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UNITA-A Case Study In Modern Insurgency

CSC 1984

SUBJECT AREA Strategic Issues

 

 

ABSTRACT

Author: Burke, Robert R., Major, USMC

Title: UNITA - A Case Study in Modern Insurgency

Publisher: Marine Corps Command and Staff College

Date: 2 April 1984

After nearly 400 years of Portuguese rule, Angola finally

became independent in November 1975. This independence was

the culmination of nearly 14 years of civil war in which

three insurgencies vied for control of Angola: the Movimento

Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA), the Frente Nacional

de Libertacao de Angola (FNLA), and the Unizo Nacional para

Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA). With the help of

nearly 15,000 Cuban troops and massive aid from the Soviet

Union, the Marxist MPLA defeated FNLA and UNITA in the

Angolian civil war of 1975-76 and established a communist

government in Angola.

Despite the communist victory, fighting has not ended

in Angola. Although FNLA has ceased to be a viable

insurgency, UNITA has staged a remarkable recovery since

the civil war. UNITA now controls at least one third of

Angola and is conducting successful operations in another

third of the country.

The purpose of this paper is to fill the void that has

been created by the absence of scholarly books and articles

on UNITA since the civil war. Most professional literature

has focused on the Communist victory in that conflict and

on "lessons to be learned" in American foreign policy in

southern Africa. As a result, a number of information gaps

remain open on recent UNITA activity in Angola. Information

obtained from State Department officials and scholars has

been most beneficial in filling some of these gaps.

In order to address the UNITA insurgency in an organized

and systematic manner, a framework for analysis is essential.

This framework assists in the identification of factors

that should be considered when examining an insurgency.

Some of these factors are critical, such as environment,

popular support, external support, organization, and

government response. This paper will define and explain

each of these factors with respect to UNITA. Their analysis

should not only provide a better understanding of UNITA and

its importance in Angola, but also an appreciation of the

heterogeneity of insurgent movements.

While many factors have contributed to UNITA's success,

two are of paramount importance. The first is Savimbi

himself. UNITA's effective political and military organization

owe much to his inspirational leadership and extraordinary

patience and dedication. Despite the presence of a large

number of competent people within the scope of UNITA's

organization, none seems capable of filling the void his

loss would create. Without Savimbi, UNITA would be extremely

vulnerable. The second factor is UNITA's environment.

UNITA's stronghold in Cuando-Cubango Province in southeastern

Angola is a natural haven that obviates the need for

sanctuary in a neighboring country. Dangerous logistical

and security burdens are avoided by the insurgents. The

regions proximity to South Africa facilitates UNITA's

receipt of external support from that country.

The irony of UNITA is that the stronger it becomes, the

less likely it is to achieve its objectives. The government

insists on keeping the Cubans in Angola as long as UNITA is

a threat. This dilemma portends a stalemate in which the

Soviets and Cubans must remain in Angola as long as UNITA

continues waging guerrilla warfare against the government.

Meanwhile, Mao's sage advice to Savimbi that the road to

success is a long and tortuous one remains the guiding

principle for UNITA as it pursues the politics of survival

into an uncharted future.

WAR SINCE 1945 SEMINAR

 

 

UNITA - A Case Study in Modern Insurgency

 

 

Major Robert R. Burke, USMC

 

2 April 1984

Marine Corps Command and Staff College

Marine Corps Development and Education Command

Quantico, Virginia 22134

TABLE OF CONTENTS

 

 

Page

LIST OF MAPS iii

INTRODUCTION 1

Chapter

1. WHENCE IT CAME 5

2. THE ARMED ARENA 20

3. DELINEATING THE POLITICAL FOLD 33

4. MUSCLE FLEXING 45

5. "SWIMMING IN A SEA OF CROCODILES" 67

6. RIPOSTE - OF SORTS 74

CONCLUSION 84

NOTES 86

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 94

LIST OF MAPS

 

 

MAP Page

1. POLITICAL MAP OF ANGOLA 6

2. ANGOLA'S ROADS AND RAILWAYS 21

3. ANGOLA'S PRINCIPAL AIRFIELDS 27

4. SAVIMBI'S HEADQUARTERS 28

5. UNITA ACTIVITY IN ANGOLA 54

6. UNITA PRIZES AND TARGETS (1) 55

7. UNITA PRIZES AND TARGETS (2) 57

INTRODUCTION

 

An understanding of insurgency is best accomplished by

focusing on a particular insurgency. Few insurgencies

offer a better opportunity to gain this understanding than

UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)

of Angola. UNITA is a classic insurgency in terms of the

definition that will follow. UNITA has been active for

a relatively long period of time. This study facilitates a

better assessment of its strengths and weaknesses. An examin-

ation of UNITA not only provides a better understanding of

the nature of an insurgency, but also of guerrilla warfare

and terrorism.

UNITA is fighting in a country of considerable strategic

importance to the United States. This alone justifies a

study of UNITA. Located between Zaire and Namibia on the

west coast of Africa, Angola is larger than the states of

New York, Texas, and California combined. Rich in oil,

iron ore, silver, manganese, copper, and phosphates, Angola

has the potential to become one of the wealthiest countries

in Africa. More important, however, is the fact that

Angola's takeover by the Marxist MPLA in the civil war of

1975-76 has embroiled the U.S. in a global shoving match

with the Soviet Union, whose support of Angola keeps the

government in power. Soviet involvement in Angola

now threatens to spill over into Namibia, which is seeking

independence from South Africa, the most powerful democracy

on the African continent. These factors portend greater

involvement of the U.S. in sub-Saharan Africa.

Few subjects seem more confusing to most Americans than

that of insurgency. The primary reason for this lies in

disagreement, even among scholars, as to what constitutes

an insurgency. While it is correctly associated with a

form of internal political violence, so too are guerrilla

warfare and terrorism. Accordingly, this study will begin

with definitions.

In his book, Insurgency in the Modern World, Professor

Bard O'Neill, a well known expert on insurgency, has taken

great pains to clarify the meaning of various terms associated

with insurgency. His definition of insurgency as "a struggle

between a nonruling group and the ruling authorities in

which the former consciously employs political resources

(organizational skills, progaganda, and/or demonstrations)

and instruments of violence to establish legitimacy for

some aspect of the political system it considers illegitimate,"1

clearly suggests that terrorism and guerrilla warfare are

instruments of violence embraced by the term insurgency,

and tailored to achieve the objectives of insurgency. The

purpose of terrorism is to lower the morale and psychological

support of the ruling government through systematic or

arbitrary acts of violence such as murder, torture, arson,

kidnapping, and hijacking. The primary target is always

the civilian population. Guerrilla warfare is used to

deplete the resources of the ruling government through

harassment by small, lightly armed groups. Unlike terrorism,

the object of guerrilla warfare is the ruling government's

armed forces, police, and crucial economic facilities.

Since both terrorism and guerrilla warfare are instruments

of insurgent warfare, they cannot be fully appreciated and

understood without examining the nature of insurgency.2

Nearly all professional literature on UNITA has been in

connection with the Angolan civil war of 1975-76. UNITA's

defeat in that conflict in spite of U.S. support has spawned

a spate of literature on "lessons to be learned" in American

foreign policy in southern Africa. Virtually nothing has

appeared in scholarly works on UNITA's remarkable recovery

since the civil war, an equally important topic.

The purpose of this paper is to fill this void. There

are no recent books and articles that focus on UNITA. A

number of information gaps remain open. Information obtained

from interviews with State Department officials and scholars

has been moot beneficial.

In order to address the UNITA insurgency in an organized

and systematic manner, a framework for analysis is essential.

This framework assists in the identification of factors

that should be considered when examining an insurgency.

Some of these factors are critical, such as environment, popular

support, external support, organization, and government

response. This paper will define and explain each of these

factors with respect to UNITA. Their analysis should not

only provide a better understanding of UNITA and its

importance in Angola, but also an appreciation of the

heterogeneity of insurgent movements. A brief historical

sketch of Angola's history will preceed an examination of

the major factors that we identified as critical. A concluding

note will provide a brief comment on UNITA's outlook.

Chapter 1

 

WHENCE IT CAME

 

 

Modern Angola has deep rooted historical ties to Portugal,

that small nation so culturally misplaced in Western Europe.

The first European to reach Angola was the Portuguese explorer,

Diogo Cao, who landed at the mouth of the Congo River in 1423.

He found the land under the rule of an African monarch, the

King of the Kongo, whose capital became the present day M'Banza-

Congo in northwest Angola (see Map 1). In 1490 the Portuguese

sent a small fleet of ships carrying priests, artisans, and

tools to the Kongolese King who received the mission warmly,

accepted Christianity, and agreed to send his son, the future

King Alfonso, to Lisbon. Initial contacts between Angola and

Portugal were friendly and respectful.

Soon, however, the slave trade led to the deterioration of

Portugal's relations with King Alfonso and his successors.

Internal revolts hastened the decline of the Kongo Kingdom.

Meanwhile, the Portuguese tended contacts southward along the

Atlantic Coast, founding Luanda, the present capital of Angola,

in 1576. The slave trade continued to dominate until the

middle of the 17th century with Angola serving as a major

source of labor for Brazilian plantations. Perhaps as many

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as 3 million Angolans were transported to the New World

during three centuries of the Portuguese slaving.1

Like the relationship of other European countries with

their colonies, that between Portugal and Angola became ever

more complicated. Angola's territorial boundaries were settled

by the Berlin West Africa Congress (1884-85), in which France,

Germany, and Portugal won international recognition of the

boundaries of their colonies bordering The Congo. Tribal wars

and uprisings in Angola increased in frequency during the

early part of the 20th century, until Portugual responded

with repressive measures The discovery of diamonds in Angola

in the 1930's stimulated Portuguese interest in developing the

colony, especially after the Salazar government took power

following World War II. Of the three Portuguese colonies in

Africa (Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea (Guinea-

Bissau)), Angola was the largest and potentially the richest.2

A long struggle for Angolan independence really got started

in 1961. To appreciate the dimensions of this latest struggle,

an examination of Portuguese colonial policies in Angola is

necessary. Of primary importance was the Portuguese conceptual

view of race, termed "Lusotropicality." Under this concept,

the fusion of Portuguese culture and history with the Black

African phyisque would constitute a new race ideally suited

for the development of the African territories into modern

states. Although Portugal viewed all members of this "race"

as ostensibly equal, the realities of life in Angola and in

the other Portuguese African territories undermined the

validity of this concept.3

The concept was too theoretical to have any useful meaning.

Distinctions among native Angolans were based on class rather

than on race. One's class depended in large part on educational

level and ability to speak Portuguese. Angolans were generally

divided into two groups, assimilado and indigena, which were

treated as citizenship categories. In order to be classified

as an assimilado, one had to speak Portuguese, receive income

from a job, have good character, be at least 18 years old, and

must not have been guilty of evading military or public service.

Native-born black Angolans who did not meet these requirements

were classified as indigena. The assimilados enjoyed a few of

the rights of white native Europeans whereas the indigena had

no political or economic rights at all. Although the number

of assimilados remained small, the racial overtones of this

class distinction alienated many native Angolans from the

Portuguese. This was especially so because white settlers

from Portugal and mesticos (mixture of native-born black Angolans

and white European settlers) had all of the rights and privileges

accorded whites in Portugal.

Education is a good example of the de facto racial barriers

existing in Angola. While education was free and compulsory

throughout Portugal and the colonies, Portugal lacked the

resources to build sufficient schools in Africa. The

few schools that did exist were located primarily in

the urban areas of Angola where most of the whites, assimilados,

and mesticos lived. Consequently, the rural indigena population

was denied any upward mobility (transition to assimilado status)

that education might have allowed.4

From the earliest days of colonial rule to the last, Portugal

used the colonies, especially Angola, to relieve social and

economic pressures at home. The unemployed, the landless, the

tenant farmers, and all those who had had problems in Portugal

(degredados) were encouraged or forced to emigrate to one of

the colonies. Dr. Gerald Bender, a noted historian, indicates

that Portugal "was the first and last European nation to use

degredados in the colonization proceess."5 Their lack of freedom

in the politics of the mother country was an important factor

in the development of Angolan nationalism.

After the outbreak of fighting in Angola in 1961, Portugal

responded to the nationalist challenge on a broad front.

The most significant response was the adoption in 1963 of the

Organic Law of the Overseas Provinces, under which the status

of the territories in Africa was changed from that of colony

to province. This action was an attempt to abate the tide of

nationalism in the colonies by providing them more administra-

tive and financial autonomy. A resettlement plan was begun

that gave the indigenous population greater access to schools

and medical facilities. Portugal sent troops to Angola

and recruited natives to fill the ranks of the armed forces.

The Portuguese secret police increased their activity and

infiltrated colonial organizations such as labor unions that

were allowed to exist for non-political purposes.6

These activities resulted in stalemate. However, this was

tantamount to a victory for the insurgents because Portugal

simply did not have the political, economic, and social where-

withal to continue the fight. General Antonia de Spinola, the

most effective counterinsurgent commander and military governor

in Angola said, "To want to win in a war of subversion by means

of a military solution is to accept defeat in advance, unless

one possesses unlimited capacity to prolong the war indefinitely...

Is that our case? Obviously not!"7

A successful counterinsurgency in Angola would have required

a sustained effort at the expense of holding onto Mozambique

and Guinea-Bissau, where similar insurgencies were active, and

this would have undermined the legitimacy of "Lusotropicality."

A failure of this concept in one colony would surely be viewed

in domestic and world opinion as a failure in the other colonies

as well. Army officers became dissatisfied with the conservative

colonial policies of the Portuguese government and staged

a coup that ousted Dr. Marcello Cataeno, who had replaced Antonio

Salazar in 1968. While this coup did not mark the withdrawal

of the Portuguese from Angola, it did result in reduced counter-

insurgent efforts. Realizing that the fate of the Portuguese

government following the coup was uncertain, the insurgents

sensed that their time was at hand. The Portuguese simply lost

the will to resist. The most important question in 1975 was

just how the governmental control would pass from Portugal to

Angola.8

At the time three insurgent groups vied to rule Angola:

the Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola (FNLA), led by

Holden Roberto; the Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola

(MPLA) led by Agustinho Neto; and the Unizo Nacional para

Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA), led by Dr. Jonas M.

Savimbi. A brief examination of each of these insurgencies

will follow.

The FNLA, which was founded in 1952, derived the bulk of

its strength from the Bakongo population in the north of Angola.

The organization stood for the liberation of all the Angolan

people from Portuguese rule. The brutality of Portuguese

repression against Bakongo uprisings after 1961 resulted in the

emigration of over 400,000 Bakongo across the border into Zaire.

This had important consequences for the future of the FNLA.

First, much of the political constituency of FNLA was located

in Zaire rather than in Angola. Holden Roberto himself lived

in Kinshasa, Zaire. From there he directed all FNLA operations.

He had close ties with Zairian President Mobutu Sere Seko and

was married to a close relative of Mobutu's wife. By having his

base in Zaire, Roberto was able to receive a consistent flow of

aid from external sources without interruption by the Portuguese.

The Zairian army organized, trained, and equipped the bulk of

the FNLA armed forces. The FNLA received aid from the CIA

(money), the Peoples Republic of China (advisers and equipment),

and Romania (arms).9 Roberto tried to enlarge his ethnic base

and even had the support of Dr. Savimbi, who served as foreign

minister of FNLA's Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile

(Governo Revolution ario de Angola no Exilo-GRAE) in 1962.10

This arrangement failed, however, and FNLA was to have little

success in obtaining popular support from the remainder of the

Angolan population.

