The Horn of Africa CSC 1984 SUBJECT AREA Strategic Issues ABSTRACT Author: GOMEZ, Arthur, Major, USMC Title: The Horn of Africa Publisher: Marine Corps Command and Staff College Date: 2 April 1984 The Horn of Africa includes the countries of Ethiopia, Somalia, and the Republic of Djibouti. It is considered a strategically important area because of its proximity to the Persian Gulf and the fact that it forms a chokepoint on the sea lanes that pass through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. Throughout its history, the Horn of Africa has been a scene of conflicts which have often involved the most powerful countries of the world. Since the end of World War II, its conflicts have involved both the Soviet Union and the United States. This superpower connection has exacerbated the basic conflicts of the Horn which involve Ethiopian attempts to counter many ethnic separatist movements and to preserve Ethiopia's current borders. This paper, which is based on readily available English language sources, is a brief historical survey of the conflicts currently facing Ethiopia. The paper begins to set a stage for addressing these conflicts by presenting some background information concerning the land, peoples and history of the region. It traces the progress of the 1974 military coup which overthrew the imperial government of Ethiopia and thereby intensified the conflicts. The paper then addresses each of the major conflicts which includes the Eritrean secession movement, several other regional and ideological insurgencies, and the long standing dispute with Somalia over the Ogaden region which erupted into the Somali-Ethiopian War in 1977. The final part of the paper presents a number of conclusions concerning: differences between Soviet and American anti-guerrilla tactics; the probable reasons for many of the key actions of the major partici- pants in the Somali-Ethiopian War; an assessment of the current status of each country in the horn; and the author's recommendations for future United States actions in the region. WAR SINCE 1945 SEMINAR The Horn of Africa Major Arthur Gomez 2 April 1984 Marine Corps Command and Staff College Marine Corps Development and Education Command Quantico, Virginia 22134 PREFACE Americans have a tendency to want to solve problems much as Alexander the Great solved the Gordian knot, slicing through all of the intricacies with one clean stroke of the sword. We like to divide things up into tidy packages of right and wrong, or black and white. We are often not content to sit back and patiently wait for a situation to develop as we strive for quick offensive action to "resolve it, one way or the other!" The Horn of Africa is a place where we have an interest and where the Soviets are even more heavily involved. It is an area that most Americans know little about where simple knee-jerk reactions and rash actions could easily endanger world peace. It is also an area where that abounds in complexities and in many, many shades of grey. The purpose of this research paper is to present a survey of the conflicts on the Horn of Africa and to explore some of those complexities. I intended originally to research the Somali-Ethiopian War but soon found a dearth of material on the actual campaign and a wealth of material on the background to the war and its many connections with all the many conflicts that continue to rage in that area. Having too little information on just the war, I decided to try and tie together the major conflicts into one survey. The result is a paper that is a bit oversize in number of pages and hopes to be a satisfactory introduction to the conflicts of the Horn. In any study of this nature, the product is constrained by the time, references, and abilities of the author. I would like to thank all the members of my family for putting up with the many hours of what would have been their time that I was allowed to spend on this project. I would also like to extend specal thanks to my wife, Louise, for tracking down many of the references and making the hundreds ot xerox copies that were used to speed the documentation effort. With any less support, the effort could have proved too much. In regards to the references, they were often difficult to obtain and some were not identified as possibly significant until it was very late, thus making it difficult to obtain them or to blend them into the text. The lack of some references may therefore be a weakness in this study. And finally, while this study is based on the works listed, the interpre- tations and naturally, all errors or omissions herein are the responsibility of the author. Arthur Gomez 2 April 1984 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page List of Maps v Chapter 1. Introduction 2 Notes 7 2. Background 8 The Land 8 The People 18 Notes 34 3. History 37 Early Ethiopia 39 Modern Ethiopia 47 The Other Countries of the Horn 65 Notes 86 4. Conflicts 92 Coup of 1974 92 Eritrea 101 Regional Revolts 107 The Somali-Ethiopian War 112 Notes 121 5. Conclusions 126 Soviet Anti-Guerrilla Tactics 126 Somali-Ethiopian War Questions 130 Current Status 137 U.S. Policy Options 147 Notes 152 Bibliography 156 List of Maps Page Map 1. The Horn of Africa 1 2. Africa 3 3. Ethiopia 9 4. Somalia 13 5. Djibouti 16 6. Peoples of Ethiopia 22 7. Somali Tribes 28 8 Early Ethiopia 40 9. Ethiopia, 1800 44 10. Ethiopia, 1900 50 11. Ethiopia, 1935 57 12. Somali Borders 67 13. Eritrea 79 14. Regional Revolts 93 15. Eritrean Rebels 104 16. The Somali-Ethiopian War 115 Click here to view image THE HORN OF AFRICA CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION The Horn of Africa is a term given to the northeast corner of Africa that juts into the Indian Ocean (see Map 1). The Horn shapes the southern portions of the Rea Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the very important Bab el Mandeb (Gate of Sorrow), which controls access to the Red Sea and therefore, the Suez Canal. As the Horn of Africa is only a metaphorical term, it has no precise de- finition. Broadly defined, the Horn includes all of Kenya, Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Sudan.(2) Narrowly defined, it is only that area populated by the Somali people including Somalia, Djibouti, the northern part of Kenya and the Ogaden part of Ethiopia.(3) A compromise, used in this study, is to limit the definition to include only Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti.(4) This area is interesting for a number of reasons. First, it is a critical geopolitical area in relation to the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Persian Gulf(see Map 2). As such, it is a scene for conflicts between the superpowers, their proxies, and other countries of the area. It is an area where the super- powers are increasingly investing their resources and prestige. Therefore, it has the potential of breeding a new conflict out of the tangled conflicts of the past that could escalate into tragic consequences for the entire world. Second, it is a region of many bitter ironies and political contraditions. Long, bloody struggles have been waged for barren and almost worthless areas. Thousands have died because of imaginary borders that were haphazardly drawn over the past century. Many of these borders were unknown and even today are incomprehensible to the nomadic peoples that have wandered the Horn for many centuries. They had no part in developing the borders and ironically, they are now the ones killing and being killed because of them. These areas were arbitrarily divided by the colonial powers without much concern for local tribal, religious, or ethnic factors. Because they were so Click here to view image THE HORN OF AFRICA poorly drawn in all parts of Africa, one key principle of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) is that these colonial boundaries will not be changed by force of arms. This principle helps to protect many African countries that fear disintegration into many tiny pieces (balkanization) because of a lack of nationalism for the newly created nations and the extremely strong, but very narrow, tribal loyalties. At the same time, opposing groups are attempting to liberate themselves under the banner of self-determination, which is also a key OAU and United Nations (UN) principle. The result is conflict with both sides basing their cause on OAU principles. Other ironies include a number of cruelly humorous scenes. One of these scenes saw the United States (US) stressing human rights and freedom while at the same time, supporting an increasingly oppressive, Marxist revolutionary government with arms. These arms were being used to consolidate the Marxists' power by openly and brutally terrorizing the population. The Marxists were taking the arms; were executing hundreds, often without even the pretense of trials; were asking for more arms; and simultaneously, were denouncing the US. Another bitterly ironic scene saw the Soviets, who had armed and trained several guerrilla forces, actively participating in the destruction of their former Marxist proteges. The complex web of interests in the Horn of Africa has found Israelis, Cu- bans, Soviets and some Arabs on the side of a Christian elite against various Moslem insurgencies supported by other Arabs, the US and many Western powers. It even had the spectacle of both superpowers clumsily switching sides during the height of the struggle. A third reason for interest is that this area includes Ethiopia which has often captured the attention of the world. Ethiopia, also known as Abyssinia (the European version of its Arab name, "El Habesha"(6)), is a country that traces its origins to a legendary union of Solomon and the Queen of Sheba and THE HORN OF AFRICA claims an unbroken history of thousands of years. It was known to the ancient Greeks and the Roman Empire. During the middle ages, Ethiopia was a Christian bastion that held out against many waves of Moslem conquest. For anti-imperialists, it was the only part of black Africa that avoided the clutches of the colonial powers by inflicting a humiliating defeat on the Italians at Adowa in 1895. This defeat was significant as it was the first major defeat of a colonial European power by a non-white, non-western nation and was also a basis for the Italians later invasion in 1935. Ethiopia's Emperor, Haile Selassie I, whose official titles included the Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah, the Elect of God, and the King of Kings, was forced to flee the country during the second Italian invasion. However, he made a very dramatic appeal against the Italian aggression and called for an immediate, armed response by the League of Nations based upon the provisions of their charter. The appeal received worldwide publicity but did nothing to stop the Italians. However, it did burn Ethiopia into the collective conscience of the Western world. After the war, Haile Selassie used Western memories of his appeal to lead Ethiopia back into the spotlight of world politics. Ethiopia became a member of the United Nations (UN), sent battalions to fight in the Korean War, and supported most US positions. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia's capital, became the site of the OAU headquarters. The Emperor, in addition to being a popular world leader, also gave the impression of trying to modernize his feudal country. The erratic, largely unplanned, and almost slow motion overthrow of Haile Selassie's long and colorful regime came as a shock to the rest of the world. The bloody course of the revolution and the brutality of the successor regime appalled many. Finally, the unexpectedly huge and quick intervention by the Soviet Union on the side of Ethiopia quickly drew the entire area into the scope of world interest. THE HORN OF AFRICA The Horn of Africa is an interesting subject of study. There naturally exists a very large mass of documentation in many languages dealing with all aspects of its history, culture and politics. However, this study is limited to readily available English sources concerning the conflicts of interest and does not attempt to be a complete, or exhaustive treatment of the subject. In doing any research at all into this area one is quickly struck by the differences in spelling of the names of the people and places. This results from languages such as Amharic, Somali, French, Italian, and Arabic, that were in use in the area, being translated into English. To reduce confusion I have attempted to stay with those forms that are most used in the general literature. The only exceptions to that attempt are found in a few quotations where I chose not to change that author's spelling and trusted that the reader will be able to properly connect the two spellings. Another point that can be confusing is that of the various Ethiopian titles that are used along with a name such as "Negus" Tasfari or "Ras" Yasu. While there are many different titles used to denote all the different levels of the government and military, I have limited mention of all except these three: Negus Neghest (king of kings, or Emperor), Negus (king), and Ras (duke). In order to simplify further, I have translated these titles in the text to their equivalents.(7) THE HORN OF AFRICA NOTES - CHAPTER 1 1. Central Intelligence Agency, Maps of the World's Nations, Volume II, Africa, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Publication GC 77-10038, 1977), cover page. 2. "Ethiopia: Conquest and Terror," Horn of Africa, 4, No. 1, (1981), p. 8. See also: Marina Ottaway, Soviet and American Influence in the Horn of Africa, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), p. 2. 3. Saadia Touval, Somali Nationalism: International Politics and the Drive for Unity in the Horn of Africa, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 5. See also: I. M. Lewis, The Modern History of Somaliland fron Nation to State, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1965), p. 1. 4. This is the most common definition used in the literature: Tom J. Farer, War Clouds on the Horn of Africa: The Widening Storm, 2nd rev. ed., (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1979), p. 1. Bereket Habte Selassie, Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1980), p. 1. Robert Gorman, Political Conflict on the Horn of Africa," (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981), p. 21. Yohannes Abate, "Africa's Troubled Horn: Background to Conflict," Focus, 28, No. 3 (Jan-Feb, 1978), p. 1. 