mirages would have exhausted their reserve fuel. Then, as the Mirages turned back toward their home bases, the Harriers would move in for the kill. The British knew one additional fact concerning the Mirage. Be- cause Mirages had no inflight refueling probe, they flew with only the fuel on board. Use of afterburner in air-to- air combat would cause a Mirage to run out of fuel before it could return to the mainland.13 The British had reason to be confident in their aircraft. In simulated combat, kill ratios of 2:1 had been claimed by 899 squadron against the U.S. Air Force F-5E and ratios above 1:1 over the F-15 and F-16.14 The total number of Sea Harriers in the British forces was extremely limited. The entire aircraft purchase, which began in 1979, was restricted to 34 aircraft of which two had not yet flown by the beginning of the war. One aircraft had already been lost in a training accident long before the start of the South Atlantic conflict. One of the last two aircraft on the assembly line was rushed through final tests, but after subtracting aircraft needed in the United Kingdom for pilot training and testing of new equipment, only 28 Sea Harriers were available for combat. Twenty of these aircraft were aboard Hermes and Invincible when the ships sailed from Portsmouth. The remainder were delivered by other means.15 Opposing these few aircraft was a force of more than 200 Argentine aircraft of all types. Most numerous were Mirages and Skyhawks; the most challenging was Super Etendard. British authorities expected Sea Harrier losses due to accidents, operational failures or even enemy action. They knew they would be incapable of replacing the aircraft since to build a new airframe would require thirty months. The only remaining option for obtaining additional aircraft was to use the Royal Air Force's Harrier GR.3. Although the GR.3s were very similar in appearance to the Sea Harrier, the airframes were not equipped in the same manner. In keeping with Britain's defense policy of tailoring its forces for a NATO battle, the Harrier GR.3 was designed and deployed for a European conflict. Twelve of the aircraft were part of the forces assigned to protect the flanks of NATO in Norway or Turkey, and most of the remaining Harrier GR.3s were based in West Germany where their primary mission was to drop cluster bombs on Soviet tanks. Since the Harrier GR.3 will be the first aircraft to be replaced by the second generation Harrier, the AV-8B, it was logical from a broad, Ministry of Defense, point of view to use the GR.3 to augment the Sea Harrier in the air defense role. In order to meet the unique operational demands of the South Atlantic conflict, the British made modifications to nearly every Royal Navy and RAF Harrier to expand the weapons systems and extend their operational capabilities. Some of the changes were already under consideration and needed only acceleration while others had to be researched, designed, manufactured and test flown within just a few days. Some of the changes included U.S. stock material such as the AGM-45 SHRIKE missile and the ALE-40 chaff/flare dispenser. The "Blue Fox" radar was installed on the Sea Harriers. RAF Harriers received a limited capability to launch the Sidewinder air-to-air missile and the carriage and release mechanism for Paveway laser guided bombs.16 The harsh weather and salt spray of the South Atlantic create a highly corrosive atmosphere. The GR.3 lacked many of the special sealing and drainage equipment found on the Sea Harrier to reduce this hazard. In addition to the drainage modifications, the aircraft also needed to be cer- tified to carry other types of weapons including the two inch naval rockets and laser guided 1000 pound bombs. The Harrier GR.3 also experienced difficulties with its inertial navigation system.17 The Italian made Ferranti system was not designed to be reoriented on a rolling/ pitching flight deck. (The Sea Harriers which had a dif- ferent navigation system were not so affected.) The Ferranti organization quickly designed a trolley-mounted reference system which was intended to permit rezeroing of the navi- gation equipment on deck before takeoff. Unfortunately, the trolley system did not work as well as the Navy had hoped. Without a reliable navigation system safe operations on a combat air-to-air mission would have been most difficult. Perhaps for this reason the GR.3 was not used in more of an air-to-air role. As mentioned earlier, twenty of the Harrier aircraft initially traveled to the South Atlantic on board Hermes and Invincible. It had been intended to ferry the remaining eight Sea Harriers and the RAF Harrier GR.3s aboard the container ship Atlantic Conveyor. However, as the ship readied to sail from England on 23 April, it was decided to delay the fly aboard until the ship reached Ascension Island, so as to allow extra time for the necessary aircraft modifications. The Harriers were flown non-stop from England to the island, a distance of nearly 4000 miles in approxi- mately nine hours and fifteen minutes (a very uncomfortable and strenuous ordeal for the Harrier crews). Eight Sea Harriers and six GR.3s were flown to the Atlantic Conveyor for transport to the war zone. Several GR.3s were left behind to serve as air protection at Ascension Island. Two additional Harriers were flown all the way to Hermes in the battle zone on 1 June were joined by two more GR.3s a week later. Four other GR.3s arrived in the Falklands area aboard the container ship Contender Bezant just after the surrender of the Argentines.18 The air war for the Falklands began on 1 May. The British began the action with a predawn attack on the Port Stanley runway by the Vulcan bomber. This was followed by dawn attacks on the Port Stanley and Goose Green runways by the Harriers.19 Most were armed with three 1000 pound bombs or three BL 755 cluster bombs. A few, armed with Sidewinder missiles instead of bombs, acted as fighter escorts for the others. All Harriers flew with two 120 gallon fuel tanks on the inboard wind pylons. The attacks themselves were not effective in interdicting the runways, but they did destroy aircraft and equipment on the ground. Additionally, the raids served notice to the Argentines that their use of the runways would be challenged. The Royal Navy attacked the Port Stanley airfield simultaneously with naval gunfire. This was the first attack by the surface force against the island proper. The Argentines countered the British bombardment with their first air action of the conflict. This attack was unique in several ways. The attack was made by three Canberra bombers flying at medium altitude and escorted by four Mirage aircraft at high altitude. (This was the first and only time Argentine aircraft were used as escorts rather than attack aircraft.) One of the Canberras was shot down by a Harrier, another Canberra was severely damaged.20 The credit for the first combat "kill" went to FLT.LT Paul Barton, a RAF pilot serving with the Navy Sea Harrier Squad- ron. A third Mirage was lost from a separate high altitude flight, possibly shot down by the Argentine anti-air defenses or as the Argentines claim, from a ship launched Sea Dart missile.21 The Sea Harrier normally performed its combat air pa- trols in flights of two. The aircraft were normally loaded with two fuel tanks, two Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, a 30mm gun and sometimes a 1000 pound bomb which could be used against enemy patrol boats or to harass enemy airfields. The aircraft's biggest handicap was shortness of station time. Because of the threat posed by the Argentine Air Force to the carriers, the British positioned the ships well off the Falklands (often 200 miles to the east). As a re- sult, the Harriers had to devote most of their mission time to transit to or from their ships. Sometimes, the on station time was as low as five or ten minutes. When the weather was favorable, the Harriers flew as many as six, ninety minute flights daily. A total of 1,000 Sea Harrier air defense missions were flown during the conflict with an aircraft availability rate of more than eighty percent.22 Normally, a fighter from a conventional carrier is re- fueled enroute to its CAP station and refueled during its return so as to extend either the range or duration at his station. Although the Harrier was capable of taking in- flight refueling, the British carriers had no aircraft capa- ble of giving fuel. Therefore, the Harriers could burn only the fuel they had at take off. To save some of this fuel, the Harriers launched with the ski jump ramp after a short take off roll and reserved fuel for the return landing. The Harriers achieved considerable success in shooting down enemy strike aircraft or at least causing many of them to jettison bombloads and abort their attacks. They were not successful in preventing nighttime C-130 supply missions from reaching Port Stanley. One daylight C-130 was shot down, however. The Harrier's first missile fell short of the cargo plane, but the second started a fire on the wing and 240 rounds of the 30mm gun destroyed the aircraft by severing one wing at the root.23 Despite that success, and the best efforts of the British to deny the Argentines the use of Port Stanley, cargo planes landed nightly, supplying the Argentines until the last days of the war. In addition to its air defense role, the Harriers also conducted strikes against Argentine ships and ground targets. The Sea Harriers and GR.3s flew a total of 215 attack mis- sions (the mission the aircraft was designed for), with up to three 1,000 pound bombs each.24 The Harriers'contribution to ground forces support was limited, chiefly because of the paucity of military targets. Additionally, the few prominent ones were heavily guarded by anti-air artillery (AAA) of 20mm (Rheinmetall), 30mm (Hispano-Suiza), and 35mm (Oerlikon), up to altitudes of 28,000 feet.25 Additionally, the Argentines were equipped with surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) including the Tigercat (a land based version of the British Seacat), Roland and Blowpipe missiles. Several naval targets were also attacked by the Harriers. On 9 May the aircraft sunk the fishing vessel, Narwal which had been shadowing the task force. On 16 May, two Argentine cargo vessels were strafed in the Falkland Sound between the two major islands. One of the vessels caught fire and was abandoned by her crew. When the RAF GR.3s arrived in the war zone in larger numbers the ground attack role was transferred to them. One attack on the Argentine fuel dumps at Fox Bay on 20 May was reported to be "spectacularly successful".26 After the landings at San Carlos, an auxillary landing site was estab- lished ashore with AM-2 metal matting. The site was equipped with a fuel supply so that the Harriers could refuel without returning to their carrier. Generally, CAP and ground attack aircraft which had expended their ordnance returned directly to the ships. Otherwise, the aircraft refueled and if on a CAP mission took off again and returned to their station. This procedure permitted the Harriers to extend their average on station time from ten minutes to fifty minutes, substan- tially increasing their effectiveness. Aircraft equipped for a ground attack role could be prepositioned at the San Carlos site, greatly reducing response time for a close air support request. The British had planned to install a much larger expeditionary field but much of the metal matting was lost when the Atlantic Conveyor was destroyed. Near the end of the war GR.3s successfully used the "Paveway" 1,000 pound laser guided bombs against point tar- gets. Pilots were successful in destroying several Argentine 105mm field artillery pieces.27 The British lost a total of ten Harrier aircraft, six Sea Harriers and four GR.3s. The first to be lost was a Sea Harrier shot down by ground fire during an attack on Goose Green airfield. The pilot, Lt. Nicholas Taylor, RN was the first of four pilots killed during the conflict. He was buried with full military honors by the Argentines in a ceremony of "considerable dignity".28 