Employment Of The AH-1T (Tow) Against The ZSU-23-4 CSC 1984 SUBJECT AREA Strategic Issues EMPLOYMENT OF THE AH-1T(TOW) AGAINST THE ZSU-23-4 Submitted to Dr. Berens In Partial Fulfillment of Requirements for Written Communication The Marine Corps Command and Staff College Quantico, Virginia Major S. J. Cobain, Jr. United States Marine Corps April 6, 1984 EMPLOYMENT OF THE AH-1T(TOW) AGAINST THE ZSU-23-4 Outline Thesis Sentence: The AH-1T(TOW) is well suited to counter the ZSU-23-4 on the modern battlefield. I. Introduction A. 1973 introduction to ZSU-23-4 B. Come as you are C. Concerns about ZSU-23-4 II. The ZSU-23-4 A. Soviet air defense system B. The Soviet motorized rifle regiment C. Capabilities of ZSU-23-4 III. Countering the ZSU-23-4 A. Limitations of ZSU-23-4 B. TOW employment considerations 1. Tactics 2. Observation 3. Weapons 4. Limitations C. Supporting arms IV. Survivability A. Aircraft B. Equipment C. Training V. Conclusion A. Increased Soviet concern B. Other threats C. Common sense approach EMPLOYMENT OF THE AH-1T(TOW) AGAINST THE ZSU-23-4 "What can be seen can be hit." For attack helicopter pilots these words suddenly had real meaning in 1973. The event that gave meaning to these words was the 1973 Mid-East War; the weapon was the ZSU-23-4. During that conflict, nearly one-half of all the aircraft that the Israeli forces lost were to the ZSU-23-4.1 The significance of that accomplishment was not lost on the attack helicopter com- munity. No single event has had such a profound effect on the tactics of the AH-1. The ZSU-23-4 is the backbone of a Soviet maneuver echelon's formidable air defense system. Although it first appeared in the mid-sixties, it was not until the 1973 Mid-East War that the ZSU's capabilities became widely known and appreciated. It immediately became apparent that the ZSU-23-4 was a deadly threat to any low flying helicopter that came within its sight and range. This disconcerting development quickly became a source of concern to attack- helicopter pilots who had previously enjoyed a relatively free rein during the Vietnam conflict. As a result of that concern, radical changes in tactics and increased emphasis on survivability equipment evolved. What are the significant developments of the last ten years that will enhance attack helicopter survivability against the ZSU-23-4? The Soviet Union has approximately 3,000 ZSU's in active divisions, while the U.S. Marine Corps has only forty-three AH-1T's. The numerical odds are not good, and they get much worse when the other weapons of the Soviet's tactical air defense system that compliment the ZSU are considered, which include, the SA-6, SA-7, SA-8, and SA-9 surface-to-air missiles (SAM). In a "come as your are war," the Marines will be further limited; only a portion of the Marine Corps AH-1T (Cobra) assets will be on hand. Today, a typical Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) has four to six attack helo's. A Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) could be expected to have from twelve to twenty-four. In order to gain an accurate perspective, an exami- nation of the Soviet tactical air defense system is appropriate. The lowest echelon of Soviet tactical air defense is organic to the infantry or tank company, which employs the shoulder launched infrared (IR) homing SA-7. A motorized rifle division has a total of over 100 SA-7's, which have a range of five to six kilometers. The next higher echelon of Soviet air defense is the air defense battery, organic to the motorized rifle regiment. This battery is equipped with the ZSU-23-4 23-mm gun and the SA-9. Each air defense battery has a platoon of four ZSU-23-4's and a platoon of four SA-9's, giving a motorized rifle division a total of sixteen ZSU-23-4's and sixteen SA-9's.2 The SA-9 has four infrared homing missiles mounted on a BRDM-2 amphibious vehicle. The BRDM-2 is a wheeled, light- armored vehicle that provides the SA-9 good mobility. The SA-9 is an improved version of the SA-7 with a range extended to approximately eight kilometers. The SA-9, an area defense weapon, is deployed between the first and second assault echelons of the regiment to provide protection for both echelons while avoiding exposure to direct enemy fire. The ZSU is a self-propelled, four-barrel, automatic, 23-mm antiaircraft gun mounted on an ASU-85 chassis. It has the capability to fire at a cyclic rate of 4,000 rounds per minute, although short bursts are normally used to reduce ammunition expenditure. The ZSU-23-4 is equipped with an onboard fire control, "Gun Dish" radar that provides the gun with a maximum effective range of 3,000 meters. With less effective optical tracking, a range of only 2,500 meters can be achieved. The ZSU is normally employed in the Forward echelon's formations. Click here to view image The motorized rifle division also has an organic air defense regiment which is equipped with either the SA-6 or the SA-8. The division has a total of 20 SA-6 transporter- erector-launchers (TEL's) which have three