5. CIA, op. cit., p. 2-1. 6. Nathaniel T. Kenney, "Ethiopian Adventure," National Geographic, 127, No 4 (1965), p. 577. 7. Richard Greenfield, Ethiopia, A New Political History, (New York: Fred- erick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1965), Appendix II, pp. 461-463 contains a good discussion of some of the Ethiopian titles often found in the literature. THE HORN OF AFRICA CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND This chapter begins the process of setting the stage for addressing the modern conflicts on the Horn of Africa by presenting its land and people. SECTION I - THE LAND The Horn of Africa is a harsh and often beautiful land. There are lush jungles; steep, rugged, often inaccessible highland plateaus and mountains; hot, humid coastal plains; incredible volcanic deserts still bubbling with volcanic activity; hot, dusty and extremely dry grasslands; and excepting parts of Ethiopia, little arable land. Many authors share the following view: That hostility should be so stubborn between the Ethiopian and Somali peoples over a land as climatically inhospitable as the Horn is one of the small mysteries of human behavior. Covering some 750,000 square miles--most of which is forbiddingly hot, dry and often very rugged--the Horn of Africa leaves a good deal to be de- sired as a piece of real estate.(1) One key to the Horn of Africa is rainfall. When the rains come on time and in sufficient quantity, both the nomadic tribesmen and the farmer prosper. However, the rainfall in this area is erratic and unpredictable. Droughts have affected the Horn and seem to be occuring with greater frequency. Droughts combine with increasing populations and wider conflicts to impose heavy burdens of suffering on the entire area. The Horn has long been a crossroads between Africa and the Middle East. Coastal lowlands provide ports which support its trade and prosperity. The same ports which provided prosperity also have provided access for the Horn's many invaders. The nature of the coastal lowlands made them easy to control and almost guaranteed that they would not stand against the waves of seaborne invaders. In contrast, the mountainous highlands have always made control of that area much more difficult. This terrain has acted very much like the many Click here to view image THE HORN OF AFRICA islands and mountains of Greece to divide and localize the large Ethiopian pop- ulation into pockets of distinct, highly independent ethnic groups. Unlike the Greeks, the Ethiopians are more isolated from contacts with the rest of the world. Yet, this same condition made the invaders' conquest of the highlands more difficult and certainly helped Ethiopia resist colonization. Facts of geography help to explain why the outer periphery of the Horn has known so many invaders, why colonial powers often seized the sea coast, and why the Ethiopians were successful in denying the interior to the colonial powers until the twentieth century. They also help to explain why the pull of separ- atism is so strong in Ethiopia and perhaps, why central governments must often use so much force to impose control. Ethiopia Ethiopia is the largest and most varied country on the Horn of Africa (see Map 3). Roughly triangular in shape it contains about 1,221,900 square kilo- meters which is about three times the size of California or, twice the size of Somalia. With the exception of permanent snow covered peaks, Ethiopia contains representative examples of every climatalogical condition found in Africa.(3) The world's most extensive fault which extends from Mozambique to the Jordan valley, the Great Rift Valley, cuts through the center of Ethiopia and neatly divides the 6000 to 8000 foot highlands which comprise two thirds of the country. To the west of the Rift, the Ethiopian Plateau rises in an extremely rugged, mountainous region that drops very sharply near the western border with Sudan. To the east of the Great Rift Valley is a lower and more level area that is known as the Somali Plateau which slopes gently to the east to form the arid, semidesert area known as the Ogaden.(4) The highlands are often referred to as a tableland. Frequent reference to the Ethiopian "tableland" obscures the real nature of the terrain, which is carved up by canyons and gorges thousands of feet deep. The net effect is captured in a remark at- THE HORN OF AFRICA tributed to one member of the 1867 British Expeditionary Force: "They tell us this is a tableland. If it is, they have turned the table upside down and we are scrambling up and down the legs."(5) As the Great Rift Valley cuts through the highlands in the southern part of Ethiopia it forms a series of large fresh or salt water lakes.(6) In the north, the Great Rift intersects with two other rift valleys to form the highly unstable, volcanic area known as the Danakil Depression. The area as first described by a British explorer is "A landscape of terror, of hardship, of death." It is up to 381 feet below sea level and is famous for being one of the hottest areas on Earth. Its only economic benefit is derived from mining the dried salt lakes, some of which are up to 1500 feet deep.(7) There is also a large coastal plain along the Red Sea in the northern part of Ethiopia that ranges from about 10 to 50 miles in width. This plain is hot, humid, mostly treeless, and has an annual rainfall of less than 10 inches.(8) It contains the two main ports of Mitsiwa and Aseb that together have histor- ically handled a smaller portion of Ethiopian trade than Djibouti. However, as the railroad to Djibouti has often been cut by guerillas, the road net in the north was improved and this situation has changed.(9) Ethiopia also has a number of small islands in the Red Sea that are known as the Dahlac Archipelago. These were not considered important until the So- viet fleet was allowed to develop military fleet anchorage facilities there. Facilities include the floating drydock from Berbera, floating piers, barracks and other improvements. The Soviets visit this site about 80 times a year.(10) All of Ethiopia's rivers rise in the highlands and flow outward. The largest of these is the Blue Nile which has it source in Lake Tana and provides two thirds of the water in the Nile below Khartoum. Others such as the Juba and the Shabellee are very important to Somalia. The Awash River drains the central highlands around Addis Ababa and then flows into the Danakil Depression where it disappears into salt lakes. While the rivers of Ethiopia are not THE HORN OF AFRICA navigable, they do provide the potential for a great deal of hydrolectric power which has yet to be exploited.(11) There has been very little economic development in Ethiopia. There are two railroads and few all weather roads. One railroad, no longer in service, connected the port of Mitsiwa with the interior. The other railroad is very important as it connects the capital, Addis Ababa with the port of Djibouti. Ethiopia, in 1977, had 10,520 kilometers of all weather roads of which a total of 3230 kilometers were paved.(12) As Tom Farer stated in 1979: The depth of Ethiopian misery is pretty much invulnerable to exaggeration. By virtually any measure of social welfare or econ- omic development, Ethiopia is one of the world's poorest countries. Its per capita gross national product is somewhere in the vicinity of $90, which places it among the bottom twenty nation-states. It is one of the eight states with an average per capita daily caloric intake of less than 1,600...Its transportation network is so exig- uous that the average peasant must walk eight hours in order to reach a road on which wheeled vehicles of any kind can move. That is one, but only one, reason why tens of thousands can die of star- vation while their government exports grain.(13) Ethiopia borders Sudan, Kenya, Somalia and Djibouti however, most of these borders are not defined by natural features. The border with Djibouti was de- termined by the Franco-Italian agreement of 1935. The border with Kenya was defined by Great Britain and Ethiopia prior to Kenyan independence. The long, 2,400 kilometer border with Sudan was delimited in 1902 and is not a matter of current dispute. The border with Somalia is based on various treaties signed by Great Britain, Italy and Ethiopia that have been the subject of many varying opinions. Only about half of it was ever demarcated and even that part of the line is officially not recognized by Somalia.(14) The entire question of bor- ders is but one of many roots in the multi-faceted Somali-Ethiopian conflict. Somalia Somalia is shaped in the form of a large number "7" and is bordered by Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. It has a total land area of about 637,540 square kilometers which is roughly comparable Click here to view image THE HORN OF AFRICA to the size of the state of Texas (see Map 4) . There is also a rather long coast line of 2,960 kilometers which has yet to be properly exploited as the Somalis have long had a strong aversion to fishing.(16) Somalia's terrain is mostly a jumble of plateaus and plains. A single range of mountains with an average height of about 1800 meters runs east to west in the northern portion of the country. Also in the north is a maritime plain of between two and eighteen kilometers. This is a semiarid region with no permanent rivers called the "guban" (burnt land). Rains turn this area into a temporary grazing area for nomadic herds. South of the mountains is a lower plateau that has very arid portions in the east and less arid areas in the west. The western plateau slopes down into the excellent grazing region known as the "Haud" which extends into Ethiopia's Ogaden provinces.(17) Southwestern Somalia is the location of the only permanent rivers, the Juba and the Shabeelle, which water the majority of Somalia's farm land. As a point of interest, both of these "permanent" rivers ran dry in the drought of 1980 for the first time in the memory of the local population.(18) These ri- vers originate in Ethiopia and travel through arid regions of Ethiopia that could benefit if they were diverted for irrigation. This action would disrupt Somalia's agriculture and is another possible Ethiopian weapon.(19) Somalia is an extremely poor country, even in comparison to Ethiopia. A total of only 15 percent of the land in Somalia is arable. About 60 percent of the population is nomadic, 15 percent are farmers and the rest are urban.(20) In 1978, the government reported only 19,380 kilometers of roads in the entire country. Of this total, about 11 percent were hard-surfaced, 36 percent were gravel or dirt surfaced, and the rest were dirt tracks. Almost all roads in Somalia were built through various aid programs such as Red China's 1,045 kilometer hard-surfaced road begun in 1973 and completed in 1978.(21) THE HORN OF AFRICA In spite of the long coast line, there are only four main ports. These include three deep water ports: Berbera, located on the Gulf of Aden, and Mo- gadishu and Kismaayo, both of which are located on the Indian Ocean. A fourth port, Marka, located on the Indian Ocean, requires lighterage. Berbera was the site of a Soviet built, military port facility that is now being expanded to support US interests. Live animals and bananas compose most of Somalia's ex- ports and together account for 90 percent of its export income. Imports con- tinually exceed exports and the country suffers from a chronic trade deficit compounded by its defense expenditures.(22) Somalia's borders with all of its neighbors are strongly disputed. The basis of these disputes is Somali nonrecognition of several European treaties. These treaties allowed some Somali-inhabited areas to be incorporated into the territory of its neighbors. The goal of reunification and the actions taken to achieve that end are part of the "Greater Somalia" movement. An example of the strength of this movement can be seen in the design of Somalia's flag. It has a five-sided star as its main design. Each point of the star represents a part of the Somali people. Two points represent British and Italian Somaliland, which became Somalia. The other three points represent the "lost territories" that are outside the borders of Somalia which include most of Djibouti, the northern part of Kenya and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. Somali attempts to gain these areas generate the major conflicts on the Horn.(23) The Republic of Djibouti Djibouti is the former French Territory of the Afars and Issas. It exists because of its harbors on the Gulf of Tadjoura (see Map 5) and the fact that it dominates the Bab el Mandeb which controls access to the Suez Canal.(24) Its port is the the best on the entire Horn of Africa and can handle up to 12 ocean going ships at one time.(25) Click here to view image THE HORN OF AFRICA At various times Djibouti has been referred to as "a valley of hell" or "a country whose landscape is a nightmare." However, on the Horn of Africa, it is not unique nor different from adjacent territories in Somalia or Ethiopia.(27) Djibouti is a tiny country of about 8,500 square miles, about the same size as the state of Massachusetts. It is a land of barren rock, volcanic material, and dry salt lakes, some of which is as much as 600 feet below sea level.(28) Djibouti is bordered only by Somalia and Ethiopia. But both covet its territory seeking to deny it to the other. In addition, the port and major city, Djibouti, serves as the terminus for the only operational railroad in the Horn of Africa connecting Addis Ababa with the sea. As much as 60 per cent of Ethiopia's foreign trade uses this railroad. Other than the railroad and port, Djibouti is composed of coastal lowlands with little to offer economically. About 1 percent of the land is arable which provides for little agriculture and some small grazing areas for the nomads. There are 100 miles of paved roads in the entire country. About 90 percent of the population is illiterate and about 85 percent of it is unemployed. The country's main support is an annual French contribution that is equal to its previous colonial support contributions.