Two other Sea Harriers and their pilots were lost on 6 May when they failed to return from a flight. It is be- lieved the two aircraft collided during poor weather. The fourth pilot was killed when his aircraft crashed just after liftoff during a night mission from HMS Hermes. Of the remaining losses, one was shot down by a surface to air missile near Goose Green airfield, and the pilot captured. The remainder were downed by antiaircraft fire--the pilots were all rescued. None of the aircraft losses were due to air-to-air combat. The 28 Sea Harriers flew more than 1,200 sorties in 44 days and achieved an exceptionally high availability rate-- almost 90 percent. In air-to-air combat the Sea Harriers destroyed at least twenty aircraft (16 with the Sidewinder air-to-air missile), four with ADEN 30mm cannon. As was the situation faced by the Argentine aircraft, the Harriers were often operating at the extreme limits of their range and were, therefore, unable to maneuver or fight back if they were to return home safely.29 CHAPTER NINE SHIPBOARD AIR DEFENSES The British forces used four different methods to reduce the impact of the Argentine aircraft. Firstly, they used the Vulcan bombers and Harrier aircraft in an attempt to inter- dict the runway at Port Stanley and to prevent the use of the field by high performance jet aircraft. Secondly, daring commando raids destroyed aircraft on the ground. Thirdly, Royal Navy Sea Harriers attempted to intercept incoming air- craft before they could attack the surface forces. Finally, the ships themselves had their own guns, missiles and chaff with which to defend themselves. This chapter will discuss the weapons used by the Royal Navy surface forces. The British defense strategy prior to the South Atlantic conflict was primarily centered on the NATO area. The Royal Navy concentrated on antisubmarine warfare and anticipated receiving air defense support from U.S. aircraft carriers as well as their own land based aircraft. Although the Royal Navy itself recognized some of the weaknesses of this policy, as well as the antiair deficiencies of its own ships, it was nevertheless forced to accept this situation because of re- duced spending for ship construction. The British fleet went to the South Atlantic armed with four types of surface to air missiles and three dif- ferent caliber antiaircraft guns. The missile systems were the Sea Dart, Sea Wolf, Sea Cat, and Sea Slug. The gun systems available were the 114mm (4.5 inch) gun and the 40mm and 20mm guns. The Sea Dart surface to air missile is a long-range intercept weapon. Classified as a "radar semiactive homing all the way" missile, it had a range of about twenty miles and a weight at launch of 1200 pounds. Designed to engage high speed, high altitude aircraft, it once destroyed a target moving at 1500 mph at 51,000 feet of altitude. It was installed aboard the aircraft carrier HMS Invincible and six of the eight destroyers including all of the Type 42 destroyers such as HMS Sheffield. The chief disadvantage of the system was its incapacity for engaging very low altitude targets. Since the Argentine Navy also possessed the Sea Dart, it is likely the Argentine pilots were aware of the system's low altitude weakness. Most of the Argen- tine attacks were made at very low altitude. This system shortfall could have been eliminated if the Sea Dart ships had also been equipped with a short-range missile system. Vessels had only the less effective 4.5 inch, 40mm or 20mm guns for close in, low altitude defenses. Despite its handicaps, the Sea Dart was credited with downing eight aircraft and held the distinction of being the first missile fired during the conflict. A Sea Dart was fired at an Argentine Boeing 707 recon aircraft early in the war. No hits were achieved, but the aircraft was chased away. The Sea Cat surface to air missile is a short-range system. With a range of just three miles, it is intended as a point defense weapon. The 139 pound missile was aboard 17 ships of the Royal Navy Task Force including HMS Hermes and two of the amphibious assault ships.1 It had also been exported to the navies of more than ten other nations in- cluding Iran and Brazil.2 Most missiles are deployed from a four round rotatable launcher. The radio command guided Sea Cat uses optical, TV or radar tracking. The missile has a high explosive warhead with contact and proximity fuzing. Although credited with the downing of eight Argentine air- craft, it has been recorded that more than ten missiles were launched for each kill.3 The Sea Wolf is also a short-range, point defense sur- face to air missile. Slightly heavier than the Sea Cat at 176 pounds it proved to be the most reliable missile system. The Sea Wolf is part of the GWS-25 defense system and contains components from a variety of manufacturers including a Marconi search and tracking radar, Ferranti fire control computers, six round launchers by Vickers, and the Sea Wolf missile bodies built by British Aerospace.4 Although the system has been in development since the mid-1960s, it didn't become operational until 1980 when it was installed aboard the first of four Type 22 frigates. Sea Wolf employs line of sight command guidance with radar or optical tracking. The warhead is equipped with both impact and proximity fuzing. The system has now been installed on two Leander class frigates and plans call for installation aboard nine additional Type 22 frigates and three additional Leander ships in the future. Additional plans call for the develop- ment of backup all-weather radar guidance and a lightweight version of Sea Wolf for installation aboard smaller ships. An improved version with a vertical launch system is being developed for installation aboard the Type 23 frigates to be ordered beginning 1984.5 The Sea Wolf was developed to counter noncrossing tar- gets (coming directly at launching ship), and targets not arriving in rapid succession. Inability to track many tar- gets simultanously and limited range make Sea Wolf unsuit- able for area defense, although it was hastily pressed into such service (with its software hurriedly altered) during the South Atlantic conflict. It is the only shipboard sur- face to air missile system currently forecasted for the Royal Navy future. Quite a bit of design work has been devoted to developing a rapid "bolt on" capability for merchant ships when needed.6 Although the system was aboard only two vessels in the Falklands area during the war, the missile scored an impres- sive five kills with only eight launches.7 It is also note- worthy to point out that while many British vessels were attacked by the Argentine aircraft, no Sea Wolf armed ship was seriously damaged.8 In an after the war test, the missile actually destroyed an Exocet missile in flight.9 The fourth shipboard launched air defense missile was the Sea Slug. From the very name of the system one might not be inspired by the performance of this missile. The British considered the missile so obsolete it was used against enemy aircraft only once, a desperation shot by HMS ANTRIM. In that instance, the missile scored no hit and the vessel itself was damaged by a bomb released by the attacking aircraft.10 The only other use of the missile was in a surface to surface role where it was used to attack an Argentine position near Stanley. The missile was launched in the normal manner and then command directed to fly into the ground when it approached the Argentines. While the results of the attack are unknown, the British themselves did not expect any material destruction to be caused by the missile. It was hoped the missile would have some psycho- logical effect on the Argentines. In addition to the surface-to-air missiles, all the Royal Navy combatants were equipped with guns. The only exceptions were the carriers. All of the destroyers and nine of the frigates were equipped with the 114mm (4.5 inch) gun, but no Royal Navy ship had more than one. This gun was both radar and optically directed.11 Unfortunately, many of the guns were directed by the same radars that directed missile systems. This arrangement was cheaper to be sure, but the disadvantage of this system was that only one of the two systems could be radar directed at any one time. Therefore, the two systems could not be used to engage tar- gets simultaneously approaching both sides of the ship. One source indicates that only one Argentine aircraft was destroyed by this gun.12 It would be impossible to estimate the number of aircraft chased away or the number of attacks in which the aim of a pilot was interrupted so that his weapon missed the ship. It is likely there were many such instances. The 40mm and 20mm guns were essentially antiquated weapons. Many were only optically sighted and none had the rate of fire of the U.S. built 20mm Vulcan cannon. Never- theless, because the Argentines carried attacks so close to Royal Navy ships, many gunners were successful in aiming close-in fire. The same source estimated six Argentine air- craft destroyed by guns. It is interesting to note that a Type 21 frigate armed with the Sea Cat missile and two 20mm guns was expected to engage a modern aircraft, whereas a World War II ship of the same size had 12 to 16 40mm and 12 20mm guns to shoot down a propeller driven aircraft. Modern technology had not prepared well enough for the jet age. The original concept of missile defenses for Type 42 destroyers such as the Sheffield was a combined weapons sys- tem that became known as GWS-25. Plans called for shipboard installation of both the Sea Dart and the Sea Wolf missiles and associated radar detection and guidance systems. The Sea Dart was intended to engage medium or high altitude air- craft at long-range. The Sea Wolf missile was designed for close-in coverage against low flying aircraft or anti ship missiles. In fact, Sea Wolf had demonstrated a good capa- bility to engage even artillery shells at close range.13 Unfortunately, for reasons of economy, "government experts" decided the Type 42 destroyers would be provided with Sea Dart missiles only and the 4.5 inch gun. This configuration eliminated the capability to effectively engage sea-skimming antiship missiles or low flying aircraft. The Type 22 frigates such as Broadsword and Brilliant were armed with Sea Wolf but not Sea Dart missiles. Other ships were equipped with less capable systems such as the Sea Slug or Sea Cat missiles. HMS Glamorgan, which was hit by a shore based Exocet was armed with Sea Slug and Sea Cat for long-range and close-in protection. The frigates Alac- rity, Antelope, Ardent, and Arrow were armed with the an- cient Sea Slug only. The Antelope and Ardent were sunk by bombs dropped from very low flying aircraft. It is obvious that the overall surface to air missile defenses were not as capable as originally envisioned and could not prevent six ships from being sunk and many others damaged.14 The conventional air-sea battle essentially commenced on 1 May 1982. With only a limited number of "fighter" air- craft and without any airborne early warning capability, the fleet was forced to rely heavily on surface to air missiles. The rationale of British officials when reducing the defense forces was that the missiles would be capable of carrying out the mission. It should be noted that the Invincible and the other vessels of that class had not been intended to operate fixed wing aircraft at all. As events turned out, their small number of Harriers aboard proved to be especially valuable assets.15 The Royal Navy's missile defense system suffered from the same limitation of nearly all naval air defense systems --over saturation. A ship has to devote one of its limited number of guidance channels to each incoming target. That channel remains tied up throughout each single engagement. Both the Type 42 destroyers (armed with Sea Dart) and Type 22 ships (armed with Sea Wolf missiles) were limited to just two channels. This deficiency was dramatically illustrated in the case of HMS Coventry. The ship detected two fast, low flying, incoming aircraft and locked on her two Type 909 missile guidance radars. Two