The Time For Sea-Basing CSC 1984 SUBJECT AREA Strategic Issues THE TIME FOR SEA-BASING Submitted to The Marine Corps Command and Staff College Quantico, Virginia In Partial Fulfillment of Requirements for Written Communications Major J. M. Eicher United States Marine Corps April 6, 1984 THE TIME FOR SEA-BASING OUTLINE Thesis statement: To have sufficient "punch" during an amphibious operation, Marine air has to be available in strength; but still unanswered is the question of how to get it where it is needed, when it is needed, in all situations. I. Current employment concepts for MAGTF air element A. Sources of air support during amphibious assault B. Reliance on "host" nation support C. Marine air as part of Navy carrier air group II. Sea-basing, an alternative concept A. Shipping required to support an amphibious force B. Dedicated strike carriers/Marine carrier air wings 1. Amphibious TF make-up 2. Available carriers 3. Marine carrier air wing aircraft mix III. Advantages of sea-basing concept A. Eliminate need for "host" nation B. Reduce logistical burden C. Maintain integrity of MAGTF D. CATF maintains control of air element IV. Drawbacks to sea-basing concept A. High cost of SLEP B. Personnel requirements C. Revision of current policies D. Task force vulnerability THE TIME FOR SEA-BASING The first assault waves have gone ashore. The defenders are being attacked in front and in rear by troops landed simultaneously from high- speed air cushion landing craft and from heli- copters. U.S. forces established local air superiority by surprise air strikes on the enemy's airfields hours before. Simultaneous surprise air strikes crippled enemy missile boats and badly damaged heavier warships in their harbors, and we have mined the harbor entrances. Since then, our aircraft have been heavily attacking defenses in the assault area, suffering sur- prisingly light losses from enemy surface-to- air missiles and antiaircraft artillery batteries.1 The forgoing could be a very real example of an intial report from the first waves of a future amphibious assault. The scenario quite graphically depicts the gradual change in philosophy since the Korean War, in that now the Navy, and ultimately the Marine Corps, relies on aviation assets rather than naval guns for the majority of the fire support prior to and during an amphibious assault. This air support is provided primarily by carrier based naval assets, augmented with a small number of Marine VSTOL attack aircraft on amphibious shipping, and any forward deployed Marine air assets. The full spectrum of Marine air cannot be deployed until secure airfields are available in or near the amphibious objective area. This places a heavy reliance on the premise that a friendly "host" nation will be close by to provide air facilities and support for operations. If this support is not available, initial air power will be provided solely by a fixed number of carrier based assets, insufficient in number to provide the combat firepower required by a Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) or a Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) sized operation in a high threat environment. To have sufficient "punch", Marine air has to be available in strength; but still unanswered is the question of how to get it where it is needed, when it is needed, in all situations. The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is a force of combined arms task organized for a specific mission, tailored to exploit the combat power inherent in closely integrated air and ground forces. This combined force may be employed in an amphibious operation or a land campaign.2 In either senario, the MAGTF commander relies heavily on his air combat element, without it mission accomplishment is in jeopardy. Marine Corps doctrine says: Marine Corps aviation will support the landing force throughout an assault landing and subsequent operations. Marine Corps aviation must be prepared to provide this support by operating tactical aircraft squadrons from carriers as part of carrier air groups or from airfields within striking distance of an amphibious objective area. It must be prepared to operate, after rapid establishment ashore, from minimal airfields within the objective area during the assault phase of an amphibious operation.3 This doctrine becomes suspect in two areas: first, once assigned, aircraft belonging to a carrier strike force will perform the mission assigned to the ship by the fleet commander, which may be sea control vice amphibious assault support; and second, forward basing of aircraft requires a friendly, secure airfield, or the building of one in the assault objective area, assuming the terrain allows for such construction. This may lead a strategist to the conclusion