(29) Djibouti is an area of concern for both Somalia and Ethiopia. Somalia does not recognize the borders of Djibouti as just over half the population of Djibouti is Somali. Besides the pull of nationalism, ownership of the port of Djibouti would be both a large economic plum for the extremely poor Somalis and another strong anti-Ethiopian weapon. Ethiopia also has vital interests in Djibouti because of the economic factors outlined above and the 40 percent of the Djibouti population that are Afars. The Afar tribes have long been a part of Ethiopia. France granted Djibouti its independence in 1977, and it still has a number of strategic interests in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. It main- tains these interests and the base at Djibouti which complements them, by THE HORN OF AFRICA "protecting" Djibouti from the Somalis and the Ethiopians. While this is done at the "request" of the Djibouti government, the significant costs of keeping 5,000 French military and administrative personnel there, and of making its annual contribution of support to Djibouti, are borne at least in part, because of those strategic interests. SECTION II - THE PEOPLE The people who inhabit the Horn of Africa comprise a mosiac of religions, races, languages, and tribes that have a long history of conflict with each other. The condition of the people can be summed up as follows: The life of the vast bulk of its people is nasty, brutish, and short, with wars adding periodically to the chronic decimation by disease and malnutrition.(30) In dealing with the figures given for population, as well as the others used throughout this paper, it must be remembered that the vast majority of them are highly suspect. As long as numbers are tied to aid or used in other political and ideological ways, they will often be "adjusted" to suit the purposes at hand. Therefore, they are not trustworthy. Ethiopia The country of Ethiopia could be described as a seething mass of divergent groups competing and clawing their way towards a goal of either dominating, or of removing themselves from the modern fiction that is Ethiopia. This boiling mass is tended by those that enforce their concept of Ethiopia using the tools of power which include fear, greed and violence. The competition between the forces of centralization and separatism is the central theme of Ethiopian history. From the very creation of the empire when small areas were first brought under central control, these two forces have struggled against each other. Each time that it seems that separatism would destroy Ethiopia, strong leaders have risen to champion centralization and to THE HORN OF AFRICA preserve the empire. Being a primitive land, the methods of the proponents of both sides usually involve pain, suffering and death. Ethiopia is the largest country on the Horn of Africa with an estimated population of at least 30 million and perhaps as many as 33 million. Examples of the problems of control of the country abound. A complete census of the country has never been taken and more than a million and a half Ethiopian ref- ugees are now living outside the country.(31) The refugee problem is a large and continual one that is caused by the many conflicts in the region. Ethiopia's large population, third largest in Africa after Nigeria and Egypt, can be divided into many different groups by considering such things as age, religion, language, tribes, or occupation. None of these are necessarily exclusive and various individuals can be members of many different divisions. These many times opposing divisions show the underlying fragmented nature of the population. They dramatically increase the physical problems imposed by the terrain and help to explain why it has been so hard to govern Ethiopia effectively, or sometimes, even to hold the country together. In contrast to our own more evenly distributed population, Ethiopia's is heavily skewed towards youth. According to 1980 UN statistics, almost half of the population (45 percent) was under the age of fifteen. In fact, the median age for the population was only seventeen. Given the growth rate of 2.5 per- cent a year, the population will exceed 55 million by the year 2000.(32) The naturally volatile nature of, and the greatly raised expectations of this part of the population has been been an explosive force in Ethiopian pol- itics. Idealism (naivete?) finds outlets in Marxism, opposing autocratic rule and attacking capitalism. This has added the dimension of ideological conflict to the struggles of Ethiopia. Ethiopia's peoples are greatly divided by religion. While most are Moslem or Christian, there is also a significant minority composed of other religions THE HORN OF AFRICA such as pagans, Falasha Jews and others. The almost equal division of the vast majority of the population into Christians and Moslems adds a religious element to most contentious issues afflicting the Horn. Given a lack of education, the absence of many distractions found in more modern societies, and the endemic poverty of the region, the elemental strength of this division is much greater than it is in our own society. While we in the US might consider religion to be a matter of sometimes strong and heated debate, in the Horn of Africa it can easily be a matter of life and death as wars often rage between the two groups. The Ethiopian Orthodox (or Coptic) Church has long been a bulwark or agent of the Empire. As a result of the mutual support between it and the ruling class, the Church has often been the target of conflict. When the ruling class conquered new areas, they brought the Church along. They provided conquered lands and slaves to support the Church and it became a part of the process of enforcing control over the conquered peoples.(33) The Coptic Church was not the only religion that was forcibly introduced. Islam developed the idea of "jihad," (holy war) aimed at converting unbelievers by the sword. Over the centuries, there have been many "jihads" of varying success aimed at the peoples of the Horn and often, specifically at the Coptic Church. The ebb and flow of these religious struggles over the last several hundred years are well remembered by the population and are an important con- tinuing source of conflict. It has often been said of the dominant Christians of central Ethiopia, that they think of themselves as an isolated island of Christianity in a hostile Moslem sea.(34) An example of the impact of religion which is still vividly remembered by both Christians and Moslems took place in the late 1890's: . . .The walled city of Harar was considered a holy city by the Muslims and its capture by Christians thus added religious animosity to anti-Ethiopian sentiment. The French traveler and writer Henri de Monfreid, who worked for Menelik, tells a story that illustrates this: when Menelik received an emissary from Abdullahi on the eve of Chelenko, the emissary brought a Muslim turban, along with the message that if Menelik wore the turban, the emir's troops would not THE HORN OF AFRICA harm him; if not, then--by Allah!--the emir would tie up him and his men with ropes and dispose of them as he saw fit. Menelik replied that he would wear the turban until the good Lord Medhane Alem (the savior of the world) granted him victory, and he would then stand on the top of the minaret on the central mosque, urinate on it, demo- lish the mosque, and there build the church of Medhane Alem in its place. Menelik was a man of his word, for the church stands there today.(35) Language is another divisive factor. The official language of Ethiopia is Amharic, yet it is the natural tongue of only a third of the population. There are more than 70 different languages, most with several dialects, spoken in Ethiopia.(36) These languages are often the only difference between many of the ethnic groups. As they are a means of identifying with a romanticised or non-Ethiopian past, they can be a source of ethnic pride opposed to central control. The many languages tend to preserve and accentuate the differences between groups and help complicate and hinder effective communication that could blend them all together. Another important factor that is related directly to both the religious and language issues mentioned above, is the tribal or ethnic composition of the country. As Ethiopia grew it became a melange of the various peoples (see Map 6) that were to varying degrees absorbed, intermingled, overrun, or ghettoized. Many of these ethnic or tribal differences have been blurred to the point where they are hardly distinguishable by the outsider, but are still critical to the peoples themselves. The traditional loyalties owed to these groups can stand in the way of Ethiopian nationalism and often can form a basis for insurgency. The leading ethnic group is the Amhara who have long dominated the central government in Ethiopia. They were administrators and leaders who settled in the conquered territories in order to pacify and control them for the empire. As the dominant group, they were convinced of their innate superiority over the other groups. They actively enforced various forms of discrimination and per- secution such as prohibiting the use of local languages in the Coptic Church, government, courts and schools.(37) Click here to view image THE HORN OF AFRICA The Oromo (also known as Galla) are a large ethnic group that may number from 15, to as many as 18 million. They are composed of 5 clans or tribes that range from the central highlands of Ethiopia to the Ogaden and into Kenya. The Oromo were conquered by a slow process of absorption, war, and diplomacy that played on local differences. This process partially blended the Oromo into the ruling Amhara elite. Many adopted the Ethiopian faith while others adopted Islam as a kind of negative response to the Amhara domination.(39) The Oromo are related to the Somali and the Afar as they all speak closely related languages. Because of their diversity they have not been formed into a single majority movement against the central government. Like the Somali and the Afar, their opposition to the central government was fairly intermittent until recent times. Some support the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), which is one of the many current revolts in Ethiopia.(40) In 1970, there were over 900,000 Somalis living in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. While Somalis have often opposed the central government, many have also taken sides with the Amhara against other Somalis. This process was used to advantage by the Amhara to occupy the Somali lands.(41) Only recently has the idea of Somali nationalism grown to the point where most Somalis support the revolt against the present central government. The Afar (also known as the Danakil) number about 200,000 and occupy the lands between the Red Sea and the highlands. Changes to their formerly semi- autonomous status, an attempt at land reform, and heavy handed repression by the ruling Ethiopian revolutionary government drove many of this Moslem and largely nomadic group into revolt. This small group's revolt is important as the Afars threaten the port of Aseb and the vital railroad to Djibouti.(42) The Tigrean people, located in the north of Ethiopia and on both sides of the Eritrean border, number almost 5 million. They trace their descent back to the early kingdoms of the area. The Tigreans were one of the main rivals of THE HORN OF AFRICA the Amhara in the competition for control of Ethiopia during its development. Their interests have not been fully met by the new revolutionary government and they too, have insurgencies in progress.(43) The last major group are the Eritreans, who like other groups, are some- what difficult to distinguish from the rest of Ethiopia. They have both Moslem and Christian elements as well as other divisions. Many feel that they are Ethiopian, while others fight for Eritrean independence. Their opposition to the central government has been active since the early 1960's. Harsh Ethiopian repressive measures have forced more and more Eritreans to take up arms against the central government.(44) The last divisive factor to be considered is the trade or occupation of the people. Fully 85% of the population has been classified as rural dwellers with about one fifth considered to be at least partly nomadic and the vast ma- jority of the rest, farmers. The urban dwellers are growing at the fastest rate as more and more rural people go to the cities in search of jobs.(45) Of the relatively small in number urban dwellers, the petty governmental workers, students, union workers and other professional people have provided much of the leadership and the pressure for change. They have had a large im- pact on the course of the revolution which overthrew Haile Selassi in 1974. Yet, they lost control of the revolt to that most important group now leading the revolution--the Army. This revolt was stimulated by many local complaints and slowly grew into a vicious movement to destroy the imperial system.(46) Related to occupation and the key to the imperial system was the ownership of the land. A complex system of land ownership produced economic power, de- termined social class, and provided the basis for the development of the Ethi- opian state. Land rights were hereditary or were awarded for loyal and faith- ful service to the Emperor. The expansion of the country and the building of the centralized authority came at the expense of conquered territory in the THE HORN OF AFRICA south that was divided up among the new ruler's trusted advisors, soldiers and favorites. These rights were also used to obtain cooperation from opposing ethnic factions and to build the imperial bureaucracy.(47) While the system was based on two basic land rights that are called "rist" and "gult", the application of these basic rights was not uniform as it varied most significantly in the older lands of the north and the newly conquered lands of the south. In fact, as these rights grew out of local practice, the application of these rights actually varied somewhat between the provinces and sometimes, within a province. To help complicate matters further, the names were sometimes reversed, the type of rights modified, and both names were sometimes used together.