more aircraft then approached the ship from the other side and hit her with three bombs which sank her. Presumably, Coventry never had the oppor- tunity to complete the engagement with the first two air- craft. Blame for the Type's inability to respond to an air threat would be placed on the design of the detection and fire control system aboard. The Type 42 ship has a manually operated combat system, which first detects a target on air search radar, then redetects it on a target indication radar (Type 992Q) and then employs one of two guidance radars to guide the missile. But even then the system is not yet ready to launch. The Sea Dart missile itself introduces further delays since it requires a two minute warm-up period on the launcher while its gyros line up.16 Unfortunately, it is not feasible to keep a warmed-up missile on the launcher indefinitely, especially in the cold weather. Reasons for the shortcomings in the Royal Navy air defense systems are more understandable if one considers the high flying target scenarios of the 1950s when these systems were first designed. The Argentine aircraft electing to approach at a very low altitudes, successfully delayed detection to ranges nearer ten or twenty miles instead of one hundred miles which was the norm thirty years ago. Delays in firing the Sea Dart missile were exposed. One should not get the impression, however, that the Sea Dart was incapable of downing aircraft. It was. In fact, HMS Coventry had a successful day prior to her sinking ("other than that, how did you like the play Mrs. Lincoln?"). The ship shot down two attacking Skyhawk aircraft at 12:30 P.M. and one out of three attacking aircraft at 3:00 P.M. She herself, however, was sunk by four more aircraft at 6:00 P.M.17 As a matter of note, Coventry was the first ship to successfully fire the Sea Dart missile during the conflict. The ship shot down an Argentine Puma helicopter flying over one of the islands, demonstrating the ability of the Sea Dart missile system to overcome ground clutter.18 In theory, a long-range missile system can overcome saturation by engaging every aircraft sequentially, before targets get close enough to attack. Such a system requires both a long-range detection capability and a very fast missile. In theory, also, a good command and control system between ships operating in harmony can overcome saturation to a degree by dividing up incoming targets between the ships in the unit so that none is overloaded and as many incoming targets as possible are engaged.19 In the case of the Royal Navy in the South Atlantic, both the detection system and the number of ships with capable missile systems was sorely lacking. The Royal Navy well understood the above theory. Their philosophy and doctrine also included the concept of layered defenses. Unfortunately, the Royal Navy as it is now con- figured does not have the organic capability to put the best concepts into practice, and when in the vicinity of home waters, must rely on the RAF and allies for additional anti- air support. Generally, it is their objective to destroy attacking aircraft (and their missiles, if any) at as far from the task force as possible since destroying the aircraft before it launches an anti ships missile not only destroys the missile for that mission but, prevents the aircraft from returning for a subsequent attack. Another advantage of destroying an aircraft as far away from the task force as possible is that the antiair missile system is then freed up to attack another inbound target. Because no single system, long-range or short can be relied upon with absolute certainty, it is desirable to construct defenses in depth so the enemy can be subjected to sequential punishment before reaching his objective. These layers need not include different types of systems but they often do. The British use a three layered plan. Royal Navy Sea Harriers were stationed in the outermost zone at their combat air patrol. When the fleet was oper- ating close to the Falkland Islands themselves, the Harriers were positioned at the north and south ends of East Falk- land. The Harriers normally patrolled in flights of two. AAW destroyers armed with the long-range Sea Dart missiles were placed to provide intermediate range protection for the task force. Behind the AAW ships were the antisubmarine warfare (ASW) ships. Although these vessels were not spe- cifically part of the antiair defenses, they nevertheless could contribute their Sea Dart or Sea Slug missiles. Posi- tioned closest to the aircraft carriers were the frigates on the intermost wing, armed with the point defense missiles, Sea Cat and Sea Wolf as well as guns of many sizes and chaff. The merchant ships and transports were positioned behind (actually to the east of) the carriers. Thus in theory, an attacking Argentine aircraft would first have to evade the Harriers, avoid being shot down by the Sea Darts, and finally get by the Sea Wolf and Sea Cat vessels before it could attack the prize target, an aircraft carrier. This defensive scheme was extremely effective since no aircraft penetrated the Royal Navy screen to attack the carriers. It would be more correct to note, however, that the Argentine aircraft carried only enough fuel to reach the Falklands, attack for five minutes and then turn for home. Because the Royal Navy had positioned its carriers well to the east, the Argentines did not have the fuel to reach those ships no matter how much they would have liked to. There are several other reasons the Royal Navy air defense strategy was not as effective as may have been expected: lack of AEW, the British radar, the terrain and the Argentine tactics. Much has been written about the British lack of airborne early warning radar (AEW). Any shipboard based aircraft type such as the Gannet, the U.S. Navy's E-2, or the RAF's AEW aircraft could have both provided ships with additional warning and directed the Harriers to intercepts of incoming aircraft. In fact, the Argentines had the benefit of their own Neptune aircraft and radar stations on the islands to assist their aircraft in both locating the Royal Navy and avoiding the Sea Harrier combat air patrols. Another shortcoming faced by the Royal Navy was the Type 965 air search radar. The system is aging and is un- able to track low flying targets at long-range. When in the open ocean, the disposition of the British forces was dictated by the capabilities of the air defense weapon systems alone. Another factor was terrain. When any naval force is operating close to a hostile shore such as during amphibious operations it is much more difficult to provide all the desired layers of air defense. The performance of different defensive weapons systems may be degraded. Under such cir- cumstances the naval force must rely more heavily on inner zone defenses. Radar can't see through hillsides. When ships are deployed close to shore, the radar capabilities may be severely degraded by terrain masking and ground clutter. It is important that expeditionary air defense units be established ashore so as to extend the air defense layers forward of the shoreline. The Falkland's terrain both hindered and helped the air defense of the Royal Navy. Falkland Sound between the two major islands is bordered on the west by a chain of mountains rising to 2,160 feet. The tallest mountain on West Falkland rises to nearly 2300 feet. These mountains, plus the hills to the west of the San Carlos area effectively masked the air search radars of the British Fleet, making defense of those ships more difficult.20 There was an advantage however. One of the reasons given by the Royal Navy for picking San Carlos for the amphibious assault was that the confined area would deny Argentina the use of its radar guided, Exocet missile against the assault ships. Weighing such variables is a flag rank responsibility for which commanders are well paid. Another factor which determined the actual effective- ness of the antiair defenses was the Argentine air battle plan. Essentially, it was simple--low, fast, and tight formations. The advantages of low flight have already been discussed. By going fast, the Argentine aircraft reduced time over the target and limited their exposure. The Argentines have stated their Mirages "flew at .95 MACH into the target, turned at .95 MACH and then escaped at .95 MACH".21 This speed reduced chances of contact by the Sea Harrier and made visual tracking in the target area much more difficult. Finally, the tactic of flying close together and using terrain masking confused British radars. One source indi- cates HMS Coventry had that problem on the day it was sunk on 25 May.22 According to that account, the ship's computer examined two approaching targets, almost indistinguishably close together, sought to decide which to attack, found the solution electronically impossible, and switched itself off. When the computer later reacquired the target, the missile could not be fired because the ship by then had turned away from the incoming missile. The Coventry was not the only ship lost in confined waters. Both HMS Ardent and HMS Antelope were sunk and several vessels damaged in the restricted waters around San Carlos. The amphibious ship Sir Tristram was sunk and Sir Galahad heavily damaged during the landings at Fitzroy. In fact, with the exception of HMS Sheffield, all of the warship losses occurred close to shore where the land mass severely limited radar warning and tracking time.23 It is worthwhile to point out another factor which may be attributed to the antiair missile defenses of the Royal Navy. The very existence of missile systems forced the Argentine aircraft to fly low to avoid them. The resultant low altitude bomb releases often did not give the bombs time to arm. While many of the ships were struck with Argentine bombs, the British ships and personnel losses would have been far greater had all the weapons exploded. As discussed in the chapter concerning electronic war- fare neither side had much capability to employ electronic means (other than radar) in defense of the force. Chaff rockets firing tiny strips of aluminum to confuse the enemy radar were used extensively by the Royal Navy. It is dif- ficult, however, to measure the effectiveness of chaff against the Exocet missile since HMS Sheffield had no time to fire it and Atlantic Conveyor had no chaff to fire. In an all out attempt to overcome attacks by radar controlled antishipping missiles, the British employed electronic surveillance measures (ESM) for detection, clas- sification and initiation of chaff for the anti-air defense of their ships. The fact that these so-called "soft kill" measures had to be relied upon for the only defense against Exocet missiles highlights further the deficiencies of the British "hard kill" systems ("Soft kill" systems attempt to divert the path of the weapon away from the item you wish to defend. "Hard kill" defenses destroy the missile or the launcher and the missile by fighter aircraft, surface to air missiles or gunfire). Although the "hard kill" air defense systems were heavily challenged during the conflict, it is much more dif- ficult to assess the effectiveness of the "soft kill" systems. First of all, it is difficult to judge because so few Exocet missiles were fired and the ones that scored hits, impacted vessels which did not employ any "soft kill" equipment. Secondly, it is difficult to measure if a missile which did not hit its target was decoyed by the system or it would have missed the ship anyway. Finally, the chaff may be effective in diverting an air to surface missile from the ship that launched the chaff, but since the missile survives the encounter with the chaff it may chose another close by, unprotected ship. (Some sources have speculated that the Atlantic Conveyor was struck by a missile which was diverted from one of the carriers.) If so, Atlantic Conveyor became a very expensive decoy. Because "soft kill" systems are relatively inexpensive and require so little deck space, they should be mandatory in a balanced overall approach to defense. Additionally, a system which