that Marine tactical air could lack in some instances the unique quality of the forward deployed Marine ground and helicopter forces during the employment phase of an operation. This fragmentation of the Marine assault system during this crucial phase brings into question the integrity of the Marine Air- Ground Task Force.4 The answer to this dilemma is twofold. Continued diplomatic efforts to increase foreign commitment to shore based alternatives must be pursued. But more import- antly, a previously devised concept for the sea-basing of Marine tactical aviation must be resurrected and actively considered for implementation. This concept was first proposed by Secretary of the Navy John Lehman in March 1981. His proposal was to reactivate the Essex- class carrier Oriskany (CV-34) with an all Marine air wing aboard, consisting primarily of A-4M attack aircraft. This, it was thought, would contribute substantially to a stronger Navy and its ability to support amphibious operations. The Senate Armed Services Committee later rejected the idea because of poor cost estimates and skepticism concerning the contribution of the Oriskany to improve the Navy's offensive capability.5 Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN (RET), points out: We need three capabilities to be ready to defend our interests in the world. First we must be confident of sufficient sea control capabilty to get there and be able to stay there. Second, we need the ability to put forces ashore--to control some of the territory if necessary. Third, we need the abilty to use air power to defend forces that have been inserted and to conduct air strikes. Only the Navy and Marine Corps can do these jobs.6 For the Navy--Marine Corps team to accomplish their mission in the amphibious arena, an increase in the current number of support ships as well as amphibious lift is required. Estimates of the required number of support ships needed for a MAF ranges as high as: 2 cruisers, 15 destroyers/frigates, 24-30 gunfire support ships, and 4-6 carriers (including 2 for mine warfare helicopters).7 The Navy, with its current number of ships would find it difficult to support such an operation. Especially, in light of the fact that up to one-half of its carrier force could be committed to an amphibious scenario. This is unrealistic in view of naval aviation's primary role, that of sea control. The ability to meet any threat to our use of the sea is the core reason for having a Navy, and if a large scale war actually did break out the Navy would be given no other task until this key issue is resolved.8 The Reagan administration's concept of a "600-ship deployable force", and the new ship building and con- version program is a step in the right direction to correct amphibious assault deficiencies. The goals of this program are a fleet composed of 15 carrier battle groups, 100 attack submarines, amphibious lift for the assault echelon of a MAF plus a MAB--some 53,700 troops, and the additional ships necessary to support these main forces.9 This program, as ambitious as it is, still does not provide the necessary platforms from which the tactical air asssets of a MAF or a MAB can provide the required offensive air support to operations ashore. The key to solving this problem lies in Secretary of the Navy Lehman's concept of using Marine assets to form an additional carrier air wing. Taken one step further, the assignment of the majority of the Marine Corps tactical aviation assets to carrier air wings would provide the necessary aircraft complement to form three or more such air wings. These assets could then be assigned to carriers whose main role is to support amphibious operations. Other amphibious shipping would be tasked with these strike carriers to form the amphibious task force(s). This concept expands the old sea-basing concept to include a strike carrier arid will provide the required firepower for the amphibious assault. Likely candidates for these proposed strike carriers include the Essex-class carrier Oriskany(CV-34), which would require reactivation through an extensive overhaul program, the Midway(CV-41), and the Coral Sea(CV-43).10 The latter two carriers are both due for replacement/ deactivation in the late 1980's or early 1990's. The proposed Marine carrier air wings for these carriers would consist primarily of F/A-18 and AV-8B aircraft. For these ships to be able to handle this mix of aircraft they would have to undergo an extensive Ship Life Extension Programme (SLEP).11 But on the other hand, by the early 1990's the Navy would have an 18 ship carrier force better able to accomplish its two military roles, that of sea control and power projection. Sea-basing offers the operational planners a far greater flexibility in their