(48) "Rist" ownership was an inherited interest in the land that could be claimed by anyone, male or female, yet was often tied to the nobility. It was passed from generation to generation based on descent from a particular ori- ginating individual. It was accepted that the tenant of the land would pay the "rist" holder a portion of the produce of the land.(49) The second right was "gult", which was a grant of imperial rights over the land, given as a reward, or in lieu of a salary, to imperial appointees. The "gult" holder was entitled to a portion of the produce of the land in the name of the ruler and supposedly passed a portion of this on to his superiors. In addition to this, the residents also "owed" labor, special taxes, fees for court decisions and "gifts" on special days to the "gult" holder. The "gult" holder also had a duty to support his leaders by supplying troops and himself as the need arose.(50) The Coptic Church received a similar right known as "semon" which was not usually subject to "gult" as their lands were considered separate from the normal lands in a region. This was a perpetual right to the land which was to support the church and supplement the fees "donated" for Church services.(51) THE HORN OF AFRICA Both types of rights could exist on the same land, the person who worked that land would simply pay a portion of his produce to each holder of rights. A person could be entitled to both basic types of rights on the same land, or to complex combinations of either type tied to many pieces of land in many parts of the country. Over time, the rights became a heavier and heavier bur- den on the rural peasants and were a factor in the process that finally des- troyed the old regime.(52) In summary, the population of Ethiopia is a large one that includes many separatist factors such as religion, language and tribal origins that all tend to break it into many smaller, often hostile groups. The central government under the Amharas was first able to overcome these factors through the liberal use of force. The base that sustained the force and helped to extend itself throughout the empire was the feudal system of land rights. These rights also helped to destroy the system as they added the weight of the majority of the people to the many groups opposed to the central government on religious, ethnic, ideological, or other grounds. The new revolutionary government which took advantage of these divisions to gain power, now has to face many of these divisive forces as well as others stirred up by the change in government. Somalia After looking at the many divisions within Ethiopia, a first impression of Somalia would indicate amazing uniformity. About 95 percent of the population of Somalia is ethnic Somali. These share the same history, culture, language and religion. However, while divisions are not so great as those of Ethiopia, there are many factors such as clan rivalries, economic pressure and political stress that tend to fragment Somalia.(53) The Somali government has attempted to justify the claims against its neighbors citing the "facts" of Somali unity and an historic notion of Somali nationalism. Ethiopians, quite naturally, view the Somali peoples as a loose THE HORN OF AFRICA group of scattered tribes without the necessary ingredients to form a nation. There is some truth in both points of view. The Ethiopian view was dominant as it had the force of the status quo behind it. That view has tended to slowly lose favor as the actions of the Somalis have shown a surprising willingness to pay the high, grim costs of uniting the Somali people. Sacrifice has convinced many of the validity of the Somali viewpoints and may have converted what was only rhetoric into reality. The origins of the Somali people are unknown. What is known begins with an Ethiopian song that celebrates the victories of the King Yeshaq (1414-1429) over a Moslem kingdom. This song mentions the Somalis for the first time. A later Ethiopian chronicle written around 1550 mentions them quite often.(54) Records show that war between the two has extended over 500 years. The Somali are composed of six main clan-families that traditionally trace their descent back to two members of the tribe of Muhammad, Samaal and Sab. Almost 75 percent of the population are members of the Dir, Issa, Darod and Hawiye clan-families which trace descent from Samaal. Another 20 percent are members of the Digil and the Rahanweyn, which trace descent from Sab. Those not in either group include those of Arab and former slave descent.(55) The Samaal were nomadic and were widely dispersed throughout the Horn (see Map 7) of Africa while most of the Sab lived more settled lives in the riverine area of southern Somalia. The nomadic life helped to scatter the Samaal and bred an almost constant, war-like tradition of conflict over water rights and grazing lands. The Sab, originally nomadic, slowly dominated the peoples that already lived in their area and relied on them as slaves to work the land. Sab wars were fought over trade, religion, or against the nomadic incursions.(56) An Ethiopian critic of the Somalis, Mesfin Wolde Mariam, presents this biased, yet also somewhat accurate, view of the nomadic Somalis: The fact is that even the Somalis themselves are torn into a number of tribes, sub-tribes, and "rers", or family groups. It is Click here to view image THE HORN OF AFRICA the smallest unit, the "rer", made up up a number of families, that is important and that exercises whatever authority there is over the individual. The tribe and the sub-tribe hardly exist in practical terms. Extreme individualism and utter lack of discipline are char- acteristic traits attributed to Somali nomads. The acute struggle for existence in this harsh environment often expresses itself in group conflicts over wells or grazing land, with almost yearly loss of life. . . 58) The Samaal have a tradition of democratic participation for males of their own group except those in despised occupational groups. They relate prestige to the number of generations between the ancestors and themselves. Alliances and confederations between the various subdivisions are common which makes for very complex relationships between family groupings. In addition, the Samaal consider themselves to be superior to all farmers and especially to the Sab, who are considered guilty of mixing with foreigners. This feeling is strong enough to cause the word "sab" (meaning "low") to be officially frowned upon by the current government.(59) The Sab have fewer generations between the ancestors and themselves. They have developed the idea of territoriality to a greater extent than the Samaal. Thpy also accepted Arab and other foreign elements into their clan structure. Being settled, they were more affected by the colonial presence and took better advantage of the educational opportunities to form many of the administrative elites in the country. Their noble class was more pronounced since the land simply produced more wealth. When slavery was abolished, it forced nobles into economic ventures in order to preserve their wealth.(60) Some anti-Somali authors declare that the Sab are not really Somalis. A more accurate appraisal is presented by I. M. M. Lewis: Thus the division between the Sab and Samale, which is the wid- est cleavage in the Somali nation, depends not only on the different economic interests of the two groups but also upon their cultural divergencies. Traditionally these distinctions are entrenched by the nomad's assumption of proud superiority and contempt for his southern countrymen, and the latter's corresponding resentment and isolation. Yet despite this, the gulf between the two communities is not so wide as might at first appear, or as insuperable as each sometimes likes to suggest. As has been said, many of the Sab are THE HORN OF AFRICA in reality of northern pastoral origin; many speak both dialects of Somali. Moreover there is much that draws the two groups together economically. . . . This sense of a commonality of interests, over and above the cultural and historical features which divide the two halves of the nation, is traditionally repre- sented in the national genealogy in which ultimately every Somali group finds a place. Here Sab and Samale are represented as brothers of common descent from a line of ancestors which eventually links the Somali as a whole to Arabia and proclaims their single origin. . . .(61) A factor, important to all Somalis, was the "dia"-paying group. This was a form of alliance where groups bound themselves together to share the rights, burdens and receipts of blood compensation. In this manner, the other members of a group would either revenge or collect compensation from those that harmed a member. The Samaal "dia" groups were much smaller than those of the Sab. The "dia" system added greatly to the internal warfare and divisions of the Somalis as it directly supported blood feuds and caused the formation of very strong group ties for very narrow interests.(62) While the "dia" groups have tended to divide and fragment the Somalis, it did not preclude broader alliances. When the larger groups such as the family or clan were threatened, Somalis rallied to their support. The problems of the past had not directly threatened the six clan-families and that level alliance had not been exercised. Modern forces such as education and propaganda have made this higher level much more important. This level has given rise to Somali nationalism and caused many of the conflicts in the area.(63) When nationalism was directed at the goal of independence, it tended to overshadow most other divisions that pull the Somalis apart. Independence soon tested this unity, as Farer explains: Aggravating these tensions is the inevitable disillusion which follows the consummation of independence. The oppressor leaves, yet so many of those problems of poverty and inequality, of personal and group animosity, once attributed (in many cases justly) to him, hang on. The celebrants wake up with a coppery taste in their mouths. The streets are still dusty and potholed. The same twisted-limbed beggars haunt the corners. There is too little work and too little money. Independence has come, but the texture of life feels the same. That was the postindependence story of Somalia.(64) THE HORN OF AFRICA Union of the former Italian and British colonies formed Somalia. Union was a goal of most Somalis but was also the cause of many problems that still affect the country. Tribal divisions were accentuated by differences in the colonial administration of the two former colonies. Not the least of these differences was language, with English being the language of the educational and civil service systems in the north and Italian being used in the south.(65) Other problems included differences in: court systems based on English and Italian law; currencies, based on the pound and the lira; basic equipment of the police and army; tarrif concepts and goals; and many more. These problems could not be solved prior to independence as the decision to unite the colonies was made just before the mandatory date of Italian withdrawal.(66) Once independence arrived, it was found that the style of administration of the government and Army officials in each area varied greatly. In addition, the smaller numbers of the north, poor lines of communication between the two parts of the country, decline of the former northern capital and a lack of northern agriculture and industry were bases for northern anger and fears of southern domination. These factors were strong enough to trigger an abortive coup just after independence.(67) Problems of diversity in Somalia have resulted in elections where over 60 political parties competed. Most of these parties were based on the narrow interests outlined above. The existence of so many parties and conflicting interests convinced Somali leaders that they had to strive for unity. The natural and easiest way to reach that goal was to use the "Greater Somalia" concept.(68) While this tactic was effective in uniting them, it has caused many years of war, hundreds of thousands of refugees and countless deaths. In summary, while Somalia has a homogeneous appearance, it also contains many divisive elements which exert fragmenting influences on the country. While these elements are not so great as those found in Ethiopia, they could THE HORN OF AFRICA have easily torn the more fragile and newly independent Somalia apart. The focus on Greater Somalia and attempts to regain lost territories have submerged the divisive elements and united the people. Should this effort to unify all of the Somalis be permanently frustrated, or if most Somalis decide that it cannot succeed, then all the divisions will again be released. If the Greater Somalia attempt has not in itself melded the tribes together, then these forces forces will, most likely, destroy Somalia. Republic of Djibouti Djibouti is an interesting area because of two factors. First, it is a natural scene of conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia. Second, it is a nation lacking a true nationality. Both factors have played their part in forming a tiny republic that sits very uneasily at a vital crossroads guarded by its for- mer colonial owner. The population of Djibouti is estimated at about 250,000 of which almost half are Somali and 40 percent are Afars. The actual numbers are in dispute for a number of reasons. These reasons include the fact that many residents are nomadic and may arrive and depart as they wish. The country is also very poor which makes administration, much less census taking, difficult outside of the main city. Finally, the exact numbers may be a danger to some officials as the political system is based on previous estimates of population.