Of the three insurgent movements, FNLA probably was the

most conservative and least complex. Holden Roberto did

everything himself, mistrustful as he was of potential rivals

to his leadership. He sought political independence for Angola,

agrarian reform, and pan-African unity. But in so doing he

relied primarily on military means rather than on political

indoctrination. By 1974, the FNLA had the largest military

force of the three insurgent movements. Nearly 2,000 guerrillas

were active in Angola and an additional 10,000 to 12,000 were

striking at targets in Angola from bases in Zaire.11

By contrast, the MPLA was a much more sophisticated and

complex organization. Founded in 1956, the MPLA was a fusion

of a number of small organizations that grew up in Angolan

cities, especially Luanda and Lobito (see Map 1). MPLA member-

ship consisted primarily of mesticos and members of the assimilado

class. While this kind of membership at first antagonized a

number of rural Angolans, the MPLA later succeeded in obtaining

support from among the one and one-half million Mbundo tribe

in the Cuanza Valley in the west, the Lunda and Chokwe tribes

in the eastern part of the colony, and from the slum dwellers

of Luanda. The MPLA stood for independence from Portugal and

the development of a modern society devoid of social and ethnic

prejudice. From the beginning, however, the MPLA was identified

with the Communist Party, which had existed secretly in Angola

as well as in Portugal since the end of World War II. By 1968,

the MPLA had created village action committees and political

cadres in every Angolan province. Regional party conferences

coordinated strategy.12

The MPLA had little difficulty in obtaining external support.

The Marxist views of the MPLA appealed to the worldwide ideological

left. This appeal gave the MPLA a distinct strategic advantage.

Liberals in Europe and North America respected the MPLA for

its multi-racial composition and nationalist outlook as opposed

to the other insurgencies for which ethnicity and regionalism

were distinguishing characteristics. The MPLA received continu-

ous support from Scandinavia, the Soviet Union, East Germany,

Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and, until the Soviets began providing

more extensive aid, the People's Republic of China. The U.S.

declined to provide support to the MPLA because of its leftist

orientation. Until the introduction of Soviet arms and Cuban

troops, the MPLA was the weakest militarily of the three insur-

gencies.13

The last of the three insurgencies is UNITA, the youngest

and the smallest at the time of the civil war. Its leader,

Dr. Jonas Malheiro Savimbi, was born in 1934 at a small railway

village in the Angolan central highlands where his father was a

stationmaster and lay Protestant preacher. His parents, of the

Ovimbundu tribe, had been converted to Christianity when they

were young adults. Savimbi's father had established a

number of small churches and schools along the Benguela Railroad,

Angola's primary railway, despite strong resistance from Catholic

priests who repeatedly tried to have him transferred to

another part of the country. This religious independence in

the face of Catholic repression had a profound effect on the

younger Savimbi, who developed a strong sense of social justice

reminiscent of the Progressives in American politics in the

early 20th century.14

After finishing at the top of his class at a colonial

secondary school, Jonas Savimbi embarked upon a long period of

political education and indoctrination. He received a scholar-

ship from the United Methodist Church to study medicine

in Lisbon in 1958. There he was under constant pressure by the

political police to inform on other Angolan students. He

refused to do this and fled to Switzerland in 1961 when anti-

colonial insurgency broke out in Angola. In 1965, he completed

a license in political and legal science at the University of

Lausanne. (The "Dr." before his name was given to him by UNITA

officials who report that he earned a medical degree instead.)

Meanwhile, he had been affiliated with Holden Roberto of FNLA

between 1961 and 1966. During this period he met Che Guevara

in Morocco and Mao Tse-tung in the People's Republic of China,

and attended the Nanking Military Academy.15

Savimbi had long felt the need to form his own movement

because the Ovimbundu (nearly 40 percent of the Angolan popu-

lation) had no political representation in the FNLA and the

MPLA. As a result, he founded UNITA in 1966. He established

an exile base in Zaire, but was soon forced to leave that

country when UNITA guerrillas destroyed a portion of the Benguela

Railroad on which Zaire is dependent for shipment of mineral

and other exports. After a short visit to Cairo, he returned

to Angola in the summer of 1968 by way of Zambia with the help

of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), which

is fighting for Namibian independence from South Africa.

With the exception of foreign visits to gain external

support for UNITA, Savimbi has remained on scene in Angola.

He long concentrated on raising the political consciousness

of the peasantry, an important lesson learned from Mao. He

established food cooperatives and developed village self-defense

units. He also established an elaborate governmental framework

in which regional elected councils made their views known

through a political commissar to the 35 member central committee

whose members were to be chosen every four years at a congress.

The central committee reported to the political bureau, a 19

member policy making body whose members were chosen by Savimbi,

the president of UNITA. Savimbi was to be "re-elected" every

four years by the congress in a secret ballot.16

Savimbi's political views probably were midway between the

conservative FNLA and the pro-Marxist MPLA. He emphasized the

importance of a truly independent Angola and relied primarily

on political rather than military means to extend his control.

This outlook explains in large part why he relied the least of

the three insurgencies on external support. For example, from

1966 to 1974, on the eve of the civil war, Egypt was the only

supplier of aid to UNITA. Savimbi claimed to have stolen and

captured all of his weapons from the Portuguese. An exceptional

politican, Savimbi tailored his pronouncements to meet the

views of his audience. On the one hand he could sooth the

Portuguese by stating he would treat Angolan whites and

mesticos as equals in a government run by UNITA. On the other

hand he could placate black Angolans by stating they would enjoy

majority rule and preeminence under his leadership. Demonstrating

a political acumen that was sorely lacking in Angolan politics,

Savimbi called for a period of political education to prepare

Angola for a democratic society.17

The three insurgencies sought to govern an independent

Angola. In January 1975, the Portuguese worked out an agreement

known as the Alvor Accord, which provided for a transitional

government including all three factions that would culminate

in free elections to prepare Angola for independence. By the

summer of 1975, continued fighting among the three groups

had resulted in the collapse of the Alvor Accord. Fighting

intensified with each of the three groups receiving external

support for their activities. Of particular concern to the

United States was the massive aid the Soviet Union furnished

the MPLA. Recognizing the military inferiority of UNITA, the

United States began supplying arms to FNLA in August 1975

in order to establish a sufficient military balance. South

Africa, anticipating direct U. S. intervention, intervened at

this time with 2000 troops and fought with UNITA and FNLA.

However, Cuban troops landed in Angola in September 1975 in

support of the MPLA. By November 1975, the number of these

troops had reached at least 15,000. Unable to control events

in Angola, the Portuguese folded their flag and removed the

last remnants of colonial rule from Angola on Independence

Day, 11 November 1975. The MPLA announced the creation of the

People's Republic of Angola in the capital city of Luanda and

received immediate recognition from the Soviet Union.18

In desperation, both UNITA and FNLA announced on 11 November

1975 the creation of the Democratic People's Republic of Angola

with headquarters in Huambo (see Map 1). Long standing hostility

between the two factions precluded a coordinated military and

political strategy to counter the MPLA. South Africa's inter-

vention proved to be a disaster for FNLA and UNITA because it

legitimized Soviet and Cuban aid to the MPLA from the point of

view of the other African states which have long been hostile

to South Africa's racial policy of apartheid. This intervention

contributed to the Huambo regime's failure to win foreign

recognition.

External support for the MPLA proved decisive. The MPLA

had, for over a decade, received Soviet and East German aid.

This included both arms and military training. The Soviets

provided MIG aircraft, T54 and T34 tanks, 122mm rockets, and

introduced Cuban troops to employ these weapons against FNLA

and UNITA. By February 1976, the value of Soviet aid over the

previous year was estimated at nearly $300 million. Meanwhile,

U.S. aid to FNLA ended in January 1976, suppressed by the

Clark Amendment, prohibiting further aid to Angola. Unused to

the conventional warfare waged by the MPLA and Cuban troops,

UNITA and FNLA were simply no match for them and were defeated.

The Huambo regime collapsed on 11 February 1976.19

Although the MPLA was successful in defeating UNITA and

FNLA in a brief civil war and in gaining control of the govern-

ment, fighting has not ended in Angola. What began as a war

for national independence in 1961 has now become a war against

the MPLA and the foreign assistance that props up its power.

In this regard, the current conflict is actually a continuation

of the uprising against colonial rule that began in 1961.

Although FNLA has continued guerrilla warfare against the

government, it has ceased to be a viable insurgency. On 18

March 1983, eight top military leaders of FNLA surrendered to

Angolan authorities and denounced FNLA while doing so.20

FNLA's leader, Holden Roberto fled to Europe. He now remains

in exile in Paris. By contrast, Savimbi of UNITA is waging a

heroic struggle to achieve his long standing objective of a

truly independent Angola. Having examined the historical

background of Angola and its fight for independence, we shall

now turn to an examination of the UNITA insurgency since the

civil war.

 

Chapter 2

 

THE ARMED ARENA

 

Environment is an extremely important factor to consider

in assessing the effectiveness of an insurgency. Environment

includes terrain, climate, communications network, ethnicity,

culture, size of the country, and population size and distribu-

tion. Rarely do all of these elements combine to favor an

insurgency.1

Angola is a large country. With an area of 421,351 square

miles, it is about twice the size of the State of Texas. Angola

lies north of the Congo River and is bordered by Zaire on the

north and northeast, Zambia on the east, Namibia (Southwest

Africa) on the south and the Atlantic Ocean on the west. (See

Map 2) The enclave of Cabinda, which belongs to Angola, lies

on the seacoast northwest of Angola proper and is bordered by

the Congo, the Atlantic Ocean, and a portion of Zaire that

separates the Cabinda enclave from Angola proper.

Angola's climate is tropical. Alternate rainy and dry

seasons are clearly defined. In the far north, the rainy season

may last as long as eight months, from September to May. In

the south, the rainy season begins later and ends sooner, from

December to April. Rainfall at any latitude in Angola is

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greater in the interior than at the coast and generally

increases with altitude. Rainfall is greatest in the far

north along the Zairian border. Temperatures decrease from

north to south and from east to west. The average annual

temperature at M'banza-Congo, for example, is 82oF while

that at Huambo is only 62oF. The coolest months are July

and August, during the dry season when frost occasionally

occurs at the highest elevations.

Like most of the other countries in sub-Saharan Africa,

Angola has an extremely varied physical environment. The

country has four dominate geographic regions: the coastal

plain along the Atlantic Ocean, the central savanna, the

northern plateau, and the steppe desert in the south. Each

of these regions warrants examination.

The coastal plain varies in width from 15 miles near

the city of Benguela to 90 miles in the Cuanza River valley

near the capital city of Luanda. The cold, counter-clockwise

Benguela Current, which prevents westerly winds from drawing

adequate moisture from the Atlantic Ocean, severely limits

rainfall on the coastal plain. Luanda, for example, rarely

receives more than 15 to 20 inches per year. This amount

is generally unreliable from year to year. Farther south

towards Namibia, the amount of rainfall gradually decreases.

The Benguela Current also keeps temperatures moderate

in the coastal plain. Vegetation in the area ranges from dry

scrub to sand dunes in the Namibia Desert to thick brush in

the north. Except for natural cover and concealment found in

the urban centers, the coastal plain has the least favorable

amount of cover and concealment for military operations of all

kinds.2

The central savanna region is predominately flat and open

with sandy soils. Through its center runs the Lunda Divide, a

series of low ridges that mark the division between the north

flowing rivers and the south and east flowing rivers. Annual

rainfall in this area ranges from 40 to 60 inches per year and

is more reliable than that of the coastal plain. Vegetation

consists mostly of savanna, but forests are present along the

major river valleys. Both conventional warfare and guerrilla

warfare are practical here.3

The northern plateau has the most physical diversity of the

four geographic regions. The region contains Angola's highest

elevations, which range from 1000 to 2500 meters. A moderate

climate with relatively cool temperatures and steady rainfall

from year to year have long made this area attractive to Angolans

of European descent. Deciduous forest once covered most of the

area, but it has largely been removed for timber. Other vegetation

consists of baobobs, acacias, and elephant grass. Dense rain

forest prevails along the Congo River in the far northwest.

Numerous hill and rock formations make the northern plateau

rather difficult terrain for conventional warfare but ideal

for guerrilla warfare. Of the four principal geographic regions

of Angola, the northern plateau has the best cover and conceal-

ment and is the most ideally suited for guerrilla warfare.4

This is the area where the FNLA was once dominant.

The final region is the southern steppe desert. It is sandy

and dry and poor. Here water is extremely scarce. Vegetation

is sparse except along river valleys where elephant grass and

scrub forest appear. Grass growing in relative abundance

during rainy seasons, disappears during the dry season. The

area is infested with the tsetse fly which makes farming and

cattle raising difficult. The few inhabitants of the area are

located along the Luengue, Cuito, Cuando and Cubango Rivers.

The Portuguese called this area the "Land at the End of the

Earth."5 Cuando-Cubango Province (see Map 2), which is located

in the steppe desert in the southeastern portion of the country,

is UNITA's principal stronghold. The steppe desert neither

favors nor hampers guerrilla warfare.6 Mobile conventional

warfare, however, is extremely difficult to conduct in the

region because of the poor trafficability of the terrain

during the rainy season, and the almost total absence of adequate

roads.

Angola's large size and distant borders have had a profound

effect on UNITA. Although Cuando-Cubango Province does not

favor guerrilla warfare, its remote location in Angola has

provided UNITA a superb sanctuary in which to build up its

infrastructure. Like the Portuguese before independence, the

present MPLA government has been unable to seal the 3,000

miles of Angolan borders. Probably 250,000 troops would be

required to do so, a task for which the MPLA is unlikely to

ever acquire adequate resources.7 The MPLA's inability to seal

the frontier has facilitated UNITA's receipt of external support.

Like most underdeveloped countries, Angola has a poor

transportation network. Only three major railways exist. The

Luanda Railroad, opened in 1901, is the country's oldest. This

railway has a total length of 240 miles with three spurs

and extends inland as far as Malange. One spur runs south

from Luanda to Dondo on the Cuanza River; another runs from

Luanda to Ndalatando and finally to Malange; and the third

runs from Luanda to Caxito. The Mocamedes Railroad extends

eastward from the City of Mocamedes for some 450 miles to

Menongue, the capital of Cuando-Cubango Province. Two other

branches reach Chiange and Kassinga. The total length of the

Mocamedes Railroad is nearly 520 miles. The most important

railway, however, is the Benguela Railroad, which has a total

length in Angola of nearly 838 miles. This railroad runs from

the port city of Benguela, eastward across the country into

Zaire, to Zambia, to Rhodesia, and finally to Beira in Mozambique.

A forty mile spur runs to the Cuima copper mines south of

Huambo. The Benguela Railroad has been a major target of

UNITA guerrillas since the civil war.8 (See Map 2 for a depiction

of Angola's railroads.)

Angola has approximately 43,000 miles of roads of all kinds.

Only 5,000 miles of roadway are paved; perhaps 16,000 miles of

Angola's roads have improved gravel or dirt surfaces. The

other 22,000 miles of roadway are unimproved dirt roads that are

impassible during the rainy season. Nevertheless, by 1975 nearly

all of the provincial capitals were accessible by paved road.

The extension of the road network is a major goal of the MPLA.

Figures that reveal the extent to which Angola's roadways were

damaged during the civil war are not available. It is reported

that a number of bridges were destroyed and that Cuban construction

brigades have assisted the MPLA in their repair. Except for

the Congo River, which is navigable with portages, Angola's

rivers are unsuitable for navigation throughout the year. (Map 2

shows some of Angola's major roadways.)9

Angola has 22 major airfields and perhaps 11 other minor

airfields throughout the country (see Map 3). The exact

number of airfields, especially those relegated solely to

military use, is not known. Like the construction of roadways,

the construction of airfields is a major priority of the MPLA,

just as it was for the Portuguese before independence.10

As can be seen, Cuando-Cubango Province in the southeastern

portion of the country (see Maps 2 and 3) is devoid of airfields,

roadways, and navigable rivers. During his recent visit to

Savimbi's headquarters in Samatango (see Map 4), Mr. Richard Harwood,

a Washington Post Foreign Service correspondent, noted that it

took 30 hours to drive a truck for a distance of 100 miles on

one of the area's pioneer trails. In order to engage UNITA

forces, the MPLA has been forced to rely primarily on aviation

with its inherent limitations of range and loiter time.