could be bolted on or quickly installed aboard merchant shipping could go a long way in providing security for these previously unprotected ships. With the exception of the Sea Wolf missile, which was not exposed to Exocet attack, none of the other air defense systems had any capability against the Exocet. Because of the low altitude flown by the Super Etendards and their distance from the targets when the missiles were fired, the Harriers and the Sea Dart missile systems were unable to detect and engage launching aircraft. Both the Harriers and the Sea Dart were handicapped by inadequate low altitude surveillance capability at long-range. Additionally, the twenty mile range of Sea Dart was insufficient to prevent the launch of Exocet beyond that range. Although the Mach .93 speed of the Exocet is considered slow by some missile standards its speed nevertheless makes it a difficult target for most self-defense systems. Several Vulcan-Phalanx radar controlled antiaircraft weapon systems were pulled from the U.S. Navy stocks and air shipped to Britain soon after the war broke out, but none became operational in the theater. The system is now installed on the newly built carrier Illustrious. The cyclical nature of air operations in the South Atlantic can be credited with contributing to the high availability of the air defense systems. An attack against any single ship may have been intense, but generally it was of very short duration. Very few ships were subjected to multiple attacks within a single day except HMS Coventry and HMS Ardent. The fact that all attacks occurred during daylight in good visibility, and that the air defense sys- tems were used little at night provided system repair crews with respites for regular, daily maintenance. Finally, the British had the luxury of pulling a ship off the line and putting it well beyond the range of every aircraft when repairs were wanted. CHAPTER TEN ARGENTINE AIR FORCE TACTICS The Argentine Air Force aimed to put both enemy aircraft carriers out of action. They were handicapped, however, by the great distances. Because of the difficulties encountered by the Argentine Navy's only carrier early in the war, the ship did not launch any aircraft against the British Task Force. Instead, all the Air Force and Naval Air Forces operated from land bases with most of aircraft operating from the mainland. Three primary airfields were used: Rio Grande, Rio Gallegos and Comodor Rivadavia which were 380, 427, and 515 nautical miles respectively from the Falkland Islands.1 Only two KC-130H aircraft were equipped as inflight refueling tankers. The distances involved and the paucity of tanking assets limited the flight endurance of the Argentine aircraft over the Falklands to only five or ten minutes and did not permit them to fly the additional 100-200 miles eastward to the operating area of the carriers. Unable to reach the carriers, the Argentines did the next best thing. The attacked those ships they could reach. Operating from land bases, the Argentine Navy aircraft (A-4s) normally carried bombloads of two or three 500 pound high explosive bombs. Most Mirages and Daggers carried 1000 pound bombs, some of which were retarded. With the exception of the Exocet, the Argentines had no precision guided muni- tions (such as laser or TV guided bombs). Their most effec- tive delivery method for delivering the iron bombs was the high-speed low-level attack profile with bomb release at point blank range. Lacking sophisticated weapons delivery systems, the Argentine reportedly drew two grease pencil lines (one for ship deck level, the other for the horizon), and tracked the ships between the two lines, dropping bombs as the ship went under the nose.2 A-4B actually hit the mast of HMS Antelope on 21 May, losing a fuel tank fin.3 Although the British Sea Harrier was a concern to the Argentine aviation forces, they considered the shipboard antiair defenses to be the primary threat. The Argentines obtained tracking information from the shore based radar facilities on the Falklands which sometimes assisted the attacking aircraft in avoiding the Sea Harriers. The ship- board defenses were much more difficult to avoid since the aircraft had to fly directly to them when attacking the ships. The Argentines effectively used their C-130 assets. The KC-130H air refueling aircraft had the capability to extend the range of the A-4 Skyhawk and the Super Etendard attack aircraft. Fortunately for the Royal Navy, only two of these aircraft were available. The three C-130E and four C-130H aircraft were primarily used to deliver cargo to the Port Stanley airport. The Argentines made good use of the limited facilities they found at that field. Lacking lighting facilities, they developed a makeshift runway lighting system to permit use of the airport after dark. Inhibited only by later British air attacks, the Argentines continued to use the runway until the final days of conflict. At one point prior to the arrival of the British in the Falklands area, the C-130s delivered a total of 140 tons of cargo in a single day.4 The aircraft were also used in a surveilance and tracking mode. The only C-130 shot down by the British Sea Harrier was probably engaged on a recon- naissance mission.5 On 29 May a single C-130 transport dropped eight bombs in a surprise attack on the tanker British Wye while the ship was enroute to the Falklands from Ascension Island and 600 miles from the Argentine mainland. One bomb actually hit the tanker near its bow but failed to explode. According to one report, the aircraft lacked any weapons racks for the bombs. The bombs were simply pushed out the rear cargo door to fall on the tanker below. This attack led to changes in the sea lanes used by the British shipping in the South Atlantic. Ships in the war zone were directed to remain underway and disperse when not actually engaged in trans- ferring stores.6 CHAPTER ELEVEN SHORE BASED AIR DEFENSES A limited antiair umbrella was erected for landing force operations. The landing force was equipped with the Rapier surface to air missile fired from a mobile launcher and the Blowpipe and Stinger hand held missiles. The Rapier missile can be positioned by truck or helicopter, the Blow- pipe and Stinger can be carried by their operators. The Rapier system was designed by British Aerospace in England to provide low altitude air defense for ground units. The system consists of four units, an optical tracker, an all weather radar tracker, a launcher and a missile. If desired, the system can be operated in optical mode only, nearly halving the transportable weight of the system. With the radar tracking unit the entire system still weighs only 6,694 pounds, well below the weight of the U.S. Hawk missile system.1 The radar portion can begin tracking air- craft at a distance of seven miles. This 94 pound missile has a maximum range of three miles and a maximum altitude of 10,000 feet. The first use of Rapier occurred on 21 May at the amphibious landing site of San Carlos. The intention was to provide critical air defense protection for all elements of the landing force, both the ground troops ashore and Royal Navy amphibious shipping. The Rapier's operators were concerned about the material conditions of their system--the exposure to salt air during the long sea voyage might have damaged the system's sensitive electronics and it had been almost a year since the last live missile firing. In fact, the Rapier teams had real difficulties the first day ashore. Up to eight batteries of launchers were unserviceable at any one time that day. Because of the difficult terrain, movement of spare parts was a problem. Also there was a tendency for the launcher rail retaining pins to shear, allowing missiles to slide off their rails and fall to the ground.2 Despite these problems or perhaps because of them, the Rapier destroyed three attacking Argen- tine aircraft with ten missiles fired the first day. To Admiral John Woodward, who was now counting heavily upon Rapier to defend his ships while they were close in shore, three hits out of ten was not good enough. The frig- ate Ardent had been sunk, two ships were hit by bombs that failed to explode (HMS Antrim was sunk the following day when a defusing attempt failed), and two more ships were seriously damaged. The next day he sent the following message: I am sure the Rapier detachments are doing all that they can. However, performance yesterday was totally unsatisfactory. Put a bomb under them before they get one on top of them.3 No bombs were necessary. The detachments worked out their difficulties and the systems performed well, scoring fourteen confirmed and six probable kills, all using the optical guidance mode. The optical system was particularly effective against low flying, relatively slow moving air- craft such as helicopters or the Pucara close air support aircraft.4 Of course optical system performance was degraded during periods of reduced visibility. The other two missile systems were the man-portable Stinger and Blowpipe shoulder fired missiles. They were essentially identical in appearance and employment. The U.S. built Stinger was designed by General Dynamics, weighed thirty-five pounds and used passive infrared homing for guidance. The British built Blowpipe was designed by Short Brothers of Belfast, Northern Ireland. It weighed forty- seven pounds and was guided optically by radio command. The advantage of the optical guidance is that the missile could be directed away from a target if it appeared the missile was approaching too close to a friendly unit. The two systems have been credited with destroying approximately ten aircraft.5 CHSPTER TWELVE ARGENTINE AIR ATTACKS Although the first significant Argentine air action against the British fleet occurred on 12 May during the attack of twelve A-4 aircraft against HMS Brillant and HMS Glasgow, the heaviest and most effective Argentine action occurred during the period 21 May through 8 June. To give the reader a flavor of the intensity of the period, the following paragraphs will describe the determination of the Argentine pilots and the effectiveness of the antiair de- fenses of the British. The first British amphibious landings took place at 0439 local time on 21 May at Port San Carlos. The landing of 10,000 troops and their equipment was completed without loss within four hours. Meanwhile the ships of the task force formed a gunline in Falkland Sound to intercept any attacking aircraft. These ships bore the brunt of the Argentine air attacks that day which came in three waves beginning at 1120 local time, some seven hours after the landings commenced.1 Two Royal Navy ships, HMS Ardent and HMS Argonaut were severely damaged by bombs with Ardent sinking later. HMS Antrim was struck by a bomb that failed to explode and two other ships, HMS Broadsword and HMS Brilliant also damaged.2 The Argentines lost nine Mirage aircraft and one damaged and five A-4 Skyhawks and one damaged as well as two Pucaras and a number of helicopters. Eleven of the attacking aircraft were downed by the Sea Harriers, three were destroyed by surface to air missiles.3 The following day was much quieter, largely due to poor weather. The British forces were fortunate to be able to consolidate their forces ashore without enemy interference. Two Argentine A-4s did make a single attack that evening, but the attack was not pressed home with intensity and one A-4 was shot down.4 On May 23rd the Argentines again attacked in earnest. The first two formations were made up of four A-4s each. The third formation was composed of four Mirages--the fourth had two Mirages. Two A-4s were confirmed shot down and two more probably shot down during the first attack. All four Mirages in the third formation and one from the fourth were destroyed. Of these, four of the aircraft were shot down by surface to air missiles, one by 20mm gunfire and two were shot down by the Harrier using Sidewinder missiles. Addi- tionally, the Harriers shot down another Mirage which did not attempt to attack the fleet, one helicopter in the air and destroyed two helicopters on