(69) The Afars and the Issa (a main Somali clan-family) are related by factors such as language, life-style and religion. Differences between the two have been increased in Djibouti as a result of French policies. Differences exist because the Afars have held more closely to their traditions and have not moved as aggressively as the Somalis into the economic life of the port. Somali ac- ceptance of economic and cultural opportunities caused more of them to settle permanently and for the French to previously favor them. However, the growth of Somali nationalism shifted French favor to the Afars.(70) THE HORN OF AFRICA French administrative and military personnel provide most services as well as defense of the country. The rest of the population includes Arab, Greek, Indian and other minorities that make up a merchant class. Of these, the Arabs have a history of using their position and religion to keep the less educated Afars and Somalis from going into business, becoming too educated, or losing their dependence on the Arabs.(71) The population of Djibouti compounds the economic interests of Ethiopia and Somalia as it gives both sides a valid claim to the port. Djibouti is therefore another possible prize in the conflicts of the Horn of Africa. THE HORN OF AFRICA NOTES - CHAPTER 2 1. Gorman, loc. cit. 2. Adapted from National Geographic Atlas of the World, (Washington, D.C.: National Geographic Society, 1981), p. 209. 3. Michael Milan Ferguson, "The Horn of Africa: Historical Patterns of Conflict and Strategic Considerations," (Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1978), p. 21. 4. Harold D. Nelson and Irving Kaplan, eds., Ethiopia, A Country Study (Washington D. C.: GPO, The American University,1981), pp.62-63. 5. Farer, op. cit., p. 11. 6. Nelson and Kaplan, op. cit. p. 63. 7. Victor Englebert, "The Danakil: Nomads of Ethiopia's Wasteland" Na- tional Geographic, 137, No. 2 (1970), pp. 187-195. 8. Richard Sherman, Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), p. 1. 9. Nelson and Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 176-177. 10. Norman L. Dodd, "African Navies South of the Sahara," Proceedings, 110, No. 3, (1984), p. 55. 11. Ibid., pp. 60-66. 12. Ibid., pp. 172-173. 13. Farer, op. cit., p. 12. 14. Nelson and Kaplan, op. cit., p. 61. 15. Harold D. Nelson, ed., Somalia, A Country Study. 3rd ed. (Washington D.C.: GPO, The American University, 1982), p. xx. 16. Robert Paul Jordan, "Somalia's Hour of Need," National Geographic, 159, No. 5 (1981), p. 752. 17. Nelson, op. cit., p. 68-73. 18. Jordan, op. cit., p. 775. 19. Mesfin Wolde Mariam, "The Background of the Ethio-Somalian Boundary Dispute," The Journal of Modern African Studies, 2, No. 2 (1964), p. 191. 20. Jordan, op. cit., pp. 750-751. 21. Nelson, op. cit., pp. 164-166. THE HORN OF AFRICA 22. Ibid., pp. 167-171. 23. Abate, op. cit., pp. 10-13. 24. Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, Djibouti and the Horn of Africa, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1968), p. ix-x. 25. Thomas A. Green, "Strategic Implications for the Republic of Djibouti of a Conflict Study of the 1974-1977 Period of the Ethiopian-Somolia War in the Horn of Africa," (Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1981), p. 47. 26. Thompson, op. cit., p.10. 27. Ibid., p. 3. 28. Green, op. cit., p. 46. 29. Marion Kaplan, "Djibouti, Tiny New Nation of Africa's Horn," National Geographic, 158, No. 4 (1978), pp. 519-527 30. Farer, op. cit., p. 1. 31. Nelson and Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 68-69. 32. Ibid. 33. Ferguson, op. cit., pp. 24-37. 34. Farer, op. cit., pp. 14-15. 35. Bereket op. cit., p. 100. 36. Nelson and Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 72-74. 37. Ibid., pp. 86-88. 38. Ibid., pp. 76-77. 39. Bereket, op. cit., pp. 76-82. 40. See "Oromia Speaks," The Horn of Africa, 3, No. 3, (1980), pp. 24-28, and "Ethiopia's Hidden War: The Oromo Liberation Struggle," The Horn of Africa, 5, No. 1, (1982), pp. 62-67, for the views of the OLF leaders. 41. Nelson and Kaplan, op. cit., p. 80. 42. Farer, op. cit., pp. 64-65. 43. Bereket, op. cit., pp. 86-91. 44. This revolt is extremely well documented. See Bereket, Farer, Gorman, and Sherman for the start of an extensive list of other sources. 45. Nelson and Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 69-72. 46. Colin Legum and Bill Lee, Conflict in the Horn of Africa, (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1977), pp. 37-41. THE HORN OF AFRICA 47. Glen Bailey, An Analysis of the Ethiopian Revolution, (Athens: Ohio University, Center for International Studies, 1980), pp. 12-14. 48. Ibid. 49. Patrick Gilkes, The Dying Lion: Feudalism and Modernization in Ethiopia, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975), pp. 104-107. 50. Ibid., pp. 107-108. 51. Ibid. p. 109. 52. Ibid. pp. 25-29. 53. Nelson, op. cit., pp. 67-68. 54. Touval, op. cit., p. 9. 55. Nelson, op. cit., pp. 81-84. 56. Ibid. 57. Ibid., p. 85. 58. Mariam, op. cit., p. 193. 59. Nelson, op. cit., pp. 82-89. 60. Ibid., pp. 89-91. 61. Lewis, op. cit., pp. 14-15. 62. Nelson, op. cit., pp. 88-94. 63. Lewis, op. cit., pp.13-14. 64. Farer, op. cit., p. 93. 65. Lewis, op. cit., pp. 166-170. 66. Touval, op. cit., pp. 115-117. 67. Lewis, loc. cit. 68. Ottaway, op. cit., p. 36. 69. Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 519-522. 70. Thompson, op. cit., pp. 23-28. 71. Ibid., pp. 32-33. THE HORN OF AFRICA CHAPTER 3. HISTORY The Horn of Africa is like that of any other area that has been contested; drenched in the suffering, pain and blood of both sides. The migration of new peoples into any area is often resisted by those that have preceeded them. In most cases, the land is limited and barely supports those living on it. Owners of the land are aware of the threat from the immigrants and have the choice of fighting, or of migrating to another area where they can seize the land of a weaker power. Both sides also know that their struggles are not just friendly competition, they are a matter of life and death for the warriors and for their families. All of the forces of both sides which include strength, strategy, skill, tactics, deceit, and hate are brought to bear. This was true of the migration of the twelve tribes of Israel into Palestine, or of the movements of the Goths against the lands of Rome, or of the American expansion to the west. We in the US have been extremely lucky. Since our civil war, we have been largely spared from the full experience of war. We are also fortunate to be a country that has led the world in economic development and military strength. We have been educated to believe that right makes might and that actions should be based on justice and fairness for all sides. We have been so secure that we nurture ideas that may be impractical such as pacifism, anarchism and the like. A combination of our unique benefits, our education system, and our dis- tance from many of the unpleasant realities of life make up a part of the American consciousness. We live in our own version of an ivory tower as most of us no longer kill our own food, or worry about starving to death, or have real contact with the baser actions of our fellow man. We also make the mistake of attributing our own unique values to those who do not share them. Examples of our special outlook can be seen in many areas. We recently canceled the development of a laser weapon that would blind and not kill our THE HORN OF AFRICA enemies because it would be inhumane. In many situations, we have restricted our allies and ourselves from using certain weapons such as napalm, cluster bomb units, poison gas, or neutron bombs because of our belief that they were inhumane. We stress that we should always fight fair, take prisoners, and re- strain ourselves from violating the various warfare conventions. We cannot understand why Cubans (and, or Grenadans) would kill one of our Cobra pilots attempting to surrender. Or, how the Soviets could shoot down a 747-load of civilians. We read of atrocities in various battles and cannot understand how they could occur and so we tend to discount, or ignore them and continue to assume that everyone "is really a nice person, just like us." The sad truth is that other people are not just like us and that we, when threatened, have also proved our own ruthless nature. Those that live with the constant evidence and threat of death, or who have almost nothing have a very much different outlook than we do. These cruel realities are shown in our own long history which includes many instances of deceit, barbarism, cruelty, and murder. Examples include: settlers knowingly giving Indians disease infected blankets; or, many instances of the killing of Indian women and children when overrunning their villages; or, Mormons, out of fear, posing as Indians and killing all adult members of a wagon train; or, the Marines often not taking Japanese prisoners during World War II. All of these are closer to the harsh realities of life than rich American housewives chartering an airplane to fly to Central America in order to protest human rights violations. The purpose of the remarks above is not to dwell on man's cruelty to man, or to spotlight lurid historical examples in order to "spice up" an otherwise dull study. Instead, it is to highlight the fact that in the Horn of Africa, like most other places in the world, pain, suffering, and sudden death have been and are still, the norm and not the exception. Killing another person because he may be a threat, is different, or has something that you want, is THE HORN OF AFRICA much more common on there than it is in our country. For example: Until recent times, it has been mandatory evidence of the man- liness of certain Galla tribesmen to prove they have killed a man by presenting his testicles to the killer's bride-to-be.(1) In the Horn of Africa, the absolute power of life and death is exercised to excess by those in power and without many of the constraints of our laws or customs. Because these things, harsh and unpleasant as they may be, are true and are to be found throughout the entire world, we cannot make the mistake of ignoring their importance in generating hate, bloody reprisals, and long dirty wars that cannot easily be solved by some quick, clean negotiations. Eritrea, the Ogaden, the West Bank, Beirut, Afganistan, Iraq-Iran, and most other wars share these facts making solutions so much more difficult. SECTION I - EARLY ETHIOPIA The history of Ethiopia is composed of many waves of migrations which have moved into the area (see Map 8). The first wave of peoples were the Cushitic-, or Omotic-speaking peoples that settled in the highlands and were later overrun by the Semitic-speaking Amhara and Tigreans.(2) Later waves of immigration in- cluded the Somalis and the Oromo. Millions of refugees are today's immigrants. One of the earliest kingdoms near present-day Ethiopia was that of Meroe which was at its height in the sixth century B.C. The people of Meroe may be the ones that the Greeks called "burnt faces" (Ethiopian) yet, this kingdom was more Egyptian than Ethiopian. The ancestors of modern Ethiopia were the small kingdoms that were seeded in the area by the Sabeans, a people from southern Arabia, at about this same time.(3) An important, official legend of Ethiopia was that its rulers were direct descendents of the union of Solomon and the Queen of Sheba. There are many versions of the legend throughout the region. Research indicates that the le- gends originated in Arabia. The Sheba (or Saba) of the Bible and which is also mentioned in Assyrian inscriptions may have been located in the northern part Click here to view image THE HORN OF AFRICA of Arabia while a kingdom called Saba also existed in southern Arabia. But, it was not Ethiopia. The legend, although false, has been used by Ethiopian rulers as a means of legitimizing their rule.(5) One of the Sabean kingdoms that was pushed off the coast and into the in- terior by the Greek conquests of Egypt was Aksum. It grew in strength and eventually regained the coast. It is considered the first Ethiopian kingdom. Its rulers spoke Greek while the population developed the classical Ethiopian language, Giiz. Aksum rose to power in the first centry A.D., because of the sea trade which flowed through its port of Adulis (modern Zula). The kingdom converted to Christianity during the fourth century at about the same time as it reached the peak of its power. This peak saw them destroy the more ancient Meroe, control a good portion of the Red Sea, and conquer parts of southern Arabia. Their power declined after the sixth century as large migrations from the north resulted from the Arab invasion of Egypt. These migrations had the effect of again cutting Aksum off from the sea and pushing it inland.(6) While Aksum is usually considered the first Ethiopian kingdom, many Eritreans consider Aksum to be Eritrean. This difference is used to justify the claim of Eritrea to be a separate country that was only recently conquered by Ethiopia. More of this argument will be presented below.(7) After being pushed off the coast, Aksum turned its energy to the south and expanded in that direction. Rather than a single movement there were actually a series of advances and withdrawals dependent on the internal strengths and weaknesses of Aksum. Similar examples of alternating Ethiopian central control and separatism continue to this day. This time also saw the strengthening of the power of Islam as Arab merchants converted those living on the coasts.(8) Around 1137, the Agew were able to seize control of Aksum and to hold it for over 130 years. They, in contrast to the earlier rulers, did not claim descent from Solomon. Other peoples such as the Tigreans and Amhara (converted THE HORN OF AFRICA to Christianity in about the ninth century), struggled against the Agew and attempted to gain power for themselves. In 1270, the Amhara were successful as they played on the ethnic issue of the Agew being alien and on the religious issue of the Agew not being descendants of Solomon.(9) Europeans had a legend of a powerful Christian king, called Prester John, who could aid them against the Moslems. When African traders brought back word of the existence of Ethiopia, the Europeans thought they had found John's king- dom. Portugal made attempts to contact the Ethiopians and set up diplomatic relations in 1509.