missiles per TEL, or 20 SA-8 TEL's each carrying four missiles. The TEL's provide excellent mobility for their sophisticated surface- to-air missile systems. These systems provide extended area coverage, out to 30 kilometers for the SA-6 and out to 10-15 kilometers for the SA-8. The Soviet tactical air defense weapons make up a protective umbrella that is unequalled; there is little dispute in this matter. The system is highly mobile and the missiles can be expected to work as intended by intercepting low and medium altitude aircraft that attempt to penetrate Soviet formations. Why then should the attack helicopter community be primarily concerned about the ZSU-23-4 and virtually exclude the surface-to-air missiles as a threat to conducting the anti-armor role? SAM's, especially the SA-6 and SA-8, were designed to have maximum effectiveness against targets that fly faster and higher than helicopters. Certainly a helicopter could be shot down by an SA-6 or SA-8, but only if the helicopter is flown with disregard to tactics and common sense. We know that an SA-6 is only marginally effective against any aircraft below 300 feet.3 A helicopter flying in accord- ance with its doctrine, maintaining 200 feet or less and utilizing terrain masking, (cover and concealment for heli- copters) to the maximum extent possible, will be out of the engagement envelope of the SA-6. The SA-8, which also acquires and tracks aircraft with radar, is also not in- tended to engage low flying helicopters. The AH-1T(TOW), employing nap-of-the-earth (NOE) tactics as it approaches Soviet formations, will be well below the threat from the SA-8 or the SA-6. The SA-7 and the improved SA-9 are a threat to heli- copters, but these missiles have several shortcomings that reduce their effectiveness against the Cobra. The Soviets, in their literature, indicate that they have faith in the ability of the SA-7 to bring down low-flying helicopters.4 However, their optimism seems to stem from experience in 1972 during the Vietnam conflict, where SA-7's were employed against helicopters that were not flying NOE (while flying NOE, a helicopter maintains 50 feet or less as it follows the contours of the terrain). According to western sources, though, three SA-7's were required for each aircraft downed.5 It would not be unusual for the Soviets to launch several SA-7's at one target. A Soviet Lieutenant General put it this way: "When the probability of destorying a helicopter with just one missile is very small, a subunit, according to the situation, can launch several missiles simultaneously, without waiting for the results of the first launch."6 The SA-7 and SA-9 home on the infrared signature of an aircraft, not necessarily the aircraft itself. This provides the helicopter with several countermeasure options. Again, the engagement envelope, with a minimum altitude of about 50 feet, can be underflown and destruction avoided by employing NOE tactics. Additional measures that can be taken to defeat an IR missile are employment of the ALQ-39 flare dispenser, which releases flares to decoy missiles and the ALQ-144 infrared jammer, which transmits modulated IR signals to confuse an IR missile and cause it to seek fasle IR sources rather than the helicopter. Low infrared paint and exhaust heat suppressors are passive measures which also reduce the effectiveness of IR homing missiles. According to the "Aircraft Survivability Equipment Special Issue" of Army Aviation, test results indicate that when both passive and active infrared countermeasures are employed, ground launched infrared heat-seeking missiles are simply not effective.7 Having considered the spectrum of dedicated Soviet tactical air defense systems, it should be apparent that the ZSU-23-4 is the most likely threat to the AH-1T(TOW)'s capability to conduct its anti-armor mission. This is because the ZSU has a lethal gun, mounted on a highly mobile vehicle, that can use its "Gun Dish" radar to acquire and track low-flying helicopters and to direct highly accurate fire. It is also the only air defense weapon that can acquire and track a target optically when necessary. It does not rely exclusively on electronics, which are subject to countermeasures. Any exposed helicopter is likely to lose a head to head gun dual with a ZSU. However, knowing the limitations of the ZSU and considering them along with the capabilities of the AH-1(TOW), there are some employment options that will make it an excellent counter threat to the ZSU-23-4. Surprisingly, one of the most important limitations of the ZSU is that, actually, there are not very many of them. Contrary to initial impression, considering the forces that a flight of four AH-1T's in direct support of a regiment and assigned to support a battalion front could expect to face, the odds against ZSU's are fairly even. A Soviet motorized rifle regiment (MRR) has only four organic ZSU-23-4's. Even if the division augmented its front line regiment with additional ZSU's, it is unlikely that the division would