use and deployment of MAGTF assets. It eliminates the reliance on a "host" nation near the theatre of operations to provide a secure base from which to operate. The personnel, equipment, supplies, and facilities needed at such a base may be so extensive, depending on the size of the deploying force, that requirements may have to be severly limited because of constraints at the available advance base. Additionally, with the size of the carrier, space would be available for the embarkation of aviation control units or other major elements of the avaition component, which would ease greatly the transportation burden of the amphibious task force. The requirement to place millions of dollars in parts, support, and test equipment in maritime prepositioning ships would also be reduced or virtually elimated, thus freeing up space there to be utilized for other ground assets.12 Paramount, though, in the strategic planners' flexibility is that they can now position the required amphibious force in total where they need it to accomphish the assigned mission. This new concept provided for the strike carrier, with Marine assets on board, to be an integral element of the amphibious task force, and as such would come under the control of the Amphibious Task Force Commander (CATF). This would solve the critical problem of ensuring that Marine air, although on Navy shipping, would be embarked for the main purpose of supporting the amphibious operations of the task force. It would also rest the control of all TACAIR assets with the CATF from the outset of the assault, which would allow for its effective employment in response to the MAGTF commander's require- ments. This answers the main shortcoming of having Marine air assets attached to Navy carrier air groups where they are required to perform missions assigned by the fleet commander in fulfilling his role of securing the sea lanes. The main advantage of the sea-basing concept is quite simply the ability to assemble and employ the complete air element of an integrated air-ground team when- ever and wherever it is required. The aviation combat element of a MAGTF is normally organized to provide offensive air support, antiair warfare, and assault support. With the assets that would be aqvailable with this concept the commander would be able to realize the full potential and effectiveness of his air and permit it to become fully integrated, responsive, and decisive within the scheme of maneuver and accomplishment of the asigned mission. This sea-basing concept is not without its draw- backs. The costs associated with extending the life of two aircraft carriers and reactivating another, as well as providing the ships companies for these carriers, would be extensive. Each ship would require approximately 120 officers and 2,100 enlisted men. This would definitely put a strain on the limited number of personnel in our volunteer forces. The sea-basing concept would require a turnaround on a Marine Corps and State Department mind-set with reguard to forward deployed shore-basing. All contingency plans and forward deployed assets, already prepositioned throughout the world, would have to be revised and repositioned to reflect the new needs integral to the sea-basing concept. It could be argued that the main disadvantage of this concept of deploying all Marine air on strike carriers would be their vulnerability to hostile forces and the costs in dollars and assets that it would require to protect them, as depicted in figure 1.13 This problem could be countered with deliberate planning and actions, such as including ASW assets in the aircraft mix and other defensive systems to handle both surface and Click here to view image air threats to the task force. The sea-basing concept is an idea, although not new, who's time has come. The U.S. military can no longer evade the question of how it will ensure its entire complement of assets integral to an amphibious task force will arrive in the theatre of operations in an expeditious and timely manner. Sea-basing answers the question of how we can comply with the recently published NAVMC 2710, which in its sommary states: --MAGTFs are task organized for rapid deployment as a part of the Navy/Marine Corps team. --With timely intelligence and early deaployment a MAGTF can: 1. Proceed to crises areas without revealing exact destination. 2. Provide continuous presence in international waters. 3. Remain independent of established ports and airfields. 4. Project selected degrees of combat power ashore. 5. Quickly build in size. 6. Supports itself once ashore. 7. Avoid necessity to negotiate staging or base rights, rent, or positioning of supplies. 