(10) While the Portugese were looking for help against the Moslems, they ended up giving assistance as Ethiopia fought the Moslems. The Moslems of the Horn had a powerful leader, the Iman of Harar, Ahmed Ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi, also called Ahmed "Gran" (the left handed), who was leading a jihad against Christian Ethiopia. He was a skillful military leader who also had the benefit of aid from Turkey in the form of troops and firearms. (11) The jihad was based on religion and on new Somali migrations which added population pressures to the Moslem kingdoms of the Horn. The Somalis provided the bulk of the Moslem army which was very successful as most of the central highlands were overrun, sacked, converted to Islam, or put to the sword. The jihad was only checked when the Portugese sent 400 musketeers, under the Dom Christopher da Gama, a son of Vasco da Gama, to aid the Ethiopians. In 1542, they helped the Ethiopians defeat Gran and forced him to retreat. Examples of the animosities of the war included da Gama claiming one of Ahmed's wives as a part of his share of the spoils of war. When Ahmed returned, he brought 900 Moslem musketeers and more cannon and defeated the combined Christian armies. He also captured da Gama, had him tortured and then killed. Gran's victory was so complete, he thought the war was over and released his musketeers. The new Emperor, Galadewos, surprised Gran and forced a battle where Gran was killed and his army routed. Battles continued and saw a nephew of Gran defeat Gala- THE HORN OF AFRICA dewos in 1559. The nephew returned to Harar with a present for the widow of Gran, the head of Galadewos.(12) The importance of the jihad is summarized by Robert Gorman: Gran's jihad had two important long-term psychological effects. First, it reinforced the Abyssinian perception that Ethiopia was a "Christian island in an Islamic Sea," underscoring the religious nature of much of the conflict that had transpired on the Horn. Second, though ultimately unsuccessful, Gran is remembered among Somali as a folk hero and an archetypal national figure despite the ambiguity surrounding his ethnic origins. While one should not underestimate the significance of these psychological factors on the development of subsequent relations between Ethiopia and Somalia, a more tangible effect of Gran's exploits was the participation of Turks and other Arabs in the conquests. This fostered claims by Turkey, and later by Egypt, to both the Red Sea ports and much of what is now Eritrea. One can trace the causes of the current Eritrean succession back to these earlier historical developments. Finally, there is an eerie, although largely coincidental, re- semblance between the impact of foreign involvement during the Gran episode and the Ethiopian-Somali war of 1977/78. In each case the use of foreign mercenaries and equipment was decisisve to the out- come. Foreign influences from Gran, through the colonial era to Grazianni and beyond to the 1977 war, have greatly affected Ethiopian-Somali relations.(13) The battles ceased as both sides had to meet a greater challenge, a new migration by the Oromo. As the Somali expanded into the Horn, they pushed the Oromo out of their previous areas and set them in motion towards the interior. The Oromo movements overran some areas, bypassed strong resistance in others, and spread unevenly throughout the highlands.(14) The Amhara developed the concept of an Emperor who was thought of as the "king of kings." His power was based on tribute and personal service from the "kings" and "dukes" of the provinces. While the Emperor was technically all powerful, he had to keep the support of the lesser rulers in order to survive. The Emperors, annointed and crowned at Aksum, would move in a royal caravan from region to region to live off, and keep an eye on, the local rulers.(15) Establishment of a permanent capital at Gondar (see Map 9) in the seven- teenth century tied the Emperor to a single region and helped the lesser kings Click here to view image THE HORN OF AFRICA increase their regional power. A conflict within the Church over the influence of the Jesuits added to the turmoil of the times. Regional leadership was allowed to become hereditary and the power of the Emperors declined.(17) By the next century, the feudal system had deteriorated to the point where only weak Emperors were allowed to reign. This period became known as the Time of the Princes. Power was in the hands of the kings and dukes and was used to strengthen their regions and themselves. The situation was so bad that writers of the day wrote of "ignorance, debauchery, witchcraft, and drunken orgies" infecting even the clergy. James Bruce, a Scot serving Egypt, noted the bloody nature of a ruling class that practiced cruelties and wrote, "Nothing occupied my thoughts but how to escape from this bloody country." The regions even made their own alliances with, and obtained arms from, foreign governments.(18) A former bandit and member of the nobility, Kassa, set up a small kingdom during the middle of the nineteenth century. He later expanded it to the point where he could seize the throne of Ethiopia in 1855. As Emperor he chose the name, Tewodros (Theodore), after the legend of a strong leader who was to appear and restore Ethiopia to greatness. To accomplish this task, he had to defeat the various kings and bring them fully under his control. One of the first and strongest regions to fall was Shewa where the Emperor captured that region's heir (and future Emperor), Menelik II, and allowed him to live. Tewo- dros attempted to modernize Ethiopia and had extensive dealings with Europeans. His attitude can be seen in a quotation attributed to him by the French consul: I know the tactics of European governments when they desire to acquire an eastern state. First they send out missionaries, then consuls to support the missionaries, then battalions to support the consuls. I am not a Rajah of Hindustan to be made a mock of in that way. I prefer to have to deal with the battalions straight away!(19) Tewodros threw anyone, even consuls, into chains if they upset him. He got angry with some British agents and promptly imprisoned them. The British tried to get them released through diplomacy. When diplomacy didn't work, they THE HORN OF AFRICA used force. They sent General Napier and a British army that included modern weapons, elephants and a brass band. The Emperor's enemies seized that time to aid the British and they had little trouble in defeating him. Tewodros saw that he had no chance. He released the prisoners and attempted to negotiate. When this offer was refused, he committed suicide.(20) Tewodros is considered the first modern Emperor. He was a strong military leader and he set up Ethiopia's first standing army that stressed drill and discipline in place of the traditional levies of warriors. He tried to reform both the Church and the imperial system of government. His failures were due to his being a poor politican. His inclination was to try to settle problems by using blunt, direct, and usually military methods. As his reforms, military conquests and internal opposition from the lesser kings increased, he alienated most of his allies. The lack of this support allowed the British to cross an otherwise hostile land with little loss and defeat his greatly reduced forces. However, the idea of a strong empire had taken hold.(21) One of the Ethiopians that supported Napier was the king of Tigray. After Napier had defeated Tewodros, he withdrew through Tigray to the coast. As he embarked aboard the ships that were to return him to India, he left his excess weapons and munitions as a reward to the king. This modern equipment and the king's natural ability were used to seize the throne in 1872. As Emperor, he took the name, Yohannes IV.(22) Egypt, which was going through a revival of strength, attempted several invasions, only some of which Yohannes was able to defeat. The Egyptians held the sea coasts all around the Horn, occupied Harar, and attempted to take the interior. From his base in Tigray, Yohannes was able to stop the Egyptians in key battles that preserved his hold on the highlands. Yohannes returned some of his Egyptian prisoners of war along with this message: Here are your soldiers Ismail! If you want any more eunuchs for your harems drive me up the rest of your army."(23) THE HORN Of AFRICA In addition to the Egyptians, Yohannes also had to face the Italians who had taken over Asab and encouraged by the British, were moving inland. The Italians had made agreements with several of Yohannes' rivals to supply them with arms in return for aid against the Emperor. One of these was Menelik II, who supported the Emperor only when it paid to do so. Menelik was concerned only about using the advanced weapons supplied by the Italians to consolidate his power in Shewa and to expand his kingdom to the south. The Italians were temporarily checked by a defeat in Eritrea in 1887, and Yohannes turned to face a Madist threat from the Sudan. When Yohannes was killed in battle, Menelik's army allowed him to ignore the line of sucession and seize the crown.(24) The rule of Menelik II coincides with the European scramble for colonies and the creation of modern Ethiopia. As such, it will be addressed in the next section. This section traced some of the main themes of the early development of Ethiopia. These themes included: the effects of migrations; the beginings of conflict with the Moslem Somalis; the development of the office of Emperor; the growth of regional strength and autonomy; and the conquest of new areas. SECTION II - MODERN ETHIOPIA A point that was evident in the last section and which will appear again and again is that the leaders on the Horn of Africa were often willing to ally themselves with anyone who could be of use. Within the diverse groups there were always those willing to assist anyone for the right price. Christians, Moslems, Europeans, Oromo, Amhara, and all the rest sought out alliances even with enemies in order to further their own interests. Alliances were often broken and many would work both sides of a conflict until a probable winner could be determined. In the nineteenth century, when the British attacked Tewodros, the future Emperor aided them. When that Emperor, Yohannes, fought the Italians, his THE HORN OF AFRICA successor to be, Menelik II, was allied with the Italians. When Haile Selassie fought the Italians just before World War II, some Ethiopian rulers aided the Italians. When the revolutionaries overthrew Haile Selassie, similar kinds of deals were made between factions. When sufficient power was at hand, the deals and the dealers were often terminated. Power does not rest easily in Ethiopia. The path to the Ethiopian throne is one marked by intrigue, power brokerage, and luck. Those that helped to put someone into power were often the ones who pulled him down. No one could be safe or secure in his position and only the strong and ruthless could rule in Ethiopia. A major cause of hatred between the Moslems and the ruling Amhara which lasted into modern times was slavery. The taking and holding of slaves was a part of all the cultures of the countries on the Horn. Conquerors of an area always enslaved parts of the conquered population. The slaves were often sold to other countries in the Middle East with some going to Saudi Arabia as late as the 1940's (and perhaps later). Slaves were used by the Amhara for farming, household, or other duties. High ranking army or governmental officials often had large numbers of them. A favorite form of slavery involved the castration of young blacks in order to provide eunuchs to care for the owner's family. As late as the 1930's, a slave child could reportedly be purchased in Addis Ababa for about 5 pounds sterling.(25) Slavery was justified by references in portions of the Old Testament and to the lack of a slavery prohibition in the New Testament. Church officials often owned slaves. The early legal code, the "Fetha Nagast", provided for the treatment of slaves and specifically prohibited the enslavement of Christians. Some point to that prohibition as a reason for the Amhara often not trying to convert their Moslem and pagan populations. In addition to large scale slaving operations of the various conquerors, a smaller scale effort has existed into modern times. Kidnappings of vulnerable individuals and raids on towns, tribes THE HORN OF AFRICA and caravans provided a continual source of income and naturally, a continual source of fear, reprisals and hate. Once taken, those slaves that resisted or were a problem were killed.(26) Emperors participated in the taking and using slaves. Each also published proclamations against slavery in order to appease Western (mostly British) sen- sitivities to obtain trade, aid, or other agreements (entry into the League of Nations). Proclamations did not stop the Emperors from slaving campaigns which provided some of the funds needed to purchase modern arms from Europeans.(27) The Italians used slavery as another propaganda justification to support their second invasion of Ethiopia. Haile Selassie abolished slavery in 1942, while the British were in actual control of the country. He later paid lip service to the anti-slavery movement by setting up and sometimes strengthening anti-slavery bureaus.(28) The holding of slaves of other religions and races added to the many forms of discrimination practiced by the population. The history of modern Ethiopia includes the reigns of two strong Emperors, Menelik II and Haile Selassie. Most historians agree that "In its extent, its government and its problems, present-day Ethiopia is largely the creation of Emperor Menelik II."(29) The second strong Emperor, Haile Selassie, ruled the empire for more than half a century. He tried to centralize the government and to modernize the country. These efforts eventually set in motion the forces needed to destroy him and the imperial government of Ethiopia. The actions of both Emperors are important in terms of creating the conflicts of the Horn. Menelik, as king of Shewa, made agreements with Yohannes that gave himself a free hand in the south. He started the pattern of conquest that as Emperor soon doubled the size of Ethiopia (see Map 10). in the south, he made allies out of some conquered Oromo and used them to help conquer other Oromos. He built a new capital at Addis Ababa (New Flower) which was further evidence of the southern shift of the empire. He also used the lands of the south as a Click here to view image THE HORN OF AFRICA means of securing his rule by rewarding his forces with it (using land rights described in Chapter 2). He seized the important Moslem town of Harar when the Egyptians pulled out. Later, he claimed lands bordering the Indian Ocean.