give up many of its 12 additional ZSU's, which are needed to protect a large front and rear area. The four ZSU's of the MRR are heavily committed providing protection to the 146 armored vehicles organic to the regiment.8 Although the radar system of the ZSU is an asset, as was previously mentioned, it also has liabilities. The "Gun Dish" radar is an excellent narrow beam radar that works well against aircraft at 300 feet out to a range of ten to fifteen kilometers. However, it has difficulty detecting low-flying helicopters in hilly or mountainous terrain because of "ground clutter" which interferes with the signal being reflected back to the radar. One article mentions that helicopters, flying at low altitudes "can appear in the area of the target completely undetected."19 The limited ability of the Gun Dish radar to detect AH-1T(TOW)'s employing NOE tactics is substantiated by operational squadrons. Flying against radars comparable to the "Gun Dish" during the Electronic Warfare Close Air Support (EW CAS) exercise and during Red Flag Exercises, at Nellis Air Force Base, AH-1T(TOW)'s have been able to con- sistently position themselves within striking range of air defense weapons simulating Soviet systems and destroy their targets before being detected.10 It is important to note that this was accomplished after intelligence information was evaluated by the pilots and a well conceived plan was executed in terrain that favored terrain masking and NOE tactics. But, it does demonstrate that a Cobra can operate in this environment. Another drawback of the ZSU's radar is that during operation it radiates energy, making it susceptible to detection and giving away the position of the unit it is attempting to protect. The AH-1T(TOW) employs the AN/APR-39 radar warning receiver to notify the pilot when he is nearing the vicinity of a radar and indicate the direciton of the "target". An operating radar is also a magnet to anti-radiation missiles (ARM) that home on the radar's antenna. The SideARM, a modified AIM-9 missile, is designed to home on the Gun Dish radar. The Soviets are well aware of these electronic warfare capabilities of the AH-1T(TOW) as well as other counter- measures that can be employed against them. As a result, the ZSU can be expected to keep its radar off to avoid detection until it is absolutely necessary to engage a target. As with any radar, the Gun Dish radar is a "soft" target, making it susceptible to artillery or rocket fragments. A ZSU that has elected to maintain "radar silence" or that has had its radar destroyed has a significantly degraded capability to acquire and hit an aerial target, because it must conduct its fire mission manually, utilizing optical sighting. As previously cited the range of the ZSU-23-4 employed in the optical mode is 2500 meters, 500 meters less than the radar aided range of 3000 meters. More significantly though, the reaction time required to put accurate fire on target is significantly increased. A Soviet article describes the procedures for engaging a target in the optical mode in the following manner. First, the target must be visually acquired, then the command given: target on the left, helicopter. Range 2000 meters, Destroy! "...the operator must lay the tubes in the direction of the target by turning the handle of the control panel, shift the sight lever to the "double position",align the open sight with the axis of the bore, set the distance grid with the indicated range, bring it up under the target, and finally, press the button on the control lever to fire a short burst.11 In this example, the target was missed during the first burst of fire. A second long burst destroyed the target. The length of time required to complete the operation previously described will depend on gunner proficiency and training, but a Soviet article in 1979 stated that in a timed test of ZSU's engaging targets without radar "the majority of the crews were lost, much time was wasted finding targets, refining and using the fire data. The result of this is that gun crews opened fire, as a rule, minutes after the helicopters appeared."12 The best trained crew and most experienced in the test took 32 seconds. The time required by the ZSU-23-4 to engage targets in the optical mode is a significant consideration. The difficulty that the crew members of the ZSU had in acquiring helicopter targets is also important to note. These two weaknesses can be exploited by a Cobra and its advantageous characteristics can be brought into play. The AH-1T(TOW)'s ability to maneuver rapidly on the battlefield allows it to employ its weapons and quickly move to alternate firing positions. The flexibility of the AH-1T combined with its small size and narrow silhouette make it very difficult to detect when it is using NOE tactics, even when it has its target in view and is engaging. The U.S. Army has conducted scientific analysis of the effectiveness and survivability of attack helicopters. A test conducted in 1976 consisted of trials using ten