the ground. Total Argentine losses for the day: eleven. The losses, however, were not one-sided. HMS Antelope was hit by a bomb that failed to detonate. The bomb later exploded while bomb disposal per- sonnel attempted to defuse it, sinking the ship. The Harriers launched an attack against the Port Stanley airfield the following day, causing minor damage to the facility. The Argentines retaliated two hours later. Five A-4 aircraft attacked the ships at the San Carlos landing area. The amphibious landing ships Sir Galahad and Sir Lancelot were hit by one bomb each but neither bomb exploded. A follow on attack by Mirages also scored a hit on Sir Lancelot, the bomb likewise failed to explode. Another formation of four Mirages was intercepted by two Harriers before the attackers reached their target. Three of the Argentines were shot down. The final attack of A-4s and Mirages lost five aircraft, two to shipboard surface to air missiles and three to the shore based Rapier missiles. Total Argentine losses for the day; eight aircraft destroyed. Again, the contest was not one-sided. HMS Sir Galahad was on fire and had one unexploded bomb on board. HMS Sir Lancelot was also burning and had two unexploded bombs on board.6 The Argentine independence day is 25 May. The British anticipated strong attacks from the mainland. They were not disappointed. HMS Broadsword and HMS Coventry were on station ten miles north of the Falklands Sound when they were attacked by three A-4 Skyhawks. HMS Coventry was hit by three bombs which exploded and sank the ship. HMS Broad- sword was also hit, but the bomb failed to explode and passed through the ship. One of the attackers was knocked down. Two additional A-4s attacked HMS Fearless near San Carlos scoring no hits. Both aircraft were destroyed.7 The final, most damaging, attack occurred near sunset that same day. Two Argentine Super Etendard aircraft attacked the Battle Group positioned 120 miles northeast of Port Stanley. Each aircraft fired a single Exocet missile from a distance of 28 miles. One, possibly two missiles struck the container ship Atlantic Conveyor. As was the case with the attack on HMS Sheffield, many sources believe the missile(s) failed to detonate, but started fires which destroyed the ship. The Argentines incorrectly believed they had hit one of the British aircraft carriers.8 Al- though this was not true, the loss of Atlantic Conveyor was still a serious loss. A large amount of equipment including tents, helicopters, and most of the metal matting needed to construct an Expeditionary Landing Site ashore for the Harriers. Total losses for the day; three Argentine aircraft destroyed, two British ships lost, one damaged.9 Harriers made attacks on the Port Stanley airport with 1,000 pound bombs on 25,26, and 27 May. Their additional role as close air support aircraft was limited because most of the land operations during this period were conducted at night. The Argentine Air Force did not challenge the British on 25 or 26 May but resumed attacks on the 27th. This time the targets were ground forces.10 Two Mirage sorties caused no damage. Two A-4s following this attack inflicted minor damage to a base maintenance area. Four more A-4s followed, this time causing a number of ground force casualities. The guns of HMS Fearless shot down one aircraft and damaged another.11 The Goose Green airfield was captured by the second battalion, the Parachute Regiment with Harrier close air support on 28 May.12 This closed one of the four airfields used by the Argentines on the islands. (The other three were Stanley, Stanley Race Course, and Pebble Island.) This capture was followed by Harrier attacks on Port Stanley and Pebble Island the following day. Several Argentine aircraft at Port Stanley were destroyed or damaged while on the ground. On 29 May a C-130 transport aircraft attacked a British tanker enroute from Ascension to the Falklands operating area. Eight bombs were dropped scoring one hit, but the bomb failed to explode. There were several sporatic attacks at San Carlos but no damage was inflicted on the Fleet. One A-4 was shot down by a Rapier missile.13 The following day, two Super Etendards and two escorting A-4s attacked the Task Force. The single, remaining Exocet missile was fired, reportedly against HMS Invincible, but no hit was achieved.14 One of the A-4s was shot down by a Sea Dart missile. The most important facet of the attack was that because of the distance of the Task Force from the mainland, air refueling was required. Due to the limited air refueling assets, the number of aircraft which could be assigned to the attacking force was also limited.15 Both sides were hampered by poor weather but on 8 June the Argentines resumed the attack. This time five Mirages attacked HMS Plymouth in the Falkland Sound width bombs, rockets, and cannon fire. Plymouth destroyed two aircraft and damaged another with Sea Cat missiles and gunfire but was herself damaged.16 Later the same day four Mirage aircraft caught the amphibious landing ships Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram while landing troops at Fitzroy. Sir Tristram, which had already offloaded most of her cargo when it was attacked, was hit by two bombs which failed to explode but caused serious fires. Sir Galahad, which was previously damaged on 23 May, was hit and set fire while it still had many of its troop cargo still aboard. More than 100 casualities were suffered and much equipment was destroyed. Sir Galahad had to be abandoned. One Mirage was shot down by the Harriers and one damaged. Later in the day a landing craft in Choiseul Sound was attacked by another four Mirage aircraft. The LCU received one bomb hit but all four Mirages were shot down. The Argentines also attacked British position ashore with several A-4s, losing one aircraft destroyed, one damaged.17 It is interesting to note that the loss of Atlantic Conveyor contributed partly to the damage to Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram. Because several of the heavy lift, troop carrying Chinook helicopters were lost in the fire aboard Atlantic Conveyor, thereby slowing down the advance of troops crossing East Falkland, a decision was made to open a second front closer to Stanley. Fitzroy was the site selected. Total Argentine losses for the day were eight aircraft shot down, three damaged. Fleet losses were much higher, more than 100 men killed or injured, two ships put out of action, two damaged. The Argentine Air Force accomplished very little during the next few days, limiting flying to scattered attacks by Pucaras against ground troops. In fact, the most important action on 12 June did not involve any airplanes at all. HMS Glamorgan was hit by a shore launched Exocet missile while conducting naval gunfire support. The Exocet struck Glamorgan near the stern, killing thirteen men and destroying the ship's helicopter. Fortunately, the blow was not a fatal one, the ship survived.18 On the same day a British Vulcan bomber made the final long-range bombing attack of the war, dropping twenty-one 1,000 pound bombs on the Port Stanley airfield. Damage was light, the runway undamaged. The final Argentine air attack took place on 13 June. A flight of four aircraft, flying at 38,000 feet was engaged by the antiair missiles of HMS Cardiff. One aircraft, likely a Canberra bomber, was shot down.19 The Argentine Commander, surrendered his forces at 0100Z 15 June 1982.20 CHAPTER THIRTEEN DESTRUCTION OF AIRCRAFT ON THE GROUND The most effective method in countering an enemy air threat is to destroy aircraft on the ground. As discussed in the chapters concerning Vulcan and Harrier operations, several attempts were made to both deny the enemy the use of the Stanley airfield and to destroy any aircraft and equipment positioned there. Although the purpose of this report is not to describe ground operations ashore at the Falklands it is worthwhile to briefly describe the success- ful commando raid against the small Argentine airfield on Pebble Island. On May 14, approximately fifty members of the Special Air Service and the Special Boat Service attacked the air- field. Assisted by naval gunfire, the teams destroyed eleven Pucara close air support aircraft and several other light aircraft on the ground, an ammo dump and a mobile land-based radar unit. This removed a major Argentine threat to British warships and amphibious shipping oper- ating in the Falkland Sound. CHAPTER FOURTEEN LESSONS LEARNED Although it is difficult to identify any single most important lesson of any conflict, this chapter will attempt to examine several important lessons that might impact American forces in the future. British sources testify that the key element in their success in the South Atlantic conflict was the skill, stamina and resolution of the individual servicemen. The need in war for physical and metal toughness as well as high profiency in tactics was underscored in the adverse environmental conditions of the Falklands. The British point to the harshness of battle stations on the exposed weather decks of the ships, and the difficult flying con- ditions experienced by their flight crews. They feel the operation clearly demonstrated the value of professional, highly trained and carefully selected armed forces and justified their priority on realistic and demanding train- ing at all levels. Additionally, the British believe the value of the British regimental system in creating unit cohesion and esprit was reaffirmed as well as the emphasis placed on discipline in producing a reliable soldier. The British feel very strongly about their training. Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Terence Lewin has stated; You cannot produce confident, highly skilled professional fighting men by keeping your aircraft on the ground, ships in harbor or men and vehicles in barracks. You have got to fly in all weathers, get to sea and stay there, and get out in the rain, snow, mud, heat and never forget that your job is to fight.1 A second lesson refers to the failure of the British armed forces to convince Argentina of Great Britain's commit- ment to the South Atlantic. If the Argentines had believed the British would have reacted so strongly to their inva- sion it is very possible they would not have attacked the Falkland Islands in the first place. Admiral Lewin, speaking as the British Chief of Defense Staff has stated, The most important lesson to learn in the Falklands conflict is this: If you hope to deter an aggressor from attack, you must have capable, well equipped forces readily available. But above all, you must demon- strate that you have the political will to use them.2 Likewise, the United States must ensure that its forces are ready and that our enemies and potential enemies know that we are prepared to use those forces. The South Atlantic conflict highlighted the fact that wars may occur in unexpected locations, without any advance warning. The victor will likely be the nation which has planned for a variety of contingencies, has the necessary equipment, and has personnel trained to operate gear in backup modes to beat the conditions present and adapt tactics to counter an opponent. The sinking of the destroyer HMS Sheffield by a sea skimming missile caused some people to question whether surface ships were now rendered obsolete. While it is true that antishipping missiles are making ships increasingly difficult to defend, more capable missiles, guns and electronic countermeasures are available to deal with them. The undeniable fact is that we still need ships. There are many places in the world outside the range of tactical aircraft where no airports exist for strategic airlift inputs. The sheer volume and weight of our equip- ment makes anything but the very smallest operation un- supportable by airlift only. During Korea and Vietnam 95 percent of the dry cargo and 99 percent of the fuel was transported by surface ships.3 We can expect the same high percentages in future conflicts. The nearly 8000 mile distance between Great Britain and the Falklands high- lighted logistical difficulties of projecting