(31) The Italians used their previous alliance with Menelik to arrive at the Treaty of Uccialli. Menelik signed the treaty in order to receive more Italian arms and to reduce the Tigrean lands of Yohannes' relatives. The treaty was used to make his new crown more secure and to aid his expansion to the south. The additional southern conquests then provided coffee, gold, ivory and slaves which were sold to obtain more European arms. The treaty gave Eritrea to the Italians and, according to their interpretation of Article 17, made Ethiopia an Italian "protectorate." When Menelik continued to deal with other Europeans, the Italians protested. His position was that the phrase in the Amharic version of the treaty (the only one he signed), was that Ethiopia "may" use the offices of Italy. The Italian version stated that Ethiopia "shall" use those offices. This difference resulted in the battle of Adowa.(32) As the Italians advanced into Ethiopia, they attempted to obtain support from those local rulers that they had dealings with. All of Menelik's leaders except one had been in contact with the Italians as they advanced. The most important of theses, Duke Markonnen, actually apologized to the Italians after his troops had attacked them because the troops had attacked without orders! Markonnen and his forces did join Menelik at Adowa.(33) As the battle unfolded the Italians were severely handicaped. Their army was heavily outnumbered and far from its supply bases. They did not know that Menekik had new French weapons or even how many troops opposed them. They had to attack uphill in rough country using very inaccurate maps. To make matters worse, Menelik's agents had convinced the Italians that many of the Emperor's troops would be away on 1 March for religious reasons. The Italians, extremely confident and perhaps trusting in the "superiority" of Europeans over natives, THE HORN OF AFRICA or even remembering Napier's easy time against Tewodros, attacked on 1 March. All three of their attacking columns were surrounded, the generals in charge of the columns were killed and the entire army routed.(34) Over half of the army was killed and many were captured. What happened to the prisoners is the subject of some disagreement. The Italian Government said later that all of them had been mu- tilated and most of them castrated, but careful examination of the records has indicated that most of the survivors were in good health, and only thirty of the Europeans had been mutilated. The native Eri- trean soldiers fared worse; many of them had a hand and a foot cut off since they were regarded as traitors rather than enemies. Mutil- ation had been a traditional treatment for Ethiopians' prisoners of war--in contrast to the treatment adopted by the British under Kit- chener when, two years later, he reoccupied the Sudan and allowed his prisoners to starve to death. Menelek and his generals, however, had issued stringent orders to abandon the practice of mutilation, and most of the captors obeyed.(35) European armies had suffered losses before, yet this battle was to be a triumph for the natives that wasn't quickly avenged. It is not clear why this battle should have had such a strong effect on the Italians and the rest of the world. While it is true that the Italians were decimated, European armies such as Gordon's in Khartoum or those in the Afgan wars had been beaten more badly. It may have been the improved communications that quickly passed the word of the humiliating defeat to the world that gave it an excessive impact. It may have been the Italian over-reaction that convinced the other Europeans that Ethiopia was now a true power. Or, it may have had something to do with the history of Ethiopia and its legendary past which predisposed the Europeans to accept Ethiopia as one of them. Perhaps all of these factors played a part. The fact that Menelik did not militarily press his advantage after Adowa may have aided this mysterious process. A quick follow up of the victory had the potential to drive the Italians out of Eritrea. But, had he made the at- tempt, Italian public opinion could have been angered enough to put additional forces into the field. With that type of determination, the Ethiopians would have been beaten. Even if he didn't anger the Italians, attack of the Italian THE HORN OF AFRICA held cities was risky. Had the cities repulsed the Ethiopians, as some small forts had already done, the myth and value of supposed Ethiopian invincibility would have evaporated. Once the Ethiopians proved vulnerable, this weakness could have been exploited and again, the Ethiopia would have been defeated. Lastly, in a longer war, the Italians could apply "diplomatic" pressure on Menelik's supporters and bribe away from him. Italians already had contacts with all of them and many had wavered until the day of the battle. After the thrill of victory wore off, they would have been ripe for this type of action. The result of Adowa was that all of a sudden, all of the European powers were beating at the door of the Ethiopians in order to negotiate borders and to give the Ethiopians arms and other aid. Menelik was suddenly on a par with the rulers of Europe and Ethiopia assumed a status that its real strength and power didn't warrant. Menelik played the situation well. He found that he had won the hearts of the common Ethiopians, the modern arms left by the Italians, and the respect of foreign governments. He used these new assets to cement his position, expand his empire, and reduce the power of the local kings. After the battle, Menelik turned his attention to borders. Frontiers were no less urgent a need. Political borders were vague and sometimes meaningless in Africa, where the European idea of sovereignty was strange and where huge spaces, empty and unmapped, separated nomads and tribal centers. The idea of a frontier, of a sort of wateright state that could be shown in a separate color on a map, was not very old in Europe itself, and Europe's innumerable frontier problems were an inheritance from the recent past when it had not mattered whether a province was the fief of a French or of a German ruler. But now frontiers were essential in Europe, and if Ethiopia were to survive as a modern state surrounded by European colonies, it too must have them. The legalistic and often meaningless task of defining the borders was undertaken through interminable negotiations with the governments that controlled neighboring terri- tories--Britain, France, Italy, Egypt. Lines of a sort were drawn, but many of them were unsurveyed and the territories they ran through unexplored.(36) The first to negotiate were the Italians who had just been defeated. In 1896, they signed the Addis Ababa Peace Treaty which surprisingly, gave them a an even larger colony in Eritrea! They renounced the Treaty of Uccialli and THE HORN OF AFRICA paid reparations. The fact that Menelik did not take control over the area is one more factor in Eritrea's claim to a non-Ethiopian history.(37) In 1897 and 1902, Menelik signed treaties with the British which defined borders with British Somaliland and Sudan.(38) He also signed treaties with the Italians in 1897 and 1908 which clearly defined part of the border between Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland. The areas gained by Ethiopia hadn't normally been under Ethiopian control. But, because of Adowa, the Europeans recognized Menelik's claim to them. All of the treaties were purposely vague and subject to varying interpretations (since future negotiations were always accompanied by "payments" to Menelik). Differing treaty interpretations were the basis for the next war between Ethiopia and Italy.(39) In 1906, Menelik suffered a stroke that began his physical deterioration. In 1908, another stroke left him almost totally paralysed. Regional rulers, court factions, and European powers all plotted and schemed with each other as Menenlik's health failed. The Europeans even signed the Tripartite Treaty to define their spheres of influence on the Horn of Africa.(40) Menelik learned of the treaty which divided up the Horn and his empire and issued a statement: We have received the arrangement made by the Three Powers, we thank them for their communication, and their desire to keep and maintain the independence of our Government. But let it be under- stood that this arrangement in no way limits what we consider our sovereign rights.(41) This was a rather tame response for the victor of Adowa and probably reflected his physical deterioration. The strongest power in Ethiopia during the decline of the Emperor was Ras Mikael. Mikael, the duke and later king of Wollo, was a former Moslem who had converted to the Ethiopian Church so that he could join the ruling elite. His career was a long one that included dealings with all the modern Emperors. He fought beside Tewodros in the battle against Napier. He supported Yohannes until Yohannes was killed by the Madhists. Mikael supported Menelik and mar- THE HORN OF AFRICA ried Menelik's daughter. Mikael's son, Lij Yasu, later ruled as an uncrowned Emperor until the future Haile Selassie defeated both the father and son.(42) With Menelik largely paralyzed, the kings began to maneuver to gain the throne. A regent was appointed to run the country until Lij Yasu could take the throne, but the regent also had a stroke and died. The kings reacted by moving armies to Addis Ababa. A sixteen year old Lij Yasu arrived in Addis Ababa and with the support of his father, took control of the government. One his supporters was Ras Tafari, who then became the Governor of Harar.(43) Lij Yasu ruled as an uncrowned Emperor and developed a reputation for both cruelty and perversions which the British consul reported. One report was: . . . But his most considerable crime so far had been committed in April, 1912, in the Danakil desert, whither he had gone with two ostensible purposes--to shoot lion and to bring to heel a number of Danakil tribes which had been raiding Ethiopian settlements. The news of the approach of Yasu and his troops preceded him and the tribesmen disappeared into the fastness of the desert. Thereupon, the prince decided that he would not be cheated of blood and ordered his horsemen to put to the sword the inhabitants of three villages, none of which had any connection with the raiders. About one hun- dred Danakil maidens, who are famed for their looks, were reserved for the attentions of Yasu and his officers before being sold on the slave market, but the rest of the inhabitants of the villages were massacred--3,000 in all. . .(44) Menelik died in 1913, and Lij Yasu's rule continued. The Germans and the Turks became allies of Lij Yasu. The mistake which provided the means to over- throw him (which excesses had not), was conversion to Islam, the old religion of his father. While this helped him gain new support from the Moslem elements of the Horn, it alienated the powerful Christian rulers of the highlands. A coup, led by Ras Tafari, removed Lij Yasu from power. Disagreements after the coup as to a replacement resulted in the Emperor's daughter, Zauditu, being crowned Empress, Duke Tafari being designated regent, and Habte Giorgis, a war minister of Menelik, being left in charge of the army.(45) Duke Tafari was an extremely patient man and carefully strengthened his power as regent from 1916 to 1930. Overcoming opposition from the Empress, he THE HORN OF AFRICA put down several rebellions as others attempted to take control of the country. His power rose to the point where the Empress was forced to make him a king. After the former husband of the Empress rebelled and was defeated, she soon died and Duke Tafari was crowned as Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia.(46) Haile Selassie was a master of diplomacy and the use of all of its tools. After each victory he took pains to make sure that his opponent could not harm him. Duke Mikael, after being defeated, was imprisoned until he died. The Empress lived until the day after Haile Selassie defeated her former husband in a decisive battle. Lij Yasu was also imprisoned, in gold chains as befits a royal heir.(47) Later, when the Italians threatened, the imprisoned Lij Yasu became a potential weapon to be used by them and he died. His death was offi- cially a "natural" death, however, a former slave of Lij Yasu gives this story: . . .but later a second car came and the two occupants waited until dark. They crept up to the cell room. There were holes in the door and His Highness must have seen their guns poking through them for he spat at the peep holes. He could spit well! He gripped the window bars as they shot him. He was a great powerful man and he shook the whole building until I thought it would fall and then I heard him slide to the floor. The two assassins seemed to dance over the body in accordance, I think, with certain witch- crafts before it was carried out at night and sent by train to Addis Ababa.(48) Haile Selassie, as regent, had visited Europe was able to get Ethiopia accepted into the League of Nations. He accepted aid and technical expertise from Europe in order to continue the process of modernization.(49) As Emperor, he issued a constitution, set up a national bank and currency, sent Ethiopians abroad to study, established schools and expanded the use of electricity and the telephone. He continued Menelik's policies of reducing the power of the local kings, centralizing the power of the government and attempting to tie those in his service to him by grants of land, positions and power. He also built up the army and established the Imperial Bodyguard.