ground observers with an unobstructed line of sight to attack helicopters at a range of 3000 meters. The attack helicopter would appear for 60 seconds each time, and observers would attempt to detect the attack helicopter during this interval. In the majority of the trials, the Cobra was not detected within the constraint of 60 seconds.13 A well trained AH-1T(TOW) crew should be able to deliver a TOW missile well within 60 seconds. The FAIRPASS HELO computer simulation model used to assess attrition of attack helicopters by ZSU-23-4's, uses the following representative times in the performance of the attack function:14 Click here to view image These times, however, assume optimum performance. The variable in these times is "gunner reaction" which involves acquiring the target, sighting the target, and aligning the aircraft with the target. This could increase the actual gunner response time by ten to fifteen seconds or more, depending on the situation and the proficiency of the gunner. The attack helicopter crew should still be able to deliver the TOW missile in well under one minute. A common sense rule used by AH-1T(TOW) pilots in tactical squadrons is: If a target has not been acquired and engaged within 20 seconds, remask and move to another firing position and attempt to reengage. Other findings of the Army's observation trials can be exploited by attack helicopter pilots. Dealing in proba- bilities of detection the trials found that: 1. Lateral maneuver or movement increased the probability of detection from .30 to .64 2. Wide lateral separation (over 500 meters) between the aircraft of a section decreased the probability of detection from .55 to .44 for observing either aircraft and from .28 to .03 for observing both aircraft. 3. When the scan sector of the observer is expanded from 60 degrees to 120 degrees the probability of detection for either aircraft of a section goes from .42 to .33 and from .19 to .09 for both aircraft. 4. Terrain background decreased the probability of detecting either aircraft from .68 to .44 and from .19 to .11 for both aircraft. The lessons learned are: (1) avoid lateral movement while exposed, (2) maintain terrain background, (3) after remasking, remain masked for 60 seconds prior to unmasking, (4) maintain good separation between aircraft in a section and (5) maintain maximum range from observers, up to maximum engagement range.15 Another test, conducted by the U.S. Army Combat Developments Experimentation Command, determined that it takes, on the average, 45.2 seconds to detect an attack helicopter that is utilizing nap-of-the-earth tactics. In all these experiments, it is important to remember that the observers were not "buttoned up" in armored vehicles, there were no artillery rounds exploding, and there was no smoke or dust to obscure vision. The ZSU itself does not provide good visibility, and depends on its radar to locate targets. If it appears that too much emphasis is being placed on observation, then it should be pointed out that the Soviets are also very concerned about detecting attack helicopters. The U.S. Army Russian Institute indicates that Soviet authors have pointed out in several articles the difficulty their air defense forces have in locating helicopters flying nap-of-the-earth in sufficient time to take them under fire.17 Up to this time the TOW missile has been the weapon traditionally considered for employment against the ZSU-23-4. It is a very accurate weapon and its maximum range of 3750 meters gives it a good stand-off capability. However, its main drawback is that the Cobra is exposed during the entire time of flight. As mentioned previously, the 14.5 seconds time of flight results in an exposure time of 26 to 40 seconds. At 3750 meters the time of flight is a full 21 seconds, resulting in exposure for up to one minute. This is a long time to be exposed, even if attack heli- copters are difficult to detect. A new munition is now becoming available to Marine aviation, the 20mm SABOT discarding, heavy metal sub-caliber penetrator round. Its aerodynamic characteristics and velocity give the AH-1T(TOW)'s 20mm cannon the increased range and the punch to kill a ZSU-23-4. This round, because of its flat trajectory and high velocity should allow the AH-1T(TOW) to engage light armored targets, such as the ZSU, out to 3000 meters. This is a significant improvement over the 1500 meter range of the standard 20mm round. Because the ZSU is lightly armored, having a maximum of 9.2mm (just over one-third inch) of armor protection, it is susceptible to the new SABOT round. This improved munition, coupled with the Helmet Sight Subsystem (HSS) of the AH-1T(TOW), will provide attack helicopters the capability to respond very rapidly to targets as they are acquired. The following table depicts the penetration capabilities of the 20mm SABOT round:19 Click here to view image The HSS system electronically aligns the 20mm cannon with the helmet. The helmets of both the pilot and gunner have a small sight mounted on