a force on a foreign soil. The surface ships may be difficult to defend in some scenarios but the fact remains that they are often the only means of operating aircraft and delivering troops and supplies to certain areas of the world. It is interesting to note that so much attention has been paid to the fact that a $250,000 missile sank a $50 million ship and so little attention has been paid to the fact that less than $5,000 worth of MK80 series general purpose iron bombs or $13,000 worth of guided bombs could do the same thing.4 The Sheffield was not the only vessel destroyed by the Exocet missile of course. The dramatic difference was that Sheffield was a warship with defenses supposedly capable of protecting her. As the container ship Atlantic Conveyor was unarmed, its loss was less "alarming". One of the consequences of the sinking of the Sheffield was to focus thought on the growing vulnerability of surface ships.5 To some, this meant that navies should transition to more numerous, smaller ships. To others, including the highest levels of the U.S. Navy, the sinking was testimony that smaller, cheaper, less well armed combatant ships represent false economies because of increased vulnerability. The sinking provided additional justification to support the modernization of the U.S. Navy's battleships. U.S. Navy officials point to the loss of the Royal Navy ships and postulate that if any of the fourteen successful attacks against the British ships had instead hit the battleship New Jersey, the ship would have been able to continue operations because of its size, damage control facilities and solid construction. One source has gone on to say that the Exocet missile would not have been able to penetrate the armor system of New Jersey, and it is doubtful any of the bombs which hit the British ships would have penetrated to a vital space or done significant damage to a modern U.S. aircraft carrier.6 The statement is probably too strong, however, because it ignores the fact that the fragine aircraft on the carrier's flight deck are very vulnerable to damage. To protect those aircraft and all its ships the Navy is installing the Vulcan/Phalanx 20mm point defense gun on most surface combatants, and is evaluating the need for increased chaff and electronic warfare capabilities. Any analysis of the South Atlantic conflict must high- light the shortfalls in Royal Navy air defenses. Predom- inant among their defensive problems was the egregious lack of airborne earlywarning (AEW). Admiral Woodward, the Task Force commander, was very much aware of these defense deficiencies. Undoubtedly he would have been pleased to have had more capable aircraft carriers. A Nimitz class carrier with its complement of AEW,long-range interceptors, tankers, antisubmarine aircraft and all weather attack bombers could have made the execution of his task immea- surably easier. Even the Royal Navy's former carrier Ark Royal with F-4 and Gannett AEW aircraft would have been a real asset. But the British went to war with the units and equipment they had, not with what they wish they had had. It matters little that the decision to remove the AEW aircraft and the ship from which it operated from the Navy inventory was a political vice military decision. What does matter is that the Royal Navy made do with what it had and that its personnel performed admirably despite manifest shortcomings in bits and pieces. To meet the need for an AEW aircraft, the Royal Navy has successfully deployed several Sea King helicopters equipped with Searchwater Early Warning Radar.7 The U.S. Navy should examine the feasibility of a U.S. Navy helicopter-borne AEW capability to complement existing fixed wing assets. The U.S. Navy also flies the Sea King helicopter. An AEW version could expand the capability of amphibious ships or surface action groups operating outside carrier protection. The loss of HMS Sheffield highlights the continuing requirement for effective close in defensive systems. The Sea Wolf missile was effective but in short supply, only two ships carried the system. The hand operated 20mm gun was plentiful but ineffective in stopping a high performance aircraft or missile. The British needed a system which would include a capable detection radar, an accurate fire control system, an effective close-in missile, heavy and light guns, especially one such as the Vulcan/Phlanx 20mm gun, and an electronic countermeasures suit. This shipboard package should be complemented by an around-the-clock, all weather fighter umbrella. The Harrier and its Sidewinder missiles is a good aircraft but a supersonic aircraft armed with the Sparrow or Phoenix missile would be the most capa- ble of meeting a sophisticated air threat. The South Atlantic conflict also identified several lessons relating to submarine warfare. The value of proper preventative maintenance was clearly demonstrated. The Argentines were unable to field a significant submarine threat because of the poor mechanical condition of their submarines. (Two couldn't get underway, one was destroyed before she could fire a torpedo and the fourth reportedly couldn't control the torpedos it did fire.) In contrast, the Royal Navy was able to deploy sufficient submarine assets on very short notice to complete their required missions. An effective maintenance program enabled these units to remain on station without serious degradation of their mission.8 The sinking of the General Belgrano blooded the nu- clear submarine as an offensive weapon. The defensive mission of the submarine was highlighted when the Argentine fleet returned to port after the cruiser's sinking and never again attempted to challenge the British Task Force. Finally, the value of nuclear propulsion was demon- strated by Royal Navy submarines which were able to transit more than 7000 miles from Britain to the Falklands in only thirteen days. Once on station the submarines were able to remain submerged and avoid detection. To the Argentines, the fact that the submarines couldn't be located anywhere emphasized that they could be everywhere. The British determined that optical designation and guidance modes for their close in surface to air missile systems were necessary in coastal areas where terrain masking and land clutter degraded the radar controlled operating modes. In like circumstances, high sea condi- tions, or when battle damage or electronic countermeasures defeat or degrade the radar capability, a visual, back up mode for close-in defense weapons could be extremely impor- tant. Those systems lacking a visual mode should receive one. Future weapons systems should be designed with an optical back up system. The British were satisfied with their decision to for- ward base some of their Harriers at San Carlos. The small advance field they established ashore with AM-2 matting demonstrated the ruggedness and versatility of the aircraft. The limited fueling capability of the site permitted Sea Harriers operating as Combat Air Patrols to extend their average time on station from ten to fifty minutes. The site also had enough parking room to prestage several Harrier GR.3s so as to more promptly respond to close air support requests from the ground forces.9 This success with advance basing confirms the U.S. Marine Corps forward basing con- cept. The Argentine destruction of HMS Sheffield and Atlantic Conveyor were virtually identical in method, yet it is the Sheffield which has received the majority of the attention. We should not dismiss the loss of Atlantic Conveyor simply because it lacks the damage control features of a typical warship. The ships of the U.S. merchant fleet which are also undefended and lack damage control features are equally vulnerable. We need to continue work in developing "bolt on" defensive systems for these ships. At a minimum, these ships could be equipped with chaff dispensers and other ECM equipment when entering a war zone. For additional protection, the ships could receive a close-in weapon system already prepackaged in several MILVANs. A 20mm Vulcan cannon or Rapier missile launcher could be quickly installed aboard any type vessel. The Royal Navy's experience with V/STOL carriers veri- fied several small ship design considerations which may prove useful to the U.S. Navy. The "ski jump" ramps on the forward portion of the flight deck increased the performance and safety of Harrier operations. Additionally, the British were pleased with the effectiveness of their active fin roll stabilization units. This equipment increased the roll stability of the ships in rough seas. In fact, the British have claimed that the combination of the ramp and stabili- zation fins permitted them to operate in higher sea states than were possible with their former, conventional carrier, Ark Royal. The U.S. Navy is installing roll stabilization systems in its FFG-7 frigates. The system could be fitted aboard other ship types as well. Presently, neither the LHA nor the LPH have the "ski jump" ramp, possibly because its permanent installation would reduce the available number of helicopter landing spots on the flight deck. Perhaps the answer would be a portable, lightweight assembly which could be installed before Harriers are embarked and removed after they leave. The losses of the Royal Navy ships have provided many lessons relating to vessel design and shipboard damage control. A summary of several of the most important are listed below. Damage Control Central. Shipboard battle damage is limited and repaired from the Damage Control Center. In many British ships this facility is co-located with the ships propulsion engineering control station. Many did not have a secondary damage control central. In at least three incidents, ships suffered damage that put the center out of action and no alternate facility was available. All three ships were sunk. The Royal Navy now requires that new con- struction ships have two separate damage control centrals.10 System Redundancy. In nearly every sinking of a Royal Navy ship, the crew was endangered by the failure of the ship's vital systems. On several occasions, fire mains were ruptured by bombs or missiles leaving part of the ship with- out firefighting water. Electrical power or communications was lost between major sections of the ship. Cabling in many Royal Navy ships is bundled and runs along the hull of the ship. A single bomb or rocket hit, even one that failed to explode, which cut the bundle rendered the ship helpless.11 Thermal Imaging Devices. When Sheffield was set afire by the Exocet missile, the ship was quickly filled with thick, black smoke that prevented the firefighters from seeing the fire. After the Sheffield loss, the Royal Navy borrowed infrared thermal imaging viewers from the British civilian firefighters and by the completion of the conflict, each vessel had three of the devices. The Royal Navy is planning to purchase these for each of their ships.12 Emergency Breathing Apparatus. Prior to the conflict, the Royal Navy issued portable breathing equipment to all its engineering plant personnel. However, several nonengineering personnel assigned below decks were lost when they were unable to escape without the emergency breathing gear. The Royal Navy will now provide the equipment to all personnel with battle stations below deck.13 Aluminum. Many critics have challenged the use of aluminum in the Royal Navy ships. Although its use did not directly contribute directly to the loss of combatant, there were instances where hot aluminum bulkheads buckled when sprayed with cold firefighting water. The bulkling caused the loss of airtight boundaries which made fire fighting and smoke containment more difficult. Reportedly, future British ship designs will exclude aluminum.14 It is interesting to observe that both sides in the South Atlantic conflict used weapons that could have been considered obsolete. Both the carrier Hermes and the car- rier Vienticinco De Mayo were built during the 1940s, the cruiser General Belgrano was built in the 1930s, the British torpedoes were designed during the 1920s. Yet in many cases, including the Belgrano and