8. Be rapidly wihdrawn after operations, while providing NCA with positive control over level and duration of commitment.14 At the national level, without a truly viable force capable of assuming the power projection role, when needed throughout every corner of the world, policy and world influence become impotent. At the force level, MAGTFs are formed as an integrated air-ground team, without each team member present during the assault its real combat power becomes suspect and accomplishment of its mission may be in doubt. Sea-basing offers an alternative to present day shore-basing concepts. It provides a viable means of ensuring that the needed air assets are where they are needed in order to influence the battle and continually operate without relying on external support until an airfield can be established within the amphibious objective area. This concept offers the opportunity to achieve improved readiness and flexibility for both our carrier and amphibious forces. It enables us to establish criteria which will povide a force capable of supporting our national strategy. These are: --To maintain our flexibility while confronting strategic and economic uncertainty. --To integrate and correlate our existing forces where possible, to stretch their operating capability. --To be prepared to continue with a fleet of fewer than 600 ships. We need to maintain the offensive capability inherent in our forces; we must be able to take the fight to the enemy. A new method of deploying our forces, in particular our air assets, must be considered: one which permits us to concentrate superior power at the point of confrontation so that the battle can be fought on our terms. "The Time For Sea-Basing" is here! FOOTNOTES 1CDR Todd Blades, USN(RET), "Needed--Heavy Firepower", Proceedings, 105/7/917 (July 1979), p.51. 2MCDEC, USMC, Tasking USMC Fixed Wing Tactical Aviation, OH 5-3, (Quantico, 1982), p.1-1. 3MCDEC, USMC, Marine Aviation, FMFM 5-1, (Quantico, 1979). 4CAPT William Sullivan, USN, "Now is the Time to: Rethink, Redesign, and Redeploy Naval Aviation" Naval War College Review, 35 (March-April, 1982), p.12. 5CAPT Jeremy Taylor, USN, "A Blue-Green Opportunity: Carrier-Based Marine Air Wings". Proceedings, 107/7/941 (July 1981), p.40. 6ADM Stansfield Turner, USN(RET, "Thinking About the Future of the Navy", Proceedings, 106/8/930 (August 1980), p.68. 7LCDR Carl Douglas, USN, "Amphibious Deficiencies-- The Navy's 'Ostrich Acts'" Marine Corps Gazette, 64 (September 1980), p.43. 8ADM Stansfield Turner, USN(RET), "Thinking About the Future of the Navy", Proceedings, 106/8/930 (August 1980), p.66. 9CDR John Alden, USN(RET), "Tomorrow's Fleet", Proceedings, 109/1/959 (January 1983), p.109. 10CAPT William Sullivan, USN, "Now is the Time to: Rethink, Redesign, and Redeploy Naval Aviation", Naval War College Review, 35 (March-April 1982), p.12. 11John Taylor, ed., Jane's--All the World's Aircraft, 1980-1981, (London: Publishing Co. Ltd., 1981),p610. 12CAPT Jeremy Taylor, USN, "A Blue-Green Opportunity: Carrier-Based Marine Air Wings", Proceedings, 107/7/941 (July 1981), p.43. 13Walter Pincus, "Our Carrier Armadas Could Sink the Budget" The Washington Post, March 25, 1984, Section C, p.1. 14HQMC, USMC, Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF), NAVMC 2710, (Washington D.C., n.d.). BIBLIOGRAPHY Alden, John D., CDR USN (RET). "Tomorrow's Fleet". Proceedings, 109/1/959 (January 1983), 109-121. Blades, Todd, CDR USNRET). "Needed--Heavy Firepower". Proceedings, 105/7/917 (July 1979), 50-54. Cordier, Sherwood. "Command of the Air at Sea: V/STOL and Small Carriers". Naval War College Review, XXXIV (July-August 1981), 93-104. Douglas, Carl, LCDR USN. "Amphibious Deficiencies--The Navy's "Ostrich Acts'". Marine Corps Gazette, 64 (September 1980), 39-48. O'Rounke, Gerald, CAPT USN(RET). "CVNs Forever! Forever?" Proceedings, 108/7/953 (July 1982), 20-26. Pincus, Walter. "Our Carrier Armadas Could Sink the Budget", The Wahington Post, March 25, 1984, Section C., p.1. Sullivan, William, CAPT USN. "Now is the Time to: Rethink, Redesign, and Redeploy Naval Aviation". Naval War College Review, 35 (March-April 1982), 10-17. Taylor, Jeremy D., CAPT USN. "A Blue-Green Opportunity: Carrier-Based Marine Air Wings". Proceedings, 107/7/941 (July 1981), 40-43. Taylor, John, ed. Janes--All the World's Aircraft, 1980- 1981. London: Publishing Co. Ltd., 1981. Turner, Stansfield, ADM USN(RET). "Thinking About the Future of the Navy". Proceedings, 106/8/930 (August 1980), 66-69. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Marine Aviation, FMFM 5-1. Quantico, 1979. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Tasking USMC Fixed Wing Tactical Aviation, OH 5-3. Quantico, 1982. U.S. Marine Corps. Plans, Policies, and Operations, HQMC. Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF), NAVMC 2710. Washington D.C., (n.d.)