them. When the gunner looks through his sight at a target, the gun is also sighted on the target. To engage, the gunner need only keep his "eye" on target and pull the trigger. With a time of flight to 3000 meters of under four seconds, and the HSS's capability to engage a target with a quick turn of the head, exposure times can be reduced from the 26 to 40 seconds required for TOW to ten seconds or less with the gun. When avoiding detection while killing targets is the name of the game, the SABOT round gives the AH-1T a whole new option. As with any weapons system, the AH-1T(TOW) is not without limitations and vulnerabilities. Regardless of the weapons system, to effectively employ the AH-1T(TOW) and still survive, these factors must be considered: (1) The attack helicopter pilot's need for current and accurate intelligence cannot be over-emphasized. Success depends on knowing the "situation". However, the intelli- gence that is required does not necessarily need to come solely from the S-2 prior to launch. Information on the situation may be provided by the Forward Air Controller or ground commander. The TOW team leader may also provide information to his flight, or the attack helicopter pilot, by conducting a reconnaissance, can obtain current infor- mation for himself. The point is, on a highly mobile battlefield, the weapons system that can locate and fix the enemy first will, more often than not, be the winner. With its thirteen power optical sight, the AH-1T(TOW) is especially suited to reconnoitering the battlefield to collect information, especially if the Cobra's superior mobility and flexibility are used to the maximum advantage. (2) To effectively employ NOE tactics, the terrain must have some relief. Relief provides the masking that the AH-1T(TOW) requires to maneuver within range of its target undetected. (3) The AH-1T(TOW) must not get so involved in killing the ZSU that it fails to protect itself from its biggest threat, enemy infantry. The AH-1T(TOW) has virtually no protection from enemy fire. If it can be hit, it can be destroyed. As was mentioned previously, the attack helicopter is exposed for extended periods while firing the TOW missile and should receive protection during these vulnerable periods. The protection can be provided by friendly infantry, artillery, suppressive fire, or escorting attack helicopters. There are several actions that can be taken and con- siderations that can be made to overcome the weaknesses of the attack helicopter. The aircraft can be made more survivable with improved engines. More powerful engines will allow the cobra to carry more ordnance to the battlefield, and they will provide systems redundancy in the event one engine takes fire. The dual engined AH-1T(TOW) would be able to return to base on a single "more powerful" engine. There is a need for more protective armor on the aircraft and for improved component parts that can withstand small arms impacts. For example, hardened flight control tubes are now in development and need to be incorporated in attack helicopters. Although the AH-1T(TOW) provides a solid foundation as an attack helicopter, new equipment and systems to complement its capabilities are still needed. The main concerns now are for an accurate Doplar navigation system to relieve pilots of constant, detailed map reading require- ments. And, to reduce pilot workload, a "cleaned-up" cockpit that has guages that are easy to read and controls that are easy to reach is needed. These improvements would allow pilots to concentrate on their mission. Finally, a Forward Looking Infrared imaging system is required to give the Cobra a night anti-tank capability. The key to success, though, is training -- training to know the threat, to know the aircraft, its capabilities and limitations, and to know employment tactics. Training is needed to familiarize the pilot with the increasingly sophisticated equipment being incorporated into the Cobra. And most of all, training is needed so that pilots will "get smart," and go beyond the mechanics of maneuvering the aircraft, to improve their instincts, enabling themselves to employ the Cobra to its maximum capabilities. Pilots will need to be prepared to face an ever growing threat. As the capabilities of the attack heli- copter have increased, there has been a corresponding increase in Soviet concern. Improvement is a double edged sword. As the AH-1 becomes a better weapon, it also becomes a higher priority threat to the Soviets. The Soviets become more aware of shortcomings in their tactical systems and they are forced to expend resources in order to overcome deficiencies. Because of their concern, the enemy has taken greater steps to defeat the Cobra threat. Today, the attack helicopter is one of the most prized targets on the battle- field because of its anti-tank capabilities. A Soviet gunner, when simultaneously confronted with a fixed wing target and an attack helicopter target, is trained to fire at the attack helicopter first. The Soviets stress that