Click here to view image

UNITA has been well able to exploit such limitations. The most

efficient weapon used by the MPLA in the civil war, the Soviet

122mm rocket, has been rendered useless against UNITA because

of the difficult terrain and the absence of an adequate trans-

portation network in the region. Conversely, UNITA has employed

the same weapon effectively against fixed MPLA targets.11

The environmental impact of population deserves close

scrutiny. With a total population of approximately 7,000,000

people, Angola has fewer than 10 people per square mile,

an exceptionally low population density compared to other

developing nations. The annual population growth rate is only

2 percent. This, too, is relatively low for a developing

nation. Reflecting a high death rate, infant mortality is 122

per 1000 (U.S. 15 per 1,000) and life expectancy is only 38

years. The largest cities are Luanda, 500,000; Huambo, 50,000;

and Lobito, 40,000. All are under firm MPLA control. Like

most developing countries, Angola is experiencing a very high

rate of urbanization, expecially near Luanda and Lobito. Since

the MPLA controls these cities, this urbanization would seem to

favor the MPLA. Before the civil war in 1975-76, approximately

400,000 whites lived in Angola. Nearly 350,000 of these people

left the country during the war. Their departure portended

serious consequences for the MPLA. The mesticos, which number

perhaps 2.2 million, are the most important political, economic,

and social group. They hold the reins of power in the MPLA.12

The ethnic fragmentation of Angola's population is its most

important demographic characteristic. As many as 100 tribes

exist in Angola based on language groupings and historical

origins. While the majority of languages stem from the Bantu

root, they are sufficiently different from one another to

preclude communication among the various tribes. As a result,

Portuguese is the only common language throughout the country.

However, the lack of schools and the tribal character of Angola's

population have traditionally hampered attempts to raise the

literacy rate, which remains less than 15 percent. The largest

ethnic group, the Ovimbundu (38 percent of the total population),

live in central and southern Angola. They adjusted well to the

Portuguese while maintaining both tribal pride and cohesion.

As mentioned earlier, the Ovimbundu have become most closely

associated with UNITA. The Bakongo (13 percent of the total

population) are concentrated in the northwest portion of the

country, including the Cabinda enclave, but also live in the

Congo and Zaire. This group has been traditionally associated

with FNLA. The Mbundu (23 percent of the total poulation)

occupy the area in the hinterland of Luanda and are culturally

related to the Bakongo. The Mbundu have been traditionally

associated with the MPLA. Other tribes include the Chokwe,

Nganguela, Kwangali, Lwena, and the Lunda (all of which constitute

less than 10 percent of the total population) in eastern Angola.

These groups are becoming increasingly identified with UNITA.13

Such ethnic fragmentaion has made nation building difficult.

No sense of being "Angolan" exists among the various tribal

groups. In fact the Bakongo loath the other tribes. Their

practice of forced recruitment of other tribal members into the

ranks of FNLA before the civil war was hardly an effective

public relations effort. Outside the Bakongo tribe, neither

unity nor habits of animosity afflict the various tribes.

This complex situation challenges both UNITA and the MPLA.

Each must strive to unify the population without allowing

tribalism to become more divisive than it already is.

While control of the government clearly gives the MPLA an

advantage in this regard, it now has fewer resources than had

the Portuguese who so sorely failed to achieve any sense of

unity in Angola. By having identified itself with the Ovimbundu

tribe, UNITA has lost what advantage of neutrality it might

otherwise have had in seeking support among other tribes.

Promising opportunities still exist, however, for further

political indoctrination of the rural societies traditionally

associated with the MPLA and UNITA.14

In summary, the most important features of the Angolan

environment are the vastness of the country and the ethnicity

of the population. A lesser, but increasingly important feature

is Angola's growing urbanization. UNITA's geographic isolation

clearly has been the most important factor in its continued

survival and growing strength as an insurgency. The ethnicity

of the population, however, makes it extremely difficult for

UNITA to establish itself as a truly national political force.

The same holds for the MPLA. Since the MPLA controls the

major cities in Angola, the increasing urbanization of the

country enhances the ability of the MPLA to widen control.

 

Chapter 3

 

DELINEATING THE POLITICAL FOLD

 

No insurgency can survive without some degree of popular

support. Insurgents must have this support to offset the advan-

tages the government has by its contol of the levers of power,

especially the military forces and the police. Most insur-

gencies cannot afford to confront the government directly; to do

so is too costly and risks destruction of the insurgent

force. Instead, insurgents seek to erode the strength and

will of the government by the use of guerrilla warfare and

terrorism until it either collapses or capitulates on condi-

tions favorable to the insurgents.1 Guerrilla warfare and

terrorism must, however, increase the base of popular support

to sustain the momentum of an insurgency.

Bard O'Neill has identified six methods that insurgents

use to gain popular support. These are: (1) charismatic

attraction, (2) esoteric appeals; (3) exoteric appeals, (4)

terrorism, (5) provocation of government counterterrorism,

and (6) demonstration of potency.2 This chapter focuses on

UNITA's employment of charismatic attraction, esoteric appeals,

and exoteric appeals. The following chapter will focus on

UNITA's use of terrorism and provocation of counterterrorism

and its demonstration of potency, and will summarize the

major aspects of UNITA's quest for popular support. A study

of UNITA's employment of the methods of gaining popular

support reveals a great deal about its organization, strategy,

and insurgency classification.

Charismatic attraction is the phenomenon by which individuals

are attracted to an insurgency through the leadership of its

chief.3 Numerous examples of charismatic attraction exist;

Mao-Tse-tung, Fidel Castro, and Agustino Sandino are some

important ones. The oratorical skills and dynamic personali-

ties of these men were important factors accounting for

large followings. No analysis of UNITA is complete without

an examination of the charismatic attraction of its important

leader -- Dr. Jonas Savimbi.

Savimbi is a leader in the best African tradition --

the chief who leads his people. His picture is everywhere.

His praises are literally sung by everyone. Fluent in Spanish,

Portuguese, English, and French, and in at least five addi-

tional native Angolan languages, he is a spellbinding orator.

This skill facilitates the transmission of a boundless

enthusiasm to a number of widely different audiences. Michael

Samuels, an Angolan affairs expert with the Center for Strategic

and International Affairs at Georgetown University, believes that

Savimbi is "one of the very few people who can lay claim to

being truly charismatic: he understands political nuance

and overall, he is very savvy."4

His conduct at a recent UNITA congress illustrates an

adroit ability to stir passions. Always stately, always

imperious, Savimbi stood erect in a favorite uniform with

pressed camouflage utilities and a green silk ascot. A red

beret pulled rakishly to the right matched the reddish

gloss on his cordovan colored boots. He spoke: "The country

is living in a moment of decision and that is why you are

here. To make decisions that will free our country from

Soviet imperialism."5 The delegates then jumped to their feet

and cheered wildly for a full five minutes. Leon Dash of the

Washington Post, one of the few Western correspondents who

has attended a UNITA congress, wrote: "it did not matter

what [Savimbi] said just as long as [he] spoke -telling

them what to do, how to do it and how long it would take.

They would follow."6 That conveys a flavor of his personal

power and attraction.

Savimbi has acquired many labels during his long struggle

against the opposition. He has been called brilliant, affable,

unyielding, forgiving, temporizing, Machiavellian, opportunistic,

lying, nationalistic, Marxist, Maoist, pro-Western, and

socialist.7 Given the radically changing circumstances of

his struggle against the Portuguese and then against the

MPLA, and his continuing search for legitimacy, internally

and externally, there is doubtless some truth in each of

these labels. All of them describe part of the Savimbi myth.

His power has rested in large part on durability. Savimbi

has become synonomous with UNITA.

Savimbi relys on esoteric appeals to gain popular

support. These appeals are primarily aimed at the thin

intellectual stratum of the population. Esoteric appeals

"seek to clarify the situation by placing it in an

ideological or thereotical context that orders and integrates

political complexities."8 Esoteric appeals aim at the masses

to galvanize them into action. An ideology that identifies

the source of frustration and grievance is necessary because

discontented people act more effectively when they are aware

of the source of their frustration.

Savimbi's primary goals are to free Angola from Soviet and

Cuban domination and to establish a democratic Angolan government.

He often says that he would agree to a negotiated settlement

in which a government of national unity and reconciliation

would be the dominant themes. No one, not even the MPLA would

be excluded. He argues for democratic elections and a mixed

economy, and says that he would accept someone else as

president in the interest of a peaceful transition to a free

government. What Savimbi will not tolerate, however, is the

"forcible imposition of Soviet expansionism and Cuban revolu-

tionary culture on a people and society alien to the experience

of Marxism".9 Probably the best example of a UNITA esoteric

appeal is the following statement by Savimbi in 1979:

Agustinho Neto came to power through Soviet

tanks and not through people's choice. His

decisive element of gaining power was the

regular army from Cuba made up of 20,000

men who are still keeping Neto in power

against the will of the people, against the

effective and active guerrillas of UNITA,

and even against growing dissatisfaction

within the ranks of the MPLA. We are

determined to remain African whatever the

odds against our temporary weaknesses.

Yesterday we were slaves. Today, some are

still slaves. Today, we want to free Afri-

cans on African soil. The price of true

liberalism and freedom is our own lives.10

Savimbi has used a number of slogans, but the most prominent

one is "Demoncracy, Socialism, Negritude, Non-Alignment." He

reconciles democracy and socialism by stating that he wants to

retain a degree of private initiative because no one "wants

to do anything unless he expects to get something out of it."11

At the same time he recognizes that as an underdeveloped

country Angola must set priorities so that the educated few

will not get all of the wealth. "Nationalization [of foreign

companies] would not be my ultimate nor immediate aim.

Foreign companies will not bring the technical knowledge to

Angola without [getting] something in return. You must be

honest with the company, however, and tell them that the wealth

will be returned to the country."12 By negritude, Savimbi is

careful not to refer to black power, a term that offends many

whites and mesticos in Angola. He believes that Angola

should be inspired by its own culture; formulas adopted

abroad that are alien to African society must be avoided.

By non-alignment, he recognizes that while total independence

might be impossible -- "you have to be allied with one block

or the other" -- Angola should be free to make its own deci-

sions.13

Unlike esoteric appeals that focus primarily on ideology

as a basis for an insurgency's legitimacy, exoteric appeals

focus on the mundane, day to day matters the people face.

Problems such as the need for food, education, land reform,

and medical care are the basis for exoteric appeals. Like

esoteric appeals, exoteric appeals are aimed at both the

intelligentsia and the masses.14

UNITA has strongly emphasized exoteric appeals for

popular support. For example, Cuban troops are described

as rapists in UNITA propaganda. The Soviets and East Germans

are described as clannish, impatient, and ethnocentric.

UNITA also emphasizes the fact that only one Ovimbundu (Faustino

Muteko, Minister of Transport) is in the MPLA hierarchy. The

MPLA is portrayed as catering to the interests of whites,

mesticos, and Mbundus in the Luanda area. UNITA charges that

the MPLA commits atrocities against civilians sympathetic to

UNITA and uses napalm and other weapons against civilians in

UNITA-controlled areas.15 The MPLA, however, routinely makes

similiar claims against UNITA.

The most important exoteric appeal that UNITA has made

is based on the deplorable state of the Angolan economy.

David Lamb of the Washington Times who recently visited

Luanda remarked that "Angola is a fragile and wounded country

in a state of utter deterioration .... A 2000 mile trip

through four provinces produced little evidence of anything

save decay and stagnation, incompetence, and inefficiency."16

Angola, once a net exporter of food, now imports over 80

percent of its requirement. The production of coffee has dropped

from 240,000 tons in 1974, the year before the civil war, to

less than 30,000 tons. Iron ore and diamond production have

almost ceased because UNITA now controls the mines. The

country receives $5 million a day from the Gulf Oil Company,

but it is spending at least $3 million a day on military

operations, salaries, and fees for 40,000 Cubans, Soviets,

and East Germans in Angola.17

Nearly all of the provinces suffer from severe shortages

of basic commodities and food. The flight of more than 350,000

skilled white Portuguese from Angola during the civil war left

the country without managerial talent.18 Industrial production

in many factories is down to 20 percent of capacity. Corruption

at all levels is reported to be increasing. The black market

prevails at ten to fifteen times the official price levels.

The unending search for food has created rampant absenteeism

at the work place. A barter system is the only mechanism

that keeps many people alive.19 The infrastructure is flat.

W. G. Smith, a British scholar with a Marxist bent, echoes

some of these features of the Angolan economy, and claims

that the only beneficiaries of the MPLA government have been

the "petty bourgeosie" of the governmental bureaucracy. The

proletariat has fared much worse than the "petty bourgeosie."

While Gulf Oil produces the basic share of the income for the

government, it employs too few workers in its highly mechanized

operations. Thousands of workers have lost their jobs during

the economic crisis and severe food shortages have resulted

from the general breakdown in the distribution system and the

shortage of vehicles and drivers. The rural towns have lost

up to half their populations to the larger urban centers,

straining the government's ability to provide essential ser-

vices.20 All of these economic deficiencies have provided

fertile ground for UNITA in broadcasting exoteric appeals

for popular support.

In the quest for popular support, UNITA has recently

established a radio station in Namibia under the auspices of South

Africa. The "Voice of the Black Cockerel," the name of the station,

is broadcast throughout Angola. Many of UNITA's esoteric and

exoteric appeals are transmitted through this powerful medium.21

Savimbi recognizes that while esoteric and exoteric appeals

are extremely important in any insurgency, their effectiveness

depends on substantive action to raise the standard of living

of the people. Perhaps the most effective method used to

proselytize the population is "consciousness raising" through

song and morality plays. Richard Harwood of the Washington

Post described a parade in which he heard nearly two hours of

songs. One was prefaced with the following chant: "Down

with Russia! Down with Brezhnev! Down with Cuba! Down with

Castro! Down with the MPLA! Down with dos Santos [now president

of the MPLA]!"22 Then a young woman recited a short poem

that read something like this:

"A lion is a soldier.

A lion is a frightening beast in the

countryside

As lions, we must be frightening to

the MPLA."

Finally, the main event takes place at the center of the parade

ground, a five scene play:

Scene one: Leonid Brezhnev, Fidel

Castro, and Agustinho Neto (first

president of the MPLA) sit around

a table to make a devil's bargain.

Brezhnev and Castro will send arms

and men to Angola. Neto will give

them the country's wealth. Scene

two: Cuban troops arrive, invade

a village, abuse and kill the peas-

ants, and steal their possessions.

Scene three: guerrillas of UNITA

hear the cries of the peasants and

vow to shave them. Scene four: the

guerrillas attack the Cubans and

rout them. Scene five: Brezhnev,

Castro, and Neto learn of the

uprising and flee for their lives.23

While the uniquely tribal character of these rituals might

seem primitive to Westerners, they are important means of

political indoctrination for UNITA. They build high morale

and cohesion while instilling a strong sense of unity, a

fundamental requirement for the success of any insurgency.

Savimbi has also placed a high priority on education.

It is compulsory. UNITA claims that more than 20,000 pupils

are enrolled in educational facilities and that an additional

56,500 children are registered in UNITA's nursery schools.

While many of the schools are no more than log benches under

shade trees, they give each pupil basic instruction in reading,

writing, arithmetic, and history. Some of the schools also

serve as boarding institutions for children whose parents are

serving in the military or who have been killed. A teacher

training college established in 1979 provides instructors to

administer adult education programs. Older students receive

paramilitary training along with political indoctrination.

Since UNITA is not officially recognized by international

agencies as a liberation movement, it does not benefit from

such organizations as UNESCO or UNICEF. Nonetheless, UNITA

claims to have more than 500 primary, secondary, and vocational

schools.24

Public health is strongly emphasized. While only one quali-

fied doctor (Dr. Adelino Manassas, who was captured from the

MPLA-held town of Huambo in 1979) is reported, public health

programs are administered by nurses and medics trained in

mission hospitals during the colonial period. The French

medical organization, Medecins Sans Frontieres, which is

active in Afghanistan, Kurdistan, and Ethiopia, is planning to

send training teams to UNITA. UNITA claims more than 200

bush hospitals.25

No less important is preventive health. Extreme care is

taken to ensure that camps are maintained as clean and orderly

as possible. Litter is nonexistent. Water supplies are

protected from contamination and every hut has its own latrine.