the torpedoes used to sink her, these weapons systems were still the most effective their country had available to accomplish particular missions.15 In other cases, such as the Argentine use of British built moored mines in the Falklands Sound, the weapon had been cast off by one nation in favor of more sophisticated system only to have the discarded system acquired by a nation whose needs were not as advanced. (Another example, two of the Argentine diesel submarines were former U.S. Navy vessels.) One advantage of retaining the less sophisticated equipment is that if the more modern systems are all expended, the former equipment may still be used. Finally, modern armed forces cannot ignore old weapons systems in planning defenses since, as the British found out, the customer of today may be the enemy of tomorrow.16 CHAPTER FIFTEEN CONCLUSION Force is never more operative that when it is known to exist but is not brandished.1 Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan The Argentine government erred in believing the British would not try to retake the Falkland Islands. After de- tecting scant British interest in the region and minuscule Royal Navy protection, the Argentines assumed the Falklands could be taken de facto with just a show of force.2 In reality Argentine had neither the political-military cohe- sion nor a sufficiently realistic strategy to ensure control of the islands. A large number of troops and a substantial amount of equipment were put ashore, but it appears their commander, General Mendez, had no real plans for their effective employment. The majority of effort to prevent the British recapture was performed by the Argentine Air Force and naval aviation assets. The British were unwilling to give up the distant islands and quickly prepared a task force to reclaim the Malvinas. But even as the Royal Navy Task Force got under- way for the South Atlantic, most of the British military and political leaders mistakenly assumed a diplomatic reso- lution would be reached before combat became necessary. The difference between the two countries is that the British went to war with their best forces available while the Argentines sent only second rate troops. They failed to strenghten their antiair defenses, or to commit their best ground troops or provide professional leadership for con- scripts.3 Argentina's leaders helped the British ground forces to retake the islands despite being outnumbered nearly two-to-one. The success of the British forces con- firmed the combined arms concept and the valve of disci- plined, well trained, professionally led troops.4 The British recapture of the Falklands also high- lighted the unique ability of maritime forces to project and sustain forces at great distances in support of national strategy and to protect national interests. There is no other way whereby a nation can project power across the oceans and force an entry ashore at a predetermined time and place.5 The British use of these ships and the ground forces they carried was well planned and executed even when the odds seemed to be against them. Firm decisions and determination at Britain's highest leadership levels pro- vided the example and set the stage for the battlefield successes. It was a war against time and the elements as well as against the Argentine military. Quality of per- sonnel and professional skill overcame the disadvantages with which the Task Force was burdened. Additionally, the full support of the British people at home was an important factor.6 For the first time in many years the British people have seen something to be proud of: a tremendous feat of arms accomplished with superb professional skill; leadership which neither swerved nor weakened; patriotism instead of economics, courage and sacrifice instead of greed and self-interest; attack instead of retreat; a fight for the flag. The Union Jack has been restored not only to Port Stanley but to Britain. Anthony Levine, National Review, July 1982, p. 898. Click here to view image FOOTNOTES CHAPTER ONE: SUMMARY OF EVENTS LEADING TO WAR 1Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands, (New York, N.Y.: W. W. Norton and Company, 1983), p. 1. 2Hastings, p. 2. 3Hastings, p. 3. 4Hastings, p. 3. 5Hastings, p. 3. 6Hastings, p. 5. 7Hastings, p. 7. 8Hastings, p. 46. 9Hastings, p. 47. 10Lawrence Freedman, "The War in the Falkland Islands" Foreign Affairs, Fall 1982, p. 196. 11Time, April 12, 1982, p. 42. 12Economist, June 19, 1982, p. 35. 13"The South Atlantic Conflict, Lessons Learned" Vol. 1, "Summary of Principal Conclusions and Recommendations" Report of the Falkland Islands Study Group to the Secretary of the Navy (Portions classified SECRET) March 1983, p. 1. 14John Laffin, Fight for the Falklands! (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1982), p. 17. 15"The South Atlantic Conflict," p. XVII. CHAPTER TWO: SUMMARY OF OPPOSING FORCES 1M. J. Armitage and R. A. Mason, Air Power in the Nuclear Age (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1983), pp. 202-203. 2Sir Terence Lewin speech to the Royal United Services Institute, 24 June 1982. 3Sir Terence Lewin. 4Capt. V. R. Villar, "A Change of Direction is Needed, Lessons from the Falklands" Jane's Defense Review 6/1982, p. 593. 5Villar, p. 593. 6"The South Atlantic Conflict" Vol. 1, p. Ex-13. 7Stephen S. Roberts "Western European and NATO Navies" Proceedings, March, 1983: p. 41. 8"The South Atlantic Conflict, Lessons Learned" Vol. II Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations," Report of the Falkland Islands Study Group to the Secretary of the Navy (Portions classified SECRET), p. 28. 9The South Atlantic Conflict Vol. II, p. VI-I. 10The South Atlantic Conflict Vol. II, p. VI-I. 11"Sink the Santa Fe!" At War in the Falklands (Canoga Park, California: Challenge Publications Inc., 1983), p. 57. 12Freedman, p. 58. 13"The South Atlantic Conflict" Vol. II, p. V-32. 14The South Atlantic Conflict Vol. II, p. V-32. 15Armitage and Mason, pp. 277-278. 16Hastings and Jenkins, p. 219. CHAPTER THREE: THE SUPER ETENDARD 1Brian Walters, "The Dassault Breguet Super Etendard" Navy International, June 1982, p. 1096. 2Robert L. Scheima, "Super Etendard; Super Squadron" Proceedings, March 1983, p. 135. CHAPTER FOUR: THE EXOCET MISSILE 1Damian Housman, "Lessons of Naval Warfare" National Review, July 23, 1982, p. 895. 2Armed Forces Journal International, July 1982, p. 30. 3Armed Forces Journal International, p. 30. 4Aviation and Week and Space Technology, June 1982, p. 14. 5RADM Julian S. Lake,"Taking a New Look at Naval Needs After the Falklands," Defense Electronics, October 1982, CHAPTER FIVE: WEATHER 1"The South Atlantic Conflict" Vol. I, p. 20. 2Hastings, p. 1. 3"The South Atlantic Conflict" Vol. I, p. 20. 4Lt. D. Smith, "Operating Sea Harriers in the South Atlantic" Naval Forces, No. VI/1982, Vol III, p. 73. CHAPTER SIX: ELECTRONIC WARFARE 1RADM Julian Lake, p. 71. 2RADM Julian Lake, p. 72. 3Air Vice Marshall Stewart W. B. Menaul, "The Falklands Campaign: A War of Yesterday" Strategic Review, Fall 1982, p. 89. 4Menaul, p. 89. 5RADM Julian Lake, pp. 79-80. 6RADM Julian Lake, p. 80. 7Roy M. Braybrook, "Helicopters in the South Atlantic War," At War in the Falklands (Canoga Park, California: Challenge Publications, 1983), p. 93. CHAPTER SEVEN: BRITISH LAND BASED AIRCRAFT 1Robert Trimble, "Black Buck" At War in the Falklands (Canoga Park, California: Challenge Publications, 1983), p. 25. 2Trimble, p. 23. 3Trimble, p. 25. 4Trimble, p. 27. 5Strategic Review, Fall 1982, p. 89. 6Trimble, p. 26. 7Trimb1e, p. 26. 8"The Falklands Crisis: Operations and Progress after May 25" Navy International, Vol. 87, No. 8, August 1982, p. 1226. 9Captain John O. Coote, "Send Her Victorious" Pro- ceedings, January 1983, p. 38. 10Armitage and Mason, pp. 208-209. CHAPTER EIGHT: THE HARRIER IN THE AIR DEFENSE ROLE 1Navy International, May 1982, p. 1038. 2"South Atlantic Conflict," Vol. II, p. VI-2. 3"South Atlantic Conflict," Vol. II, p. VI-2. 4"South Atlantic Conflict," Vol. II, p. VII-16. 5"South Atlantic Conflict," Vol. II, p. VII-16. 6Roy Braybrook, "Harriers at War" At War in the Falk- lands (Canoga Park, California: Challenge Publications, 1983) pp. 28-41. 7"South Atlantic Conflict," Vol. II, p. VII-17. 8"South Atlantic Conflict," Vol. II, p. VII-l7. 9"South Atlantic Conflict," Vol. II, p. VII-17. 10"South Atlantic Conflict," Vol. II, p. VII-9. 11"South Atlantic Conflict," Vol. II, p. H-5. 12"South Atlantic Conflict," Vol. II, p. VI-6. 13Braybrook, p. 33. 14Braybrook, p. 33. 15Braybrook, p. 34. 16"South Atlantic Conflict," Vol. II, p. VII-9. 17Braybrook, p. 35. 18Braybrook, p. 36. 19"South Atlantic Conflict," Vol. II, p. 18. 20Navy International, June 1982, p. 1098. 21Jeff Ethell, "Mirage Squadron, An interview with Comodoro Carlos E. Corino, Commander Grupo 8 De Caza and one of his pilots" At War in the Falklands (Canoga Park, Cali- fornia: Challenge Publications 1983), p. 49. 22"Lessons of the Falklands," Summary Report Department of the Navy, Washington, DC, February 1983, p. 27. 23Braybrook, p. 41. 24"Lessons of the Falklands," p. 27. 25Braybrook, p. 41. 26Braybrook, p. 41. 27Armitage and Mason, p. 218. 28Eyewitness Falklands. 29"South Atlantic Conflict," Vol. I, p. EX-10. CHAPTER NINE: SHIPBOARD AIR DEFENSES 1Journal of Electronic Defense, August 1983, p. 39. 2Lon Nordeen, "An Update on Ship-to-Air Missiles" Naval Forces, No. VI, 1982, Vol. III, p. 52. 3Journal of Electronic Defense, August 1983, p. 37. 4Journal of Electronic Defense, August 1983, p. 37. 5"South Atlantic Conflict," Vol. II, p. V-3. 6"South Atlantic Conflict," Vol. II, p. V-2. 7Journal of Electronic Defense, August 1983, p. 39. 8Damian Housman, "Lessons of Naval Warfare" National Review, July 23, 1982, p. 895. 9CDR Honeyball, interview of 27 February 1984. 10Hastings and Jenkins, p. 205. 11"South Atlantic Conflict," Summary Report, pp. 1-3. 12A. H. Cordesman, "The Falklands Crisis; Emerging Lessons for Power Projection and Force Planning" Armed Forces Journal International, September 1982, pp. 29-46. 13Strategic Review, Fall 1982, p. 85. 14Strategic Review, Fall 1982, p. 85. 15Normal Friedman, "The Falklands War: Lessons Learned and Mislearned" ORBIS A Journal of World Affairs, Winter 1983, Volume 26, Number 4, p. 925. Reprinted in Current News Special Edition, 22 June 1982, p. 1-18. 16Friedman, p. 925. 17Friedman, p. 925. 18Friedman, p. 925. 19Friedman, p. 925. 20South Atlantic Conflict, Vol. II, p. B-2. 21Ethell, "Mirage Squadron," p. 51. 22Hastings, p. 225. 23A. H. Cordesman, "The Falklands Crisis, Emerging Lessons for Power Projection and Force Planning" Armed Forces Journal International, September 1982, p. 46. CHAPTER TEN: ARGENTINE AIR FORCE TACTICS 1Ethell, "Mirage Squadron," p. 48. 2Jeff Ethell, and Michael O'Leary, "Strike, Strike, Strike!" At War in the Falklands (Canoga Park, California: Challenge Publications, 1983), p. 8. 3Ethell, "Strike Strike Strike!", p. 8. 4Armitage and Mason, p. 205. 5Armitage and Mason, p. 215. 6Armitage and Mason, p. 215. CHAPTER ELEVEN: SHORE BASED AIR DEFENSES 1"The South Atlantic Conflict," Vol. I, p. E-1. 2Hastings, p. 211. 3Hastings, p. 211. 4"South Atlantic Conflict," Vol. 1, p. EX-8. 5"The Falklands: Warning, Intelligence and Diplomacy" Armed Forces Journal International, September 12, 1982, p. 32. CHAPTER TWELVE: ARGENTINE AIR ATTACKS 1Armitage and Mason, p. 212. 2"The South Atlantic Conflict," Vol. II, p. XXII. 3Armitage and Mason, p. 212. 4Armitage and Mason, p. 212. 5Armitage and Mason, p. 212. 6Armitage and Mason, p. 213. 7Armitage and Mason, p. 213. 8Laffin, p. 93. 9Armitage and Mason, p. 214. 10"The South Atlantic Conflict," Vol. II, p. XXIII. 11Armitage and Mason, p. 214. 12Hastings, pp. 233-253. 13Armitage and Mason, p. 214. 14"The South Atlantic Conflict," Vol. II, p. XXIII. 15Armitage and Mason, p. 215. 16Armitage and Mason, p. 217. 17Armitage and Mason, p. 217. 18Hastings, p. 297. 19Armitage and Mason, p. 218. 20Armitage and Mason, p. 218. CHAPTER THIRTEEN: DESTRUCTION OF AIRCRAFT ON THE GROUND 1G. L. Guertner, "The 74 Day Way: New Technology, Old Tactics" Military Review, November 1982, p. 67. CHAPTER FOURTEEN: LESSONS LEARNED 1Sir Terence Lewin Speech of 24 June 1982. 