all weapons are to engage attack helicopters whenever possible. Small arms, machine- guns, tanks, and artillery are trained to mass their fires. The Soviets also train their own MI-24 attack helicopter pilots to engage and destroy Cobras. Destruction of attack helicopters has actually become a primary mission for the MI-24 Hind. Certainly follow-on Soviet attack helicopters will be designed with enhanced capabilities to engage their Western counterparts. Obviously the Cobra is not invulnerable. In order to survive, it must exploit its capabilities to the maximum extent possible. However, the Cobra attack, coordinated with artillery and tactical air, can overwhelm the Soviets' air defense system and take advantage of the resulting synergistic effect. The more diverse the attack, the more difficult it will be for the air defense system to counter it. The AH-1T(TOW), employing its tactics as part of a well organized attack, coordinated with other supporting arms, has the firepower and survivability that are suited to counting the ZSU-23-4 threat. And, if the going gets tough, good Marine Cobra pilots will remember to "stay low and keep moving." Footnotes 1Michael L. Brittingham, Attack Helicopter Employment Options, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, June 11, 1980, p. 27. 2Michael H. Crutcher, Soviet Tactical Air Defense, Defense Intelligence Report DDB-1140-6-8, December 1, 1979, p. 4. 3Daniel Bauer, "Tank Killer," Armor, May-June 1977, p. 9. 4Brian P. Mullody, Soviet Air Defenses Against Attack Helicopters, U.S. Army Russian Institute, June 1980, p. 10. 5Ibid., p. 10. 6Gatsoloyen, "Kogda v Vozdukhe Vertolety, Voyennyy Vestnik, p. 112, as quoted in Mullady, p. 11. 7"Aircraft Survivability Equipment Special Issue," Army Aviation, June 30, 1978, p. 53. 8Mullady, p. 10. 9Ibid., p. 15. 10"AH-1T(TOW) Suppression of AAA and SAM Threats," Point Paper, Marine Attack Helicopter Squadron 169, November 9, 1983. 11Senior Sergeant A. Zakharov, "Tsel 'Na Nizkoy Visote", Znamenosets, No. 1 (1978); p.11, as quoted in Mullady, p. 16 12Colonel S. Bulyzhkin, "Batareya v Nastupienii", Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 2 (1979); p. 66, as quoted in Mullady, p. 16. 13Rudolph J. Pabon, Robert A. Davison, William I. Parks, Technical Report TR 2-76, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, February, 1976, p. iii. 14J. L. Freeh, Fire Support Against Massed Armor and Fire Support at Night, Institute for Defense Analysis, August 1974, p. 42. 15Ibid., p. 61. 16Helicopter Relative Detectability Test, Joint- Countering Attack Helicopter (J-Catch) Phase V and VI, March 1980. 17John B. Woods, Soviet Perceptions of NATO's Anti- tank Defense, U.S. Army Russian Institute, 1981, p. 14. 18Marino S. Melsted, SABOT Projectile Test and Evaluation, Gun System Branch, Naval Weapons Center, October 27, 1980, p. 9. Bibliography "Aircraft Survivability Equipment Special Issue." Army Aviation, June 30, 1978. Bauer, Major Daniel R. "Tank Killer." Armor, May-June 1977, pp. 8-10. Blewitt, Stephen J. Investigation of Helicopter Visual Detection. Boeing Vertol Company. Philadelphia, 1974. Brittingham, Major Michael L., Attack Helicopter Employment Options. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Fort Leavenworth, 1980. Bulyzhkin, Colonel S. "Batareya v Nastuplenii." Voyennyy Vestnik, 2 (1977), as quoted in Major Brian T. Mullady, Soviet Air Defense Against Attack Helicopters. U.S. Army Russian Institute. APO New York, 1980. Crutcher, Major Michael H. Soviet Tactical Air Defense. Defense Intelligence Agency Report DDB-1140-6-80, December 1, 1979. Freeh, J. L. Fire Support Against Massed Armor and Fire Support at Night. Institute for Defense Analysis, August 1974. Gatsolayev. "Kogda v Vozdukhe Vertolety." Voyennyy Vestnik, as quoted in Major Brian T. Mullady, Soviet Air Defense Against Attack Helicopters, U.S. Army Russian Institute. APO New York, 1980. Melsted, Marino S. Sabot Projectile Test and Evaluation. Gun System Branch, Naval Weapons Center. China Lake, 1980. Mullady, Major Brian P. Soviet Air Defenses Against Attack Helicopters. U.S. Army Russian Institute, APO New York, 1980. Pabon, Rudolph J., Robert A. Divison and William T. Parks. Technical Report TR 2-76. U.S. Army Combined Arms Center. Fort Leavenworth, 1976. U.S. Army. U.S. Army Combat Developments Experimentation Command. Helicopter Relative Detectability Test, Joint-Countering Attack Helicopter (J-Catch) Phases V and VI. Fort Ord, 1980. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Attack Helicopter Squadron 169. Point Paper. AH-1T(TOW) Suppression of AAA and SAM Threats. Camp Pendleton November, 1983. Woods, John B. Soviet Perceptions of NATO's Anti-Tank Defense. U.S. Army Russian Institute, APO New York, 1981. Zakharov, Senior Sergeant A. "Tsel 'Na Nizkoy Visote." Znamenosets. (1978). As quoted in Major Brian T. Mullady, Soviet Air Defense Against Attack Helicopters. U.S. Army Russian Institute. APO New York, 1980.
|Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list|