Unlike most African communities, UNITA camps are devoid of

part, a response to the hostile environment of the countryside

and the severe shortage of adequate medical supplies. Malaria

is a severe problem during the rainy season. Pneumonia and

eye diseases are also common during this period. The intensity

of the military struggle has resulted in a large number of

wounded who cannot be adequately treated. Treatment of burns

by napalm has been especially difficult. Medicines, instruments,

and microscopes are badly needed.26

In its advocacy of Angolan nationalism, UNITA has made a

special effort to include representatives from Angola's

eight major tribal groups in the party leadership. Straw

polls among military officers show that all of the tribal

groups are represented. Of particular significance is the

increasing number of Mbundus, traditional supporters of

MPLA, in clandestine UNITA activities. In an attempt to

gain favor with the churches, which resent the MPLA law

forbidding party membership to anyone who "holds a belief in

any religious area," UNITA has guaranteed freedom of

religion.27

Nor has the UNITA "economy" been neglected. Through Savimbi's

advocacy of self-reliance, UNITA is now able to grow nearly 70

percent of its food supply. UNITA has developed a large

network of collective farms under the direction of Dario

Daniel Katata. He was Director of Agriculture in Huambo,

Angola's most important food producing region, under the

MPLA before his and his senior staff's defection to UNITA in

1977. He has established experimental farms and agricultural

schools where students who have completed secondary school

science courses train to establish new farms. Farms are

operated by villagers under military supervision. They give

one morning of labor each week in exchange for time on their

private plots. Emphasis is given to the cultivation of land

along the river valleys where the best soils are located.

Cabbages, tomatoes, peppers, onions, beans, tobacco, and

maize, the staple diet in Angola, are grown on UNITA

collective farms. Katata hopes UNITA will soon be totally

self-sufficient in food supplies.28

Chapter 4

 

MUSCLE FLEXING

 

While charismatic attraction, esoteric appeals, and

exoteric appeals are extremely important methods of gaining

support, no insurgency can rely on these factors in isolation.

An insurgency must demonstrate a capacity to use military

force to convince the population of its strength and potential

for success. We shall first examine UNITA's use of the

military by examining the final three methods of gaining

popular support: terrorism, provocation of counterterrorism,

and demonstration of potency.

Terrorism and provocation of counterterrorism are often used

where esoteric and exoteric appeals are unsuccessful. The

primary goal of terrorism is to demonstrate the weakness of

the government in the face of insurgent strength. The provoca-

tion of counterterrorism is to designed to stimulate a govern-

mental response so arbitrary that the resentment of the

population will rage against the government.1 UNITA's successful

use of esoteric and exoteric appeals since the civil war has

obviated the need for terrorism and techniques for provocation

of counterterrorism to gain popular support.

Demonstration of potency is the final technique the insurgent

uses to gain popular support. No insurgency can survive unless

it can demonstrate an ability to meet the needs of the population

through social services and to gain strength through military

means. We have already examined UNITA's quest for popular support

through demonstration of potency in the social and economic

realm. Despite Savimbi's frequently avowed reliance on a

political solution to the Angolan conflict, his military

achievements through conventional and guerrilla warfare

since the civil war have been most effective.

Savimbi fully recognizes that military as well as political

and social means must be used to convince the population

that UNITA will eventually succeed. George B. Jordan, a

noted expert as guerrilla warfare, notes that "units...

active and successful in the accomplishment of assigned

missions build up a high esprit de corps and attract followers;

success is contagious."2 Guerrilla units that do not remain

active in combat lose their morale and sense of purpose.

UNITA's strong appreciation for the importance of guerrilla

warfare reflects Savimbi's training under Mao Tse-tung and

Che Guevara in the 1960's.

On any given day in Jamba, just 50 miles north of the

Namibian border in Cuando-Cubango Province, one is reminded

of Parris Island. Companies march in perfect formation; the

voices of the men rise and fall in melodic cadence. Drums

signal the beat to which the companies march. Buglers blow

at timed intervals. Such is the cacophony of Jamba, where

UNITA trains approximately 1500 regular troops every three

months.3

The military facilities at Jamba would please an inspector

general. Jamba is a major installations with a hospital,

barracks, drill fields, and machine shops. Neat fences line

the roadways. Guards in beautiful olive drab uniforms stand

watch at each gate. The huts are neatly numbered; "Casino

number 9" is an example. Generators provide electric light

for all the huts and buildings. Jamba is the largest of

some 20 training centers in UNITA territory.4

Military training is as rigorous as one would expect in a bona

fide insurgency. Military service in UNITA is voluntary and

without pay. Most recruits are about 18 years of age; some

are a little younger. Many have to walk for as long as two months

to reach the training centers from the outlying "liberated

zones." Upon arrival, the new recruits engage in endless

physical training sessions and instruction on the assembly and

disassembly of the AK-47 rifle and the Soviet PKM machine

gun. The instructors are dedicated professionals whose classes

are well organized to make learning easier. Recruits are

required to assemble and disassemble these weapons until they

can do it in seconds. Contests are given and the instructors

praise those with the fastest times.

Despite the rigors and the absence of pay, morale is

exceptionally high. Classes are sometimes interrupted by

boisterous outbursts of singing, slogan shouting, and fist-

clenching appeals for Angolan independence from "Soviet-Cuban

imperialism" or "Soviet expansion."

Training is tailored to one's ability, experience, and

prospective use in the organization. Promising recruits,

usually those who have had some basic education, receive

more specialized training in communications, intelligence,

commando operations, and logistics. Some recruits are even

assigned to the military band, a luxury few insurgencies can

afford, but one that is essential to UNITA. Regular soldiers

with field experience receive periodic improvement courses

in tactics. Guerrilla forces, however, receive more limited

training and are encourged to operate as independently as

possible in their own areas.5

UNITA's forces are divided into three general categories.

The first category consists of 15 regular battalions of 500-600

men each. The mission of these battalions is to protect the

"liberated zones" under total UNITA control from MPLA counter-

attacks. The second category is the guerrilla force of

approximately 25,000 men. The mission of this force is to

gain new territory and woo the population to the UNITA cause.

The third category consists of a number of special commando

units of 45 men each. These units perform highly sophisticated

sabotage operations.6

UNITA's military command structure is solid and includes

highly competent and experienced officers. Under Savimbi is

Brigadier Demosthenes Chilingutila, the army field commander

and chief of staff. Secretary general Miguel N'Zau Puna also

holds the rank of brigadier along with Samuel Epalanga, who

coordinates relations and supplies with South Africa. Other

prominent military figures are Colonel Bok Sapalalo, chief of

logistics; Colonel Renato Mateus, chief of operations; Colonel

Geraldo Nunda, senior political commissar, Colonel Antonio

Vakulakuta, chief of administration; and Colonel Sam Chiwale,

chief of training. (Colonel Chiwale once held the grade of

brigadier and the position of army commander and chief of

staff, but was recently demoted to his current grade and

position.) Most of these men have been with Savimbi since

the founding of UNITA in 1966 and are exceptionally loyal to

him. The armed forces over which these men preside are

highly cohesive and unified. No evidence of factionalism

exists in any segment of the UNITA organization.7

Nearly all of these military leaders are ranking members

of UNITA's political bureau. As mentioned in Chapter 1, this

is the policy making body that hears the views of the 35

member central committee, which in turn deals with the regional

councils in UNITA-held territory through the political

commissar. Since the last UNITA Congress in 1982, a 14-man

political bureau has emerged with the following ranking order:8

1. Jonas Savimbi (President)

2. Brigadier Miguel N'Zau Puna (Secretary general)

3. Brigadier Demosthenes Chilingutila (army commander

and chief of staff)

4. Brigadier Samuel Epalanga (chief liaison with

South Africa)

5. Colonel Geraldo Nunda (senior political commissar)

6. Colonel Antonio Vakulakuta (UNITA's senior Ovambo

tribe member)

7. Jeremias Chitunda (foreign affairs secretary)

8. Colonel Renato Mateus (chief of operations)

9. Ernesto Mulato (secretary for economic affairs;

UNITA's senior Bakongo tribe member)

10. Carlos Kandanda (representative in West Germany)

11. Antonio Dembo (chief liaison with Zaire;

UNITA's senior Mbundu tribe member)

12. Colonel Smart Chatta (secretary for justice;

UNITA's senor Chokwe tribe member)

13. Eugenio Ngolo (central committee secretary)

14. Tito Chingunji (roving envoy, mostly in London)

Until recently, UNITA officers received military training

abroad. Hundreds of officers have received extensive training

in Morocco, Senegal, Tanzania, and Zambia. Others received

training while serving with the Portuguese armed forces in

Angola during the colonial era. However, Savimbi claims that

since mid-1982, outside training has ceased and his forces

now have a highly qualified officer corps fully capable of

training its own. He also claims that UNITA, unlike the

MPLA, has never employed mercenaries nor advisers, nor conducted

operations with South African troops.9

UNITA forces are well equipped. All regular troops wear

leather boots and locally made uniforms consisting of khaki,

olive-green, or dark blue depending on the unit. Local

workshops turn out as many as 2000 uniforms a month each

operating on a 24-hour basis. The principal weapon is the

AK-47 Kalashnikov rifle, most of which have been captured

from the MPLA. Other weapons are purchased on the international

arms market or supplied by friendly nations. Western observers,

such as Richard Harwood of the Washington Post and Fred

Bridgland of the Scotsman, report large supplies of small

arms ammunition, 12.7mm anti-aircaft guns, and SAM-7 missiles.

Skilled workers quickly repair damaged weapons in well organized

workshops.

Cannibalization and innovation in weapons repair and

development are essential. A chief mechanic at one workshop

devised a new kind of rocket launcher from parts taken from

helicopter firing pods. The launcher had hand carved and

polished ivory knobs. Mechanics have become especially

adept at manufacturing their own parts to replace those that

are missing in captured weapons.10

UNITA has also improved its communication facilities.

It has gotten lorries from South Africa and a fleet of some 200

captured vehicles of Soviet, Polish, or Czech origin. These

vehicles are precious to UNITA. Each truck is assigned its

own driver, co-driver, and mechanic. The team is held totally

accountable for a truck's condition. No one else may so much

as touch the treasured vehicle. As a result, trucks are

maintained in top shape. UNITA engineers are constantly

expanding the road network by felling trees and constructing

catwalks across rivers and swamps. UNITA claims to have

20,000 miles of usable roads and tracks throughout the "liberated

zones." Near Jamba is UNITA's clandestine communications

center. UNITA forces, equipped with hand held Racal radios,

use coded messages to remain in daily contact with all their

units and bases over a 900 set two-way radio network. UNITA's

headquarters monitors all MPLA radio traffic so that troops in

the field can change tactics according to MPLA troop movements.11

UNITA's transformation from a defeated band of some 1500 to

3000 guerrilla forces at the end of the civil war in 1976 to a

powerful military force has meant vast dividends in morale

among UNITA insurgents. The troops are truly enamored with

their mixed force of regular battalions and guerrilla units equipped

with modern weapons and vehicles. A young solder named "Red

Sun" -- a typical war name given to all soldiers; others,

for example, include Gringo and Big Rat -- who has been

in the bush fighting for five years told Richard Harwood that

"he feels very strong. We can move in lorries now. We have

a regular army. We have SAM missiles. We shoot down airplanes.

We chase them [MPLA forces] away."12 This is typical of the

kind of confidence and enthusiasm shown by young UNITA soldiers.

Savimbi admits that the goal of rebuilding UNITA's military

has been difficult. "The first two years were the hardest,"

he said. "There were many problems. No guns, little outside

support and consistent harrassment by government troops and

planes. But if a guerrilla force can overcome the initial

obstacles and survive those first two or three years, then

you know that you have succeeded."13

Savimbi has clearly succeeded in demonstrating that UNITA is

potent force. He is now reported to have under his control

nearly one third of the country and to be conducting guerrilla

warfare at will in another third (see Map 5). UNITA claims

to be conducting operations in ten of Angola's 16 provinces.

However, as one senior diplomat warned, the military situation

in Angola is in a constant state of flux. "Above all," he

said, "You must avoid using the word 'control'. Everyone

claims to control everything here, but the verb just doesn't

fit the situation."14 Nevertheless, UNITA has achieved a

number of military successes especially during the last three

years. Even MPLA president Edwardo dos Santos, in a 1982

speech commemorating Angola's seventh anniversary of independence,

said that UNITA has caused $10 billion -- Western intelligence

sources say $7 billion - worth of damage to roads, bridges,

buildings, and other facilities. Dos Santos also reports

that nearly 160,000 Angolans have been made homeless refugees

by the fighting.15

UNITA's first major military victory since the civil war

was the capture of Mavinga in 1981 (see Map 6). Mavinga is

the second largest town in Cuando-Cubango Province and has

Click here to view image

been an important administrative and trading center with

police barracks under the MPLA. UNITA regards Mavinga as a

precious jewel that symbolizes its capability to attack and

defeat in open country a modern Angolan army that is supported

by Cuban troops and Soviet logistical help. UNITA reports

that a brigade of 2,000 MPLA troops guarded the town and its

3000 yard airstrip on 19 September 1980. Two other large

MPLA contingents were located 30 miles to the west; 6000

Cuban and government troops at Menongue (see Map 7) and 4000

at Cuito-Canavale. UNITA forces attacked the town at daylight

with four battalions of 625 men each (2500 total). In four

hours UNITA secured the town, the airfield, the brigade

command post, and inflicted heavy casualties among the MPLA.

The MPLA tried to retake Mavinga first in March 1981 and

again in June of that year. Both attempts failed. UNITA

battalions ambushed MPLA relief forces 40 miles west of

Mavinga, killed 800 MPLA troops, and captured hundreds of

weapons, large stores of ammunition, and more than 70 trucks.

UNITA also shot down a Soviet Antonov cargo plane (capable of

carrying T62 tanks) and a helicopter gunship. MPLA prisoners

confirmed this account of the battle for Mavinga, which now

remains firmly in UNITA's hands.16

UNITA captured the towns of Lupire, Muie, and Lumbala

(see Map 6) in 1982. Lumbala was a particularly important

prize. It has an airfield and controls the main access route

to Zambia, whose president, Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, supports

Click here to view image

UNITA. On 8 November 1982, 3000 UNITA regular troops launched

an assault on Lumbala's garrison of 1200 MPLA and 90 Cuban

troops. Within two hours UNITA had seized the town and

inflicted heavy casualties among the defenders. UNITA reported

200 enemy dead, including 16 Cubans, and only 12 dead and 23

wounded among its own forces.17

In February 1983, UNITA captured Cangonga (see Map 6)

on the Benguela Railroad. The manner in which it was taken

not only shows the detail in planning made but also the

sophistication off the force involved. Battalion 017, commanded

by Colonel Ben-Ben Arlindo Pena, 28 years of age, had constructed

a relief model the size of a badminton court of the town and

its approaches to use for the battle briefing. Colored

roads, arches, bark, twigs, and moss were used in the model

town to symbolize the buildings and fortifications of Cangonga.

Battalion 017 conducted endless rehearsals. The battalion

consisted of 520 regular troops armed with 75mm cannons,

81mm mortars, RPG-7 antitank missiles, AK-47 rifles, a

45-strong platoon of "Special Forces," a 50-strong logistics

team, 25 demolitions specialists, some 300 guerrillas, and a

long chain of young men and women carrying ammunition on

their heads. Finally, at 0300 on 11 February, a single

rifle shot signaled that all units of Battalion 017 were in

position. At 0500 the attack began. The MPLA's arsenal

exploded and the entire town was soon ablaze. The MPLA

garrison was stunned! Most of the 300 defenders fled.