(50) The expansion of Italian Somaliland (see Map 11) into Ethiopian territory led to a battle at Wal Wal. The Emperor attempted to use the League of Nations Click here to view image THE HORN OF AFRICA to defuse the situation. The Italians used it as a pretext that they had been looking for to avenge their defeat at Adowa by invading Ethiopia. The Italians had already scouted the country and had made agreements with some local rulers to gain their support. They attacked with modern arms, aircraft, and poison gas. In spite of Ethiopian bravery, Italian strength soon proved to be too much. They overran Ethiopia and Haile Selassie fled.(52) Haile Selassie personally addressed the League of Nations. His speech was halted by a number of Italian and pro-Italian newspapermen who created a loud disturbance until they were thrown out. His address included: I, Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia, am here today to claim that justice which is due to my people. . . . I assert that the problem submitted to the Assembly today is a much wider one than the removal of sanctions. It is not merely a set- tlement of Italian aggression. It is collective. It is the very existence of the League of Nations. It is the confidence that each State is to place in international treaties, it is the value of pro- mises made to small States that their integrity and independence be respected and ensured. It is the principle of the equality of states on the one hand or, on the other, the inevitability that they will be forced to accept the bonds of vassalship. In a word, it is interna- tional morality that is at stake. . . .It is us today. It will be you tomorrow.(53) The Italians consolidated their areas on the Horn and renamed them Italian East Africa. They brought in Italian settlers, expanded the road network and made a number of other economic improvements. However, they were faced with continual resistance. The Italian answer was terror: . . . On June 6 it was ordered from Rome that all rebels be immediate- ly executed. Graziani interpreted that instruction in the broadest possible way, to include mass executipn of suspects. No consideration at all was given to the proposition that men fighting in organized troops should be treated, when captured, as prisoners of war. The killers of Magliocco and his companions, who were in fact imperial cadets in uniforms, were apprehended. Three hundred of them--not all 300, obviously, were guilty of the murders--were shot.(54) To celebrate the birth of an heir to the Italian crown, the Italians had 3,000 poor Ethiopians gather to receive a gift of money and refreshments. A grenade attack from the crowd sparked "three hours" of firing by the Italian THE HORN OF AFRICA police and three days of reprisals in the empire. Women and children were machine gunned and left to rot. The Italians began "cleaning up" parts of the city by spraying occupied homes with gasoline and setting them afire.(55) Later, the military ruler of Ethiopia, Graziani, came up with a plan: Graziani evidently formally submitted the program for exter- minating Ethiopian intelligentsia to Rome for approval. And Rome formally approved it, with the provision that it should be carried out in secrecy with as few witnesses as possible. The viceroy specified the classes of people who were to be killed: holders of university degrees and high school diplomas; members of the Young Ethiopia Party; officers and cadets of the imperial military academy. This wholesale readjustment of the mechanism of Ethiopian so- ciety was begun, but the extent to which it was completed is con- jectural. . . . It appears to be true that (considering that the intelligentsia was very small in 1936) that there was literally a lost generation of educated Ethiopians.(56) The effects of the occupation on Ethiopia were deep and long lasting. The Italians instituted many harsh racial separation procedures and made it policy to favor the Moslem Oromo and Somali over the hostile, Christian Amhara. This added to the conflicts that were to rage after the Italians left.(57) While they provided economic improvements to Ethiopia, their attacks on the educated class left few to administer it after the war. This destruction insured that any changes to the feudal system would come slowly as the educated opposition to, or support for the Emperor, would have to be regrown. Reformers would find it more difficult to overcome the more deeply entrenched imperial system. Once Italy joined the war against the Allies, Haile Selassie was aided by Britain. He returned to Sudan to help lead a guerrilla movement in Ethiopia. An eccentric British officer, Orde Wingate, who had gained fame in Palestine as a trainer of the irregular Israeli forces that later became the Israeli Defense Force, led some of the combined forces. Surprisingly successful against the Italians, by May 1941, they had retaken Addis Ababa. The British were hesitant to allow the Emperor to resume power but Wingate helped the Emperor stage a triumphant return to Addis Ababa on 5 May.(58) THE HORN OF AFRICA The British were slow to allow Haile Selassie to independently exercise his control over the country. He was allowed to issue Proclamations concerning the country which were carried out by the British. Without British approval, he began appointing governmental officials which forced the British to support him. He even had the British put down a revolt led by a son of Lij Yasu. By 1942, the Emperor had a signed agreement whereby the British provided financial support and allowed him to fully reestablish his government in most areas of Ethiopia. The notable exceptions to the agreement were the Ogaden and Eritrea which were retained under British control.(59) In order to make contacts with the US and overcome British controls, the Ethiopians used many ruses. Once they used the cover of attending a World Food Conference in the US to obtain aid and their first American advisors. Another time, a secret early morning plane trip was arranged for Haile Selassie to go to Suez and meet Franklin Roosevelt. The British ambassador heard the plane was followed it in the only plane he could find, a biwing. His old plane was lucky to make it across the desert to Suez and he alerted Churchill of the secret. Churchill then met with the Emperor and upon learning that the US had provided jeeps and other vehicles, gave the Emperor a Rolls Royce.(60) Haile Selassie used internal intrigues in order to consolidate his power. He favored those leaders that had gone into exile with him and even those that had aided the Italians over those that had stayed behind to fight because the fighters had too much local power to be trusted. He made it his practice to build up one faction, then another and play them against each other. Whenever anyone became too popular, he would demote or exile him. There were a number of internal crises that had to be overcome and after each success, the Emperor emerged in a slightly stronger position. On the international scene, Haile Selassie traded on his image as an en- lightened absolute ruler. He joined the UN and advanced his claims against the THE HORN OF AFRICA entire the Horn. He courted the US in order to ease Britain out of the picture on the Horn and to build up his army (a vital tool to ensure his control of the country). With US support, he was able to have the UN join Eritrea to Ethiopia in a federal system. He gave the US rights to an important communications and intelligence gathering base called Kagnew Communications Station. He even pro- vided troops to the UN forces fighting in Korea and the Congo.(61) Haile Selassie also became a leader of the African movement as he joined with the leaders of many African countries in openly denouncing South Africa and attempting to set up some sort of regional African organization. This was to result in the OAU which placed its headquarters in Addis Ababa.(62) In December 1960, while Haile Selassie was on one of his many state visits abroad, some elements of the government and the army staged a coup. His son, the Crown Prince, was declared the new ruler and Addis Ababa was secured. The Emperor learned of the coup, organized a counterattack and quickly returned to the country. Loyal army troops attacked and the coup was destroyed. The fact that there was a coup was a sign of the problems that Ethiopia was facing and was a portent of the future. Haile Selassie survived because the coup had not gained the support of the people, the Church, or of most of the army. He met the challenge of the coup by executions and tighter controls which made the old imperial system that much more vulnerable.(63) The coup proved the validity of the Emperor's divide and rule tactics. The Emperor ensured complete separation of the Imperial Body guard and the army by appointing rivals to command and staff each. While the Imperial Bodyguard took part in the coup, the army later crushed them. As long as the army failed to unify, the country's strongest element could not overthrow him.(64) After the coup, the Emperor attempted to coopt many of those that might be sympathetic to the coup by speeding up the moderization process. He directed his attention to the military and more than doubled land grants to military and THE HORN OF AFRICA police officers who supported him. To reduce the power of the landed nobility, he attempted to impose a new form of taxation which would have weakened their power. This was met by hostility and revolt in some areas and was allowed to lapse. Reforms were too much for the conservatives; too little for the growing union, student, and professional groups; and did not get to the heart of the problem, which was the imperial government and its land tenure system. The end result was that reforms were limited by the Emperor so as not to give away too much, were often resisted by conservatives, and turned out to be too little, too late to stop the move towards massive discontent.(65) Ryszard Kapuscinski, a modern Polish writer acceptable to the Soviets, interviewed many of the people that surrounded Haile Selassie before and during the 1974 coup. His book which is as expected, very biased against the Emperor. However, there are some insights into the ruling methods used by Haile Selassie during this time. He tells of the Emperor raising people from the gutter into power so that they would be loyal only to him. He describes the daily rituals of office where the Emperor would: hear the reports of spies and confidants, which were usually directed against each other; listen to and judge problems that people were addressing to him for decision; personally dole out all funds for projects, relief, or rewards; and promote and demote government officials in order to insure his total control over the country.(66) The picture is one of a typically feudal system and surprises some: In fact, the contrast that has existed between the world-wide reputation of Emperor Haile Selassie and the state of affairs within Ethiopia must strike most forcibly any person interested in the country. He was widely regarded as an absolute monarch with semi- divine status. This was far from the case. He always had to con- tend with a number of conflicting power groups--the Church, the central and provincial aristocracy and the army. He kept his pos- ition by balancing these forces and by playing them against each other, at which he was very competent. But the imperial position, in spite of all efforts at centralization, was never really strong enough to ignore them.(67) THE HORN OF AFRICA Haile Selassie was not unaware of the problems in Ethiopia. In fact, just after the coup of 1960, an American advisor, Donald E. Paradis, presented the Emperor with a memo. In it, Paradis argued that the empire was too complex for one man to govern and that the country required land reform and a change in ex- ecutive decision making procedures. He warned that unless power was delegated to those below the Emperor that the educated classes would revolt "against a system which has created obstacles and frustrations at every turn, which has inhibited and prevented progress." This revolt would be "even more horrible" than the 1960 coup. Speaking of forces of history which could only be delayed, he said, "We must either move with them or be overwhelmed by them."(68) G. Mennen Williams, the former governor of Michigan and the Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, visited Ethiopia in early 1961. He agreed that changes had to be made if Haile Selassie was to survive. Those changes were not likely as they "would involve undercutting . . . family . . . friends, and . . . supporters." However, in April 1961, the Emperor made a speech to his ministers outlining changes that delegated authority and responsibility for decisions to that level. This speech cheered the Americans.(69) The American embassy's political officer, Edward Holmes, writing in late 1961, presented an accurate assessment when he noted that Haile Selassie could never change. The Emperor's old system of divide and conquer had already re- turned and there was growing unrest that would explode in revolt. Holmes was only incorrect in predicting that the change was imminent.(70) Haile Selassie stayed in power but his power weakened. The army became aware of its importance and presented demands for higher pay which were granted in 1961 and 1964. A Oromo political movement had to be broken up in 1966. The forced, total union of Eritrea to Ethiopia in 1962, resulted in an increasingly debilitating insurgency.(71) The numbers of educated Ethiopians increased as the annual count of college students exceeded 2000 for the first time in 1967. THE HORN OF AFRICA (72) However, as the newly graduated college students went to work at various levels within the government, their loyalty to the Emperor was strained by con- flicts between the nature of the government and the ideals of their education. As a result, there was more and more student unrest. A Soviet view of the situation on the eve of the 1974 coup was given in 1981: By 1974, Ethiopia found itself with a backward agriculture and very acute social contradictions, and with a number of unsolved eth- nic, religious and other problems. The per capita income (about $80 in 1973) was one of the lowest in Africa. Economic difficulties were primarily d