2Sir Terence Lewin. 3RADM Hamm address to Marine Corps Command and Staff College of 10 January 1984. 4Cordesman, pp. 29-46. 5Adm. Stansfield Turner, "The Sheffield Shock" Newsweek, May 17, 1982, p. 45. 6Journal of Electronic Defense, p. 32. 7"The South Atlantic Conflict," Vol. II, p. 11. 8"The South Atlantic Conflict," Vol. II, p. X-15,16. 9Armitage and Mason, p. 217. 10"The South Atlantic Conflict," Vol. II, p. XI-12. 11"The South Atlantic Conflict," Vol. II, p. XI-12. 12"The South Atlantic Conflict," Vol. II, p. XI-12. 13"The South Atlantic Conflict," Vol. II, p. XI-12. 14"The South Atlantic Conflict," Vol. II, p. XI-12. 15"The South Atlantic Conflict, Lessons Learned," p. EX-11. 16"The South Atlantic Conflict, Lessons Learned," p. EX-11. CHAPTER FIFTEEN: CONCLUSION 1Military Review, November 1982, p. 51. 2Brig. Gen. J. D. Hittle, "Cost Cutting at RN Expense was Primary Cause of the Falklands War" Congressional Record, 128: E4130-E4131, September 13, 1982. 3"The South Atlantic Conflict," Vol. I, p. 1. 4"The South Atlantic Conflict," Vol. I, p. 1. 5"The South Atlantic Conflict," Vol. II, p. XII-2. 6Strategic Review, Fall 1982, p. 91. APPENDIX A. Cronology, "The South Atlantic Conflict," pp. 15-21. B. Maps: "Lessons of the Falklands Summary Report," pp. 16, 20. BIBLIOGRAPHY PRIMARY SOURCES Telephone interview with CDR Honeyball, Air Staff Officer to RADM Woodward, British Task Force Commander in the Falklands Conflict, 27 February 1984. CDR Honeyball is presently on duty in the United States on the staff of NAVAIR in Washington. "Lessons and Implications from the South Atlantic Conflict" DoD/IDA Task Force Report R-27l IDA L06# HQ 83-25722/6 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Director Net as- sessment. (SECRET) 6 volumes, November 1983. The most comprehensive account of the conflict. Distri- bution is controlled by the originator, however. "Lessons of the Falklands" summary report, Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C., February 1983. "The South Atlantic Conflict, Lessons Learned Vol. I Summary of Principal Conclusions and Recommendations." Report of the Falkland Islands Study Group to the Secretary of the Navy (SECRET), March 1983. "The South Atlantic Conflict, Lessons Learned Vol. II Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations." Report of the Falkland Islands Study Group to the Secretary of the Navy (SECRET), March 1983. SECONDARY SOURCES Abhau, W. C. RADM USN. "A Suggestion Regarding the Falklands Study," memo to LTGEN Shutler of 14 January 1983. "The Aerospatiale AM-39 Exocet Missile." Navy International June 1982, 1098-1099. Ambrose, Andrew I. "Arming Merchant Ships," Naval Forces No. V1/1982 Vol. III, 60-64. Armitage, M. J. and R. A. Mason. Air Power in the Nuclear Age, Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1983. Excellent summary of British and Argentine air opera- tions. Barger, Milliar I. "Seawolf Knocks out Exocet in Sea Trials," Armed Forces Journal International, February 1984, 36. Beck, Peter J. "Britains Antarctic Dimension," International Affairs, Summer 1983, Volume 59, Number 3 reprinted in Current News, Special Edition, 19-30 includes discussion of removal of research vessel Endurance from South Atlantic. Bonsignore, E. "Hard lessons from the South Atlantic," Military Technology 6/1982, 31-36. Some sources have surmised that the Exocet missile which struck HMS Sheffield exploded. This article provides evidence to indicate the missile did not detonate. Braybrook, Roy M. "Harriers at War," At War in the Falklands Challenge Publications Inc., Canoga Park, California, 1983, 28-41. Cable, Sir James. "The Falklands Conflict," Proceedings September 1982, 70-76. Calvert, Peter. "Soverenty and the Falklands Crisis," International Affairs, Summer 1983, Volume 59, Number 3. Reprinted in Current News Special Edition, 9 November 1983, 8-12. Coote, Captain John O., Royal Navy. "Send Her Victorious " Proceedings, January 1983, 33-42. Cordesman, A. H. "The Falklands Crises; Emerging lessons for the power projection and force planning," Armed Forces Journal International, September 1982, 29-46. Good discussion of aircraft tactics. Author makes the point that a mix of FA-18 and AH-64 aircraft might be cheaper and more capable than the Harrier. Dar, Major General E. H. (Pakistani Army). "Strategy in the Falklands War," Proceedings, March 1983, 132-134. Article is primarily orientated to the land campaign. Drysdale, Major David (AOO HMS Hermes). "The War at Sea," Globe and Laurel, July-Aug. 1982, 228-232. The Globe and Laurel is the professional publication of the British Marines. Dunnett, Denzil. "Self-Determination and the Falklands," International Affairs Vol. 59, Number 3, Summer 1983. Printed in Current News Special Edition 9 November 1983, 12-19. Ethel, Jeff. "Mirage Squadron, An Interview with Comodoro Carlos E. Corino, Commander Grudo 8. DeCaza and one of his pilots," At War in the Falklands, Challenge Publi- cations, Inc., Canoga Park, California, 1983, 46-51. A rare interview with the commander of one of the Argentine Air Force Squadrons. Ethell, Jeff. "Pocara," At War in the Falklands, Challenge Publications, Inc., Canoga Park, California, 1983, 42-45. Ethell, Jeff and Michael O'Leary. "Strike, Strike and Strike! The story of Argentina's air war against the British." At War in the Falklands, Challenge Publi- cations, Canoga Park, California, 1982, 4-21. One of the few articles which present the Argentine viewpoint. "The Falklands Crisis Operations and Progress after May 25," Navy International, Vol. 87, No. 8, August 1982, 1222- 1226. "The Falklands: Warning, Intelligence, and Diplomacy," Armed Forces Journal International, September 1982, 30-40. Freedman, Lawrence. "The War in the Falkland Islands," Foreign Affairs, Fall 1982, 196-198. Friedman, Normal. "The Falklands War: Lessons learned and mislearned," ORBIS A Journal of World Affairs, Winter 1983, Volume 26, Number 4, 907-940. Reprinted in Current News Special Edition, 22 June 1982, 1-18. Getler, Michael. "U.S. Air to Britain in Falklands War is Detailed," Washington Post March 7, 1984, p. A9. States U.S. was prepared to offer use of the U.S. Navy heli- copter carrier USS Guam to Britain if either of the Royal Navy carriers were lost during the Falkland Conflict. Gorton, Steven. "Thoughts on the Falkland Islands War," Proceedings September 1982, 105-107. Guertner, G. L. "The 74 day War; new technology, old tactics," Military Review November 1982, 65-72. Hackett, General Sir John. "Be Bold, Bloody and Quick," Time, May 10, 1982, 29. Hastings, Max and Simon Jenkins. The Battle for the Falk- lands. New York, N.Y.: W.W. Norton and Company, 1983. Excellent account of the political history of the Islands. Housman, Damian. "Lessons of Naval Warfare," National Re- view July 23, 1982, 895. A comparison of U.S. Navy and Royal Navy Air Defense assets. Kelsey, Commander Robert J. USN. "Maneuvering in the Falklands," Proceedings, September 1982, 36-37. Kennedy, Floyd D. "Sea Service," National Defense Journal of the American Defense Preparedness Association. January 1984, 9-10. Laffin, John. Fight for the Falklands! New York, N.Y.: St, Martin's Press, 1982. The first book about the war to be published. Not as complete or accurate as the Hastings book. Lake, RADM J. S. "A tactical analysis of the South Atlantic War." Naval Forces 6/1982, 32-26. Lake, RADM Julian S. "Taking a New Look at Naval Needs After the Falklands," Defense Electronics October 1982, Vol. 14, 78. Lebow, Richard Ned. "Miscalculation in the South Atlantic: The Origins of the Falkland War," Journal of Strategic Studies March 1983, Vol. 6, Number 1: 5-35. Reprinted in Current News Special Edition 9 August 1983, 1-16. Lejeune, Anthony. "Colonel Blimp's Day," National Review July 23, 1982, 898. "Lost at Sea," At War in the Falklands Challenge Publications Inc., Canoga Park, California, 1983, 74-79. MacKay, Gillian. "The Falklands: Picking Up the Broken Pieces," MacLeans June 28, 1982, 22-23. Makin, Guillermo A. "Argentine approaches to the Falklands/ Malvinas: was the resort to violence foreseeable?" International Affairs Summer 1983, Volume 59, Number 3, 391-452. Reprinted in Current News Special Edition 9 November 1983, 1-7. Menaul, Air Vice Marshall Stewart. "The Falklands Campaign: A War of Yesterday," Strategic Review, Fall 1982, 85-87. Excellent discussion of military hardware used in the South Atlantic. Nicholls, Capt. D. V. RM (Public Relations Officer with 3 Commando Brigade). "Amphibious Victory," Globe and Laurel July-Aug. 1982, 220-227. Nordeen, Lon O. "An Update on Ship-to-Air Missiles," Naval Forces, No. VI-1982, Vol. III, 48-52. Nutwell, Commander Robert M. USN. "Postscript: The Falk- lands War," Proceedings January 1983, 82-83. O'Ballance, E. "The Other Falkland Campaign (The role of the media)." Military Review January 1983, 9-16. "Peace?" Editorial Navy International, Vol. 87, No. 7, July 1982, 1157-1165. Reece, Colonel M. J. British Defense Staff, Washington letter to General John W. Vessey, USA Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff of 8 July 1982 forwarding the text of a speech made by Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Terence Lewin, British Chief of the General Staff, to the Royal United Services Institute, 24 June 1982. Roberts, Stephen S. "Western European and NATO Navies," Proceedings March 1983, 34-41. Russel, George. "Battle of the Microchips," Time May 17, 1982, 26-27. Russel, George. "Face-off on the High Seas, the British and Argentines Brace for Combat over the Falklands," Time April 19, 1982, 26-37. Russel, George. "Nearing the Moment of Truth," Time May 3, 1982, 30, 31. Scheima, Robert L. "Super Etendard; Super Squadron," Proceedings March 1983: 135-137. Pictures included with the article show that all five Super Etendard aircraft survived the war. Simmons, Henry. "Lessons of the Falklands," Astronautics and Aeronautics July-August 1982, 6. "Sink the Santa Fe!" At War in the Falklands, Challenge Publications, Inc. Canoga Park, California, 1983, 56-59. Smith (Lt. D.). "Operating Sea Harriers in the South Atlantic," Naval Forces 6/1982, 72-76. Smith, M. Press Officer, Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering Ltd. Barrow-in-Furness, Cumbria, England. Letter of 13 December 1983. Vickers Shipbuilding manufactures the Sea Wolf and Sea Dart missile launchers. "Some Reflections on British Operations in the Falkland Islands," New Zealand International Review November/ December 1982, 2-7. Strasser, Steven and David C. Martin "Are Big Warships Doomed? Newsweek, May 17, 1982, 32-45. Strasser, Steven, and 7 others. "Britannia Scorns to Yield," Newsweek, April 19, 1982, 40-46. "That Magnificent Flying Machine," Time, June 7, 1982, 38. Discussion of Harrier aircraft. Trimble, Robert. "Black Buck," At War in the Falklands Challenge Publications Inc., Canoga Park, California, 1983, 22-27. A description of the Vulcan bomber. "Triumph and Tragedy of the Atlantic Conveyor," At War in the Falklands, Challenge Publications, Inc., Canoga Park, California, 1983, 52-55. Turner, ADM Stansfield. "The Sheffield Shock," Newsweek May 17, 1982, 45-46. Admiral Turner is a former pres- ident of the Naval War College and past director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Turner, Admiral Stansfield. USN "The Unobvious Lessons of the Falklands War," Proceedings, April 1983, 50-57. Villar (Capt. V. R.). "A change of direction is needed. Lessons from the Falklands," Jane's Defense Review 6/1982, 593-596. Walker, P. F. "Smart Weapons in Naval Warfare," Scientific American May 1983, 53-61. Walters, Brian. "Air Power---A Decisive Element in the Falklands Campaign," Navy International, Vol. 87, No. 7, July 1982, 1164. Walters, Brian. "The Dassault Breguet Super Etendard," Navy International June 1982, 1096-1098. One of the best descriptions of this aircraft. "The War is On." Newsweek, May 10, 1982, 28-31. Whitaker, Mark, Tony Clifton and 5 others. "An Odd Little War Turns Very Ugly," Newsweek, May 17, 1982, 28-31.
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