UNITA killed or captured the remainder.18

The importance of Cangonga's capture was two-fold. First,

it allowed a secure supply line to be pushed to regular forces

and guerrillas who had already infiltrated 200 miles north

of the Benguela Railroad. This would help UNITA fulfill one

of its major objectives of creating a corrider of "liberated"

territory right up the center of the country to where a

salient of Zaire juts into northcentral Angola. This would

cut off the territory held by the MPLA in the east from its

areas in the west. The significance of Cangonga's capture,

however, lay in its propaganda value. UNITA wanted to show

Western journalists as well as its own people that its forces

were highly skilled and motivated, and fully capable of

striking the MPLA in the very heart of Angola with a surgical

precision devoid of help from external sources, especially

South Africa.19

UNITA achieved other important military successes in 1983.

It has taken every principal town from Lumbala to Luena (see

Map 6) on the Benguela Railroad. Heavy fighting is now

taking place around the town of Huambo and Kuito (see Map 6),

both of which lie along the Benguela Railroad. These two

cities are located in the economic heartland and the best

food producing region of the country. Although the MPLA

refuses to allow Western journalists to enter the region, it

has corroborated destruction of Angola's second largest dam,

the Alto-Catumbela (see Map 6), between Huambo and Lobito, a

major port on the Atlantic. UNITA blew the dam with a force

of 800, including the 530-strong 517th Battalion that is

based in the mountains northwest of Huambo.20

The destruction of the dam reflects Savimbi's desire

to concentrate on economic targets as well as to infiltrate

new regions and bring as much territory as possible under

his control. Savimbi plans to open up a new front in Uige

Province in order to focus on Luanda and the oil rich Cabinda

enclave. Others likely targets are food distribution centers

in Malange and Cuanza Sul Provinces, and the Canbembi dam

near Dondo (see Maps 2 and 7), just 130 miles southeast of Luanda.

This dam is the largest in Angola and is the capital's chief

source of electricity and water.21

The largest battle between the MPLA and UNITA took place

in August 1983 when UNITA captured the city of Cangamba (see

Map 7), a strategic crossroads town of 6000 in Moxico Province.

The battle lasted nearly eleven days with three UNITA brigades

(strength and composition unknown) pitted against MPLA forces

of at least equal size. UNITA seized the town and claimed

to have killed 709 enemy troops, including 120 Cubans, and

to have taken 328 prisoners in the battle. It claimed only

63 dead and 200 wounded. The MPLA contends that its forces

killed 1100 UNITA troops while losing only 53. While the figures

on both sides probably are exaggerated, they do indicate the

scope of the battle.22

UNITA's pattern of behavior after capturing a town in

MPLA territory follows a familiar pattern. The town is first

divested of all booty -- blankets, small generators, radios,

sewing machines, buckets, drinking bottles, cooking pots,

uniforms, boots, and anything else of value. UNITA forces

rarely try to hold captured towns. All towns of any economic

or military value are sabotoged. UNITA forces frequently

stage small groups of men armed with anti-aircraft and light

artillery weapons to key locations to block the MPLA from

returning. Civilians are settled in nearby UNITA-controlled

village camps and encourged to resume farming their own fields.

This procedure assures UNITA a continued food supply, provides

UNITA access to the local population for political indoctrination,

and renders the towns useless to the MPLA.23

However, in its infiltration of disputed territory, UNITA's

modus operendi reflects Savimbi's training under Mao at the

Nanking Military Academy. As Savimbi has often said, the

basic lesson he learned there is that a peasant cannot be won

by guerrillas unless he is helped and treated with respect.

He cannot be coerced. Accordingly, his policy is to have the

guerrillas enter the villages unarmed initially. They talk to

the people until a point has been reached when they will feed

and protect the guerrillas. Then the guerrillas will provide

arms. Savimbi's guerrillas are under under strict orders to

avoid clashes with the MPLA unless absolutely necessary.24

UNITA has also used another tactic to demonstrate its military

potency, the so-called dramatic gesture, a form of terrorism.

This refers to acts of kidnapping or hijacking conducted by

the insurgents to convince world and domestic opinion that

they are a strong and active force fighting for worthwhile

goals.25 On 12 March 1983, UNITA announced the taking of

64 Czechoslovak and 20 Portuguese hostages and the capture

of a Cuban Army officer in an attack on an industrial plant

near Huambo. Czechoslovakia confirmed the capture of its

nationals and appealed to the international community for

help in securing their release. UNITA has indicated it is

willing to swap the Czech prisoners for the release of its

own prisoners held by the MPLA. UNITA also holds several

Soviet prisoners taken when an Antonov military transport

plane was shot down by a UNITA SA-7 missile in 1981.26

Savimbi admits that UNITA has a deliberate policy of

hostage taking. Anyone in Angola who is sympathetic toward the

MPLA is a candidate for capture. He believes that hostages

are important propaganda symbols that advance the cause of UNITA.

Prisoners are treated well in UNITA camps, however, and many have

been released to the Red Cross after being held captive for as

long as four months to three years or more.27

UNITA's growing strength as an insurgency since the civil

war reflects primary emphasis on three of the six methods

used to gain popular support: charismatic attraction, exoteric

appeals, and demonstration of potency through military means.

Of these three methods, charismatic attraction is the most

important. Savimbi's forceful and dynamic leadership is

vital to UNITA's success, so much so that one wonders how

UNITA could survive without him. While UNITA is rich in

competent lieutenants, none seems to be capable of filling

his shoes in the event of Savimbi's death, capture, or assas-

sination. UNITA's exoteric appeals to the masses for popular

support are successful because propaganda and sloganeering

are supported by deeds. UNITA's emphasis on health care,

education, and adequate food supplies for the population have

proven enormously effective in winning the minds and hearts

of a number of rural Angolans, many of whom had faced starvation

and want before coming under the aegis of UNITA. Equally

important, however, is UNITA's demonstration of potency

through military means. UNITA has clearly shown that it has

a powerful military that can function as a conventional army

as well as a long term guerrilla force. UNITA has good

command structure, logistics, and tactical skills to defeat

forces with superior equipment and air support. Without

question UNITA's territorial gains in recent years owe much

to its military strength.

As we have seen, UNITA has developed an extremely effective

organization to support political and military objectives.

The organization is simple and permits intimate contact

with the people. This simplicity has also facilitated the

achievement of a high degree of cohesion and unity. Devoid

of factionalism and competing centers of loyalty, UNITA has

presented a positive image of strength and seems to commit

all resources to problems of political and military mobilization.

The result has been a dramatic increase in the strength of

UNITA since the civil war.

UNITA's strategy reflects Savimbi's training under Mao.

Savimbi has used the same sequential stages to win adherents

for UNITA: political organization, guerrilla warfare, and

conventional warfare. UNITA has created cellular networks in

newly won areas to propagandize the population by emphasizing

both esoteric and exoteric appeals. UNITA supports such

appeals with solid social services to isolate the population

from the MPLA. Although terrorism is often associated with

the first stage of the Maoist strategy as a means of gaining

popular support, it is most often used in that strategy when

the insurgent organization and environment are unable to

support guerrilla warfare. However, since UNITA's organization

is simple and responsive to its needs and since the environment

in which UNITA operates permits guerrilla warfare, Savimbi

has avoided the use of terrorism to gain popular support.

He has, however, resorted to sabotage operations, another

feature commonly associated with the organization stage of

the Maoist strategy.

The second stage of the Maoist strategy consists of

warfare by volunteer guerrillas and the establishment of

extensive social services to gain new territory and popular

support. As we have seen, UNITA has conducted widespread

guerrilla warfare operations. Like Mao, Savimbi has relied

exclusively on voluntary recruits to fill the ranks of the

guerrilla forces and the regular army. UNITA has established

an array of schools, political indoctrination centers, and

health care centers to win the population.

Finally, UNITA has conducted conventional warfare with

regular forces, the third stage of the Maoist strategy.

Although the objective of this stage is to overthrow the government

through full scale civil war, UNITA has mainly relied on

conventional warfare to improve popular support and gain

foreign respect through demonstrations of potency. UNITA

does not have the resources to wage full scale civil war

against the MPLA and is unlikely to acquire such conventional

strength.

Savimbi's goals indicate the kind of insurgency UNITA

represents. Since UNITA wants the Soviets and the Cubans out

of Angola and since the MPLA is so closely affiliated with

them, one logically concludes that UNITA seeks what is tantamount

to an overthrow of the MPLA. In this context, UNITA can be

classified as a revolutionary insurgency. On the other

hand, Savimbi has indicated a willingness to negotiate a

power sharing agreement with the MPLA if the Soviets and the

Cubans leave the country. If one assumes the MPLA can survive

without their assistance, UNITA can also be classified as a

reformist insurgency because it would presumably be obtaining

more political, social, and economic benefits through such an

agreement with the MPLA. However, UNITA's identification

with the Ovimbundu in Angola also suggests that UNITA may

ultimately prove to be a secessionist insurgency, in which

insurgents reject the political community of the larger

government and establish their own. Since UNITA identifies

the policies of the MPLA with those of the Soviets and the

Cubans, UNITA clearly rejects the political community of the

MPLA. And, as we have seen, UNITA has established a separate

political community.28 The UNITA insurgency is difficult

to precisely classify. It seems to be a secessionist insurgency

with hopes for becoming revolutionary one. It might have

to settle for being a reformist insurgency.

Chapter 5

 

"SWIMMING IN A SEA OF CROCODILES"

 

 

UNITA's external support is divided into four categories

to identify the extent of support provided: moral support,

political support, material support, and sanctuary. Of

these kinds of support, moral support is the easiest to

provide because it is the least costly and risky. Such

support may involve nothing more than public acknowledgement

that the insurgency is fighting for a just and worthy

cause. A nation or group that actively champions the cause

of an insurgency is said to be providing political support.

Material support is tangible support that includes money,

arms, food, training, and military advisers. The final

kind of support provided to an insurgency is sanctuary. A

good example of such support is that which Zaire provided

Holden Roberto of FNLA before his defeat by the MPLA during

the civil war and prior to his exile to Paris. Just as

moral support involves the least risk, so material support

and sanctuary involve the most risk for the supporting

nation or group.1

Although material support probably is the most desirable

from the standpoint of the insurgents, other forms of

support are important. Whether a particular kind of

support is more important than another depends a great deal

on the status of an insurgency at any given time. Sanctuaries,

for example, can be important in any stage of an insurgency,

but they may be most critical in the early days of an

insurgency when it is unable to establish a secure base in

the target country. Such was the case of UNITA in 1966,

when Zaire provided a badly needed sanctuary.

The country most commonly associated with external

support for UNITA is South Africa. This country shares

UNITA's goal of a Soviet and Cuban withdrawal from Angola

and regards UNITA as an effective counter to Angolan Support

of the Southwest Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) (the

Marxist organization that is attempting to take over Namibia),

whose raids into Namibia originate from sanctuaries provided

by the MPLA in Cunene Province (see Map 2) in southern

Angola. South Africa is widely rumored to want UNITA

established in Cunene Province to provide a buffer between

Namibia and SWAPO. This action would allow South Africa to

beef up the multiracial government it has installed in

Namibia and ignore U.N. Resolution 435, calling for interna-

tionally supervised elections that probably would favor

SWAPO. The Namibia issue is the primary one of several

factors accounting for close relationships between South

Africa and UNITA.2

Thus, South Africa's moral, political, and material

support to UNITA has been extensive. South Africa has made

no secret of its support of UNITA and has insisted that

UNITA be included in any settlement involving Namibia. Of

most importance to UNITA, however, is South Africa's material

support. Although UNITA denies receiving weapons from

South Africa, an assertion enjoined by South Africa, UNITA

has received arms from South Africa during its raids on

SWAPO. UNITA admits it receives military intelligence

information, trucks, medicines, gasoline, helicopter transport,

food, and miscellaneous items in return for which UNITA

provides ivory, timber, and diamonds. South Africa has

provided medical care in Namibia for UNITA wounded. Most

South African aid goes to UNITA through Namibia.3

While UNITA has been South Africa's cause celebre,

South Africa has been UNITA's bete noire. UNITA's close

ties to South Africa have provided the MPLA an important

esoteric appeal. The MPLA has declared UNITA a puppet of

racist South Africa. There is no question that UNITA's

credibility in the eyes of black African states has been

damaged by relations with South Africa. Savimbi admits

that it "hurts" him to have any dealings with South Africa.

He is against apartheid, but believes that relations with

South Africa are inevitable because it is the most powerful

country in sub-Saharan Africa. He is quick to point out

that nearly 90 percent of MPLA trade within Africa is

with South Africa.4 Savimbi is a practical man. He trades

with South Africa to survive. "When you are swimming in a

sea of crocodiles," he says, "you don't ask about the

identity of the one offering a helping hand."5

Savimbi has twice privately visited the U.S. since the

civil war. He first visit, in November 1979, was sponsored

by the New York based Freedom House, an organization that

monitors political freedom around the world. Savimbi met

with former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the late

Senator Henry Jackson, Senator Sam Nunn, Senator Daniel

Moynihan, a member of the board of Freedom House, and James

Schlesinger, who was Secretary of Defense during the civil

war. Savimbi urged the U.S. to drop attempts to negotiate

with the MPLA and requested moral and political support.

"We don't need tanks and we don't wany any GI's to go there

(Angola)," he said, "because we are already winning the

war, but we do need your understanding."6 Savimbi also met

with the Congressional Black Caucus. From this group he

got only a chilly reception because of connection with

South Africa. Believing that aid in any form to UNITA

would antagonize the black African states, President Carter

and other administration officials refused to meet with him

and gave him no Support.7

Savimbi's second visit to the U.S., in December 1981,

was far more productive. He met with Alexander Haig, then

Secretary of State, William Clark, then Deputy Secretary

of State, and Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State

for African Affairs. Savimbi cogently argued that UNITA is

a legitimate political force fighting for democracy in

Angola. His efforts were successful. The Reagan

Administration has actively sought the repeal of the Clark

Amendment, which obstructed aid to Angola in 1976.

President Reagan himself said, "...frankly, I would provide

them (UNITA) with weapons. It doesn't take American

manpower; Savimbi...controls more than half of Angola...I

don't see anything wrong with someone who wants to free

themselves from the rule of an outside power, which is the

Cubans and East Germans..."8

Although the Senate voted to repeal the Clark Amendment

in 1981, the House will not follow. The division in Congress

over the Clark Amendment reflects conflict over U.S.

policy in Angola. On the one hand, the President and the

Senate believe the Clark Amendment is too restrictive on

U.S. policy options there. On the other hand, the House

believes that repeal of the amendment would, in the words

of Congressman Howard Wolpe of the House Foreign Affairs

Committee, "encourage South African aggression and

intransigence, both with respect to Namibia [and Angola]

and with respect to the issues of internal change in South

Africa itself."9 Since South Africa backs UNITA, U.S. aid

to UNITA would, Wolpe said, "be viewed as a very threatening

gesture by the Angolans themselves and would be viewed by

the entire continent of Africa as an intention to interfere

in Angolan internal affairs."10 The House believes that U.S.

relations with Angola should be normalized and that Namibia

must be settled before the Clark Amendment is repealed.11

This view has prevailed. The Clark Amendment remains in effect.

Nevertheless, the Reagan Administration has provided

UNITA moral and political support by affirming that UNITA

is a legitimate force in Angola and should play a strong

role in any settlement of the Namibia issue. UNITA has

also been recently encouraged by the refusal of the U.S. to

seek diplomatic relations with the present Angolan government.

This stance probably will continue as long as Soviets and

Cubans remain in Angola. Although Savimbi would welcome

material support from the U.S., he has not asked for it.

He has, however, gotten what he wanted most: public recogni-

tion of UNITA as a viable political force.

UNITA has received support in one form or another from

a number of other sources. Besides South Africa, Morocco

has been UNITA's most active suporter. Morocco still seems

to be providing weapons training for UNITA officers and key

troops in the regular army, despite Savimbi's claim that

UNITA is now conducting its own military training. There

are reports that Pierre Muller, a veteran Swiss arms dealer,

has met with UNITA's representative in Morocco, Jose Furtado.

Tunisia and Zaire are also firm supporters. Zambia is much

less firm in its support, but ignores UNITA activity along

Angola's eastern border. Other supporters of UNITA have

been Senegal, Ivory Coast, Togo, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and

the People's Republic of China. UNITA has acquired Spanish

and Yugoslav weapons in Madrid through Portuguese mercenaries

and Bulgarian and Czech weapons through Lebanese arms

dealers.12

Despite Savimbi's advocacy of self-reliance, UNITA has

received extensive support of all kinds from external

sources. The scope of this support reflects the relatively

high degree of legitimacy UNITA has achieved in the eyes of

foreign nations, including the United States. Nonetheless,

the most important single source of external support for

UNITA is South Africa. Until the Namibia issue is resolved

to South Africa's satisfaction, meaning a free and independent

Namibia as opposed to a Marxist one run by SWAPO, South

Africa will continue to aid UNITA morally, politically,

and materially. And UNITA will continue to accept this

aid in spite of the bad press associated with it.

Chapter 6

 

RIPOSTE - OF SORTS

 

 

No other factor is more important in determining the

outcome of an insurgency than the government response.

Professor Walter Sonderland, a noted expert on counterinsur-

gency, has written: "As soon as the challenge is in the

open, the success of the operations depends not primarily on

the development of insurgent strength, but more importantly

on the degree of vigor, determination, and skill with which

the incumbent regime acts to defend itself, both politically

and militarily."1

Except for total war, no demand is greater on a government

than the coordinated execution of a counterinsurgency program.

Such a program requires an effective counterorganization

that includes psychological warfare operations, extensive

police action, sophisticated security measures, and responsive

intelligence activities to identify insurgent cells and

isolate them from the population. A flexible military must

also exist to conduct operations ranging from small unit

patrolling to mobile conventional warfare in order to kill

or capture isolated guerrillas, destroy insurgent base camps,

defend vital lines of communication, and defeat insurgent

mobile conventional forces. Not only must all these activities

be carried out simultaneously, they must also be done in

such a manner as to retain the support of the government and

the people.2 Accordingly, a successful counterinsurgency

program requires extensive resources, political and military

adroitness, and, in most cases, at least as much patience as

that demonstrated by the insurgents.

As we have seen, UNITA's growing strength in recent years

suggests that the Marxist MPLA has had serious difficulties in

executing an effective counterinsurgency program. One of the

major difficulties has been the uninspired leadership of the

MPLA. As president of the MPLA, Jose Edwardo dos Santos is

head of government, president of the party, and commander

in chief of the armed forces. Yet he, like Agustinho Neto before

him, is a colorless individual. He is shy, taciturn, and

reluctant to make public appearances, He lives in Futunga

Belas, the presidential compound just south of Luanda. Once

this site was a famous resort for the rich in the colonial

era; now tanks are dug in around the main road that runs past

the compound and Cuban guards take quarters next door.3

Although the MPLA bureaucracy is more sophisticated and

complex than UNITA's, dos Santos has none of the personal

leadership qualities that Savimbi of UNITA demonstrates.

Perhaps fear of Savimbi's charisma provides some of the

rationale for the MPLA official stance toward UNITA. The

MPLA regards UNITA as a group of "bandits" that would disappear

without aid from South Africa. Savimbi is viewed as "the

main enemy of the Angolan people and little more than an

extension of the South African military machine to be dealt

with by force rather than [by] political compromise."4

Savimbi is the most wanted "outlaw" in Angola. There are rumors

that the government is not unanimous on this issue, but none

of these has been confirmed.5 This suggests that some elements

within the MPLA might be willing to negotiate with Savimbi

and establish a coalition government.

The competency of the MPLA government is questionable.

Official visitors and diplomatic representatives have indicated

that apart from the president and a few ministers, the other

members of the government are disinterested in running the

country. Few members of the government in key positions take

part in negotiations on crucial issues. As indicated in a

recent edition of Africa Confidential, "The party members

are vastly outnumbered by the non-committed, and the main

nucleus of power surrounding the presidency is outnumbered

by the dissidents within the party secretariat and people's

assembly."6

Factionalism has been a serious problem for the MPLA.

In 1977, two members of the government, Nito Alves and Jose

Van Dunem, distressed over the poor state of the Angolan

economy, staged an abortive coup that resulted in a massive

purge and reorganization of the government. The commissars

and directing committees in eight provinces were removed.

In October 1983, dos Santos narrowly escaped an assasination

attempt. The MPLA has always had a mixture of ideologues and

pragmatists who disagree violently over the direction Angola

should take. The ideologues want a Soviet style economy

while the pragmatists want more private enterprise and exchange

with the West. In response to the internal rivalries that

beset the MPLA, dos Santos has played a more active role in

the selection of candidates for office.7 Nevertheless,

the divisiveness within the MPLA has seriously impaired its

efforts to counter UNITA.

The MPLA government is similar to the oligarchical Salazar-

Caetano regime in Portugal that kept the country isolated

from the outside world. Censorship is widespread. The

few foreign vistors allowed to enter the country are afraid

to talk to anyone but official representatives. All interviews

must be arranged by the Department of Information and Propaganda.

It took Jay Ross, a Washington Post correspondent, 23 days to

obtain just one interview. The secrecy surrounding the MPLA

probably has hampered its ability to gain more international

recognition from the West, especially the United States.8

Although the MPLA has attempted to mobilize the population

by socializing the economy along Soviet lines, it has made

some concessions to realism. Nearly all Portuguese enterprises

that were abandoned during the civil war have been nationalized.

Other enterprises deemed essential, such as banking and finance,

have also been nationalized. State farms and agricultural

cooperatives have been established. Yet the MPLA has recognized

protected, and guaranteed private activities and property,

even of foreigners, provided they supported the nation's

economy. Corporations such as Gulf, Texaco, Boeing and

Mobile have not been nationalized because the MPLA derives

much of its revenue from these companies and because the MPLA

does not have the technicians to run them if they were nation-

alized.9

Indeed lack of skilled technicians and adequate resources

has forced the MPLA to rely heavily on outside assistance.

As mentioned earlier, the departure of more than 350,000

skilled white Portuguese during the civil war has left Angola

bereft of managerial talent. Cubans have helped to fill the

void. While the exact number of Cuban civlians in Angola is

not known, there are reports that at least 4500 to 5000 are

serving in medical, education, construction, technical, and

agricultural fields. Besides Cubans, technical aid is coming

from the Soviets, Yugoslavs, Bulgarians, Romanians, Czechoslovaks,

Poles, East Germans, Brazilians, and some British and Scanda-

navians.10 This foreign assistance is vital to the MPLA, and

as long as it continues to receive such assistance, UNITA

will retain a most powerful esoteric appeal for popular

support.

The chaotic economic situation has continually beset the

MPLA. Low productivity levels are blamed on corruption and

inefficiency at all levels. President dos Santos has publicly

lashed out at officials who take bribes and department heads

who are more concerned with titles and salaries than with

their competency on the job. Dos Santos has accused the

"petit bourgeois" in the civil service and state run businesses

of using their positions to commit economic sabotage.11

Not only does UNITA benefit from the MPLA's inability to

meet the economic needs of the population, but from its

corruption and inefficiency as well.

Foreign assistance to the MPLA in the military sphere has

received the wide publicity. Besides the MPLA's 40,000

regular soldiers, there are another 25,000 Cuban troops

and 2000 Soviet military advisers in Angola. Although most

of the fighting has been waged by MPLA regular troops, there

are reports that the use of Cuban troops is increasing in the

face of recent UNITA military successes.12

Cuban and MPLA troops who have been captured by UNITA report

that morale is low among many of their units. Cuban captives

report acute food and clothing shortages as well as

arbitrary extensions of tours of duty in Angola. The low

morale among the Cubans might also be based on their own poor

military training. One Cuban captive reported that he was

sent to Angola as a kind of peace corps volunteer and wound

up being a mortarman in the 5939th Cuban Regiment. MPLA

captives report that they receive little or no pay and that

desertions are increasing.13 While the validity of reports

from MPLA and Cuban captives in UNITA camps is suspect,

there probably is some truth to them.

The MPLA has had serious difficulties in manning the ranks

of the People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola

(Forces Armados Populares de Libertacao de Angola-FAPLA). In

1978, Angola became the first black state in sub-Saharan Africa

to initiate compulsory military service. Both men and women

from 18 to 35 are eligible for military service regardless of

race, ethnic background, or place of birth. Since implementation

of the draft law, MPLA newspapers have reported a high number

of "preposterous" excuses for avoiding military service. Many

Angolans eligible for military service discover at the last

minute that they are the sole support for families or that

they have debilitating physical defects.14

The MPLA has made serious blunders in its struggle against

UNITA. Like the Soviets in Afghanistan, the MPLA does not seed

to relish guerrilla warfare. The MPLA has relied too heavily

on search and destroy operations against UNITA. Amnesty

International (AI), the London based human rights organization,

has accused the MPLA of torture and execution of UNITA sympath-

izers captured in such operations. The security police of

the MPLA has been singled out by AI as the primary culprit.15

Moreover, the MPLA has sent a number of alleged UNITA sympath-

izers to Cuba for political indoctrination and for work in

the sugar cane fields. UNITA alleges that over 6000 youths

have been sent to Cuba from UNITA areas.16 These activities

have contributed to an increase in the number of refugees

whose number probably exceeds half a million in Angola today.17

The MPLA has recently adopted other measures to counter UNITA.

In June 1983, the MPLA declared a general amnesty for all

UNITA guerrillas while enacting a tough new internal defense

law to combat UNITA guerrilla attacks. There are no reports

on the effect the amnesty has had. The internal defense law

places power and responsibility for security in the hands of

military councils whose members are appointed by dos Santos.

The councils have the authority to restrict movement, organize

transport of supplies, and requisition food and other essential

items.18 Both means suggest a growing feeling of frustration

on the part of the MPLA in its struggle against UNITA.

Finally, the MPLA is hoping to diffuse UNITA through a

settlement on Namibian independence. The MPLA contends that

South African aid to UNITA would stop if Namibia became

independent. South Africa has repeatedly invaded southern

Angola since 1978 to raid bases held by SWAPO. UNITA has,

at least until recently, received extensive aid from South

Africa to assist in raids on SWAPO bases. South Africa,

Angola and SWAPO have just recently agreed to observe a cease

fire that might set the stage for Namibian independence and

cessation of South African forays into Angola. The cease

fire resulted from an agreement by which South Africa will

refrain from its attacks on SWAPO if Angola and SWAPO stay out

of Namibia.19

The outlook for the agreement and cease fire is dim.

South Africa and the U.S. still insist that Cuban troops be

withdrawn from Angola. They are unlikely to go. And SWAPO

is unlikely to cease activities in Namibia. Finally, Jonas

Savimbi has warned that any peace agreement regarding Namibia

that does not include a role for UNITA in the region is

doomed to failure.20 Even if the agreement holds, the MPLA is

extremely naive to believe that UNITA will wither and die

without South African aid. Just the opposite might happen.

The most important feature of the MPLA response to the

UNITA insurgency is extensive reliance on outside assistance,

principally Cuban. This assistance has placed the MPLA in an

awkward and embarrassing position. Without help, the MPLA

cannot function in either the economic or military sphere.

With it, the MPLA is a prime target for UNITA esoteric

appeals for popular support. Even more embarrassing to the

MPLA is the relatively poor quality of assistance received

in the military sphere. The Cubans in Angola do not seem to

be well trained in guerrilla warfare and their morale is

sagging. While external support has kept the MPLA in power,

it has not enabled the MPLA to overcome severe deficiencies

in resources, leadership, cohesion, and unity, without which

factors an effective counterinsurgency program against UNITA

is impossible. There is every indication that additional

support from the Soviet Union, Cuba, or both will be required

to bolster the economy and improve the MPLA military posture

against UNITA. The MPLA's response to UNITA has been arbitrary,

uncoordinated, and unsophisticated, and reflects an inability

to differentiate the threat posed by UNITA.

 

CONCLUSION

 

An insurgency is best evaluated only after it has ceased

to exist through failure or, having succeeded in the accom-

plishment of its objectives, becomes a governing entity.

Until that time, evaluation is difficult because of the

rapidity with which events occur and circumstances change.

After the civil war, UNITA was virtually a moribund organi-

zation. In just seven years, however, it has become

an extremely powerful force that threatens the survival of

the ruling government. Still, UNITA has not accomplished

its primary objective of ridding the country of foreign

domination. Since UNITA still exists, it has neither failed

nor succeeded as an insurgency. UNITA's future depends

on these very factors that have accounted for its remarkable

survival. These will play an important role in its future.

UNITA owes its existence to two primary facts. Jonas

Savimbi, himself, is the lightening without which the fuel

for UNITA could not be fired. His inspirational leadership

and extraordinary dedication and patience have been instru-

mental in UNITA's development of an effective political and

military organization and achievement of a high degree of

solidarity and unity. Although Savimbi has a number of

competent assistants, within the scope of his organization,

none seem capable of filling the void his loss would create.

Without him, UNITA's effort might be seriously derailed.

The second factor is environment. The government has

been unable to overcome the advantageous geographic isolation

of UNITA. So distant from the rest of the country, Cuando-

Cubango Province affords UNITA a natural haven that obviates

the need for sanctuary in a neighboring country. Dangerous

logistical and security burdens are avoided by the insur-

gents. UNITA's guerrillas roam almost at will in a third

of the country. They conduct effective operations in

another third. Although environment never determines the

outcome of an insurgency, it often dictates the rules of

engagement by which an insurgency must function. These

rules clearly favor UNITA.

What outcome can we predict? The irony of UNITA is

that the stronger it becomes, the less likely it is to

achieve its objectives. UNITA wants both Soviets and

Cubans out of Angola, but their presence is the key make

weight to the strength of UNITA. This dilemma portends a

stalemate in which the Soviets and the Cubans must remain in

Angola as long as UNITA continues waging guerrilla warfare

against the government. Meanwhile, Mao's sage advice to

Savimbi that the road to success is a long and tortuous one

remains a stark principle for UNITA as it pursues a course

into an uncharted future.

NOTES

 

INTRODUCTION

1Bard E. O'Neill, William R. Heaton, and Donald J.

Alberts, eds., Insurgency in the Modern World (Boulder,

Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), p 1.

2O'Neill, pp. 4-5.

Chapter 1

1Department of State, Background Notes, Department of

State Publication, No. 7975 ([Washington, D. C.: Government

Printing Office, 1979]), pp. 3-4.

2Department of State, Background Notes, p. 4, Irving

Kaplan, ed., Angola: A Country Study, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.:

The American University, 1979), pp. 3-31; John A. Marcum, The

Angolan Revolution, Vol. 1: The Anatomy of an Explosion

(1950-1962) (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1967),

pp. 1-8.

3Alberts, pp. 236-237.

4Ibid., p. 238; Kaplan, pp. 112-115.

5Kaplan, p. 28.

6Alberts, p. 239.

7General Antonio de Spinola, quoted in Newsweek, May 6,

1974.

8Alberts, pp. 240-241; Kaplan, pp. 131-132.

9Kaplan, pp. 123, 133.

10Ibid., p. 127; Marcum, pp. 245-246.

11Kaplan, p. 124.

12Ibid., pp. 125-126; Marcum, pp. 28-30.

13Kaplan, p. 126; John A. Marcum, The Angolan Revolution,

Vol. 2: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare (1962-1976)

(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M. I. T. Press, 1978), pp.

28-30, 40, and 278.

14John A. Marcum, "The Politics of Survival: UNITA in

Angola," Africa Notes, no. 8 (February 18, 1983), p. 1.

15Ibid., p. 2; Marcum, Exile Politics and Guerrilla

Warfare (1962-1976), pp. 191-197.

16Kaplan, pp. 127-128.

17Ibid., p. 130; Marcum, Exile Politics and Guerrilla

Warfare (1962-1976), pp. 185, 217, 243. and 247-248.

18Kaplan, pp. 133-136.

19John A. Marcum, "Lessons of Angola," Foreign Affairs,

54 (April, 1976), 417.

20"FNLA Rebels Surrender, UNITA Threat Continues,"

Guardian [Manchester, U.K.], June 8, 1983, p. 14.

 

Chapter 2

1Bard E. O'Neill, William R. Heaton, and Donald J.

Alberts, eds., Insurgency in the Modern World (Boulder,

Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), p. 16.

2Irving Kaplan, ed., Angola: A Country Study, 2d ed.

(Washington, D. C.: The American University, 1979), p. 61;

Alberts, p. 243.

3Kaplan, p. 61; Alberts, p. 243; Department of State,

Background Notes, Department of State Publication, No. 7975

([Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1979]),

pp. 1, 3.

4Alberts, p. 243.

5Richard Harwood, "Savimbi Defends Links With South

Africa," Washington Post, July 24, 1981, p. A1.

6Alberts, p. 243.

7Ibid.

8Kaplan, pp. 232-237.

9Ibid., pp. 237-238; Alberts, p. 244.

10Kaplan, pp. 239-240.

11Alberts, p. 244.

12Department of State, Background Notes, pp. 1-3; Kaplan,

pp. 125-126.

13Department of State, Background Notes, p. 1; Kaplan,

pp. 127-130.

14Alberts, p. 246.

 

Chapter 3

1Bard E. O'Neill, William R. Heaton, and Donald J.

Alberts, eds., Insurgency in the Modern World (Boulder,

Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 6-7.

2O'Neill, pp. 6-7.

3Ibid., p. 7.

4Michael Samuels, quoted in National Review, August 22,

1980, p. 1018; Statement by Michael Samuels, Georgetown

University, personal interview, Washington, D. C., January 16,

1984.

5Leon Dash,. "Savimbi, Lifeblood of UNITA, Is A Man of

Many Labels," Washington Post, August 13, 1977, pp. A1 and A11.

6Ibid., p. A1.

7Ibid.

8O'Neill, p.7.

9Jonas Savimbi, quoted in National Review, August 22,

1980, p. 1018.

10Jonas Savimbi, quoted in Donald J. Alberts, ed.,

Insurgency in the Modern World (Boulder, Colorado: Westview

Press, , p. 248.

11Fred Reed, "Savimbi Outlines UNITA's Strategy,"

Washington Times, December 2, 1982, p. 8A.

12Dash, p. A11.

13Reed, p. 8A.

14O'Neill, p. 8.

15Edward Girardet, "Angolans describe human rights abuse

during the civil war," Christian Science Monitor, June 3, 1983;

"Angola: Behind the Mask," Africa Confidential, 23 (August 25,

1982), p. 6.

16David Lamb, quoted in the Washington Post, July 25,

1981, p. A17.

17Richard Harwood, "UNITA's Shoestring Enterprise,"

Washington Post, July 25, 1981, p. A17.

18Jay Ross, "Nightmares Beset a Pivotal Nation,"

Washington Post, September 20, 1981, p. A22.

19"Angola: Behind the Mask," Africa Confidential, 23

(August 25, 1982), p. 5.

20Harwood, p. A17.

21"Angola: The UNITA Structure," Africa Confidential, 24

(May 25, 1983) , p. 4.

22Richard Harwood, "Guerrillas Demonstrate High Morale,"

Washington Post, July 22, 1981, p. A1.

23Ibid.

24Girardet, p. 13.

25Ibid.

26Reed, p. 8A.

27"Angola: Behind the Mask," Africa Confidential, 23

(August 25, 1982), p. 7.

28Fred Bridgland, "Inside the Secret World of UNITA,"

Scotsman [Edinburgh, Scotland], July 23, 1981, p. 11; Edward

Girardet, "One Place Where Pro-West Rebels Take the Offensive,"

U. S. News and World Report, June 13, 1983, pp. 30-31.

 

Chapter 4

1Bard E. O'Neill, William R. Heaton, and Donald J.

Alberts, eds., Insurgency in the Modern World (Boulder,

Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), p. 9.

2Bard E. O'Neill, ed., Insurgency in the Modern World

(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980, p. 10, citing George

B. Jordan, "Objectives and Methods of Communist Guerrilla

Warfare," Modern Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 404 and 409.

3Fred Reed, "Angolan Rebels train with order,

discipline," Washington Times, December 1, 1982, p. 1A.

4Ibid.

5Ibid.; Edward Girardet, "Angolan rebels go on offensive

against Soviet-backed regime," Christian Science Monitor, May

31, 1983, pp. 12-13.

6"Savimbi has large number of SAM-7's, "Johannesburg Star

[Johannesburg, S. A.], October 30, 1982, p. 9.

7"Angola: The UNITE Structure," Africa Confidential, 24

(May 25, 1983), p. 4, Fred Bridgland, "The Long March of

Savimbi, "Scotsman [Edinburgh, Scotland], July 22, 1981, p. 10.

8"Angola: The UNITA Structure," Africa Confidential, p. 4.

9Girardet, p. 13.

10Ibid.; Richard Harwood, "UNITA's Shoestring

Enterprise," Washington Post, July 25, 1981, pp. A1, A16, and

A17.

11Girardet, p. 13.

12Richard Harwood, "Guerrillas Demonstrate High Morale,"

Washington Post, July 22, 1981, p. A15.

13Edward Girardet, "Angola's UNITA: guerrillas...or

shadow government?", Christian Science Monitor, June 1, 1983,

p. 12.

14Glenn Frankel, "Angolan Rebels Gain Strength,"

Washington Post, July 21, 1981, p. A1.

15Fred Bridgland, "What if the Angolan Rebels Win?",

Washington Post, May 29, 1983, p. C2.

16Richard Harwood, "Angolan Rebels' Precious Jewel,"

Washington Post, July 21, 1981, p. A1.

17Bridgland, "What if the Angolan Rebles Win?", p. C2.

18Ibid.

19Ibid.

20Ibid.

21Frankel,. p. A10.

22Ibid.

23Girardet, "Angola's UNITA: guerrillas...or shadow

government?", p. 12.

24Bridgland, "The Long March of Savimbi," p. 10.

25O'Neill, p. 11.

26Bridgland, "What if the Angolan Rebels Win?", p. C2.

27Ibid.

28O'Neill, p.3.

 

Chapter 5

1Bard E. O'Neill, William R. Heaton, and Donald J.

Alberts, eds., Insurgency in the Modern World (Boulder,

Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 15-16.

2Glenn Frankel, "S. Africa, U.S., Angola to join in Peace

Effort, "Washington Post, February 16, 1984, pp. A1 and A40;

Glenn Frankel, "Angola Joining South Africa to Observe Truce,"

Washington Post, February 17, 1984, pp. A1 and A16.

3Richard Harwood, "Savimbi Defends Links with South

Africans," Washington Post, July 24, 1981, pp. A1 and A15;

Edward Girardet, "One Place Where Pro-West Rebels Take the

Offensive," U.S. News and World Report, June 13, 1983, pp.

30-31; "UNITA's Timber Trade," Africa Research Bulletin,

January 15-February 14, 1983, pp. 6719-6720; Richard Harwood,

"What if the Angolan Rebels Win?", Washington Post, May 29,

1983, p. C2.

4Harwood, "Savimbi Defends Links with South Africans," p.

A15, Edward Girardet, "Angola - yet to come to grips with

independence," Christian Science Monitor, June 16, 1983, p. 12.

5Richard Harwood, "UNITA's Shoestring Enterprise,"

Washington Post, July 25, 1981, p. A16.

6Thomas W. Lippman, "Savimbi Pushing U.S. to Stiffen

Stand on Africa," Washington Post, November 7, 1979, p. A4.

7Steve Mufson, "Angolan Rebel Leader Courts U.S. Aid,U

Wall Street Journal, December 17, 1981, p. 29.

8President Ronald Reagan, quoted in The Library of

Congress, Angola and the Clark Amendment, Congressional

Research Service, Issue Brief Number 1B81063 ([Washington,

D.C.; Congressional Research Service, October 20, 1982]),

p. 10.

9Congressman Howard Wolpe, quoted in "Angola Interview,"

Africa Report (November-December 1981), pp. 6-7.

10Ibid., p. 7.

11Henry Allen, "Angola's Struggle from Within,"

Washington Post, December 12, 1981, p. C11; Bernard D.

Nossiter, "Angola Rebel Leader Says His Forces Are Beating

Cubans," New York Times, November 8, 1979, p. k; Statement by

Michael Ranneburger, Department of State, personal interview,

Washington, D. C., February 10, 1984.

12"Angola: Can UNITA Survive?", Africa Confidential, 20

(February 14, 1979), p. 2.; "Angola: The throttling process,"

African Confidential, 23 (December 1, 1982), pp. 6-8; Allen,

p. C11; "Angola: The UNITA Structure," Africa Confidential, 24

(May 25, 1983), p. 3; "Savimbi can carry on without SA's

backing," Johannesburg Star [Johannesburg, S.A.], April 16,

1983, p. 2; Statement by John Marcum, University of California

(Santa Cruz), personal interview, Santa Cruz, California (via

telephone), February 23, 1984.

 

Chapter 6

1Bard E. O'Neill, ed., Insurgency in the Modern World

(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), p. 19, citing Walter

C. Sonderland, "An Analysis of the Guerrilla Insurgency and

Coup D'Etat as Techniques of Indirect Aggression," International

Studies Quarterly, December 1970, p. 345.

2O'Neill, pp. 19-21.

3"Angola: Wind of Change," Africa Confidential, 24

(September 21, 1983), p. 7.

4David B. Ottaway, "Angola Unwilling to Make Peace with

Guerrillas," Washington Post, December 29, 1978, p. A2.

5Edward Girardet, "Angola - yet to come to grips with

independence," Christian Science Monitor, June 16, 1983, p. 12.

6"Angola: The throttling process," Africa Confidential,

23 (December 1, 1982), pp. 6-8.

7Ibid., p. 6; Irving Kaplan, ed., Angola: A Country

Study, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: The American University,

1979), pp. 137-140).

8Jay Ross, "Inaccessibility to West Fosters

Misunderstandings of Key Nation," Washington Post, September

20, 1981, p. A22.

9Kaplan, pp. 203, 223, 226, 230, and 249.

10David Wood, "Angola Hints Terms for Cuban Exodus,"

Washington Star, December 25, 1978, p. 2; Jay Ross, "Nightmares

Beset a Pivotal Nation, "Washington Post, September 20, 1981,

pp. A1, A22; Glenn Frankel, "Angolan Rebels Gain Strength,"

Washington Post, October 4, 1983, pp. A1 and A10.

11Marcelino Komba, "Pretoria Strikes Again," Africa, No.

107 (July, 1980), pp. 27-28.

12Frankel, pp. A1, A10, and A11.

13Richard Harwood, "UNITA Guerrillas Show Off Soviet and

Cuban Captives," Washington Post, July 23, 1981, pp. A1 and A20.

14Kaplan, pp. 172-173.

15Edward Girardet, "Angolans describe human rights abuse

during civil war," Christian Science Monitor, June 3, 1983,

p. 13.

16Francis X. Maier, "The Jonas Savimbi Interview,"

American Spectator; 13 (January, 1980), p. 10.

17Ross, "Nightmares Beset a Pivotal Nation," p. A1.

18"Angola: Amnesty for Rebels," Africa Research Bulletin,

July 1-31, 1983, p. 6903.

19Glenn Frankel, "S. Africa, U.S., Angola to Join in

Peace Effort," Washington Post, February 16, 1984, pp. A1 and

A40; Glenn Frankel, "Angola Joining South Africa to Observe

Truce," Washington Post, February 17, 1984, pp. A1 and A16.

20Frankel, "Angola Joining South Africa to Observe

Truce," p. A16.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

Books

Chilcote, Ronald H., ed. Protest and Resistance in Angola and

Brazil. Berkeley, California: University of California

Press, 1972.

An anthology of scholarly essays on resistance

movements in Angola and Brazil that includes a fine

synthesis provided by the editor. Chapter 11 regarding

Portuguese racial policies, written by Roger Bastide, is

one of the best analyses of the "science" of lusotropi-

cology, the controversial racial concept developed

by Gilberto Freyre, the renown Portuguese sociologist.

Kaplan, Irving, ed. Angola: A Country Study. 2d ed. Washington,

D.C.: The American University, 1979.

The best, most up-to-date single volume work on the

Angolan scene written by Foreign Area Studies, the American

University, under the Area Handbook Program.

Klinghoffer, Arthur J., The Angolan War: A Study in Soviet

Policy in the Third World. Boulder, Colorado: Westview

Press, 1980.

Professors of political science at Rutgers University,

Klinghoffer, in this work, discusses both the Soviet and

Cuban roles in Angola and the U.S. reaction to those roles.

________. The Soviet Union and Angola. Carlisle Barracks,

Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 1980.

A candid analysis of Soviet involvement in Angola.

Klinghoffer believes that Soviet policy in Angola has been

very successful thus far, considering the comparatively

small investment the Soviets have made there.

Marcum, John A., The Angolan Revolution. Vol. 1, The Anatomy

of an Explosion (1950-1962). Cambridge, Massachusetts:

M.I.T. Press, 1967.

The most scholarly work available on the Angolan

Revolution by one of America's leading authorities on

Angolan politics. This volume focuses on the events that

culminated in the initial colonial uprisings in 1961.

________. The Angolan Revolution. Vol. 2, Exile Politics and

Guerrilla Warfare (1962-1976). Cambridge, Massachusetts:

M.I.T. Press, 1967.

A superb analysis of the Angolan civil war of 1975-76

and its historical background. Of particular value is

Marcum's focus on Portuguese colonial policies.

Okuma, Thomas, Angola in Ferment. Boston: Beacon Press, 1962.

A survey of Portuguese colonial policies through 1961,

the first year of anti-colonial uprising in Angola. Okuma

spent nearly eight years in Angola as a teacher and a

missionary. He was a Fellow in the African Studies program

at Boston University.

O'Neill, Bard E., William R. Heaton, and Donald J. Alberts,

eds. Insurgency in the Modern World. Boulder, Colorado:

Westview Press, 1980.

An outstanding work that provides an extremely useful

analytical framework that can be used to assess the

effectiveness of any insurgency. Selected case studies

incorporating this framework are included.

 

Periodicals

Adelman, Kenneth L. "Report From Angola." Foreign Affairs 53

(April 1975): 558-574.

Adelman cites Portugal's failure to sense and follow

the "flow of history in the fifties and sixties" as a

primary reason for Angola's troubles in the 1970's. A

former assistant to the Secretary of Defense and now a

senior political analyst at the Stanford Research

Institutie, Adelman believes there can be no permanent

peace in southern Africa without the participation of UNITA.

"Amnesty for Rebels." Africa Research Bulletin (July 1983):

6903-6904.

A short article that includes data on the government's

declaration of amnesty for UNITA guerrillas and increased

security measures against UNITA, UNITA's recent guerrilla

activity, UNITA's receipt of external support, and the

scope of UNITA's organization.

Baynham, S. J. "International Politics and the Angolan Civil

War" Army Quarterly and Defense Journal 107 (January

1977): 25-32.

Baynham argues that Angola is potentially too rich

and too strategically important to determine its own

future, thus explaining why the Angolan civil war was an

international rather than a national conflict.

Bender, Gerald J. "Angola: Left, Right and Wrong." Foreign

Policy, no. 43 (1981), pp. 53-69.

Associate professor of history at the School of

International Relations, University of Southern California,

Dr. Bender argues that the U.S. should recognize the

Marxist MPLA regime, citing the heavy U.S. financial

investment in Angola and the futility of linking diplomatic

relations to Cuban withdrawal as primary reasons.

________. "Angola, The Cubans, and American Anxieties."

Foreign Policy, no. 43 (1981), pp. 3-30.

Bender was on the staff of then Senator John V. Tunney

(D-California) who sponsored legislation ending U.S.

participation in the Angolan civil war. Bender downplays

the Cuban role in Angola and argues that U.S. diplomatic

recognition of Angola is a necessary first step in

development of a responsible African policy.

Girardet, Edward. "One Place Where Pro-West Rebels Take the

Offensive." U.S. News and World Report, June 13, 1983,

pp. 30-31.

A beautifully crafted article on UNITA's recent

military gains and surge in popular support.

Henriksen, Thomas H. "People's War in Angola, Mozambique, and

Guinea-Bissau." Journal of Modern African Studies

14 (September 1976): 377-399.

An excellent work on emerging nationalism in Portugal's

African colonies and on Portugal's inability to develop a

successful counterinsurgency program.

Hughes, Anthony J. "Congressman Howard Wolpe." Africa Report

26 (November-December 1981): 4-8.

A first-rate report of an interview with Congressman

Howard Wolpe of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Wolpe

represents the majority view of Congress that the Clark

Amendment should remain in effect until Namibia is settled.

Komba, Marcelino. "Pretoria Strikes Again." African Affairs,

no. 107 (1980), pp. 27-28.

This article reports of South Africa's desire to have

UNITA installed in power in Angola and of widespread

corruption in the Angolan government.

Maier, Francis x. "The Jonas Savimbi Interview." American

Spectator 13 (January 1980): 7-11.

An excellent report of an interview with Jonas

Savimbi. He emphasizes the "treachery" of the Angolan

government and chastens the Carter administration for not

responding to the Soviet and Cuban occupation of Angola.

________. "Voice from the Wilderness." National Review,

August 22, 1980, pp. 1017-1018.

A fine description of Jonas Savimbi with particular

emphasis on his first private visit to the U.S. in 1979.

Maier, editor of the National Catholic Register, is very

sympathetic towards Savimbi and believes he would be a

humane leader of the Angolan people.

Marcum, John A. "Lessons of Angola." Foreign Affairs 54 (April

1976): 407-425.

One of many "post mortem" monographs on the ill-fated

U.S. involvement in the Angolan civil war of 1975-76.

Marcum decries U.S. support of South Africa in that conflict

and argues for "dissociation" from that country in order to

gain more black African support.

_______. "The Politics of Survival." Africa Notes, no. 8

(1983), 5 pages.

An outstanding mini-biography of UNITA's leader, Jonas

Savimbi, by the foremost U.S. expert on Angolan politics.

Meynell, Charles, ed. "Angola: Can UNITA Survive?" Africa

Confidential 20 (February 1979): 1-3.

An excellent article on UNITA's principal logistical

backers.

________. Angola: Behind the Mask. Africa Confidential

23 (August 1982): 5-7.

This article covers UNITA's external support and

emphasizes UNITA's vulnerability if a settlement over

Namibia is reached.

_________. "Angola: The Throttling Process." Africa

Confidential 23 (December 1982): 6-9.

An incisive analysis of internal political developments

within the Angolan government. The article focuses on the

government's dependency on the Cubans in the face of

growing UNITA strength.

________. "Angola: The UNITA Structure." Africa Confidential

24 (May 1983): 2.

A complete listing of the prominent figures in UNITA's

political and military organization. Emphasis is also

given to UNITA's territorial and political goals as well as

to UNITA's receipt of external support.

________. "Angola: Wind of Change." Africa Confidential 24

(September 1983): 7.

This article portrays dos Santos, President of the

Angolan government, as a shy, taciturn figure who resembles

"Sidney Poitier in his early films" and focuses on the

government's internal divisions. Key governmental figures and

offices held are included.

Papp, Daniel S. "Angola, National Liberation, and the Soviet

Union." Parameters, Journal of the U.S. Army War College

8 (March 1978): 26-39.

A fine overview of Soviet involvement in Angola. Papp

argues that Soviet actions fit within the confines of Soviet

ideology and that the Soviet Union's wont of aiding selected

national liberation movements will continue.

Schmidt, Rudolf "Angola: An International Conflict." Aussen

Politik 27 (April 1976): 475-488.

Schmidt argues that South Africa is an "enemy" of

African independence by its intervention in the Angolan

civil war and suggests possibilities the U.S. could have

explored to avoid the debacle it incurred by supporting

South Africa in that conflict.

"UNITA's Timber Trade." Africa Research Bulletin (January 15-

February 14, 1983): 6719-6720.

An interesting account of UNITA's teak log trade with

South Africa in exchange for diamonds and ivory. The

diamonds UNITA sends to South Africa comes from mines that

UNITA has taken over in Angola.

Newspapers

Allen, Henry. "Angola's Struggle From Within." Washington

Post, December 12, 1981, pp. C1, C11.

An excellent account of Savimbi's first private visit

to the U.S. in 1979 and his difficulties over UNITA's South

Africa connection.

Bridgland, Fred. "The Long March of Savimbi." Scotsman

[Edinburgh, Scotland], July 22, 1981.

An excellent article on UNITA's military organization

by one who is currently writing a biography of Savimbi,

UNITA's leader.

________. "Inside the Secret World of UNITA." Scotsman

[Edinburgh, Scotland], July 23, 1981.

Fred Bridgland accompanied Richard Harwood of the

Washington Post on a three month visit to UNITA-controlled

areas. Bridgland is currently writing a biography of

UNITA's leader, Jonas Savimbi. This article provides

excellent coverage of UNITA's political and military

organization.

________. "What if the Angolan Rebels Win?" Washington Post,

May 29, 1983, p. C2.

Bridgland, currently writing a biography of Jonas

Savimbi, focuses on UNITA's recent military victories.

Dash, Leon. "Savimbi, Lifeblood of UNITA, Is a Man of Many

Labels." Washington Post, August 13, 1977, p. All.

A superb account of Savimbi's personality and politics.

"FNLA Rebels Surrender, UNITA Threat Continues." Guardian

[Manchester, U.K.], June 8, 1983, p. 14.

A good account of the demise of FNLA, one of the three

insurgencies that vied for power in the Angolan civil war

of 1975-76.

Foisie, Jack. uIn Troubled Angola, War and Strife Just Won't

Go Away." Washington Post, June 4, 1980., p. A21.

Foisie provides some useful information on Cuban

involvement in Angola.

Frankel, Glenn. "Angolan Rebels Gain Strength." Washington

Post, October 4, 1983, pp. A1, A10, A11l.

This article provides a good account of UNITA's

military strength.

________. "Hopes for Namibia Solution Dying on Angola's Battle-

fields." Washington Post, October 5, 1983, pp. A1, A33.

This article sets forth the conditions under which Cuban

troops would leave Angola.

________. "S. Africa, U.S., Angola to join in Peace Effort."

Washington Post, February 16, 1984, pp. A1, A40.

This article provides excellent coverage of recent

attempts to reach a settlement on Namibia.

________. "Angola Joining South Africa to Observe Truce."

Washington Post, February 17, 1984.

A fine article on the truce that is currently being

observed between Angola and South Africa as a preliminary

step for a Namibia settlement.

Girardet, Edward. "Angolan rebels go on offensive against

Soviet-backed regime." Christian Science Monitor,

May 31, 1983, pp. 1, 12-13.

One of the best newspaper accounts of recent UNITA

military gains.

________. "Angola's UNITA: guerrilla...or shadow government?"

Christian Science Monitor, June 1, 1983, p. 13.

An outstanding description of UNITA's Jonas Savimbi and

his efforts to gain more popular support.

________. "Angola's Savimbi: portrait of a rebel." Christian

Science Monitor, June 2, 1983, p. 13.

A superb description of Savimbi's policies and outlook

for Angola.

________. "Angolans describe human rights abuse during civil

war." Christian Science Monitor, June 3, 1983, p. 13.

An excellent account of Amnesty International's report

of recent human rights abuse in Angola.

________. "Angola--yet to come to grips with independence."

Christian Science Monitor, June 16, 1983, p. 12.

Art outstanding account of the deplorable state of

Angola's economy.

Harwood, Richard. "Warrior Camp Deep in the Bush." Washington

Post, July 19, 1981, pp. A1, A21.

The first article in a superb series entitled "Angola -

A Distant War." Harwood, who spent three months in Angola

as UNITA's guest devotes this first article to the

historical background of UNITA.

________. "Rebel Goal: An End to Foreign Control." Washington

Post, July 20, 1981, pp. A1, A8.

A fine description of UNITA's goals in this second

article of Harwood's "Angola - A Distant War."

________. "Angolan Rebels' Precious Jewel." Washington Post,

July 21, 1981, pp. A1, A8.

This, the third of seven articles on "Angola - A Distant

War," focuses on UNITA's capture of the town of Mavinga, a

strategic crossroads center in Cuando-Cubango Province in

southeastern Angola.

________."Guerrillas Demonstrate High Morale." Washington

Post, July 22, 1981, pp. A1, A15.

This article, the fourth of seven articles on "Angola -

A Distant War," is a superb description of Savimbi's

charismatic leadership.

________. "UNITA Guerrillas Show Off Soviet and Cuban

Captives." Washington Post, July 23, 1981, pp. A1, A20.

This, the fifth article in Harwood's series entitled

"Angola - A Distant War," describes UNITA's rationale for

taking hostages.

________. "Savimbi Defends Links With South Africans.

Washington Post, July 24, 1981, pp. A1, A15.

This article, the sixth of Harwoods's series entitled

"Angola - A Distant War," contains Savimbi's explanation of

his reliance on South African aid.

________. "UNITA's Shoestring Enterprise." Washington Post,

July 25, 1981, pp. A1, A16, A17.

This article is the last of Harwood's series entitled

"Angola - A Distant War." The article focuses on UNITA's

policy of self-reliance.

Lippman, Thomas W. "Savimbi Pushing U.S. to Stiffen Stand on

Africa." Washington Post, November 7, 1979, p. A31.

This article covers Savimbi's first private visit to

the U. S. in order to obtain support from the Carter

Administration.

Mufson, Steven. "Angola Rebel Leader Courts U. S. Aid."

Wall Street Journal, December 17, 1981, p. 29.

A fine account of Savimbi's second private visit to the

U. S. in December 1981.

Nossiter, Bernard D. "Angola Rebel Leader Says His Forces Are

Beating Cubans" New York Times, November 8, 1979, p. k.

This article, which covers Savimbi's first private visit

to the U.S. in 1979, includes some useful information on

Savimbi's personal lifestyle.

Ottaway, David B. "Angola Struggles to Revive Its Limp Economy.

Washington Post, December 25, 1978,, p. A26.

An excellent account of Angola s economic difficulties

with particular emphasis on the government's lack of skilled

managerial talent.

_______. "Angola Unwilling to Make Peace With Guerrillas."

Washington Post, December 29, 1978, p. A2.

A good description of the government's attitude toward

UNITA in 1979.

Porte, Jean-Luc. "UNITA Rebels Expanding Raids in Angola."

Washington Post, May 10, 1983, p. A4.

Porte, who was recently expelled from Angola, gives an

excellent account of UNITA territorial gains.

"Rebel Leader Wages War On Two Fronts, at Least." New York

Times, December 5, 1982, sec. 2, p. 4.

A good account of Savimbi's attitude about reconcilia-

tion with the Angolan government. Savimbi states that some

form of reconciliation with the government will be made

when Cuban troops leave Angola.

Reed, Fred. "UNITA rebels build nation-within-nation in war torn

Angola." Washington Times, November 29, 1982, pp. 1A, 6A.

The first article in a series entitled "African Bush

War," Reed provide excellent coverage of UNITA's internal

political organization.

_______. "Shortages Plague Angolari Fighters." Washington

Times, November 20, 1982, pp. 1A, 8A.

This is the second article of a series entitled "African

Bush War." Reed focuses on UNITA's dire need for all kinds

of material support.

________. "Angolan Rebels Train with Order, Discipline."

Washington Times, December 1, 1982, pp. 1A, 6A.

This is the third of a series of articles entitled

"African Bush War." The article provides an excellent

account of UNITA military training.

_______. "Savimbi outlines UNITA's strategy." Washington

Times, December 2, 1982, pp. 1A, 8A.

this is the fourth article in a series entitled "African

Bush War" The article reports of an interview Reed had

with Savimbi, with emphasis on UNITA political strategy.

_______. "UNITA: Tough and Competent." Washington Times,

December 3, 1982, p.3A.

This article, which is the last of a series entitled

"African Bush War," provides a superb account of UNITA's

military training and discipline.

Ross, Jay. "Inaccessibility to West Fosters Misunderstandings

of Key Nation." Washington Post, September 20, 1981,

p. A22.

Ross provides a superb account of the difficulties he

encountered in Angola in arranging for interviews with

governmental representatives.

________. "Nightmares Beset a Pivotal Nation." Washington Post

September 20, 1981, pp. A1, A22.

This is the first article in a series entitled "Angola:

Africa's Battleground." The article focuses on Angola's

embattled economy.

________. "Angola Sees Rebel Forces As Puppets of Pretoria."

Washington Post, September 21, 1981, pp. A1, A18.

A good account of the Angolan government's view of

UNITA. Ross echoes the government's position that the key

to defeating UNITA is to end its ties to South Africa.

"Savimbi and the sinews of war." Johannesburg Star

[Johannesburg, S.A.], April 2, 1983, p. 7.

A short article on UNITA's logistical support from

Zaire, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia, which have long been

staunch supporters of UNITA.

"Savimbi can carry on without SA's backing." Johannesburg Star

[Johannesburg, S.A.], April 16, 1983, p. 2.

A good article on Savimbi's connection with South

Africa. Emphasis is given to Savimbi's determination to

survive, even without help from South Africa.

"Savimbi has large number of SAM-7's." Johannesburg Star

[Johannesburg, S.A.], October, 20, 1982.

A candid account of UNITA's growing military arsenal.

"UNITA grateful for Reagan's aid." Johannesburg Star

[Johannesburg, S.A.], November 20, 1982, p. 5.

A candid statement by Savimbi thanking President

Reagan for his political and moral support.

Wood, David. "Angola Hints Terms for Cuban Troop Exodus."

Washington Star, December 25, 1978, p. 2.

Wood reports of the government's willingness to remove

Cuban troops if South Africa stops supporting UNITA and

raiding SWAPO bases in Angola.

Government Documents

Department of State, Annual Human Rights Report for Angola (1982)

A complete survey of the status of human rights in

Angola. Information is provided on killings, disappearance,

torture, cruel and inhuman punishment, arbitrary arrest and

imprisonment, and other aspects germane to human rights.

Department of State, Background Notes. Department of State

Publication No. 7975 (September 1979).

A fine mini-survey of the Angolan scene with data on

Angola's geography, people, government, economy, history,

political conditions, U.S. - Angola relations, and foreign

relations.

Department of State, Southern Africa: America's Responsibility

for Peace and Change. Department of State Publication

[Bureau of Public Affairs] Current Policy No. 497 (June 23,

1983).

An address by Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Under Secretary

for Political Affairs, before the National Conference of

Editorial Writers, San Francisco, California, June 23,

1983. This address includes a summary statement of U.S.

foreign policy toward Angola, Namibia, and South Africa.

The Library of Congress, Angola and the Clark Amendment.

Congressional Research Service Issue Brief No. 1B810C3

(October 20, 1982).

An outstanding chronological survey of U.S. involvement

in Angola presented in Kiplinger style. This document also

contains a full description of the Reagan Administration

policy in Angola.

 

Interviews

Marcum, John. Personal interview. Santa Cruz, California

(via telephone), February 23, 1984.

A leading authority on Angolan politics, Dr. Marcum

provided some useful information on UNITA's relations with

South Africa.

Rannebarger, Michael. Personal interview. Washington, D. C.,

February 10, 1984.

The Angola desk officer at the State Department, Mr.

Rannenbarger was extremely helpful in clarifying the U.S.

position on UNITA.

Samuels, Michael. Personal interview. Washington, D. C.,

January 16, 1984.

An Angolan affairs expert with the Center for Strategic

and International Affairs at Georgetown University, Mr.

Samuels provided some useful insight on Savimbi's character

and personality.



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